De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Book Ten
Book Eleven
Book Twelve
Introduction
IN WHICH IS TREATED THE LEGITIMATE Manner of reconciling the freedom of created choice with the certainty and infallibility of Divine Foreknowledge, Providence, and Predestination, and with the efficacy of the helps of grace.
AFTER all the helps of divine grace, both extrinsic and intrinsic, have been disputed in the preceding books, it remains for us to explain in this last book how the freedom of created choice is preserved unharmed together with the efficacy of those same helps. And since the concord of two extremes cannot be known unless the nature of each extreme is first discerned, before we come to declare the legitimate concord of grace and free choice it will be necessary to resolve certain difficulties concerning the nature of that same free choice; for the other extreme, namely the quiddity of efficacious help, has already been discussed above. Therefore concerning the nature of free choice, and its concord with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence, and predestination, eight things are to be considered.
I. What is the legitimate definition, and the proper nature, of free choice.
II. Whether indifference belongs to the essence of a free power, and in what indifference freedom formally consists.
III. Whether created free choice truly and properly has dominion over its own act, and what sort of dominion this is.
IIII. Whether the concord of free choice with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence, and predestination can be demonstrated by natural reason.
V. Whether by the absolute power of God any creature, apart from the beatific vision, can have evident knowledge of the mystery of the Trinity, or of other things which of themselves belong to faith.
VI. The various modes of concord between free choice and grace which are assigned by different theologians are reported and refuted.
VII. The ancient and legitimate concord of free choice with the infallibility of divine predestination, and with the efficacy of the helps of grace, is established, explained, and defended.
VIII. An epilogue of almost all the things that have been said in the preceding disputations is subjoined, containing twenty propositions.
Disputatio CXV: What the legitimate definition and proper nature of free choice are.
What the legitimate definition of free choice is, and its proper nature.
I. Certain more recent Doctors have said that free choice is that which, all things required for acting having been posited, can act and not act, or can so do one thing that it can also do the contrary. This definition of free choice in this form is found neither in Aristotle, nor in the Master of the Sentences, nor in St. Thomas, but in some of the nominalists: which definition, although it can have a true and catholic sense, nevertheless in the sense in which it is explained by some does not seem able to stand. For they understand this definition thus: that, all things required antecedently to the free act having been posited, and also the actual influx by which the will flows into it, free choice can, even in the composite sense, perform that act and not perform it, but suspend it; or even elicit the contrary act. This opinion proceeds from a bad understanding of the composite and divided sense, which we treated ex professo in disputations 93 and 94. From this they infer that it is necessary for true freedom, and for the use of it, that the motion by which God moves the will to consent can at once stand in the same free choice, and be composed with the contrary dissent.
They prove this. First: for the inner force and intrinsic indifference of the free faculty demands it: for otherwise, if we interpret in the divided sense that word, can, as placed in the definition of free choice, the proper privilege of freedom will be destroyed. For the sense will be that with that power, and with all things required for acting, the act is so conjoined that, as far as lies in itself, the privation of the act could also be conjoined with it, if any one of the aforesaid requisites were removed. But this is not true freedom: for it can belong even to fire; for it so heats, when the wood is present, that it could cease if the wood were removed: therefore for true freedom it is necessarily required that, all things required for acting having been posited, it can act and not act even in the composite sense.
Second: for the blessed one, by absolute necessity and not freely — not with a will of contradiction or of contrariety — loves God clearly seen, and yet in the divided sense he can cease from the love of God, namely if he be deprived of the beatific vision, from which the act of love follows by necessity: therefore, for a free power with respect to some act, and for its free use, it does not suffice that, all things required for acting having been posited, it can in the divided sense not act, but it is necessary that it can do so also in the composite sense.
It is confirmed: for even if you include the very act of loving, he who actually loves can in the divided sense hate, just as a white thing can be black: therefore the power of acting and not acting, which is placed in the definition of free choice, is not to be understood in the divided sense, else man would not be more free and indifferent before he acts than while he acts.
II. Third: because if created free choice, all things required for acting having been posited, cannot in the composite sense not act — especially since one of the things required antecedently to our free act is God's efficacious motion, physically predetermining free choice to consent, which having been posited, such an act follows infallibly — but such a motion is not required antecedently to acting; otherwise he who did not have that motion could not act for lack of an active principle necessarily prerequired, and so the omission of the act would never be imputed to him as a fault, and he who has it could not not act, and so the freedom of our choice would perish altogether: therefore.
It is confirmed by all the arguments by which in disputation 23 we strove to prove that a physical predetermination of this kind is repugnant to created freedom, not only as regards its use, but also as regards the free faculty itself.
Fourth. In the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 5, on justification, it is said that, when God touches the heart of man by the illumination of the Holy Spirit, he freely receives that inspiration as one who can reject it. And canon 4 defines that free choice, moved and aroused by God, can dissent from that same motion, if it will. There the Council speaks of the man who is actually touched and actually moved by God: therefore it speaks in the composite sense. It holds, therefore, that for the freedom of choice it is necessary that, all things required for acting on God's part having been posited, free choice can still, by its innate freedom, act and not act, even in the composite sense.
It is confirmed from the fifteenth decree of faith of the Council of Sens, where, after teaching against the Pelagians that the created will needs the help of prevenient grace in order to turn itself to God, it adds against Luther: Nor does so great a necessity of grace prejudice free choice, since it is always at hand, nor does even a moment pass in which God does not stand at the door and knock; and if anyone opens the door to him, he will enter in to him and sup with her: nor, finally, is the help of the God who draws of such a kind that it cannot be resisted. And to prove that man can resist the help of the drawing God, the Council adduces the passage of Matthew 23: How often would I have gathered thy children, as the hen gathers her chickens under her wings, and thou wouldst not? And it also adduces what St. Stephen said to the Jews, Acts 7: You always resist the Holy Spirit. The Council holds, therefore, that man, even when moved by efficacious help, while that help stands, can conjoin actual resistance with the whole entity and intrinsic power of that same help, and consequently that he can resist it in the composite sense.
III. In a contingent and free cause there is at once a power to opposites, but not to opposites at once.— Now we, in order to assign the legitimate definition of free choice and explain its nature, must necessarily presuppose two foundations. It must be presupposed first that, as Aristotle teaches, and St. Thomas, 9 Metaph., lecture 10, in a contingent and free cause there is at once a power to either of two opposites; yet there is not a power to have opposites at once, just as in man there is at once a power to walk and to sit, yet there is no power to walk and sit at once; and the reason is: for the power to one act is not repugnant to the power to the contrary act, nor is it even repugnant to the contrary act; but contrary acts are repugnant to one another in the same subject. Hence created free choice, not only before it is determined to one act, but even in the very instant in which it is determined by God and determines itself to the same act, has at once the power by which it can freely produce the contrary act; yet it does not have the power to have the contrary act at once; for two contrary acts cannot be at once in the same power, but only successively. Hence arose that distinction commonly received by theologians and metaphysicians concerning the simultaneity of power and the power of simultaneity;1 for in free choice there is a simultaneity of power to act and not to act: for by the very fact that it performs one act, it does not destroy the free faculty and the power which it has to perform the contrary act, if it will, or not to act; and likewise by the fact that it does not perform such an act, it does not lose the power of performing that act; yet there is not in free choice, nor can there be, a power of simultaneity to contrary or contradictory acts: for these cannot be at once in the same thing. To explain this, then, that distinction of the composite and divided sense serves, which the Doctors commonly use, as was seen in disputation 25.
IV. In what sense free choice, all things required for operation having been posited, can act and not act.— It must be noted secondly that, when it is said that the free power is that which, all things required for acting having been posited, can act and not act even in the composite sense, this can be understood in two ways: first, so that the composition is made between the things prerequired for acting and the very power of acting and not acting: and then the sense is that the power to act and not to act stands at once in the same subject with the things antecedently prerequired for such an operation: and this sense is most true, as we shall explain afterwards. In the second way it can be understood so that the composition is made between the things antecedently prerequired for performing such an act and the privation of such act, or the contrary act itself: and then the sense is that all things prerequired, even on God's part, for performing such a particular act, and the privation of the same act, or the contrary act, can be, or sometimes are, at once in the same subject. In this sense, then, we intend to attack the aforesaid definition. Hence:
In free choice, together with all things prerequired for acting, the power of not acting stands at once.— FIRST CONCLUSION. For free choice it is necessarily required that, all things prerequired antecedently according to the order of reason or of time for the act having been posited, it can act or not act; namely so that with the same prerequired things there stands at once in free choice the faculty and power by which it can act if it will, or not act if it will. In this conclusion all Catholics agree: for it is held as defined in the Council of Trent, in the place cited above, against Luther and Calvin. For Luther asserted that free choice has itself merely passively, receiving into itself the free act produced by God alone: but Calvin said that man indeed concurs actively to the act which God produces in us, yet not with a free motion, but only a spontaneous one, and not under compulsion, as a horse runs when it is led by its rider.
Efficacious help does not take away from free choice the power of not acting.— It is proved further: for if any one of the things prerequired for performing such an act in particular took away from free choice the faculty, or power, of not acting, or of performing the opposite act, it would be the efficacious motion of God, by which we are predetermined to such an act, that did this; but a motion of this kind does not take away from free choice the faculty of not performing that act, or of performing the contrary act: it only brings it about that, although free choice can act and not act such an act, it nevertheless infallibly and freely performs it, as is clear from St. Prosper, who says:2 What God willed them to will, they willed; and to those who obey him he so gives the willing itself that he does not take away even from those who are to persevere that mutability by which one can will not. and St. Thomas, q. 23 de ver., a. 5 ad 3, says that although the non-being of the effect of the divine will cannot stand at once with the divine will, nevertheless the power of failing the effect stands at once with the divine will; for these are not incompatible: God wills this man to be saved, and this man can be damned; but these are incompatible: God wills this man to be saved, and this man is damned: and he says the same in q. 6 de ver., a. 3 ad 7. It is confirmed: since the power of dissenting and God's absolute decree, or the efficacious motion by which God moves free choice to consent, are not opposed to one another, as is clear from the foundations laid down: therefore the things prerequired on God's part for free choice to perform such an act do not take away from that same choice the faculty by which it can not act, if it will, or perform the contrary act. From these it follows that the will is free and has a true faculty by which it can absolutely act and not act, not only before it determines itself to act, but even in the very instant in which it acts: but of this we must treat in the following disputation.
V. It is not of the essence of free choice that, all things prerequired for acting having been posited, it can in the composite sense not act.— SECOND CONCLUSION. It is not of the reason or definition of free choice that, all things prerequired antecedently according to the order of causality for performing such an act having been posited, it can fail to perform the same act in the composite sense, if the composition be made between prerequired things of this kind and the privation of such act, or the contrary act. And so these two are at once incompatible, namely that in free choice, for some instant of time, there be all the things antecedently prerequired, according to the order of causality, for the production of such an act, and that it not produce it, but produce the contrary act: and nevertheless with this incompatibility the freedom of choice stands at once. This conclusion is according to the mind of St. Thomas, in the place cited above and in other places to be cited below, and it is proved: for among the things prerequired antecedently to the concurrence of free choice for man to produce an act (of love, for example) there is enumerated God's absolute and efficacious decree, by which he determined that free choice should produce such an act, and the efficacious help by which in time he premoves the will to the same act; but with the aforesaid decree and efficacious help it does not stand at once that free choice not produce that act of love, or elicit the contrary act of hatred, as is clear from St. Thomas, 2-2 q. 24, a. 11, in the body, where he says: That the power of the Holy Spirit works infallibly whatever it has willed. Hence it is impossible that these two be at once true, that the Holy Spirit wills to move someone to an act of charity, and that he lose charity by sinning. and p. 2 q. 112 a. 3 in the body he says that the preparation, according as it is from God moving, has necessity to that to which it is ordained by God; not indeed of compulsion, but of infallibility, because the intention of God cannot fail. Hence if it is from the intention of the moving God that the man whose heart he moves obtain grace, he infallibly obtains it, according to that of John 6. Everyone who has heard from the Father, and has learned, comes to me, etc. and St. Augustine, in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, ch. 95, says: Our God in heaven and on earth has done all things whatsoever he willed: which assuredly is not true if he willed some things and did them not, and (what is more unworthy) did them not because, that what the Almighty willed might not be done, the will of man hindered it: therefore, all things required for producing some act having been posited, it does not stand at once that free choice not produce that3 act, or elicit the contrary act.
VI. They answer that the absolute and efficacious decree by which God determined that Peter be converted is not altogether antecedent to Peter's future conversion, but presupposes it as future on the hypothesis that he will be placed in such circumstances, and foreknown by God through the knowledge which they call middle.4 Hence in the very decree of God there is already involved Peter's future consent on that hypothesis. Hence the argument proves nothing; for it does not proceed about the things which are antecedently prerequired for acting, but about the things which presuppose the future conversion. But this solution is attacked by the same arguments5 by which in disputation 7 we showed that that middle knowledge does not stand.
The efficacious decree does not presuppose middle knowledge.— Further: for if before the decree of the divine will it is supposed that the will will cooperate from its innate freedom, on the hypothesis that it be placed in such circumstances, it would follow that the concurrence and operation of the created will would not be reduced to God as to an efficient cause, but only to created free choice: and so created free choice would be the first cause of its own concurrence and cooperation, which nevertheless is impossible, as St. Thomas shows ex professo in 2 Sent., d. 37, q. 2, a. 2.
Secondly the conclusion is proved. One of the things prerequired for God to create the world at the beginning of time was the eternal decree of his will by which he determined to create it; and yet, this decree having been posited, it was not compossible that he should not in fact create the world, else God would be changed: therefore, if for a free act it is required that, all things antecedently prerequired having been posited, free choice can act and not act even in the composite sense, it follows that God did not produce the world freely, but from absolute necessity.
VII. The legitimate definition of free choice is explained.— THIRD CONCLUSION. The legitimate definition of free choice is as follows. Free choice is the faculty of the will and of reason for acting or not acting towards either of two, and for doing one thing or the other. For its explanation it must be observed that, although freedom is formally in the will as in its proximate and immediate subject, nevertheless radically and fundamentally it is in the intellect;6 for it is founded and rooted in the indifference of the judgment by which the intellect judges that the good proposed to the will as to be loved does not have a necessary, or natural, connection with the good in general, to which the will is naturally determined as regards specification. So St. Thomas teaches, p. 2 q. 17, art. 1 ad 2, where he says that the root of freedom is the will as its subject; but as its cause it is reason: for from this the will can be borne freely to different things, because reason can have different conceptions of the good: and therefore the philosophers define free choice as the free judgment concerning reason, as if reason were the cause of freedom. And since, in this state, whatever good reason proposes to the will, it proposes it with this indifference of judgment, therefore the will remains free with respect to such a good, to love it or not love it, as regards exercise, as St. Thomas excellently explains, q. 24 de ver., art. 1, and 3 contra Gent., ch. 83, reason 4, and 1 p. q. 83, art. 1. But all these things are comprehended and explained in the definition of free choice proposed: for since freedom is formally in the will as in its subject, which is not in itself determined to one thing, but determines itself through the deliberation of reason to this or that good, therefore it is said in the definition of free choice that it is the faculty of the will towards either of two; but that particle (and of reason) is added to explain the root and foundation of the will's indifference; which, as we have said, is the indifference of the judgment of reason: and by the name of reason is understood intellectual cognition, even if it takes place without the discourse of reason, so that the definition may extend also to the free choice of the angels and of God, as St. Thomas says, q. 24 de ver., art. 3 ad 1, where he establishes this definition, which the Master of the Sentences also handed down in 2 Sent., d. 24. The remaining particles, namely for acting or not acting, etc., are added for fuller explanation.
VIII. For freedom the faculty for contradictory opposites suffices.— It must be noted secondly that for freedom there is not necessarily required the faculty for contrary opposites, as for doing good or evil, but the faculty for contradictory opposites suffices, as for acting and not acting; so St. Thomas teaches, q. 24 de verit., art. 3 ad 3, and it is proved: for in God there is found most perfectly free choice, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 19, art. 10; but in God there is no faculty for doing good and evil, but only for doing good: for the works of God are perfect, as Scripture says: therefore, etc. From this it follows that to be able to sin does not pertain to the formal reason of free choice, but is rather a certain imperfection of created choice, belonging to it because it was made from nothing:7 and this reason St. Augustine assigns, lib. 2 de vitiis et concup., ch. 28, and lib. 12 de Civit., ch. 1; whence St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 62, art. 8 ad 3, says that free choice can choose different things, the order of the end being preserved, and this pertains to the perfection of its freedom; but that it choose something by turning away from the order of the end, which is to sin, this pertains to the defect of freedom: and he says the same in q. 24 de ver., art. 3 ad 2. But what kind of indifference is of the essence of freedom will be clear in the following disputation. To all the arguments made from the beginning the answer is given; they prove only the first conclusion; but insofar as they seem to proceed against the second, each one must be met.
IX. To the first, then, the answer is that the intrinsic indifference of the free faculty does not demand that, all things prerequired for performing such an act having been posited, the will's not performing the same act stand at once, but only demands that, all things prerequired antecedently to the operation, or concurrence, of the free cause having been posited, there stand at once in the same power the faculty by which it can, from an intrinsic active principle, not perform such an act if it will; but this can belong neither to fire nor to any non-free power: for, all things prerequired for heating having been posited, there is not in fire the faculty by which it could, from an intrinsic active principle, not heat if it willed; but by the necessity of nature it is determined to heat. And although, the wood being removed, it does not heat it, this nevertheless does not come about from an intrinsic active principle having the faculty for either of two, but from something extrinsic, namely from the removal of the wood.
The beatific love is an act simply necessary.— To the second the answer is that, as was said in disputation 22, n. 43, the beatific love which is in the blessed, as it is terminated at God, is an action simply necessary and not free; because, the beatific vision and the clear vision of God having been posited, and all things prerequired for loving God, there does not remain in the will of the blessed the faculty by which it could not love God if it willed. And the reason of this is that, as we said above from St. Thomas, the faculty for either of two which is in the free will is rooted in the intellect, or reason, according as the intellect can have different conceptions of the good: and because the intellect of one seeing God through his essence cannot conceive, as a good, ceasing from the act of the love of God, or hating God, therefore the will of the blessed is not free with respect to such love, as the will of the wayfarer is; but in the beatific love there is absolute necessity, and a happy necessity, as Augustine says. But in our free choice, in this state, with all things prerequired for loving, there stands at once the faculty by which it can not love if it wills, since the intellect can propose to the will, as a good, ceasing from such love, although in fact it does not propose it.
X. To the confirmation the answer is that, as will be clear below, even in the instant in which our will actually loves, it at once retains the power and faculty by which it can not love if it wills: for even while it loves, it loves freely, simply speaking; although in a certain respect, and on the supposition that it loves, it is necessary that it love, because everything that is, while it is, necessarily is: as the Philosopher says, lib. 1 Periherm., ch. 6. Nor is man more free before he acts than while he acts, but rather, on the contrary, while he acts he has a more perfect freedom: for he has freedom completed through second act, which freedom is indeed more perfect than the freedom which is only in first act: for it has less of potentiality. But as regards indifference, it must be said that, if we speak of the indifference which is intrinsic and essential to freedom itself, free choice has the same indifference before it acts and while it actually acts:8 for essential indifference consists in an indivisible; nor does it admit of more or less. But this is the indifference which is opposed to determination to one thing by necessity; and this indifference free choice always has, whether it actually acts or not. But if we speak of privative indifference, which imports the imperfection of created free choice, it is more indifferent before it acts, because then it has the privation of second act, which it does not have when it actually acts. But this indifference is not of the essence, but an imperfection of freedom, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 contra Gent., ch. 82.
XI. To the third the minor is denied. To the proof it must be said that he who receives into himself the efficacious motion of God, prerequired antecedently for the act of love, for example, can, simply speaking, not perform such an act if he wills: since, as has been said, the efficacious motion of God does not take away from free choice the power, or faculty, by which it can not act, or dissent, if it wills. But he who actually does not receive the efficacious motion to act can also act through the active power which he has, or through the sufficient help which God, as far as lies on his part, mercifully confers on all according to place and time; and therefore they sin if they do not act: for the efficacious motion is not necessary in order that man can act, but in order that he actually act, and the power be reduced to act. Nor is such a motion an active principle in the direct line, but the last complement of the active power, as St. Thomas teaches, 3 contra Gent., ch. 66, reason 4, and q. 3 de pot., art. 7 ad 7. Hence from the fact that someone is not premoved by efficacious motion it is only inferred that he will not perform such an act; but it is not inferred that he cannot perform it: for that consequence is manifestly open to objection. For indeed from the fact that someone does not have whiteness, which is necessarily required in order that he be white, it does not follow that he cannot be white, but only that he is not white;9 for he who does not actually have whiteness can nevertheless be white, because he can have whiteness, through which he is made white. Proportionably we say in the present case that he who is not efficaciously premoved by God to such an act will not produce that act; yet he can, through the active power which he has, natural or supernatural, namely through sufficient help, produce that act: because he can always, in this state, be moved by God with an efficacious motion, through which the active power is completed and applied; yet not without the cooperation of free choice concurring in the same instant of time to produce that same act freely: therefore man can always have this efficacious motion. And if anyone asks on what this power of having efficacious motion is founded, it must be said that, as is gathered from St. Thomas, 3 p. q. 8, art. 3 ad 1, it is founded on two things.10 First indeed, and principally, on the mercy of God, which can mercifully convert any wayfarer to himself, and efficaciously premove him to good. Secondarily, however, on the freedom of choice, which in this state is flexible towards good and towards evil: on which account Augustine said, To be able to have faith is of the nature of men;11 because namely he has a natural capacity for having faith from the mercy of God; yet Augustine immediately subjoins, But to have it is of the grace of the faithful. Let St. Thomas be consulted, 3 contra Gentes, ch. 156 and 159.
XII. The Council of Trent speaks in the divided sense when it says that free choice can dissent from efficacious motion.— To the fourth argument it is said that the Council of Trent speaks in the divided sense, not in the composite sense, as some even of the authors of the contrary opinion admit. And to the attack it must be said that the Council indeed speaks of the man who is actually touched and moved by God; yet it does not for that reason speak in the composite sense: for by that proposition of the Council, understood in the composite sense, it is not merely signified that the motion of God is composed and conjoined with free choice; but it is signified that efficacious motion and actual dissent are compossible in the same free choice: which sense nevertheless is false, and therefore that proposition in the composite sense is false: whence it could not have been intended and defined by the sacred Council in that sense, but only in the divided sense. This is also gathered from the very form of the proposition defined in the Council: for it has the form of a divided and not of a composite modal,12 since, as St. Thomas teaches, opusc. 4 de modalibus, and after him Ferrara, 1 con. Gent., ch. 67, M. Soto, lib. 3 Summularum, ch. de modalibus, and others: a composite modal, which makes the composite sense, is that in which the dictum is the subject and the mode is predicated, as: That the predestined be damned is possible; That a white thing be black is possible. But a divided modal, which makes the divided sense, is that in which the mode is interposed between the parts of the dictum, as: The predestined can be damned; A white thing can be black; or: A white thing is possible to be black; but in that proposition of the Council by which it is asserted that free choice, moved and aroused by God, can dissent if it will, the whole dictum is not the subject, but rather the verb, can, or the mode, possible, is interposed between the extremes of the dictum: therefore it is not a composite but a divided modal, and consequently it makes the divided sense, and in the divided sense it was intended by the Council.
XIII. What is required for the truth of a composite modal.— But in order to explain generally when a modal is true or false in the composite sense, a single general rule must be laid down, namely that for the truth of a composite modal de possibili, or accepted in the composite sense, it suffices and is required that the extremes imported by the dictum of that modal be compossible in the same subject; for by this reason it is called composite, because it composes, or places at once in the same subject, the aforesaid extremes, by means of the copula de possibili, as in this proposition: That a white thing be black is possible; the dictum of the modal is all of this, that a white thing be black, of which dictum one extreme is white, the other is black. In order, then, that this proposition be true in the composite sense, it is necessarily required that it be possible for the same subject to be at once white and black: and therefore that modal is false, because the proposition de inesse, by which it is immediately regulated and proved, namely a white thing is black, is an impossible proposition. Proportionably we say in the present case that, because these two are incompatible, namely that free choice be moved by God with efficacious motion, and that it resist or dissent, therefore that proposition in the composite sense is false, namely: Free choice, moved by God with efficacious motion, can dissent.
XIII.13 It can dissent from any help whatsoever.— To the last argument the answer is, from what has been said on the Council of Trent, that man can, absolutely speaking, dissent from both sufficient help and efficacious help: but from sufficient help man can resist even in the composite sense; and this alone the passages of Scripture adduced by the Council prove. But from efficacious help man cannot dissent in the composite sense, as has been proved; yet he well can dissent absolutely, and in the divided sense: for the power of dissenting stands at once in free choice with efficacious motion. But they object.14 A power which will never be reduced to act is in vain: therefore, if free choice can dissent from efficacious help, it will sometimes in fact dissent; or that power will be in vain; or at least it will be a remote and not a proximate power. The answer is that,15 in order that some power not be in vain, it is not required that it be at some time reducible to every act which it can produce; but it suffices that it be reduced to some act or acts;16 otherwise the power which God has to create another world, which will never be reduced to act, would be in vain. Hence the free choice of him who is efficaciously moved to the act of the love of God, and the power which he has for either of two, is not in vain; because although such power is never to be reduced to the act of hating God, it is nevertheless reduced to the act of love, and to other acts. Similarly too we say that the power of free choice to dissent is a proximate power, because on the part of the power nothing further is required in order that it can truly dissent if it will, although in fact it will not dissent.
Disputatio CXVI: Whether indifference belongs to the essence of a free power, and in what indifference freedom formally consists.
Whether indifference is of the essence of the free power, and in what indifference freedom formally consists.
It is proved, first, that the freedom of choice does not consist in any indifference: for all indifference is either passive or active; but the freedom of choice does not consist formally in passive indifference, nor in active indifference: therefore in none. The minor is proved, as to the first part: for otherwise man would not have a greater or other indifference than a staff; since a staff also has passive indifference, so as to be moved upward or downward, to the right or to the left, by another: and so free choice would behave like some inanimate thing, receiving a motion caused by another: and consequently formal freedom would be in God, moving free choice to one part or the other, and not in the free choice that is moved, which is repugnant to the definition of the Council of Trent, session 6, ch. 5, and canon 4. As to the second part it is proved: for created free choice is predetermined efficiently to its act, prior in the order of nature to its performing any act, as has been shown in disputations 22 and 23; therefore in the instant in which it acts, or in what is prior in the order of nature, it does not have active indifference so as to determine itself, or to be able to determine itself, to either side; for what is determined by another is not actively indifferent to determining itself or not determining itself: for what determines itself is understood as undetermined before it determines itself: therefore active indifference is not intrinsic to free choice, at least to created free choice.
It is confirmed. Throughout the whole time in which the will produces a free act, it truly has freedom in respect of that act, and yet throughout that whole time it does not have indifference to either side, since it is already determined to one of the opposites: therefore active indifference is not of the essence of freedom.
Secondly. In God there is the most perfect free choice, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 19 art. 10, and book 1 contra Gentiles ch. 88, and yet in him there can be no indifference: for indifference denotes potentiality to having contrary or diverse acts successively, which cannot belong to God; otherwise he would be mutable, against that word of James 1: With whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration: therefore indifference is not of the intrinsic notion of free choice as such, and according to its common notion.
Thirdly. Christ the Lord freely obeyed even unto death, and yet, the commandment being supposed, his free choice did not have indifference to obeying and not obeying: otherwise he could have sinned: therefore indifference to either side is not of the intrinsic notion of free choice.
Fourth: for the evil angel now in fact sins: therefore he acts freely; for sin cannot be without freedom: and yet he does not have indifference in his free choice to sinning or not sinning; or to doing evil or not doing it: for his choice is obstinate in evil: therefore indifference to either side is not necessarily required for freedom.
II. Fifth. And it is proved that at least the indifference of the object and of the judgment of reason does not suffice for freedom: for God, since he is the author and Lord of the created will, can, in whatever way he has willed, move the will, impel it, necessitate it, or prevent it from going forth into a free act and make it go forth into a necessary act; for it is said in Prov. 21: The heart of the king is in the hand of God; like the divisions of waters, he will turn it wherever he wills: therefore even if the object be indifferent and the judgment of reason indifferent, he will be able to necessitate the will to will that object.
Sixth. All the holy Doctors require for the free use of the will this condition on God's part, namely that he allow it to be moved in its own proper way.1 They suppose2 therefore that God can, according to the efficacy of his power, prevent that manner of acting if he wills: therefore the indifference of the object, or of the judgment of reason, is not enough for the use of free choice; but it is also necessary that force or necessity not be brought in by an extrinsic agent.
Seventh. The heretics, especially Calvin, do not deny that we act from a perfect judgment and with advertence of reason: for they experience that they are not coerced by the objects themselves, nor suffer necessity; yet they deny that we act freely, on the ground that God by his omnipotent will imposes necessity on us; and in this they are not reproved by Catholics for asserting something that even in the matter itself involves a contradiction or repugnance, or exceeds the omnipotence of God; but they are refuted because it is established from the divine Scriptures and other principles of faith that God does not ordinarily deal with us with that efficacy and omnipotence of his, nor is that consonant with his most wise and most sweet providence.
III. On the contrary is the definition of freedom handed down and explained in the preceding disputation.
On this difficulty certain doctors report two ways of explaining the intrinsic indifference of freedom. The first is that this indifference is to be understood as only passive, namely in such a way that the power of willing and not willing is found in the created will only insofar as it is not of itself determined to willing this or that object, nor to willing or not willing the same object: but can be determined to either by another. Yet I would believe that there is no Catholic doctor who holds that the essential indifference of freedom, even as it is found in an intellectual creature, is only passive indifference; for otherwise indifference of this kind would be only for receiving an act produced by God alone in the created will, the will itself behaving merely passively: which is a heresy condemned against Luther in the Council of Trent, session 6, can. 4, on justification. For Luther, as was shown in disputation 3, no. 8, asserted: that free choice has no activity in good works, when we speak of the inward work: but behaves merely passively.
III. The second opinion, or the second way of explaining the indifference essential to freedom, is that of those who constitute the freedom of the will radically in the indifference of the judgment of reason, by which the intellect judges that the good proposed to the will as to be pursued does not have a necessary connection with the good in common, to which the will is naturally determined. When, therefore, the intellect proposes to the will an object with this indifference, then the will has formal freedom in respect of that same object; and if through such a judgment of reason it desires that object, it is always carried into it with freedom. Hence the authors of this opinion regard it as impossible that the will be moved by such a judgment of reason to love that object, and love it of necessity and without the use of freedom, however efficaciously it be moved by God.
IIII. Indifference is one thing negative, another privative.— Certain theologians regard this opinion as false, and they are refuted by the last three arguments from the facts set out at the beginning: yet to us it appears most true, and we judge that it is the express mind of St. Thomas. Hence for its understanding it must be noted, first, that indifference is twofold, one negative, the other privative. That is called indifferent with negative indifference which according to itself is not more determined to this object than to that, or to acting or not acting: and in this way the divine will, before it had decreed to create the world, was in that prior sign of reason, according to itself, indifferent to this part or to that: or even to creating or not creating another universe; because it was not more determined, according to itself, to one than to the other. But this indifference does not import in God any privation of any perfection:3 for God is not perfected in himself by determining himself to produce something outside himself; but the whole perfection is placed in the creatures which are produced into being by the divine will; and therefore God loved them and produced them freely, because creatures do not have a necessary connection with the divine good; so that without them the divine good is not preserved; to love which the divine will is naturally determined. Hence St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 19 art. 3 ad 5, says that the divine will, which of itself has necessity, freely determined itself to an object to which it has a non-necessary relation. That is called privatively indifferent which is capable of being perfected and determined by some act, whether it be determined and perfected by itself, or by another, or be perfected at once by itself and by another; and indifference of this kind presupposes in the power itself some imperfection or potentiality: hence this indifference can belong only to a created power: which St. Thomas also explained in 1 contra Gentiles ch. 82 in these words: To be directed to either of two things can belong to a power in two ways. In one way on its own part; in another way on the part of that to which it is said to be directed. On its own part indeed, when it has not yet attained its perfection, by which it would be determined to one: hence this redounds to the imperfection of the power, and it is shown that there is potentiality in it, as is clear in the doubting intellect, which has not yet attained the principles from which it would be determined to the one or the other. But on the part of that to which it is said to be directed, a power is found to be directed to either of two things when the perfect operation of the power depends on neither, but yet either can be: as when someone can use different instruments equally for accomplishing the same work; but this does not pertain to the imperfection of the power, but rather to its eminence, insofar as it exceeds either of the opposites, and on that account is determined to neither, but is related to either. And so it is in the divine will in respect of things other than itself: for its end does not depend on any of the others, while nevertheless it is most perfectly united to its end: therefore it is not necessary to posit any potentiality in the divine will. Let the holy Doctor be consulted, q. 24 On Truth, art. 3, in the body, where he assigns the difference between divine, angelic and human free choice.
V. Indifference is one thing passive, another active.— It must be noted, secondly, that the indifference of a power is sometimes joined to a purely passive power, as is the indifference which prime matter has to this substantial form or to that, and the indifference of a subject in respect of the whiteness or blackness which it receives. For this indifference is only passive; because neither does prime matter concur effectively to the production of a substantial form, nor does the subject concur actively to the production of whiteness, but only in the genus of material cause. Sometimes, however, it is joined to an active power, as is the indifference which a craftsman has to making or not making some artifact; or even to making this or that artifact. Thirdly, indifference can be joined to a power which is partly active and partly passive; or is passive in order to one thing and active in order to another: as the intellect, in order to the species produced by the object, has the character of a passive power, because it receives that species into itself; but in order to the act of understanding it has active indifference. Similarly the will, in order to the production of a free act, has active indifference, and insofar as it receives into itself the immanent acts which it produces, it has some character of a passive power.
VI. Passive or privative indifference is not of the essence of free choice.— First conclusion. Passive or privative indifference is not of the intrinsic notion of free choice, if it be considered according to the common notion, which belongs analogically to God and to intellectual creatures. In this conclusion all theologians agree, and the second argument from the facts at the beginning proves it: for in God is found whatever pertains to the common notion of wisdom; since wisdom is a perfection simply, which is found formally in God; but freedom also is a perfection simply existing formally in God: therefore whatever pertains to the common, formal and essential notion of freedom must be found in the divine freedom; but no passive or privative indifference belongs to it, nor can it belong to it, as has been said, otherwise God would not be pure act, nor infinitely perfect: therefore.
Negative and active indifference is of the essence of free choice.— Second conclusion. Negative indifference, and active indifference, which imports being able to act and being able not to act; or being able to act this or that, is of the intrinsic notion of freedom. This conclusion is likewise commonly received among theologians, and it is established from the definition of freedom handed down in the preceding disputation, and will be clear from the fourth conclusion.
VII. Created choice has some passive indifference.— Third conclusion. In every created free choice, by the very fact that it is created, there is found some indifference, or passive power, according to some aspect. This conclusion is also certain, and it is proved. First: for every created free choice, since it is not pure act, nor free by essence as God is, but by participation, has some potentiality, which can be perfected by diverse acts; but every potentiality perfectible by diverse acts has some passive indifference in order to receiving those same acts: therefore.
Secondly. Every created free choice, as was said above from Augustine, is by its nature peccable and defectible, because it was made from nothing: therefore by its nature it is mutable from good into evil, from justice into sin: for sin cannot be except in free choice and from free choice; but every subject of change through diverse acts, insofar as it is a subject, has a power and some passive indifference in order to the reception of those acts: therefore.
Thirdly. Created free choice is not simply the first self-mover, but moves itself freely, yet moved by God prior in the order of reason, as we showed in disputations 18 and 23: therefore, although in order to the production of a free operation it has active indifference, yet in order to the divine motion by which it is moved by God to determine itself freely and to produce those acts, it has some indifference and passive power: therefore in every created free choice there is found some passive indifference conjoined to active indifference.
VIII. The indifference which is the essence of freedom.— Fourth conclusion. The formal freedom of created choice does not consist formally in objective indifference, nor in passive indifference, but in the active indifference of the free faculty itself, which is related indifferently to opposites; although it has joined to it, or presupposes, some passive indifference of the power itself, and the indifference of the object. The conclusion is proved. First: for free choice is essentially and per se an active power, as St. Thomas teaches, q. 24 On Truth, art. 4, especially in the reply to the eighteenth: therefore the essential indifference of freedom must be active: therefore the essence of freedom cannot consist in passive indifference. Secondly it is proved from the definition of free choice; for it is a faculty of the will and of reason toward either of two, or the faculty of willing and not willing; of choosing this means or that in order to the end: but to will and not to will, to choose this or that, are actions of an active power: therefore the indifference in which the freedom of choice formally consists must be formally active indifference.
IX. The indifference of the object and of the judgment of reason is the root of freedom.— Fifth conclusion. The indifference of the object, or objective indifference, and the indifference of the judgment of reason, by which the intellect proposes to the will the object itself as to be loved not of necessity but with the active indifference of the will itself toward either of two — namely because it judges that such a proposed object does not have a necessary connection with the end and with the good to love which the will is naturally determined — is the root of freedom, which formally resides in the will, in such a way that it is impossible for the will through that judgment to be carried into such an object and to will it without freedom. And so if the will wills that object so proposed, it is necessary that it will it freely and not of absolute necessity. This conclusion is against certain theologians who teach that God can by his absolute power necessitate the will, and bring it about that it is carried without freedom into an object indifferent in itself and proposed to the will as to be loved through an indifferent judgment of reason, in the manner explained above. Yet our conclusion is the mind of St. Thomas, 2 p. q. 17 art. 1 ad 2, where he says that the will can be carried to diverse things for this reason, that reason can have diverse conceptions of good; and 1 p. q. 83 art. 1 in the body he says that because the judgment of reason is related to diverse things and is not determined to one, for that very reason it is necessary that man be of free choice, from this very fact that he is rational. By which words St. Thomas openly teaches that it is impossible for the will to will something under a judgment of reason that is related indifferently to opposites, and to will it of absolute necessity and not freely.
Moreover it is proved by reason: for the object of the will is the good apprehended through the intellect: therefore it is impossible for the will of absolute necessity to love any good unless the intellect proposes that good to the same will as to be loved of absolute necessity: therefore if it proposes it as to be loved not of absolute necessity but with the indifference to opposites explained above, it will be impossible even by the absolute power of God that the will, through that judgment, tend into that good and yet love it of absolute necessity and not freely.
X. The indifference of free choice in respect of divine help is passive, but in respect of the free action it is active.— To the first argument from the facts at the beginning it is answered that created free choice, in order to the prior motion by which it is moved by God to determine itself freely, behaves passively, insofar as it receives that same motion into itself: hence the indifference which it has in respect of that same motion is passive; but in respect of the free operation which it produces as moved by God, it has active indifference, and in this indifference freedom essentially consists; not, however, in the first, although it presupposes it, as has been said. And to the passage of the Council adduced it is answered that it openly confirms what we have said. For when it says that free choice is moved by God, it does not obscurely indicate the power and passive indifference which it has in respect of the motion of prevenient grace which it receives; and when it adds that it cooperates freely with God moving it, so that it can dissent if it wills, it most clearly teaches that in free choice moved and stirred by God there is active indifference in respect of that same cooperation: which indifference consists in this, that it can perform and not perform that act, absolutely speaking. And, in order to show that the indifference of created choice is so active as to have some passive indifference joined to it, the Council does not define absolutely that free choice in no way behaves passively, but defines that it does not behave merely passively, as some inanimate thing, so as to do nothing at all freely in the same instant of time in which it receives the divine inspiration.4 To the other point touched in the same argument — for what is determined by another does not determine itself — it is answered that, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 83 art. 1 ad 3, and 2 p. q. 9 art. 2 in the body, although the will moves itself, nevertheless before it moves itself it is moved by God; because the created will is a mover that is moved, and is not simply the first self-mover, just as Peter's father is truly the cause of Peter, but not the first cause: for he has another, prior cause. Proportionably we say in the present case that the created will determines itself, freely producing the second act, by which it is formally determined in second act; but because it is not simply the first free thing, nor the first self-determining thing, it is predetermined by God in the ultimate complement of the first act to determine itself in the second act by producing a free operation. Hence St. Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 2, to certain objectors who said that freedom is destroyed if it be said that free choice is acted upon by God, answers: Let them understand, if they are sons of God, that they are acted upon by the Spirit of God; so that they may do what is to be done; and when they have done it, let them give thanks to him by whom they are acted upon: for they are acted upon so that they may act, not so that they themselves may do nothing. And he says the same in other places adduced in disputation 18, no. 16.
XI. The will, in the instant in which it wills, is free to will and not to will.— To the confirmation, Ockham in 1 Sent. d. 38 q. 1, and Gabriel in the same distinction, answer that the will, in that instant in which it elicits volition, is not free not to elicit it, or to elicit the contrary act. This opinion, however, is false, as will be clear at the end of this disputation: for, as we were saying above, the freedom of choice in second act is more perfect than freedom in first act. Moreover: for otherwise the first act of the will would never be free; and consequently would not be meritorious. It is proved: for that act is not free before it is elicited, since it does not exist; nor is it free after it has been produced, for there is no power over the past: therefore if it is not free in the instant in which it is produced by the will, it will never be free. It is answered therefore otherwise: that although the will is under one act, it nevertheless remains still with the power to elicit the opposite act, as has been said above; and therefore it remains free in respect of that same act even in the instant in which it produces it: although it cannot in the composite sense not bring it about.
In the will of God there is no passive or privative indifference.— To the second it is answered that in God there can be no passive or privative indifference; there is, however, active indifference together with the indifference of a secondary object, which does not have a necessary connection with the divine good: and this indifference suffices for God to will freely and not of necessity that creatures exist, as St. Thomas shows, 1 p. q. 19 art. 3.
XII. To the third it is answered that the death of Christ the Lord, in order to his will, was an indifferent object, because by its nature it did not have a necessary connection with the good to which the human will of Christ was naturally determined; hence, through an indifferent judgment of reason, his intellect proposed to his will that death itself was to be accepted; and therefore he died freely and obeyed freely; and consequently, simply speaking, he had the faculty for either side, namely for accepting and for refusing death, although, the commandment being supposed, it was incompossible with that same commandment that he should will not to die.5 But the argument still presses. Christ the Lord did not have the faculty to obey the commandment and not to obey it; otherwise he could have sinned: for disobedience and transgression of a commandment cannot be without sin: therefore in respect of obedience, formally speaking, he did not have an indifferent faculty for either side: therefore he did not obey freely.6 It is answered that Christ the Lord not only died freely, but also freely obeyed the commandment to die imposed on him; otherwise he would not have merited formally by the act of obedience, since for such merit it is necessarily required that the obedience be free.7 But the consequent is against that word of the Apostle, Phil. 2: He humbled himself, etc., for which cause God also hath exalted him, and hath given him a name which is above all names. XIII. To the attack made it is answered that 'not to obey' can be taken in two ways. In the first way contrarily, or privatively, as it signifies the same as to disobey, or to sin by the sin of disobedience; and in this way Christ the Lord could not not obey. In the second way it is taken negatively, as it signifies the mere negation of the act of obedience, which negation can be said of what is and of what is not, and can belong to someone without any sin, even when no commandment exists:8 as if Peter, for example, does not hear the sacred rite on the second or third ferial day, when there is no commandment to hear Mass, it is most truly asserted that Peter then did not obey the commandment to hear Mass, if 'not to obey' be taken merely negatively, because it is truly so that he did not perform the act of obedience of hearing Mass, since there was no commandment and he did not hear Mass. And in this way Christ the Lord was able not to obey in the negative sense, because he could have no commandment to die; just as this negative is in fact true: Christ did not obey unto the death of decapitation; nor did he obey by undergoing death in the fifteenth year of his age; because in truth he had no commandment to undergo the death of decapitation: and in this sense Christ had the faculty to obey and not to obey. And this faculty for contradictory opposites suffices for him to have obeyed freely: for we have already said above that the power to sin, or to disobey, does not pertain to the formal notion of freedom, but to its imperfection, according as it is found in a defectible creature. If it be said: for, the commandment being supposed, he could not not obey, even negatively: therefore even the decree and the commandment being supposed, he did not have an indifferent faculty to obey and not to obey, even negatively, and so he did not obey freely.9 It is answered that, the commandment being present and presupposed, he could not in the composite sense not obey negatively, because he would also consequently disobey contrarily: hence, just as he then could not disobey contrarily, so also he could not in the composite sense not obey negatively: yet it does not follow from this that he did not obey freely: for it suffices for freedom that he could obey and not obey negatively, absolutely speaking.10
XIV. The demons are obstinate in evil, and nevertheless they sin freely.— To the fourth it is answered that although the evil angel is obstinate in sin, yet he is obstinate by an operation perfectly free, by which he determined himself to such an election with the highest knowledge of the indifference of the means to the end, and of all the circumstances. Yet because his free choice, after it has once determined itself to something with perfect freedom, is by its nature inflexible, therefore he cannot recover from the evil which he once chose with full freedom: this, however, does not diminish his freedom; rather it is a sign of greater freedom: for man, because he is rational by nature, can afterwards refuse what he once chose, while he is on the way; since after the first election new reasons can offer themselves to him, and new knowledge of some circumstances, on account of which he could reject that good which he once chose. Similarly we have an example of this also in God, who, after he has freely determined himself to do something, cannot change his counsel or choose the opposite, on account of the immutability of the divine will and the infinity of his knowledge, which knows all things in one most simple act: and yet he freely produces outside himself what he willed; on which see also St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 19 art. 3 and art. 7 ad 4. Proportionably we say of the angels that, before they adhere, they can adhere to this object and to the opposite; but after they have adhered to some object with perfect freedom, they now adhere to it immovably, as St. Thomas says, 1 p. q. 64 art. 1; and yet, absolutely speaking, they adhere freely to that same object: for from the beginning the act proceeds from the power not of necessity, but according to the mode of freedom. Other arguments which could be objected against the fifth conclusion have already been adduced by us and solved in disputations 18, 22 and 23.
XV. A doubt now offers itself as an appendix, which we touched on in passing above: whether the will, in the instant in which it elicits some act, is truly free in comparison with that same act, or in respect of eliciting the contrary act, if it wills.
The first opinion is that of those who assert that the will, in the instant in which it elicits volition, is not free not to elicit it, or to elicit the contrary act: and similarly, in the instant in which it elicits the nolition of some object, it is not free to will the same object: and they add that only before that instant is there freedom in it, so that it may elicit the volition of that object, or the nolition, as it has pleased it. So think Ockham in the first book of the Sentences, dist. 38, question 1, Gabriel in the same distinction and question, and certain others of the nominalists. This opinion is proved: for the will, in the instant in which it wills some object, cannot not will it; because it cannot at once will and not will the same object: therefore in that same instant there is not in it freedom to not will the same object.11 The consequence is proved: for, as has been said above, freedom is a faculty of the will and of reason toward opposites: therefore if in the instant in which it wills some object there is not in it the faculty to not will the same object, it follows that in that same instant there is not in it freedom to will and not will the same object.
Secondly it is proved: because, as Aristotle12 teaches in book 1 of the Perihermenias, ch. 6, Everything that is, while it is, is of necessity: therefore in the instant in which the volition of some object is in the nature of things, it cannot not be, and consequently there is not in the will the faculty or freedom for that same volition not to be, or for the opposite nolition of the same object to be.
Thirdly. Over a past action there is no power, and consequently no freedom, for it not to be; because it already has being outside its causes: therefore neither is there freedom in respect of a present operation for it not to be: for it too already has being outside its causes.
XVI. The second opinion is that of others who, rejecting Ockham's opinion, affirm on the one hand that the will, in the instant in which it elicits the volition of some object, is truly free in comparison with that same volition; but on the other hand, in order to defend such freedom, they have recourse to a priority of nature, in which the will is understood as indifferent to either part before it determines itself to one. For they say that the will, at whatever point of time it arrives, precedes its act by priority of nature, as any other cause precedes its effect: for it is prior in the order of nature that the will exist at any point of time, than that the act emanate from it in that same point. But this priority of nature has a true foundation in the thing. Since, therefore, the will is by its own nature a free cause, that is, one in whose power it is to will or not to will, or to hold back the act altogether and will nothing, then at whatever point of time it exists, in that prior of the same point in which it is conceived with a foundation in the thing as by order of nature antecedent to its act, it is in its power either to do nothing at all, or to elicit volition or nolition, as it has preferred. And by this reasoning they defend that the present operation is elicited freely13 by the will. They confess, however, that by this very fact — that the will later in the order of nature freely determines itself to one part of the contradiction — it can no longer determine itself to the other, or be subject to it.
XVII. This opinion, however, seems to differ little or not at all from Ockham's opinion, nor does it sufficiently explain the reason why the will is truly free in comparison with the present operation: for according to it the will would be free only in the prior of nature, in which it is considered before it elicits volition or nolition, but not in the instant of time in which it elicits it; and consequently the present operation would be free only in its cause, and not formally in itself, which would be to fall back into Ockham's opinion, which they attack.
Moreover: for the instant of nature is not an instant in which, but one from which: therefore, if the will is not free for either part of the contradiction or contrariety in the instant of time in which it determines itself to one part, but only in the prior of nature in which it is considered before it determines itself, it follows that in no instant of time does the will freely elicit its volition or nolition.
Nor does it satisfy if it be answered that the will can continue the present operation and desist from it, and for that reason is free: for besides that the authors of the first opinion do not deny this but expressly affirm it, by this alone freedom would be saved in the will, in comparison with the prosecution of the act, which pertains to future time; but not in comparison with the present operation as it takes place in this present instant.
XVIII. The will is free even in the very instant in which it acts.— It must be said, therefore, in accordance with what we premised in the preceding disputation, that our will is truly free in comparison with the volition or nolition which it elicits at any moment or instant of time; and that it is truly free not only for the reason that, prior in the order of nature to its determining itself to one part, it could refrain from determining itself to that same part and determine itself to the opposite; nor only because it can continue or desist from the operation which it produces in the instant of present time; but also because in the instant of time in which it elicits its operation it retains a true power and faculty by which it can not elicit it if it wills, or also elicit the contrary operation.
This opinion is proved by the authority of St. Anselm, in the book On the Harmony of Foreknowledge and Predestination, ch. 1, where he establishes the difference between the past on the one hand and the present and the future on the other: for in a past thing not only does the power or freedom no longer remain for the past not to be past at the same time, but it can no longer even come about that that thing which is past should not be past. But concerning the present and the future, power and freedom are otherwise: for although there is no power by which it could come about that the present should not be present at the same time, or the future should not be future, there is nevertheless power for the thing which is present not to be present, and for the thing which is future not to be future: therefore according to Anselm the present operation, elicited by the will, is subject to its power and freedom just as a future operation is: but in comparison with a future operation the will truly has the power and freedom by which it can elicit it or not elicit it, or also elicit the contrary operation: therefore it has the same power and freedom in comparison with the present operation. They answer by restricting the authority of Anselm to the present insofar as it has something in common with the future, namely that it can still be continued and remain, or cease to be.14 For they say that the present agrees in part with the past and in part with the future. For it has actual being outside its causes, in which respect it agrees with the past, and on this side it is now subject to no power for it not to be outside them: for we say that an effect remains in the power of someone, to be or not to be, for as long as it is not outside its causes but is still indifferent: therefore the thing which is present cannot now not be present, and this (they say) Anselm would not deny. But besides this the present has something in common with the future, which in no way belongs to a thing already past, namely that it can still be continued and remain, or cease: and on this side Anselm said that a present thing is subject to our freedom just as a future one. But the future, since it has nothing outside its causes while it is still future, remains altogether freely in our power. XIX. This explanation, however, does not seem to be the mind of Anselm: for according to it the present operation would be subject to the power and freedom of the will only according to what it has of the future, namely according to continuation or cessation, which in truth does not belong to the operation according to the first instant in which it begins to be, but according to future time; and consequently the difference of St. Anselm between a present and a past operation would be none, and he ought not to have assigned it between the past on the one hand and the future on the other; for according to the explanation given, a present thing, according to all that it has for the instant of present time, agrees with the past as regards this, that it is not subject to the power of the will for it not to be.15 This is confirmed, and the force of this argument is more fully opened: for the present operation elicited by the will, considered according to all that it has for the instant of present time, is more perfectly free than a future operation. For the present operation is free in second act; but the future, as future, is free only in first act, or in potency: but that which is actually such is more perfect than that which is such only in potency: but the future operation, while it is future, as the authors of the solution which we are attacking confess, remains altogether in our free power and freedom, according to the opinion of Anselm: therefore much more perfectly does the present operation of the will remain in our power and freedom, according to all that it has for the present instant.
Finally, against the authors of the second opinion the argument suggested above from the Council of Trent presses, which in my judgment seems most effective; for speaking of a man who actually consents and cooperates with God stirring and calling him, it defines that he can dissent, if he wills, and from this it proves that he consents freely: therefore according to the definition of the sacred Council not only in the prior of nature, in which the will is considered before it elicits consent, but also in that same instant of time in which it consents, it truly can dissent, if it wills: therefore in that same instant it consents freely. Moreover: for if the will, absolutely speaking, in the instant of time in which it consents, cannot dissent if it wills, it follows that, simply speaking, it consents necessarily and not freely; for that is called necessary which cannot be otherwise absolutely.
If it be said that, from the supposition that the will consents, it is necessary in the composite sense that it consent, since it is impossible for the will in respect of the same object at once to consent and not consent, or to dissent: against this is the fact that necessity on a supposition, or in the composite sense, is not to be called necessity absolutely, but in a certain respect, as was shown in disputation 25, and consequently the act which is said to be necessary only on a supposition is compatible with a true and real power, which could not produce that act but elicit the opposite, if it wills.
XX. By these things, however, the first argument from the facts at the beginning remains solved; for we say that, although in a man in the instant in which he elicits consent there is not freedom, or a free faculty, for eliciting dissent at the same time as consent, yet in that same instant there is in him a free power and faculty for eliciting, concerning the same object, dissent and consent divisively. For, as has been said above, in free choice there is a faculty for opposites; yet there is not a faculty for having or eliciting opposites at the same time: nor is such a faculty required for freedom; otherwise it would imply a contradiction that some act be free not only in its exercise, but also in the very faculty of the power.
To the second it is answered, with St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 14 art. 13, that that proposition of Aristotle, Everything that is, while it is, is of necessity, is to be understood not of the necessity of a thing existing considered absolutely in itself, but as it supposes the thing to exist, as if it were said: An existing thing is existing; but this necessity does not take away the freedom or contingency of the thing considered absolutely and in itself.
To the third it is answered that over a past action there is no power nor freedom, because that being of the past thing outside its causes has now totally ceased; and because there is no return from privation to habit by nature, therefore free choice has no freedom or faculty by which it could bring it about that a past volition was not in the nature of things. But the being outside its causes, which belongs to the operation of the will in any present instant, is truly in the making, and proceeds from the will itself as from an efficient cause according to the mode of freedom. Since, therefore, a free power has this from its own intrinsic notion, that it so elicits consent that it can truly not elicit it but the contrary dissent, if it wills, as is established from the Council of Trent, therefore in the will in that same instant in which it elicits consent there is true freedom and faculty by which it can not elicit it but the contrary dissent, if it wills; although, the consent standing, it will never in fact elicit the contrary dissent in that same instant, just as was said above of efficacious help to consent, which he who receives infallibly consents, and can truly dissent if he wills; but in fact will not dissent.
Secondly it is answered that the argument concludes only that there is not in free choice freedom or faculty for bringing it about that its present operation at once be and not be: for that is altogether infactible even by God; but it does not prove that in the instant of time in which free choice consents it cannot, absolutely speaking, or in the divided sense, dissent, if it wills.
Disputatio CXVII: Whether created free choice truly and properly has mastery over its act, and what such mastery is.
Whether created free choice truly and properly has dominion over its act, and what sort of dominion this is.
I. THIS difficulty can be treated under other terms: namely, whether the consent of free choice, especially with respect to supernatural acts, is first and immediately in its power, or in the power of God.
On which question those authors who think that the actual determination of the will, supposing exciting grace, must be begun first by that same created will, by reason of its innate freedom, so that the rights of its freedom be preserved unviolated, teach consequently that free choice so has dominion over its act that the determination of such an act, even when it is supernatural, is first and immediately in its power; and that the freedom of that choice cannot otherwise be defended as regards its actual use, indeed not even as regards its free power itself. This opinion can be proved.
First from St. Augustine, book 1 of On Free Choice, ch. 12, saying: You see, then, as I think, that it is established in our will that we either enjoy this good, so great and so true, or lack it; for what is so situated in the will, as the will itself is? And book 1, ch. 14, he says: What each one, I say, chooses to follow and embrace, consists in being placed in the will: And book 2, ch. 18: Man himself, insofar as he is a man, is some good, because he can live rightly when he wills. And book 3 of On Free Choice, ch. 3: For I cannot think otherwise than that it is in our power only what we do when we will. Wherefore nothing is so in our power as the will itself; for with no interval at all, it is at hand as soon as we will. And ch. 17: Who, he says, sins in that which can in no way be guarded against? But sin is committed; therefore it can be guarded against. By these words Augustine openly teaches that to will and to be unwilling are immediately in the power of the will, and that free choice truly and properly has immediate dominion over its act; otherwise it would not be free, nor would sin be imputed to it as guilt when it sins, nor would it be worthy of reward when it acts piously.
II. Secondly it is argued from the authority of St. Thomas, in the second book of the Sentences, d. 25. q. 1. art. 1. in the body, where he says that judgment about one's own action belongs only to those who have understanding, as though it were established in their power to choose this action or that; whence also they are said to have dominion over their act, and for this reason free choice is found in those alone who have understanding, and not in those whose actions are determined not by the agents themselves but by certain other prior causes. And in the reply to the first he speaks thus: In God free choice is saved as regards this, that the determination of his act is not from another but from himself: whence he is most truly the Lord of his work, and for this reason also it is said in the text that free choice is found otherwise in God than in others. And in the reply to the second he adds: It belongs to the freedom of choice that it be able to do some action or not to do it; and this belongs to God: for the good things which he does, he is able not to do. And in the reply to the third, speaking of man's free choice, he says: The determination of the action and of the end is established in the power of free choice: whence there remains to it dominion over its act, although not as to the first agent. By these words he openly teaches that for the freedom of choice, whether in God or in men, it is necessarily required that it have dominion over its act, and power to produce it or not to produce it.
Confirmation: for from this that St. Thomas, in the reply to the first just cited, proves that there is free choice in God, because he is most truly the Lord of his work: and from this he concludes that he is the Lord of his work, because the determination of his act is not from another but from himself: therefore, according to St. Thomas, in order that someone have free choice it is necessarily required that he have dominion over his act; and similarly, in order that he have dominion over his act, it will be necessary that the determination of that same act be in him not from another but from himself; otherwise that causal statement of St. Thomas would be false, namely: Because the determination of his act is not from another but from himself, therefore God is the Lord of his work.
III. Thirdly it is argued from the definition of free choice commonly received by the theologians: for free choice is that which, all things required for acting having been posited, can act and not act: therefore for the freedom of choice it is necessarily required that it have immediately a proximate and unimpeded power over either act, namely over willing and being unwilling: but this is to have absolute dominion over the very act of willing and being unwilling: therefore.
Fourthly. A man is not said properly to have dominion over that which depends on the will of another: therefore similarly a man will not be said to have free choice with respect to an act which is not immediately in his power, but in the power of God: therefore, in order that true freedom be defended in man, it is necessary to say that consent or dissent is immediately under the dominion and power of that same choice.
Confirmation. If the will of man has no dominion or power of acting except what God wills it to do: therefore freedom will exist only in God, who, as he wills, moves the created will to this act or that; and not in the created will itself: since it cannot determine itself to act as it likes, but as it pleases God.
Fifthly. If our choice is not under our dominion and power, it follows that men who do not act well are not to be reproved, nor those who live piously to be praised: but that all praise is to be attributed to God; because by his power he brought men to act well; and by the same reasoning it would have to be imputed to God that men sin or persist in sins, since indeed he does not grant them to be converted to God.
IIII. Created free choice has dominion over its act, but not the first dominion.— The second opinion affirms that created free choice indeed has dominion over its act, but not the first and absolute dominion: for the first and absolute dominion, wholly independent of another, resides with God alone, who is the universal Lord of all. And since this opinion is true and according to the mind of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, for its explanation it must be noted that, as St. Thomas teaches:1 Free choice is the cause of its own motion; because man through free choice moves himself to act; yet it is not of the necessity of freedom that what is free be the first cause of itself, just as neither, for something to be the cause of another, is it required that it be the first cause of it. Whence a voluntary motion, although it has a proximate intrinsic principle, yet because this principle is a mover moved by another, therefore the first principle of that same voluntary motion is from without; just as the first principle of natural motion is also from without, namely that which moves nature:2 and therefore these two cohere well, namely that created free choice moves itself and is premoved by another: that it determines itself as the proximate cause of its own motion, and is predetermined by God as by the first cause: inasmuch as created free choice is not simply the first self-mover or the first self-determiner. Proportionably, in the present matter it must be said that these two cohere best with each other, namely that created free choice has dominion over its act and deliberates about it, and yet does not have the first and absolute dominion over it, nor is simply the first deliberator about such an act or the first determiner of it; but necessarily every deliberation and dominion of the created will must be reduced to God, as to the first deliberator and the first lord simply. And the reason for this is that created dominion does not exclude but rather presupposes uncreated dominion, and depends on it, just as the created causality of any particular cause does not exclude but rather presupposes the causality of God, and is reduced to him as to a prior cause per se efficient3.
V. Let the first conclusion, then, be: man's free choice has dominion over its act, as its proximate cause. In this conclusion the authors of both opinions agree; and the arguments made from the beginning prove it effectively.
Created free choice in the use of its dominion over its act depends on God as on the first predeliberator.— Second conclusion. Created free choice, in the actual use of the dominion and of the faculty which it has over its acts, depends on God as on the absolute Lord who predeliberates and predetermines, before the foreknowledge of future cooperation, what in particular that created choice itself is going to do. And so the deliberation and determination of the created choice to one side falls under the divine predeliberation and predetermination, and it depends on it in the genus of efficient cause that created free choice deliberate and will what is good. All theologians hold this conclusion who hold that God by his motion, or by efficacious grace, not only morally but also efficiently, or physically, makes us do, and works that we work. And it is proved by all the reasons by which it was shown above that God by his decree and efficacious motion physically predetermines all secondary causes, even free ones, to act, their freedom and nature being saved.4
Secondly it is proved: for, as was shown in disputation 28, all free acts in the individual, and according to all good circumstances, are subject to divine providence: therefore before the created will deliberates about any act, or uses its dominion and power of producing such an act, it is presupposed that God has first preordained that the created choice itself deliberate about such an act and use its faculty to produce that same act: otherwise created free choice would be simply the first free being and the first deliberator about such an action, whose contrary St. Thomas proves in the Prima Secundae, q. 9. art. 4.
VI. They answer this argument that man is not simply the first deliberator, nor the first lord of his act, but the proximate one: because although he can deliberate about his act without God effecting that man deliberate, yet he cannot deliberate without God conserving free choice, and equally inflowing with it into that same act. But this solution is impugned in disput. 18. no. 14, and disput. 24. no. 17.
Dominion over its act is not first in the power of the created choice, but in the power of God.— Third conclusion. Dominion over its act is not first in the power of the created choice, but in the power and dominion of God, especially with respect to supernatural acts. We mean to say that every dominion, and the actual use of the dominion, which the created will, as a proximate cause, has or exercises over the free acts which it elicits, proceeds from God as from the most powerful and first efficient cause, and must be reduced to him in the end as to the first author and the first absolute Lord: and we speak of all acts which in the individual are not sins. That this conclusion is according to the mind of St. Augustine and St. Thomas I show thus.
First: for St. Augustine, book 1 of the Retractations, ch. 9, explaining those words, To will is present with me, but to accomplish I find not, says that man does not have it in his power to be good. And book 2, ch. 1, he adds: Although it is in each one's power what he wills, yet it is not in anyone's power what he can do. Which was said for this reason, because we say that nothing is in our power except what is done when we will, where first and most of all is the willing itself. For with no interval of time at all the will itself is at hand when we will, but this power also for living well we receive from above, when the will is prepared by the Lord. And in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 10, explaining those words, Therefore it is of faith, that the promise may be firm to all the seed according to grace:5 This, he says, he promised not from the power of our will, but from his predestination. For he promised what he himself was going to do, not what men were to do: because even if men do the good things which pertain to worshipping God, he makes them do what he commanded: they do not act so that he may do what he promised: otherwise, for God's promises to be fulfilled, it would be in the power not of God but of men; and what was promised by the Lord would be rendered to Abraham by them. By which words he openly teaches that the power which free choice has over pious operations is first in the power of God, and that men receive from him the power which they have to do those things which pertain to the worship of God. Which he teaches even more clearly in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 8, in these words: As the Apostle says, which I also recalled in the previous book: We are not sufficient to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.6 Following whom blessed Ambrose dares and says:7 For our heart and our thoughts are not in our power: which everyone who is humbly and truly pious perceives to be most true. And a little below, explaining that verse of Psalm 118, Incline my heart into your testimonies, and not into covetousness, he adds: For our heart and our thoughts are not in our power, which, poured out unexpectedly, confound the mind and the soul, and drag them elsewhere than you have proposed: they recall us to worldly things, insert mundane things, thrust in voluptuous things, weave in alluring things, and at the very time when we prepare to lift up the mind, inserted among empty thoughts, we are for the most part cast down to earthly things. It is therefore not in the power of men but of God that men have power to become sons of God. For they receive it from him who gives to the human heart pious thoughts, through which it may have the faith which works through love:8 to take up this good, and to hold it, and to advance in it perseveringly even to the end, we are not sufficient to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God, in whose power are our heart and our thoughts. From ch. 13 he twice repeats the saying of Ambrose cited above: For our heart and our thoughts are not in our power. And in ch. 19 he answers the objection of those who from the fact that our heart and our thoughts are not in our power wrongly inferred that men are not to be exhorted to act well, or reproved if they have sinned. And in the book On Grace and Free Choice, ch. 20, he concludes thus: Divine Scripture, if it be diligently inspected, shows that not only the good wills of men, which he himself makes out of evil ones, and having made them good directs them to good acts and to eternal life; but even those which preserve the creature of the world are so in the power of God that, as he wills and when he wills, he makes them incline either to conferring benefits on some or to inflicting punishments on others, as he himself judges, by a most hidden judgment indeed, but without doubt most just. And in the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 14, he says: to will or not to will is so in the power of the one willing or unwilling that it neither impedes nor overcomes the power of the divine will. For concerning those who do what he does not will, he himself does what he wills. And a little below: If therefore, when God wills to establish kings on earth, he has the wills of men more in his power than they have their own; who else brings it about that reproof be salutary, and that correction be made in the heart of the one reproved, so that he be established in the heavenly kingdom? He teaches the same in other passages to be adduced in the reply to the first and fifth arguments.
VII. The same opinion is held by St. Thomas, 3 Contra Gentiles, c. 149, where explaining these words of the Apostle: It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy,9 he says: Therefore by words of this kind the free choice of the will is not excluded, as some have badly understood, as though man were not the lord of his interior and exterior acts, but it is shown that he is subject to God. And ch. 160, explaining what he had said in the preceding chapter, namely that it is in the power of free choice to impede the reception of divine grace, or not to impede it, he adds: But what was said, that it is in the power of free choice to present no impediment to grace, applies to those in whom the natural power has been integral. But if through preceding disorder it has declined to evil, it will not be altogether in its power to present no impediment to grace. For although for some moment it can by its own power abstain from some particular act of sin; yet if it is left to itself for a long time, it will fall into sin, through which an impediment is presented to grace. And 2. 2. q. 2. ar. 5. ad 1. he says: that if something be said to be in the power of man, with the help of grace excluded; thus man is bound to many things which he cannot do without preparing grace; as to love God and neighbour, and similarly to believe the articles of faith. But yet this he can with the help of grace. From which passages it is evidently clear that, according to the opinion of St. Thomas, man's free choice has power and dominion over its act not from itself but from God, as from the first efficient and moving cause, and that it depends on him not only as regards the faculty of the power and the habitual dominion, but also as regards its actual use. He teaches the same in all the passages adduced above and to be adduced below, in which he asserts that created free choice, however perfect it be posited, can do nothing unless it be moved by God. But especially 1. 2. q. 109. ar. 2. ad 1., explaining how man has dominion over his act, he says: The mind of man, even when healthy, does not so have dominion over its act as not to need to be moved by God, and much more the free choice of man, weak after sin, by which it is impeded from good through the corruption of nature. By which words he quite openly teaches that created free choice does not have the first and absolute dominion over its act, but in the actual use of that dominion depends on the motion of God, who is the first and absolute lord of all, according to that word of Esther 13, You are Lord of all, nor is there anyone who can resist your majesty. And in book 1 Contra Gentiles, c. 68, after the fifth reason he confirms the same in these words: But the dominion which the will has over its acts, whereby it is in its power to will or not to will, excludes the determination of a power to one thing, and the violence of a cause acting from outside, but does not exclude the influence of a superior cause, from which it has its being and its acting: and so causality remains in the first cause, which is God, with respect to the motions of the will.
VIII. Secondly it is proved from that word of Prov. 21: The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, that is, in the power of the Lord, like the divisions of waters, wherever he wills he turns it. By which words it is signified that the dominion of the heart, of the will, and of free choice, which the most powerful among temporal princes has, is subject and subjected, as regards all its motions, to the power and dominion of the divine free choice. Likewise also Rom. 9: It is not of him that wills, namely, to will, nor of him that runs, namely, to run, but of God that shows mercy: which words do not signify that man has no dominion and power over his willing and not willing, but declare that man does not have the first and absolute dominion over his willing and not willing; but that God alone is the first and absolute Lord of our actions, and that our willing and not willing is in his power, and depends on his nod and will. With which agrees that word of Jerem. 10: I know, Lord, that the way of man is not his, nor is it for a man to walk and direct his steps.
Thirdly it is proved by reason: for, as St. Thomas teaches, dominion is the faculty of using a thing, but no creature has the power of using its own choice from itself, but every actual use of free choice, with respect to any good act, is from God, as was shown above: therefore no creature has the first and absolute dominion over its act, but such dominion is only with God, and consequently, in the actual use of this dominion it depends on God as on a prior cause per se efficient. To all the arguments made from the beginning the answer is that they prove only the first conclusion: but insofar as they seem to impugn the second and the third, each must be satisfied.
IX. To the first the answer is that St. Augustine expressly teaches our opinion, as is clear from the passages adduced for the third conclusion. And to the testimonies adduced to the contrary Augustine himself replies, book 1 of the Retractations, ch. 9, where he reports that those same testimonies had earlier been objected to him by Pelagius, who contended that Augustine was being drawn over to his own opinion, as is clear from the words of the same Augustine adduced in disput. 22. no. 28.10 And in ch. 10 of the same book, answering the objected testimonies, he says: But what I said: That light, however, does not feed the eyes of irrational animals, but the pure hearts of those who believe in God, and turn themselves from the love of visible and temporal things to the fulfilling of his commandments, which all men can do if they will, let not the new Pelagian heretics think that it was said in accordance with them. For it is altogether true that all men can do this if they will; but the will is prepared by the Lord, and is so increased by the gift of charity that they can. Which was not said here for this reason, because it was not necessary for the present question. And ch. 22 of the same book: In another place I said: Unless each one, I say, has changed his will, he cannot do good, which the Lord teaches in another place to be placed in our power, where he says: Either make the tree good, and its fruit good; or make the tree evil, and its fruit evil.11 Which is not against the grace of God which we preach. For it is in the power of man to change his will for the better: but that power is nothing unless it be given by God, of whom it was said: He gave them power to become sons of God.12 For since that is in our power which we do when we will, nothing is so in our power as the will itself; but the will is prepared by the Lord. In this way, then, he gives the power. Thus also is to be understood what I said afterwards, that it is in our power either to merit being grafted into the goodness of God or to merit being cut off by his severity; because nothing is in our power except what follows our will. And when the will is prepared by the Lord, strong and powerful, the work of piety is easily accomplished, even what was difficult and impossible. The opinion of St. Augustine, then, is that man's free choice has power and dominion over its act, but does not have this power and dominion from itself, but from God, as from the first and absolute Lord, from whom all good things proceed, whether great or very small or middling; lest anyone glory in himself but in the Lord; as the Apostle says: What do you have that you have not received? But if you have received it, why do you glory as though you had not received it?13
X. To the second the answer is similarly that St. Thomas indeed confesses that man through will and reason has dominion over his act: but not the first and absolute dominion, as is clear from what has been said above; and especially in the second book of the Sentences, which is the first passage adduced for the opposite opinion, he expressly insinuated this when he said: There remains to man dominion over his act, although not as to the first agent; as if he were saying that man does not have the first and absolute dominion over his act, but that this dominion resides only with God. And to what is objected from the reply to the first, the answer is that St. Thomas from this, that the determination of his act is not from another but from himself, rightly infers that God is most truly the Lord of his work; yet it is not necessarily required, in order that man be lord of his act, that the determination of that same act not be in him from another, namely from God; but it suffices that man himself through free choice be the proximate cause of the determination of his act. Nor is it unfitting that this determination be first in the power of God, as was shown above. And by these things the answer is clear to the other passages of St. Thomas brought forward in the first argument.
What is necessary for the freedom of the act.— Secondly the answer is that, in order that someone be most truly, or most perfectly, lord of his act, it is necessarily required that his determination be not from another but only from himself. Whence God alone is most perfectly Lord of his act; because his dominion is wholly independent of another. Whence St. Thomas with great care added that adverb, most truly; for he did not say, because the determination of his act is not from another but from himself, therefore God is lord of his work; but he added: Whence he himself is most truly the Lord of his work; that is, most perfectly. Whence St. Thomas can be explained so that his meaning is that for the freedom of choice it is required that its determination be not so totally from another as to exclude the free cooperation of the choice, by which, as a proximate cause, it concurs from itself, that is from an intrinsic principle, to the determination of that same act. And by these things the answer is given to the confirmation. And to what is objected in the same confirmation, namely that that causal statement of St. Thomas would be false, namely: Because the determination of his act is not from another but from himself, therefore God is the Lord of his work; the answer is, first, that St. Thomas added that word, therefore most truly, that is in the most perfect way, he is Lord of his work. Secondly the answer is that even if he had not added that particle, the causal statement would still be true: for, for its truth, it is not required that whoever is lord of his act be so the cause of it that such a determination be only from himself and not from another. Just as this causal statement is true: Because Peter is a man, Peter is an animal; yet it is not permitted from that same causal statement to infer that, in order that something be an animal, it must be a man; for it can be an animal even if it is not a man.
XI. A power unimpeded for acting is said in two ways.— To the third the answer is that a power can be called proximate and unimpeded for acting in two ways. First, because nothing else is required on the part of the power itself by which it be constituted in first act to act actually, or to will and not will; and in this way free choice, all things required for acting having been posited, can by a proximate and unimpeded power act and not act, will and not will. Whence St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 83. art. 2. ad 2., says that faculty sometimes names a power unimpeded for acting, and thus it is placed in the definition of free choice. In the second way a faculty or power can be called proximate and unimpeded for acting, because in its operation it does not depend on another prior cause efficiently granting it to cooperate or to concur actually; and in this sense no secondary cause, however perfect it be posited, is in itself, and with divine premotion excluded, unimpeded for acting; because, as was said above from St. Thomas, no secondary cause, however perfect, can go forth into its act except by the power of the divine motion.
XII. To the fourth the answer is that man is not said to have dominion, or free choice, with respect to that which is in no way in his power, nor depends on his will; but free acts, whether they be natural or supernatural, are in the power of created free choice; yet not with the power excluded which God, as the first and absolute lord, has over those same acts. But when the acts are proportionate to free choice, man has power over those same acts through the natural faculty of free choice which he received through creation; although, in order that this power go forth into act, the general prior concurrence of God is necessarily required, as was said above.14 But if they are supernatural, or exceeding the natural powers of free choice, it does not have the faculty, or power from the powers of nature, to produce those acts; but this power belongs to it through the help of grace; as St. Thomas says, 2. 2. q. 2. ar. 5. ad 1. But what we can do through friends, we are said to be able to do through ourselves, as Aristotle says, 3 Ethics, c. 3.
To the confirmation the answer is that it concludes only that freedom by essence, and independent of another prior cause, is found only in God, who is simply the first free being, on whom consequently, as on a prior cause per se efficient, depends every created freedom, and its actual use.
Predestination and the efficacy of grace do not take away the necessity of exhortations and of preaching.— To the fifth the answer is that the same argument was once objected against the doctrine of St. Augustine, to which nevertheless the holy Doctor replies in these words:15 I think that Cyprian and Ambrose, whose testimonies we have set down as so brilliant, ought to suffice and to be sufficient for both ends, that is, that believing in all things, they should preach in all things the gratuitous grace of God as it is to be believed and preached: and that they should not think that same preaching adverse to the preaching by which we exhort the sluggish, or reprove the wicked: because these men too, when they so preached the grace of God that one of them said that one should glory in nothing, since nothing is ours; and the other, that our heart and our thoughts are not in our power, yet did not cease to exhort and reprove, that the divine commandments might be done. Nor did they fear lest it be said to them: Why do you exhort us? Why do you reprove us, if we have no good thing that is ours, and if our heart is not in our power?
Disputatio CXVIII: Whether the harmony of free choice with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence, and predestination can be demonstrated by natural reason.
Whether the concord of free choice with the infallibility of foreknowledge, providence, and divine predestination can be demonstrated by natural reason.
I. The difficulty of the concord of free choice with grace.— This difficulty is usually discussed in connection with the various mysteries of the faith in various places of St. Thomas's Summa of Theology. For in 1 p. q. 32 ar. 1 the holy Doctor asks whether the Trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason. And in 3 p. q. 1 ar. 1 the Thomists dispute whether the possibility of the mystery of the incarnation, or its actual execution, can be evidently known or demonstrated, at least a posteriori, by the light of nature alone. And in 2. 2. q. 1 art. 4 the matter is turned into a general controversy: whether the mysteries of our faith are evidently possible. In the present place, however, we must touch upon those of these questions which will seem to conduce to our purpose. And although all Catholics agree that it is certain that man has free choice, yet by what light this is certain, and how the freedom of that same choice coheres with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence, and predestination, and with the efficacy of the helps of grace, is not so known through itself that all agree that it can be evidently demonstrated by natural light. Hence St. Augustine, sensing the difficulty of this question:1 There are some, he says, who so defend the grace of God as to deny man's free choice, or who think that, when grace is defended, free choice is denied. And again he says:2 That question, in which the choice of the will and the grace of God are disputed, is so difficult to discern that, when free choice is defended, the grace of God seems to be denied; but when the grace of God is asserted, free choice is thought to be taken away. And in book 2 On the merit and remission of sins, ch. 18: The very reasoning, he says, which can be entered upon concerning these matters by such men as we are, straitens any one of us who seeks earnestly, lest we so defend grace as to seem to take away free choice; and again, lest we so assert free choice as to be judged, in proud impiety, ungrateful to the grace of God.
II. That man has free choice is known both from faith and from natural light.— There is, then, a first opinion of certain Catholics, who affirm that it is certain from the doctrine of faith that man has free choice, yet that this cannot be established by natural reason. This opinion, however, need not be impugned ex professo in the present place: for in 1 p. q. 83 art. 1, and On Truth q. 24, and 1. and 2., and q. 6 On Evil art. unique, St. Thomas demonstrates not only by testimonies of Scripture but also by evident natural reasons that man has free choice. Hence in the cited q. 24 On Truth ar. 1 he says that not only does faith teach, but evident reason also shows, that there is free choice in men. Master Bañez demonstrates this opinion by several reasons, 1 p. q. 83 ar. 1 dub. 1 conc. 3. But the strongest is the one St. Thomas assigns in the same article: because it is established by the light of nature that man is a rational animal; therefore it is evident that he acts by the free judgment of reason, by which he can be borne to different things, indeed even to opposites. But everything that acts from the free judgment of reason, being able to be borne to opposites, has free choice; because, as St. Thomas noted in 1. 2., the Philosophers define free choice as being a free judgment arising from reason: therefore.3
III. That the concord of free choice with grace can be demonstrated, some hold.— The second opinion is that of others, who affirm by the opposite extreme that it is not only evidently known by natural light that man is endowed with the freedom of choice, but that the concord of that same choice with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge and providence can also be clearly and easily harmonized through middle knowledge, of which we must treat in disp. 120. This opinion, however, is proved.
First: because what is natural can be demonstrated by natural light; but that man has free choice, and the actual use of it, is a natural truth; and the foreknowledge and providence that God has of human affairs which do not pertain to the order of grace is likewise natural: therefore the account of the concord of that same choice in such human affairs with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge and providence can be demonstrated by the light of nature alone: but the concord of free choice with the gifts of grace has no greater difficulty: therefore that same concord can also be easily and clearly demonstrated.
Secondly it is argued. The heretics, especially of our time, when they have striven to introduce new and inexplicable doctrines repugnant to the Catholic truth, bid them be believed even if they can neither be understood nor accommodated to the principles of faith and the light of reason. Thus Calvin, when he had asserted that God works evil works in us as he does good, adds:4 If anyone object that this is above the grasp of his mind, I confess the same of myself. But what wonder if the incomprehensible and immense majesty of God exceeds our measure? Yet so far am I from undertaking to explain after the manner of the flesh that sublime and hidden secret, that I would have what I said at the outset continually come back to mind: that they are fools who desire to know more than God has revealed. Wherefore let learned ignorance rather delight us than an intemperate and drunken curiosity beyond what God permits: therefore it is not lawful for a Catholic man to establish such a concord of free choice with the gifts of grace as cannot be fully understood or grasped by the human intellect; but it must be, as it were, received with closed eyes, or believed as the mystery of the Trinity.
Thirdly, the same can be proved. Many supernatural mysteries, short of the beatific vision, can be evidently known or demonstrated by evident reasons: therefore a fortiori the account of the concord of free choice with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge and providence can be demonstrated by natural light. The antecedent is proved: for the habit of faith can be evidently known by the light of nature. For the angel, while he was a wayfarer, evidently knew all things that were within himself; but the habit of faith was within the angel himself, for it inhered in his intellect: but a habit of this kind of itself inclines to assent to the mystery of the Trinity: therefore the inclination to such assent can be evidently known by the light of nature, and consequently the object of that inclination can also be evidently known, namely the Trinity of persons subsisting in the same numerically one divine nature.
It is confirmed, first. The angel evidently knew that he had assent to this proposition, God is three and one, since he experienced such assent in himself: therefore it was evident to the angel that that assent was supernatural. The consequence is clear: for between natural and supernatural assent no middle is given. But it was evident to the angel that that assent was not natural: for he evidently knew all natural things; yet among them he did not see such an assent and its object: therefore he evidently knew that that assent and its object were supernatural: therefore by natural light he evidently knew it to be true that God is three and one.
It is confirmed, secondly. By the light of nature it is evident that God has intellect and will: therefore it is evident that he knows and loves himself: therefore it is evident that he produces the Word and the love of the same substance and nature as God himself: for by the action of the intellect and the will there is necessarily produced some term remaining in the agent. But it is evident that such a term cannot be an accident in God, since it is known by the light of nature that no accident is given in God: therefore it is evident that it is a substance; and consequently it is evident that in God there is one person producing and two produced, one through the intellect and the other through the will: for it is impossible that anyone produce himself: therefore the Trinity of persons is evidently knowable by nature.
IIII. Fourthly it is argued. The mystery of the Trinity is evidently credible, as the theologians commonly confess: therefore evidently possible: therefore evidently true. The first consequence is proved: for what is evidently impossible is evidently incredible: therefore, arguing from the opposite of the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent, what is evidently credible will be evidently possible. But the second consequence is known: for, as Aristotle teaches, in eternal things to be and to be able are the same.5
V. The concord of free choice with the efficacy of divine grace cannot be evidently known by the light of nature alone.— The third opinion confesses that the freedom of our choice can indeed be evidently known and demonstrated by the light of nature alone: but how its actual use stands together with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence, and predestination, and with the efficacy of the helps of divine grace, cannot be perfectly known or comprehended by the light of nature alone: and therefore the account of this concord must be believed, and the intellect brought into captivity unto the obedience of faith. To this opinion Cajetan inclines, 1 p. q. 22 art. 4 §. To this doubt; where, resolving the present difficulty, after he has reported the opinion of those asserting that the same future contingent act is avoidable and unavoidable — avoidable indeed in itself, but unavoidable as it is foreseen — he thus concludes: Our intellect will rest, not in the evidence of the truth inspected, but in the inaccessible height of the hidden truth. And this seems to my little wit reasonable enough, both on account of the reason already given, and because, as Gregory says, he thinks too little of God who believes of him only what he can measure by his own wit. Nor therefore, I suspect, is anything to be denied of those things which we know or hold by faith to pertain to the divine immutability, actuality, certainty, and universality, and the like: but I think that something hidden lies concealed, either on the part of the order that is between God and the foreseen event, or in the very glue, as it were, between the event itself and its being foreseen; and so, considering the intellect of our soul to be the eye of a night-owl, I find its rest only in ignorance. For it is better, both for the Catholic faith and for philosophy, to confess our blindness than to assert as evident things that do not quiet the intellect: for evidence is that which quiets. Nor for this reason do I accuse all the Doctors of presumption: since by stammering, as they could, they intended to insinuate the immobility and the supreme and eternal efficacy of the divine intellect, will, and power, all of them through the infallibility of the order of divine election to all events, none of which is an obstacle to the aforesaid suspicion, which believes that something higher lies hidden in them. And truly, if it were so preached, perhaps no Christian would err concerning predestination, as he does not err in the matter of the Trinity: because it is said and written, and so it is, that it is hidden from the human intellect, and faith alone suffices. I have transcribed these things from Cajetan because he speaks most piously, and his words breathe Christian modesty and humility. Imitating him, Master Bañez says:6 If anyone does not understand how the use of free choice is free and nevertheless is an effect already predefined by divine providence, he must believe it. And elsewhere:7 First of all they ought to have believed what they say they cannot understand: for we Catholics believe the mystery of the Trinity even if we do not understand it.
VI. I judge this opinion to be true, and consonant with the mind of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. For its evidence it must be considered that it often happens that two extremes, considered in themselves, are evidently known by the light of nature alone, and yet the connection they have with each other, and the mode of that connection, cannot be certainly known or demonstrated without a higher light. For example, that God exists is known through itself; and that man exists is also known by the light of nature: but that God is man, and man is God, is known only through divine revelation. Similarly too, when one extreme is naturally knowable, but the other is known only through supernatural light, the connection of both, and the mode in which they cohere with each other, cannot be evidently demonstrated, although the one extreme is comprehended by the light of nature alone. And the reason of this is: for the connection between two extremes, and the mode of that connection, cannot be evidently known unless both extremes are evidently known: therefore, whenever one extreme is supernatural, it is impossible that the connection it has with the other extreme be evidently known by the light of nature alone, even if that other extreme does not transcend the order of nature.
Our opinion is therefore proved by the testimonies of St. Augustine adduced, and by others that will be brought forward below, in which he expressly confesses that the concord of free choice with predestination and grace cannot be perfectly known or comprehended by human reason.
VII. Clarity in matters of faith ought to be suspect.— Secondly it is proved by reason: for in matters of faith, since it deals with things not seen, every evidence or clarity ought to be suspect, nor is anything therefore to be reckoned true because it can easily be comprehended or understood by us: for it happens that on one side some doctrine seems to carry ease with it, and on the other is repugnant to the principles of faith. For example, our intellect, led by the light of nature alone, more easily conceives that the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the Eucharist as in a sign, and not according to real presence, as the Lutheran heretics assert: for by their position all the natural reasons that are objected by unbelievers against this venerable sacrament are easily solved. Similarly the same intellect more easily perceives that God is one in essence, but not three in persons, as the ancient Philosophers held; yet a Catholic man ought not therefore to judge that true because our intellect can easily grasp it, or because it appears to us clearer: otherwise the Catholic faith would certainly have to be cast away, in whose mysteries, to be explained and defended, very many difficulties occur, and only those things would have to be accepted which our intellect easily grasps: which nevertheless is repugnant both to the doctrine of the Church and to the authority of Scripture, which says:8 Neither has the eye seen, nor the ear heard, nor have they ascended into the heart of man, the things which God has prepared for those who love him.9 Hence St. Augustine says:10 Is that therefore to be denied which is open, because that which is hidden cannot be comprehended? Are we, I say, therefore to say that what we clearly see to be so is not so, because we cannot find why it is so? And in another place he says:11 But I, even if I cannot solve their arguments, yet see that we must adhere to those things which are most open in the Scriptures; that from them the obscure may be revealed, or if the mind is not yet fit to discern them when demonstrated, or to investigate hidden things, they may be believed without any hesitation. And in sermon 20 on the words of the Apostle: Better, he says, is a faithful ignorance than a rash knowledge. And Jerome: It is better to be ignorant of something than to learn it with danger. And Irenaeus, book 2 Against Heresies, ch. 45: Better therefore and more useful is it to be simple and to know little, and through charity to become near to God, than to think oneself to know much, and to be found blasphemous against one's God through much experience. Therefore the account of the concord of free choice with the gifts of grace which is assigned by St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and their disciples is not therefore to be rejected because our intellect cannot fully see or comprehend it.
VIII. Thirdly it is proved. Because, although our free choice is contained within the limits of nature, yet divine grace and its efficacy exceed the whole order of nature: therefore the connection and concord of both cannot be perfectly or evidently known or comprehended by our intellect in this state. The consequence is clear: for, as has been shown, the connection and concord of two extremes, of which one is supernatural, cannot be perfectly known or demonstrated by the light of nature alone.
Many natural things cannot be perfectly understood by man.— Fourthly. Because even in natural things there are many whose reasons man cannot perfectly know or demonstrate; namely the mode by which the rational soul is whole in the whole and whole in each part; and the mode by which God is in all things by essence, presence, and power; and in the ant, the bees, and other tiny living things many things are found, in the knowledge of which men labour greatly; for which reason the Wise Man says:12 And we hardly estimate the things that are on earth: and the things that are in sight we find with labour. But who shall search out the things that are in heaven? And who shall know thy thought, unless thou give wisdom, and send thy Holy Spirit from the highest? Hence St. Augustine, after he had diligently treated in the second book On the Trinity that question — whether spiritual creatures can work miracles by their own natural power — concludes at the end:13 It is altogether useful for me that I remember my own powers, and warn my brethren to remember theirs, lest human weakness advance beyond what is safe. For in what way the angels do this, or rather in what way God does this through his angels, I am unable to penetrate with the keenness of the eyes, nor to unravel with confidence in reason, nor to comprehend with the advance of the mind, so as to speak as certainly to all the things that can be required concerning these matters as if I were an angel, or a prophet, or an apostle. Wherefore, with this moderation also applied, one must proceed without assertion and without prejudice to a better opinion, as far as reason and authority can help.
The omnipotence of God cannot be perfectly known by man.— Fifthly. The omnipotence of God, since it is infinite, cannot be perfectly known or comprehended by the human intellect; but God by his omnipotence brings it about that the man whose heart he moves wills, and wills freely. For St. Thomas says14 that even if God changes the will of man to something else, nevertheless he does this by his omnipotence, that he willingly wills that into which he is changed: therefore it cannot be perfectly known or comprehended by man how the freedom of choice stands with the efficacious motion of God, or with the infallibility of divine providence and predestination.
IX. To the first argument it is answered that, although it is a natural truth, and is established by experience itself, that man has free choice, yet its connection with efficacious grace, and the mode of that connection, cannot be demonstrated or evidently known in this state.
The mysteries of faith are to be believed in order that they may be understood.— To the second it is answered that the heretics therefore bid what they teach be believed, lest the falsity, impiety, and repugnance to Catholic truth be detected in their sects, which they strive to introduce according to their own brain, against the Apostolic See, against the sacred Councils, indeed even against the divine letters and the light of nature. But Catholics wish what faith teaches to be believed in order that it may be understood, because it cannot be investigated or comprehended by human reason. Hence the Lord, about to speak of the great and from the ages hidden mystery of the incarnation, says: If you will not believe, you shall not understand:15 to signify that the mysteries of faith are to be believed in order that they may be understood. Hence St. Peter the Apostle: We, he says, have believed and have known that thou art the Christ, the Son of God.16 Where, as Augustine noted,17 he said we have believed before we have known; to teach that the hidden mysteries of God are to be believed in order that they may be known, and that faith is to be put before knowledge. But the unbelieving Jews wished first to see the things that were to be believed by faith. For they said: What sign therefore dost thou do, that we may see and believe?18 They wished to see before believing. Thomas the Apostle also: Unless I see, he says, the print of the nails in his hands, and put my finger into the place of the nails, and put my hand into his side, I will not believe.19 For which Christ the Lord charged him with unbelief: Be not, he says, unbelieving, but faithful. And again: Because thou hast seen me, Thomas, thou hast believed: blessed are they who have not seen, and have believed.
X. To the third it is answered that the mysteries which of themselves pertain to faith cannot be known quidditatively, or evidently demonstrated, except through the beatific vision. And to the impugnation Cajetan seems to insinuate that any angel whatever, through implanted and connatural species, evidently knew the supernatural habits infused in him:20 for he says that through those species the angels knew faith, hope, and charity by natural cognition, not absolutely and in themselves, but as they pertain to the angel himself, who perfectly knows himself. But whatever be the case with Cajetan's opinion, it is answered that, as St. Thomas teaches, the object of the theological virtues, and consequently the theological virtues themselves, cannot be comprehended or evidently demonstrated by natural reason.21 Hence even the highest angel did not evidently know by the light of nature the supernatural habits or the supernatural acts which he produced; just as neither did he know habitual grace,22 because, as St. Thomas teaches in prima secundae, q. 112, article 5, no one, setting aside divine revelation, can know with infallible certainty that he or another has habitual grace. And the reason he assigns persuades this: because no one can know that he has knowledge of some conclusion if he were ignorant of the principle. But the principle of grace and its object is God himself, who, on account of his excellence, is unknown to us, according to that of Job 36: Behold, God is great, overcoming our knowledge. And therefore his presence in us and his absence cannot be known with certainty, according to that of Job 9: If he come to me, I shall not see him: and if he depart, I shall not understand.
XI. To the first confirmation it is answered that the angel did not evidently know that the assent to the mystery of the Trinity which he elicited was supernatural and not natural: because, although an angel left to his own nature evidently knows all natural objects and all acts of the natural order, even those freely elicited by himself, yet God by his absolute power could hide some natural object from him; and because the angel himself could not evidently know by the light of nature alone whether God in this respect was using his absolute power, since that depends on the mere will of God: therefore he could not evidently know that the assent which he elicited concerning the mystery of the Trinity, or concerning its object, was not natural but supernatural.
But against this: for at least the highest angel evidently knew that that revelation of the mystery of the Trinity was not made by another, inferior angel: for he evidently knew that he was higher than all; and that no inferior angel could illuminate a superior, as St. Thomas shows 1 p. q. 107 art. 3. Therefore he evidently knew that that revelation had been made to him immediately by God; and consequently that the revealed mystery was true: for it was evident to him that God cannot lie or deceive anyone.
Some answer that the argument at most concludes that the highest angel had evidence in the one attesting the mystery of the Trinity, and the other things which he knew from the beginning by faith. But we say that, although it was evident to the highest angel that he was higher than all according to natural being, yet it was not evident to him that he had grace, as is clear from the premises: nor did he evidently know that a higher angel in natural being was also higher in the order of grace. By this doctrine a similar argument is solved, which is customarily made in the third part to prove that the angels by natural power evidently knew that the humanity of Christ the Lord subsists through an uncreated subsistence, and so knew through their natural powers the mystery of the incarnation, after it had in fact been carried into execution. For it must be said that he did not evidently know by the light of nature alone that that subsistence by which the humanity of Christ subsisted was not created;23 because, although among created subsistences he did not see the subsistence of Christ's humanity, yet, standing in the light of nature alone, he did not know whether in truth the humanity of Christ had a proper subsistence, and whether it was hidden from him on account of some mystery. But the blessed angels knew the mystery of the incarnation through divine revelation, and consequently they also knew with certain knowledge that the humanity of Christ subsists immediately and formally through the uncreated subsistence of the Word.
XII. The mystery of the Trinity is not demonstrated by natural reason.— To the second confirmation it is answered that, although it is certain that by created natural cognition a word is produced, yet it is not evident or certain, indeed not even true, that a word is produced by every cognition. For it is a most probable opinion that the blessed do not produce a word by the beatific vision, as very many Thomists teach in 1 p. q. 12; and it is of faith that the Holy Spirit, and likewise the Son of God, by knowing his essence, do not produce the Word; whence it is not evident by the light of nature that God, by knowing himself, produces the Word. But the reason by which St. Thomas deduces from the things that occur in created cognition that in God there is a substantial generation of the Word is not demonstrative, but a probable conjecture for persuading and explaining the things that the Catholic faith teaches concerning the eternal generation of the divine Word.
But against this there is an argument: for, as St. Thomas teaches 1 p. q. 93 art. 5 in the body of the article, in man there is the image of God, not only according to the imitation of the divine nature, but also according to the representation of the three persons; because just as in God there are three persons in one essence, so proportionally in man there are three powers in the same soul: therefore, just as by natural light man can evidently demonstrate a posteriori that God exists, so also he will be able, through effects representing the Trinity of persons — namely through the knowledge of himself — evidently to know the mystery of the Trinity.
What sort of image of the Trinity is in man.— It is answered that God is one is evidently demonstrated a posteriori through creatures, since this consequence is evident: There are created things: therefore there is given one first efficient principle, independent in its being from another; otherwise in efficient causes there would be a process to infinity, as St. Thomas shows 1 p. q. 2 art. 3 in the body: and as regards the question whether he is, the creatures themselves perfectly demonstrate God a posteriori. But the image of God that is in man does not perfectly represent God as he is three and one, even as regards the question whether he is, but only in an imperfect mode, as St. Thomas teaches in the same art. 5, q. 93, solution to 3. And the reason of this is: for the divine relations constitutive of the persons import only a respect within; whence God himself, as he is three, produces no effect outside, but through something common to the three persons, namely through his omnipotence: whence no effect of God can evidently demonstrate, even a posteriori, the Trinity of persons, but only the unity of the divine essence.
XIV. The mystery of the Trinity is not evidently possible for us.— To the fourth it is answered that the mystery of the Trinity is indeed evidently credible, as are the other mysteries of our faith, yet it does not follow that it is evidently possible or true for us: for many false things, indeed even impossible things, are more probable than true ones. And the reason is: for the evidence of credibility, and credibility itself, is taken from the authority of those who speak and from other extrinsic signs; but possibility is founded in the very nature of the thing. Whence, although it is more probable, and consequently evidently credible, that quantity is distinguished from the quantified thing, yet it can be that in reality it is impossible. To the impugnation it is said that the consequence made does not proceed from the opposite of the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent; because both the antecedent and the consequent of each consequence are affirmative, and so they are not opposed to each other.24 But in order that, from the opposite of the consequent of this consequence — this is evidently impossible: therefore it is evidently incredible — the argument be made to the opposite of the antecedent, we must argue thus: This is not evidently incredible: therefore it is not evidently impossible; and in each consequence the consequent is true, as is the antecedent, because we have evidence neither that the mystery of the Trinity is possible nor that it is impossible.
For although in reality it is not only possible but even necessary that God be three, yet this cannot be evident to any creature, as has been said, setting aside the beatific vision.
Disputatio CXIX: Whether at least by God’s absolute power a creature, without the beatific vision, can have evident knowledge of the mysteries that belong in themselves to faith.
Whether, at least by God's absolute power, any creature, setting aside the beatific vision, can have evident cognition of the mysteries that pertain per se to faith.
I. For the explanation of this difficulty it must be noted that a cognition can be evident in two ways. First, extrinsically, namely because the object is not known evidently in itself but in another, that is, in the attester, who cannot lie; as if someone evidently knew that God says or attests something, he would deduce by evident consequence that it is true: for it is evident that God cannot lie or deceive anyone, since he is the first truth. Secondly, a cognition can be evident intrinsically and in itself, whether the evidence be a priori or a posteriori, and whether it concern the question whether the thing is, or the question what it is. And indeed in the first sense this difficulty is treated expressly in 2. 2. q. 5, a. 1, where Bañez and Cajetan dispute it, and q. 171, a. 5. Finally, in 3 p. q. 11, a. 1, it is disputed whether the soul of Christ by infused knowledge evidently knew the mystery of the Trinity and the other articles of our faith; and the most weighty theologians, with whom I agree, confess that it knew them evidently with evidence in the attester. And the reason is: for the soul of Christ by infused knowledge most certainly knew that it was supreme among all creatures in the supernatural being of grace, and consequently knew with certainty that God is, who immediately revealed these mysteries to it. Since therefore he evidently knew that God cannot lie, it follows that through infused knowledge he had evidence in the attester of the mysteries of faith. But whether faith is compossible with this same evidence in angels or in men is expressly disputed in 2. 2, q. 5, cited above. In the present place, therefore, we do not speak of evidence in the attester, but of the intrinsic evidence of the thing, a priori or a posteriori.
II. The first opinion, then, is that of certain more recent authors, who assert that short of the beatific vision and of evidence in the attester, evident cognition of the mystery of the Trinity, and of the other things that pertain per se to faith, can be given in other ways. They prove this opinion.
First: for whatever does not imply a contradiction God can do; but it does not imply a contradiction that evident cognition of the mystery of the Trinity be given in other ways distinct from the beatific vision and from evidence in the attester: therefore.
Secondly: for, as will appear below, many grave Doctors set out several other modes by which the mystery of the Trinity can be evidently known by a pure creature: therefore it must not be said that this is impossible.
An evident cognition of the Trinity can be had only through the beatific vision and in the attester.— Durandus teaches the contrary opinion, q. 3 of the prologue; the Thomists commonly follow it, and it seems to us to be according to the mind of St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 32, a. 1. It is proved first by a reason drawn from the same a. 1. For, setting aside evidence in the attester and that which is had through the beatific vision, in which the divine essence is united to the created intellect under the aspect of an intelligible species, no other evidence of the mystery of the Trinity can be had, even a posteriori: for, as St. Thomas shows, 1 p. q. 12, a. 2, no created species can represent God quidditatively as he is in himself: but it is impossible that evident cognition of the mystery of the Trinity be given a posteriori; because no effect represents, or can represent, the mystery of the Trinity evidently as regards the constitution and distinction of the divine persons, as was shown above: therefore.
It is proved secondly by destroying all the other modes by which the authors of the first opinion contend that the mystery of the Trinity can be evidently known. The first mode is through abstractive knowledge, by which one knows, not indeed that the Trinity actually exists in reality, but the connection of the three persons with the divinity; as when we say that man is a rational animal, capable of wonder and of laughter, etc.: for this knowledge is abstractive, because we affirm none of these things to exist, but only assert the connection of the predicate with the subject, so that, if man exists, it is necessary that a rational animal, capable of wonder and of laughter, exist. And in this way, they affirm, the Trinity of persons can be evidently known by a pure wayfarer through a created species. So think some of the more recent theologians.
III. An abstractive evident cognition of the Trinity cannot be given.— But this mode is impugned by the Thomists, who hold that the divine essence, as it is in itself, cannot be represented quidditatively through any created species. Furthermore, its impossibility is shown; for it implies that someone know the divine essence quidditatively without knowing its actual existence: for actual existence belongs to the quiddity of God;1 nay rather, to have being by essence, or to be that very being by essence, infinite and unlimited, having beforehand in itself whatever pertains to the perfection of being, is the proper quiddity and essence of God according to our manner of conceiving; according to that word: He who is, sent me to you: and: I am who am:2 which St. Thomas also teaches, 1 p. q. 4, a. 2, and reason persuades it: for to have being by essence is the proper perfection which, in our manner of understanding, is presupposed in God to all other perfections, and through which, as through the notion first conceived of God, the rest are demonstrated. Hence St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 3, a. 1, in the second reason demonstrates that God is not a body, because he is the first being by essence, including no potentiality; and q. 4, a. 2, shows that the perfections of all things are in God, because he is the first being subsisting through itself; and q. 9, a. 1, reason 1, concludes that God is immutable, because he is pure act. Finally, in the course of the first part, he reduces all the other perfections that are in God, as to the first simply, in our manner of conceiving, to being itself by essence; and there he stops, nor does he show from any other prior reason that God has being by essence. This is confirmed: for, since to be a rational animal is the quiddity of man, it is impossible to know man quidditatively unless it be known that he is a rational animal. Since therefore being of existence belongs to the quiddity of God, it will be impossible to know God quidditatively without knowing the actual existence which he has in three persons.
IV. Two solutions are brought to bear on this argument. The first is that although actual existence belongs to the quiddity of God, and therefore the mystery of the Trinity cannot be perfectly known quidditatively without its actual existence being known, nevertheless it can be known quidditatively imperfectly and confusedly without such existence.3 For they say that it is not necessary that one who knows a thing quidditatively know all its quidditative predicates, but that it suffices that he know the more important ones; otherwise whoever knew God or a creature quidditatively would also know comprehensively, which is false: for all the blessed know God quidditatively, yet they do not comprehend him. This solution, however, is easily impugned. First: for it implies a contradiction in terms that something be known imperfectly and confusedly and be known quidditatively; for quidditative cognition is distinct cognition of a thing as it is in itself.4 Hence one who knew of man only that he is a being would not know him quidditatively. Secondly: for to know a thing quidditatively it is necessary to know all its essential predicates. For one who were ignorant of some essential predicate of man, as that he is rational or that he is an animal, would not know him quidditatively. Thirdly: for this solution supposes one falsehood, namely that the cognition by which all the quidditative predicates of God are known is comprehensive cognition of him:5 for this is false, since for the comprehensive cognition of a thing it does not suffice to know all its quidditative predicates, or those things which are formally found in that thing, but beyond this it is required that all things be known which are eminently or virtually in it: and therefore the blessed, even if they see all things which are formally in God, because they nevertheless do not know all things which are virtually in his power, namely all possible creatures, for that reason do not properly comprehend God, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 12, a. 7.
V. The second solution is that actual existence is the chief predicate of God, by which he is most distinguished from creatures.6 Hence one who did not attain it would not be said simply to know God quidditatively; nevertheless he would be said to know him in himself and through his proper species abstractively: and by this abstractive knowledge, they assert, God can be known as triune without the beatific vision. But against this solution there is an argument: for evident cognition of a thing in itself, which is not had a posteriori through an effect, is quidditative cognition:7 therefore, since that cognition of God is not from an effect and is evident cognition of the thing in itself, it will be quidditative cognition; the contrary of which this solution teaches. Furthermore: for one who saw the divine essence clearly and evidently as it is in itself would necessarily love God, and consequently would have eternal life and be blessed, as is clear from that word of John 17: This is eternal life, that they know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent: therefore this evidence would not be short of the beatific vision. This is confirmed: for only the beatific vision, or God known through the beatific vision, can on the part of the object efficaciously move the will and necessitate it to love God, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 111, a. 2, and q. 106, a. 2.8 But God clearly and evidently known through such knowledge would efficaciously move the will on the part of the object9 and would necessitate it to love God: therefore such knowledge would be beatific, and consequently, short of the beatific vision, evident cognition of God cannot be had.
VI. The second mode by which the mystery of the Trinity can be evidently known short of the beatific vision is assigned by other theologians; namely through a vision of the Trinity as to whether it is, and not as to what it is. For this vision, if God by his absolute power communicated it to someone, would not be a quidditative and perfect vision of God, but a very imperfect and confused one. And indeed that such a cognition is possible is proved: for in fact Christ the Lord by infused knowledge evidently knew the mystery of the Trinity as to whether it is, but not as to what it is; and likewise the prophets knew evidently, by the prophetic light, that there are three persons in God: therefore it is not repugnant that a vision of the Trinity be given, by which it be evidently known that the Trinity is, without that which is the what-is of the Trinity itself being known; but such a cognition would not be beatific: therefore.
This mode is impugned by nearly the same arguments as the preceding one: for this evident cognition of the Trinity, as to whether it is, would either be evident cognition a posteriori through effects, and this cannot be said, because, as has been shown, no effect of God shows clearly and evidently that there is in God a Trinity of persons; or it would be evident cognition a priori, or quasi a priori, namely because through it the whether-it-is of the Trinity would be known as it is in itself; and this too cannot be said: for that cognition would be beatific. For it is impossible that the existence of the Trinity be evidently known as it is in itself without the divine essence being evidently known, and all its attributes and the other predicates which are formally in God; on account of which all the Thomists, with St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 12, a. 7, teach against Scotus that it implies a contradiction for anyone to see clearly and evidently one divine person without another, or the essence without the persons, or one attribute, or any other predicate existing formally in God, without all the other attributes or predicates of God being known. Since therefore the existence of the three persons of the Trinity is a quidditative predicate of God, it follows that it is impossible that it be evidently known as it is in itself without the divine essence and all the attributes being evidently known. But these cannot be evidently known except through the beatific vision, through which God is known quidditatively as he is in himself: therefore. Hence to the argument made it is answered that it is false that Christ the Lord by infused knowledge evidently knew the mystery of the Trinity, even as to whether it is, as the Thomists commonly teach, 3 p. q. 11, a. 1; and a fortiori the same must be thought of the prophets: for otherwise it would follow that those same prophets did not have faith in the mystery of the Trinity as to whether it is. This is proved: for obscurity and inevidence belong to the nature of faith, and these cannot stand together with evidence in respect of the same object: therefore, if the prophets had evidence of the mystery of the Trinity as to whether it is, it follows that they did not have faith in the same mystery.
VII. The third mode is if God infused into someone a light by which his intellect would be determined to assent to this proposition: The Trinity exists; namely in such a way that through the species of creatures the Trinity of persons would be apprehended, as it is now apprehended by us, and through that infused light they would be elevated and determined so as to concur together with the intellect to the assent of the same proposition: The Trinity exists. For such cognition would not be beatific, nor evident in the attester, but would be evident from the terms, not according to itself, but as it lies under the experience of the intellect seeing and determined to the assent of that proposition. Some more recent theologians set out this mode as possible, but in our judgment it seems much less intelligible than the two preceding. First indeed: for this cognition of the mystery of the Trinity would not be clear and evident from the fact that that infused light determined the intellect, as regards the exercise, to the assent of the mystery of the Trinity. For the efficacious help of divine grace physically predetermines, as regards the exercise, the intellect itself to the free assent of the same mystery, and yet that assent is not evident but obscure, since it is an assent of faith, for which obscurity is intrinsically required. Nor would that cognition be evident because it would proceed from an infused light higher and more eminent than the light of faith: for the infused light by which the soul of Christ the Lord knows the mystery of the Trinity through infused knowledge is superior to the light of faith and more excellent than it; and yet through infused knowledge Christ the Lord did not evidently know the mystery of the Trinity in himself,10 even as to whether it is, but only in the attester, as was said above: therefore in no way would that cognition of the mystery of the Trinity be evident or clear, even as to whether it is. Secondly, because no infused light superior to the light of faith is given, nor can be given, by which the mystery of the Trinity may be clearly and evidently known in itself, except the light of glory, which is the beatific light; for if it were giveable, it would have been granted to the soul of Christ: but it is established from what has been said that Christ through infused knowledge did not evidently know the mystery of the Trinity, even as to whether it is, except by evidence in the attester only: therefore no evident cognition of the mystery of the Trinity can be given except a beatific one. But that which the authors of this opinion assert in the explanation of their opinion, that that cognition is evident from the terms, does not seem intelligible: for evident cognition from the terms cannot be had11 except concerning the first, most universal principles, which are known per se by the light of nature, as: Anything is or is not; Every whole is greater than its part. But the mystery of the Trinity is above all principles, even the most universal principles of nature, and transcends its whole order: therefore it cannot be evidently known from the terms.
Nor does it suffice to answer that that cognition is evident from the terms, not according to itself, but as they lie under experience: for either by experience they understand the experience of the terms, and this is not so, otherwise we too would evidently know that the Trinity is: for we experience the very terms signifying that the Trinity is. Or they understand the experience of the thing itself signified by the term, namely of the three persons of the Trinity; and this is a begging of the question: for we contend that the Trinity itself, even as to whether it is, cannot be known through experience except through the beatific vision, by which each of the blessed beholds the divine persons in themselves. Nay, properly speaking, experience cannot be had through the beatific vision, because experience properly pertains to sense; but through the intellect experience is not had except in a broad sense, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 54, a. 5, ad 2. We have, therefore, that that third mode of evidence is impossible.
VIII. The fourth mode is through discursive knowledge, from many essential predicates known through the beatific vision and having a connection with the mystery of the Trinity. From these, some say, the same mystery can be evidently known or deduced, a priori or a posteriori.
Against this mode, however, it is argued: for the evidence of the Trinity as it is in itself is not had through discursive knowledge unless it be reduced to the beatific knowledge,12 through which alone those predicates of God are known from which the Trinity of persons is inferred, just as the evidence of our theology is reduced to the knowledge of the blessed, because we do not evidently know the principles of faith from which theological conclusions are deduced. Furthermore, this mode of evidence seems altogether impossible: for the essential predicates are common to all the divine persons: therefore from them the Trinity of persons cannot be evidently known or deduced, otherwise in fact we would by the natural light evidently know that there is a Trinity of persons in God: for we evidently know a posteriori the essential predicates of God, as that he is a being, infinite, omnipotent, supremely good: therefore if from evidently known essential predicates it can be deduced, by evident consequence, that there is in God a Trinity of persons, it follows that the mystery of the Trinity can be evidently known or demonstrated by us by the light of nature alone.
IX. Whether Paul, the vision being past, evidently remembered that he had seen God.— The fifth mode is through the memory of a beatific vision already had: for one who sees God triune and one, if he be deprived of that vision, will afterwards evidently remember that he saw God triune and one, as in fact St. Paul remembered after the rapture, as is clear from those words of the same Apostle: That such a man was caught up even to the third heaven, and there heard secret words which it is not lawful for a man to speak.13
Against this mode fight the arguments by which, in the first part, q. 12, a. 11, the Thomists commonly show that through the species left in the intellect of St. Paul after the rapture he did not clearly and evidently know the beatific vision which he had, or that he had seen God through his essence; and much less could he through those same species evidently know the Trinity of persons: otherwise faith in the mystery of the Trinity would not have remained in the Apostle after the rapture.
It remains, therefore, that short of the beatific vision and of evidence in the attester, the mystery of the Trinity, or the other things that pertain per se to faith, cannot be evidently known by any creature.
Disputatio CXX: In which various ways of reconciling free choice with grace proposed by different doctors are presented and refuted.
In which the various ways of reconciling free choice with grace, which are assigned by different Doctors, are reported and refuted.
I. ALTHOUGH above the reconciliation which is assigned by some has been set out at sufficient length and refuted through very many disputations, nevertheless I judged it fitting to touch upon it briefly in the present place and to attack it, and to run through the reconciliations of the other theologians, so that the reconciliation of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, to be subjected in the following disputation, may appear the clearer.
A certain reconciliation of free choice with grace is proposed, and attacked.— The first ground, then, of reconciliation is founded on that middle, or conditioned, knowledge (for no force is done to the word), by which, as they say, God, before every free decree of his will predetermining future acts, on any hypothesis whatsoever that is given, certainly and infallibly knew what created free choice, out of its innate freedom, would do in the particular case, on the hypothesis that it were placed in such or such an order of things, and in such circumstances, and were allured and invited by such external and internal motion: although with that same freedom it could do the opposite, if it willed. But they posit this middle foreknowledge in God for this reason, as we observed above, namely that from it may be taken the infallibility of divine predestination and of the future consent of free choice, efficacious grace being posited. For since they think that God by his efficacious grace does not predetermine the created will1 truly and efficiently to consent to God calling and arousing it, because they suppose that with this predetermining grace the freedom of our choice cannot consist, they infer in consequence that the aforesaid infallibility cannot be founded either in some absolute decree of God efficaciously and efficiently predetermining that a man consent by his free choice, or in the real power of the efficacious help of prevenient grace, or of grace antecedent in the order of causality, to the free consent of the created will. Whence they are compelled to have recourse to the said middle knowledge, so that to it, as to the first root, the infallibility of divine predestination and of the future cooperation of created choice may be traced back.
II. Some hold that prevenient and exciting grace are formally indeliberate vital acts.— Secondly they suppose that prevenient and exciting grace are formally certain vital acts which God works in us without us: without us, I say, as freely cooperating, yet not without us as vitally and efficiently concurring; and that it consists in the illustration and illumination of the intellect, and in the excitation and persuasion of the will, which indeed proceed efficiently from the intellect and the will, not indeed as free, but as nature, although antecedently they depend on the will as it is free choice, namely inasmuch as it depended on its freedom that a man should acquire the knowledge of the mysteries of faith, or of the things that were to be done, by approaching preachers, or by acquiring them in another way by his own industry; into that knowledge God would insert himself, elevating it by his special influx, so that it be supernatural and such as is necessary for salvation, and so obtain the character of prevenient grace. The illumination, then, being supposed, by which God illuminates the intellect and proposes the good to the will as befitting it, they affirm that immediately, without any freedom, there arises purely naturally in the will a movement of affection toward the good proposed to it, by which movement indeed it is allured and as it were invited to love that good, and to command the executive powers to carry it out, as for example to command the intellect to assent to the things of faith proposed and explained. In these two movements, then, namely in the illustration of the intellect and the affection of the will, elevated by God by his special influx, they say that prevenient and exciting grace consists. But free choice, aided and aroused by these two movements of prevenient grace, has the free power of commanding or not commanding the assent of faith. But if the will wills to embrace the faith, and commands to the intellect the act of believing, the movement of prevenient grace which it has flowing in at the same time, it elicits in itself a supernatural act, by which it wills to embrace the faith, and by which it commands the assent to the intellect; and at the same time the intellect, moved by that supernatural command of the will and aided by the divine illustration, elicits a supernatural act of assenting to the things revealed; and exciting or prevenient grace, by a new influx, by which together with free choice it flows into the supernatural act of faith, obtains the character of helping, cooperating and efficacious grace. But if the will, in accordance with its innate freedom, is unwilling to embrace the faith, exciting and prevenient grace remains within the limits of sufficient grace and is not efficacious, because the will, as it is free, was unwilling to embrace the faith, although through exciting and prevenient grace it could truly have embraced it.
III. These foundations being established, together with many others which we have reported and attacked above, they think that they deliver a facile, clear, and for all accessible and intelligible reconciliation of free choice with divine foreknowledge, providence and predestination, and with the efficacy of the helps of grace; through which they escape the most difficult arguments that are urged by the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, and afterwards by others, against the divine predestination delivered by the Apostle and explained by St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and by the aid of that one middle knowledge they seem easily to dissolve them.
For if anyone asks whence it comes that the same help is efficacious in one man and not in another, or that, with the same helps on the part of God — of prevenient grace, inasmuch as they are helps of prevenient grace — one man is made predestined and is justified, perseveres in grace and is saved, while the other is not made predestined nor justified, but remains a reprobate for ever: they answer that the one, by the freedom innate to him, willed to use those same helps well and to persevere with them to the end, while the other did not, and that God foresaw this by that supereminent middle knowledge of his. If it is asked again whence it comes that the same prevenient grace is efficacious in one man and not in another, they answer that the one willed to use that same grace well and, by the freedom innate to him, to cooperate with it, whereas by that same freedom he could have not cooperated; but the other was unwilling to cooperate, and that God foreknew this by the same middle foreknowledge. And when they are pressed as to why God foreknew by that middle knowledge that one would cooperate and not the other, they answer that by the freedom of choice of each it was so to be in reality on the hypothesis that those men were placed by God in such an order of things and aroused and allured by such helps in such circumstances. And if the objection is put again, whence it comes that of two men prevented by equal helps of grace one is to consent, or to persevere to the end, and the other not, they answer that so it was to be according to the innate freedom of each, namely because one was going to will and the other was not going to will: and here they think that one must stop, and that no other reason is to be sought why this man was to consent with such helps and not the other. For they think that one must always answer, that so it pleased them, nor do they admit that the created will has another prior cause truly efficient of its cooperating, namely the efficacy of the divine will, to which, as to the first efficient cause, all things that are done in time must be traced back.
IIII. In what sense some understand that no cause of predestination is given.— And when it is objected against them, according to the sentence of St. Augustine, approved by many supreme Pontiffs and drawn from the most evident testimonies of the sacred Scriptures, that no cause, reason or condition without which it is not, of predestination is assigned on our part, but that it must be referred back to the mere and gratuitous will of God, who has mercy on whom he wills, and whom he wills he hardens; for which reason the Apostle says: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how incomprehensible are his judgments, and unsearchable his ways: they answer that the admiration of the Apostle tends only to this, that he signifies that no cause, reason or condition can be assigned on our part why God willed to call one man at that time and in those circumstances in which he foreknew by middle knowledge that he would consent and persevere on the hypothesis that he were aroused and allured by such grace; and that in the same sense the sentence of St. Augustine concerning gratuitous predestination is verified. Yet they say that this must be conceded, that there is given on the part of the good use of future free choice on a hypothesis a condition without which the will to confer the means to salvation would not obtain the formal character of predestination in comparison with this particular man, but would retain the common character of providence.
THIS ground of reconciliation remains sufficiently refuted by what has been said above. For it has been shown that that middle knowledge truly is not given even in God, as is clear from what was said in disp. 7. Hence, since the foundation of that reconciliation does not stand, it is necessary that the things built upon it collapse. It has also been shown that that interpretation of the Apostle's admiration does not agree with the doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, as is plain from what was said in disp. 37, no. 10, and disp. 110, no. 13. Moreover, an argument is brought against the same reconciliation: for it is of faith that divine foreknowledge, providence and predestination, and the efficacious helps of prevenient grace, in no way prejudice the freedom of our choice, but cohere with it: therefore the ground of that reconciliation neither ought nor can be reduced to that middle foreknowledge, which all the ancient Doctors deny, and which, in our view, it is certain is not given. The consequence is proved: for a matter of faith ought not to rest, nor can it rest, on a doubtful or non-existent foundation; otherwise faith itself would be doubtful: therefore it is necessary to defend and explain the reconciliation of free choice with grace and divine predestination without middle foreknowledge.
V. Augustine did not reconcile the infallibility of predestination with the freedom of choice through middle knowledge2.— Moreover there is an a posteriori argument pressing enough, by which it is shown that that manner of reconciling free choice with grace is not conformable to the doctrine of St. Augustine: for the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians3, as St. Augustine acknowledges, objected against him that he was an assertor of fate and overthrew the freedom of created choice, and led men into a kind of despair through the predestination and grace which he constantly taught in his books and defended in his disputations. But they would not have objected this to that holy Doctor, had he traced the reconciliation of free choice with predestination and grace to that middle knowledge; for if, on the part of the good use of future free choice foreknown by God through middle knowledge, he had somewhere assigned the difference on account of which, with equal helps on the part of God, one man is converted and saved because he willed it, while another persists in sin and is damned because he was unwilling to be converted, with what feigned colour could even the heretics, acute as they were, though most wicked, have objected to Augustine that he established fate and led men into a kind of despair? For Augustine would have had an easy solution and could have answered: I do not in fact introduce fate; for men, by the freedom innate to them, use the helps of grace well because they will to; while others do not use those same helps, nor are saved, because they will not. And the Apostle could have answered the same to those who object: What is there still to question? for who resists his will? And yet they do not answer so, but say: O man, who are you, that you answer God? O the depth of the riches. And: There is no iniquity with God, as we observed in disp. 110, no. 13, with the same Augustine: therefore, etc.
It is confirmed: for St. Augustine, in order to solve the arguments of the Pelagians against the predestination which he preached, never had recourse to middle foreknowledge, but rather refuted it, as was shown in disput. 7: therefore he understood that by that same foreknowledge the freedom of our choice cannot be reconciled with the infallibility of predestination and grace.
But they say that, if this ground of reconciliation had been proposed and explained to St. Augustine and St. Thomas, or if they had been consulted on the matter, they would at once have answered that predestination and reprobation were not made without foreknowledge of the good use of free choice: which would have tempered the harshness of the sentence on gratuitous predestination which they taught; but that they did not advert how much the addition of that middle knowledge would contribute to this, which they neither denied nor would have denied had they been consulted about it; and consequently that through that same middle knowledge they would have reconciled the freedom of our choice with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge and predestination. We however say that the holy Augustine and Thomas were not so slow of wit that that manner of reconciliation, which is founded on middle foreknowledge, never occurred to them, if by it the freedom of choice could be reconciled with the infallibility of divine predestination. Since, then, they nowhere had recourse to that middle foreknowledge, but to the omnipotence and efficacy of the divine will, which works all things in all according to the nature of each, it seems evident a posteriori that they judged that by that middle knowledge the freedom of choice cannot be reconciled with the efficacy of divine predestination and grace.
This reconciliation, and the foundations on which it rests, could be attacked by more arguments, which nevertheless we deliberately omit, since they have been abundantly attacked in the course of this whole work.
VI. The second ground of reconciliation is according to the sentence of Durandus, in 2 Sent., dist. 37, q. 1, asserting that no concurrence of the divine will is necessary for the actions of secondary causes, but that it is enough that God produced them into being, and afterwards conserves the natures themselves and their powers. Yet this sentence is false,4 and opposed to the sacred Scriptures and the holy Fathers, as the theologians commonly acknowledge: for it is said in Isai. 26: All our works you have wrought for us, O Lord. And 1 Co. 12: Who works all things in all. And Ephes. 1: Who works all things according to the counsel of his will. And Ioan. 5: My Father works even until now, and I work. And in Conc. Araus. 2, can. 9, it is said thus: As often as we do good, God works in us and with us, that we may work. Which St. Thomas also proves by many arguments, 3 cont. gen., ch. 67. Necessarily, therefore, it must be said that God not only produced secondary causes and conferred on them the powers to act, and conserves them in their being, but also moves and applies them to act, and together with them likewise produces his effects: on which more has been said in the preceding disputations. Hence by this doctrine the freedom of choice cannot be reconciled with the infallibility5 of divine predestination.
VII. A third ground of reconciliation is assigned by others. For they say that the divine cooperation holds on the side of the effect, not on the side of the cause, that is, that the concurrence of God does not determine our will, nor impresses or works anything in it, but flows immediately into the effect and produces it in that very moment in which it is produced by our will. From this they infer that God does not determine the will, nor the will God: for each freely applies its concurrence; and if one of them is unwilling to concur, the work will not be done; as when two men carry a huge stone which one man could not carry, for neither adds strength to the other, nor impels him, and it is free to each to let go of the burden: although God (unless he wills extraordinarily to work a miracle) will always concur when our will concurs, since he freely bound himself in a certain manner to this, when he created the free will. VIII. They infer secondly that, although at absolutely the same moment of time and of nature, God and the will begin to act, nevertheless God acts because the created will acts,6 and not conversely: and that this is what some say, that the will acts prior in nature to God, not by the priority of the instant in which, but of that by which. They attribute this manner of reconciliation to Gregory of Rimini, Scotus, and Gabriel, in 2 Sent., dist. 37.
Yet this manner of reconciliation also does not seem conformable to the doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, as is clear from what has been said above. For it was shown in disp. 18 that the general concurrence of God is an immediate influx into secondary causes, even free ones, and that it premoves and predetermines them to produce their effects naturally or freely or contingently, according to the manner of their own nature. It was shown also in disp. 22 and 23 that God, by his eternal, efficacious and absolute decree, antecedently to the foreknowledge of the future cooperation of created choice, predetermined all the good acts which are done in time by the created will, and especially those by which the predestined attain to eternal life. It was shown moreover in disp. 85 that God and free choice are not partial causes of the supernatural consent, like two men dragging a ship, of whom one does not move the other to concur, nor by his influx causes the other to concur with him. It was shown finally in disp. 99 and 100 that that causal statement is false: Because the will acts, therefore God acts; but that this one is true: Because God acts, the will cooperates. Since, then, no foundation whatever of this reconciliation seems to stand, it is necessary that the same reconciliation which has been built upon it collapse.
There is the further point that this manner of reconciling the freedom of choice with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence and predestination, and with the efficacy of the helps of grace, does not seem to preserve the predestination of God as altogether gratuitous and independent even, as it were, of a condition without which it is not, namely the future free cooperation of created choice, which is shown thus. For if God cooperates because man cooperates, then it is prior in the order of reason that God foreknow that free choice will cooperate, than that he will to concur with it by his grace to the pious operation, and to ordain him through such means to eternal life; and in consequence predestination, as regards all its effects, will be dependent, at least as on a condition without which it is not, on the good use of free choice foreknown by God. From which again it seems to follow that grace is the handmaid of free choice and obsequious to it, and in consequence that the same grace is given according to our merits, which no Catholic admits. Moreover it would also follow that efficacious grace, inasmuch as it is formally efficacious, or helping, is not prevenient, nor antecedent in the order of causality to the free cooperation of our choice, but is only simultaneous, or concomitant, and flows equally with that same choice into the pious operation; but this consequent, although it is admitted by the authors of this sentence, does not seem able to be conceded, as is clear from what has been said above on the efficacy of grace:7 therefore this manner of reconciliation is not to be admitted.
Disputatio CXXI: In which the legitimate harmony of free choice with the infallibility of divine predestination and the efficacy of the helps of grace is established and defended.
In which the legitimate concord of free choice with the infallibility of divine predestination, and with the efficacy of the helps of grace, is established and defended.
I. Once the concord which various doctors assign has been excluded, it remains for us to set out the legitimate concord of free choice with divine foreknowledge, providence and predestination, and with the efficacy of the help of divine grace, which St Augustine, St Prosper and St Hilary, St Anselm and the other Fathers, and among the Scholastic Doctors St Thomas and the Thomists, handed down; and since it is contrary to the concord founded in middle knowledge, it must of necessity rest upon contrary foundations as well.
Let the first foundation, then, be this: that it is not knowable, even by God, before the actual decree of his will — absolute on the part of the act of willing, and at least conditioned on the part of the object willed — what in particular a created will,1 out of its own innate freedom, would do, on the hypothesis that it were constituted in such an order of things and with such helps — not efficaciously predetermining it to either side — and were aroused, allured and invited. Whence it comes about that much less is it knowable, before that same efficacious decree — absolute even on the part of the object willed — what in particular is absolutely future from the freedom of choice and from the other contingent secondary causes. This foundation was established and proved, by the testimonies of St Augustine and St Thomas and by the common consent of the ancient Doctors and of the Thomists, in disputation 7. Wherefore the infallibility of predestination, and of the future cooperation of the created will, cannot be traced back to the foreknowledge of God as to its first root,2 but to his absolute and efficacious decree, by which he mercifully determined to work our works in us and with us, if they are good, or to permit them, if they are evil. And the same must be said proportionably of future conditioned contingents: for their truth depends also upon the free decree of the divine will, absolute on the part of the act of willing, although on the part of the object willed it is conditioned, by which God determined, a condition being posited, that certain future contingents should come about, which are expressly set forth in the sacred Scriptures: as is clear in the decree by which God determined to convert the Tyrians and Sidonians, if Christ had worked among them those signs which he worked in Chorazin and Bethsaida.
II. The second foundation is that there is no law established by God of infallibly giving the helps of prevenient grace to those who do all that lies in them from the powers of nature alone,3 but that they are bestowed, upon whomsoever they are bestowed, out of the mere and gratuitous mercy and liberality of God, so that on our part no good operation or disposition is presupposed, not only as that on account of which they are conferred, but even as that without which they would not regularly be given by God, and according to the common manner of calling men: for otherwise it seems to follow that grace comes after the human will, and does not go before it; and consequently it would also follow that grace is given according to our merits, as has been shown expressly in disputation 56. Whence it comes about that the infallibility of predestination cannot be founded upon any one or several good works morally foreknown by God, nor depend upon them, nor presuppose them on our part even as a condition without which men would not be predestined by God; but of necessity such infallibility, as we said in disputations 30 and 41, must be traced back to the mere and gratuitous will and good pleasure of God, according to that word of Matth. 11: Yes, Father, for so it has seemed good in your sight.
III. The third foundation is: the general concurrence of God is an immediate influx of God into secondary causes, by which they are premoved, applied and determined to act, each one according to the condition of its nature — the natural cause, indeed, naturally, but the free cause freely; which has been shown expressly in disputations 18 and 23; and this holds most of all true when the secondary causes are free and contingent. Whence it comes about that the first and the second cause concur to the same effect not as partial causes, of which one does not determine the other nor make it concur partially with itself — as when two men drag a boat — but each is a total cause in its own order, of which one, namely free choice, is subordinated to the other, namely God, not only in being but also in acting. Hence God by his divine motion brings it about that free choice cooperates with him freely, which we left proved also in disputation 85.
IIII. The fourth foundation is: God, by his eternal, absolute and efficacious decree, antecedently to all foreknowledge of the future cooperation of our choice, predetermined all good acts in particular, according to all their circumstances, and those especially by which the predestined attain to eternal life, with the freedom of our choice preserved; and in time he moves that same choice by an efficacious motion, so that it elicits those acts which God determined in his eternal counsel should come about; which has been shown most copiously through three whole disputations above.4 And from a decree of this kind of the will of God, as from its first root and cause, and from the efficacy of his motion, as from the instrument of God, it has its origin that free choice, moved and aroused by God, freely and infallibly works in time those acts which God predefined as future, through the free cooperation of that same choice. Hence St Augustine traces back the certainty of predestination, as regards the attainment of the effect, to the efficacy of the means or of the effects of predestination, by which they are most certainly delivered, whoever are delivered,5 and he traces back the foreknowledge of this infallibility, as to its first root, to the efficacious decree by which he determined mercifully to deliver his own, as has been shown in disputation 7 by many testimonies of the same Augustine. For he teaches that God foreknew these things for the reason that he decreed to do them.
V. Created freedom must be traced back to the efficacy of the divine will as to its first cause.— The fifth foundation, and one especially to be observed in this matter and kept before the eyes, is that all actual freedom and contingency which is found in human acts and in any other actions whatever must be traced back, as to its first root, to the efficacy of the divine will and to the infinite power of his omnipotence. For since, as St Thomas says,6 when some cause has been efficacious to act, the effect follows the cause, not only according to that which is done, but also according to the manner of being done or of being. For it is from the weakness of the active power in the seed that the son is born unlike his father in the accidents which pertain to the manner of being. Since therefore the divine will is most efficacious, it follows not only that those things come about which God wills to come about, but that they come about in the manner in which God wills them to come about. But God wills some things to come about necessarily and some contingently, so that there may be order in things for the completion of the universe. And therefore to some effects he adapted necessary causes, which cannot fail, from which effects proceed of necessity; but to others he adapted contingent and defectible causes, from which effects come about contingently. The effects willed by God do not therefore come about contingently because the proximate causes are contingent, but because God willed them to come about contingently, and prepared contingent causes for them: and he teaches the same in the same 1 p. q. 22, art. 4. Hence from the fact that God predetermined and willed that Peter be converted at such a time and with such intensity, it follows necessarily, with the necessity of the consequence and of infallibility, that Peter be converted with that same intensity and be converted freely; because God predefined and willed both. Nor does that necessity of the consequence, or from the supposition of the decree of the divine will, conflict with freedom, as was explained in disputation 25. And the same must be said of all other good acts; for as St Thomas says, 1. 2. q. 10, ar. 4, ad 1: The divine will extends not only to this, that something be done through the thing which it moves, but also that it be done in the manner which is fitting to its nature; and therefore it would conflict more with the divine motion if the will were moved by necessity, which does not suit its nature, than if it were moved freely, as suits its nature. Hence that word of St Anselm:7 Since what God wills cannot not be, when he wills that the human will be forced or prevented by no necessity in willing or not willing, and wills that the effect follow the will, then the will must needs be free, and that which it wills must come to be. From which words it is evidently clear that by the decree of the divine will the freedom of our will, or its actual use, is not taken away or impeded, but rather is perfected and caused. Whence we must not infer: God wills Peter to speak, therefore he will speak of necessity; but we must infer: therefore he will speak freely, because God willed that Peter himself speak freely.
VI. Predestination is certain with the certainty of order.— From these foundations it is inferred first that predestination is certain and infallible as regards the attainment of the effect, with the certainty of order and of the causality of the means, by which, as Augustine says, they are most certainly delivered, whoever are delivered,8 and as the Apostle says: that the promise may be firm according to grace.9 For since such certainty and infallibility cannot be drawn from middle knowledge, as has been shown above, it must needs be drawn from the absolute decree of the divine will and from the efficacy of the helps by which God willed to send his elect to eternal life, as has been shown in disputations 30 and 41.
It is inferred secondly that the infallibility of the future consent or effect of predestination, drawn from the absolute decree of the divine will and from the very efficacy of the helps of prevenient grace, in no way prejudices the freedom of that same choice, whether as regards the free power itself or as regards its actual use; but in a wondrous manner perfects and strengthens it: because, as has been said, God not only decreed that man should act, but also willed that he should act freely, and by his efficacious help predetermines the will of that same man to act freely. And the reason is that which St Thomas assigns, q. 24 de veritate, art. 1, in the body, and in several other places: namely, that man, through the free judgment of reason, which is indifferent to either side, is moved by God and moves himself. For he, judging of things to be done through the power of reason, can judge by his own free decision, insofar as he knows the reason of the end, and of that which is for the end, and the relation and order of the one to the other; and therefore he is a cause of himself not only in moving but also in judging; and therefore he is of free choice, as if one said of free judgment concerning acting or not acting; whence he is moved by God not only to act but also to act freely.
VII. The concord of choice with grace which St Augustine and St Thomas handed down.— It is inferred thirdly that just as the authors of the opposite opinion have recourse to middle knowledge in order to reconcile the freedom of choice with the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence and predestination, and with the efficacy of the helps of grace, so too we have recourse to the omnipotence and supreme efficacy of the divine will, and to the dominion which his divine majesty has over the wills of men, so as to make them incline whither and when he wills. And in this way we judge that the ancient10 concord of the freedom of created choice with the infallibility of predestination and the efficacy of the helps of grace is to be defended and explained according to the mind of St Augustine and St Thomas: as is sufficiently clear from what has been said in the course of this work, and from the passages of Scripture which refer to the divine will and omnipotence all the good things that are done in time. Whence St Augustine says:11 Divine Scripture, if it be diligently inspected, shows that not only the good wills of men, which he himself makes out of evil ones, and having made them good directs to good acts and to eternal life, are so in the power of God that he makes them incline whither and when he wills, either to bestowing benefits on some or to inflicting punishments on others, as he himself judges, with a most hidden judgment indeed, but without any doubt most just. He teaches the same in other passages adduced above, in which he proves that human wills cannot resist the will of God: and that God has the wills of men more in his power than they themselves have their own; not obscurely indicating that recourse must be had to the omnipotence of the will of God, who makes concord in the high places,12 in order to reconcile the freedom of created choice with the infallibility of predestination. To this St Thomas has recourse both in the passages alleged above and also in 2 Sent. dist. 25, q. 1, art. 2, ad 1, where he says that God works in the will, and in free choice, according to its exigency: whence even if he changes the will of man to something else, he nevertheless by his omnipotence brings it about that that to which it is changed it wills voluntarily, and so the character of compulsion13 is removed. Where St Thomas has recourse not to foreknowledge but to the omnipotence and supreme efficacy of the divine will, in order to reconcile the freedom of choice with divine providence and causality. The same is clear from what he says in 1 p. and 1. 2. in the passages alleged above.
Against this doctrine and account of the concord of free choice with divine predestination many arguments are brought forward, which have in part been touched upon and resolved in the preceding disputations; nevertheless in the present, for the greater clarity and explanation of the doctrine of St Augustine and St Thomas, a few must be set out and resolved.
VIII. The first argument is: for the concord which establishes the aforesaid predetermination in the created will, or the efficacious decree of the divine will antecedently to the foreknowledge of the future cooperation of our choice, does not seem able to be distinguished from the opinion of the heretics who deny free choice, except as to words. For the heretics do not deny that God acts freely when he determines our will, and that men have a full and perfect judgment of reason when they choose something, and choose spontaneously and voluntarily: but they say that all things are done by the decree and predetermination of God, nor can God decreeing and predetermining be resisted: and therefore that the free choice of man is a title without the thing, or a thing of title alone; that is, an empty and superfluous name. Therefore if we too admit that our will is so determined by God that it acts only that to which it is determined by God, and yet contend that, because God determines it freely and it acts voluntarily and with a full judgment of reason, man is of free choice, it follows that the whole controversy between us and the heretics is about a name: namely whether man is to be called of free choice or not. But this is not to be admitted, because the labors of so many most learned men, and of the Ecumenical Council itself, spent in asserting the freedom of choice, persuade us otherwise. For those most wise men were not ignorant of what St Augustine warned in ep. 28 to Jerome, and elsewhere: when the matter is settled, there must be no disputing about the name.
IX. Heretics depart from the Church not in all things, but in some.— So that the resolution of this argument may appear more evident, it must be carefully observed that heretics depart from the Church not in all things but in some, according to that word which the Psalmist speaks: For they were with me in many things:14 for heretics are with Catholics in many things indeed, but not in all; which St Augustine too, speaking against the Donatists, noted in these words:15 We both had baptism, they were with me in it: we both had the Gospel, they were with me in it: we celebrated the feasts of the martyrs, they were there with me: we frequented the solemnity of Easter, they were there with me. In schism not with me, in heresy not with me: in many things with me, in a few things not with me: but in these few things in which they are not with me, the many things in which they are with me do not profit them. Proportionably we say of Calvin that he withdrew not in all things, but in many, from the doctrine of the Catholic Church. Since therefore heretics teach false things mixed with true and true with false, one must cautiously discern, even in the very books of heretics, between leprosy and leprosy and sound skin, and the Catholic doctrine — not confounding both, but separating the true from the false: for it is written: If you separate the precious from the vile, you shall be as my mouth.16 Nor ought Catholics, nor can they, deny those things in which heretics do not depart from the Church, otherwise they could and should rightly condemn the Lord's Prayer; because Calvin asserted that it is to be recited and believed. X. Calvin therefore erred first,17 as one of the Doctors who wrote against him well noted, because he approved this most wicked consequence: The divine will is the first cause of all things; and it has already from eternity decreed what it wills or does not will to be done; therefore there can be no freedom of choice in man: for the first cause is most efficacious, and according to the Scriptures no one can resist the divine will. But we say on the contrary that the antecedent is indeed true, and taken from the sacred Scriptures, but that the consequence is bad and the consequent heretical: for, as St Thomas teaches,18 from the fact that the will of God is most efficacious, and no one can resist it, it rather follows that those things come about freely or contingently which he so willed to come about; because the divine will extends not only to this, that something be done through the thing which it moves, but also that it be done in the manner which is fitting to its nature.
Secondly Calvin erred: for he asserted19 that God so efficaciously moves and affects the will of man that it is afterwards not in our choice either to obey his motion or to resist it, as I said in disputation 3. But we say on the contrary that although God efficaciously moves free choice so that it is converted and acts piously infallibly and indeclinably, as Augustine and Thomas have very often taught, nevertheless our free choice can either obey the motion of God or resist it, and, as the sacred Council of Trent speaks, dissent from it, if it will.20 We add that although it cannot happen that these two things be true at once — namely that free choice be efficaciously moved by God to act piously, and that it not act — nevertheless these two are compossible at once: namely that free choice be efficaciously moved by God to pious acts, and that it be able not to perform those same acts, if it will; as has been said above: and therefore the will remains free in its operations.
Thirdly Calvin erred, because he said21 that God wills so to work in us by grace or efficacious motion, and to convert us to himself, that our choice does not freely obey prevenient grace with a following will. But we say with the sacred Council of Trent, St Thomas and all the holy Doctors that God indeed, by his efficacious prevenient grace, so converts us to himself, and works in us to will and to accomplish, according to his good will, that nevertheless our will, moved by God through efficacious prevenient grace, obeys and cooperates with God moving it, with a following will and with its own freedom. For just as God cooperates with man by going before him and moving him, so too our choice freely cooperates with the God who goes before it, by following after him, as Pope Gelasius taught, ep. 5 to all the bishops throughout Picenum, whose words have been several times adduced by us above.
Fourthly Calvin erred, because he posited grace to be efficacious of itself22 in such a way as to exclude moral motion, which is by counsels and persuasions, and to take away the free cooperation of the human will. But we say that efficacious grace includes, or presupposes, moral motion and persuasion, and that the same efficacious grace does not take away, but rather perfects, the freedom of choice.
Fifthly Calvin erred, and was impious and blasphemous against God, in that he said23 that men sin by the decree and will of God and by his providence, and that God is the cause and author of sin, and works evil works in us even as good works, not permissively only, but truly and properly. But we say on the contrary with the sacred Council of Orange and of Trent24 that God does not work evil works as he does good works, but only permits them; and that men sin by their own evil will alone, and not by any decree or providence of God. We distinguish nevertheless two things, with St Augustine and St Thomas, in evil works:25 one, that they are beings; the other, that they are evil; and the first we attribute to God, as to the first cause that acts per se:26 for every being by participation proceeds from the first being by essence, which is God. But the second we attribute only to the deficient secondary cause, namely the created will, which is defectible because it was produced from nothing.
Sixthly Calvin erred in that he said27 that our will, unless it be bent to good by the grace of God, is naturally inclined to evil. But we say with the holy Doctors Augustine and Thomas that our will is naturally inclined to good, as to its proper object, and has this inclination from the author of nature: but that it is bent to evil proceeds from the evil will itself, or from the suggestion of the devil.
These and other ravings against Catholic doctrine Calvin poured out, for which he was deservedly condemned with the other heretics by the Church in the Council of Trent, as is clear from the chapters and canons issued by that same Council; he did not, however, err in asserting that God, by the eternal decree of his will, which no creature can resist, predetermined all the good acts that are done in time, or efficaciously bends and moves the same will by his grace so that it infallibly performs such acts. For this word is not from Calvin but from Augustine, book on the gift of perseverance, chap. 6, saying: Nothing is done except what he either does himself or permits to be done. He is able therefore to bend wills from evil to good, and to convert those prone to fall, and to direct them into a step pleasing to himself. To whom it is not in vain said: You, God, being turned, will give us life.28
XI. These things being supposed, it is answered to the argument made that this our account of concord through the efficacious decree of the divine will is distinguished from the error of the heretics who deny free choice, not only as to words but also as to the thing itself, as heaven from earth. For although the heretics do not deny that God acts freely when he determines our will, and that men have a full and perfect judgment of reason when they choose something, and choose spontaneously, without compulsion; they nevertheless deny that man freely determines himself in the second act, as a true free cause of his act: they deny that he has a truly free judgment of reason when he chooses something: they deny, finally, that man chooses voluntarily, if voluntarily be taken as signifying the same as freely. And when the heretics themselves infer that therefore the free choice of man is a title without the thing, or a thing of title alone, from the fact that all things that are done in time are done by the decree of God, which cannot be resisted when it predetermines, they are most deceived in the drawing of the consequence and in the consequent itself, when from a Catholic antecedent they infer, by a most wicked consequence, a heretical consequent, as has been shown by us more at length above. I add that Catholics do not concede absolutely that created free choice cannot dissent from efficacious help, as the objector seems to suppose; but only with a diminishing addition, namely in the composite sense, because, as has been explained and proved above, these two cannot be true at once:29 God efficaciously moves free choice to consent; and free choice dissents.
The second argument is: for this account of reconciling the freedom of choice with grace is almost unintelligible, nor does it quiet our intellect; and on account of its difficulty the Pelagians denied the necessity of efficacious grace, while the Lutherans and Calvinists, admitting the efficacy of that same grace, took away freedom of choice from the midst. But the concord which rests upon middle knowledge lucidly and easily reconciles the freedom of choice with the infallibility of divine predestination and the efficacy of the helps of grace, and opens the way by which the Pelagians and Lutherans may return to the unity of the Church. Which concord, had it always been given and explained, perhaps neither would the Pelagian heresy have arisen, nor would the Lutherans have so impudently dared to deny the freedom of our choice, pretending that it cannot cohere with divine grace, foreknowledge and predestination, nor would so many of the faithful have been disturbed by the opinion of Augustine and by the contests with the Pelagians, and have defected to the Pelagians; and those relics of the Pelagians in Gaul, of whom mention is made in the letters of Prosper and Hilary, would easily have been extinguished; as is clear from those points in which those same letters testify that those men agreed with Catholics, and dissented from them; finally, the contests among Catholics would easily have been composed.
It is answered that, as has been said above,30 the account of the concord of free choice with grace cannot be perfectly known by man, for this state, or comprehended. Whence, although the concord assigned by us — indeed even by St Augustine and St Thomas — does not perfectly quiet the intellect, it is not therefore to be rejected, since it is clear from what has been said above that it is conformable to the testimonies of the sacred Scriptures and to the doctrine of the Councils.
But the clarity and facility which the concord founded in middle knowledge seems to display involve in reality many difficulties, which we have touched upon in disputation 7, indeed in almost the whole course of this work. Nor does a concord of this kind seem apt for resisting the Pelagians and Lutherans, as can be gathered from what has been said above. I add that the Pelagians did not deny the necessity of efficacious grace on account of the ancient concord handed down by Augustine, nor did the Lutherans take away freedom of choice from the midst on account of that same concord; but because they wished to be wise beyond what it is fitting to be wise, and to admit only a doctrine that quiets the intellect. Whence it was on account of their own obstinacy, and not on account of the contests of St Augustine with the Pelagians, that they fell away from the Catholic faith, and denied what is certain, because they could not comprehend what is hidden.
The third argument is: for men are led into a certain desperation, and lose heart, if it be said that it has already been established and determined by a divine decree altogether immovable, before every respect to the good or evil use of free choice foreknown by God through middle knowledge, who are to be brought into glory and who are not to be admitted. For by this doctrine an occasion is given to men to say: If it has already been settled concerning my salvation or damnation, whether I act badly or well, it cannot turn out otherwise; whatever I am now, such shall I finally be as God decreed that I should be; and so most men will be turned to torpor and sloth. Therefore the concord of free choice with the infallibility of predestination is not to be traced back to the efficacy of the decree of the divine will, but to middle knowledge: for in this way no occasion will be given to men to lose heart, but all will take care to conduct themselves strenuously in virtue, knowing that God has determined nothing by an immovable decree concerning their predestination or reprobation before he foreknew their good or evil use of free choice.
Predestination before foreseen merits does not lead men into desperation31.— To this argument, which was also formerly objected against St Augustine, answer has already been given several times above; and St Augustine expressly answers it in the book on the gift of perseverance, chap. 15, in these words: But they say, as you write, that no one can be aroused by the stings of correction, if it be said in the assembly of the Church, with many listening: Such is the definite sentence of the will of God concerning predestination, that some of you came to the faith from unbelief by receiving the will to obey, or remain in the faith by receiving perseverance; but the rest of you, who linger in the delight of sins, have not yet risen because the help of merciful grace has not yet raised you. Nevertheless, if there are any of you not yet called, whom his grace has predestined to be chosen, you will receive that same grace by which you may will, and be elect. And if any of you obey, if you are predestined to be cast out, the powers of obeying will be withdrawn, so that you cease to obey. When they say these things, they ought not so to deter us from confessing the grace of God, that is, the grace which is not given according to our merits, and from confessing the predestination of the Saints according to it: as we are not deterred from confessing the foreknowledge of God, if someone speaks of it to the people thus, saying: Whether you now live rightly or not rightly, you will afterwards be such as God foreknew you would be; good, if good; evil, if evil. For if, on hearing this, some are turned to torpor and sloth, and being prone from labor go after their concupiscences to lust, is it therefore to be thought that what has been said concerning the foreknowledge of God is false? Will they not, if God foreknew that they would be good, be good, in whatever malice they may now be engaged? But if he foreknew them evil, they will be evil, in whatever goodness they may now be seen? By these words Augustine confesses that it is indeed true that the predestined will infallibly be saved, and the reprobate will similarly infallibly be damned. But men ought not therefore to despair, or to relax their diligence in performing good works. Because, as we were saying above,32 the disposition of divine predestination does not have it that whatever the predestined man does, he attains eternal life, but that he is saved through good works, which are also predestined and preordained by God. On which account the Apostle Peter says: Brethren, be the more solicitous to make your calling and election certain through good works.33 Similarly the reprobate too will not be punished with eternal punishment except on account of the guilt which he has from himself, and not from the preordination of God. Whence to one of the reprobate it was said:34 Why is your countenance fallen? Will you not, if you do well, receive; but if you do evil, your sin will immediately be at the door?
Many other arguments are usually brought against our doctrine, which however need not be reported in the present, since they have been proposed and resolved in various disputations above. For some contend that by this concord the freedom of choice is destroyed, which we dissolved expressly in disputations 18, 22 and 23. Some strive to prove that the necessity of prayer and of correction is taken away by the same doctrine, of which we have treated abundantly in disputation 110. Others, finally, contend to show that our manner of concord makes God cruel, as we reported in disputations 37 and 38, in which places those things can be seen which, to avoid prolixity and the useless repetition of the same arguments, we deliberately omit.
Epilogue of almost everything said in the preceding disputations, containing twenty propositions.
I. In order that all things which have been said in this whole work may be more easily understood, it has seemed good to comprehend and touch upon them in brief in the following propositions. For I judged that this would be welcome to pious readers: for, as August. says, The same thing said in one way often moves; said in another way it does not move.1 Nor yet have I wished to recall2 all things that were said above, but only those which seem to look to a brief resolution.
Free choice was wounded and weakened by sin.— But for the full understanding of these things, two foundations, in which all agree, must be supposed.3 The one is that man's free choice was by original sin not only turned away from God, and stripped of original justice and of supernatural gifts, but was also wounded, weakened, and injured in natural goods. Caelestinus I. teaches this, epist. 1. ad quosdam Galliarum Episcopos cap. 4, and Innocentius I. in the epistle to the Council of Carthage, and the Council of Orange can. 1, condemning as Pelagian the man who says that by the offense of Adam's transgression man was not wholly, that is, in body and soul, changed for the worse, but that, with the freedom of the soul remaining unharmed, he holds only the body to be subject to corruption. The holy Council of Trent confirmed the same decree under anathema, sess. 5. decreto de pecc. origin. can. 2. and sess. 6. decr. de iustificat. cap. 1. in fine, where it says that free choice was by Adam's transgression weakened and inclined, though not extinguished. St. Thom. teaches the same 1. 2. q. 85. ar. 1, which he also proves from Luc. c. 10, where the man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, that is, into the downfall of sin, is stripped of gratuitous goods and wounded in natural goods, as Beda expounds.
Secondly, it must be supposed, from the doctrine of the same St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 85. ar. 3,4 that the free choice of man incurred, through the sin of the first parent, four wounds, according to the number of the powers of the soul which can be subject to virtues and vices: namely ignorance in the intellect, malice in the will, infirmity in the irascible, and concupiscence in the concupiscible. But because the will is the inclination of the whole man, human nature, as St. Thom. teaches 1. 2. q. 109. ar. 2. ad 3, is more corrupted by sin as regards the appetite for good than as regards the knowledge of truth; whence a man can know more things by himself, without the help of grace, than he can accomplish by the powers of nature. Hence St. August.5 says: I sighed, bound not by another's iron, but by my own iron will. The enemy held my will, and from it had made a chain for me, and had bound me fast. For from a perverse will lust was made; and while lust is served, custom is made; and while custom is not resisted, necessity is made; and by these, as by certain rings linked one to another (whence I called it a chain), a hard slavery held me bound.
Hence arose the inclination, or facility, to evil, of which it is written: The sense and thought of men are prone to evil from their youth,6 and the difficulty of embracing, and even of knowing, the good of reason. For it is said, Sapien. 9: We hardly guess the things that are on earth; and the things that are at hand we find with labour. In order, then, that free choice may be able to work works perfect and proportioned to its nature, it is necessary that it be healed and strengthened by grace; and further, it needs divine help in order to be raised to working supernatural works, which exceed the whole order and capacity of nature, as will become manifest in the following propositions, the contrary positions having been refuted in their place above.
On the powers of free choice, especially in fallen nature.
FIRST proposition. Man's free choice in fallen nature cannot, without the help of grace, produce a moral work7 which, in comparison with a natural end, is truly good and a work of true virtue: so that it is referred by the one working to God as to the last natural end, loved above all things simply.
True virtue cannot exist without grace.— St. August. teaches this lib. 1. retract. c. 3, where he retracts what he had said lib. 1. de ordine, namely that the philosophers, though not endowed with true piety, shone with the light of virtue; and lib. 4. contra Iulianum cap. 3, where by many testimonies of Scripture he manifestly shows that true virtue, even moral virtue, is not in anyone unless he is just; but it is impossible for anyone truly to be, or to become, just without the help of grace: for otherwise, as the Apostle argues,8 If justice is through the law, and through nature, then Christ died in vain;9 therefore without the help of grace there can be no true virtue, nor act of true virtue, even in comparison with a natural end.
St. Thom. teaches the same 2. 2. q. 23. artic. 7, where he shows that without charity there can be no true virtue; but charity10, even the natural charity by which God is loved above all things simply, cannot be had in fallen nature without the help of grace, as will appear below. And 1. 2. q. 65. ar. 2 he teaches that the moral virtues do not have the perfect and true character of virtue unless they are productive of good in order to a supernatural end; and in the solution to 1 he adds that, if moral virtue be taken according to the perfect nature of virtue, it makes the one who has it good, and consequently cannot exist together with mortal sin. Moreover it is proved. True virtue is that which makes the one who has it good, and his act good; but moral virtue without charity does not make the one who has it truly good, even in comparison with a natural end, nor his act truly good: for it is said, 1. Cor. 13: If I distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I deliver my body so that I burn, and have not charity, it profits me nothing. Since, then, charity cannot be had without the help of grace, it remains that by the powers of nature alone a fallen man cannot perform any work of true virtue, in the sense explained, even in comparison with a natural end. It is confirmed. It is impossible that a man be turned away and disordered from a supernatural end, and that he be converted to God as to the last natural end, and rectified in his will in respect of that same end; but without the help of grace he cannot elicit any work that is truly good and a work of true virtue in comparison with the last supernatural end: therefore neither in comparison with the last natural end.
II. Second proposition. Man by the powers of nature alone cannot assent to all the supernatural mysteries proposed and explained to him, as revealed by God, or because they have been revealed by God: namely, so that the formal reason of believing be the divine revelation.
To assent to supernatural mysteries as revealed by God, man cannot without the help of grace.— This proposition is proved from sacred Scripture, ad Philip. 1:11 To you it is given not only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him. And ad Eph. 2: By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves; for it is the gift of God. And 1. Cor. 4: What have you that you have not received? By which testimony especially, together with the explanation of Cyprian, Aug. confesses lib. de praedest. Sanctor. cap. 3 that he was convinced to retract the opinion by which, before his episcopate, he asserted that faith is not a gift of God, but is in us from ourselves. For the Apostle, in order to comprehend even faith itself, says absolutely: What have you that you have not received? etc. But what faith is, and what is conducive to salvation.
Secondly it is proved from the Council of Orange, 2. can. 7, where it is defined that man, by the vigour of nature, cannot consent to the Gospel preaching without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit. And in the Council of Trent, sess. 6. can. 3. de iustificat., he is anathematized who has said that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and his help, man can believe as is fitting, etc. But he who assents to all supernatural mysteries as revealed by God undoubtedly believes as is fitting: for he believes on account of the divine revelation as on account of the formal reason, as the Christian faith believes. For the heretic or the unbeliever does not assent to the mysteries of faith on account of the divine revelation as on account of the formal reason, but on account of other motives, or human reasons, and therefore he does not believe with a divine faith, certain and infallible on the part of the formal reason of believing, but with a human and fallible one, and so he does not believe as is fitting for salvation. And to exclude this human faith the Councils added that particle, as is fitting. It is confirmed: for, as is gathered from St. Thom. 2. 2. q. 1. ar. 1, and q. 5. ar. 3. in corp. and ad 1, in this Christian and human faith are distinguished, that the divine or Christian faith rests upon the first truth revealing as upon the formal reason; but human faith rests upon human testimony as upon the formal reason of believing, or upon another human motive. From which again follows another difference, that the Christian faith is certain and infallible on the part of the formal reason of believing, because namely it rests upon an infallible and indefectible formal reason, namely the first truth revealing, which can neither be deceived nor deceive; but human faith is fallible and defective, because it rests upon a fallible foundation, namely human testimony: therefore the assent by which someone assents to all supernatural mysteries as revealed by God, and because they have been revealed by God, is an assent of Christian faith, and such as is fitting for salvation; it cannot therefore be had from the powers of nature alone.
Thirdly it is proved from August. lib. de dono perseverantiae cap. 17, where he proves that faith is a gift of God, from that passage of Eph. 6: Peace to the brethren, and charity from God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ: for he says: From whom, then, are peace and charity, from him also is faith; on which account we ask from him that it be increased in those who have it, and that it be given to those who have it not. And cap. 9, for the same opinion he cites St. Cyprian, St. Ambrose, and Gregory Nazianzen; and cap. 20: What, he says, does God first and chiefly command us, but that we believe in him? And this therefore he himself gives, if it was well said to him: Give what you command. The same he teaches in the whole book de praedestin. Sanctor., especially c. 2. 3. 6. and 9, and epist. 105, and the two following, and tom. 3. lib. de Spiritu et littera cap. 31, where he says: For what is it to believe, but to consent that what is said is true? and a little after he adds: For even that we may believe, God has given. Which he proves by the authority of the Apostle, 1. Corinth. 4: What have you that you have not received? And in chapters 32 and 33 he confirms the same thing.
Fourthly it is proved from St. Thom. 2. 2. q. 6. ar. 1, where he says: For man's assent to the things which are of faith, besides those things which outwardly lead to faith, it is necessary to posit another interior cause, which moves man inwardly to assent to the things which are of faith. And at the end of the body he thus concludes: And therefore faith, as regards the assent, which is the principal act of faith, is from God moving inwardly through grace.
Fifthly. For the act of faith is the beginning of our justification, as the Council of Trent teaches, sess. 6. cap. 8. de iustificat., from the Apostle, ad Rom. 5: Being justified therefore by faith. Therefore if the act of faith is had from the powers of nature alone, the beginning of our salvation would be from nature, or from ourselves, which is not to be admitted.
III. The beginning of faith is from God.— Third proposition. Not only faith itself, but also the first beginning of faith, proceeds from the help of grace, and not from the powers of nature alone. It is had as defined in the Council of Orange, can. 5, where, from the authority of the Apostle, ad Philip. 1,12 He who began in you a good work will perfect it, etc., it concludes that the beginning of faith is from the gift of grace. And St. August. lib. de praedestin. Sanctor. c. 2 says: And so the very beginning of our faith, from whom is it, if not from him? For it is not with this one exception that the rest are from him; but from him, and through him, and in him are all things;13 which he proves there by many testimonies of Scripture, especially from that of 2. Cor. 3: We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God. But to think is prior to believing; therefore, according to the Apostle, the first beginning of faith is not from ourselves, but from God. The same he teaches cap. 20.
Secondly it is proved by the reasoning of St. August. cap. 2. de praedest. Sanctor. For if man from the powers of nature begins to believe, so that God by his gift may increase and perfect faith itself, it follows that the grace by which faith is perfected is given according to our merits: For who would say that he who has begun to believe merits nothing from him in whom he has believed? Whence the same August. lib. contra duas epist. Pelag. c. 8 says: Perhaps, then, they themselves in that way at least preserve a place for grace, so that they think that without it man can have the desire of good, but of imperfect good; but that he cannot more easily have that of perfect good through it, but that without it he cannot at all; yet even so they say that the grace of God is given according to our merits.
Thirdly it is proved by the reasoning of the same St. Augustine, lib. de praedestin. Sanctor. cap. 2, near the end: for if the beginning of faith is not from grace but from nature, it follows that faith itself, increased and perfected, is not from grace but from nature. The words of August. are: But why is it not wholly attributed to man, that he who could establish for himself what he did not have, may himself increase what he has established? I do not see at all, unless because no resistance can be offered to the most manifest testimonies, by which faith also, from which piety takes its beginning, is shown to be a gift of God.
IV. Man in fallen nature cannot love God above all things without the help of grace.— Fourth proposition. Man's free choice in fallen nature cannot, without the help of grace, love God above all things simply,14 even as he is the author of nature. It is proved from the Council of Milevis, can. 4, where it is defined that both are a gift of God: both to know what we ought to do, and to love, that we may do it. And in the Council of Orange, 2. can. 25 it is said: It is altogether a gift of God to love God. And in the Council of Trent, sess. 6. de iustif. can. 3 he is anathematized who has said that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and his help, man can love as is fitting, etc. But the love of God above all things simply is as is fitting for salvation, since mortal sin, or aversion from God, is not compatible with it, as was said in proposition 2. For that particle, as is fitting, was added in the Council to distinguish it from imperfect love, by which the sinner loves God insofar as he preserves him, or on account of some other human motive, but not on account of his goodness, nor above all things simply.
Secondly it is proved from sacred Scripture, ad Rom. 5: The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us. And 1. Ioan. 4: Charity is of God.
St. August. teaches the same, epist. 107. ad Vitalem: We have lost, he says, free choice for loving God, by the greatness of the first sin: that is, we have lost the power of loving God above all things simply from the mere capacity of nature. And lib. de gratia et libero arbitrio cap. 18: If the love of God and of neighbour is not from God but from men, the Pelagians have conquered; but if it is from God, we have conquered the Pelagians. And St. Prosp. lib. cont. collatorem, cap. 30: So great, he says, according to this man is the soundness, or the capacity, of free choice, that charity, which stands in the citadel of all the virtues, he holds not from the gift of God but from the will alone. Which he attacks there by many testimonies of Scripture.
Secondly it is proved from St. Thomas 1. 2. q. 100. ar. 10. ad 3, where he says that the precept of charity is not fulfilled without grace. And he speaks also of the precept of charity, to which man is obliged by the law of nature; and q. 109. art. 3. in corp. he says thus: Man in the state of integral nature did not need the gift of grace superadded to natural goods in order to love God naturally above all things, although he needed the help of God moving him to this; but in the state of corrupt nature man needs even for this the help of grace healing nature.
If it be said that sacred Scripture, the Councils, and the Fathers speak of supernatural love, but not of the merely natural love by which God is loved above all things simply; on the contrary: for Pelagius, whom the Councils and sacred Scripture condemn, never taught that the love which he himself established as from the powers of nature alone was supernatural, but he said absolutely that the love of God above all things, and the absolute purpose of never sinning, can be had simply from the powers of nature; and yet the Councils and the holy Fathers, especially Aug. and Prosper, condemn this assertion of his: therefore.
It is confirmed: for Pelagius asserted that the love of God above all things can be had from the powers of nature alone: therefore he was speaking of merely natural love. The consequence is plain: for love proceeding from the powers of nature alone is merely natural: therefore the Councils, which determine against Pelagius that man cannot from the powers of nature alone love God above all things, speak also of the natural love by which God is absolutely loved above all things. To this is added that St. Thom., in the place cited above, speaks expressly of natural love.
V. Fifth proposition. Man in fallen nature cannot, without the help of grace, fulfill all the precepts, even of the natural law, or overcome any great difficulty and temptation, for any period even a short one,15 which it is necessary to overcome in order to observe that same law. It is proved from the Councils and Fathers adduced in the preceding proposition: for the precept even of the natural law, of loving God above all things simply, man cannot keep in fallen nature without the help of grace, as was shown in that same proposition.
Greater temptations cannot be overcome without the help of grace.— It is proved secondly: for St. Augustin. epist. 106. ad Paulinum reports that it was a condemned assertion of Pelagius, that our victory is not from the help of God but from free choice; and in the same place he teaches: that every faithful man is bound to confess that when we fight against temptations and illicit desires, although we have free will there also, yet our victory comes not from it, but from the help of God: therefore, etc.
Thirdly it is proved: for Innocentius I. in the epistle to the Council of Carthage says: With us, to resist, it is not free choice but the help of God alone that can effect it. And Caelestinus I. epist. 1. cap. 6 defines that no one, even one renewed by the water of baptism, is fit to overcome the snares of the devil and to conquer the desires of the flesh, unless through the daily help of God he has received perseverance in good conduct: and this is understood of the graver temptations that occur, for any period, however short, which, on account of the infirmity of nature, man cannot overcome unless he is helped by grace. Whence St. Prosp. lib. cont. collat. capit. 33 and 35 sharply reproves Cassian because he said that not from the grace of God but by his own powers Job overcame the temptations of the devil: But grace only prevented the most violent enemy from making his soul demented and deprived of sense, and from making it unequal to himself, and from weighing it down with the iniquitous weight of the contest.
On man doing what is in him from the powers of nature alone.
VI. Sixth proposition: There is no law, nor was one ever established by God, of giving the actual helps of prevenient grace to those who do all that is in them from the mere capacity of nature,16 nor did Christ the Lord merit, or will, that there be such a law.
No law has been established by God of giving the helps of grace to those who use well the goods of nature.— This is St. August. lib. 1. quaest. ad Simplicianum, near the end, at the verse For you have not, etc., where he teaches that God often leaves men in unbelief who apply themselves to good moral works from the capacity of nature, and calls to the faith others who are corrupt in morals, most wicked, and the greatest of sinners. Aug. holds, then, that there is no law established by God concerning the giving of the helps of grace to those who do what is in them from the capacity of nature. Likewise also lib. 1. contr. duas epist. Pelag. cap. 8 he says: For if without the grace of God the desire of good begins through us, that very beginning will be a merit, to which, as by debt, the help of grace comes; and so the grace of God will not be given freely, but our merit will be given.17 By which words he teaches that the operations preceding grace, proceeding from the capacity of nature alone, on which being posited grace is given, are some beginning of that same grace, and some merit of it: which he also teaches more at length lib. de praedest. Sanctor. cap. 2. Therefore St. Aug. understood that there is no such law; otherwise the same act, begun from the powers of nature, would be infallibly elevated by God through grace inserting itself, and would become supernatural and such as is fitting for salvation; and so the beginning of grace would be from us, which nevertheless St. Augustine always condemned in the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians.
This is St. Prosper's lib. contra collatorem cap. 4. 5. and 6, where he attacks that assertion of Cassian: He who, when he has looked upon a certain beginning of good will in us, straightway enlightens it, and strengthens it, and stirs it to salvation, giving increase to that which either he himself planted, or saw to have emerged from our effort. St. Prosper holds, then, that no law has been established by God of conferring on those who do what is in them from the powers of nature alone the helps of prevenient grace, by which acts begun through nature may become such as is fitting for salvation. And cap. 6 St. Prosper adds: But how do you not notice that you fall into that condemned position which, whether you will or not, you are convicted of asserting, that the grace of God is given according to our merits, when you affirm that something of good work precedes from the men themselves, on account of which they obtain grace? For the faith of the one asking, the piety of the one seeking, the insistence of the one knocking, cannot be held to be of no merit, especially since all such are said both to receive, and to come, and to enter. He holds, then, that grace is given according to our merits, if it be asserted that God confers it by law infallibly on those who do all that is in them from the powers of nature alone, by asking, seeking, knocking, etc. Whence lib. de vocat. gent. c. 9 he says: It remains altogether, and is daily fulfilled, that the Lord promised to Abraham without condition, and gave without law. The same is the opinion of St. Thom. 1. 2. q. 112. ar. 3. in corp., where he teaches that preparation, if it be considered as it is from free choice, has no necessity with respect to the obtaining of grace. And the same he teaches q. 109. ar. 6. ad 2, where he explains that text, To the one doing what is in him God does not deny grace, as concerning the one doing what is in him when moved by divine help; and he delivers the same explanation super caput undecimum ad Roman. Lect. 3. circa medium, which passage is notable, and must necessarily be seen. And 3. cont. gen. c. 149 throughout, especially rat. 1 and 3, he proves that man cannot merit divine help, nor even obtain it by his own power; for thus he says in the first reason: Man does not move himself to this, that he may obtain the divine help which is above him, but rather he is moved by God to obtain it. But the motion of the mover precedes the motion of the moved in reason and in causality: therefore the divine help is not given to us on this account, that we are advanced to it by good works, but rather we therefore profit by good works, because we are preceded by divine help. But if the aforesaid law had been established by God, man by his own power would obtain the help of prevenient grace, by doing all that is in him from the powers of nature alone.
Moreover: for, as St. Thomas says 2. 2. quaest. 80. in corp., a legal debt is that to whose payment someone is bound by law: therefore if God bound himself by his law to give the helps of prevenient grace to those who do what is in them from the capacity of nature, such helps would be owed to them according to law, and so grace would not be grace, because it would be given not freely but by debt. For it is said ad Roman. 4: To him who works the reward is not imputed according to grace, but according to debt. And cap. 11: But if by grace, it is now not of works; otherwise grace would not be grace.
Nor is it enough to answer that prevenient grace is given by law to those who do what is in them, not indeed on account of their merits, which are nothing without grace, but on account of the merits of Christ the Lord: for this does not commend, but rather obscures, the infinite merits of Christ, since it is nothing else than to merit that his grace should not be grace but a wage.
From this it follows that man cannot from the powers of nature alone ask for or desire the help of grace, but it must necessarily be said that such a desire proceeds from the help of prevenient grace, otherwise the beginning of grace would be from us. For Augustine says, in the book de corrept. et gratia, chapter 1: But who flees to grace, unless when the steps of man are directed by the Lord, and he wills his way? And by this, even to desire the help of grace is the beginning of grace: And I said, now I have begun: this is the change of the right hand of the Most High. And in the Council of Orange, canon 6, it is defined: If anyone says that the mercy of God is conferred from on high upon us who believe, will, desire, strive, labour, watch, study, ask, seek, knock, without the grace of God; but does not confess that it is brought about in us, that we may believe, will, or be able to do all these things as is fitting, by the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, etc., he resists the Apostle saying: What have you that you have not received?18 and by the grace of God I am what I am.19
On the comparison of grace and free choice with one another.
VII. Helping grace is prevenient.— Seventh proposition. God by his helping grace flows into free choice, premoving it20 that it may cooperate, and likewise truly and efficiently causes, together with that same free choice, its pious operation. And so the divine operation does two things. The first is to move free choice efficaciously, that it may work. The other is to cooperate together with that same choice, and to produce truly efficiently the free act. And indeed that God by a simultaneous concurrence produces efficiently, together with free choice, its pious operation in itself, all Catholic Doctors confess against Durandus, and it is established from what was said in disputation 18, especially number 11, and disputation 24, number one. But that he also precedes free choice by moving it, that it may consent,21 is proved by the authority of Pope Gelasius, epistola 5. ad universos Episcopos per Picenum, where he speaks thus:22 The Teacher of the Gentiles cries out, briefly summing up all gifts in himself: By the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace in me was not in vain:23 that he might show that he himself did not precede the gift of grace, but followed after it, and might declare that he was a cooperator with grace, by following after it. If, then, free choice cooperates with grace by following after it, then helping grace cooperates with that same choice by preceding it and moving it.
Secondly it is proved from the Council of Trent, sessione 6. de iustificatione cap. 5, at the verse through his arousing and helping grace, etc., where it divides prevenient grace into arousing and helping. It holds, then, that helping grace, as it is helping, is prevenient.
Thirdly it is proved from St. Augustine, epistola 107. ad Vitalem, where he says that this was his chief question with Pelagius concerning the grace of God:24 Whether this grace precedes or follows the will of man; that is, whether it is given to us because we will, or whether through it God also brings it about that we will. For Pelagius asserted that it is given because we will; but St. Augustine contended that through it God brings it about that we will. Whence, book 3. Hypognost. after the middle, he says: In every holy work, therefore, the will of God is prior and the will of free choice posterior: that is, God works, man cooperates. But if you say, as you have been accustomed to say, that I willed first and then God willed, you make it a merit, so that grace is from works, and is now not grace but a wage. And St. Prosper, in the epistle to Augustine, at the verse whence because in these, says: The beginning of salvation is badly placed in man, if the human will is impiously preferred to the divine will, so that someone is helped because he willed, and not rather wills because he is helped. Since, then, St. Augustine and St. Prosper contend against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians that free choice wills because it is helped by God, it is evident that they hold that helping grace, as it is helping, precedes the free cooperation of the choice, not indeed in time, but only in the order of reason and of causality.
Finally it is proved from St. Thom. 1. 2. q. 111. ar. 2. in corp., where he divides the divine help, by which he moves us to will and to act well, into operating and cooperating grace. He holds, then, that God through cooperating, or helping, grace moves free choice to act, and consequently that he is prevenient insofar as he premoves that same choice to work.
VIII. God does not await man's consent.— Eighth proposition. After God by his arousing grace knocks at and touches the hearts of men,25 he does not await that the will itself, from its own innate freedom, begin its movement by consenting; but God through helping grace brings it about that it consents freely and infallibly. It is proved from the Council of Orange, 2. can. 4: If anyone contends that God awaits our will, that we may be cleansed from sin, etc. And the Council understands that he does not await man's free consent, even after he has aroused it: for it proves that he does not await it, because by the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit he brings it about that we will to be cleansed.
It is proved secondly from St. Aug. epist. 107, near the end: How, he says, does God await the wills of men, that they may precede him, to whom he gives grace; when we not undeservedly give him thanks for those whom, not believing in him and with impious will persecuting his doctrine, he beforehand bestowed mercy, and converted to himself with most almighty ease, and made willing out of unwilling; to what purpose do we give him thanks for this, if he himself did not do it? Here Aug. speaks of efficacious grace, by which God makes the unwilling willing: for his controversy with Pelagius, at least his principal one, was about this grace; as was shown in disput. 99. nu. 2. Since, therefore, God through that grace truly and efficiently brings it about that we will to be cleansed, it remains that even after he has aroused us he does not await our will, that we may will to be cleansed; but that God himself works the very willing in us, and with us, that we may work, as is said in Conc. Araus. can. 9.
IX. Grace and free choice are not two partial causes of the pious operation26.— Ninth proposition. Helping grace and free choice are not partial causes of the supernatural consent,27 as two men drawing a ship, such that neither is premoved by the other, or brings it about that the other cooperates with itself. It is proved from the passages of the Councils and Fathers cited in the two preceding propositions. Moreover St. Th. teaches this expressly, 4. con. Gen. c. 7. n. 16, where he says that when two agents partially draw a ship, because the power of each is imperfect and insufficient for that effect, from the different powers one power of them all is gathered together, which suffices to draw the ship. By which words he signifies that causes concurring partially are imperfect, and therefore that out of the two one integral and total cause is constituted: but it is impossible that the divine causality be imperfect: therefore. The same28 proposition is taught by St. Aug., St. Ans., St. Bernar., and the other Fathers, whose testimonies we adduced in disp. 85. n. 3. and disp. 62. n. 2.
On the foreknowledge and gratuitous predestination of God.
X. Middle knowledge is not to be posited29.— Tenth proposition. Middle knowledge is not to be posited in God,30 by which, before the actual decree of his will, he should know what a created choice would do from its own innate freedom, if it were placed in such an order of things; or if by such and such a supernatural excitation it were invited and allured even interiorly: but all foreknowledge of the future cooperation of the choice, even on the hypothesis aforesaid, presupposes in the sign of reason the free decree of the divine will, by which he wills absolutely, or on that hypothesis given, to effect that operation in us, and with us, if it is good; or to permit it, if it is evil. It is proved from sacred Scripture, in which it is asserted that nothing will be future unless God wills it to be. Apoc. 4: You have created all things, and for your will they were, and were created. Sap. 11: But how could anything remain, unless you had willed it? ad Eph. 1: Who works all things according to the counsel of his will: therefore before the aforesaid decree nothing is, or can be understood as future, even on any hypothesis whatever.
Secondly it is proved from St. Aug. in Ench. ad Laur. c. 95, where he says: Nothing, therefore, is done unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it to be done, or by doing it himself, etc. And to whom beyond doubt it is as easy to do what he wills, as it is easy not to permit to be what he does not will: and more expressly lib. de praed. SS. c. 14, explaining that text of Sap. 4, He was taken away, lest malice should change his understanding, he says: This was said according to the perils of this life, not according to the foreknowledge of God, who foreknew this, that it was to be, not that it was not to be, that is, that he was to bestow on him an untimely death, that he might be withdrawn from the uncertainty of temptations: not that he was to sin, who was not to remain in temptation. And lib. 1. de anim. et eius orig. c. 12, arguing against those who said that God permitted many infants to depart in original sin because he foreknew that they would be wicked if they lived, he says: Foreknowledge itself is wholly emptied, if what is foreknown shall not be. For how is it said to be foreknown as future, which is not future?
Moreover; for this middle, or conditioned, foreknowledge was impugned by St. Prosper and St. Hilary. For St. Prosper, epist. to Aug., says: But they subject the election of God to any feigned merits whatever to such an extent that, because they fashion past things which do not exist, and future things which are not to be future, and by a new kind of absurdity among them both things not to be done are foreknown, and things foreknown are not done. And St. Hilary, in his epistle to Aug., recalls the same thing, saying: But when it is said to them, why is it preached to others, or somewhere, or not preached, or now preached, which at some time was preached to almost all, as now it is not preached to some nations, they say that this belongs to the divine foreknowledge: that at that time, and there, and to those, the truth should be announced, or is announced, when, and where, it was foretold that it must be believed. And this they testify that they prove not only by the testimonies of other Catholics, but also by the older disputation of your holiness. For the Massilians attributed the aforesaid knowledge of conditioned things, preceding every free decree of the divine will, to Augustine. Answering them, St. Aug. in the book de praed. SS. teaches that the foreknowledge of the future cooperation of the choice follows upon the decree by which God predestined that men should consent to God calling. For c. 10 he says: By predestination indeed God foreknew the things which he himself was to do. Whence it is said: He made the things that are to be. And explaining that text of ad Rom. 4, Because whatever he has promised, he is able to do, he says: He did not say to foretell, he did not say to foreknow: for he can foretell and foreknow even the deeds of others, but he said: He is able to do, and by this they are his own deeds, not another's. And c. 19 he adds: When therefore he predestined us, he foreknew his own work, who makes us holy and immaculate. The same he says lib. de dono persev. c. 14, at the verse Or will anyone dare to say, and c. 18, at the verse: Of no one, therefore.
This is also the express opinion of St. Th., who establishes in God only a twofold knowledge, namely that of simple understanding, by which he knows all possible things, and the knowledge of vision, by which he knows the things that exist in some difference of time; as 1. p. quaest. 14. artic. 9. in corp., 3. p. q. 10. art. 2. ad 2, and in several other places adduced in disp. 6. num. 5. To this is added that the holy Doctor, 1. part. quaest. 14. artic. 13. in corp., teaches that concerning a future contingent, as it is in its contingent cause, no knowledge can be had except a conjectural one. And the same he teaches q. 57. a. 3, and q. 86. a. 3. in corp. and ar. 4. also in corp., and q. 16. de malo artic. 7. He holds, therefore, that before the decree of the divine will determining the future contingent to one of the two sides, it is not knowable with certainty, even by God.
XI. No cause of predestination is given on our part.— Eleventh proposition. No cause, reason, or condition is given on our part31 on account of which the divine providence, supernatural in comparison with this man or that, obtains the formal reason of predestination, or retains the common reason of providence: but predestination itself must be reduced to the sole gratuitous will of God. It is proved from sacred Scripture, ad Rom. 9: For when they were not yet born, or had done anything good or evil, (that the purpose of God according to election might remain) it was said to her, not by works, but by him who calls: the elder shall serve the younger, as it is written, Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated. And again: It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy. And ad Roman. 11: The remnant, according to the election of grace, has been saved. And Ephes. 1: Who has predestined us unto the adoption of children, according to the purpose of his will, unto the praise of the glory of his grace. And a little after: In whom we also are called by lot, predestined according to the purpose, which must be understood of the gratuitous purpose of God's will, not of the purpose of man foreknown by God, as is most plainly established by the common consent of the ancient Fathers, especially Aug. lib. 2. contr. duas epist. Pelag. c. 9, and lib. de correp. et grat. c. 7. And Mat. 11: Yes, Father, for so it was pleasing before you. The same is the opinion of St. Aug. q. 2. ad Simplic. and lib. de praedestin. Sanct. c. 15. 16. and 17, at the verse He foreknew, therefore, says the Pelagian, and epist. 106, where in support of this doctrine he presses the passage adduced by the Apostle ad Rom. 9. The same he confirms in almost all his books written against the Pelagians. The same opinion is taught by St. Thomas, 1. par. quaest. 23. art. 5, and 3. contra Gentes cap. 163, and quaest. 6. de veritate artic. 2, and on cap. 15 of John, Lect. 5, and on Roman. 9, Lect. 2, and on Eph. 1, Lect. 1, in which places he affirms that the foreknowledge of merits is not the cause of predestination as regards its whole effect. And St. Thomas intends to exclude also the condition without which it does not happen, and merits proceeding not only from the powers of nature but also from the help of grace, as was seen in disp. 110. n. 12. and 13. And reasoning convinces this: for since all the merits by which the predestined attain to eternal life are effects of the divine predestination, they cannot be its cause as regards its whole effect.
XII. God has predetermined all things by an absolute decree.— Twelfth proposition. God, by the absolute and efficacious decree of his will, antecedently to the foreknowledge of the future good use of free choice,32 has predetermined all the good acts which are done in time, and especially those through which the predestined attain to eternal life. It is proved from sacred Scripture, in the passages adduced in proposition 10. Moreover it is proved by other authorities of Scripture and of the holy Fathers, especially St. Dionysius the Areopagite, St. Anselm, St. Damasc., St. August., St. Thom., and other Doctors, whose testimonies I have adduced in disp. 22. n. 28. and following. Let St. Th. be consulted, quodlib. 12. q. 3. ar. 4, where he says that all things have been predetermined and ordered by the providence of God. And the same he says on cap. 5 of Dionys. de divin. nomin. Lect. 3, and 1. p. q. 19. ar. 3. ad 5, and q. 116. ar. 1. 3. and 4.
XIII. The cooperation of free choice with grace is an effect of predestination.— Thirteenth proposition. The cooperation of free choice with the gifts of grace is in the predestined an effect of predestination,33 and proceeds efficiently from God, who by the help of grace brings it about that we cooperate freely; and consequently it does not depend on the sole and innate freedom of the choice. It is proved from Caelest. Pap. epis. ad Episc. Gall. c. 7, where he teaches that no one, except through Christ, uses free choice well.
Secondly it is proved from St. Aug. lib. de dono persev. c. 14, saying: For if we are to glory in nothing, since nothing is ours; surely neither are we to glory in the most persevering obedience; nor is it so to be called ours as if it were not given to us from above. And lib. 1. retract. c. 9 he says: And because all good things, as has been said, both great and middling and least, are from God; it follows that from God also is the good use of free will, which is a virtue and is numbered among great goods. And in book 2. de peccat. merit. et remiss. cap. 18: But men labour to find in our will what good is ours, which is not ours from God; and how it can be found I do not know. And a little after, from those words of the Apostle, What have you that you have not received?, he proves that the good use of choice is not from us but from God. And St. Prosper, contra collatorem, definit. 11, says: Impious is the sense which thinks that man happier, to whom God has given nothing, than him to whom he has conferred all things.
Thirdly it is proved from St. Thomas, 1. par. q. 23. a. 5. in corp., where he shows that the good use of grace is from grace, because whatever is in a man ordering him to salvation is wholly comprehended under the effect of predestination. And in the solution to 1 he says that the foreknown use of grace is not the reason for the conferring of grace, but its end. And 1. 2. quaest. 111. ar. 2. ad 2 he says that God does not justify us without us, because by the movement of free choice, while we are justified, we consent to the justice of God; yet that movement is not the cause of grace but its effect; whence the whole operation belongs to grace.
Fourthly it is proved by the reasoning of St. Augustine, lib. 2. de pecc. merit. et remiss. cap. 18, cited above: for if to be able to will the good is from God, and the good use is from us, it follows that what is from us is better than what is from God: for actually to do good is better than to be able to do good: but the consequent is said most absurdly: therefore.
On the twofold help of grace: namely, sufficient and efficacious.
XIV. The help of grace is twofold, one sufficient, the other efficacious.— Fourteenth proposition. A twofold help of God, or help of grace, must necessarily be distinguished: one sufficient, by which man can be converted to God, or work piously; the other efficacious, which God effects, that he be actually converted and work piously.
It is proved from sacred Scripture: for of the sufficient help it is said, Apoc. 3: I stand at the door and knock, etc. Prov. 1: Because I called, and you refused. Matth. 20: Many are called, but few are chosen. Act. 7: You always resist the Holy Spirit; by which help they were called. Luc. 14: who would not come to the marriage. Of the efficacious help the Apostle speaks, 1. ad Cor. 1, when he said that he preached Christ Jews and Greeks themselves who are called. And ad Rom. 8: Whom he predestined, them he also called. And again: to those who according to the purpose are called saints. And again: Not by works, but by him who calls, it was said to her, the elder shall serve the younger.34 By him who calls, not by any calling whatever, but by that calling by which one is made a believer, as Aug. says q. 2. ad Simpl. Of the same help the Lord speaks through Ezech., saying: I will make you walk in my commandments. And Ioan. 6: Everyone who hears from the Father, and has learned, comes to me. For he did not say, as Augustine observes,35 Everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned can come to me; but he said: comes to me; because everyone who has learned from the Father not only can come, but comes. For so he teaches: God, granting at once to those who are called according to the purpose both to know what they should do and to do what they know. This is the more powerful, high, and secret grace, by which God works in us, though not without us freely cooperating, the consent of the good will: by which grace he converts to himself the wills not only turned away but even opposed, making the unwilling willing; out of those not believing or not loving, making them believing and loving; out of the resisting, consenting; since the grace which is conferred on us through Jesus Christ (to use the words of Aug.) is the effector of the good will.36
It is proved by the authority of St. Aug. lib. de corrept. et grat. c. 12, saying: The helps of grace are to be distinguished: one is a help without which something is not done, and another is a help by which something is done. And lib. de praed. SS. c. 16 he establishes the same distinction, and proves it by many testimonies of Scripture.
Likewise St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 109. art. 10. ad 2, and on that text of 1. Timothy 2, He gave himself a redemption for all, says: for all sufficiently, for some efficaciously. The same he says on Hebraeos 9, at the end, on those words: to exhaust the sins of many. And in 4. sentent. distinction. 8. quaestione 2. articulo 2. quaestiuncula 3. ad septimum he says: That the blood of Christ was shed for all as regards sufficiency, but for the elect only as regards efficacy. But the efficacious help is distinguished from the sufficient help not only in the extrinsic respect of a gratuitous gift or benefit, namely because it is given in those circumstances in which God foreknows that the man will consent if he is premoved by it: but because, as it comes from God and from his absolute decree of converting the man, it has in an intentional mode a certain real power for moving the free choice, which the help that is only sufficient does not have, as is established from what was said in disput. 72. num. 2.
XV. Efficacious help moves free choice to good action not only morally, but also efficiently.— Fifteenth proposition. The efficacious help of prevenient, or preoperating, grace moves man's free choice to good action, not only by persuading, alluring, inviting, or otherwise attracting even interiorly in a moral way; but also efficaciously, and by truly effecting, that the choice itself, moved and aroused by God, determine itself to good action, and act. It is proved from the Council of Orange, 2. can. 9, where it is said: As often as we do good, God works in us, and with us, that we may work. But to work only morally by persuading is to work metaphorically, and not properly, as St. Thomas teaches q. 3. de malo art. 3. in corp. And can. 6 it is defined that by the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit it is brought about in us divinely that we believe, will, etc. And in the Council of Trent, sess. 6. de iustif. can. 4, it is defined that man's free choice, moved and aroused by God, cooperates freely by assenting to God arousing and calling. It is proved moreover from St. Augustine, lib. de grat. et libero arb. c. 16, where he says: It is certain that we do, when we do; but he makes us do, by supplying most efficacious powers to the will, who said: I will make you walk in my justifications. And libr. 1. cont. duas Epist. Pelag. cap. 19: He is drawn, he says, in wondrous ways to will, by him who knows how to work within the very hearts of men, not that men, which cannot be, should believe unwilling, but that willing men should be made out of unwilling. Nor can St. Augustine be expounded as speaking of a merely moral efficacy, which is by persuasion and internal excitation; for this Pelagius admitted, though he denied that it is simply necessary for salvation, whom nevertheless St. Augustine in the book de gratia Christi cap. 7. and 10 vehemently impugns, because he posited only a prevenient37 grace that persuades morally, and not one that truly effects that man will, as is clear from the words of Pelagius related by Augustine in the same c. 10. For he said: Not by the help of God, but from ourselves the good will is effected in us. Where the word effected signifies true efficiency. The same conclusion St. Prosper teaches openly in the epistle on free choice to Rufinus, where he says: Who doubts that free choice then obeys the exhortation of the one calling, when the grace of God has generated in it the affection of believing and obeying? Otherwise it would suffice for a man to be admonished, and a new will would not also be made in him; as it is written: The will is prepared by the Lord:38 And as the Apostle says: For it is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish, for the good will.39 For which good will, unless that which God has worked in them? That what he had given them to will, he might give them also to do. Let those words be weighed, Otherwise it would suffice for a man to be admonished: by which he shows evidently that the efficacy of preoperating grace is not merely moral, or after the manner of one persuading, but also after the manner of a physical cause, or of one truly effecting, that free choice may cooperate. The same St. Th. teaches on c. 6 of John, Lect. 5, on those words: No one can come to me, unless the Father draws him: where he says: The Father draws many to the Son by the instinct of the divine operation moving the heart of man interiorly to believe. Philip. 2. It is God who works in you to will and to accomplish. And there he distinguishes this drawing from that which is done by persuasion, or internal revelation. And below, explaining that text, Everyone who hears from the Father, etc., he says: The drawing of the Father is most efficacious: which he proves because everyone who has heard from the Father and has learned comes to Christ. And 2. 2. quaest. 6. artic. 1. in corp. he says that faith, as regards assent, is from God moving interiorly through grace. And 1. 2. q. 109. ar. 1. in corp. he says that as all bodily movements are reduced to the movement of the heavenly body as to the first bodily mover, so all movements, both bodily and spiritual, are reduced to the first mover, simply: which is God. And therefore however perfect any bodily or spiritual nature be posited, it cannot proceed to its act unless it is moved by God. And the same he says art. 9. in corp., and in almost all the articles of quaest. 111, and 1. p. q. 105. ar. 4. in corp., and q. 106. art. 2. in corp., and q. 111. art. 2. in corp.; in which places, and very many others, he teaches that God moves the will not only on the part of the object, and after the manner of one persuading, as an angel or a man can move another's will, but on the part of the power, and after the manner of one truly and properly acting and perfecting.
The same proposition is confirmed by all the passages adduced for assertion 13. For if the very cooperation and consent of free choice is from God as from a cause efficient of itself, it remains that God, through the efficacious help of prevenient grace, works not only morally, but truly efficiently, that the choice itself freely consent.
XVI. The efficacy of the divine help is founded on the omnipotence of the divine will.— Sixteenth proposition. The efficacy of the help of prevenient grace, and its infallible connection with the free cooperation of the choice, is wholly founded upon and derived, as from its first root, from the omnipotence of God, and from the absolute and efficacious decree of his will, willing that the man whom he moves be converted and work piously:40 nor does efficacy of this kind depend in any way, even as on a condition without which it does not happen, on the future cooperation of the created choice:41 although the free act by which a man perseveres depends effectively on his choice as moved by God.
It is proved from the passages of Scripture, of St. Augustine, and of St. Thomas adduced in proposition 14. For St. Augustine calls efficacious grace a calling according to the purpose for this reason, because it depends on the purpose and will, not indeed of man, but of God who calls, as the same Augustine explains against the Pelagians, lib. de correptione et gratia, cap. 7, at the words: they are elect.
Moreover also St. Thom. 1. 2. quaest. 112. artic. 3. in corpore refers the infallibility of the cooperation of the choice to the intention of God moving, because from the decree of the Divine will, whose power is in an intentional mode in the efficacious help, that help itself has this, that it infallibly brings it about that the free choice work piously.
Evident reasoning persuades the same: for efficacious grace, insofar as it is efficacious, precedes the cooperation of the choice, as was shown in disput. 90. and 91: therefore it precedes it in the order of reason and of causality: therefore it does not depend on it: for the prior does not depend on the posterior.
In addition. The cooperation of the choice is an effect of efficacious help in the genus of a cause truly efficient: therefore the efficacy of the same help does not depend on the cooperation of the choice: for the efficacy of a cause does not depend on its effect, but on the contrary the effect itself depends on the efficacy of the cause.
XVII. Efficacious grace being placed in free choice, it will be converted infallibly and freely.— Seventeenth proposition. Efficacious grace being placed in free choice, it follows infallibly that the free choice itself consents and works piously: so that these two are at once incompatible, namely that efficacious grace be placed in a man, and that the man actually dissent. It is proved from that text of Ioan. 6: Everyone who hears from the Father, and has learned, comes to me; for he did not say, he can come to me, but he comes, as Augustine noted lib. de gratia Christi contra Pelagium, et Caelest. cap. 14. For grace is the effector of the good will, as the same St. Augustine teaches quaestione 2. ad Simplicianum. Likewise ad Rom. 8: And whom he called (namely with the calling according to the purpose, or efficacious) them he also justified. Threnorum 542: Convert us, O Lord, to you, and we shall be converted? Isai. 46: My counsel shall stand, and all my will shall be done. And Esther 13: Lord, Lord, almighty King, for in your dominion all things are placed, and there is no one who can resist your will, if you have decreed to save Israel. And Genes. 50: Can we resist the will of God? Psalm. 134: Whatever the Lord willed, he has done. Since therefore efficacious help is a calling according to the purpose of God willing to convert man to himself, and is founded in that same purpose; it follows that, as the efficacious will of God works infallibly whatever it wills, so also efficacious help infallibly works the same.
Secondly it is proved from St. Augustine, lib. de corrept. et gratia, cap. 14, where he says: To him who wills to save, no man's choice resists; for so to will or not to will is in the power of the one willing or not willing, that it neither impede the divine will nor overcome his power. And in Enchir. ad Laurent. cap. 95 he says: But our God is in heaven above; in heaven and in earth he has done all things, whatever he willed. Which assuredly is not true if he willed something and did not do it; and, what is more unworthy, therefore did not do it because the will of man prevented, lest what the Almighty willed should be done. Unless we believe this, the very beginning of our confession of faith is endangered, by which we confess that we believe in God the Father Almighty: for it is not for any other reason that he is truly called Almighty, but because whatever he wills, he can; nor is the effect of the Almighty's will impeded by the will of any creature. And cap. 103 he adds: No one is saved, unless he whom God has willed to be saved; and therefore he must be asked that he will it; because it is necessary that it be done, if he wills it. And lib. de corrept. et gratia, cap. 8, explaining that text of Lucae 22, I have prayed for you, Peter, he says: When he prayed that his faith should not fail, what else did he pray for, but that he should have in faith a most free, most strong, most invincible, and most persevering will? and cap. 12: Relief was given, he says, to the infirmity of the human will, that it might be acted upon by divine grace indeclinably and insuperably; and therefore, though infirm, it should not fail, nor be conquered by any adversity. And in the book de dono perseverant. cap. 14 he says that through the benefits of God they are most certainly freed, whoever are freed: therefore, etc.
Thirdly it is proved from St. Thom. 1. 2. q. 112. art. 3. in corpore, where he says that if the preparation for grace be considered as it is from God moving, then it has necessity to that to which it is ordained by God, not indeed of compulsion, but of infallibility. Whence if it is from the intention of God moving that the man, whose heart he moves, should obtain grace; he infallibly obtains it; according to that of Ioan. 6: Everyone who hears from the Father, and has learned, comes to me. And 2. 2. quaest. 24. art. 11. in corpore he says: The power of the Holy Spirit moving the soul infallibly works whatever it wills; whence it is impossible that these two be true at once, that the Holy Spirit wills to move someone to an act of charity, and that he lose charity by sinning. And quaest. 23. de veritate, art. 5. ad 3 he says the same. And quaest. 6. de malo, artic. unico ad 3 he says: God moves the will immutably on account of the efficacy of the moving power, which cannot fail.
XVIII. The gift of perseverance, and its efficacy, does not depend on the cooperation of free choice.— Eighteenth proposition. The gift of perseverance, in the character of the gift of perseverance, and its efficacy, does not depend, even as on a condition without which it does not happen, on43 the cooperation of our choice, but on the purpose and absolute decree of God effecting that man persevere in good even to the end.
It is St. Augustine's, lib. de corrept. et gratia, cap. 12, where he says:44 And by this, not even concerning perseverance in good did God will his saints to glory in their own powers, but in him who gives them not only such help as he gave to the first man, without which they cannot persevere if they will; but also works in them even to will; that, since they will not persevere unless they both can and will, the possibility and the will of persevering be given them by the largesse of divine grace. And lib. de dono perseverantiae, cap. 7 he says: Altogether in this matter let the Church not expect laborious disputations, but attend to her daily prayers. She prays that unbelievers may believe: God therefore converts them to the faith. She prays that believers may persevere: God therefore gives perseverance, even to the end. And lib. de dono persever. cap. 2, and lib. de corrept. et gratia, cap. 12 he says: Why is perseverance asked of God, if it is not given by God? Or is that also a mock petition, when that is asked of him which is known that he does not give, but that, while he does not give it, it is in man's power?
It is St. Thom. 1. 2. quaest. 109. art. 10. in corp., where he says: For the continuation of good even to the end of life, a man established in grace needs the divine help directing and protecting him. and quaest. 114. art. 9. in corpore he says: But the perseverance of the way does not fall under merit, because it depends solely on the divine motion, which is the principle of all merit: but God gratuitously bestows the gift of perseverance on whomsoever he bestows it. The same is proved by the passages adduced for the three preceding propositions. Finally the holy Council of Trent, sess. 6. de iustificat. cap. 13, says that the gift of perseverance cannot be had from elsewhere, except from him who is able to establish him who stands, that he may stand perseveringly, and to restore him who falls: If therefore the gift of perseverance cannot be had from elsewhere, except from God: therefore its efficacy does not depend on the cooperation of the choice, but on God alone.
XIX. Efficacious help and the power of dissenting are compatible together in free choice.— Nineteenth proposition. Efficacious help and the power of dissenting are compatible together, and are composed in the same choice. It is proved from the Council of Trent, sess. 6. de iustific. can. 4, where it is defined that free choice, aroused and moved by God, can dissent if it wills: it holds therefore that the efficacious motion of God, and the faculty of dissenting if it wills, are together in the same choice.
Moreover it is proved from St. Prosper, lib. 2. de vocat. gent. cap. 27. and 28, where he says: What God willed them to will, they willed: who so bestows the very willing to obey him, that he does not take away even from those who will persevere that mutability which can will not to. And St. Thomas, quaest. 23. de veritate, art. 5. ad tertium, says that although the non-being of the effect of the divine will cannot stand together with the divine will; yet the power of failing the effect stands together with the divine will; for these are not incompatible: God wills this man to be saved, and this man can be damned; but these are incompatible: God wills this man to be saved, and this man is damned. The same he says quaest. 6. de veritate, art. 3. ad 7, whose words we have adduced in disput. 18. num. 23.
XX. Efficacious grace does not destroy, but perfects, the freedom of choice.— Twentieth proposition. By prevenient grace efficacious in the manner aforesaid, the freedom of choice is not destroyed, nor is its actual use impeded, but in a wondrous manner it is perfected and strengthened. It is proved from the Council of Trent, sessione 6. de iustificatione, cap. 5. and can. 4, where it is defined that free choice, aroused and moved by God, can dissent if it wills. Likewise also Caelestinus Pope, epist. ad Episcopos Galliae, cap. 12, says: By which help and gift of God free choice is not taken away, but is freed; so that from dark it becomes bright, from crooked straight, from sick sound, from foolish it becomes prudent.
Secondly it is proved from St. Augustine, lib. de spiritu et littera, cap. 29, saying: Do we empty free choice through grace? God forbid. But rather we establish free choice. For as the law is not emptied through faith, so free choice is not emptied through grace, but rather is established. And lib. 1. cont. duas epist. Pelagianorum, cap. 20 he says: Did the men of God who wrote this, or rather the very Spirit of God, under whose authorship they were written through them, fight against man's free choice? God forbid. But it commended the Almighty in all things, both his most just judgment and his most merciful help.
Thirdly it is proved from St. Thomas in the second of the Sentences, distinct. 25. quaestione prima, articulo secundo, ad primum, where he says that even if God changes the will of man to something else, nevertheless he does this by his omnipotence, that he willingly wills that into which he is changed. And prima secundae, quaestione 10. articulo 4. ad primum he says: That it would be more repugnant to the divine motion if the will were moved by necessity, which does not befit its nature; than if it were moved freely, as befits its nature. Likewise prima parte, quaest. 19. articulo octavo, and quaestione 83. articulo primo, ad tertium, he says: God therefore is the first cause moving both natural causes and voluntary causes. And as by moving natural causes he does not take away that their acts be natural; so by moving voluntary causes he does not take away that their actions be voluntary; but rather he does this in them. For he works in each one according to its property. And tertio contra Gentes, cap. 148, he shows by many arguments that by the help of divine grace no prejudice is done to the liberty of our choice. And it can be proved from what was said in proposition 19: for efficacious grace, by which God moves free choice to consent to the divine calling, in truth does not take away from that same choice the faculty by which it can dissent if it wills, as is established from the Council of Trent, and from what was said in disputation 18. num. 23: but it effects that, although it can dissent from its innate freedom, it nevertheless does not dissent, but infallibly consents: therefore it does not injure it in anything, but rather perfects and strengthens its freedom. For, as was said in disputation 115 and 116, freedom consists in the faculty of the will and of reason toward either side, namely toward acting and not acting, toward consenting and dissenting. Since therefore the will, even in that instant in which it is efficaciously moved to consent to the divine calling, retains the true and unimpeded faculty by which it can dissent if it wills; it remains that by efficacious grace of this kind the freedom of choice is not injured, nor impeded as regards its actual use, but rather perfected and healed. Which St. Prosper also confirms in his epistle to Rufinus on free choice, in these words:45 But too ineptly, and too inconsiderately, is it said by the adversaries, that by this grace of God nothing is left to free choice. And impugning the Collator, because he asserted that by efficacious grace, by which God makes willing men out of unwilling, the freedom of choice is destroyed, he says thus: Why do you strive to gather broken weapons from the petty reasonings of shattered argumentations?46 Why, by reviving the ashes of an extinct dogma, do you try to kindle the reek of failing smoke into a revived flame? There is no danger to free choice from the grace of God, nor is the will taken away, when good willing is generated in it. For if it is therefore not to be thought ours, because it is formed, ruled, ordered, imbued; the sons of God are stripped of liberty, who are led by the Spirit of God, they lose the vigour of the rational mind, and are deprived of every praise of voluntary devotion, to whom is given the spirit of wisdom and understanding, of counsel and fortitude, of knowledge and piety, and of the fear of the Lord. And cap. 38 of the same book he adds: The inept complaint of the proud does not disturb us, by which they allege that free choice is taken away, if both the beginnings, and the progress, and the perseverance in good even to the end, are said to be gifts of God: For the assistances of divine grace are the supports of the human will. Willing, we pray, and yet God has sent the Spirit into our hearts, crying Abba, Father.47 Willing, we speak, and yet, if what we speak is pious, it is not we who speak, but the Spirit of our Father, who speaks in us.48 Willing, we work out our salvation, and yet it is God who works in us both to will and to work.49 To whom be power, dominion, brightness, wisdom, thanksgiving, honour, and glory for everlasting ages. Amen.
The end of the twelfth and last book.
All things I humbly submit to the correction of the Holy Roman Church, which is the pillar and firmament of the truth.