De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Introduction
Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.
Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.
Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.
Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.
Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.
Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.
Whether God, through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, truly brings it about by efficient causality that we act; or only by persuading, inviting, and alluring, or otherwise also drawing us inwardly in a moral way.
I. Since not only St. Augustine but also the sacred Scriptures and the Councils expressly teach that God makes us act and works so that we may work—as the passages to be cited below prove more clearly than light—there is no Catholic who denies in words that God, through the help of grace, makes us act and works so that we may cooperate. There is, however, disagreement among theologians about the way in which God does this.
For some, although they acknowledge that God, through the efficacious help of grace, truly effects a supernatural act by efficient causality and physically, together with free choice, nevertheless deny that God himself, through the efficacious help of prevenient grace, truly and by efficient causality brings it about that our free choice exercises causal influx and cooperates with God as he calls and moves it. Hence they explain all the passages of Scripture, the Councils, and the holy Fathers that assert that God, through his prevenient grace, makes us act—inasmuch as this is attributed in some way to God alone and to prevenient grace—as referring only to a moral or metaphorical causality. This occurs only by persuading, alluring, inviting, and inwardly presenting an object suitably and opportunely, in the way God foreknows that the created will will give its consent. Their chief foundation is this:1 for otherwise they think the freedom of our choice cannot be preserved unharmed. For if, before the created will elicits its act or cooperates with God as he moves it, God must first, in the order of reason and causality, bring it about that the will itself wills, then it will not be within that same will's power to will or refuse at its pleasure. It will be only in God's power, since he brings it about that we will or refuse whenever it pleases him. Thus freedom will be in God alone, not in the created will.
Moreover, this opinion can be proved as follows. God makes us act by working in us, without us, the beginning of a good will, which is not perfected without us. For Augustine says in book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 17: He works without us when beginning, he who cooperates with those who will when perfecting. But God does not work in us, without us, the beginning of a good will except by morally persuading, alluring, and inviting. For he cannot physically effect the beginning of an act of the will without us, because, being a vital act, it cannot be produced by God alone without the concurrence and cooperation of the created will. Therefore God makes us act only morally, not truly by efficient causality or physically.
This is confirmed. For the physical beginning of an act of good will is free to man; otherwise the whole act would not be free for man. Since an act of the will is instantaneous, if its beginning were not free with respect to man, the whole act would not be free for that same man, but would be free for God alone. But it is impossible for a free act, or any physical beginning of it, to be produced without the free consent and cooperation of our will. Therefore it is impossible for God, through operating or prevenient grace, insofar as it is prevenient, to make us act physically or truly by efficient causality. Therefore he effects this only morally.
Second. The whole causality of prevenient grace, through which God makes us act, is reduced to the motion exerted by the end. For through this grace God makes the object proposed for love appear more honorable and more worthy of love, the object to be feared more dreadful, and the object to be hated more shameful, and so on. But the causality of the end is only moral, not truly and properly efficient. Otherwise the efficient and final causes would be confused and coincide. Therefore God, through prevenient grace, makes us act only morally, not truly by efficient causality.
This is confirmed: for through prevenient grace, by which God makes us act, God moves a man, insofar as he is a man, to act and consequently moves him to act freely, in accordance with the mode of his nature. But man, insofar as he is man, is moved to act by an end conceived beforehand, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2. q. 1. art. 1. Hence human actions take their species from the end, as he shows in the same question, article 3. Therefore through prevenient grace God makes us act only morally.
II. Third. To work so that we will, or to bring it about that we will, is nothing other than to work something in us by which we are disposed or inclined to will, and to do so with the purpose and intention that we will. But all this belongs to the order of moral causality and does not intrinsically include true efficient causality with respect to the act of willing. Therefore, from the fact that, according to Sacred Scripture, the Councils, and the Fathers, God works in us so that we will and makes us act, it does not follow that he truly brings it about by efficient causality that we will. Rather, all those expressions, insofar as they are attributed to God alone, can and must be understood as referring to moral or metaphorical causality. The minor premise is proved: one who excites and premoves a person inwardly to love does something by which he disposes and inclines the will to love. For he works an illumination of the intellect and an inspiration through which the will is prepared and moved to love. For the devil too prepares the will and moves it by persuasion to sin, by proposing to it the attractiveness of the object. Likewise, one person can by persuasion prepare and incline another person's will to do something; yet the devil does not truly bring it about by efficient causality that a person sins, but does so only morally, just as one person makes another will only morally. Therefore.
This is confirmed. It is one thing to produce willing in us, and another to bring it about that we will. For one who asks or commands another to will brings it about that the other wills, but does not work in that person the act of willing. Therefore, similarly, through prevenient grace, insofar as it is prevenient, God, by persuading, brings it about that we will, without, through that same grace insofar as it precedes the free cooperation of our choice, effecting the very act of willing in us.
Fourth. There is no action upon an action; otherwise another action would be necessary for that prior action, and another for that one, and so there would be an infinite regress among actions and efficient causes. Therefore, before the action and cooperation of free choice, no divine action is understood as prior, by which God physically, or truly by efficient causality, brings it about that free choice cooperates. Consequently, through the efficacious help of prevenient grace, he makes us act only morally.
Fifth. The same can be proved by all the preceding arguments,2 by which the authors of this opinion try to persuade us that God, by his efficacious help, does not predetermine free choice to act, but that the actual determination of that same choice proceeds from its own innate freedom alone. For from this principle, if it were true, it clearly follows that God, through the efficacious help of prevenient grace, makes us act only morally, not physically or truly by efficient causality.
III. God, through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, makes us cooperate both morally and by efficient causality.— Nevertheless, despite these arguments, it must be held with absolute certainty that God, through the efficacious help of prevenient grace, makes us act and works so that we may work, not only by persuading, alluring, inviting, or otherwise also drawing us inwardly in a moral way, but also by truly bringing it about through efficient causality, and doing so efficaciously, that free choice itself, moved and roused by God, freely determines itself to act well and does so. This is the express opinion of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, as is clear from the passages cited above and from those to be cited below.
This is proved, first, by the clearest testimonies of Sacred Scripture. Among them, the foremost is Ezekiel 36: I will give you a new heart, and I will place a new spirit within you; I will take the stony heart from your flesh and give you a heart of flesh, and I will place my spirit within you; and I will bring it about that you walk in my precepts, keep my judgments, and act. St. Augustine often pressed this testimony against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians,3 concluding against them that God makes us act and works so that we may work, and does so not only by persuading, alluring, inviting, or otherwise also drawing us inwardly in a moral way, but also by truly bringing it about through efficient causality, and efficaciously, that our free choice cooperates. But especially in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 11, For this reason, he says, these things are both commanded to us and shown to be gifts of God, so that it may be understood that we do them too, and God brings it about that we do them; just as he says most clearly through the prophet Ezekiel. For what could be clearer than where he says, “I will bring it about that you do them”? Attend, dearest brothers, to the very passage of Scripture, and you will see that God promises that he himself will bring it about that they do what he commands to be done. And in On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 16: It is certain that we keep the commandments if we will; but because the will is prepared by the Lord, we must ask him that we will as much as suffices for us to act by willing. It is certain that we will when we will, but he brings it about that we will the good—he of whom it was said, as I quoted a little earlier, that the will is prepared by the Lord, and of whom it was said: “The steps of a man will be directed by the Lord, and the man shall will the Lord’s way.”4 Of him it was said: “It is God who works in you both to will and to act.”5 It is certain that we act when we act; but he brings it about that we act, by supplying the will with the most efficacious powers—he who said: “I will bring it about that you walk in my statutes, observe my judgments, and act.”6 When he says, “I will bring it about that you act,” what else does he say but, “I will take from you the stony heart, by which you did not act, and give you a heart of flesh, by which you may act”? And what is this but, “I will take away the hard heart, by which you did not act, and give you an obedient heart, by which you may act”? He brings it about that we act, to whom a man says: “Set a guard, Lord, over my mouth”;7 for this is to say, “Bring it about that I set a guard over my mouth”—a benefit already obtained from God by the one who said: “I set a guard over my mouth.”8 St. Prosper in Against the Collator and St. Fulgentius explain the same passage from Ezekiel in the same sense,910 the latter concluding from the prophet's words as follows: God therefore gives a new heart so that we may walk in his statutes, which pertains to the beginning of a good will. He also grants that we observe his judgments and act, which pertains to the effect of a good operation. From this we know11 that it belongs to God that we will to do good, and that we be able to do good. A little further below, explaining the words In God we shall do valiantly,12 he adds: But what we do in God is what, through God’s acting in us, we are given to do. This is shown clearly in the epistle to the Hebrews: after it had been said of God, “May he equip you in every good thing to do his will,” there immediately follows, “Doing in you what is pleasing before him through Jesus Christ.”13 Therefore every work that is done in God, God does in us. For all things are from him, and through him, and in him. Therefore both the good will and the good operation are from him. The Doctor of the Gentiles affirms this in these words: “For it is God who works in you both to will and to bring to completion, for a good will.”14 St. Thomas taught the same opinion in the passages cited above;15 especially in 3. Against the Gentiles, ch. 88, where, from the passage quoted from Philippians 2, It is God who works in you both to will and to bring to completion, for a good will, and Proverbs 21, The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; he will turn it wherever he wills, he proves that God alone can move the will by way of an agent—that is, truly by efficient causality, as distinguished from merely moral motion. This is gathered from the fifth argument, where, explaining what it is to be moved by way of an agent, he says: I mean being moved by an extrinsic principle that moves by way of an agent and not by way of an end. And in ch. 89, recounting and refuting the interpretation of those who wrongly interpreted the cited passages of Scripture, he says: But some, not understanding how God can cause the movement of the will in us without prejudice to the freedom of the will, tried to explain these authorities wrongly, saying that God causes willing and bringing to completion in us insofar as he gives us the power to will, but not in such a way that he makes us will this or that—just as Origen explains it in the third book of On First Principles, defending free choice against the authorities just mentioned. From this there seems to have arisen the opinion of certain people who said that providence does not concern those things subject to free choice, namely choices, but that providence relates to external outcomes. For one who chooses to attain or accomplish something, such as building or becoming wealthy, will not always be able to reach it. Thus the outcomes of our actions are not subject to free choice, but are arranged by providence. These authorities of Sacred Scripture plainly resist that view. For it is said in Isaiah 26: “You, Lord, have wrought all our works in us.” Hence we have from God not only the power to will, but also the operation. Moreover, what Solomon himself says, “He will incline it wherever he wills,” shows that divine causality extends not only to the power of the will, but also to its act. Again, God not only gives things their power, but no thing can act by its own power unless it acts by his power, as was shown above. Therefore a person cannot use the power of the will given to him except insofar as he acts by God's power. But that by whose power an agent acts is the cause not only of the power, but also of the act. This is clear in the case of a craftsman, by whose power an instrument acts—even an instrument that does not receive its own form from that craftsman, but is merely applied by him to its act. Therefore God is the cause for us not only of the will, but also of willing. In this testimony, let the Reader consider those words of St. Thomas, but not in such a way that he makes us will this or that. With these words he refutes those who assert that God does not make us will this or that, because they did not understand how he could do this without prejudice to freedom. He therefore holds that God truly brings it about by efficient causality that we will this particular thing or that. For if this were understood only as moral or metaphorical causality, there could be no reason, not even the slightest, to move Origen and others to think that our freedom of choice was prejudiced by such divine causality. St. Thomas is therefore speaking of true efficient causality, commonly called physical causality, by which God effects not only the act of willing together with the willing person, but also brings it about that the person wills. This is indicated by those words of St. Thomas: Therefore God is the cause for us not only of the will, but also of willing.
Second, this is proved from the Council of Orange, canon 9, where it says: Whenever we do good, God works in us and with us so that we may act. By these words it teaches clearly enough that God not only works with us through efficient causality in doing good works, but also works in us by bringing it about that we cooperate with God. For if God worked with us in doing good works only by a simultaneous influx, but did not bring it about that we cooperate, it would have said only: Whenever we do good, God works with us. It would not have been necessary to add the words, he works so that we may act. And canon 20 adds: Many good things are done in a person that the person does not do; but a person does no good things unless God grants that the person does them.
IIII. The authors of the opposing opinion answer all these arguments in two ways. Their first answer is that God makes us act and works so that we may work, not physically, or truly by efficient causality, by predetermining the will to act well, but by inwardly persuading and alluring that same will, and drawing it morally in the way in which he foreknows that the will will consent. In this sense, they say, the passages of Scripture, the Councils, and the holy Fathers cited above are to be understood.
This answer, however, does not seem to satisfy the cited testimonies. First, they teach without qualification that God works so that we may work. But to work only by morally persuading is not properly to work, but only to work metaphorically, as St. Thomas teaches in question 3, On Evil, article 3, in the body. Second, St. Augustine speaks expressly of physical efficient causality, as distinguished from causality that is only moral, as is clear from On Rebuke and Grace, chapters 11 and 12, whose words we cited in Disputation 71, number 7. For he assigns a difference between the grace given to Adam and the grace given to us through Christ. The grace of the first state only made it so that a person would have justice if he willed, and would do good and persevere in it if he willed. But the grace of Christ is more powerful, for through it God brings it about that a person wills. And to exclude the false interpretation of mere moral causality set out above, St. Augustine used the verb “to effect,” which signifies true efficient causality. Third, as was shown above, the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians admitted an interior prevenient grace consisting in an illumination of the intellect, persuasion, and an excitation of the sluggish will, through which God makes us will only morally or metaphorically; but they denied the grace that truly brings this about by efficient causality, as is clear from what was said in Disputations 1 and 2. Therefore, when St. Augustine and the Councils teach against the Pelagians that God, through efficacious grace, makes us act and works so that we may work, they speak of physical efficient causality, not of causality that is only moral or metaphorical.
V. Their second answer is that Augustine and the Councils also speak of physical efficient causality. For when God grants efficacious help, he infuses something physical and truly causes it by efficient causality in the intellect and will themselves, namely an interior illumination, which is something real and physical, and an excitation and pious affection of the will, which likewise is something real and physical, received in that same will. And if our will, through the freedom innate to it, wills to determine itself to perform a pious act toward which it is moved by exciting grace, God too, through that same grace by a simultaneous concurrence, truly produces the pious operation with us by efficient causality. In this sense they acknowledge that God physically, or truly by efficient causality, makes us act and works so that we may work.
This explanation, however, is easily refuted. For the Councils and Fathers do not merely intend to establish against Pelagius and the Semi-Pelagians that God works something physical through efficient causality in our intellect and will when he makes us act; as was said, the Pelagians did not deny this. Nor do they intend merely to teach that God simultaneously cooperates physically with our will in producing a pious act if our will itself wills to determine itself to act; for the Pelagians did not deny this either, as was said above.16 Therefore they intended to define something more: namely, that by his grace God truly brings it about by efficient causality that the will itself freely determines itself and cooperates with God as he calls it, so that the cooperation and determination, or influx, of the created will is an effect of the divine operation in the order of true efficient causality. For by his grace God brings it about that we cooperate, freely assenting to that same grace. It should also be added that, although God causes something in the intellect and will as an efficient cause when he rouses free choice to act—namely, interior illuminations and excitations—nevertheless, through these he makes the will determine itself only by moral persuasion, not by true efficient causality. Similarly, one person, when he persuades another that something is good, produces something by true efficient and physical causality, for the persuasion is something real whose efficient cause is the one persuading. But through it he brings it about only morally that the other consents; he does not make him willing from unwilling, or consenting from resisting. God, however, brings this about in us through prevenient grace, as Augustine often teaches.
VI. What they add in the same answer about God's simultaneous influx or concurrence does not satisfy the argument either. Through it God works with us if we will; yet he does not bring it about that we will. But in the passages cited, St. Augustine contends that God not only cooperates with us when we will, but also works in us so that we will. Hence, in book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 17, he says: It was said of him who works so that we may will: “For it is God who works in you both to will.”17 Of him who cooperates when we already will and act by willing, it was said: “We know”, he says, “that all things work together for good for those who love God.”18 And in Question 2 to Simplicianus he says:19 For it is God who works in you both to will and to act for a good will. Here he shows clearly enough that the good will itself is also brought about in us by God working. For if the statement, “It is not of the one who wills, nor of the one who runs, but of God who shows mercy,” was made only because man's will alone does not suffice for us to live justly and rightly unless we are helped by God's mercy, “It is therefore not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills” could also be said in this way, because God's mercy alone does not suffice unless the consent of our will is added. But this is clear: we will in vain unless God shows mercy. Yet I do not know how it can be said that God shows mercy in vain unless we will. For if God shows mercy, we also will; for it pertains to that same mercy of God that we will. For it is God who works in us both to will and to act for a good will. Therefore, according to Augustine, our very acting is an effect of the divine operation in the same kind of causality, and just as properly, as it is an effect of our free choice. And in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 8: Why, he says, does he not teach all? If we say that those whom he does not teach are unwilling to learn, we shall be answered: “Where, then, is what is said to him: ‘Lord, when you turn us, you will revive us’?”20 Or if God does not make the unwilling willing, what does the Church pray for her persecutors in accordance with the Lord's command? It is therefore so plainly Augustine's opinion that God, by the help of pre-operating grace, truly brings it about by efficient causality that we act and works so that we may work that there is no need to dwell on it further. See the same Augustine in On Grace and Free Choice, chapters 20 and 21, where, among other things relevant to our purpose, The Almighty brings about, he says, in the hearts of people, even the movement of their will, so that through them he may do what he himself has willed to do through them, since he does not know how to will anything unjustly.
VII. Third, this is proved by reason. Interior illuminations of the intellect, excitations of the will, and persuasions, however perfect they may be and however much they may be multiplied, can exist in one who is unwilling. Therefore, by moral motion alone, God does not efficaciously bring it about that we will. Therefore, beyond such excitations and persuasions, an efficacious help must be posited, through which God truly brings it about by efficient causality that we act and works so that we may work.
Fourth. Through prevenient grace God works good works in us, not only permissively, but properly and per se; as the Council of Trent defines, anathematizing those who say that God works evil works just as he works good ones, not only permissively, but also properly and per se, so that the destruction of Judas is no less his own work than the calling of Paul.21 By these words it establishes a difference between evil works and good ones, because, as St. Thomas teaches: God is said to be the cause of good actions not only with respect to the essence of the act, but also with respect to the perfection according to which they are called good: for his causal influx upon the agent brings about both its acting and its acting well; but in evil actions, although he is their cause with respect to their essence, he is not their cause with respect to their defect. And therefore he must be called absolutely the cause of good works, but not of sins.22 Therefore, according to the Council’s definition, God is properly and per se the efficient cause, exercising causal influx upon the agent so that it acts well. Therefore he makes us act not only morally but also truly by efficient causality. For a moral cause is not a cause per se, but is called a cause metaphorically, as St. Thomas teaches,23 since the effect does not follow from it, motion does not begin from it, nor does it impart to the agent the very act of acting.
Fifth. The same point can be confirmed by all the arguments through which it will be made clear in Disputations 96 and 97 that the determination and cooperation of free choice do not have its innate freedom alone as their efficient cause; rather, they must be reduced to the absolute and efficacious decree of the divine will, as to a prior per se efficient cause, although God does not effect them without us freely consenting and cooperating.
Finally, to prove the same point, the passage of the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 4 can be brought forward: For who distinguishes you? And what do you have that you did not receive? But if you received it, why do you boast as though you had not received it? For if God, through his efficacious grace, does not truly cause us to act by efficient causality, but a man, given exciting grace, were to determine himself to a devout action by his own innate freedom alone, he could glory in himself against another in that determination, and by means of it distinguish himself from the one who persists in sin or does not cooperate with God calling and rousing him. This is how St. Augustine argues in the passage cited, Disputation 62, no. 6.
TO the foundation of the contrary opinion, the reply is that it concludes only that willing itself is not primarily and per se in the power of the created will, but in the power of God, who alone has first and absolute dominion over every created action, as will be clear in Disputation 117. For freedom by essence is found only in God; in intellectual creatures, however, freedom and dominion are found by participation from the first free being and the first Lord, on whom they depend as on an efficient cause, even in the exercise of that same dominion.
VIII. In reply to the first argument made in confirmation of this opinion, it is answered that God brings about in us the beginning of a good will not only morally but through efficient causality, prior in the order of nature, though not prior in time, but with that same will simultaneously exercising causal influx and freely cooperating, as was said above. And by this the reply to the confirmation is clear.
In reply to the second, although the whole moral causality of prevenient grace is reduced to the motion exerted by the end, the causality of efficacious help, by which God effects man’s conversion, is not reduced to the motion exerted by the end alone, but truly belongs to the genus of efficient cause, as was said. Hence, through prevenient grace, God makes us act not only morally, that is, by a motion from the object or the end, but also truly through efficient causality.
In reply to the confirmation, it is answered that man, as man, is moved to acting both morally by the object, or by the end previously conceived, and also through efficient causality by God as the first mover, as St. Thomas teaches in 1.2, q. 9, art. 1 and 4; and he needs both motions in order to act, as will be clear in Disputation 91.
What it is for God to work so that we will.— In answer to the third argument, it is said that to work so that we will is to work something in us by which we are disposed, efficaciously inclined, and determined to will. But this does not belong only to the genus of moral causality, since persuasion alone does not transform the will from one thing to another, as was said above from St. Augustine and Thomas. Hence, besides an inward illumination of the intellect and the rousing of the sluggish will, it is required that God truly bring it about through efficient causality that we act; otherwise he will not incline free choice efficaciously to will, but only sufficiently, just as the devil does not make a man sin efficaciously, as St. Thomas teaches in the body of q. 3, de malo, art. 3; and he gives the reason: because he prepares and inclines the man’s will to sin only by persuading it.
In answer to the confirmation, it is said that it is one thing to make us will, and another to produce the willing itself; nevertheless, we say that God truly does both through efficient causality by his grace. He brings about the first, namely, without our bringing it about that we will; the second, however, he works together with us as we consent and cooperate simultaneously in time, as was said. The case is not the same with a man or an angel who asks or commands another to will; for he makes the other will not properly but metaphorically, as is clear from what was established above.
In answer to the fourth, efficacious help, by which God makes us act and works so that we act, does not belong directly to the category of quality, because it is a motion by which free choice is applied to acting; it will be called a motion endowed with causal power, as was shown in Disputation 19. Hence it does not follow that there is an infinite regress in actions or in efficient causes.
The fifth argument is answered by what was said in Disputation 22 and the two following disputations.