De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Introduction

IN WHICH THE HELP OF OPERATING AND COOPERATING, HELPING, OR EFFICACIOUS GRACE IS TREATED.

HAVING considered the helps of exciting and sufficient grace, it remains for us to dispute the helps of helping, operating, and cooperating, or efficacious, grace. Since these helps can be considered in two ways, namely, in themselves and by comparison with the helps of exciting and sufficient grace, we must first treat these helps in themselves; afterwards they are to be considered by comparison with the helps of exciting and sufficient grace. In the first matter, fourteen points must be examined.

I. What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how the latter is distinguished from operating grace.

II. Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it is cooperating or helping, is prevenient, or premoves free choice toward consent; or whether it merely flows into the same consent simultaneously with free choice.

III. What efficacious help is, and in what its efficacy consists.

IIII. How many kinds of efficacious help there are.

V. Whether the help of helping, cooperating, or efficacious grace and free choice, in relation to a pious act, are two partial causes, like two people pulling a ship.

VI. Whether God, through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, causes free choice to exert its own influx upon consent, properly as an efficient cause or in the manner of a physical cause; or whether he effects this only morally, by persuading, inviting, and attracting.

VII. Whether actual efficacious help is subject to our power of choice as regards its use, just as the habits we use when we will are subject to us.

VIII. Whether, in one who has infused habits for eliciting a supernatural act, a special help is necessary—not only of exciting grace but also of helping grace—really distinct from the help of the infused habit.

IX. Whether created free choice is the first cause, or the first root, of its own determination.

X. Whether the help of grace, in its character as efficacious help, depends on the free influx of created choice together with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God antecedently to the free consent of that same choice. Here certain ways of speaking about the nature of efficacious help are weighed.

XI. Whether God, through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, predetermines free choice to consent.

XII. Whether free choice, moved by God through efficacious help, can also, in the composite sense, reject that same help, dissent, and fail to be converted. Here certain decrees of the Council of Trent and of Sens are weighed and explained.

XIII. Whether a person's free choice can resist efficacious help.

XIV. How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that a person's free choice, moved by God through efficacious help, cannot in the composite sense dissent or fail to be converted, but only in the divided sense.

Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.

Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.

Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.

Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.

Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.

Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.

Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.

Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.

Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.

Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.

Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.

Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.

Disputatio XCIII: Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, speaking properly of resistance.

Disputatio XCIV: How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that human free choice moved by God through efficacious help cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.

Disputatio XCV: Whether, after God has mercifully aroused created free choice, he awaits its free consent to be purified or justified.

Disputatio XCVI: Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who arouses and calls it.

Disputatio XCVII: Whether the good use or cooperation of free choice, by which it consents to God who arouses and calls it, proceeds from its innate freedom alone.

Disputatio XCVIII: Whether, exciting grace being presupposed, the consent or cooperation of free choice must first be begun by the created will, or by the divine will or the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand.

Disputatio XCIX: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person, preceded by exciting grace, wills to be converted, he is therefore helped by God and converted; or, conversely, he is converted because he is helped by God.

Disputatio C: Whether the bestowal of efficacious help is the adequate cause of the conversion of free choice.

Disputatio CI: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person is not helped by God, he is therefore not converted.

Disputatio CII: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person aroused by God does not will to use sufficient grace, he is therefore not helped by God or converted.

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

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