De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Introduction

Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.

Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.

Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.

Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.

Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.

Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.

Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.

Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.

Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.

Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.

I. A similar question will have to be discussed below, in Disputation XCVIII, where it will be asked whether, given exciting grace, the consent or cooperation of free choice is first begun by the created will or instead by the divine will, that is, by the efficacious help of pre-operating grace. But because some recent theologians use various ways of speaking on this point, I have thought it necessary to treat the proposed question expressly. Some have said that the created will is in a certain way the first root of its determination with respect to the determination of an action. They also admit that every free will can in its own order be called the first root of its determination. Nevertheless, they say that God concurs simultaneously with that same determination of the will through his concurrence.

Other theologians, however, distinguish between the conversion of the will and its determination. They assert that although the conversion and consent of the will come from the will itself and from God acting together with the will to produce that same conversion and consent, the determination of the will—which occurs in both cases—comes from the will itself, as it freely applies and determines itself to consent or dissent through its innate freedom, and does not come from God determining it by his omnipotence. They add that one should not grant that God determines the will together with the will determining itself, just as one grants that God produces an effect together with the will simultaneously in the order of nature. This opinion is proved as follows.

First. Before it determines itself, the created will is wholly undetermined in the order of nature and has no necessity to exercise an influx, either absolutely or on the supposition of another act of its own. Rather, by its freedom’s own indifference alone, it begins an act whenever and of whatever kind it wills. Therefore, this determination must be referred to that same will as its first root and cause.

This argument can be confirmed: although the created will in its existence depends on another prior cause that efficiently produces it per se, namely God, and for that reason cannot be called simply the first cause, nevertheless, in comparison with the determination of its act, it has no other prior cause that efficiently produces it per se. For this determination proceeds from its own innate freedom alone, as will be proved in Disputations XCVI, XCVII, and XCVIII. Therefore, in this order, or in comparison with this kind of determination, it can be called the first cause. The inference is proved as follows: in this sense, the first cause of a determination is said to be that which has no other prior cause of that same determination.

II. Secondly, it is argued that created free choice has absolute dominion over its act, as Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas seem to teach in the places to be cited in Disputation CXVII, nos. 1 and 2. Several arguments will be brought forward there to confirm this. Therefore, the determination of an action must be referred to free choice itself as its first per se efficient cause. The inference is proved as follows: a person is not properly said to have dominion over something whose use depends on another’s will, since dominion is the proper power to use a thing for all uses permitted by law.

Thirdly, it is wholly incompatible with freedom for the determination of one’s act to be in oneself from another, as is clear from Saint Thomas in Book II of the Sentences, dist. 25, q. 1, art. 1, reply to the first objection. There he says that free choice is preserved in God insofar as the determination of his act is not from another but from himself; and from this he infers that God is truly the Lord of his work. Since, then, the will has true freedom, as is clear from the Council of Trent, it follows that the determination of our will to this or that act is not from another but from itself. Consequently, in its own order, it can be called the first cause or first root of its determination.

Fourthly, it is proved that God does not determine the will, even together with that same will determining itself, and does not concur as an efficient cause in such a determination. For if God’s influx were to be applied to determining the will, it would have to be immediate in the will, so that the will would be applied and moved to consent, or to determine itself to consent. But it is impossible for there to be such an immediate influx into the will to produce a free action or determination, as is clear from the arguments proposed at the beginning of Disputation XVIII. Therefore, God, neither by general concurrence nor by any other concurrence, even simultaneous concurrence, is the cause of the will’s determination. Consequently, the created will must be called the first and sole cause of that same determination.

Fifthly, the determination of the will is not an action of the will under every aspect of its consideration; rather, it is the very action insofar as it has the character of an influx belonging to the will alone. This is called the will’s determination insofar as the will thus exercises an influx, cooperates, and consents, while it is within the will’s power not to exercise that influx, not to cooperate, and not to consent. Therefore, nothing else should be posited as God’s cooperation in determining the will in this way, together with the will itself. Therefore, by its innate freedom alone the will determines itself and, consequently, will be the first and sole cause of its determination.

They confirm this with all the arguments by which, as will be clear in Disputations XCVI and XCVII, they try to prove that the good use of the helps of grace, insofar as it proceeds from free choice, proceeds from its own innate freedom alone. For since the will’s determination to supernatural acts is nothing other than the aforesaid good use insofar as it proceeds from free choice, it follows that the will’s determination must be referred to its innate freedom alone and, consequently, that the created will is the first and sole cause of its determination.

Sixthly, once any action or cooperation of God to determine the will to consent is posited, the will can still fail to determine itself and fail to consent. Therefore, by that action or cooperation it is not determined; rather, it still remains for the will to determine or not determine itself, and to consent or not consent. Therefore, no action or cooperation of God is the will’s determination. Consequently, the will is the first and sole cause of its determination.

III. The created will is not the sole or first cause of its determination.— The second opinion teaches that the will’s determination must be referred to God as to a prior per se efficient cause, as was seen in Disputations LXXV and LXXXVI and will be discussed more fully in Disputation XCVI. God does not, however, produce that same determination of free choice in us without our freely concurring and cooperating at the same time, but later in the order of reason, as the holy Council of Trent teaches. Consequently, the created will cannot be, or be called, the first root or first efficient cause of its determination. This opinion is followed by all defenders of efficacious grace, which physically predetermines free choice to consent; their testimonies were cited in Disputations XXII and XXIII. I consider this opinion so certain that its opposite has no probability. But, in order to examine the different ways of speaking used by some theologians and to explain what should be thought about them, we must first state and assume those points on which the authors of both opinions agree and about which no theologian has ever had any doubt. First, they agree that the created will, or free choice moved and excited by God, is the proximate cause not only of a pious operation but also of its own determination, by which it determines itself to act piously. Otherwise, it would be purely passive, receiving an operation produced by God alone, which is incompatible with the Council of Trent. Its actions would also not be free and, consequently, would not be meritorious or demeritorious. Secondly, they agree that created free choice truly moves and determines itself when it produces a free action. For it belongs to the nature of a free operation that it proceed as from a proximate cause, from an intrinsic principle that moves and determines itself, as will be made clear in Disputation CXVII and has been partly shown above in Disputations XVIII and XIX. Thirdly, with a qualification and in a certain respect, they agree that free choice can be said to be the first and sole cause of its determination or pious operation—namely, in the genus of the proximate secondary cause that elicits that same operation. For in this order it has no partnership with another proximate or secondary cause that would produce the same determination or pious operation together with the will itself. The difficulty, then, is whether the created will should be called the first root or first efficient cause of its determination, in such a way that it has no other cause that produces that same determination prior to it in causality or simultaneously with the created will.

IIII. A first cause of an effect is spoken of in two ways.— To explain this, it should be noted that something can be called the first cause of an effect in two ways. First, positively: because through a power not received from another, higher cause, it produces that effect. In this sense, God alone is the first cause of every created effect, whether he produces it immediately through himself or through another, secondary cause. In another way, something can be called the first cause negatively: because it has no prior per se efficient cause on which the concurrence of that same cause, by which it produces the effect, depends.

Let the first conclusion, then, be this: the created will cannot be called the first root or first cause of its determination in this latter sense that we have explained. This is the conclusion of Saint Thomas in Book II of the Sentences, dist. 37, q. 2, art. 2, in the body, and it is proved by his argument, which we brought forward in Disputation XVIII, no. 14, and Disputation XXIV, no. 19. For otherwise, with respect to its determination, the created will would have the character of a first principle, and thus two first principles would have to be admitted, which must not be said.

They reply that the created will does not simply have the character of a first principle in comparison with its own determination, because, although it can determine itself and does so without the influx of a prior agent predetermining it, nevertheless it does not have existence from itself and cannot operate without the first agent’s general simultaneous concurrence, whereas existence from itself and the ability to operate without that concurrence would be necessary for it to have the character of a first principle. But Saint Thomas expressly refutes this solution in the cited place, and it remains sufficiently ruled out by what was said in Disputations XVIII and XXIV above.

Secondly, it is proved as follows. The determination by which the will determines itself is nothing other than the very free volition, insofar as it proceeds from that same will as its proximate efficient cause. But under this aspect such a determination is not ultimately reduced to the created will, but to God as to a prior per se efficient cause, as was shown in Disputation XXXVI and will be discussed more fully in Disputation XCVI and the two following disputations. Therefore, the created will is not the first cause, even in the negative sense, of its determination. The inference is proved as follows: that is called the first cause negatively, in comparison with some effect, which has no other prior cause to which that effect is reduced. Since, then, the will’s determination, or free act, even insofar as it proceeds from the will, is reduced to God as to a prior per se efficient cause, it follows that the created will cannot be called the first cause or first root of its determination.

Thirdly, it is proved as follows. Just as the created will is not simply the first mover of itself, so it is not simply the first determiner of itself, as is clear from what was said in Disputations XXII and XXIII. Otherwise, it would be simply the first deliberating and the first free being, if its determination were not reduced to another prior efficient cause. Therefore, it is not the first cause of its determination. V. They reply that there is a great difference between God’s freedom and the freedom of the created will. For God is not only free, but is free per se and essentially; he possesses the use of freedom not only without dependence on another, but also without any potentiality, composition, or imperfection. For this reason, that mode of freedom requires infinite perfection and therefore cannot be communicated to any creature in that mode. Yet a participation in that freedom and indifference, with true dominion over one’s act, can be communicated to a creature without infinite perfection. Thus, for a power that is indifferent in itself to produce one act determinately rather than another, not through the determination of another but spontaneously and by an intrinsic power (although not without the concurrence of another), infinite perfection is not required. Hence it does not follow that a free will operating in this way, or first determining itself, is the first free being, unless the term “first free” is highly equivocal. For what is properly called the first free being is either what is free by essence or what has freedom wholly independent of another. Neither applies to the created will, since it has freedom only by participation in God’s freedom and depends on that same freedom in its determinations. But if “first free” is said of the agent from which a free determination first proceeds in its own order, then it is true that every free will can in its own order be called the first root of its determination: for, without that will, the determination cannot occur, and it occurs in no other way than through the will’s intrinsic and free application. They add that this is a highly improper meaning of the term and therefore one should not use it or attribute it to the created will. But against this there is an argument: as Saint Thomas argues in Book II of the Sentences, dist. 37, q. 2, art. 2, although this reply might establish that our will was not the absolutely first being, it could not avoid saying that it is the first agent if its action and determination were not reduced to some prior agent as to an efficient cause.

Moreover, the same reply supplies a powerful argument against the authors of the opposing opinion. For by the same reasoning that the created will is called “the first free being” most improperly, it must also be called “the first cause of its determination” most improperly. Consequently, one should not use this term or attribute it to the created will. But they say that this term should not be attributed to the created will absolutely except in evil acts. In good acts, and especially supernatural ones, we cannot speak this way absolutely, because although the will has its part in such a free determination, its first beginning is not from the will itself but from God, who prepares and helps it to determine itself. But against this there is the following argument. If the authors of this reply mean that the first beginning of a free determination does not have the will itself, but God, as its efficient cause, they are consequently bound to admit with us that such a determination is not to be reduced to the created will as to its first efficient cause, but to God alone, who, as an efficient cause, truly and efficaciously brings it about through the help of helping grace that the will determines itself. But if they mean that the first beginning of its determination comes from God only morally, insofar as through exciting grace he moves the will to consent by attracting, inviting, and persuading it, it seems to follow that the created will must properly be called the first physical efficient cause of its determination. Nor should the qualification “in its own order” or “in a certain way” be added to that same expression. Rather, it would be permissible to admit absolutely that although the created will does not have the character of a first principle, it truly is the first cause of its determination—something that even the authors of the reply we are refuting do not admit.

VI. Second conclusion. It cannot be denied that God concurs as an efficient cause in the determination by which the created will determines itself. The arguments made in favor of the preceding conclusion prove this all the more strongly. For otherwise it would follow that this determination must be attributed to the created will alone and not to God, and, consequently, that God would not be the first author and cause of all beings that belong to the order of nature or grace. VII. They reply that the will’s determination to good acts can in some way be attributed to the author of nature insofar as it proceeds from the faculty of free choice, which that same author of nature has conferred so that it may freely determine itself in this way; this is because it is not an abuse of free choice, as determination to a sinful act is, and insofar as the same author often helps and invites free choice to that determination through his particular gifts and helps. Nevertheless, they say that the determination itself must be attributed simply to free choice. But this reply needs no refutation: for according to it the will’s determination to good acts would be reduced to God only as to a cause without which it would not occur: that is, unless God had created free choice, its determination to this or that action would not have existed in the world. Or it would be reduced to God only as to a moral cause, not as to a physical efficient cause. How false this is is plainly clear from what was said in Disputations XXXVI and LXXXVI.

Moreover, the free power by which our will can freely determine itself is attributed to God as to its first efficient cause. Therefore, the actual determination of that same will must also be attributed to God as to its first per se efficient cause. Otherwise, as Saint Augustine argues, we would attribute what is less perfect to God, but what is more perfect not to God but to free choice. Yet this conflicts with the words of the Apostle James, who says: Every excellent gift and every perfect gift is from above, from the Father of lights. For it is clear that the actual determination to good is something more perfect than the power of determining oneself, just as an act is simply more perfect than a habit, as Saint Thomas says in the First Part of the Second Part, q. 71, art. 3, replies to objections 1 and 3, and First Part, q. 25, art. 1, reply to objection 2. Aristotle also teaches this in Metaphysics IX, text 19, saying: The act of any power is better than the power itself. We proved the same in the preceding disputation, no. 12.

VIII. How the will’s determination is free.— The conclusion is also proved by demolishing the chief foundation of the opposing opinion. For from this foundation it argues that God does not produce the will’s determination even together with the will: otherwise, the freedom of choice with respect to that same determination would be destroyed, and it would not be free if God produced it together with the will. But this reasoning assumes something false. Therefore, and so forth. The minor premise is proved as follows: an act of willing by the will and every other pious operation of it is truly free, even if God produces that operation together with the same will. Therefore, the will’s determination will likewise be free even if God produces its determination together with the will. The inference is proved because it is no more incompatible with freedom for God to produce the will’s operation together with it than for him to produce its determination together with the will determining itself. They reply by denying the inference and give the reason for the distinction: God’s influx into an action is immediate in the action itself, not in the will and then into the action through the will moved by him. But if God’s influx were to be applied to determining the will, it would have to be immediate in the will, so that the will would be applied and moved to consent, or to determine itself to consent. Therefore, one should not grant that God concurs as an efficient cause together with the will in its determination in the same way as he concurs in the action itself. Nevertheless, this reply remains sufficiently refuted by what was said in Disputations XVIII, XXII, and XXIII: for it was shown that God’s general concurrence, both for acts of the natural order and for those of the supernatural order, is God’s immediate influx into the cause, by which he moves, applies, and predetermines it to operate. Through such an influx, the freedom of created free choice is not only unharmed but perfected in a wondrous way.

IX. How the will is understood to be undetermined in the order of nature before it determines itself.— In answer to the first argument, it is said that, in that priority of nature before it determines itself, the created will is indeed undetermined in second act, or in the determination formally effected by an act of the will itself. Yet it is not undetermined with respect to prior determination, or with respect to the completion of first act, which is effected by God’s efficacious help, as was shown in Disputation XXIII. And although, in that priority, the will has no absolute necessity to exercise its influence, nor any necessity on the supposition of another act produced by that same will, it nevertheless has a conditional necessity to exercise its influence, or on the supposition of the divine will and efficacious help, as was shown in Disputation XXV. This necessity is a qualified necessity and therefore is not opposed to freedom, as is clear from what was said in that same disputation.

In answer to the confirmation, it is said that the created will depends on God not only in its being but also in its cooperation and influx, as on a prior per se efficient cause, as was said; this will be further evident in Disputations XCVI, XCVII, and XCVIII, where the arguments customarily brought forward to the contrary will be resolved. Hence, with respect to its own determination, the will cannot be called the first efficient cause, but only a proximate and secondary cause.

In answer to the second argument, it is said that created free choice does indeed have dominion over its act, but not first and absolute dominion, as will become clear in Disputation CXVII, where the testimonies of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas hinted at in the argument will be answered.

X. What a free power requires.— In answer to the third argument, it is said that it is indeed incompatible with a free power for the determination of its act to be in it from another while that power itself remains purely passive. But it is not incompatible with a free power for the determination of its act to be from another, provided that the power itself concurs from within itself in determining its act—that is, from an intrinsic active principle that is not determined in the manner of nature, or naturally to one outcome, but retains a true capacity for either alternative. Free choice retains this capacity even when predetermined by God, as was said in Disputation XVIII, no. 23. This answers the authority of Saint Thomas adduced; it will be explained at greater length in Disputation CXVII.

In answer to the fourth, the minor premise is denied. For God’s concurrence is an immediate influx into the will, as was shown in Disputations XVIII and XIX.

In answer to the fifth, it is said that the determination of the will of which we speak is the action itself insofar as it has the character of an influx—not of the will alone, but of the will as moved and predetermined by God’s influx to determine itself to act freely and to cooperate—as is plainly clear from what was said in Disputations XVIII and XXIII.

In answer to the confirmation, I shall respond expressly in Disputations XCVI and XCVII.

In answer to the seventh, it should be said that, once God’s action predetermining the will to consent is posited, the will cannot fail to determine itself in the composite sense, although it can do so absolutely and in the divided sense, as was said in Disputation XXV and will be said at greater length in Disputations XCII, XCIII, and XCIV.

Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.

Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.

Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.

Disputatio XCIII: Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, speaking properly of resistance.

Disputatio XCIV: How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that human free choice moved by God through efficacious help cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.

Disputatio XCV: Whether, after God has mercifully aroused created free choice, he awaits its free consent to be purified or justified.

Disputatio XCVI: Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who arouses and calls it.

Disputatio XCVII: Whether the good use or cooperation of free choice, by which it consents to God who arouses and calls it, proceeds from its innate freedom alone.

Disputatio XCVIII: Whether, exciting grace being presupposed, the consent or cooperation of free choice must first be begun by the created will, or by the divine will or the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand.

Disputatio XCIX: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person, preceded by exciting grace, wills to be converted, he is therefore helped by God and converted; or, conversely, he is converted because he is helped by God.

Disputatio C: Whether the bestowal of efficacious help is the adequate cause of the conversion of free choice.

Disputatio CI: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person is not helped by God, he is therefore not converted.

Disputatio CII: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person aroused by God does not will to use sufficient grace, he is therefore not helped by God or converted.

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

↑ Top of work