De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Introduction

Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.

Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.

Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient, or premoving free choice to consent; or whether it merely flows jointly and simultaneously with it into a pious operation.

I. We briefly touched on this difficulty in disputation 72, conclusion 2, but now it must be discussed and explained more fully, since from understanding it the efficacy of the helps of grace—which, in keeping with the teaching of the holy Fathers Augustine and Thomas, we are endeavoring to defend—will appear more clearly.

Some more recent theologians, then, hold that cooperating grace, precisely insofar as it is cooperating, does not precede the influx, or free cooperation, of our free choice, but flows jointly and at the same time with it into acts of believing, hoping, loving, and so forth. They prove their opinion.

First, by the authority of Saint Bernard, in his book On Grace and Free Choice, where, explaining the nature of operating and cooperating grace, he says: It arouses free choice itself when it sows a thought; it heals when it changes the affection; it strengthens in order to bring it to act; it preserves it lest it experience failure. Grace thus works with free choice in such a way that it only precedes it at the first stage, while in the others it accompanies it. It precedes it for this very purpose: that thereafter it may cooperate with it. Yet what was begun by grace alone is completed jointly by both, so that they work together, not separately, at the same time, not in turn, through each advance. It is not partly grace and partly free choice: each accomplishes the whole by an undivided act. By these words he expressly teaches that God’s grace only precedes free choice when it arouses it; for, he says, in the other matters grace accompanies free choice, namely, when it cooperates with it. And when he says, what was begun by grace alone is completed jointly by both, he shows most clearly that the help of cooperating grace is not prevenient, but flows into a pious operation jointly with our will. Chrysostom teaches the same in Homily 12 on the Epistle to the Hebrews, saying: It does not precede our wills, lest free choice be harmed. These words are to be understood of cooperating grace, for elsewhere he had taught that exciting grace precedes that same choice.

Second. To cooperate with another toward some effect is to produce that same effect jointly with the other; for “cooperating,” as is clear from the very meaning of the word, denotes a relation to another who acts at the same time. Therefore cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, in no way precedes the free influx and cooperation of our free choice, but is simultaneous with it both in the order of nature and in time.

This is confirmed. The one with whom another cooperates does something, as Augustine teaches; but before our own influx, free choice does nothing, since the operation of choice cannot exist or even be conceived without its influx. Therefore, before such an influx, God does not cooperate with free choice; and consequently cooperating grace does not precede the influx of that same choice.

II. Third. The cooperation of grace toward our conversion, or toward any other pious operation, depends on the free cooperation of our free choice, just as the concurrence and influx of the habits of the virtues into our operations depend on the cooperation of the faculties themselves. This is why we use the habits for our operations when, according to our own choice, we wish to act, and do not use them when, according to that same choice, we wish to cease acting. Therefore cooperating grace does not precede, but accompanies, the free influx and cooperation of our free choice, just as the influx of a habit into an operation accompanies the influx of a faculty. The consequence is proved as follows: what depends on another does not precede it, even in the order of nature, because what is prior does not depend on what is posterior.

Fourth. Cooperating grace and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people towing a ship. But partial causes towing a ship, or concurring to produce some other effect, concur together toward that effect in such a way that neither precedes the other, but rather each depends on the other in producing that effect. Therefore cooperating grace neither precedes nor is prevenient to the cooperation of our free choice, but is altogether simultaneous with it.

Fifth. One who cooperates does something cooperatively; but the help of divine grace, at that prior sign of reason, or instant of nature, before free choice flows into consent, does nothing cooperatively, because it does not cooperate in the consent itself—for otherwise, before the cooperation of choice, the consent itself would be understood to have been produced by grace alone, and thus free choice would be merely passive in its cooperation in that same consent, which is contrary to the definition of the Council of Trent; nor does it cooperate in anything else at that prior point, since it cannot be specified what that would be. Therefore, before the free influx of our choice, cooperating grace is not understood to be present; consequently, such grace does not precede that same influx, or the cooperation of choice, even in the order of nature. If it is said that cooperating grace is prevenient to the free cooperation of our choice in the order of nature to the extent that, through it, God makes us act and works so that we may act—which God indeed does in us antecedently to the influx of that same choice—and that from this side cooperating grace is prevenient, although in relation to the pious operation itself it concurs at the same time with free choice, the following is an objection to this.

III. Sixth argument. The grace of God, insofar as it makes us act, is not cooperating grace, but physically operating grace, as was said in the preceding disputation. For, in relation to this effect, our will does not move itself, but is only moved by God. Therefore cooperating grace, formally speaking, insofar as it cooperates, is not prevenient, but accompanies the free influx of our choice.

To the contrary. We cooperate with the grace of God by following it; therefore the grace of God cooperates with us by going before us; and consequently cooperating grace precedes the cooperation of our choice in the order of nature. The premise is expressly stated by Pope Gelasius I in his Epistle 5 to all the Bishops throughout Picenum; where, explaining the passage in 1 Cor. 15, Yet not I, but the grace of God with me, he says: What Christian, then, would dare to say that he has anything good without grace, when the Teacher of the nations cries out, briefly gathering all gifts into himself: “By the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace in me was not in vain”—to show that he himself did not go before the gift of grace, but followed it, and to demonstrate that he was a cooperator with grace by following it? “But I labored more than all of them,” he says. And again, fearing that he might seem to presume upon himself, he added: “Not I, but the grace of God with me.” He did not say, “I, and the grace of God with me,” but put the grace that went before him first and then added himself. What, then, can be had without grace, when faith itself is through grace? The consequence is proved because it cannot be true that free choice cooperates with grace by following it unless grace cooperates with that same choice by preceding its influx in the order of causality.

IV. To explain this difficulty, it should be noted that here we are not speaking of antecedence, or priority, in the order of time. For all theologians agree that cooperating grace is in the same instant of time as the influx, or cooperation, of created choice. Nor are we speaking of priority in dignity, since all acknowledge that God’s cooperation is the more excellent and more principal cause of a pious operation than the cooperation of free choice. The Semi-Pelagians too, especially Faustus, frankly acknowledged this, as was seen in disputation 2, no. 8. We are speaking, then, of antecedence, or priority, in the order of reason and causality. The controversy is this: whether cooperating grace, formally speaking, precedes the cooperation of our choice in the order of reason and causality, so that this causal proposition is true: “Because God cooperates, free choice cooperates”; while this one is false: “Because free choice cooperates, God cooperates.” This causal proposition is to be treated expressly in disputations 98 and 99.

V. Second, it should be supposed, on the basis of what was said in the preceding disputation, that cooperating grace is really distinct from exciting grace; for this is one of the principal foundations of our opinion. We should also recall what was said about general concurrence and the way in which God concurs with secondary causes in their operations, in disputations 18, 22, and 23; what we wrote about the dependence of the free cooperation of that same choice upon God, especially in supernatural acts, in disputation 36; and what we will say about the same matter in disputations 85 and 86, and from disputation 96 onward through disputation 100. For from what was said, and will be said, in the disputations cited above, the resolution of the present difficulty can readily be gathered.

VI. Cooperating grace is prevenient to the concurrence of free choice.— The first conclusion, then, is this: cooperating grace, insofar as it is distinguished from exciting grace, is prevenient to the free cooperation of created choice. This conclusion is opposed to the authors of the first opinion; nevertheless, Master Medina expressly teaches it in the First Part of the Second Part, question 111, article 2, section “This doctrine,” where he says: Operating or prevenient grace is twofold. One kind precedes the sinner so that he may rise; the other is that by which the sinner, assenting to God who goes before him, now rises. God precedes the will in both, but in the former, by supplying it, he often works alone, while putting a good thought into our hearts and rousing us. In the latter, our will, following God who goes before it, cooperates with him by willing, or by assent, while, aroused and moved by God, it begins to act well. By these words he plainly teaches that helping, or cooperating, grace is prevenient, and that the cooperation of our choice follows that same grace in the order of causality. He explains this further about the middle of his commentary, saying: Therefore, to will to repent, to will to come to one’s senses, to will to receive remission of sins, does not come from the will alone; rather, God works that together with us, making the ill-willed will well-disposed and consenting to his will. Thus God indeed changes our will by his operating grace, and so works willing in us; yet, because an unwilling will cannot be changed against its will, it cooperates with God by consenting to him. See: he says that the grace by which God works willing in us—which he distinguishes from exciting grace—is prevenient. All the proponents and defenders of efficacious grace, which physically predetermines free choice to consent, defend the same opinion. It is certain and very much in conformity with Sacred Scripture, the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs and Councils, and the teachings of the holy Fathers, especially Augustine and Thomas. It is proved from the passage in Philippians 2: For it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish. And from Isaiah 26: You, O Lord, have wrought all our works in us. For in saying he works in us, it signifies a certain antecedence by which God, through cooperating grace, brings about those same works together with us. Hence Saint Prosper, in his letter to Augustine, calls that same grace pre-operating, on account of this kind of antecedence and priority in the order of causality. The same may be proved from other passages of Scripture and from the definitions of Councils. In disputation 86 it will be made clear that God, through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, actively and properly, or in the manner of a physical cause,causes free choice to apply its own influx and cooperation to consent. Moreover, the authority of Pope Gelasius, introduced in the argument to the contrary, confirms the same point.

Second, it is proved by the authority of Saint Thomas, in the First Part of the Second Part, question 111, article 2, in the body of the article, where he says: In that effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is attributed not only to God but also to the soul; and in this respect it is called cooperating grace. By these words he plainly teaches that our mind, or free choice, in relation to the effect attributed to cooperating grace, is both moved by God and moves itself. Therefore cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, both moves free choice and, together with it as moved by God, produces a pious operation. But every mover, insofar as it moves, precedes the motion of the movable thing at least in the order of nature. Therefore cooperating grace precedes, in the order of nature, the cooperation of created free choice by which it moves itself and freely consents to God who moves it.

This is confirmed by that definition, Conc. Trid. sess. 6. de iustif. can. 4: If anyone should say that the free choice of man, moved and aroused by God, cooperates in no way by assenting to God who arouses and calls it, etc., let him be anathema. See, it says that free choice of man cooperates, yet is moved by God. This certainly occurs not only through exciting grace, but also through helping and cooperating grace, which it had taught without obscurity to be prevenient in chapter 5 of the same session, as was explained above.

VII. Third, it is proved as follows. Every meritorious work of the children of God is an effect of cooperating grace, as Saint Thomas teaches in 1. 2. q. 114. in prooemio, saying: Next we must consider merit, which is an effect of cooperating grace. But in every meritorious work our will not only moves itself physically, but is also moved by God, as is clear from Roman. 8. Those who are led by the Spirit of God are the children of God. From these words Saint Augustine, in the passages cited in disputation 18, number 16, concludes that the children of God are led so that they may act, not so that they themselves do nothing. Therefore it is prior that the children of God be led, or moved, by God, before they themselves do anything. They are led physically by helping, or cooperating, grace; for through exciting grace they are only moved morally toward free consent, as was said above and will be shown more fully below. Therefore helping, or cooperating, grace precedes the free cooperation of choice in the order of nature and causality.

Fourth. Cooperating grace—or God himself, as he flows in through cooperating grace—and free choice are not two partial causes of a pious operation, but total causes, one of which, namely free choice, is intrinsically subordinated to the other and depends on it, as on a superior and prior efficient cause, not only in its existence but also in its cooperation, as will be made clear in disput. 85. 96. et 97. Therefore cooperating grace precedes the cooperation of choice in the order of reason and causality. The consequence is proved as follows: wherever one thing really depends on another, there is an order of prior and posterior according to the order of nature.

VIII. They reply that, just as one relative depends on its correlative, yet is neither prior nor posterior to it but simultaneous in nature, as Aristotle teaches in the category of relation, and depends on it reciprocally, so that when one relative is posited, the other is posited in reality, and when it is removed, the other must necessarily be removed, so, by analogy, although the cooperation of free choice is subordinated to divine cooperation, neither is prior to the other; rather, they depend on each other and are posited or removed together in nature. Yet this solution is easily refuted: for one correlative is not subordinated to the other as to a per se efficient cause, but as to a terminus in relation to which it is essentially defined. For that reason one relative cannot be understood without the other, and consequently they are simultaneous in nature. The cooperation of our choice, however, depends on God who cooperates as on a prior per se efficient cause, as was said above and will be shown below. Hence divine cooperation must precede the cooperation of created choice in the order of nature and causality.

Fifth, it is proved as follows. Faustus of Riez, as was seen in disput. 2. nu. 5. et 8, asserted that grace and free choice are joined together in matters pertaining to salvation, and that grace is a companion, not a forerunner, of human merits. Yet he attributed the principal role in the work of our salvation to grace alone, and was speaking of helping, or cooperating, grace. For, as is clear from what was said in disput. 2. nu. 6. et 7, he did not deny but expressly conceded that human wills are preceded by exciting grace in pious operations that follow faith, although he asserted that faith is from ourselves, within us. Nevertheless, the Saints who wrote against him contend that helping, or cooperating, grace is not merely a companion but also a forerunner of human merits. Therefore.

IX. Second conclusion. Cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, precedes the cooperation of created choice with it in the order of reason and causality. This conclusion follows from the preceding one: for cooperating grace, insofar as it is distinguished from exciting grace, is prevenient, as was shown; but insofar as it cooperates, it is really distinct from exciting grace, as is clear from the premises. Therefore, insofar as it cooperates, it is prevenient to the influx of created choice. This conclusion will be made clearer by the solution to the final argument.

Saint Bernard’s authority concerning cooperating grace is examined.— The reply to the first argument, then, is that Saint Bernard’s meaning is that grace precedes the cooperation of choice only in the act of arousing, according to the order of time; for, generally speaking, exciting grace precedes the free consent of choice in time. When he adds that in the other matters it accompanies it, he is speaking of accompaniment according to the temporal instant, not according to the instant of nature. For in the same context he quite clearly acknowledges that the cooperation of grace precedes the cooperation of choice in the order of nature and causality; for he immediately adds: It is not partly grace and partly free choice, but each accomplishes the whole by an undivided act. The whole indeed belongs to free choice, and the whole comes from grace; but just as the whole is in free choice, so the whole comes from grace. It is as if he said: although grace and free choice jointly and simultaneously produce a pious operation in time, nevertheless the cooperation of grace precedes in the order of nature and causality. Those words repeated twice by Saint Bernard indicate this, namely, the whole is from it. By them he indicates that the cooperation of choice depends on the cooperation of grace; consequently grace precedes the cooperation of that same choice in the order of causality. The authority of Chrysostom introduced in the same argument is to be understood in accordance with this teaching; more was said about it in disp. 22. nu. 22. et 23.

X. The reply to the second argument is that cooperating with another toward some effect is to produce that same effect at the same time as the other; it is not, however, necessary that both concur simultaneously in the order of nature, or of causality.

In reply to the confirmation, it is said that for grace to cooperate with free choice, it is sufficient that at the same instant of time in which grace cooperates, choice itself also cooperates by freely flowing into consent; although, according to the instant of nature, the cooperation of grace precedes—not by eliciting a pious operation without us, but by causing us to consent freely and infallibly.

The difference between a habit and actual help.— The reply to the third argument is that, although the cooperation of grace occurs only if the free cooperation of choice is present at the same instant of time, it does not depend on that cooperation, just as the sun does not depend on a ray, although it is never without one. The same account does not apply to the cooperation and influx of habits and to the influx of cooperating grace. For a habit does not predetermine a faculty with respect to the exercise of an act, since its actual use is subject to the power of free choice: for we use habits when we wish. Cooperating grace, however, is not subject, with respect to its use, to the power of our will; rather, it subjects our will to itself and makes it obedient, as will be clear in disp. 87. Hence the cooperation of grace precedes the cooperation of our choice in the order of nature; the influx of a habit into works of piety, however, does not precede in the order of nature, but accompanies the influx of the faculty that produces those same works.

As for the fourth argument, the premise is denied; it will be treated expressly in disp. 85.

XI. The reply to the fifth must be given at greater length in disp. 98. For now, we say briefly that an instant of nature is not an instant in which something occurs, but an instant from which it occurs. Hence there is no need to assign, for some instant, something produced by cooperating grace alone and not by free choice; it is enough to understand the dependence that the influx of choice has upon the cooperation of grace. It does not follow, then, that free choice is merely passive, receiving a consent produced by grace alone.

Second, it is replied that, although the consent of free choice does not proceed as an efficient effect from grace alone, but from grace and free choice, nevertheless the first beginning of that same consent proceeds from helping grace alone. For it is this grace which, once exciting grace is presupposed, first initiates our consent by moving and applying free choice to act, as will be clear in the same disputation 98.

The effects of operating and cooperating grace.— The reply to the sixth argument is that the proper effect of operating grace is to move only. For, as was said on the authority of Saint Thomas, grace is called operating in relation to that effect in which our mind is moved and not moving, God alone being the mover; the effect of cooperating grace, however, is that in which our mind both moves and is moved. Nor does it follow from this that grace is called operating and cooperating in relation to the same effect. For one effect of grace is merely to move the will; another is, by moving that same will, to produce a pious operation simultaneously in time with it. The first effect is attributed to operating grace, and the second to cooperating grace. Hence not only operating grace, but also cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient.

Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.

Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.

Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.

Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.

Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.

Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.

Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.

Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.

Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.

Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.

Disputatio XCIII: Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, speaking properly of resistance.

Disputatio XCIV: How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that human free choice moved by God through efficacious help cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.

Disputatio XCV: Whether, after God has mercifully aroused created free choice, he awaits its free consent to be purified or justified.

Disputatio XCVI: Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who arouses and calls it.

Disputatio XCVII: Whether the good use or cooperation of free choice, by which it consents to God who arouses and calls it, proceeds from its innate freedom alone.

Disputatio XCVIII: Whether, exciting grace being presupposed, the consent or cooperation of free choice must first be begun by the created will, or by the divine will or the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand.

Disputatio XCIX: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person, preceded by exciting grace, wills to be converted, he is therefore helped by God and converted; or, conversely, he is converted because he is helped by God.

Disputatio C: Whether the bestowal of efficacious help is the adequate cause of the conversion of free choice.

Disputatio CI: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person is not helped by God, he is therefore not converted.

Disputatio CII: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person aroused by God does not will to use sufficient grace, he is therefore not helped by God or converted.

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

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