De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Introduction
IN WHICH THE HELP OF OPERATING AND COOPERATING, HELPING, OR EFFICACIOUS GRACE IS TREATED.
HAVING considered the helps of exciting and sufficient grace, it remains for us to dispute the helps of helping, operating, and cooperating, or efficacious, grace. Since these helps can be considered in two ways, namely, in themselves and by comparison with the helps of exciting and sufficient grace, we must first treat these helps in themselves; afterwards they are to be considered by comparison with the helps of exciting and sufficient grace. In the first matter, fourteen points must be examined.
I. What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how the latter is distinguished from operating grace.
II. Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it is cooperating or helping, is prevenient, or premoves free choice toward consent; or whether it merely flows into the same consent simultaneously with free choice.
III. What efficacious help is, and in what its efficacy consists.
IIII. How many kinds of efficacious help there are.
V. Whether the help of helping, cooperating, or efficacious grace and free choice, in relation to a pious act, are two partial causes, like two people pulling a ship.
VI. Whether God, through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, causes free choice to exert its own influx upon consent, properly as an efficient cause or in the manner of a physical cause; or whether he effects this only morally, by persuading, inviting, and attracting.
VII. Whether actual efficacious help is subject to our power of choice as regards its use, just as the habits we use when we will are subject to us.
VIII. Whether, in one who has infused habits for eliciting a supernatural act, a special help is necessary—not only of exciting grace but also of helping grace—really distinct from the help of the infused habit.
IX. Whether created free choice is the first cause, or the first root, of its own determination.
X. Whether the help of grace, in its character as efficacious help, depends on the free influx of created choice together with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God antecedently to the free consent of that same choice. Here certain ways of speaking about the nature of efficacious help are weighed.
XI. Whether God, through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, predetermines free choice to consent.
XII. Whether free choice, moved by God through efficacious help, can also, in the composite sense, reject1 that same help, dissent, and fail to be converted. Here certain decrees of the Council of Trent and of Sens are weighed and explained.
XIII. Whether a person's free choice can resist efficacious help.
XIV. How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that a person's free choice, moved by God through efficacious help, cannot in the composite sense dissent or fail to be converted, but only in the divided sense.