De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Introduction
Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.
Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.
Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.
Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.
Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.
Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.
Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.
Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.
Whether, in one who has infused habits, special help not only of exciting but also of helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.
I. The first opinion asserts that the habit of faith suffices to produce supernatural acts of faith, and that no special help of exciting or helping grace is necessary. This opinion says the same of other supernatural acts. Some theologians hold this view and speak of the matter as follows: Once the habit has been infused, it, together with God’s general concurrence, suffices to elicit supernatural acts of believing suited to a supernatural end. Yet one must not deny that the habit of faith, and of the other supernatural virtues, is greatly helped by illuminations and particular helps conferred through the gifts of the Holy Spirit—wisdom, understanding, counsel, piety, and fear, and so on—so that it may elicit its acts with greater fervor and excellence.
This opinion is proved first by the authority of Saint Thomas, I–II, q. 113, art. 8, in the body, where he says that, when the wicked person is justified, the very motion of God moving him is the infusion of grace. From this he concludes that, in the order of nature, the first thing in the justification of the wicked is the infusion of grace; the second, a movement of free choice toward God; the third, a movement of free choice toward sin; and the fourth, the remission of guilt, to which the whole transformation is ordered as to its end. In art. 6 of the same question, in the body, he says that four things are enumerated as required for the justification of the wicked: the infusion of grace, a movement of free choice toward God through faith, a movement of free choice toward sin, and the remission of guilt. A little later he says: Therefore, the infusion of grace is understood on the side of the divine motion. By these words Saint Thomas requires no other special help, really distinct from those same habits, as necessary in addition to the infusion of grace and supernatural habits, in order that free choice elicit supernatural acts of faith, charity, and contrition.
This is confirmed: for in art. 7 of the same question, in the body, he says that the whole justification of the wicked consists originally in the infusion of grace, for through it both free choice is moved and guilt is remitted. By these words he plainly teaches that through the infusion of grace, or through infused grace, God moves free choice to supernatural acts by which a person is prepared for justification. He therefore holds that, in one who has infused habits, some special help of helping or exciting grace is not absolutely necessary. For the habit itself has the character of divine help, as may be gathered from the words of the Council of Milevis, canon 3: Whoever says that the grace of God, by which we are justified through Jesus Christ our Lord, is effective only for the remission of sins and not also as help so that they may not be committed, let him be anathema.
II. Second, special help of exciting and helping grace is necessary for this reason: acts of believing, hoping, and loving, and other acts of this kind, which as regards their substance can be produced by free choice through the powers of nature alone, must become supernatural and such as salvation requires. But through infused habits, or through the concurrence of those same supernatural habits, these acts are sufficiently elevated so as to be supernatural. For God infuses such habits into the operative powers so that the operative powers may have within themselves a formal active principle of the supernatural order, proportionate to acts of this kind. Therefore, in those who have infused habits, no other special help, really distinct from those same habits, is absolutely necessary for the powers elevated by the habits to elicit supernatural acts.
Thirdly, special help of exciting and helping grace is not absolutely necessary for one who has infused habits in order physically to predetermine a power established in first act to operate. For such predetermination, since it removes indifference to operating or not operating, in which the freedom of choice essentially consists, cannot be compatible with that freedom. Also, we use habits when we will; consequently, for someone to use the habit of faith or charity infused in him by God to elicit one or another act of faith or charity, no special help of exciting or helping grace will be necessary in addition to the innate freedom of choice. Nor is such special help absolutely necessary for God to cooperate simultaneously with the power and supernatural habit in supernatural acts: general concurrence suffices for this, by which God concurs simultaneously with all other secondary causes established in first act through forms proportionate to their effects, since God’s concurrences should not be multiplied without necessity. Therefore, special help of exciting or helping grace is posited superfluously as necessary for producing supernatural acts in one whose power has already been perfected by supernatural habits.
III. The second opinion is that of other theologians, who hold that for supernatural acts elicited by infused habits, exciting grace proportionate to those acts and a simultaneous concurrence of the order of grace are indeed absolutely necessary:1 but that, in addition to these, no other helping grace is absolutely necessary for eliciting a supernatural act. For the most part, however, it is useful, so that the act may be performed more easily, sweetly, and perseveringly, if God wills to confer it, because it increases the powers for operating. This opinion nevertheless adds that, although a new helping grace is not necessary for a justified person to perform each supernatural act, it is necessary for a person in the state of fallen nature to persevere in grace for a long time. For perseverance in grace requires special help, as the councils define, namely, the gift of perseverance, which includes both exciting and helping grace. These authors are convinced by the following arguments.
Fourth, for from the teaching of Saint Thomas in the First Part of the Second Part, q. 109, arts. 1, 2, and 3, it is plainly gathered that no other helping grace besides concurrence of the order of grace is absolutely necessary for one who has infused habits to elicit supernatural acts.
Fifth, through the habit the faculty has sufficient power as a proximate cause, and through supernatural concurrence that proximate cause has sufficient help from the first cause in that order. What else, then, could be necessary? Perhaps it will be said that an actual complement is required, as they call it, which is not sufficiently given by the habit alone, because second act is more perfect and more actual than first act. But the power with the habit is established only in first act, and therefore does not yet have complete power for eliciting an act until it receives another, flowing actual grace, as it were, by which it is perfectly completed.
Against this is the sixth argument. If this reasoning had any force, it would prove not only for acts of grace but also for natural acts that a faculty with a habit does not have sufficient power for its connatural act, although all philosophers say that it has not merely sufficient but superabundant power, and therefore can not only exercise its act but do so easily and pleasantly. Moreover, the same would have to be said of every natural active power, however perfect, which is plainly false for the reasons given in Disputation XVIII to prove that God’s general concurrence is not an immediate influx into secondary causes. Finally, the same would have to be said of that flowing quality which others invent. For, as they themselves also admit, that quality is not an act of life elicited by the soul, but is pre-infused by God alone, in the order of nature, for eliciting an act. Therefore, it too stands in relation to action as first act to second act, and is less perfect in this respect: it does not formally constitute the power in its ultimate act, as the action itself, or second act, does. It too will therefore be an incomplete power and will need another complement. And so the process would go on to infinity, since that complement is always only first act. If a distinction is established between a habit and that flowing quality on the ground that a habit can be separated from second act, whereas that flowing quality cannot, the following argument is made against this.
IIII. Seventh, this is of no help in the first place, because inseparability does not remove the distinction between first and second act. The light of glory, for example, also has an inseparable vision, and charity joined to it has an inseparable love; nevertheless, they are first acts, so much so that the authors of the opposing opinion also require the aforesaid flowing quality beforehand in those cases. Accordingly, that distinction entails only that the quality is a naturally acting first act with such necessity that it carries the will along with it, and consequently also removes the free exercise of action.
Eighth, first act, especially supernatural first act, is absolutely more perfect than second act, because it not only makes operating easier but also grants the very ability to operate. Second act, by contrast, is called more perfect only in a qualified respect, because it is ultimate and leaves no further potency. Yet there is nothing to prevent what is absolutely more perfect from producing something that is absolutely lower and less perfect, even if that thing seems to surpass it in a qualified respect. Therefore, the foundation of the opposing opinion collapses: from the fact that second act is absolutely more perfect than a habit, it infers that a power elevated by a habit needs the special help of helping grace to be premoved to operate. Without such help, therefore, it will be able to elicit supernatural acts with the habit alone.
They confirm this opinion with all the arguments brought above2, by which they try to prove that God’s general concurrence, and likewise helping grace insofar as it helps, is not God’s immediate influx into free choice as into a cause, nor does it premove or predetermine free choice to operate; rather, it is an immediate influx together with the secondary cause into that cause’s effect.
V. Nevertheless, the third opinion is that of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas, and it is beyond doubt to us. The Thomists commonly defend it, asserting that, in one who has infused habits, special help of grace, both exciting and helping, really distinct from those habits, is absolutely necessary for each supernatural act, in addition to the habits themselves and the simultaneous concurrence of the same order as grace. By this help free choice, established in first act through the infused habits, is completed in its active power, and is premoved and determined to operate. Hence, to resolve this difficulty, three conclusions must be stated and proved.
Special help of exciting and helping grace is necessary for each supernatural act.— First conclusion. Even in one who has infused habits, special help of exciting or helping grace is absolutely necessary for each supernatural act. Thus, by the habit alone, he will never produce a supernatural act unless he is roused or helped by God through special help. In the present conclusion we speak disjunctively of the special help of exciting or helping grace, for the following conclusions will explain whether both kinds of help are necessary for each act. The conclusion is against the first opinion, but it can be proved by all the arguments with which it was shown in Disputation XX that the general concurrence by which God concurs with free choice, elevated through supernatural habits, in acts of faith, hope, and charity is a concurrence of the supernatural order, different in kind from that by which he concurs with natural secondary causes in merely natural effects.
It is also proved from the words spoken to the Apostles, who were certainly just: Without me you can do nothing (John XV). And in the person of the just, Psalm XXVI says: Be my helper; do not forsake me. From these testimonies Saint Augustine, in his book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 1, concludes that even when someone has been freed from the condemnation of sin, he still needs the help of his Liberator in order to do good. Augustine cannot be explained as speaking of God’s general concurrence, for he speaks of the help of the Savior, which is conferred on us through Christ. This is plainly special help: general concurrence is not the help of God the Redeemer, but of God the Creator, common to all creatures, including irrational and insensible ones, which are not capable of the redemption of Jesus Christ. Therefore, in addition to the infused habit, actual help of exciting or helping grace is necessary for each supernatural act. Likewise, Psalm CXXVI says of justified people: Unless the Lord guards the city, the guard keeps watch in vain. Saint Ambrose and Hilary interpret these words of the soul of the just person,34 which cannot resist temptations by doing good without God’s protection and help.
It is proved secondly from Pope Celestine’s letter to the bishops of Gaul, ch. 8, where he teaches that the just perform good works at God’s prompting: For this very reason, because the will is prepared, he says, by the Lord, and he himself touches the hearts of his faithful with paternal inspirations so that they may do some good. For all who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God5 —so that we may recognize that our own free choice is not absent, and yet in each movement of the human will toward any good we may not doubt that his help has greater force. In ch. 10: On the fruits, he says, of the commandments the Lord was speaking, when he did not say, “Without me you can do nothing more difficult,” but said, “Without me you can do nothing”6; and he is speaking of actual help. He therefore holds that, in addition to justifying grace, special help is necessary for every good and meritorious work, not merely to make it easier, as Pelagius said, but for it to be accomplished at all.
Thirdly, this is proved from the definition of the councils, especially the Second Council of Orange, canon 10, which says: The help of God must always be implored, even by those reborn and holy, so that they may reach a good end or persevere in a good work. Here it teaches that the help of grace is necessary not only for persevering to the end but also for carrying out a good work with perseverance. It states this more clearly in canon 25: We also believe this, it says, according to the Catholic faith, that all the baptized, having received grace through baptism, can and ought, with Christ helping and cooperating, to fulfill the things that pertain to salvation, if they are willing to labor faithfully. By these words it teaches that, in addition to habitual grace, special help is necessary for the good works by which the commandments are fulfilled. And at the Council of Trent, Session VI, On Justification, ch. 16, the holy Synod teaches that Christ Jesus himself, as the head to the members and as the vine to the branches, continually pours his power into the justified78 —a power that always precedes, accompanies, and follows their good works, and without which those works could in no way be pleasing to God and meritorious. By these words it teaches that for each meritorious work, in addition to justifying grace and infused habits, special help—which it explains by the name “power”—is absolutely necessary.
Fourthly, it is proved as follows. As Augustine admits,9 several ancient councils defined, against Pelagius, that God’s grace is given for each act. That is, special help from God is absolutely necessary for each pious act, for this is what the Fathers were discussing when they pressed Pelagius, as is clear from what was said above. Hence Pelagius himself, as Augustine reports in epistle 106, at the Council of Palestine, so as not to be condemned himself, anathematized what he had asserted: that God’s grace—that is, actual help or the help of grace—is not necessary for each pious act. Saint Augustine himself, in epistle 107: This is, he says, that evil opinion of the Pelagians, of evil repute, deservedly rejected, and condemned at the judgment of the Eastern bishops by Pelagius himself, too, who feared being condemned: the opinion in which they say that God’s grace is given not for each act, but is found in free choice or in the law and teaching. A little later, from many passages of Scripture, he proves our conclusion, concluding as follows: Therefore, God’s grace is not in the nature of free choice, or in the law and teaching, as the Pelagian perversity foolishly supposes. Rather, it is given by his will for each act, so that we may believe in God and live piously. He proves the same in Book I of On the Grace of Christ against Pelagius, chs. 2 and 3. Saint Prosper agrees in Book of Responses to the Chapters of the Gauls, response 8, where he teaches that this very doctrine was sanctioned by the judgment of 214 priests. Saint Jerome treats the same subject at great length against the Pelagians in his letter to Ctesiphon, saying: They posit God’s grace in such a way that we do not rely on and are not governed by his help in each work, etc.; and those who say this do not understand that the devil hisses through their mouths an intolerable blasphemy. He proves this there as well with many scriptural testimonies, in Book III of his Dialogue against the Pelagians, and in his commentary on Galatians, ch. 3, on the words He, therefore, who supplies the Spirit to you; and on Ephesians, ch. 2, explaining For we are his workmanship; and on Jeremiah, ch. 25, and ch. 31, on the words Turn me, O Lord, and I shall be turned. Finally, Vincent of Lérins, in Book Against the Profane Novelties of Heresies, p. 22 in the Leuven edition, says: Who before that profane Pelagius ever presumed so much on the power of free choice that he did not think God’s grace necessary to help it in good things through each individual act? This conclusion will become clearer from the arguments brought forward for the following two conclusions.
VI. Second conclusion. In addition to infused habits, a just person needs new exciting grace in order to perform good works, both internal and external. This conclusion is against some theologians who assert that a just person can exercise both internal and external righteousness whenever he wills—that is, perform good works and keep the divine precepts—and ordinarily does not need new exciting grace, but only helping grace. Nevertheless, our conclusion is proved from what was said in the preceding conclusion.
Exciting grace is necessary for each meritorious act even in a just person.— It is proved further. First, from the Council of Trent, Session VI, On Justification, ch. 5, where it declares that the beginning of justification in adults must be traced to the prevenient grace of God through Jesus Christ—that is, to his calling, by which they are called despite having no merits of their own—so that those who had turned away from God through sins may, through his exciting and helping grace, be prepared to turn toward their own justification by freely assenting and cooperating with that same grace. In ch. 6 it adds that people are prepared for righteousness itself when, roused and helped by divine grace, they conceive faith from hearing and are freely moved toward God. Therefore, just as exciting grace is necessary for supernatural acts elicited before justification, in accord with the teaching of the Council of Trent, so the same grace will also be necessary for supernatural acts elicited after justification. The inference is proved as follows: just as the will is prepared and moved by the Lord to elicit supernatural acts of faith, hope, and charity, by which a person is prepared for justification, so too is it prepared by the Lord to produce similar acts after justification. Since this preparation is made through the special help of exciting and helping grace, it follows that this grace is necessary for eliciting supernatural acts even in one who has infused habits. The same is proved from the Council of Orange, canon 25, where the council fathers declare: This, they say, we salutarily profess and believe: in every good work, we do not begin on our own and then receive help through God’s mercy; rather, with no preceding merits, he first inspires in us faith and love for himself, so that afterward, with his help, we may be able to fulfill what is pleasing to him. Here the council teaches that, in addition to the help of helping grace required to fulfill the supernatural commandments—namely, to have faith in and love for God—exciting grace is necessary, which the council signified by divine inspiration.
This is confirmed. As will be clear in Disputation XC, no. 6, free choice, even when established in first act, needs a moral motion from the side of the end in order to operate. But in supernatural acts this moral motion is made by God through exciting grace, just as physical motion comes from him through helping grace. Therefore, in each free supernatural act God rouses the will to elicit an act of this kind.
Secondly, it is proved by the authority of Augustine, whose words seem to express our conclusion. In Book II of On the Merits and Remission of Sins, ch. 18, he says: That we turn away from God is our doing, and this is an evil will; but that we turn toward God we cannot do unless he rouses and helps us, and this is a good will. Here he speaks without distinction of turning toward God through a good act, whether it occurs before or after the infusion of a habit, and teaches that it cannot take place unless God rouses us. He therefore holds that, in addition to infused habits, exciting grace is given for each supernatural act. He teaches the same in On the Spirit and the Letter, ch. 34, in these words: God acts through persuasive presentations to the mind so that we may will and believe, whether outwardly through the Gospel exhortations—where the commandments of the law also do something if they remind us of our weakness, so that by believing we may flee to justifying grace—or inwardly, where no one has it in his power to determine what comes into his mind; but whether to assent or dissent belongs to one’s own will. And in Book of Eighty-Three Questions, q. 68, he says generally of all good acts: No one can will unless admonished and called. Finally, in Question II to Simplician: Who, he says, can believe unless touched by some call, that is, by some testimony of things? Who has it in his power to be touched in mind by such a presentation that his will is moved toward faith? Saint Prosper teaches the same in Book II of The Call of All Nations, ch. 26, saying: God’s grace, he says, has the chief place, persuading by exhortations, moving by examples, frightening through dangers, stirring through miracles, giving understanding, inspiring counsel, and illuminating the heart itself and imbuing it with the affections of faith. But the human will is also subject to it and joined with it; the will has been roused by the aforesaid helps for this purpose, that it may cooperate in the divine work within itself.
Third, it is proved by reasoning. The will never performs any good work unless it has been proposed to it through the intellect, since nothing is willed unless it is first known, as Augustine says. But that presentation, by which the intellect proposes to the will a supernatural good as something to pursue and love, as suitable to it, pertains to exciting grace, since through it the will is persuaded, attracted, and invited to pursue that good. Therefore, however just a person may be and whatever infused habits he may have, he still needs exciting grace for each supernatural act.
This is confirmed. In a just person, the illumination of the intellect by which a supernatural good is proposed to the will as something to pursue and love—even if it occurs through some recollection or memory of a preceding divine excitation—does not proceed from the powers of nature alone; otherwise, the first beginning of a good work in us would come from us. Therefore it proceeds from the help of exciting grace. Consequently, in addition to infused habits, special help of exciting grace is absolutely necessary for each supernatural act. They reply to these arguments10 that the habit of grace and charity, and the other infused habits in a just person, have the character of exciting grace because they incline free choice to supernatural acts. Hence, just as someone not yet justified can produce the fruit of conversion and works of penance from the seed of a good inspiration, much more can he produce the fruit of righteousness and good works from the seed of grace that makes one pleasing to God, without any new exciting grace.
Refutation.— But an argument can be made against this solution: although grace and the other infused habits habitually incline a person’s free choice to elicit supernatural acts, they do not incline it actually unless it is actually moved by exciting and helping grace to elicit those same operations. Therefore, an infused habit alone does not take the place of the special help of exciting grace.
VII. Special help of helping grace is necessary for each act even in a just person.— Third conclusion. In a just person, in addition to exciting grace and supernatural simultaneous concurrence, by which God produces supernatural acts together with free choice and infused habits, special help of helping grace is necessarily required for each act. The conclusion is against the authors of the second opinion, but it is expressly stated by Saint Augustine in On Nature and Grace, ch. 26, where he says: Just as the bodily eye, even when completely healthy, cannot see unless helped by the brightness of light, so a person, even when most perfectly justified, cannot live rightly unless divinely helped by the eternal light of righteousness. God therefore heals not only to erase what we have sinned, but also to grant that we do not sin. In On Grace and Free Choice, ch. 6, he confirms the same with many scriptural testimonies, especially from Song of Songs VIII: Who is this who comes up, made white, leaning on her beloved? Having been made white, he says, she walks well, but only if she perseveringly leans on him by whom she was made white. For this reason Jesus himself, on whom the one made white leans, said to his disciples: “Without me you can do nothing.” This is also the opinion of Saint Thomas, I–II, q. 109, art. 1, in the body, where he says that however perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature may be held to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it is moved by God. He teaches the same in art. 9. Saint Thomas cannot be explained as speaking only of exciting grace, for through it God does not physically move free choice to pious operations but only morally; still less can he be interpreted as speaking only of simultaneous concurrence, as was shown above. Rather, he must necessarily be understood as speaking of helping grace, through which free choice is premoved and predetermined to operate. Saint Thomas teaches the same opinion in the places cited above. It can first be proved by the arguments made for the preceding conclusion.
It is also proved from the definition of the Second Council of Orange, canon 9: Whenever we do good, God works in us and with us so that we may act. Here it speaks universally of all good works, including those of a person already justified, and teaches that special help of helping grace is necessary for works of this kind. Through it God not only works the good work simultaneously with us, but also works in us, namely by means of that same help causing us to cooperate freely with God, as is clear from what was said above, where we interpreted the council’s words in this same sense. Otherwise it would have said, “Whenever we do good, God works with us”; there would have been no need to add the words “God works in us and with us.” This is confirmed by Innocent I in his reply to the Council of Carthage, where he says: All the saints testify that they can do nothing without God’s help. And in his reply to the Council of Milevis: It is necessary, he says, that, once the freedom of our former state has been restored to us through grace, we seek that grace, since we cannot avoid the devil’s temptations and devices in any other way than through helping grace. Celestine I, in his letter to all the bishops of Gaul, chs. 8 and 9, also decrees that grace is necessary for each act. He reports Pope Zosimus asserting in his letter to the bishops of the whole world that in each movement of the human will toward any good we should not doubt that his help has greater force, and that every holy thought and every movement of a good will comes from God, because through him we can do something good, without whom we can do nothing. He is speaking of the special help of helping grace, by which God acts in us so that we both will and do what he wills, as the same Celestine says in ch. 12 of that letter. Because of these testimonies, Master Medina, I–II, q. 109, art. 9, conclusion 3, considers our opinion so true and certain that he considers teaching the contrary untenable.
Secondly, God alone is the one who first initiates, physically—that is, by true efficient causality—every good work, even in justified people, as was shown above. But God makes this beginning through the special help of helping grace, insofar as through such help he premoves free choice and causes it to cooperate with him. Therefore, in addition to infused habits, special help of helping grace is necessary for each act in just people, not merely simultaneous help but also help prior to the cooperation of free choice, preceding it in the order of causality.
Thirdly, no action follows from something that is indifferent between alternatives unless something else determines it to one of them, as the Commentator says in Physics II, text 48. But human free choice, even when perfected by a supernatural habit, remains indifferent between alternatives, namely, operating and not operating, since a habit does not determine the faculty with respect to the exercise of an act, but only with respect to its specification. Therefore, it will never break forth into a particular act unless it is determined by God to produce this supernatural act here and now. But God makes this determination through the special help of helping grace, as was shown above. Therefore, even just people need special help of helping grace for every supernatural act.
Fourthly, general concurrence, whether of the order of nature or of the order of grace, by which God concurs with secondary causes established in first act through forms proportionate to their effects, is an immediate influx into secondary causes, completing and perfecting them so that they actually operate, as was shown in Disputations XVIII, XIX, and XXIII. Therefore, the special help of helping grace necessary for each supernatural act does not consist only in simultaneous concurrence, by which God, together with free choice elevated by a habit, flows into a supernatural act; it also consists in a prior motion by which God causes free choice to concur with him. Therefore, in addition to infused habits, just people need special help of helping grace for each supernatural act.
VIII. To the first argument the reply is that Saint Thomas explicitly teaches our opinion in many places, especially in the First Part of the Second Part, q. 109, art. 9, where he says that even one who has already attained grace, beyond the habitual gift by which corrupt human nature is healed and elevated to perform meritorious works of eternal life, needs the help of grace in another way, namely, to be moved by God to act rightly. By this help Saint Thomas means the special help of helping grace, not only simultaneous help but also prior help. Nor does he teach the contrary in the passages cited, because by “infusion of grace” he includes both habitual grace, through which a person is formally made just, and also the special or actual help by which free choice is moved to elicit the acts through which one is prepared for justification. In adults this help inseparably accompanies the first infusion of habitual grace. Hence, when in the cited article 6 he says that the infusion of grace is understood on the side of the divine motion—words by which he seems to mean that in justification itself God moves free choice to supernatural acts through the infusion of grace—he does not mean that he accomplishes this through habitual grace alone, but also through special actual help: through grace, radically or habitually; through special help, actually and formally. This also makes clear the answer to the confirmation11 and likewise to the Council of Milevis: the passage is understood of habitual help, without excluding actual motion. For justifying grace not only remits sins; it also gives strength through other infused habits or virtues, by which a person can thereafter avoid sin and persevere in the good, if he wills. But that, beyond this habitual help, special actual help is necessary for operating well or persevering in the exercise of the act is taught by the Supreme Pontiffs and the councils cited above.
IX. Special help of grace is not necessary only for an act to be supernatural.— To the second argument, the reply is that special help is necessary not only for an act of believing, hoping, and loving God to be supernatural, but also for it simply to exist and to be produced by free choice in its exercise, as is gathered from what was said above. Nor should it be admitted that these same acts can be produced in their substance by the powers of nature alone, as is clear from what was said in Disputation LXV. And although free choice is sufficiently elevated in first act through infused habits to elicit supernatural acts, nevertheless, in order actually to elicit acts of this kind in the exercise of its power, special help of exciting and helping grace is necessary, for the reasons assigned above.
To the third argument, the reply is that special help of helping grace is necessary both to predetermine a faculty established in first act through a supernatural habit to operate—it does not follow from this that freedom of choice is destroyed, as was shown in Disputations XVIII and XXIII and will be made clearer below—and also so that God, together with the faculty elevated through a habit, may produce the supernatural operation. For when the secondary cause is supernatural, God’s general concurrence must also be supernatural, as was shown in Disputation XX.
To the fourth argument on behalf of the second opinion, the reply is that, according to the teaching of Saint Thomas, the supernatural concurrence required on God’s side for supernatural acts is not only simultaneous, that is, flowing into those same acts jointly with free choice; it is also prior and immediate in its influx into free choice itself, as is clear from what was said above in Disputations XVIII and XXIII.
X. To the fifth argument, the reply is that a faculty does indeed have, through a supernatural habit, sufficient power as an efficient cause by which it truly can elicit supernatural acts if it wills to do so. But the habit alone does not grant it that it actually wills; otherwise, as long as it had the habit, it would always be operating in act. Therefore, in order for it to operate in act through the habit, special help of helping grace is necessarily required, by which it is moved and predetermined to operate, as was said above. For simultaneous concurrence does not predetermine free choice to operate and concur with God; rather, it presupposes that through its innate freedom it wills to use the supernatural habit and to operate with it.
To the sixth argument, the reply is that this is not the sole or even the chief reason why we say that special help of helping grace is necessary for each supernatural act even in just people. There are other more compelling reasons drawn from passages of Scripture, the Supreme Pontiffs, and the councils, by which we have proved this more effectively. We nevertheless admit that this argument too has great force. In answer to the attack on it, one should say that a faculty with a habit does indeed have sufficient and superabundant power by which it can operate if it wills, but it does not have the efficacious power by which it actually operates. Hence, for that it is necessary that it be moved and predetermined to operate through God’s actual concurrence of the supernatural order, as was shown more fully above. The same should be said proportionately of any permanent natural active power, however perfect, as may be gathered from Saint Thomas, I–II, q. 109, arts. 2 and 9, and from what was said in Disputations XVIII and XXIII.
To the confirmation, the reply is that this special help, or motion in the manner of a transient motion, does not need another motion from God by which it would be moved or predetermined to operate, as do faculties perfected or elevated by habits. Saint Thomas assigns the reason for this distinction:12 for although through grace and the other infused habits a person is healed with respect to the mind and perfected in first act for operating, corruption and infection with respect to the flesh still remain in him, through which he is a slave to the law of sin, as is said in Romans VII. A certain obscurity of ignorance also remains in the intellect, according to which, as is also said in Romans VIII, we do not know what we should pray for as we ought. Consequently, through habitual grace alone a person does not adhere immovably to the good, nor is he predetermined actually to pursue and love it. Therefore, he still needs the special help of helping grace, by which he is moved undeclinably and insuperably to do good. But this reason does not apply to one who has the special help of helping grace or the gift of perseverance. Hence it does not follow that he still needs another help or that the process goes on to infinity. When it is argued that even that special help of helping grace, or flowing motion, stands in relation to a supernatural act as first act to second, the reply is that this help, or prior motion, is formally neither first act nor second act, but a complement of first act and a certain mean between that first act and second act, as was said in Disputations XVIII and XIX.
XI. To the seventh argument, the reply is that the distinction assigned between a habit and the special help of helping grace does not entail that the same help acts naturally with such necessity that it drags the will along with it. For the will is not moved through grace by being forcibly carried along, as Luther claimed it was. Rather, it entails only that the habit does not cause the will to cooperate freely and infallibly with it. God does cause this through the special help of helping grace, because he moves the will in conformity with its own nature, as was said above. Hence special help not only does not destroy freedom of choice but perfects it in a wondrous way, for it grants it the actual use of that same freedom, as is clear from what has been established.
XII. An act is absolutely nobler than a faculty or habit.— To the eighth argument, the reply is that second act, speaking absolutely, is more perfect than a habit, although in a qualified respect a habit is superior. This is what Saint Thomas teaches in I–II, q. 71, art. 3, in the body and in replies to objections 1 and 3, and I p. q. 25. art. 1, ad 2. Richard of Middleton, IV Sentences, dist. 49, art. 1, q. 4; Soto, the same distinction, q. 1, art. 2, concerning the first conclusion; and Giles, quodlibet 4, q. 19, agree. Cajetan supports this in I, q. 27, art. 1, near the end, where he says that an act is superior to a habit in its character as actual. The reason is that second act participates more in actuality and, consequently, one acting through it is more like God than one acting through a habit, which includes a certain potentiality and imperfection. Moreover, a habit is ordered to an act as to its end, for the sake of which the habit itself is necessary. Hence, according to the common opinion of theologians, beatitude consists essentially in an act and not in a habit, as is clear from I–II, q. 3, art. 2, and IV Sentences, dist. 49. Therefore, since operation is the ultimate act, it is simply more perfect than a habit. For formal beatitude, since it is a person’s ultimate act, must consist in what is more perfect and more actual.13 Nor is it an obstacle that a habit is the efficient cause of an act, for this does not entail that it is simply more perfect than the act, but only more perfect in a qualified respect. For a habit is not the principal cause of the act itself but an instrumental cause; an instrumental cause need not be simply more perfect than its effect, especially when the effect is the end to which the cause itself is ordered. Since, therefore, second act is simply more perfect than a habit, the faculty elevated through a habit must be moved by God through the special or actual help of helping grace, so that it may elicit an act proportionate to itself.
I think the reply to the confirmation was already given in Disputation XVIII. For there, as I believe, a full enough answer was given to all the arguments that try to prove that God’s general concurrence is not an immediate influx into a secondary cause.