De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Introduction
Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.
Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.
Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.
Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.
How many kinds there are of the efficacious help of prevenient grace.
I. Since the acts to which efficacious help is given are diverse, it is reasonable to raise the question: Should efficacious helps be distinguished according to the diversity of supernatural acts, so that, for example, efficacious help for believing is distinguished in kind from efficacious help by which God is loved, just as acts of believing and loving are distinguished? The same difficulty concerns other acts, both natural and supernatural.
And the first reason for doubting is this. Sufficient help is not distinguished in kind according to the diversity of the acts to which it is given; for the same sufficient help can be the principle of acts that differ in kind, such as desiring, fearing, and so on, which, since they are elicited by different powers, must differ in kind. Therefore, neither is efficacious help.
Secondly. Efficacious helps should not be multiplied without necessity; but no necessity appears for establishing as many efficacious helps as there are supernatural acts. Otherwise there would be almost infinitely many such helps, since supernatural acts are almost innumerable. Therefore.
Thirdly, for otherwise it would follow that several efficacious helps are necessary for believing. This consequence is contrary to the common opinion of theologians. Therefore. The consequence is proved: several acts that differ in kind concur in the act of believing—namely, considering what is to be believed, desiring, willing, believing, asking this of God, and the very act of believing. Willing or believing, on the one hand, and actually believing, on the other, are acts that differ in kind1, since they are elicited by different powers. Therefore, if efficacious helps are to be distinguished according to the specific diversity of acts, it follows that several efficacious helps are necessary for a single act of believing.
II. Those authors cited in Disputation 71 who consider the division of help into sufficient help and efficacious help vain and useless hold2 that, properly speaking, help can be called efficacious only if it is the help by which someone perseveres to the end and is saved. Consequently, they hold that no distinction should be sought among efficacious helps. They prove this by the following arguments, which are set out in order.
Fourth argument. Efficacious grace is that by which someone is certainly and infallibly set free, as is clear from Augustine, who says:3 Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of God’s benefits, by which all who are set free are set free with the greatest certainty. But those who do not persevere to the end, however much they may live in grace and engage in works of charity during the course of their lives, are not, properly speaking, set free but are damned. Therefore, they truly and properly had no efficacious help, and consequently there will be only one efficacious help: namely, the gift of perseverance.
This is confirmed: efficacious grace is the effect of divine love, by which those who receive this grace are brought to eternal life. For the Apostle says:4 Those whom he predestined, he also called; and those whom he called, he also justified; and those whom he justified, he also glorified. Therefore, efficacious grace is conferred only on the predestined. Therefore, no help other than the gift of perseverance should properly be called efficacious help.
Fifthly. Augustine often calls an efficacious call a call according to purpose; this expression is taken from the Apostle’s words:5 For those who love God all things work together for good—for those who are called saints according to his purpose. This is to be understood not as referring to a person’s purpose but to God’s purpose, by which he mercifully wills to save those whom he has called, as the same Augustine explains in other passages.6 But only the call, or help, by which the predestined are saved is a call according to the purpose of God’s grace. Therefore, only this help should be called efficacious.
Sixth, this can be proved in the same way. For help that is merely sufficient in relation to a further effect, toward which it is principally ordered, although efficacious in relation to another effect, is not called simply efficacious help, but is so called with a qualification and in a qualified sense, as is gathered from what was said in disputation 80. But all help of grace is principally ordered to attaining eternal life, since eternal life is the ultimate end to which means must be principally ordered. Therefore, since only the gift of perseverance is efficacious with respect to attaining eternal life, it follows that no other help can be called simply efficacious help.
On the contrary: habits are distinguished in kind according to the specific diversity of acts, because habits are specified by acts, and acts by their objects. But efficacious helps are likewise specified by the acts to which they are ordered, since they are active principles by which our free choice performs those same acts. Therefore, efficacious helps ought to be distinguished in kind according to the specific diversity of acts.
III. I find little or nothing written on this difficulty by the Scholastic Doctors; therefore it must be resolved solely from theological principles. To make this clear, it should be considered that, since efficacious help is something inhering in a power and prior to its operation, as is clear from what was said above,7 its distinction may be drawn not only from the object but also from the subject and from other circumstances of place and time. Its distinction in number is taken from the subject,8 as with other accidents. Hence efficacious help conferred on Peter for believing differs numerically from efficacious help conferred on Paul for the same act, because these helps are in different subjects. Likewise, efficacious help conferred on Peter at one time for loving God differs numerically from efficacious help conferred on the same Peter at another time to elicit an act of love. For just as a difference in time suffices for the numerical diversity of motion, as is said in the books of Physics, so it also suffices for the numerical distinction of efficacious help, since efficacious help is a certain motion flowing along with the act for which it is conferred, as is gathered from what was said in disput. 18. et 19. And in this, as I judge, there is no controversy among theologians. The greater difficulty concerns the specific distinction of efficacious help and consists in this: Are all efficacious helps of the same species or of different species, and from what is this unity or diversity to be drawn? For the explanation of this, let the following be stated:
IIII. Several other efficacious helps are given besides the gift of perseverance.— First conclusion. Not only the gift of perseverance is to be called efficacious help; several other helps too must be called efficacious simply and absolutely, such as the help by which the reprobate are converted to God or obtain justifying grace. This conclusion is most certain, explicit in St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and commonly received by theologians; I prove it. First, the help by which God causes us to act and works so that we may perform any pious act is efficacious help, as was said above and is clear from the words of Ezech. 36., I will cause you to act, and Philipp. 2., For God is the one who works in us both to will and to bring to completion, and Conc. Araus., Whenever we do good, God works in us and with us so that we may act:9 these testimonies have always been understood by the holy Fathers, especially Augustine, as referring to efficacious help. But by his grace God not only causes the predestined to perform pious acts; he also effects this in the reprobate, who do not have the gift of perseverance. Therefore, besides the gift of perseverance, other helps that are efficacious simply are given.
Secondly. Habitual grace, by which the reprobate are justified and for a time are friends of God, is true grace, speaking absolutely and simply, as is clear from that definition of Conc. Trid. sess. 6., decree on justification, can. 17.: If anyone says that the grace of justification comes only to those predestined to life, while all the rest who are called are indeed called but do not receive grace, as though they had been predestined to evil by divine power, let him be anathema. Therefore, in the same way, the help by which God effects that they perform works of piety is absolutely true efficacious help of grace.
Thirdly, it is proved as follows. As was shown in disp. 71., the division of the help of grace into sufficient help and efficacious help is adequate. But the help by which the reprobate, while in a state of grace, perform works meritorious of eternal life is not merely sufficient help. Therefore, it is truly and properly efficacious help. The minor premise is proved: for, as we said in disput. 79., sufficient help is that which gives only the ability to act piously, whereas efficacious help is that which gives the actual performance of a pious act. But the help by which the reprobate perform works meritorious of eternal life gives not only the ability to act piously but the pious act itself. Therefore, it is not merely sufficient help. It follows, then, that it is truly and properly efficacious help; and consequently, besides the gift of perseverance, which is proper to the predestined, other efficacious helps must be acknowledged. What these helps are, and how they are distinguished from one another, will be clear from the following conclusion.
V. Efficacious helps: from what they derive their specific distinction.— Second conclusion. Efficacious help by which free choice believes is distinct in species from efficacious help by which it loves God above all things or produces other supernatural acts. To make this conclusion clear, we must assume that, since even unformed faith is a gift of God, as St. Thomas teaches in 2. 2. q. 6. ar. 2., and as we have shown in part in disp. 49., efficacious help is necessarily required for faith to come into act. Hence St. Augustine, lib. de praedest. Sanctorum, cap. 16., explaining the words of Rom. 9., It was said to her, not from works but from the one who calls: “The elder shall serve the younger,” says: Did he say, “Not from works, but from the believer”? He took even this entirely away from the human being, so as to give the whole to God. He said, then, “But from the one who calls”—not by just any call, but by that call through which a person becomes a believer. He thus teaches plainly that God gives efficacious help by which he makes a person a believer. With this established, our conclusion can first be proved by the argument made above on the contrary side.
It is proved further. Efficacious help is that by which free choice actually acts, as was said above. Therefore, efficacious help for believing differs in species from efficacious help for loving. The inference is proved: for the active principle by which we perform the act of believing is not of the same species as the active principle by which we produce the act of loving, since active principles are distinguished according to their termini.
Secondly. Motions toward termini that differ in species also differ in species, as Aristotle teaches in 3. physic. But efficacious help is a certain motion, or moving, by which God moves free choice toward termini that differ in species, namely, toward pious acts of different species. Therefore, efficacious helps ought to be distinguished in species according to the distinction among the acts.
Thirdly. According to the opinion of certain theologians, which we discussed in disput. 19., efficacious help is not really distinct from the act produced through it, as one thing is distinct from another; it is distinct only formally. Therefore, help by which we believe is identical in entity with the act of believing, and help by which we love God will be identical in entity with the act of loving. But acts of believing and loving differ in species. Therefore, help by which we believe differs in species from help by which we love God; and the same must be said proportionally of other acts.
VI. And if an argument is made: that which is not directly in a genus or species cannot differ in species from another; but efficacious help is not directly in any genus or species, since it is something incomplete and flowing, like motion, as was shown in disput. 18. et 19. Therefore, one help cannot differ in species from another.
The reply is that efficacious help can differ in species from another help in the way in which it is placed in a genus or species, just as motion toward quality differs in species from motion toward quantity. Although it is not directly in any genus or species, it belongs by reduction to the species of its terminus, just as the incomplete is referred to the species of its complete counterpart: for example, a human embryo is referred to the species of human being, and a horse embryo to the species of horse, as St. Thomas teaches in q. 3. de potentia, art. 9. ad 10.
From these points follows the fifth conclusion, which directly answers the question.10 The efficacy of the help of prevenient, or pre-operating, grace consists formally in a certain motion received in the intellect and will, by which God truly premoves human free choice as an efficient cause, or in the manner of a physical cause, and causes it freely and infallibly to cooperate with God as he rouses and moves it. St. Augustine often calls this motion a deep and secret call, a call according to purpose—not the purpose of a human being, but that of God, who by his absolute and efficacious will wills to convert to himself the person whose heart he moves, through that person’s pious and free action, without presupposing middle foreknowledge of that future cooperation, even on the hypothesis that the person would be touched and moved by such an excitation. And because, by the aforesaid decree of God who predestines, a certain special power is communicated in an intentional mode to the efficacious motion of prevenient grace—a power that is not in the help of exciting grace or of sufficient grace—St. Augustine teaches that by this motion God gives the will most efficacious strength, and makes the unwilling willing and the resisting consenting,11 removes the hardness of the heart, softens it, and turns it to himself. Yet this does not take place without our freely consenting and cooperating simultaneously in time, though subsequently in the order of reason and causality. All these points remain sufficiently proved from what was said both in the preceding conclusions and in disput. 18. 22. 23. 73. et 82.; they will become clearer from what is to be said in disput. 86. 90. and the three following disputations. And if someone asks whether this kind of efficacious help of pre-operating grace is a quality, the reply is that it is not a quality but a motion of God endowed with causal power, which gives free choice the final completion of the first act, just as was said in disputation 19. about general concurrence, by which the first cause premoves and determines secondary causes to act.
VII. How many kinds of sufficient help there are.— To the first argument, drawn from points made at the beginning, the reply is that the same should be held about sufficient help as was said about efficacious help. To make this clear, we observe that sufficient helps of prevenient grace are of two kinds. Some first precede us, with no other help preceding them; and since such helps are not formally vital acts but something prior to a vital act, as we showed in disp. 74., they must also be distinguished in species according to the specific diversity of the vital acts they bring about in us. For we have already said in disput. 80. that every sufficient help is efficacious in a qualified sense, namely, in relation to the effect that it actually produces in us. Other sufficient helps do not first precede the will but are themselves preceded by prior helps, and have the character of a subsequent help in relation to one effect and of a prevenient help in relation to another. These helps are formally vital acts, as was said in the aforementioned disp. 74. Hence they must be distinguished in species according to the specific diversity of the formal object, just as, speaking physically, an illumination of the intellect differs in species from a pious affection of the will. But if such imperfect acts are considered morally, their specific unity or difference must be assessed with respect to the perfect act to which they are ordered. For example, illumination of the intellect concerning matters of faith, consideration of what is to be believed, desire to believe, asking, and a pious affection of the will concerning those same objects, along with other such acts, although they differ in species in the order of nature, since they are elicited by different powers, are nevertheless of the same species in the moral order, because they are ordered to the same end, namely, to produce an act of faith. The same must be said proportionally of other similar acts.
To the second argument, the minor premise is denied. To the proof, the reply is that efficacious helps are not infinite but are determined according to species, although they can multiply infinitely in number.
To the third, the inference is denied. To the proof, the reply is that all those imperfect acts that temporally precede the act of faith itself, or free assent, concerning what is to be believed, are included under sufficient help for believing and belong to the same species of help in the moral order, although they differ in species in the order of nature, as was said.
VIII. To the fourth argument, which intends to prove that no efficacious help exists besides the gift of perseverance, the reply is that efficacious grace is that by which someone is certainly and infallibly delivered. However, for grace to be efficacious, it is not necessary that the person to whom it is given be delivered from eternal damnation; it is enough that he be delivered according to present justice, or that through it he be delivered from a sin he would commit if he performed the contrary act.
How efficacious help is an effect of divine love.— To the confirmation, the reply is that efficacious grace is an effect of divine love, whether that love is considered according to eternal predestination or according to present justice, and whether it is simply supernatural or supernatural in a qualified sense. I say this on account of those to whom God gives actual faith or hope while they are in mortal sin. For, speaking absolutely, God does not love them with supernatural love, since they are absolutely his enemies; he loves them only in a qualified sense. That God loves them with some supernatural love is clear from this: by loving creatures, God communicates to them the good they have, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. p. q. 20. ar. 2. in corp. Hence God’s love, from which that good proceeds, must be of a corresponding kind. The gift of faith, however, is a supernatural gift; therefore, the love by which God loves a sinful person who has faith, insofar as that person is faithful, must be supernatural. But, speaking absolutely, God does not love sinners with supernatural love; rather, he simply hates them, in accordance with the saying in Sap. 14.: The ungodly and his ungodliness are hateful to God. It follows, then, that he loves them in a qualified sense, when he communicates some supernatural gift to them.
To the fifth, the reply is that every efficacious call is according to the purpose of God’s grace, by which he absolutely wills to bring a rational creature to eternal life, or to move that creature efficaciously toward some supernatural good.
IX. To the sixth, the reply is that when supernatural acts are imperfect and by their nature are ordered to other acts, as thinking, desiring, and asking are, then help that is called efficacious in relation to these acts should not be called efficacious simply, but efficacious in a qualified sense, as was said in disput. 80. However, when acts are perfect in their own genus, as acts of faith and charity are, then help that is efficacious in relation to these acts should be called efficacious simply and absolutely, even if afterward the person to whom it is given falls into mortal sin and is damned. A second reply is that, as St. Thomas teaches,12 something can be called such simply in two ways. In one way, “simply” means the same as “absolutely,” as when something is said simply without qualification, as the Philosopher says in 2. topic. In this sense, help by which we believe or love God is called efficacious simply, even if the person to whom it is given does not persevere to the end. In another way, “simply” means in every way, or entirely; and in this sense only the gift of perseverance can be called efficacious simply, because this gift alone makes a person act well in every way and entirely, so that the person does not turn away from the supernatural end.