De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Introduction

Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.

What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they are distinguished from one another.

I. The resolution of this difficulty is very necessary for understanding and explaining the nature and property of efficacious grace, for laying open the mind of Saints Augustine and Thomas concerning the power and efficacy of this same grace, and for reconciling various passages of Augustine that at first sight seem contrary to one another. There are as many opinions on this matter as there are heads, but those most commonly circulated among theologians are reduced to four. The first is that of those who assert that grace is called operating with respect to interior acts, but cooperating with respect to exterior acts. They prove their opinion.

First, from St. Thomas, I–II, q. 111, a. 2, where he says that, with respect to the interior act, the will is as something moved; and therefore, insofar as God moves the will to this act, grace is called operating. Further below he adds that, with respect to the exterior act, grace is called cooperating. He says the same in II Sentences, d. 26, q. 1, a. 5.

Second, an argument is made from the authority of St. Augustine, On Grace and Free Choice, ch. 17, where, explaining the words to the Philippians 2, “It is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish: For a good will,” he says: “He himself works that we may will, beginning the work; he cooperates with those who will, bringing it to completion.” And immediately he adds: “That we may will, he works without us; but when we will, and will in such a way as to act, he cooperates with us.” By these words he attributes willing itself, which is an interior act, to operating grace; but the exterior work, which the word “to act” signifies, he attributes to cooperating grace.

This is confirmed by the authority of St. Bernard, who, explaining the same passage to the Philippians 2, says that since there are three things—thinking well, willing well, and acting well—the first two belong to God, while the third is said to be both God’s and ours. There he attributes the interior act itself, namely thinking well and willing well, to operating grace; but he refers the good exterior act to God cooperating with us.

II. The second opinion is held by certain more recent theologians, who affirm that operating grace is identical with exciting, attracting, inviting, or morally moving grace, which moves free choice toward supernatural acts; while cooperating grace is identified with helping grace, or with grace that flows into a pious act jointly with free choice. For they say that one and the same grace, insofar as it excites, attracts, and invites our choice to acts of believing, hoping, loving, or repenting, is called prevenient and exciting grace; and under this aspect it precedes our choice toward such acts. But insofar as, once our choice is already consenting and cooperating in the acts to which that grace invites and attracts, grace itself also cooperates in those same acts with a new influx and action, it is called helping and cooperating grace. In support of this opinion there is

A third argument, which its proponents often press, is taken from the Council of Trent, Session 6, on Justification, chapter 5, whose words we cited in disputation 74, no. 1. There the Council calls it prevenient, exciting, and helping grace, and says that free choice is disposed to justification by assenting to and cooperating with that same grace. Therefore, that disposition takes place with free choice cooperating and consenting together with prevenient and exciting grace; and consequently, that same grace which precedes free choice and excites it to such an act cooperates at the same time with it. Thus prevenient, cooperating, and helping grace are not distinct graces, but one and the same grace: considered before free choice cooperates with it and elicits the free act by which it is disposed to justification, it is called prevenient; but considered insofar as, once free choice is cooperating with it, it too cooperates and flows into that same act, it is called cooperating and helping grace.

This is confirmed by those words in canon 4 of the same session: “If anyone says that the free choice of a human being, moved and aroused by God, cooperates in no way by assenting to God who arouses it, etc.” Here you see the Council affirming that free choice cooperates with God who arouses it, when it assents and disposes itself to justifying grace; and consequently, that God also cooperates with it toward the same disposition through exciting grace. For one who cooperates with a cooperator is called cooperating; therefore operating grace is the same as exciting grace, and cooperating grace is the same as helping grace.

III. Fourth, they prove the same from the authority of St. Augustine, On Grace and Free Choice, book 1, chapter 16, who says: “It is certain that we keep the commandments if we will; but because the will is prepared by the Lord, we must ask him that we will as much as suffices for us to act by willing. It is certain that we will when we will, but he makes us will the good, of which it is said: ‘The will is prepared by the Lord, and the steps of a man shall be directed by the Lord’”; “and: ‘It is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish’”; “It is certain that we act when we act; but he makes us act, by supplying the will with most effective powers, he who said: ‘I will cause you to walk in my statutes.’” And in chapter 17 he says: “Who had begun to give this charity, even if small, unless he who prepares the will and, by cooperating, brings to completion what he began by operating? For he himself works that we may will, beginning the work; he cooperates with those who will, bringing it to completion. Therefore, that we may will, he works without us; but when we will, and will in such a way as to act, he cooperates with us. Yet without him, whether operating so that we will or cooperating when we will, we have no power for good works of piety.” From this testimony it is gathered that operating grace is that by which the will is prepared by the Lord, and that this same grace is meant when God is said to make us will or act. It is clear, however, that God does this in us through exciting grace: for by that grace he enlightens us and directs our steps, which Augustine there attributes to this operating grace; and by attracting the will he prepares it sweetly to will to believe, love, or act. Therefore, according to Augustine, operating grace is the same as exciting grace, and cooperating grace is the same as helping grace.

IIII. Fifth. God is not said to work in us so that we may will because he alone brings about willing itself in us, but because he is the one who works in us the beginning of a good will, which is not brought to completion without us. This is what Augustine says: “He himself works that we may will, beginning the work; he cooperates with those who will, bringing it to completion.” But God works in us the beginning of salvation only through exciting grace, as is clear from the Council of Trent. Therefore the function of operating grace and of exciting grace is the same, and consequently the function of cooperating grace and of helping grace will also be the same.

Sixth. This is proved from the very meaning of the names. For the designation “cooperating grace” is self-evident and fits helping grace most clearly, since it cooperates with human efforts, as Ambrose rightly said in his second book on Luke. And—and this is very much to be noted—that word indicates a certain simultaneous conjunction of the will and helping grace in the same act or action, in which they are said to cooperate with one another, so that under this aspect neither precedes or impels the other, but they merely act together. Operating grace, as can be gathered from Augustine, is so called either because through it God works in us without us, or because through it God, even alone and without us, works so that we may will, in keeping with the words of the Second Council of Orange, chapter 20, from Augustine, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, book 2, chapter 8: “Many good things are done in a human being which the human being does not do; but the human being does no good things which God does not grant him to do.” Therefore.

Seventh. For St. Augustine often attributes cooperation to God’s help, that is, to helping grace, but operation to calling, that is, to exciting grace. For God calls through exciting grace, as the Council of Trent said, and through that same grace works in us a good will. This is what those words of St. Augustine signify: “For God provides in one way that we may will, and in another what we have willed: that we may will, he wished to be both his and ours—his by calling, ours by following. But what we have willed he alone provides, that is, the power to act well and to live always in blessedness.” There he attributes to God’s calling, that is, to exciting grace, in the same way the role of being that by which God works in us so that we may will, although willing itself does not take place without us.

V. The third opinion is that a good work, insofar as it proceeds from God as its principal cause, is called operating grace; but insofar as it proceeds from our free choice, it is called cooperating grace. The chief reason for this opinion is that we cooperate with God, as is defined by the Council of Trent: therefore God’s operation is called operating grace, while our cooperation will be cooperating grace.

The fourth opinion is that of Cajetan, I–II, q. 111, a. 2, and Master Soto, On Nature and Grace, book 1, chapter 16: grace is called operating insofar as it causes in us an intention of the end, but cooperating insofar as it cooperates with us in a right choice of means. Many recent Thomists defend this opinion, and it seems to be the express opinion of St. Thomas in the cited I–II, q. 111, a. 2, where he says: “There is in us a twofold act. The first is an interior act of the will; with respect to this act, the will is as something moved, while God is as the mover, especially when the will begins to will the good, after previously willing evil. And therefore, insofar as God moves the human mind to this act, grace is called operating.” There he proves this by the authority of St. Augustine cited above, who says: “That we may will, he works; but when we will, he cooperates with us so that we may bring it to completion.” And in his reply to the third objection he adds: “Someone is said to cooperate with another not only as a secondary agent with a principal agent, but as one who helps toward an end already presupposed. Now through operating grace a human being is helped by God to will the good. Therefore, once the end is already presupposed, it follows that grace cooperates with us.”

VI. To resolve this difficulty, however, we must first assume with St. Thomas, in the cited article 2, “that the operation of an effect is attributed not to what is moved, but to what moves. Therefore, in an effect in which our mind is moved and does not move, while God alone moves, the operation is attributed to God; and in this respect grace is called operating. But in an effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is attributed not only to God but also to the soul; and in this respect grace is called cooperating.” He teaches the same in On Truth, q. 27, a. 5.

The will moves itself morally and physically.— Second, it should be noted that the will can move itself in two ways. In the first way, morally: this occurs when, from a prior willing of the end, it applies itself to the choice of means. In the second way it can move itself physically, namely, when it freely produces an act even if it does not properly deliberate about it; for an act can be free even if it is not deliberated, as happens in willing the end. For when someone desires health as an end, or turns to God through an act of charity as to the ultimate end, it is certain that such an act is absolutely free, since it is meritorious of eternal life. Yet it is not called deliberated, because it does not presuppose any deliberation of reason. For deliberation is not about the end as an end, but about the means to the end; and therefore in that act the will does not move itself morally, but only physically.

The will moves itself morally only with respect to the means.— Third, it should be noted that in every free operation, whether it concerns the end or the means, the will always moves itself physically, because, as was said above and will be shown more fully below, it belongs to the nature of a voluntary act that it have as its efficient cause an intrinsic principle that moves itself at least physically. Yet it is not necessary that in every operation of the will, even a free one, it move itself morally through deliberation, as is clear in willing the end. The reason is this: as St. Thomas teaches in the First Part of the Second Part, q. 13, a. 3, and q. 14, a. 2, deliberation and counsel do not concern the end, but only the means. Therefore, when someone wills the end as an end, the will does not move itself morally; for in order to move itself morally, it must deliberate and take counsel about the exercise of the act. I say, when someone wills the end as an end; for if an intermediate end is considered insofar as it has the character of a means ordered to a further end, the will can indeed move itself morally when it desires that end. The reason is that an end, insofar as it takes on the character of a means, is an object of deliberation and counsel. For someone can deliberate: “Whether, in order to attain eternal life, it is useful for me to have perfect health”; although health, as the end of medicine, does not fall under consultation and deliberation.

VII. Operating grace morally is the same as exciting grace.— Let our first conclusion, then, be this: operating grace morally is the same as exciting grace. We grant this conclusion to the proponents of the second opinion; it alone is proved by the arguments adduced for that opinion, if they prove anything at all. It is proved further as follows: operating grace morally is that which, by attracting, inviting, and persuading, makes us act and works so that we may act, as is clear from what was said above. But all this belongs to exciting grace: through it, God enlightens the intellect and attracts the will to follow the good, as was said above. Therefore, and so forth. It follows that cooperating grace morally alone does not differ from exciting grace: for one who excites another and persuades him to do good is the moral cause of that same good; therefore he cooperates with him morally in willing or carrying out such good; therefore cooperating grace morally alone is the same as exciting grace. However, because Sacred Scripture, the Councils, and the Fathers—especially St. Augustine and Thomas—do not speak of operating or cooperating grace only in this sense, but also in a higher one, namely, of grace that physically, or truly as an efficient cause, makes us act and so works that we may act, let us proceed as follows.

VIII. Operating grace physically is really distinct from exciting grace.— Second conclusion: operating grace physically is really distinct from exciting grace. This conclusion is opposed to the proponents of the second opinion, who, as was seen above and will be clear below, admit no operating grace that truly as an efficient cause, or by physically predetermining the will, makes us act; and they explain all the passages of Scripture, the Councils, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas that are brought against them as referring to grace that operates morally beforehand. Our conclusion, however, is taught by all recent Thomists, and was taught earlier, not obscurely, by Saints Augustine and Thomas, as will be treated expressly in disputation 86. There, through many testimonies of Sacred Scripture, definitions of Councils—especially the Council of Orange—the clearest passages of the holy Fathers Augustine and Thomas, and theological arguments, it will be made evident that God, through the help of pre-operating grace, makes us act and works so that we may act, not only by persuading, attracting, inviting, or otherwise drawing us inwardly in a moral way, but also by truly and efficaciously causing, as an efficient cause, free choice itself to cooperate and freely consent to God who moves and calls it. For from this it is clearly concluded that this operating grace is really distinct from exciting grace, since exciting grace does not have this sort of effect, as the proponents of the contrary opinion admit. Nor is it enough to reply that exciting grace fails to have this sort of effect through the fault of the person who is moved and aroused, because free choice does not wish to cooperate or consent to God who moves and excites it. For we maintain that God, through the operating grace of which we are now speaking, certainly and infallibly subjects the human will to himself and makes the unwilling willing, and the resistant consenting. Yet he does not accomplish this through exciting grace alone, as is clear from what was said above about the effects of exciting grace.

IX. Second, the same point is proved. Cooperating grace is really distinct from exciting grace; therefore operating grace is too. The inference is proved: operating and cooperating grace are not distinct, but are one and the same grace according to different effects, as St. Thomas teaches in I–II, q. 111, a. 2, in the body of the article and in reply to the fourth objection. The antecedent is proved: cooperating grace acts upon a pious act as an efficient cause, whereas exciting grace does not produce that same act as an efficient cause, or physically; it reaches the will’s consent only morally. Consequently, when a pious act is produced, such exciting grace often does not exist. Hence it cannot act as an efficient cause, because what does not exist does not operate, since each thing operates insofar as it is in act. Therefore operating grace is really distinct from exciting grace.

Furthermore, our conclusion is proved by all the arguments with which, in disputations 22 and 23, it was shown that God physically predetermines free choice to cooperate with and consent to God who calls, through the motion of pre-operating grace. Since exciting grace does not thus predetermine free choice to act, but leaves it so indeterminate that dissent by that same choice can coexist with that very grace exciting it to consent, it follows that such exciting grace is really distinct from operating grace.

Operating and cooperating grace concur in every pious act.— Third conclusion. In every pious act, whether it is an intention of the end or a choice of means, whether it is an interior or an exterior act, operating grace always concurs, at least physically, as does cooperating grace. This is proved as follows: operating grace physically is that through which God works so that we may act, by predetermining our will to consent; cooperating grace, in turn, is that through which God works a pious act with us. But in every pious act God truly acts as an efficient cause through his grace to make us act, and likewise works the act itself with us, as is clear from the definition of Conc. Araus. can. 9: “Whenever we do good, God works in us and with us, so that we may act.” There the phrase “in us” denotes the effect of operating grace, just as the phrase “with us” denotes the effect of cooperating grace. Therefore, in every pious act operating grace concurs in us, through which God works so that we may act, making us act—something that he alone effects, as was shown above; and cooperating grace also concurs, through which he effects the pious act itself with us.

Second, this is proved as follows. Our free choice does not perform any supernatural act unless it is moved by God, as stated in Trident. sess. 6. de iustif. can. 3. et 4. Therefore, in every supernatural act, free choice is both moved by God and moves itself at least physically. Therefore both graces are present: operating and cooperating. The inference is proved as follows: according to St. Thomas, operating grace is named with respect to an effect in which our will is related only as something moved; cooperating grace is named with respect to an effect in which the will, once moved, moves itself.

This is confirmed. In relation to the prior motion by which our will is moved by God to supernatural acts, it is passive, since such motion is not produced actively by our free choice but only by God, from whom comes the help of pre-operating grace. Therefore, with respect to that effect, grace alone operates, and so it is operating grace. Again, the will, moved by God, actively and freely produces supernatural acts meritorious of eternal life and other free supernatural acts. Therefore cooperating grace concurs in that case.

Third, this is proved by the clearest testimonies of St. Augustine, in which he teaches our opinion, but especially in On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 16, where he says: “It is certain that we will when we will; but he makes us will the good,” and below: “It is certain that we act when we act; but he makes us act, by supplying the will with most effective powers.” By these words the holy Doctor distinguishes two things in every pious act. The first is that he makes us will, which, as will be clear below, must be understood as true efficient causality after the manner of a physical cause. This he attributes to God alone, and consequently to operating grace; for grace is called operating in relation to an effect in which the will is related only as something moved, while God alone moves, as was said above. The second is the very willing of our will, of which not only God, or his grace alone, is the efficient cause, but our free choice too, together with that grace, in keeping with the Apostle’s words: “I labored more abundantly than all, yet not I alone, but the grace of God with me.” Therefore, in relation to this effect, our mind is not only moved by God, but at the same time also moves itself at least physically; consequently, such an effect must necessarily be attributed to cooperating grace. St. Augustine therefore holds that operating and cooperating grace concur in every pious act. This is confirmed more fully by those words of his in the same book, chapter 17: “That we may will, he works without us; but when we will, and will in such a way as to act, he works with us. Yet without him, whether operating so that we may will or cooperating when we will, we have no power for good works of piety.” He proves this by the authority of the Apostle, adding: “Of him operating so that we may will, it is said: ‘For it is God who works in you also to will.’” “Of him cooperating when we already will and act by willing, he says: ‘We know that all things work together for good for those who love God.’” And in To Simplicianus, book 1, question 2, near the middle, he says: “God provides in one way that we may will, and in another what we have willed. For that we may will, he wished to be both his and ours: his by calling, ours by following. But what we have willed he alone provides”; as though he were saying: we will with God, but God alone makes us will. More will be said about this in disputation 100. Finally, in On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 13, he concludes in this way: “Therefore we will, but God works in us also to will; therefore we act, but God works in us also to act, for a good will. It is fitting for us both to believe and to say this: it is pious, it is true, so that our confession may be humble and submissive, and all may be given to God.”

They reply to the first testimony, from On Grace and Free Choice, that Augustine said God makes us will even if we will when we will, and makes us act even if we act when we act, because by such a secret calling he prepares our will so that it may readily elicit consent. They say that in the second testimony and all the others he intended to teach exactly the same thing, and nothing else.

This solution, however, is ambiguous and can be adapted to our opinion as well as to theirs. Hence we argue against it as follows. When they say that God makes us will and act because by such a secret calling he prepares our will, etc., they either understand by this secret calling a calling by which God makes us will and act only by persuading, attracting, inviting, or otherwise drawing the will inwardly in a moral way. This is not at all consistent with the teaching of St. Augustine, because in his opinion God, through pre-operating grace—which he often called a deep and secret calling—does this not only in the moral way just explained, but also truly as an efficient cause, or after the manner of a physical cause: he causes us to cooperate and to apply a free influx to consent, as will be made clear in disputation 86. If, however, they understand a deep and secret calling that makes us cooperate in both ways, namely morally and physically, or after the manner of a physical cause, they agree with our opinion. Consequently, they must admit that God, through the help of pre-operating grace, physically determines the will to every particular pious act with all its circumstances, as we said in disputations 22 and 23, and will be shown more fully in disputation 91. Moreover, when they add that God prepares our will by a secret calling so that it may readily elicit consent, the word “readily” causes a difficulty. Why, then, do they insert this word? Would the sense not have been complete if they had said “so that it may elicit consent”? For, as will be made clear in disputation 88, the help of grace is necessary not only for free choice to elicit consent to a pious act readily, but for it to elicit that consent at all.

If it is said that God makes us act as an efficient cause and physically because he physically and as an efficient cause produces in the intellect and will indeliberate illuminations and excitations for this purpose and with this intention—that we may act—we reply: this is to produce those indeliberate motions in us physically, by which God makes the will cooperate only morally, in the manner of one persuading and inviting. But this does not preserve the claim that God, through his pre-operating grace, truly as an efficient cause, or physically, makes us cooperate.

Fourth, this is proved as follows. Two things are necessary for every pious act: the concurrence of God and the concurrence of created free choice. But God’s concurrence is prior, since he is the first cause, which by its operation influences all secondary causes prior in reason and causality than they reach their effects, as was shown in disputation 18. Therefore, in every pious act there is something attributed to God alone and to operating grace, namely, the influx into free choice as a cause, by which it is prepared or predetermined to act piously; and there is the pious act itself, which proceeds from God and free choice and therefore must be attributed to cooperating grace.

X. The opinion of Cajetan, Master Soto, and the other Thomists is to be understood in accordance with this teaching. For they do not intend to deny this third conclusion, but only to teach that, in intending the end, our will does not move itself morally through deliberation of reason, but is moved by God alone with respect to the specification of the act. Consequently, grace is called operating in relation to the end, in the way explained above, and cooperating in relation to the means. The first opinion can be understood in the same sense: by the interior act of the will it means the intention of the end, and by the exterior act, the choice of means. St. Thomas uses “interior act” and “exterior act” in this sense in the First Part of the Second Part, q. 18, a. 6, in the body, when he says: “In a voluntary act a twofold act is found, namely, the interior act of the will and the exterior act; and each of these acts has its own object: for the end is properly the object of the interior voluntary act.” In these words, as Cajetan explains there, by the interior act of the will he means the intention, which concerns the end; and consequently, by the exterior act he means choice. Hence, in the reply to the second objection of the same article, he says that being ordered to such an end, although it is incidental to the exterior act, is not incidental to the interior act of the will, which is related to the exterior act as the formal to the material.

By these points the reply to the first and second arguments, together with the confirmation offered for the first opinion, is clear.

XI. To the third argument on behalf of the second opinion, we reply that, in adults, the first and remote beginning of justification is taken from exciting grace, but its proximate beginning from helping grace, which includes operating and cooperating grace, through which God works in us and with us so that we may act. Therefore, we must deny that the Council of Trent, in the words cited, meant that operating grace, of which we spoke in the third conclusion, is the same as exciting grace. For exciting grace does not act as an efficient cause together with free choice in producing a pious act, but only morally, as is clear from what was established above. Helping grace, however, is that which effects the same pious act in free choice and together with it. Insofar as this grace moves free choice and physically predetermines it to consent, it is called operating, because in relation to this effect our will is moved and does not move, while God alone moves. But insofar as it produces a pious act as an efficient cause together with free choice thus moved by God, it is called cooperating grace, because in this effect our will both moves itself and is moved; and therefore the operation is attributed not only to God but also to the soul. Thus helping grace is called operating insofar as it moves and determines free choice to act, but cooperating insofar as it produces a pious act together with free choice moved by God. This is the legitimate sense of the Council of Trent, as is clear from the cited canon 4, where, antecedently to free consent, it requires not only an excitation through which God morally makes us act, but also an efficacious motion through which God truly acts as an efficient cause to bring about our consent. We call this predetermining motion physically operating grace. And by these points the reply to the confirmation is clear.

XII. To the fourth argument we reply that those passages of Augustine powerfully confirm our opinion and completely overturn the contrary one. For from them we learn, first, that although a person’s free choice wills freely, God alone is the one who makes that person will—not only by morally persuading through exciting grace, but also by truly acting as an efficient cause through operating grace, making free choice itself consent and cooperate, while at the same time cooperating with us in the consent itself. Second, we learn that God prepares the will to consent in two ways. First, by a certain moral persuasion, which is through exciting grace. Second, by a motion that predetermines the will to consent, which takes place through operating grace, precisely insofar as it operates.

To the fifth argument we reply that God is said to work in us so that we may will because he alone makes us will. For although a human being wills freely, the human being does not make himself will; God alone effects this through operating grace, as we shall show in disputation 100 from various passages of St. Augustine and other Fathers. God makes us will and works in us the beginning of a good will not only by morally persuading, but also by truly and efficaciously causing us, as an efficient cause, to consent freely. With respect to this effect Augustine said: “He himself works that we may will, beginning the work.” But because we too cooperate freely, he therefore adds: “He cooperates with those who will, bringing it to completion.” Thus, although the function of grace in morally producing our willing is the same as that of exciting grace, the role of operating grace physically is not the same as that of exciting grace; consequently, these two graces are really distinct from one another.

XIII. To the sixth argument we reply that we infer our opinion from the very meaning of the names: for operating only morally is not properly operating, but metaphorically, as was shown above. Hence, when Augustine says that God alone operates, beginning the work, or that he alone works so that we may will, he is not to be understood as speaking only of moral operation—that is, of an operation by which willing itself first begins only in a moral way—but also of physical operation, through which God first initiates our willing, making us cooperate with him and consent freely. Nor do we admit that helping or cooperating grace, insofar as it is helping, concurs with our free choice in a pious act only by a simultaneous influx. For, as will be made clear in the following disputation, helping and cooperating grace, although simultaneous in time with the influx of free choice, nevertheless precedes it in the order of reason and causality.

To the seventh argument we reply that in those words, under the name “calling,” St. Augustine includes not only exciting grace, which operates morally so that we may will, but also the grace by which God truly acts as an efficient cause to make us act, as was said. Hence St. Thomas, I–II, q. 113, a. 1, ad 3, understands by the name “calling” the help of exciting grace and of grace that moves, that is, efficaciously helps. For he says: “Calling refers to the help of God inwardly moving and arousing the mind to abandon sin; this motion of God is not itself the remission of sin, but its cause.”

Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.

Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.

Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.

Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.

Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.

Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.

Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.

Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.

Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.

Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.

Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.

Disputatio XCIII: Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, speaking properly of resistance.

Disputatio XCIV: How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that human free choice moved by God through efficacious help cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.

Disputatio XCV: Whether, after God has mercifully aroused created free choice, he awaits its free consent to be purified or justified.

Disputatio XCVI: Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who arouses and calls it.

Disputatio XCVII: Whether the good use or cooperation of free choice, by which it consents to God who arouses and calls it, proceeds from its innate freedom alone.

Disputatio XCVIII: Whether, exciting grace being presupposed, the consent or cooperation of free choice must first be begun by the created will, or by the divine will or the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand.

Disputatio XCIX: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person, preceded by exciting grace, wills to be converted, he is therefore helped by God and converted; or, conversely, he is converted because he is helped by God.

Disputatio C: Whether the bestowal of efficacious help is the adequate cause of the conversion of free choice.

Disputatio CI: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person is not helped by God, he is therefore not converted.

Disputatio CII: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person aroused by God does not will to use sufficient grace, he is therefore not helped by God or converted.

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

↑ Top of work