De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Introduction

Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.

Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.

Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.

What the efficacious help of pre-operating grace is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.

I. For a proper understanding of the true state of this controversy, we must presuppose and recall what we observed at the beginning of disputation 23 concerning the title of the question, lest the truth we earnestly seek happen to be obscured by ambiguous expressions that can give rise to confusion. To this question, then, some doctors answer that such efficacy does not consist in only one thing, but in three things that are necessarily required to constitute it. The first is the reality of the divine motion on the part of both the intellect and the will: that is, God illumines the intellect and moves the will inwardly, inclining and enticing it as one who persuades, so that it consents to God who arouses and calls it. The second is the congruity of that motion with a subject so disposed and situated in such circumstances. For a motion of prevenient grace is congruous with respect to one person who has such a temperament and inclination, or lesser sins, or is not troubled by the temptations of the devil or the goadings of the flesh; yet it is not congruous with respect to another, either because that person has a hard temperament, or greater sins, or is continually troubled by the temptations of the devil or the flesh. From this they infer that a certain prevenient grace is congruous and efficacious if bestowed on someone at such a time and in such circumstances, though it would not be congruous or efficacious for that person if it were given at another time or in other circumstances. The third is middle knowledge, by which God, before the efficacious decree to convert a person, certainly foreknows, as they say, that this motion is so suited and congruous to this particular person’s will that, if that person were premoved by it in such circumstances, he would infallibly consent.

II. Where some say the efficacy of the help of prevenient grace consists.— They say, first, that the complete efficacy of this call consists in this: by his infinite wisdom, God foresees what each cause, or will, would do in every event and circumstance if placed there; he also knows when, and to which call, each will would give its assent if the call were given to it. Hence, when he wills to convert a person, he also wills to call him at the time and in the way in which he knows that he will consent. This call is called efficacious because, although of itself it does not have an infallible effect, insofar as it is subject to that divine knowledge it will infallibly have that effect. Sometimes this may happen with a special congruity and moral efficacy of the call, and sometimes without it, with free choice cooperating with the general influx of God’s grace. In either way grace will be efficacious, although one is more copious than another.

From this they infer that this efficacy is not physical, but moral, and is not to be considered from the call itself taken in itself—that is, according to the reality or motion it places in a person—but insofar as it proceeds from God and is under his intention, knowledge, or direction. By “knowledge” they mean middle knowledge, which we mentioned in disputation 7.

They say that the teaching of Augustine is to be understood according to this mode of efficacy, and they explain their reasoning: Augustine considered not only the congruity that a call in itself has with a person’s temperament or nature, which is a congruity, as it were, in first act, but also, and especially, the proportion that consists in the call being given when it is going to produce its effect. This properly consists in second act, and can be called most congruous, because it is most fitting for a person to be called when he is going to respond, even if he is called gently, rather than to be called forcefully when he is not going to consent. They prove this opinion.

First, by the authority of Saint Augustine, who, in addition to the reality of the motion received in the intellect and will, requires the aforementioned congruity for efficacious grace, which he often calls grace according to purpose. For he says: Those are the elect who were called congruously; those, however, who did not correspond and were not attuned to the call were not elect, because they did not follow, although they were called. And a little later: It is not of one who wills, he says, nor of one who runs, but of God who has mercy, who called in this way, in a manner suited to those who followed the call. For whomever he has mercy on, he calls in a way he knows will suit him, so that he will not reject the one calling. And he seems to allude to the same thing in lib. de spiritu, et litt. cap. 34., saying: By the persuasions of things seen, God acts so that we may will and believe, whether externally through the exhortations of the Gospel or internally, where no one has control over what comes into his mind; but to assent or dissent is properly a matter of the will. And he immediately adds: In these ways, then, God acts with the rational soul so that it may believe. By these words he plainly signifies that God brings it about that we believe through moral persuasion. Likewise, in lib. 2. de peccatorum meritis, et remiss. cap. 17., explaining where the efficacy of the call consists, he says: People are unwilling to do what is just, either because it is hidden whether it is just, or because it is not pleasing. For the more certainly we know that something is good, the more strongly we will it, and the more ardently we delight in it. But that what was hidden may become known, and what was not pleasing may become sweet, is the grace of God, which helps human wills. And in tract. 16. in Ioannem, explaining the passage: Unless the Father who sent me draws him, he understands this drawing as moral, for he says: I believe willingly if I am drawn; it is too little to be drawn willingly—you are drawn also by delight, not by necessity. And a little later: Nuts are shown to a boy, and he is drawn—drawn by love. If it is true that each is drawn by his own pleasure, will not Christ, revealed by the Father, draw him? By these words he signifies that a person is drawn to Christ through moral persuasion. And in epist. 105. he says that through that deep and secret call, God so acts upon the understanding that he adapts assent to it: for by those particles so and that he signifies that in this call God preserves a manner suited to each person, so that the person is led to assent, or consent. The same is indicated in lib. de praedest. Sanct. cap. 8., where he says: This school is very far removed from the senses of the flesh, in which the Father teaches in this way; he does not act through the ear of the flesh, but through the heart. Likewise, in libro de dono perseverantiae cap. 14., after saying of the Tyrians and Sidonians: Since it was not given to them to believe, even the means by which they might believe was denied to them, he adds: From this it appears that some have, in their very disposition, a divinely bestowed natural gift of understanding, by which they may be moved to faith if they either hear words suited to their minds or behold signs, etc. By these words he seems to require, for the efficacy of grace, a congruity of the call consisting in a certain proportion involving such an illumination or inspiration, effected by God in such a way in a person of such temperament, nature, and condition.

III. Second, they also prove that this kind of congruity is not sufficient for the efficacy that Augustine intends to attribute to such a call, namely, that its effect follow altogether infallibly. For this infallibility must be so great that its ever failing would involve a contradiction; but such infallibility cannot arise from the force of congruity alone. Therefore that congruity is not sufficient for the efficacy of the call. The major premise is clear: this call is a means suited to God’s efficacious intention, but it involves a contradiction for God’s efficacious will not to be fulfilled. Therefore that call cannot be a proportionate means unless it is so infallible that it is wholly impossible, and involves a contradiction, for it not to attain its effect. The minor premise is proved as follows: all that congruity of itself produces is a certain moral certainty, which is not absolutely incompatible with free choice resisting a call that is congruous in this way, to the extent that Anselm said that Paul could have resisted his call, however efficacious it was. For he says in Math. 6, concerning these words: Your will be done: Although Paul was struck, his will was free to resist, if he wished. For this reason, Chrysostom, in homil. 31. et 56. in Matth., speaking of the calls of Matthew and Paul, says that God did not call him earlier because he foresaw that the call would then penetrate his soul. He holds, therefore, that the efficacy the call could have had from a special congruity with the character or condition of Paul or Matthew was not sufficient; rather, God also had to observe a time at which he foresaw that the call would have its effect if it were given to him.

Third, they prove this because Saint Augustine does not place the efficacy of this call in necessity, but in infallibility and certainty, to indicate that the aforementioned foreknowledge of God is necessary for this same efficacy. For necessity pertains to a cause, whereas certainty and infallibility pertain to foreknowledge, as Capreolus previously noted in 1. dist. 40. quaest. 1. art. 1. ad 1. contra 2. conclusionem. Hence, in Augustine’s de bono persever. cap. 14., he says that this call pertains to those benefits by which all who are freed are freed most certainly. For this reason, too, he never said that the will cannot resist such a call, but only that it will never resist it, as is clear in lib. de praede. SS. cap. 8., because foreknowledge does not take away the power, simply speaking, to do the opposite of what has been foreseen.

IIII. They say that Chrysostom signified this same mode of the efficacy of the call in the cited passages, and that Ambrose—or whoever explains those words under his name—indicated it as well: Those who have been called saints according to purpose, in Rom. 8, saying: Those are called according to purpose whom God foreknew would be believers fit for him, so that before they believed they were known. For the same opinion they also cite Origen, who says in Rom. 9, It is certain that God not only knows each person’s purpose, but also foreknows it. As a good and just steward, knowing and foreknowing beforehand, he uses the motions and purpose of each person to accomplish the things that each person’s mind and will have chosen. Therefore, and so forth.

They confirm the same opinion with all the arguments brought forward in disput. 7., by which they endeavor to persuade us that this middle knowledge must be posited in God: through it, before any free decree of his will, they think God certainly foreknows what our free choice, by its innate freedom, would do on the supposition that God placed it in such circumstances and moved it by one or another arousal.

Fourth, they prove this on the ground that the efficacy of the help of grace cannot be explained in any other suitable way. And this way is entirely sufficient and most apt both to reconcile freedom with grace, and to explain how the efficacy of grace, which achieves its effect, does not exclude the sufficiency of grace that does not achieve its effect, and finally to reconcile the various statements of the Saints concerning divine predefinition, or predestination, regarding a person. They prove the premise: another account of efficacy, consisting in physical predetermination of the will to consent and cooperate with God who arouses and calls, is repugnant to freedom and takes away the sufficiency of grace from those to whom this physically predetermining grace is not given. Nor would God need to observe the time and manner of arousing and calling the person he wished to convert, because this physical predetermination will always and necessarily have its effect if applied. Hence it would also make no difference if a greater call, or arousal, were given so that a person might be converted more fervently, since God can predetermine free choice as he wishes, and everything depends on this predetermination. That this way is entirely sufficient and most apt to reconcile freedom with grace is proved as follows: the causality of the call is moral, for it occurs by way of persuasion and inducement. But moral persuasion and inducement are not repugnant to the freedom of choice, as is self-evident, nor is infallibility that arises from foreknowledge; for, considered as such, it does not arise from a cause or from an antecedent supposition, but from the supposition of the thing itself as future, in the aspect of a true and knowable object. From this it is then readily understood how, without this efficacy of grace, there can be sufficient grace in those who are not converted: this can come about from their will alone, which can fail to consent even if grace in first act has all sufficiency. Scripture speaks in this way: How often I wished to gather your children, and you were unwilling? And many times elsewhere.

V. Fifth. Grace that is efficacious with respect to one person is inefficacious with respect to another; and likewise, the same grace, with respect to the same person, is efficacious if conferred at this time and in these circumstances, and inefficacious if conferred at other times or in other circumstances. Therefore the efficacy of grace does not consist in a motion that physically predetermines free choice to consent. For this predetermining grace infallibly obtains its effect whenever it is conferred and in whatever circumstances. Therefore it consists in a motion congruous and adjusted to the constitution, quality, and disposition of the subject, which God foreknows will have its effect if conferred on that person. The premise is proved as follows: in natural things, because of the differing disposition or resistance of what is moved, exactly the same motion is effective in moving one subject and ineffective in moving another. For if someone with a motive power of four attempts to move a subject with a resistance of eight, he will not move it, because, as Aristotle says, action does not arise from a ratio of lesser inequality. But if he moves a subject with a resistance of two, it will be moved effectively, because the resistance of the thing acted upon is less than the motion of the mover. The same occurs in free actions, even supernatural ones: one subject may have greater resistance than another, namely, because it has a hard temperament, a perverse inclination, or is entangled in more sins. This may also occur with respect to the same subject at different times: at one time it is well disposed toward divine things, has lesser sins, and is incited to evil by no temptations of the devil; at another time it is stubborn, badly disposed or affected toward divine things, bound by more sins, and harassed by some vehement temptation. Therefore the same motion of prevenient grace will be efficacious with respect to one subject and inefficacious with respect to another; and the same must be said of prevenient grace with respect to the same subject at different times, when it happens to be differently disposed.

This argument can be confirmed by all the arguments to be brought forward in disput. 108., by which the authors of the contrary opinion contend that, when the helps of prevenient grace are altogether equal in two people, it can happen that one is converted, perseveres in grace, and is saved, while the other remains in sin and is damned. For if this principle is once admitted, it follows that prevenient grace is not efficacious according to its real and intrinsic power, but through the aforementioned congruity together with foreknowledge, by which God knows that, if free choice is premoved by it, it will infallibly render its consent.

VI. To the contrary. For, as is clear from the foregoing, God, insofar as he is the author of nature, by means of general concurrence and in the manner of a physical cause predetermines all secondary causes, even free ones, to their operations according to the mode of their proper nature. Therefore, insofar as he is the author of grace, through supernatural help he predetermines our free choice, in the manner of a physical cause, to consent to God who arouses and calls.

VII. The efficacy of divine help presupposes moral motion.— The resolution of this difficulty can be gathered from what was said in lib. 3. de concursu Dei generali, and especially from the points noted in disput. 18. 22. 23. and the two following disputations, in which the foundations have been established for the opinion that God, through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, physically predetermines our will so that it freely and infallibly cooperates with God who arouses and calls. For a fuller explanation of this difficulty, however, we must first suppose that, according to everyone’s opinion, the efficacious help of pre-operating grace presupposes a moral motion, or a motion by way of persuasion, which occurs through an appropriate presentation of the object, by which that object appears lovable and suitable to the will. The reason is this: since nothing is willed unless it is first known, the will cannot desire anything unless it is first presented to it through the intellect as suitable. From the object’s being presented in this way as lovable, the will is morally inclined, allured, and, as it were, invited to will it. But because the will, while it is a wayfarer, cannot be moved efficaciously by any object, as Saint Thomas expressly teaches; this moral motion alone, however perfect it may be, cannot infallibly bring about the will’s consent. Therefore the infallibility of the future consent must come from another source, for persuasion does not compel an unwilling person, as Saint Thomas teaches from Saint Augustine in quaest. 3. de malo, art. 3. in corpore.

Efficacious grace is always congruous, so that free choice may act through it.— Secondly, we must suppose that, according to everyone’s opinion, efficacious grace is congruous, by which the will is moved in such a way that it will infallibly render its consent. For since God reaches powerfully from end to end and orders all things sweetly, if he moves the will efficaciously so that it consents, he moves it congruously and in a way that accords with the nature of the will. Hence Saint Thomas says in p. 2. q. 10. art. 4.: it would be more repugnant to divine motion if the will were moved by it necessarily, which does not accord with its nature, than if it were moved freely, as accords with its nature. The difficulty, then, is where this congruity of grace comes from: whether the help itself, which is called efficacious, brings this congruity with it, so that to whomever it is given and in whatever circumstances, it is congruous for moving the will efficaciously; or whether this congruity is extrinsic, or is drawn from circumstances extrinsic to the efficacious help itself, so that it varies according to the different circumstances and qualities of the subject, so that a motion that is congruous with respect to one person would not be congruous with respect to another; and likewise, a motion that is congruous with respect to one person at this time and in these circumstances would not be congruous with respect to that same person at another time and in other circumstances.

VIII. The congruity of efficacious grace is intrinsic to it.— The first conclusion, then, is this. The efficacious help of pre-operating grace, according to its real power and intrinsic perfection, which it has insofar as it comes from God, is congruous for the will to be moved efficaciously through him, in whatever circumstances it is given to the person. Thus the congruity of that help does not depend on the subject’s natural constitution or any other accidents of the subject, nor does it vary with the diversity of those who are aided by efficacious motion. This conclusion is proved as follows. For, as was shown in the preceding disputation and in disput. 73., the help of pre-operating grace does not depend for its efficacy on the free influx and cooperation of created choice with that same help, even as a condition without which it would not be efficacious. Rather, it has its efficacy intrinsically, namely, from the real power and perfection it brings with itself insofar as it comes from God and inasmuch as it is an instrument of the will of God, who, without any middle knowledge being presupposed, efficaciously wills to convert to himself the person whose heart he moves. Therefore, to whomever it is given and in whatever circumstances, it is congruous that, by its power, free choice will infallibly consent and cooperate with God who arouses and calls. This is confirmed. For, as will be clear in disput. 87., after God has aroused a person, he does not wait for that person’s will to want to be cleansed; rather, through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, he actively and properly brings it about that the person wills. We will show this more fully in disput. 95. and the following ones. Therefore, considered in itself and insofar as it comes from God, it is congruous that, if a person’s free choice, placed in whatever circumstances, is premoved through it, that choice will infallibly consent.

IX. The will of God is most efficacious.— This is proved secondly. When an agent of infinite power moves a subject, that subject is moved infallibly, because the resistance of the thing acted upon neither exceeds nor equals the power of the agent. But God is an agent of infinite power; for it is said in Esther 13: O Lord, O Lord, almighty King, for all things are placed under your dominion, and there is no one who can resist your will, if you decree to save Israel. Hence Saint Thomas says in 2. 2. q. 24. art. 11. in corp. that the Holy Spirit infallibly effects whatever he wills, and in 1. 2. q. 113. ar. 3. in corp. he says: If it is from the intention of God who moves that the person whose heart he moves should attain grace, he infallibly attains it, according to the words in Ioan. 6.: Everyone who hears from the Father and has learned comes to me. Saint Augustine also shows this expressly in Enchirid. ad Laur. cap. 95. and in other passages cited by us in disput. 31. and 32. Therefore the efficacious motion of God with respect to any person, placed in whatever circumstances, will be a congruous and suitable means for infallibly bringing about the effect for which it is given by God’s intention, and thus will cause the person to consent freely and act piously; otherwise the effect of the divine will would be prevented by the human will, which we showed above to be impossible. They reply that God does not have an absolute and efficacious decree to convert a person unless middle knowledge is presupposed, by which, before the decree of his will, he certainly knew that if Peter were moved by such help in such circumstances, he would infallibly consent by his innate freedom. But this solution rests on a false foundation. For above, in disput. 7., we showed expressly that this middle knowledge, which they posit before the free decree of his will, does not exist even in God.

Third, it is proved as follows: for it would follow that the ultimate differentiating reason why the help of grace is congruous with respect to this subject, and consequently efficacious, must be traced back to something natural, namely, to the particular constitution of this individual, or to some constellation of the heavens, or to some taking of food or drink. The consequence is false, for it would be to reduce grace to nature. Therefore. The consequence is proved as follows: according to the authors of the contrary opinion, the same help of God given to a person in circumstances in which that person has a cheerful heart or is disposed with such a constitution is congruous with that person, whereas in other circumstances it would not be congruous. But such a constitution or disposition can arise from a constellation of the heavens or from another natural cause. Therefore.

X. This argument is confirmed by the authority of St. Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 5, where he rejects all natural endowments when the subject is the grace of Christ; for he says: Given this most evident intention of the Apostle, by which he speaks against human pride, so that no one may glory in a human being but in the Lord, it is altogether absurd, as I judge, to suppose that God’s natural gifts are meant—whether one means the whole and perfect nature as it was bestowed in the first creation, or whatever remnants of a corrupted nature there may be. He says the same in Question 2 to Simplicianus, in the words cited in Disputation 55, no. 8. Nor is it enough to reply, that in these passages St. Augustine intends only to teach that no merit, reason, or condition is supplied on the part of nature on account of which God might confer on someone a congruous grace, adapted to his constitution or disposition; yet that he does not deny that some condition is supplied on the part of nature—that is, of the person’s constitution or disposition—without which the prevenient grace that God confers on such a subject solely from his own gratuitous generosity would not be adapted or congruous to him, so that, if he were premoved by it, he would infallibly consent; for in the other passages cited above he seems plainly to teach the contrary. For this reply was sufficiently, as I judge, refuted above, when we were treating God’s gratuitous predestination. There it was shown, in accordance with the teaching of St. Augustine, that no reason or condition is supplied on our part without which the plan for ordering means to an end, pre-existing in God, would not have the character of predestination in relation to this or that person. Therefore, likewise, no reason or condition can be supplied on our part without which prevenient grace would not be congruous or efficacious in relation to this or that person; for the same arguments apply to predestination itself and to congruous and efficacious grace, which is its effect.

XI. The efficacy of grace does not depend on the circumstances of the subject, place, time, etc.— Fourth, it is proved. The congruity of the help of prevenient grace, or its efficacy, does not wait for the human will to wish to be cleansed; rather, it makes the will wish this, as will be clear in Disputation 95. Nor does it take account of, or necessarily require, circumstances of time or place, or other dispositions belonging to the subject, as is clear from St. Prosper, On the Ungrateful, ch. 15, where he says:

But when almighty grace saves a human being:

It itself completes its own work, for which the time to act

is always at hand, whatever it wills to be done; no delay

Arises for it from dispositions, nor does any cause hold it in doubt;

Nor does it accomplish by the care and duty of a minister

What it alone can do, nor entrust to servants the task of acting in its place.

By these words he plainly teaches that the grace of God is in itself so congruous and efficacious for accomplishing what God wills to work through it that, whenever it is conferred and under whatever circumstances, it brings about what it is appointed to bring about by God’s efficacious will and intention. No disposition or constitution of free choice either gives or takes away from it the opportunity to act. Therefore, the congruity of this same prevenient grace does not depend—even as on a condition without which it could not be—on this or that constitution or disposition of the subject, or on other circumstances in which it is conferred. Consequently, efficacious grace itself, according to its real power and as it comes from God, brings with it the congruity required for its efficacy.

XII. The efficacy of grace does not depend on foreknowledge of the good use of free choice.— Second conclusion. The efficacy of the help of prevenient grace does not depend—even as on a condition without which it could not be—on middle foreknowledge, that is, on God’s foreseeing by that same middle knowledge the good use of free choice; nor does it presuppose that foreknowledge in God in any way. This conclusion is proved by all the arguments with which, in Disputation 7, we showed that this middle knowledge does not subsist and, consequently, is not in God.

Efficacious grace predetermines free choice to cooperate.— Third conclusion. By the efficacious help of grace, God physically predetermines created free choice, or predetermines it in the manner of a physical cause, so that it freely and infallibly consents and cooperates with God as he rouses and calls. All Thomists defend this conclusion, which I judge to be the explicit teaching of St. Thomas and to have been handed down in equivalent words by St. Augustine and the other Fathers. It is proved by all the arguments with which, in disp. 23, it was shown that God, insofar as he is the author of nature, through general concurrence by means of a prior motion inhering in the cause, predetermines every secondary cause, even a free one, in the manner of a physical cause, to each particular good act, together with all its circumstances, while preserving the properties and nature of those causes. For from this principle it follows all the more strongly that God, insofar as he is the author of grace, through the special concurrence of efficacious, or helping, grace, predetermines created free choice in the same way to supernatural acts, while preserving its properties and freedom.

XIII. It is proved further. The help of helping grace is efficacious in itself, as it comes from God prior to the free cooperation of our free choice, since it does not depend on that cooperation for its efficacy, even as on a condition without which it could not be, as is clear from what was said above: therefore it physically predetermines the will to consent. The inference is proved: for, as some proponents of the opposing view admit, help or predetermination efficacious in itself means the same as physically predetermining help; and there is no need to quibble over the word.

It is proved secondly. The efficacious help of helping grace, insofar as it is efficacious and helping, is not God’s immediate influx together with our free choice into the operation of both, but an immediate influx into free choice itself, as into a cause, as is clear from what was said in disp. 18. about God’s general concurrence. Therefore it physically predetermines free choice to cooperate with God as he rouses and calls. The inference is proved: for this kind of immediate influx of God into free choice as a cause cannot exist, nor even be understood, without physical predetermination. Hence the proponents of the opposing view, who attack this kind of predetermination, consistently teach that the help of helping, or efficacious, grace, insofar as it is helping, is not God’s immediate influx into free choice as a cause, but an influx simultaneous and co-instantaneous with free choice into its effect, as we saw in disput. 82.

XIIII. Thirdly. By the efficacious help of helping grace, God brings it about not only by persuading, inviting, and enticing, or in some other way by drawing us inwardly in a moral manner, that we act; he also truly effects this as an efficient cause, as must be proved in disp. 86. This will become still clearer in disp. 96. 97. et 100., where it will be evident that the influx, or cooperation, of free choice with grace does not arise from its innate freedom alone, but must ultimately be traced back to God himself and his help, as to a prior per se efficient cause. Therefore, he physically predetermines free choice to consent. The inference is proved: for physically to predetermine is nothing other than truly to act as an efficient cause in bringing it about that free choice itself freely and infallibly cooperates with God as he rouses and calls, as is clear from the very meaning of the term.

This is confirmed: whoever causes free choice to determine itself predetermines it to act. For to predetermine is to determine first, in the order of reason, or to cause something to determine itself; but by efficacious help God truly causes free choice physically to determine itself by cooperating and consenting to God as he calls. Therefore, he physically predetermines it.

Fourthly. The efficacious help of helping grace is not subject, as regards its use, to the power of our free choice, as are habits, which we use when we wish; rather, it subjects free choice itself to itself, as will be clear in disp. 87. Therefore, it physically predetermines free choice to consent and cooperate.

Fifthly. Created free choice is not simply the first cause of its own determination, especially in relation to supernatural acts, nor does it begin that determination as the first, as we will show at length in disp. 89. Therefore, it is predetermined by another, prior cause, namely God. This predetermination, in relation to supernatural acts, takes place through efficacious help. Therefore, by efficacious help God physically predetermines free choice to exert influence in supernatural acts.

Sixth. Efficacious helps of prevenient grace, like divine predestination, certainly and infallibly bring about the effect for which they are given, as was shown in disp. 30. et 41. But this certainty and infallibility are not founded on middle knowledge. For, as is clear from what was said in disp. 7., such middle knowledge does not exist in reality, even in God, nor is its object knowable before the decree of the divine will. Therefore, they must necessarily be founded on predetermination, by which God, through his absolute and eternal decree and, in time, through those same helps, predetermines free choice to cooperate with God’s grace. The inference is proved: once certainty and infallibility arising from middle knowledge—or from the future cooperation of free choice, foreknown by God through that same knowledge—are set aside, no other foundation remains on which such certainty can rest except predetermination, by which God, through efficacious help, physically predetermines free choice to cooperate with that same grace, as the proponents of the opposing view admit. For moral predetermination alone does not make free choice consent infallibly, since by its freedom it can dissent from any persuasion, even in the composite sense. Therefore, one must necessarily assert that God, through the efficacious help of grace, physically predetermines free choice to consent to and cooperate with that same grace.

This is confirmed, and the force of this argument is further clarified. To explain it, we must consider that, as Aristotle and the other philosophers teach, arts are of two kinds, some are called demonstrative, while others are conjectural. Demonstrative arts are those which, when their means are applied according to the rules of the art, infallibly attain the intended end, because all that is necessarily required to attain the end lies within the craftsman’s power. This is evident in the art of housebuilding, by which a house fit to protect people from rain is infallibly built, because all the means by which this end is attained lie within the craftsman’s power. The Philosopher calls those arts conjectural which, although they proceed according to the rules of the art, do not infallibly attain the intended end, because they do not have within their power all the means by which the end intended through that art is attained. Medicine provides an example. For although a physician applies to a sick person, according to the rules of medicine, all the remedies suited to curing the illness in order to heal the patient, he does not infallibly attain this end, because he does not have within his power the power of nature, or the patient’s own natural heat, without which the remedies do not cooperate toward the patient’s health. Likewise, the art of oratory is not demonstrative but conjectural: although an orator uses all the means, according to the rules of a perfect orator, to move Peter’s will to love his enemy, he does not infallibly attain this end, because Peter’s will, which is necessary for the orator to prevail and attain this end, is not within the orator’s power, and he cannot effectively change or incline it wherever he wishes. With this established, the argument proceeds as follows. The art of the supreme physician, our Lord Christ, who came to seek and to save what had been lost, is not conjectural but demonstrative, and therefore infallibly attains the end that he intends by an absolute and efficacious will, as is clear from what was said in disput. 30. et 41. But he would not infallibly attain his intended end—namely, the sinner’s conversion and final salvation—unless he had the will of that same sinner within his power and could efficaciously incline and determine it by his grace wherever he wished, because the sinner’s conversion and salvation do not occur without the cooperation of that person’s free will, in accordance with Augustine’s saying: He who made you without you will not save you without you. Therefore, through efficacious grace God physically, or as an efficient cause, predetermines the will to consent and cooperate with helping grace.

What the help of grace that physically predetermines is, how it is distinguished from helps that predetermine only morally, and how our freedom and its actual exercise cohere with that same predetermination, has been explained fully enough in disput. 18. 22. et 23. In those disputations we also adduced many further testimonies from St. Augustine, St. Thomas, the other Fathers, and the Scholastics, who taught our position; for that reason, we deliberately omit them in the present disputation.

XV. The efficacy of divine help is not merely moral but also physical.— Fourth conclusion. The efficacy of the help of pre-operating grace, insofar as it precedes the cooperation of our free choice in the order of causality, is not merely moral efficacy but also physical efficacy, which, in the manner of a physical cause, efficaciously premoves free choice to consent, to act piously, or even to persevere to the end. This conclusion is against the authors of the first opinion; nevertheless, it follows by evident inference from the premises. For efficacy that is merely moral is that which, only by persuading, enticing, inviting, or otherwise drawing inwardly in a moral manner, causes free choice to cooperate with God as he rouses and calls. But the efficacious help of operating grace causes free choice to cooperate not only in those ways; it also truly brings this about through efficient causality, as was shown in disp. 86. Therefore, the efficacy of this same help is not merely moral but also physical, or in the manner of a physical cause.

Secondly. Moral efficacy does not physically predetermine our will to act, but leaves it undetermined and thus indifferent, so that, if it wills, it acts; if it does not will, it does nothing. But the efficacy of the help of prevenient grace—that is, God through efficacious help—physically predetermines our will to act, as was shown in the preceding conclusion and in disp. 23. Therefore, the efficacy of the help of helping grace is not merely moral.

Thirdly, for it would follow that God, through his grace, draws us to the good with no efficacy different from that with which the Devil, through his malice, draws sinners to evil. For the Devil, too, makes people sin by a certain moral efficacy; in this sense Scripture says, that the Dragon—that is, Lucifer—with his tail—that is, by moral persuasion and example—dragged a third part of the stars down to earth. The consequence, although some authors of the opposing view concede it, does not seem admissible. Therefore.

Mere moral efficacy does not infallibly bring about the effect.— Fourthly. As the proponents of the opposing view admit, moral efficacy or determination alone, even if it attains the highest degree of perfection, does not make the will consent infallibly with metaphysical certainty in such a way that, given such efficacy, it would be impossible in the composite sense for the will moved by moral efficacy not to consent or to dissent. But the predetermination and efficacy of the help of pre-operating grace make the will consent to God as he rouses and calls so certainly and infallibly that, even speaking metaphysically, it is impossible in the composite sense for the will not to consent or to dissent, as will become clear in disp. 92 and the two following disputations. The same antecedent is confirmed by the sixth reason given for the preceding conclusion and by the other arguments adduced in disput. 23. nu. 16. 17. et 18.

XVI. To the first argument, the reply is as follows. According to St. Augustine’s meaning, efficacious grace is congruous—not with a congruity that depends on some natural disposition of free choice or on other extrinsic circumstances of place and time, but with the congruity that the efficacious help itself brings with it—as was said in 1. conclus. of this disputation and disp. 7. n. 28., where we explained the authority of St. Augustine cited from quaest. 2. ad Simplicianum. To the other passage, from c. 34, On the Spirit and the Letter, the reply is that St. Augustine does not assert that God acts only through the persuasions of things seen, or only in these ways, so that we may will. For this is expressly contrary to the teaching of the holy Doctor himself in lib. de gratia Christi contra Pelag. et Caelest. cap. 7. et 10., and in many other passages, where, in addition to external and internal persuasions, he requires something else on the part of grace in order that we may believe and act piously. Rather, he teaches that through the persuasions of things seen—or through two persuasions—God moves people to faith, namely, by persuading externally and internally and setting the object before them; this is entirely true. But, in addition to this motion, Augustine himself establishes in the same passage another motion on the part of the power, through which God actively and properly causes us to act and works so that we may act. For in c. 35. seq. he says that a human being does this in no way unless God grants it and works it, and he is speaking of operation properly so called, not merely of moral operation, as is clear from other passages of the same St. Augustine cited above and to be cited below. Secondly, the reply is that St. Augustine sometimes uses the term persuasion or teaching to mean an efficacious motion that predetermines free choice to consent, one that persuades in such a way as to convince and infallibly bring about the effect, as is clear from the same Augustine’s lib. de gratia Christi contra Pelag. et Caelest. c. 13, where he says: If this grace is to be called teaching, let it certainly be called so in this way: God is believed to infuse it more deeply and inwardly, with ineffable sweetness, not only through those who plant and water outwardly, but also through himself, who secretly gives its increase, so that he not only shows the truth but also imparts charity. For in this way God teaches those who are called according to his purpose, at once granting them to know what they should do and to do what they know. From this the reply is clear to the other passages of St. Augustine cited in the same argument from epistola 107. and cap. 8. On the Predestination of the Saints.

Augustine’s view, from which it appears, etc., is explained.— To the other testimony, from cap. 14. On the Gift of Perseverance, the reply is that St. Augustine does not mean that the Tyrians and Sidonians would have believed solely through those outward signs, suited to the natural power of the intellect, if such signs had been performed among them. Rather, he is plainly speaking of what is required on the part of the presentation of the object for faith. The sense is that some people have a natural intellect so disposed that, as far as the object is concerned, they are more affected and moved objectively by these signs or deeds than by others. But in addition to this motion, Augustine himself requires another on the part of the power, so that a person actually believes; this is the efficacious help that predetermines the will to consent. This explanation is gathered from the same context, for he adds: But it did not benefit them, namely, the Tyrians and Sidonians, that they were able to believe, because they had not been predestined by him whose judgments are inscrutable and whose ways are unsearchable; nor had it harmed those, that is, the Jews, that they were unable to believe, if they had been predestined, so that God might enlighten them, blind as they were, and might will to take away the heart of stone from those who were hardened. A little later he says: For those to whom this has been given hear these things and do them; but those to whom it has not been given do not do them, whether they hear them or do not hear them.

XVII. To the second argument, the reply is that, according to the mind of St. Augustine, efficacious grace brings with it a congruity such that it would be contradictory for it ever to fail and for the human heart on which it is conferred not to turn to God. For although, speaking absolutely and in the divided sense, a person’s free choice can dissent from an efficacious call, this is nevertheless impossible in the composite sense, as will become clear in disput. 92. Hence, for an efficacious call to obtain its effect infallibly, neither middle foreknowledge of the future cooperation of free choice nor God’s waiting for or observing a favorable place and time is required or presupposed in God, as is clear from what was said above. For he knows that an efficacious call will certainly and infallibly have its effect, whenever and under whatever circumstances it is conferred on a person, as was said above. Therefore, when Anselm says that Paul’s will could resist an efficacious call if he wished, this is understood absolutely and in the divided sense, but not in the composite sense. And he means resistance in the common sense, according to which “to resist” means the same as “to dissent”; this will be treated in disput. 93. Or one may say that Anselm’s statement is to be understood under the condition of the will. For this conditional is true: St. Paul could resist the efficacious call, if he wished. It is in this sense that St. Thomas, q. 1. de potentia, ar. 6. ad 3., explains that statement of the Philosopher in lib. 4. Topicorum, cap. 5.: God and the virtuous person can do evil things. For he says: The Philosopher’s statement is to be understood under the condition of the will. For this conditional is true: God can do evil things, if he wills. Nothing prevents a conditional from being true even though its antecedent and consequent are impossible, as is clear in this conditional: If a human being flies, he has wings. Thus Paul could resist God’s most efficacious call, if he wished, but grace itself caused him not to resist. As for the passage of Chrysostom, the reply is that it is to be understood of the foreknowledge that follows the decree of the divine will, by which God fulfilled what he had predestined, and not of foreknowledge of the good use of free choice that precedes that same decree, as was said in disp. 7. Hence it does not follow that middle knowledge is necessary for the efficacy of the helps of grace.

XVIII. The necessity on the supposition of the divine decree does not take away the freedom of the act.— To the third argument, the reply is that St. Augustine located the efficacy of the call not only in the infallibility and certainty of its effect but also in the causality of the help, as was shown in disput. 25. 30. et 41. For just as certainty and infallibility derived from foreknowledge do not take away from free choice the free capacity by which, speaking absolutely and in the divided sense, it can refrain from acting, if it wishes, so the necessity on the supposition of the absolute decree of the divine will, or of efficacious help, likewise does not take away that capacity, as was shown above. As for the objection that necessity pertains to the cause, while certainty and infallibility pertain to foreknowledge, the reply is that the certainty of the order of means to an end pertains to the cause, as we said in disp. 41., following St. Thomas, when we were treating the certainty of predestination. The words of Chrysostom, Ambrose, and Origen that are adduced to prove the necessity of middle knowledge have already been explained by us above.

We have answered the confirmation fully in disputation 7.

To the fourth, the antecedent is denied. To the proof, the reply is that the way of explaining the efficacy of grace that we have set out in no way conflicts with freedom or takes away the sufficiency of grace, as was shown above, because, if such efficacy is applied, it will indeed have an effect necessarily, by a conditioned necessity, or necessity on a supposition, but not by absolute necessity. This was shown in disput. 25. On the contrary, the way of explaining the efficacy of grace that is based on middle foreknowledge brings with it many difficulties, some of which we touched on in disputation 7. and which will be explained more fully in disputation 120.

To the fifth, the antecedent is denied. To the proof, the reply is that when the agent has infinite power, as God does when moving through efficacious grace, he overcomes any resistance of the patient, because no creature can resist him or prevent the effect he wills to produce from following, as was said in disp. 31. et 32. This will be discussed further in disput. 93.

A reply to the confirmation will be given in Disputation 108, where the question touched on in that same confirmation will be treated directly.

Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.

Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.

Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.

Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.

Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.

Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.

Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.

Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.

Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.

Disputatio XCIII: Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, speaking properly of resistance.

Disputatio XCIV: How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that human free choice moved by God through efficacious help cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.

Disputatio XCV: Whether, after God has mercifully aroused created free choice, he awaits its free consent to be purified or justified.

Disputatio XCVI: Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who arouses and calls it.

Disputatio XCVII: Whether the good use or cooperation of free choice, by which it consents to God who arouses and calls it, proceeds from its innate freedom alone.

Disputatio XCVIII: Whether, exciting grace being presupposed, the consent or cooperation of free choice must first be begun by the created will, or by the divine will or the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand.

Disputatio XCIX: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person, preceded by exciting grace, wills to be converted, he is therefore helped by God and converted; or, conversely, he is converted because he is helped by God.

Disputatio C: Whether the bestowal of efficacious help is the adequate cause of the conversion of free choice.

Disputatio CI: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person is not helped by God, he is therefore not converted.

Disputatio CII: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person aroused by God does not will to use sufficient grace, he is therefore not helped by God or converted.

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

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