De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Introduction

Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.

Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.

Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.

Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.

Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.

Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.

Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.

Whether efficacious actual help is subject to the power of our free choice, as regards its use, in the way that habits are subject to it, which we use when we will.

I. THE affirmative position is consistently defended by all the authors who deny that efficacious help physically predetermines free choice to consent; they prove it by all the arguments set out above, by which they oppose this kind of predetermination.

Moreover, it is proved by the authority of St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 83. ar. 1. ad 5. where, after proposing the fifth argument to prove that man does not have free choice, in this form: The Philosopher says 3. Ethic. cap. 5.: As each person is, so the end appears to him. But it is not in our power to be of one kind or another; this is from nature. Therefore it is natural to us to pursue some end; therefore, it is not from free choice—he replies that inclinations or dispositions arising from any impression of bodily causes do not prejudice the freedom of choice, because they are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys. A little earlier he had stated that man naturally desires the ultimate end, namely happiness, and does not do so freely, because natural appetite is not subject to free choice. St. Thomas therefore holds that, for an inclination or disposition not to prejudice freedom of choice, it must, as regards its use, be subject to the judgment of reason and to the power of free choice. Therefore, if efficacious help is not subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, it will destroy its freedom.

Second, it is argued as follows: although the supernatural habits of faith, hope, and charity incline the faculties in one direction, namely, toward producing acts of the virtues proportioned to them, as regards their actual use they are nevertheless subject to the power of free choice, for we use habits when we will. Therefore, divine grace’s efficacious helps, although they incline the faculties toward producing similar acts, must also, as regards their actual use, be subject to the power of our free choice and subordinate to it. The inference is proved as follows: the very same rationale applies to help as to habit, since help is reduced to the species of habit.

Third. The efficacious help of divine grace has no effect in us without the free cooperation of our free choice; otherwise, it would produce a pious action in us without our freely consenting and cooperating, which is contrary to the decrees of the Council of Trent: therefore, as regards the actual production of that same effect and, consequently, as regards its actual use, it is subject to the power of our free choice. For the use of help consists in the actual production of the act for which it is given.

Fourth. The created will does not use the efficacious help of prevenient grace necessarily; otherwise, it would act necessarily and not freely, since it uses the help only by acting. Therefore, it uses this help freely and, consequently, can use it or not use it. Therefore, as regards its use, it is subject to the power of our free choice.

Fifth. Help that free choice can resist does not subject free choice to itself; rather, as regards its use, it is subject to that choice. But free choice can resist efficacious help, for the Council of Sens says: Nor is the help of God who draws such that it cannot be resisted: therefore, this kind of help is subject to the power of free choice as regards its use.

II. The contrary position is also consistently defended by all the Thomists and other authors who hold that God, by his efficacious grace, physically predetermines man’s will to consent and to act piously. And since this position is certain and highly consonant with the sacred Councils and the holy Fathers;

To explain this, to make the title of the question clear, and to understand the point on which the authors with whom we are disputing disagree with us, we must first state that all Catholics agree against Luther and Calvin that man concurs freely with efficacious help, cooperating and assenting to God who rouses and moves him; and consequently, speaking absolutely, he can fail to act and dissent if he wills. This is defined under anathema in the Council of Trent, sess. 6. can. 4., and the Holy Synod teaches in cap. 5. of that same session that man can reject through free choice the inspiration he receives from God. Hence, if in the present disputation “use of efficacious help” means the cooperation of free choice with it, or the term toward which that same help moves free choice, namely, the operation, there is no doubt that such use, as we are moved by God, is subject to the power of our free choice. This follows from the argument drawn from Trent: even when free choice is moved by efficacious help to act piously, it can truly, speaking absolutely and in the divided sense, reject that inspiration and dissent if it wills, although it cannot be the case both that efficacious help is present and that it in fact rejects it or dissents. But since, strictly and properly speaking, to use something is to apply and determine it to an operation or to the effect for which it is ordered, as we shall say shortly, the difficulty is this: whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use in such a way that our will, according to its freedom, applies and determines efficacious help to cooperate with it; and consequently, whether these two coexist, or can coexist: that this help, considered according to all the real power it has from God, is in a man, while the man does not cooperate in the act toward which it moves him, because he does not will to use this same help—as happens with habits, which we use when we will; and because we do not always will to use a habit, it is possible at once to have the habit and to do nothing with it.

What the use of a thing is.— Note, therefore, secondly, that, as St. Thomas says, 1. 2. q. 16. art. 1., Use of a thing imports the application of that thing to some operation. Hence the operation to which we apply a thing is also called its use: for example, riding is the use of a horse, and striking is the use of a staff. Since the will uses the other faculties, both internal and external, using is consequently an act of the will as the first mover, and of reason as that which directs; but it is an act of the other faculties as those which execute, and which stand to the will, by which they are applied to acting, as instruments stand to the principal agent. It follows that the efficacious help of divine grace cannot be subject or subordinate to the power of free choice as regards its use unless it is applied and determined by free choice to acting in actuality.

Efficacious help of grace is not subject to free choice but subjects it to itself.— Therefore, it must be said that the efficacious help of pre-operating grace is not subject to the power of our free choice in this second sense, as regards its use, in the way that habits are subject to it, which we use when we will. Rather, the help itself subjects the human will to itself powerfully and sweetly, and makes it obedient. Consequently, these two things are incompatible: that efficacious help, considered according to all the real power it has as it comes from God, is in a man, and that the man does not cooperate with it, although he can, if he wills, fail to cooperate.

It is proved first as follows: if free choice uses efficacious help in such a way that, according to its freedom, it determines that help to concur with it, it would follow that the help, or assistance, of grace is subordinated to human humility or obedience. This is shown as follows. If, whenever the will wills to obey and cooperate, efficacious help concurs with it, and does so only then; if it is the will of the one obeying that applies the help itself to concur with it; and if, when the will does not will to obey, the help itself produces no pious action in us or with us, then the assistance of grace is subordinated to human humility or obedience. But this conclusion is contrary to the Council of Orange, can. 6., where it is said: If anyone subordinates the help of grace to human humility or obedience, and does not agree that it is a gift of grace itself that we are obedient and humble, he resists the Apostle, who says: What do you have that you did not receive? And, by the grace of God I am what I am. By these words the Council defines that the help of grace is not subordinated to human humility or obedience. If it is said that the Council means that the help of grace is not subordinated to human humility or obedience arising from the powers of nature alone, as the Semipelagians said about the first call, asserting that God gives his prevenient grace to those who seek, knock, and strive by the powers of nature, but that the Council defines nothing against those who say that, after God has roused free choice by his grace and mercifully gone before it, that same grace is made subject or subordinate to free choice, all the arguments by which we shall show in disp. 95. that even after grace’s first rousing God does not wait for our willing to be cleansed militate against this. Let Augustine be consulted, lib. de corrept. et gratia cap. 1. 2. et 8., where he says: The human will does not obtain grace by freedom, but rather freedom by grace, etc.; that is, helping grace makes free cooperation of free choice follow.

Second, it is proved as follows: for St. Augustine, as was seen in disputation 73. nu. 2., teaches in epist. 107. ad Vitalem that those contradict our prayers who say, with regard to God’s call, that consenting or not consenting is so much our own affair that, if we will, it comes to pass, but if we refuse, we make God’s work of no effect in us. St. Augustine therefore holds that those contradict the prayers of the Church who say that the help of grace is subject, as regards its use, to the power of our free choice in such a way that, if we will, we cooperate with it, but if we refuse, we make that help of no effect in us.

This is confirmed. As Augustine often teaches, God by the help of efficacious grace makes the unwilling willing and the resisting consenting. Therefore, by that same help he subjects human wills to himself; therefore, the help itself is not subject to human wills as regards its use.

Third, it is proved. For St. Prosper, reporting the position of the Massilians, says that they thought the human will procures for itself the aid of divine grace; grace does not subject the human will to itself. Attacking this position in lib. 1. de vocat. gentium, cap. 25., he says: Could the power of grace, which subjected to itself those whom it willed, not convert those who remained unconvertible? By these words he teaches plainly that the efficacious help of divine grace submits and subjects human wills to itself. Therefore, it must be said that grace itself subjects free choice to itself as regards right use; the contrary must not be asserted, namely, that efficacious grace is subjected, as regards its exercise, to the power of created free choice.

Fourth, it is proved as follows. What is more powerful and stronger in acting overcomes and subjects to itself what is less powerful in acting or resisting; for it is said in Lucae 11.: When a strong man, fully armed, guards his own courtyard, his possessions are all in peace. But when one stronger than he comes upon him and conquers him, he takes away all his armor in which he trusted and distributes his spoils. But the efficacious will of God is much more powerful in acting than human free choice is in resisting. For Augustine says: No human free choice resists him when he wills to save; for willing and refusing are so within the power of the unwilling or willing person that they do not impede the divine will or overcome divine power. For he himself does what he wills with those who do what he does not will. And a little later: It is therefore not to be doubted that human wills cannot resist the will of God, who in heaven and on earth has done all things whatsoever he willed, and who also made those things that are to come, so as to prevent him from doing what he wills; since indeed, he does what he wills, when he wills, even with the very wills of men. And below: God, he says, has the wills of men more in his power than they themselves have their own. And in Enchirid. ad Laurentium cap. 95. Our God, he says, is above in heaven; in heaven and on earth he has done all things whatsoever he willed. This is plainly not true if he willed anything and did not do it. And, what is more unworthy, he did not do it because a human will prevented what the Almighty willed from being done. And below: If we do not believe this, the very beginning of the confession of our faith is imperiled, by which we profess to believe in God the Father almighty. For he is truly called almighty for no other reason than that he can do whatever he wills, and the effect of the Almighty’s will is not hindered by the will of any creature. Therefore, efficacious grace subjects free choice to itself as regards its use; therefore, it is not subject to that same free choice.

This is confirmed. Efficacious grace softens the free choice of man, removes its hardness, and overcomes its resistance; for Augustine says: This grace, therefore, which is bestowed on human hearts by divine generosity in a hidden way, is received by no hardened heart *. For it is given precisely so that hardness of heart may first be removed. And the Lord says through the Prophet: And I will give them a new heart, and I will place a new spirit within them, and I will take the heart of stone from their flesh and give them a heart of flesh, so that they may walk in my commandments, keep my judgments, and do them. And in cap. 36.: And I will put my spirit in your midst, and I will make you walk in my commandments, keep my judgments, and carry them out. Therefore, efficacious grace subjects free choice to itself as regards its use, and not the reverse.

Fifth, it is proved as follows: otherwise it would follow that efficacious grace does not apply free choice to acting, but, on the contrary, free choice applies efficacious grace so that it may cooperate with it. This conclusion is contrary to what was said above: therefore. The inference is proved as follows: as St. Thomas teaches in the cited 1. 2. q. 16., to use something is to apply it to acting. Therefore, if efficacious grace is subject to free choice as regards its use, it follows that free choice itself applies efficacious grace to acting. This argument is confirmed by all the arguments by which it was shown in disput. 23. that God, through efficacious help, premoves, applies, and predetermines human wills to act. The arguments by which we showed in disp. 21. that God’s general concurrence is not indifferent in itself reach the same conclusion.

III. IN answer to the first argument, it is said that St. Thomas rightly infers that qualities or dispositions arising from the impression of a bodily cause do not impair the freedom of choice, even though they incline the will in some way toward one side, because such qualities and inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, insofar as it is within our power to acquire such qualities, either causally or dispositionally, or to exclude them from ourselves. Yet it does not follow from this that, if it is not in our power to acquire efficacious grace causally or dispositionally, or if this same efficacious grace is not subject to the power of our free choice as regards its actual use, the freedom of that choice is lost. For a man’s freedom to act or not to act to remain, it suffices that he can, speaking absolutely and in the divided sense, reject efficacious grace and dissent if he wills, even though in the composite sense he cannot reject it or dissent, as was said above and will become clearer below.

In answer to the second, the inference is denied, and the reason for the distinction is this: a habit gives only the ability, or perfects it, whereas efficacious help grants the faculty its actual operation. Hence a habit does not subject free choice to itself as regards actual use, but is subject to free choice, insofar as free choice is moved by God through an actual motion. Efficacious help, however, subjects the created will to itself and makes it obedient, as was said.

IIII. What effects efficacious help causes in us.— In answer to the third, it is said that efficacious help has a twofold effect in us, or a twofold mode of causing, one of which follows upon the other. The first is to exercise an immediate causal influx upon free choice as upon a cause, moving it, applying it, predetermining it, and effecting that it cooperate and consent. It produces this effect in us prior to the cooperation of our free choice, not by priority of time, but of reason and causality, as was said above. In this respect it is in no way subject to the power of our free choice, but only to the power of God; for God alone moves us and makes us act, as was shown above. The second effect is to produce free consent together with the will that it moves. In this respect it is subject to the power of our free choice on the side of the term, namely, on the side of the free act for which it is given, because that act itself is under the power of our free choice as moved and roused by God. But the help itself, even as it exercises causal influx upon free consent, is not strictly within our power; for although the help itself does not exercise causal influx upon consent without our freely concurring, our free choice does not cause the help to exercise causal influx upon consent. On the contrary, God through that same help causes our free choice to concur.

In answer to the fourth, our will freely uses itself insofar as, moved and applied by God, or by helping grace, it freely moves and applies itself as the proximate cause for acting, and acts. Properly speaking, however, the will does not use the help, since it does not apply or determine it to acting. Hence it does not follow that the will uses it necessarily or freely, except in the sense explained in the first foundation. But you will say: If help applies the will to acting, then the will does not apply itself and, consequently, does not act freely but necessarily. It is answered that this conclusion does not follow; it follows only that the created will is not absolutely the first to move itself, the first to apply itself, or the first to determine itself, as was said above.

In answer to the fifth, if efficacious help is considered according to its physical entity, setting aside the efficacious decree of the divine will, whose power it contains in an intentional mode, the will can resist it. But if it is considered as an instrument of God who wills to convert a man to himself, the will cannot resist it, properly speaking of resistance, just as it cannot resist the will of God’s good pleasure, as was said above and will be clear below. If, however, we speak of resistance in a broad sense, so that it includes the power to dissent and not to act, free choice can indeed resist efficacious help absolutely and in the divided sense—that is, dissent from it—but not in the composite sense, because efficacious help cannot coexist with actual dissent by free choice, although it can coexist with the power to dissent, as was said in disput. 18. num. 23. and disput. 25.

Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.

Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.

Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.

Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.

Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.

Disputatio XCIII: Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, speaking properly of resistance.

Disputatio XCIV: How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that human free choice moved by God through efficacious help cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.

Disputatio XCV: Whether, after God has mercifully aroused created free choice, he awaits its free consent to be purified or justified.

Disputatio XCVI: Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who arouses and calls it.

Disputatio XCVII: Whether the good use or cooperation of free choice, by which it consents to God who arouses and calls it, proceeds from its innate freedom alone.

Disputatio XCVIII: Whether, exciting grace being presupposed, the consent or cooperation of free choice must first be begun by the created will, or by the divine will or the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand.

Disputatio XCIX: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person, preceded by exciting grace, wills to be converted, he is therefore helped by God and converted; or, conversely, he is converted because he is helped by God.

Disputatio C: Whether the bestowal of efficacious help is the adequate cause of the conversion of free choice.

Disputatio CI: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person is not helped by God, he is therefore not converted.

Disputatio CII: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person aroused by God does not will to use sufficient grace, he is therefore not helped by God or converted.

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

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