De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Introduction

Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.

Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.

Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.

Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.

Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.

Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.

Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.

Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.

Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.

Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.

Whether the help of grace, insofar as it is efficacious help, depends on the free influx of created free choice together with it, or whether it is efficacious in itself, as it comes from God prior to the free cooperation of that same free choice.

I. We touched on this difficulty incidentally in Disputations LXXII and LXXIII, while discussing the nature of the division of gratuitous help into sufficient help and efficacious help. Now, however, it must be discussed at greater length.

Some recent theologians teach that the help of grace is not efficacious of itself, that is, by the sole force and intrinsic power of the help itself, but in dependence on the free cooperation of created free choice with it. From this they infer that our free choice, by its innate freedom, can cause the same help, while remaining unchanged in itself, to become efficacious or inefficacious. They prove their opinion by the arguments set out in the aforementioned Disputation LXXIII.

They also prove the same point as follows. Human beings, placed in the arena of this life, have been put in the hand of their own counsel, so that they may reach out their hand toward whatever they wish, as is clear from Ecclesiasticus 15: God created man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel, etc. But in truth a person would not have been placed in the hand of his own counsel unless, by his innate freedom, he could cause help that is efficacious for premoving him to become inefficacious by not consenting to it, and cause help that is inefficacious to become efficacious by consenting to it and cooperating vigorously with it. Therefore, by his freedom he can bring this about; consequently, no help is given that is efficacious by its own nature, prior to or independently of the free cooperation of our free choice. The inference is proved: for if help were efficacious by its own nature, our free choice could not make it inefficacious. Indeed, not even God could do so, since it is not in his power to change the nature or essence of a thing, just as no power can make something be a human being and not be a rational animal, since a rational animal is the very essence of a human being.

II. Second. Efficacious help is nothing other than help that actually produces a pious act of willing or a pious operation, as is clear from the very meaning of the name. But no help produces an act of willing or pious operation by its own nature prior to the free influx and cooperation of our free choice with it; otherwise, free choice would be purely passive, receiving a pious operation produced by God alone. Yet this openly conflicts with the definition of the Council of Trent: therefore, no help is efficacious by its own nature, or independently of the free cooperation of free choice. Consequently, it will be efficacious only from the event or effect, which likewise depends on the cooperation of free choice.

Third, they argue as follows. No help of grace is efficacious naturally; otherwise, it would make a person cooperate naturally and not freely. Therefore, neither is it efficacious by its own nature. For what is such by its own nature is deemed to be so naturally. Therefore, it will be efficacious accidentally and from an extrinsic source, namely, from the free cooperation of free choice.

Fourth. The help of grace is efficacious only insofar as it is subject to the foreknowledge and will of God, who wills by such help, bestowed on such a person in such circumstances, to convert that person to himself. Therefore, it will be efficacious only by an extrinsic denomination. The inference is proved: for God’s foreknowledge and will are something extrinsic to the help itself. Therefore, it is not efficacious through some real and intrinsic power existing in efficacious help, which is absent from sufficient help.

Fifth. If the help of grace is established as efficacious by its own nature, or by a real and intrinsic power of the help itself, all freedom of choice is entirely taken away. Therefore, it must not be so established. The antecedent is proved: for if it is efficacious by its own nature and intrinsically, free choice will not be able to refrain from acting with it. Therefore, through such help the faculty of free choice to act or not to act is destroyed; consequently, its freedom perishes, since freedom consists in the faculty for either alternative.

III. They confirm their opinion by all the arguments set out in Disputation XXIII, with which they try to prove that, through efficacious help, God does not predetermine the created will to consent in the manner of a physical cause, but leaves it entirely indifferent and undetermined, so that it acts if it wishes and does not act if it does not wish. For this principle entails that no help of grace is efficacious of itself and intrinsically, but only from its effect. For help that is efficacious of itself and intrinsically has the power physically to predetermine free choice to consent. The arguments set out in Disputations XVIII and LXXXV tend in this direction as well. With them they try to prove that God’s general concurrence, both in the natural and in the supernatural order, is not an immediate influx into the secondary cause but into its effect; and, consequently, that God and free choice are two partial causes of a pious operation, just as two people pulling a ship are partial causes of the ship’s motion. For this entails, by an evident inference, that the help of grace is not intrinsically efficacious, or efficacious by its own nature.

IIII. This opinion, however, does not seem admissible. Hence all Thomists and other Doctors who hold that the efficacy of the help of pre-operating grace is not only moral but also physical, and that it predetermines our free choice to consent freely in the manner of a physical cause, defend the contrary view. They do not all agree, however, in how to express it. Some say that it is efficacious of itself; others assert that it is efficacious by its own nature; others object to this way of speaking because it seems somewhat harsh, and want it to be said that it is efficacious prior to and independently of the free cooperation of free choice. Still others approve none of the foregoing ways of speaking. They think instead that the help of grace should be called efficacious not in itself, of itself, or by its own nature, but as an instrument of the absolute and efficacious decree of the will of God—excluding middle knowledge—who wills free choice to cooperate with God as he moves it, and to consent.

How the help of grace is efficacious of itself or by its own nature.— To set forth my opinion on the matter itself and on the ways of speaking just mentioned, one must observe that when it is said that the help of grace is efficacious of itself, as it comes from God, the phrase of itself can be understood in two ways. First, it can be taken as abstracting from God’s absolute and efficacious decree that a person be converted or act piously here and now. In this sense no Catholic has said that the help of grace is efficacious in itself or of itself. For it is self-evident by the light of nature that nothing comes to be in the world unless God wills or permits it, since through his intellect and will he is the cause of everything that has being in any way, as was shown in Disputation XXVI. In a second way, the help of grace can be said to be efficacious of itself such that the phrase of itself, or in itself, signifies independence from the free cooperation of our free choice. Thus, to say that the help of grace is efficacious in itself or of itself is the same as saying that it is efficacious prior to and independently of the free cooperation of our free choice. The proponents of the foregoing proposition understand it in this sense, and in this sense it is entirely true, as will be clear below. Likewise, when it is asserted that the help of grace is efficacious by its own nature, the phrase by its own nature can be understood in two ways. First, it can signify the same as naturally, as if one were saying that, through efficacious help, God makes a person act naturally. In this sense the proposition is false and was not intended by Catholic authors, who explicitly teach against the Lutherans and Calvinists that a person cooperates with God as he rouses and moves him, not naturally but freely. Some nevertheless want to defend the foregoing proposition when rightly and piously understood, insofar as it signifies that it belongs naturally, or by its own nature, to efficacious help to be the means by which God causes a person to act freely and infallibly. For just as it naturally belongs to efficacious motion, by which God applies natural secondary causes to act, to be the means by which God himself causes natural secondary causes to act naturally and without the use of freedom, so they do not consider it unfitting to grant that it belongs to efficacious help of divine grace by its own nature, or naturally, to be the means by which God causes a person freely to cooperate and consent to the divine call. For efficacious help of grace intrinsically and essentially makes free causes act freely, just as God’s general concurrence makes natural causes act naturally. The reason for this is the one we gave above: God’s concurrence causes secondary causes to act, each according to its own nature, as Saint Thomas teaches: I p. q. 19. art. 8. This way of speaking could indeed be tolerated in this sense. But because it is very ambiguous, and it is unclear whether the phrase by its own nature, or naturally, in that proposition modifies the verb belongs—expressed or understood in the previously cited way of speaking—so that the sense is that it naturally belongs to efficacious help to make a person act, and act freely; or instead modifies the verb act, as if one were saying that God, through efficacious help, makes a person act naturally; lest anyone through ignorance or inattention understand or take that proposition in this second, heretical sense, one should not use it, especially since there are other words that can explain and defend the efficacy of the help of pre-operating grace with the greatest clarity and precision, and without any danger of offense, as will be clear from what is said below. Second, the phrase by its own nature can be taken to signify the same as through a real and intrinsic power that it has from God alone, prior to the free cooperation of free choice, even when that cooperation is foreknown by the knowledge they call middle knowledge. In this sense, Catholics who use the proposition understand it, and this sense is Catholic. But, as was said, this way of speaking is not free from equivocation. Therefore, it will be better to explain the efficacy of the help of divine grace by other expressions to be set out below.

V. What the term “efficacious grace” signifies.— Second, one must observe that in the present disputation the term efficacy is not taken for actual efficient causation by which the help of grace, together with the will, produces a pious operation, but for the real and intrinsic power that the help itself has from God to move free choice and cause it freely to cooperate and consent. Saint Augustine spoke of the efficacy of grace in this sense when he said: It is certain that we act when we act; but he makes us act, by furnishing the will with most efficacious powers, he who said: I will cause you to walk in my commandments, and to keep my judgments and do them. By “most efficacious powers” he wished to be understood to mean the real and intrinsic power that efficacious help has from God to cause free choice to cooperate with God and consent. He means the same thing by help that is more powerful and stronger: Saint Cyril also used this expression to explain the efficacy of grace, as is clear from his words cited in Disputation LXXI, no. 10. Since some recent theologians also take efficacy to mean actual efficient causation, it will be useful, for completeness of doctrine, to discuss efficacy in both senses.

Third. One must note that efficacious help, being God’s immediate influx into free choice as a cause, and together with free choice into its operation, as is clear from what was said in Disputations XVIII, XXII, and XXIII, produces a twofold effect, one of which is subordinated to and follows the other. First, it premoves and causes free choice to cooperate and consent, as was shown in Disputation LXXXVI. This belongs to the help insofar as it is God’s immediate influx into free choice as a cause. Second, it produces a pious operation together with free choice itself as moved by God, simultaneously in time. This effect is attributed to the same efficacious help insofar as it is an influx with free choice into the operation, which depends on both.

Fourth. One must note that, as the authors of the opposing opinion acknowledge, dependence, properly speaking, in efficient causes implies a certain subordination and inferiority of that which depends on another to that on which it depends. Hence, although the first cause, acting outwardly through secondary causes, does not produce their effects without the influx and cooperation of secondary causes, nevertheless the divine operation in producing such effects does not, properly speaking, depend on the cooperation and influx of secondary causes. Rather, the converse is true: the cooperation and influx of each secondary cause depends on God’s operation, as was said in Disputation LXXXVI and will be clearer still in Disputations XCVI and XCVII. Therefore, all dependence is to be attributed to the secondary cause in comparison with the first, on which it depends for its being, influx, and cooperation; and the same is true of a pious operation, which depends on free choice as its proximate cause and on God as its first, per se efficient cause.

VI. The efficacy of grace does not depend on the free cooperation of free choice.— Let the first conclusion, then, be this. If we speak of the efficacy of the help of divine grace in its first and proper meaning, insofar as it signifies the real and intrinsic power of the help through which God causes free choice to cooperate and consent, it must be said that this efficacy does not depend on the free cooperation of free choice, but precedes it in the order of reason and causality. This conclusion can easily be proved from what was said in the preceding disputations. For efficacious help is God’s immediate influx into free choice as a cause, as was shown in Disputation XVIII; and through the same help God applies and physically predetermines free choice itself to cooperate and consent, as is clear from Disputations XXII and XXIII and will be clearer still in Disputation XCI. Therefore, its efficacy does not depend on the influx and cooperation of free choice.

Second. What is prior does not depend on what is posterior. But the efficacy of grace is prior to the cooperation of free choice, since efficacious grace, or helping grace insofar as it helps and cooperates, is prevenient, as was shown in Disputation LXXXII. The influx and free cooperation of free choice, however, are posterior, since they are the effect of the same efficacious help, as is clear from what was said in Disputation LXVI and from what will be said in Disputations XCVI and XCVII. Therefore, the efficacy of the help of prevenient grace does not depend on the free cooperation of free choice.

Third. The bestowal of efficacious help is the adequate cause that makes free choice cooperate, as will be clear in Disputation CII. Therefore, the efficacy of the same help does not depend on the free influx and cooperation of free choice itself. The inference is proved: for the efficacy of a cause does not depend on its effect; rather, the effect depends on the power and efficacy of its cause. For example, the efficacy that fire has to heat does not depend on the heating or heat produced; on the contrary, the heating itself and the heat produced depend on the intrinsic power and efficacy of fire.

Fourth. Help whose efficacy depends on the free influx and cooperation of free choice with it is efficacious only from its effect. But the help of helping grace is not efficacious only from its effect; rather, it is efficacious through the real power it has as it comes from God, prior to the same cooperation of free choice, as was shown in Disputation LXXIII. Therefore, efficacious help, insofar as it is efficacious, does not depend on the free influx and cooperation of created free choice with it.

VII. Let the second conclusion be this. If the efficacy of the help of divine grace is taken for its efficient causation, by which it causes free choice to exercise its influx together with grace and cooperate, this efficacy, or efficient causation, does not depend on the free influx and cooperation of that same free choice. This conclusion is proved by the arguments made for the preceding conclusion. It is also proved because grace alone causes this effect in us. For although a person wills freely, only God gives the will most efficacious powers and through the help of grace causes it to cooperate and will, as was shown in Disputation LXXXVI and will be clearer still in Disputation C. Therefore, this efficient causation of grace is understood as prior to the free cooperation of free choice and, consequently, does not depend on it.

The actual efficient causation of grace is not without the free cooperation of free choice, yet it does not depend on it.— Let the third conclusion be this. If the efficacy of gratuitous help is taken for its actual efficient causation, by which it produces with us the very act of willing, or a pious operation, that efficacy, or efficient causation, does not exist without the free cooperation of free choice; yet, properly speaking, it does not depend on it. The authors of both opinions undoubtedly accept the first part of this conclusion, and the reason is evident: otherwise, free choice would be purely passive, receiving a pious operation produced by grace alone, which conflicts with the definition of the Council of Trent. The authors of the first opinion do not accept the second part. But it is proved by the arguments made for the first conclusion and by what was said in the fourth foundation. For dependence in efficient causes implies a certain subordination and inferiority of that which depends on another to that on which it depends. But the efficacy of grace, even if taken for the efficient causation of grace itself, is not inferior to the cooperation of free choice, nor subject to it. Rather, efficacious grace subjects the human will and makes it obedient to itself, as was shown in Disputation LXXXVII. Therefore, the efficacy of grace and its efficient causation do not depend on the free cooperation of free choice.

VIII. Free choice does not make the helps of divine grace efficacious.— It is also proved as follows. Otherwise, it would be in the power of our free choice to make the helps of grace efficacious by cooperating with them, or inefficacious by withholding consent. Yet this is impossible, as was shown in Disputation LXXIII and will be shown at greater length in Disputation CVIII. This is confirmed: for the opposing opinion would entail that efficacious helps have from God only the power by which they can produce an effect actually, while they would beg their actual efficient causation from free choice actually acting as an efficient cause—if through the influx and cooperation of free choice the help of grace that was not efficacious in itself is made efficacious. Consequently, our free choice would confer on the helps of grace the efficacy they have.

Solution:— They reply that when it is asserted that our consent makes the helps of grace efficacious, this should not be understood as though our free choice imparted some power or efficacy to the helps themselves. Rather, the helps impart to free choice the power and inclination to elicit consent by inviting, attracting, and assisting free choice itself toward that end. But they say we mean it in this sense: for help to be efficacious is nothing other than for it, through its impulse and invitation, which it has by a necessity of nature insofar as it is prevenient grace, to move free choice to consent or to cooperate with it toward contrition or another act to which prevenient grace invites it. But moving free choice to consent or cooperate with prevenient grace toward contrition depends on the innate freedom of free choice, by which it wills or does not will to elicit such consent and cooperation. Thus, that the help of prevenient grace is efficacious—that is, that it has the effect to which it invites free choice—depends on free choice itself consenting and cooperating with it as a part of the cause that must produce such an effect together with it. In comparison with that effect, if it is produced, the help is called efficacious; if it is not produced because free choice does not will to consent and cooperate, the help is called inefficacious. From this they infer that for free choice, first moved and roused in the order of nature by the help of prevenient grace, freely to consent and cooperate with that same help is not to attribute efficacy to it. Rather, it is to supply the condition without which that help would not have the character of being efficacious in comparison with such an effect, nor would it have the character of helping free choice toward contrition through a new influx of that same help into contrition, by which it cooperates with free choice to produce contrition. For the free cooperation of free choice, concurring with it to produce that same contrition, would be lacking. Thus, according to this reply, although all supernatural efficacy and efficient causation come from the help of grace, nevertheless that efficacy or efficient causation depends on the free cooperation of free choice as on a condition without which it would not have the character of being efficacious in comparison with such an effect.

IX. Refutation.— Many things are involved in this reply that have been sufficiently refuted above and will be refuted again in what follows. First, what it asserts is false: that the help is efficacious means nothing other than that it has the effect to which it attracts and invites free choice. For it has already been shown above that the help of pre-operating grace is efficacious principally, and is called efficacious, because of its real and intrinsic power, through which God, in the manner of a physical cause, causes free choice to cooperate by predetermining it to such cooperation. It is also false that they say the efficacy of help depends on the free cooperation of free choice as on a condition without which it would not be efficacious. For a condition without which something would not be the case precedes, at least in the order of reason, the effect that depends on it. But the free cooperation of free choice does not precede the efficacy of grace, even in the order of reason; rather, the reverse is true: in the order of nature and causality the efficacy of grace precedes the free cooperation of free choice, since efficacious help, insofar as it is efficacious and helping, is prevenient, as was shown in Disputations LXXXII and LXXXVI. Therefore, it is impossible for the efficacy of grace to depend, even as on a condition without which it would not be efficacious, on the free cooperation of free choice. This is confirmed first as follows. If the cooperation of free choice is a condition without which actual grace would not be efficacious, then that cooperation, or influx of free choice, precedes the efficacy of grace in the order of nature, just as the application of fire precedes the action by which fire burns wood. Therefore, the cooperation or consent of free choice does not need the efficacy of grace, since it is understood as prior to it. From this it follows again that efficacious grace, insofar as it is efficacious, follows upon the influx and cooperation of free choice. Yet this cannot be admitted.

X. Predestination does not depend on the free cooperation of free choice.— This is confirmed a second time. For otherwise it would follow that divine predestination, by which people are efficaciously ordered to eternal life through these and those helps, depends on their free cooperation as on a condition without which it would not have the character of predestination in comparison with those people, but would retain only the character of a common supernatural providence. But this consequence is explicitly contrary to the teaching of Saint Augustine, as was shown in Disputation XXXVII. Therefore. The inference is proved: predestination includes efficacious helps, since predestination, as we said above from Augustine, is the preparation of God’s benefits, by which all who are delivered are most certainly delivered. Therefore, if the efficacy of those same helps depends on the free cooperation of free choice with them as on a condition without which they would not be efficacious, it follows that divine predestination itself depends on that same free cooperation as on a condition without which it would not be predestination.

XI. How a person is said to have been placed in the hand of his own counsel.— In answer to the first argument, it is said that a person is not said to have been placed in the hand of his own counsel because he can make help that would otherwise be inefficacious become efficacious, but because he has the choice of his own act and can act or not act. For although, on the supposition that a person is moved efficaciously by God to consent, he cannot fail to consent in the composite sense, as was proved in Disputation XXV, nevertheless he can always absolutely and in the divided sense dissent, if he so wills. This will be discussed at greater length in Disputations XCII, XCIII, and XCIV. Let what was said about this same authority in Disputation XXI, no. 11, and Disputation XXIII, no. 44, be consulted.

In answer to the second, it is said that the help of grace being efficacious does not mean only that it produces a pious operation, but that it physically predetermines free choice to cooperate and consent, causing it actually to concur with grace itself; and it does this first in the order of reason, before free choice cooperates, as was said. Second, even if efficacy is taken for the actual efficient causation of help, it still does not depend on the free cooperation of free choice. For although it is in the same moment of time as that cooperation, it precedes it in the order of reason and causality—not by producing consent without the free cooperation of free choice, but by applying free choice itself so that it may cooperate freely and have an influx into consent.

The solution to the third argument is clear from what was said above.

XII. Efficacious help, as subject to God’s decree to convert a person, adds a new power over sufficient help.— In answer to the fourth, it is said that the help of grace is indeed efficacious as subject to God’s absolute and efficacious decree to convert to himself the person whose heart he moves, prior to all foreknowledge of our free choice’s future cooperation. And although that decree, insofar as it formally signifies an act of the divine will, is something extrinsic to efficacious help, insofar as it signifies the effect of that decree, it is not extrinsic to the same help. For, as is clear from the premises in Disputations XIX, XXXI, XXXII, and LXXIII, it places in the help a certain intentional power of God, just as the power of an art is in the instrument of the artisan while it is moved by him. This power cannot fail, nor can the human will impede it, so that the effect God intends to produce through that help will follow—not only as to its substance but also as to the mode of freedom fitting to the created will.

In answer to the fifth, the antecedent is denied. To the proof, it is said that, as was shown in Disputation XXV and will be discussed more fully in Disputations XCII and XCIII, the person moved by God through efficacious help can, absolutely speaking and in the divided sense, dissent and not act, although in a qualified way and in the composite sense that person cannot dissent or fail to act. For the freedom of our free choice it is enough that, absolutely speaking and in the divided sense, it can refrain from acting; it is not required that it be able to refrain from acting in the composite sense. More will be said on this in Disputations CXV, CXVI, and CXXI.

In answer to the confirmation, I think sufficient satisfaction has already been given in the disputations cited there.

Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.

Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.

Disputatio XCIII: Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, speaking properly of resistance.

Disputatio XCIV: How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that human free choice moved by God through efficacious help cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.

Disputatio XCV: Whether, after God has mercifully aroused created free choice, he awaits its free consent to be purified or justified.

Disputatio XCVI: Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who arouses and calls it.

Disputatio XCVII: Whether the good use or cooperation of free choice, by which it consents to God who arouses and calls it, proceeds from its innate freedom alone.

Disputatio XCVIII: Whether, exciting grace being presupposed, the consent or cooperation of free choice must first be begun by the created will, or by the divine will or the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand.

Disputatio XCIX: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person, preceded by exciting grace, wills to be converted, he is therefore helped by God and converted; or, conversely, he is converted because he is helped by God.

Disputatio C: Whether the bestowal of efficacious help is the adequate cause of the conversion of free choice.

Disputatio CI: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person is not helped by God, he is therefore not converted.

Disputatio CII: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person aroused by God does not will to use sufficient grace, he is therefore not helped by God or converted.

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

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