De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Introduction
Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.
Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.
Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.
Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.
Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.
Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, as two men hauling a ship.
I. CERTAIN more recent theologians defend the affirmative side. To explain it, they say that the whole effect is both from God and from secondary causes, yet from neither God nor the secondary causes as a total cause, but as a part of a cause that at the same time requires concurrence and another influx. It is just as when two men haul a ship: the whole motion proceeds from each of the haulers, but not as from the total cause of the motion, since each of them together with the other produces every part, and each individual part, of that same motion. They extend this doctrine to supernatural acts, in producing which they hold that God, by his concurrence, and free choice are two partial causes of those same acts, as two men hauling a ship are, with respect to the ship's motion. This opinion is proved.
First: according to the Catholic faith, defined at the Council of Trent against the Lutherans, not only God, or grace alone, is the efficient cause of supernatural consent, but free choice too is its true efficient cause, and cooperates with God. Therefore God and free choice are partial causes of the same free act, as two men hauling a ship. The consequence is proved: for a partial cause, in relation to some effect, is one that has the partnership of another cause, just as a total cause is said to be one that does not have the partnership of another cause.
Second. God and free choice do not flow into a free act by the same influx; rather, both God and free choice have their own proper and distinct influx, necessary for the same effect. Otherwise free choice would not be the principal secondary cause of supernatural acts, but a mere instrument, because it would have no proper active power, nor its own activity and influx with respect to those acts; instead it would operate only through the influx of the principal agent, as a brush produces an image. The contrary was shown in Disputation 68. Therefore God and free choice, by what they call causal partiality, truly are two partial causes of the same effect.
Third, this is proved by the authority of theologians who expressly teach that God and free choice are two partial causes of the same effect. For Capreolus speaks in this way in 2 Sentences, distinction 28, question 1, article 3, reply to the twelfth argument against the third conclusion, where he says: God not only helps toward the good by partially co-producing it, which is the common mode in which he concurs in the effect of every agent, etc. Gregory of Rimini has the same exact words in the same reply to the twelfth argument. Likewise Gabriel says in 2 Sentences, distinction 1, question 2, article 1: God, producing an effect in a secondary cause, is a partial cause, just as the secondary cause is. And in distinction 37, question 1, article 1, replying to the argument concerning the fourth way: By willing, God causes all things; yet he is not for that reason a total cause, because he wills other causes to concur with him. St. Bonaventure says in 1 Sentences, distinction 40, question 1, article 2: Predestination, insofar as it expresses the character of a cause, does not necessarily posit an effect, because it is not a cause by necessity. And again: It is not the total cause, but acts with another contingent cause, namely, with free choice. Olcoth says in 2 Sentences, question 1, article 3, at the beginning: One must imagine that God and creatures are two partial causes. Lychetus says in 2 Sentences, distinction 37, question 2, under “reply to the solution,” that although the divine will always concurs in every action of ours as a partial cause, it nevertheless wills the secondary cause to cooperate with it. Raphael Venustius, Book 2 On Predestination and Free Choice,1 where, arguing against Luther, he says: He does not notice that God is a partial and total cause of our work, but a cause whose influx is not total. Finally Thomas Elysius, of the Order of Preachers and Master of Sacred Theology, says in his treatise On the Gifts of the Holy Spirit, page 478: The sufficiency of dispositions comes from God and from us, as from two partial causes making one total cause. Since so many weighty Catholic authors, then, acknowledge that God and free choice—and any secondary cause whatsoever—are partial causes, or concur partially in producing the same effect, it follows that this opinion and manner of speaking is at least very probable.
Fourth. The same point can be supported by all the arguments brought forward above to prove that God, by his influx, does not physically predetermine free choice2 and the other secondary causes to act, nor bring it about that they cooperate with him. For from this principle it clearly follows that God and free choice are partial causes of the same effect, as two men hauling a ship are, although the likeness does not hold in every respect, but in this respect: God and free choice have their own effort and influx into the free act, as two men hauling a ship do in relation to the ship's motion.
This opinion can also be confirmed by the arguments to be brought forward in Disputation 97, by which they contend that the influx of free choice, by which it freely cooperates with God as he excites and moves it, proceeds by efficient causality from its own innate freedom alone, and is not to be reduced to God or to the efficacious help of grace as to a prior cause that exercises efficient causality in its own right. For if this is once established, it follows that God and free choice are partial causes of free consent, as two men hauling a ship are, in the sense intended by the authors with whom we are disputing.
II. St. Thomas explicitly teaches the contrary opinion, 4. Against the Gentiles, ch. 7, no. 16. and book 3, ch. 70, at the end, which St. Augustine had taught earlier in the passages to be cited below and in others that we shall bring forward in Disputation 100 to prove that the imparting of efficacious help is the adequate and sole efficient cause by which free choice is converted and acts piously. All the Thomists follow this opinion, among them Master Bañez: first part, question 23, article 3, doubt 3, reply to the third argument; and second part of the second part, question 10, article 1, doubt 2, doc. 3; and from the things already said.
Partial causes of a supernatural act: in what sense grace and free choice are called so.— To make this clear, let us separate the points on which the authors of both opinions agree and lay out the point on which they disagree. We must note that two causes can be called partial or be partial, in relation to some effect, in two ways. In the first way, because each of them, in producing the same effect, has the partnership of another cause cooperating and flowing into that same effect. In this sense the authors of both opinions unanimously acknowledge that God and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent. They teach the same about the concurrence of God and other secondary causes, even contingent ones, in relation to natural effects, because it is not God alone who produces that effect by efficient causality; the secondary cause too produces that same effect by efficient causality, as St. Thomas shows in 3. Against the Gentiles, ch. 69 and 70., against the position of those who took away from natural things their proper actions. He proves this especially also of the choices of the human will, in chapters 89., 90., and 91. of the same book. In the second way, two causes can be called partial because, although one gives the other a power or active capacity in first act, by which it can produce an effect together with the other, each of them nevertheless applies its own effort of itself in such a way that it flows with the other into the effect, yet does not receive that effort and actual influx from the other as from a proper efficient cause. For example, let us suppose that two horses,3 one begotten by the other, are moving a cart. Each applies its own effort and influx to that motion, and the influx of one does not depend on the other as on an efficient cause, although it depends on it as on a cause that confers the power or capacity to move. In this sense, then, the authors of the first opinion assert that God, through the help of grace, and free choice are partial causes flowing jointly into a supernatural act. For although God grants free choice its existence as a power of willing, and sufficient help or a habit by which it can proximately exercise influx into a supernatural act, they nevertheless say that the actual influx and effort by which free choice—moved by exciting grace or aided by a supernatural habit—elicits supernatural acts must be attributed to free choice as an efficient cause exercising influx in accordance with its innate freedom, so that this actual influx and effort do not depend on God or on efficacious help as on a prior cause that exercises efficient causality in its own right, but only as on a cause that allures, invites, persuades, or otherwise draws it inwardly in a moral way. Otherwise, they think, the freedom of our choice cannot be preserved unharmed. Against this opinion, let the following be stated.
III. God and free choice are not properly partial causes of a supernatural operation.— First conclusion. God, or his efficacious grace, and free choice are not partial causes of the acts of believing, hoping, and loving, and of other supernatural acts, as two men hauling a ship are; rather, each is a total cause in its own order. One of them, namely free choice, in its influx and cooperation, is subordinated to the other, namely God, as to a prior cause—not only as to one who persuades or moves it inwardly in a moral way, but also as to a cause that truly brings it about by efficient causality that free choice itself concurs and cooperates with him. The following testimonies show that this conclusion is the express teaching of the holy Fathers, especially St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and of the other doctors who defend their opinion.
First of all, St. Augustine, explaining the passage in Romans 9, It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, and attacking a certain explanation of those who asserted that it was said, “not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy,” for this reason: that the result comes partially from both, that is, from the man's will and God's mercy—draws from this explanation the conclusion that, conversely, one could also rightly say, “It is not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills,” because God's mercy alone does not bring that about. Hence the holy Doctor concludes as follows:4 Now, if no Christian would dare to say, “It is not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills,” lest he plainly contradict the Apostle, it remains that the words, “It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy,” must be understood to have been rightly said so that the whole may be given to God, who both prepares man's good will to be helped and helps it once prepared. And in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 2, attacking those who assert that God and free choice are partial causes of the supernatural act of faith, he says: Although unwilling to oppose such clear testimonies, yet wishing that his believing came to him from himself, a man might, as it were, make a bargain with God, claiming one part of faith for himself and leaving a part to God; and, what is more arrogant, he takes the first part for himself and gives God the later one; and in saying that it belongs to both, he makes himself first and God second. The most blessed Cyprian, that pious and humble teacher, did not think in this way; I mean the one who said that one should glory in nothing, since nothing is ours. To show this, he called the Apostle as witness, saying: “What do you have that you did not receive?” And in chapter 7 of the same book he says: Whatever good, therefore, Cornelius did before he believed in Christ, as he believed, and after he had believed, must all be given to God, lest anyone be exalted. And in chapter 16 he says: The Apostle says: “Not from works, but from him who calls,” it was said to him, “The elder shall serve the younger.” Did he say, “not from works, but from him who believes”? He utterly took this away from man too, in order to give the whole to God. He therefore said, “But from him who calls”—not by just any calling, but by that calling through which one becomes a believer. And in On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 6, he concludes as follows: We therefore live more securely if we give the whole to God, and do not entrust ourselves partly to him and partly to ourselves. And in chapter 13 of the same book: We therefore will, but God works in us also the willing; we therefore act, but God works in us also the very acting for a good will. It benefits us to believe and to say this. This is pious; this is true: that the confession be humble and submissive, and that the whole be given to God. By these words St. Augustine proves that the whole must be attributed to God because, although man wills and acts freely, God nevertheless by his grace brings it about that man wills and acts. Hence, in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 2, the same Augustine says: He himself, then, made the faith of the nations, since he is able to do what he promised. But if God works our faith, acting in a wonderful way in our hearts so that we believe, is there any fear that he cannot do the whole? And so man claims for himself the first parts of it, in order to merit receiving the last parts from him. See whether anything else is being done in this way than that God's grace is given according to our merits, in whatever manner, and thus grace is not grace.
St. Chrysostom teaches the same doctrine. St. Augustine records that Julian the Pelagian himself honorably recalled him, praised him as holy and learned, and said that Chrysostom had received testimony and glory from fellowship with the truth.5 For, explaining those words in the second epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 3, Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as if from ourselves, he says: As if Paul were saying more plainly: When I said, “We have confidence,” I did not mean that it is partly ours and partly God's, but I attribute the whole to him and acknowledge it as received from him. And in homily 4 on the second epistle to the Thessalonians, chapter 2, I, he says, certainly said this: the whole, however, is God's. And in homily 15 on the Acts of the Apostles, Let this alone be our concern, he says, how we may conquer the devil; indeed, it is not our work, but the whole is of divine grace. In the same way St. Jerome speaks against the Pelagians, on chapter 18 of Jeremiah. Explaining the words Behold, as clay in the hand of the potter, after teaching that grace and free choice are preserved in pious actions, he adds: Nor will what comes to pass therefore belong wholly to man, but to the grace of him who has bestowed all things. For freedom of choice must be preserved in such a way that the grace of the giver excels in all things, in accordance with the prophetic saying: “Unless the Lord builds the house, those who build it have labored in vain.6 Unless the Lord guards the city, the one who guards it will keep watch in vain.” For it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy.78 St. Basil too, in homily 22 on humility,9 says: Nothing has been left to you, O man, about which you can boast. And St. Ambrose says in book 2 of On Abraham, chapter 7,10 it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, so that you might not justify yourself, but might attribute all things to God, who called you—namely, by an efficacious call, through which he brings it about that we act. Paul Orosius agrees at the end of his Apology for the Freedom of Choice,11 which he wrote against Pelagius while the latter was still alive. Explaining the words in John 15, I am the vine, you are the branches, he says: Whatever the branch has, it has, of course, from the vine. For the Apostle says: “You do not carry the root, but the root carries you.”12 Why, then, does it boast of the fruits seen in it, when everything belongs to the vine—not only that it may be able, but also that it may exist? Otherwise it will be cut off and thrown into the fire. For it is not the branch but the vine that can; and what the vine can do, the branch shows. So it is enough for each one to have. But let him humbly acknowledge where and from whom he has it, and wait patiently, lest, while he does not have it and believes that he has it, the very thing he has be taken away from him. St. Cyprian says in his sermon on fasting and temptation,13 We owe everything to God: that we live, that we move, that we are. And St. Anselm says in his book On the Concord of Predestination and Free Choice,14 shortly after the beginning: The whole, he says, must be ascribed to grace, because one’s willing does not come from the one who wills, nor one’s running from the one who runs, but from God who shows mercy. And on chapter 2 of the epistle to the Ephesians, on the words By grace you have been saved through faith, and this is not from yourselves, etc., he says: Faith itself, or your calling, is God's gift, and not partly, but purely God's gift; because it is not from your works—that is, there is no mingling of works there—so that no one may boast. By these words he clearly teaches that God and free choice are not partial causes of the act of faith and of other supernatural acts, as two men hauling a ship are. This is shown by the words not partly, but purely, and there is no mingling of works: they signify that the influx, or cooperation, of free choice must ultimately be referred back to God himself as to an efficient cause, so that faith may be God's gift not partly, but purely. He therefore holds that God and free choice are not partial causes of a pious operation, as two men hauling a ship are. Gregory Nazianzen, Cyprian, and Bernard teach the same; we cited their testimonies in Disputation 62, number 6. Moreover, St. John of Damascus holds the same in his History of the Illustrious Men Balaam and Josaphat, saying:15 The one who had more virtue ascribed the whole to the grace of God.
Finally, St. Thomas embraces the same doctrine in 1. 2. q. 111. art. 2. ad 2:16 for he says, God does not justify us without us, because, through the motion of free choice, while we are being justified, we consent to God's justice. Yet that motion is not the cause of grace, but its effect; hence the whole operation belongs to grace. He teaches the same point more clearly at the end of 3. Against the Gentiles, ch. 70, in these words: The same effect is not attributed to a natural cause and to divine power as though it were made partly by God and partly by a natural agent; rather, it is wholly from each, in different ways, just as the same effect is attributed wholly to an instrument and wholly also to the principal agent. But the principal agent and the instrument are not two partial causes of the effect, since the instrument is subordinated in its influx to the principal agent. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, God, or efficacious grace, and free choice are not partial causes of supernatural consent, as two men hauling a ship are.
IIII. This opinion can be confirmed by those words of James: Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights.17 Since, then, the cooperation of free choice, consenting to God who calls, is something excellent and perfect, it follows that it must be attributed to God. Consequently, God is not a partial cause, but a total one, to whom the cooperation of free choice must be referred as to a prior efficient cause. For this reason the Catholic Church says in a certain prayer: God, to whom belongs everything that is best, etc. These words signify that God is not a partial cause, but in his own order is the total cause of every supernatural act of our free choice, or of any other effect produced, even through the intervention of a secondary cause.
They answer all these arguments by saying that God is indeed a total cause in the totality of the effect, since the whole effect is produced by God, just as it is also produced whole by the secondary cause; yet he is not a total cause in the totality of the cause, because it is not God alone who produces the free act in us by efficient causality: free choice also cooperates at the same time, and flows jointly with him into the pious operation itself. It is as when two men haul a ship: each produces the whole effect, and no part of the ship's motion can be assigned as produced by one and not the other. Yet neither is the total cause of the ship's motion, but each is a partial cause, because neither produces that motion unless aided by the other, who at the same time flows into it and produces that same motion.
V. There is, however, a forceful argument against this solution. For, as St. Thomas teaches in book 4 of Against the Gentiles,18 when many agents partially haul a ship, since the power of each is imperfect and insufficient for this effect, one power belonging to all is gathered from their various powers, and this suffices to haul the ship. But God's power is not imperfect; it is infinite, as St. Thomas himself shows in 1. Against the Gentiles, ch. 43. Therefore God and free choice are not partial causes of a supernatural act, as two men hauling a ship are. Otherwise God's power would be insufficient and imperfect, and would need the power of another to produce some effect.
Second, it is proved by refuting the chief foundation of the opposing opinion. For if, for some reason, God and free choice were partial causes of the supernatural action of believing, hoping, and loving, etc., this would be so especially because not God alone, but man's free choice too, produces such acts at the same time. But this reason is groundless. For it would follow from it that the Father and the Son partially produce the Holy Spirit, as two men hauling a ship do. Indeed, it is not the Father alone who produces the Holy Spirit, nor the Son alone; rather, the Father and the Son produce him together. But the consequence is inadmissible, as St. Thomas shows in the passage from 4. Against the Gentiles cited above. Therefore, even if God and free choice produce a supernatural act together, it does not follow that they are partial causes of that same act, as two men hauling a ship are.
Third, it is proved as follows. As shown above, the very cooperation and influx of free choice into a pious operation proceed by efficient causality from God, or from the help of efficacious grace. For this reason, as we shall say below,19 God, or the imparting of efficacious help, is the adequate cause that brings it about that a person is converted or acts piously. Therefore God and free choice are not partial causes of the same operation, as two men hauling a ship are. The consequence is proved: in partial causes of this kind, each has an influx and effort so proper to itself that neither receives it from the other as from a proper efficient cause, as was said above.
Fourth, this is proved by all the arguments in which it will become clear in Disputations 96 and 97 that, when free choice consents to God as he excites and moves it, it does nothing from itself that it has not received from God as a prior cause that exercises efficient causality in its own right. Consequently, its cooperation with grace does not proceed from its own innate freedom alone. From this it is clearly concluded that God and free choice are not partial causes of supernatural consent, as two men hauling a ship are partial causes of the ship's motion. This argument can also be confirmed: the acts of believing, hoping, and loving God as the author of grace are supernatural in their substance and in all their being, as was shown in Disputation 65. Therefore the will, considered in itself and in its natural power, since it is a power of a lower order, cannot have any power connatural to it by which it could produce such acts even as a partial cause. Otherwise, from itself and by its own nature it would have a connection and proportion connatural to it with the order of grace; consequently the order of grace would not be above the entire order of nature, which cannot be admitted.
VI. The same is proved by the arguments in Disputations 18 and 23, which showed that God's general concurrence, in both the natural and supernatural orders, is God's immediate influx into secondary causes, including free causes, and premoves them by efficient causality toward their own operations, each according to the mode of its nature. But this does not belong to partial causes, or to causes that concur partially in producing the same effect, as is clear from what was said above.
VII. In reply to the first argument, it is said that although it is not grace alone that produces man's supernatural operation, but free choice too concurs in it by efficient causality at the same time, cooperating with God's grace, nevertheless God alone, and grace alone, brings it about that free choice cooperates, as was shown above. Therefore it is not a partial cause, but a total cause in its own order of every supernatural act. For, to be a partial cause in the sense of causal partiality, as they say, it is not enough to have the partnership of another cause simultaneously exercising causal influx into the effect. Beyond this, it is required that each cause, taken by itself and separately, be imperfect and have imperfect power in cooperating toward the same effect, as was said. It is further required that the influx and effort of one cause not proceed by efficient causality from the other, which is not the case here.
How the influx of free choice is proper to it.— In reply to the second argument, it is said that human free choice does indeed have its own influx into a supernatural act, an influx that proceeds from an intrinsic principle elevated by grace; but it receives this same actual influx from God, as from a truly efficient cause, as was shown. For Jerome says: Willing and running are mine; but that very thing that is mine will not be mine without God's continual help.20 Hence, although through its own form free choice produces supernatural acts—not as a mere instrument, but as a principal cause, in keeping with what was said in Disputation 68—nevertheless God and free choice are each a total cause in their own order of those same acts, not a partial cause in the sense of causal partiality, as was said. For confirmation of this solution, see what was said in Disputation 62, number 8.
In reply to the third argument, it is said that Catholic doctors who teach that God is a partial cause of the effects he produces through secondary causes should be understood as using “partial cause” in its general sense: a cause that has the partnership of another cause concurring by efficient causality in producing the same effect, as can be gathered clearly enough from the words quoted from them. If perhaps one or another spoke less properly in this respect, asserting that God and free choice are two partial causes making one total cause, we should not for that reason depart from the opinion and manner of speaking of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and the other Fathers. As was shown above, they affirm that God is not a partial cause but a total cause, on whom not only our very willing, but also the cooperation and influx of our free choice, depend as on a prior efficient cause. This was shown above and will be made clearer in the following disputation.
As for the matters touched on in the fourth argument, they have already been amply answered in Disputations 22, 23, and 24. The answer to the confirmation will be clear in Disputation 97.