De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Book Nine
Book Ten
Book Eleven
Introduction
IN WHICH IS TREATED REPROBATION, and the Reprobate, who fall short of the supernatural end.
AFTER the disputation concerning Predestination, and the helps of grace, through which the elect are led to the supernatural end, we must treat of Reprobation, and of the Reprobate, who fall short of the same end by their own malice, so that from the consideration of divine justice, which is exercised in those same reprobate, the abundance of mercy, which is communicated to the elect, may shine forth the more. Concerning reprobation, therefore, six things are to be considered.
I. Whether divine reprobation includes a positive act, by which God, by an absolute will, before the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice that is future by hypothesis, wills not to admit the reprobate into his kingdom: or whether it includes only a negative act.
II. Whether a cause of reprobation is given on our part, as regards its entire effect.
III. Whether the showing forth of divine justice in the reprobate, and of greater mercy in the elect, is on God's part a sufficient cause of reprobation.
IIII. Whether God grants to all men, however hardened, and to the reprobate, sufficient supernatural helps, through which they can attain to eternal life, and in fact attain it, if they will.
V. Whether God from eternity, by an absolute and efficacious will, antecedently to the foreknowledge of the future determination of the created will, has decreed not to give sufficient or efficacious supernatural helps unto salvation to those who in fact do not receive them in time.
VI. Whether little children dying with original sin are to remain forever in limbo, damned to death, or whether after the day of judgment they are to lead a blessed life in this world.
Concerning the number of the reprobate it has been said in disp. 43, in the course of disputing concerning the number of the predestined.
Disputatio CIX: Whether reprobation includes a positive act by which God, with absolute will before foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, wills not to admit the reprobate into his kingdom.
Whether reprobation includes a positive act, by which God, by an absolute will prior to the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, wills not to admit the reprobate into his kingdom.
I. It is proved that it includes only a negative act. First: God from eternity did not have a positive act by which he willed not to create another world, but bore himself only negatively: therefore in like manner, with regard to the reprobate, he bore himself only negatively, by not ordaining them to eternal life by an absolute and efficacious will. The consequence is clear from the parity of reason. The antecedent is proved: for to posit in God a positive act by which he wills not to do those things which in fact he will not bring about seems superfluous, since the same effect follows from positing in him a negative act concerning that object.
Secondly. The permission of the sin of final impenitence does not import in God a positive act: for such impenitence consists formally in this, that God does not confer the efficacious help by which the reprobate would be converted at the end of life; but this is not a positive act, but the denial of help: therefore in like manner reprobation does not consist in a positive act.
Thirdly. All the things that are handed down in the sacred Scriptures and in the Councils concerning the reprobation of angels and of men are most abundantly accounted for without our saying that reprobation means a positive act by which God wills not to admit the reprobate to eternal life: therefore.
Fourthly. It is proved that reprobation, although it includes a positive act of excluding the reprobate from eternal beatitude, that act is nevertheless not absolute, prior to middle, or conditioned, foreknowledge, but only a conditioned act, by which God willed to exclude the reprobate from his kingdom if they should sin, making bad use of the helps of grace: for it seems altogether unworthy of the divine goodness and clemency to establish in God an absolute act by which he wills not to admit some to eternal beatitude; nor is this agreeable to the sacred Scriptures. On the other hand, the opinion which asserts that God, before the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, reprobates no one and excludes no one from his kingdom, greatly commends the mercy of God, of whom Scripture very often says: It is not my will that the wicked man die: I do not will the death of the sinner, but rather that he be converted and live, as is clear from Ezekiel 18 and 33. Therefore, etc.
This is confirmed: for otherwise it would follow that counsels are in vain, precepts in vain, by which the reprobate are induced to good; indeed such exhortations and reproaches, which on God's part are in the Scriptures, would seem rather mockeries and illusions than true and sincere signs of divine mercy: because in the end, however the reprobate may conduct himself, he will remain excluded from eternal beatitude, if prior to the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice God has already from eternity excluded him by his absolute decree.
Fifthly. God, as far as lies on his part, willed from eternity by a positive act that all men without distinction be saved, nor did he except anyone in particular; as is clear from that passage of 1 Timothy 2: God wills that all men be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth: but with this volition there is not compatible in God a positive and absolute act by which he has determined to exclude some from his kingdom, or not to admit them, prior to the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice: therefore reprobation does not include such a positive act.
Sixthly: God gives to all men, however hardened and reprobate, supernatural helps that are sufficient, by which they can come to eternal life, and in fact come, if they will. But that many are not saved through those helps, but remain reprobate, had no origin in any positive decree of God willing not to admit them into his kingdom, but proceeds only from their own malice; namely because they were unwilling so to use the helps of grace as to obtain eternal salvation; for if they used those same helps well, as they could, they would be saved and would be of the number of the predestined: therefore.
This is confirmed: since otherwise this causal proposition would have to be admitted: Because God reprobated such men or angels, and willed by an absolute will not to admit them into his kingdom, nor to confer on them efficacious helps; therefore they remain excluded from it. But this is not to be said: for it would be to throw back upon the divine will the damnation of the wicked; which is against Scripture and the passages of the Saints: therefore.
II. This difficulty paves the way to that famous question which must be treated in the following disputation: namely, whether on our part there is given a cause of reprobation, or at least a condition on which it depends. Hence the various opinions of the Doctors will have to be explained. The first is that of those who assert1 that God in that instant, or sign of reason, in which he predestined the elect to eternal life and willed to confer on them grace and glory, bore himself only negatively towards the reprobate; so that he is said to have reprobated certain ones because he did not choose them nor predestine them. From which it seems to be inferred that reprobation, as regards the essence of reprobation, does not include a positive act, but only as regards its last effect, which God brings about, sin being supposed. To this opinion Scotus adheres, in 1 Sent. d. 41, q. un., and in 3 Sent. d. 19, q. un., § in illa quaestione. Where he distinguishes five instants, or signs of reason, in God,2 or in the divine prevision; for first God understood himself under the aspect of the supreme good: in the second sign he understood all other creatures: in the third he predestined these to glory and grace, and towards the others he had a negative act by not predestining them: in the fourth he foresaw that they would fall in Adam: in the fifth he preordained, or provided, a remedy, how they might be redeemed through the passion of the Son: so that Christ in the flesh, as also all the elect, was foreseen and predestined to grace and glory before the passion of Christ was foreseen: as a medicine against the fall. This fifth sign of reason does not pertain to the present difficulty, but to another, which is usually disputed in the third part, q. 1, a. 3: namely, whether if Adam had not sinned the divine Word would have been incarnate: In the first instant, he says, God, out of all the future intellectual creatures represented to his intellect, willed to confer beatitude on certain ones by an efficacious will; but towards the remaining creatures he bore himself negatively. Hence according to this opinion a cause of reprobation is given on our part, but not of predestination. The foundations of it have been touched in the first three arguments made at the beginning.
III. The second opinion is that of certain of the more recent theologians, and it consists in four statements. The first statement is:3 God willed from eternity, by a positive act, that all men be saved, if it had not lain with themselves or with their first parent. From which they infer that, prior to the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice that will be future by hypothesis, in the establishing of such an order of things, God has reprobated no one by a positive act. The second statement is:4 The plan, or order, of means with which God foreknows that an intellectual creature will, by its own freedom, make good use of its choice and will come by those same helps to eternal life, together with the purpose of putting that same order into execution, is formally predestination. The third statement is:5 The same plan, or order, of means to a supernatural end, with which God foreknows that an intellectual creature will make bad use of its choice, so that in fact it does not come through those means to eternal beatitude, does not formally have the character of predestination, but retains the common character of providence in respect of a supernatural end. But if such providence has joined to it the will of permitting sins and perseverance in them up to the end of life, and finally the will of excluding men or angels from the heavenly kingdom on account of sins of this kind, by such a will the character of reprobation is completed. They prove the first statement by the last three arguments made at the beginning: but the reasons by which they prove the three later statements have been adduced in disputations 35, 36 and 37.
IIII. For the resolution, however, of this difficulty and the explanation of the opinion of St. Thomas, it must be noted that, as the same St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 23, a. 3, and on Romans 9, lect. 2 and 3, and 3 cont. Gent. c. 163, as predestination is a part of divine providence, so also is reprobation: whence whatever belongs essentially to divine providence must necessarily belong to reprobation. It must be noted secondly that reprobation is opposed to approbation: but approbation6 is the act of the intellect judging that some thing is apt and convenient to an end. Whence St. Augustine, lib. 1 contra Academicos c. 4, and in the Enchiridion c. 17, defines error as the approbation of the false as true: whence reprobation will be the opposite judgment, by which something is spurned and rejected, or judged not to be convenient to the end. It must be noted thirdly that exclusion from the heavenly kingdom can be taken in two ways. First, insofar as it has the character of privation and of the pain of loss, which corresponds to sin on the part of aversion, according to that word: Depart from me, you workers of iniquity: and Matt. 25: Go, you cursed: for in this word the pain of loss is expressed; as in the following words the pain of sense is described, corresponding to sins on the part of conversion, when it is added: Into eternal fire. Secondly it can be taken as importing a positive act of not giving beatitude to some, by ordaining this to his own glory and to the greater splendor of mercy in the elect.
V. Reprobation by God includes a positive act.— First conclusion. God's eternal reprobation includes a positive act by which he willed not to admit certain ones to eternal life. This conclusion seems to be expressly St. Thomas's, 1 p. q. 23, a. 3, and it is proved. First: for it does not suffice for reprobation that God bear himself merely negatively towards the reprobate, by not ordaining them efficaciously to eternal life: for God did not truly reprobate possible men or angels who will never exist, and yet he bore himself negatively towards them, by not ordaining them to eternal life: therefore reprobation includes a positive act. It is proved secondly. Election is the acceptance of one thing in preference to another; for he is properly said to choose who, two means to the obtaining of an end being proposed, accepts one and rejects the other: but God from eternity by a positive act chose certain ones to eternal life; for the Apostle says,7 He chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy, etc. Therefore by a positive act he willed to admit certain ones and not to admit certain others to his kingdom. It is proved thirdly. Reprobation, as has been said in the first foundation, is a part of divine providence: but divine providence essentially includes a positive act by which things are ordained to an end: therefore reprobation also includes a positive act.
VI. Second conclusion. If exclusion from the heavenly kingdom be considered insofar as it has formally the character of the pain of loss, it presupposes guilt. Concerning this conclusion too there is no difficulty; for all are bound to admit it: for punishment, in the character of punishment, and likewise vindictive justice, presupposes guilt. And this conclusion is efficaciously proved by the last three arguments made at the beginning.
Absolute reprobation precedes the foreknowledge of the future evil use of free choice.— Third conclusion. The positive act by which God from eternity willed not to admit certain ones into his kingdom was not conditioned, but absolute, preceding in the sign of reason the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice that will be future by hypothesis, that such an order of things be established. This conclusion is expressly St. Augustine's and St. Thomas's in the passages to be alleged below; and the Thomists defend it in common, especially Cajetan on Matthew 11, on those words: I confess to you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, up to those words, Yes, Father, for so it has been pleasing before you. But the truth of this conclusion is founded most of all on that opinion which asserts that no cause is given on our part in respect of the whole effect of reprobation, of which we must treat in the following disputation. If therefore no cause of reprobation is given, then reprobation does not depend on the foreseen evil use of free choice, even as on a condition without which it does not take place: therefore it imports an absolute act in God. The conclusion is proved: for the Apostle, Romans 9, after he had inferred from what he had said in the same chapter concerning predestination and reprobation: Therefore he has mercy on whom he wills, and whom he wills he hardens; immediately sets out the complaint of those to whom predestination and reprobation preceding the foreknowledge of merits seem harsh, and says: Why then does he still complain? For who resists his will? And he meets this objection by adding: O man, who are you, that you answer back to God? Does the thing formed say to him who formed it, Why have you made me thus? Or does not the potter have power over the clay, from the same mass to make indeed one vessel for honor, but another for dishonor? But this answer and reproach would have no place, if God, prior to the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, had reprobated no one by an absolute and efficacious will; for the Apostle could easily answer that it depended on the good or bad use of the created free choice, foreknown by God as on a condition without which it does not take place, that the supernatural providence of God has formally the character of reprobation in respect of one and not in respect of another. Nor is it enough to answer that the depth of predestination and reprobation consists in this, that no cause or condition is given on our part for which God determined to establish man in such an order of things, in which he foreknew that man would, by the freedom of his choice, use the helps of grace well or badly; so that by using them well he would come to eternal life, or by using them badly would fall away from it. For this solution has already been excluded in the treatise on predestination.8
Secondly. It is proved by the authority of St. Augustine, epistle 107 to Vitalis, where, after the middle of the epistle, he hands down our conclusion: and among other things he says: Many are not saved, not because they themselves will it, but because God does not will it; which is shown without any obscurity in little children. And the same he teaches in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, c. 12, where he says that it is not to be ascribed to fate or to fortuitous chances that some little children die before they are baptized, but to the providence and will of God. The same says St. Prosper, lib. 1 de vocatione Gentium, c. 22, and lib. 2, c. 22 and 23. Therefore the positive act by which God reprobates some is not conditioned, as if it had lain with them, but absolute, according to the opinion of St. Augustine.
Finally it is proved by destroying above all the foundation of the contrary opinion: for supernatural beatitude is not due to any creature considered according to its natural endowments: therefore God could from eternity, according to his own will and without injury to anyone, prior to the foreknowledge of the good or evil use of free choice, choose certain ones to eternal life and will by a positive act not to admit certain ones, without doing injury to anyone: for, as St. Thomas says, q. 6 de veritate, a. 2, ad 8, in gratuitous things there is no place for injustice or respect of persons: For I can give to one and not give to another according to the pleasure of my will, even if both are equal. This conclusion will be clearer in the following disputation; concerning which those things also are to be seen which we have said in disputation 37.
VII. To the first argument from the facts at the beginning, the consequence is denied; for of possible things which will never exist there is not properly providence: but God properly has providence not only in respect of the predestined, but also of the reprobate; whence there is no similarity.
To the second it is answered first, that the denial of efficacious help, by which a man is converted at the end of life or perseveres in grace, is an effect of reprobation; whence before this denial there is understood in God a positive act by which he has reprobated certain ones. It is answered secondly, that the very denial of efficacious help imports also in God a positive act by which, for the manifestation of his justice, prior to the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, he decreed not to confer on the reprobate the efficacious help by which he would avoid the first sin, on account of which they are damned, but to permit them to fall into it.
To the third argument the antecedent is denied; for unless we posit a positive act in God in respect of the reprobate, that passage of Romans 9 does not seem able to be fittingly upheld: Not from works, but from him who calls, it was said: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated; which passage is explained of the eternal predestination and reprobation of Jacob and Esau, and of all the other elect and reprobate. Thus St. Augustine explains that passage, lib. 1 q. ad Simplicianum, q. 2, and epistle 105 to Sixtus, and in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, c. 98, and 16 de Civitate c. 35;9 St. Thomas, 3 cont. Gent., in the place cited above; Burgensis in his additions on Malachi 1; and many other Doctors; which explanation is the literal one. But in the propriety of speech, to hold someone in hatred does not import only a negation, but also a positive act.
VIII. To the fourth argument it is answered from what has been said in the third conclusion, that that act by which God reprobates is not conditioned but absolute. And to the impugnation it must be said that the mercy and justice of God in respect of a rational creature are according to the order of providence and of the divine will, because he works all things for himself. Whence it is said in Romans 9: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I will show mercy to whom I have been merciful. But the divine will is to be known and investigated by us in those things which surpass the capacity of nature, through sacred Scripture, as St. Thomas teaches, 3 p. q. 1, a. 3, and not through natural reason, which cannot attain those things which are of the Spirit of God. But in Scripture it is had: that not from works, but from him who calls, it was said: Jacob I have loved, Esau I have hated: which words, and others which have been adduced in disputation 37 and will be adduced in the following disputation, do not obscurely signify that reprobation itself precedes the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice; for otherwise it should rather be said, not from him who calls, but from the diverse works foreseen, namely good or evil, it was said, Jacob I have loved; but Esau I have hated. Nor is this unworthy of the divine goodness and clemency, but greatly consonant with it: for in gratuitous things there is no place for injustice; for one can by his own freedom grant a favor to one, but not likewise to another. But the passages of Scripture which are adduced to the contrary are explained in two ways. The first explanation is,10 that they are to be understood of sin, which God does not will but permits. The second explanation is of eternal death: and the sense is, that God, by his antecedent will, does not will the eternal death of the sinner: for by this will he wills that all men be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth, as is said in 1 Tim. 2. Which passage St. Thomas explains of the antecedent will, 1 part q. 23, article 4, ad 3; nevertheless, sin being supposed, he wills to punish him in hell with perpetual punishment, as St. Thomas says in a. 3 of the same question.
IX. The exhortations of the reprobate are not in vain in respect of God.— To the confirmation an answer has already been given sufficiently by us above. And now we say briefly that exhortations and reproaches are indeed in vain in respect of the reprobate, insofar namely as through them they do not obtain the final supernatural beatitude, and that not through the fault of God but through their own; because, as is said in Job 24: They themselves were rebellious against the light; and in c. 21 Job says in the person of the reprobate: Depart from us, we do not wish the knowledge of your ways. They are not, however, in vain in respect of God: for he attains other ends, of which we shall speak in disputation 111. This solution can be illustrated by an excellent example: for as the sun does not in vain illuminate the whole world, even if he who closes his eyes, or the window, is not illuminated by its light, so proportionably God does not in vain exhort all to virtue, even if some by their own malice abuse the divine exhortations. For of it is said in John 1: He was the true light, which enlightens every man coming into this world. Let St. Thomas's example on this matter be seen, 3 cont. Gen. c. 159.
The antecedent and consequent will of God do not conflict with each other.— To the fifth it is answered with St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 23, a. 4, ad 3, that God by his consequent will, which is the will simply, does not will that all men be saved, which St. Augustine also acknowledges in the place cited above,11 but nevertheless by his antecedent will, which is the will in a certain respect, he wills that all men be saved; and with this will there stands in God the absolute act by which, prior to the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, he wills not to admit certain ones into his kingdom. For since that kingdom is not due to any creature, God can according to his will give it to whom he has willed. But that those two wills are not conflicting is manifestly clear: for he who throws his goods into the sea in time of storm simply wills to throw them away, in order to save his life; nevertheless he is unwilling in a certain respect, and would not wish to throw them away: therefore in the same way there stand together in God the will in a certain respect, namely the antecedent will, by which he wills that all men be saved, and the absolute will, by which he wills that some not be saved, for the manifestation of his justice. But whether the antecedent will formally imports in God a conditioned act, or a velleity, and in what it is distinguished from the consequent will, has already been explained in disputation 34.
To the sixth argument the answer will be clear from those things which must be said in disputation 112.
To the confirmation it is answered through those things which have been said in disputations 100 and 101.
Disputatio CX: Whether there is a cause of reprobation on our part with respect to its entire effect.
Whether there is on our part a cause of reprobation, as regards its entire effect.
I. The affirmative PART is proved from the Council of Valence under the Emperor Lothair, ch. 3, where it is said thus: We faithfully confess the predestination of the elect to life, and the predestination of the ungodly to death: yet in the election of those who are to be saved, the mercy of God precedes good merit; but in the damnation of sinners, the merit of evil precedes the just judgment of God. But by the just judgment of God some men are reprobated: therefore sin, or the foreknowledge of it, precedes reprobation, and consequently is its meritorious cause. The same thing the passages of Scripture seem to suggest in which it is held that God does not will the death of the sinner, and created man not that he should perish but that he should obtain salvation, and consequently always stands at the door and knocks.
It is argued secondly from the authority of St. Augustine, which in the matter of grace and predestination is of the greatest weight: for he teaches that original sin is the cause of reprobation in men. Thus he says in epistle 105 to Sixtus, when he says: We seek the merit of hardening, and we find it; but we seek the merit of mercy, and we do not find it, because there is none. II. Nor can this be explained of the last effect of reprobation, of which sin, at least original, is the cause; otherwise he would not have well assigned the difference between predestination and reprobation: for even predestination, as regards its last effect, has some cause on our part: namely the merits of grace, as St. Thomas teaches in 1 p. q. 23, a. 3. Likewise also in q. 2 ad Simplicianum, and in the Enchiridion to Laurentius from ch. 94 through 100, and in the book de praedestinatione et gratia, ch. 3 and 7, and de praedestinatione Sanctorum, ch. 8 and 9, and book 6 of the Hypognosticon, he very often repeats that the cause of reprobation is original sin. Whence St. Thomas, q. 6 de ver. a. 2, ad 9, expressly confesses that, according to Augustine: The reason of reprobation in men is original sin.
This is confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas on ch. 9 of Romans, Lect. 2, at the end, where he says that the foreknowledge of merits cannot be any reason of predestination; because the merits foreknown fall under predestination, but the foreknowledge of sins can be some reason of reprobation on the part of the punishment: from these words the following argument is drawn. Therefore no cause of predestination is given on our part, because whatever is required for the predestined to attain the last end of predestination falls under predestination as its effect, and consequently can be neither a cause nor a condition on which predestination depends; but this reasoning does not proceed in the case of reprobation: for the sin which is required for the last effect of reprobation to follow does not fall under reprobation as its effect, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited article 3, but is presupposed on our part. The same St. Thomas seems to teach in the same article 3, and in the solution to the third, when he says that God willed to show his goodness in some by way of mercy, sparing them; and therefore he predestined them to glory; where he manifestly seems to teach that predestination presupposes original sin, and the whole mass of nature infected in the first parent, and consequently that reprobation also presupposes original sin: for out of the same mass he mercifully predestined some and justly reprobated others.
Third. To reprobate is to hold someone in hatred; for as to hold someone in hatred is to will evil to him, but God holds no one in hatred, nor wills to anyone the evil of punishment except on account of guilt: therefore reprobation presupposes the foreknowledge of guilt.
Fourth. The reprobation of men presupposes the foreknowledge of original sin, which is a sufficient cause of reprobation: therefore there is on our part a cause of reprobation. The antecedent is proved, because the predestination of Christ the Lord supposes in the sign of reason the foreknowledge of original sin, and so comes as a remedy for it, and otherwise would not have come, as St. Thomas teaches, 3 p. q. 1, a. 3, especially in the solution to the fourth: therefore our predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of original sin, otherwise it would precede the predestination of Christ, and so Christ the Lord would not be the first of the predestined, nor their head: therefore reprobation also is understood as after the foreknowledge of original sin. That consequence is clear: for predestination in the sign of reason precedes reprobation, as affirmation precedes negation: therefore if the foreknowledge of original sin precedes our predestination, much more must it precede reprobation.
Fifth. God, as far as lies on his part, wills to exclude no one from his kingdom, inasmuch as he wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth, as is said in 1 Tim. 2: therefore that he wills to exclude some from his kingdom presupposes a demeritorious cause on their part.
It is argued sixth. Reprobation is an act of punitive or vindictive justice: therefore it necessarily presupposes guilt foreknown, on account of which God decreed to punish men.
This is confirmed: for otherwise God would be cruel, and not a most clement prince, if of his mere will he had reprobated some, knowing and seeing that by that very fact they were to be damned.
III. Seventh. There is on our part a cause of the whole effect of reprobation: therefore there is a cause of reprobation. The consequence is clear: for on this ground St. Thomas, in 1 p., at the article cited, proves that no cause of predestination is given on our part, namely because no cause of the whole effect of predestination is given: therefore if a cause of the whole effect of reprobation is given, a cause of reprobation will be given on our part. But the antecedent is proved: for, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 23, a. 3, ad 2, and q. 6 de verit. a. 1, at the end of the body, and on Romans 9, Lect. 4, there are two effects of reprobation, namely the infliction of eternal punishment, which is the last effect, and the withdrawal of the help of divine grace, or the abandonment in sin; but of each effect a cause is given on our part; for the cause of the infliction of eternal punishment is guilt, as all acknowledge; and in like manner guilt, at least original, is the cause of the other effect, namely of the abandonment in sin, as is clear from St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1, where he says that the help of grace, to whomsoever it is given by God, is given mercifully: but to those to whom it is not given, it is not given save in punishment of a preceding sin, at least original, as St. Augustine says in the book de correptione et gratia; and in 3 contra Gentes, ch. 159, he says that men are not helped by God, the cause being in themselves, namely because by their own guilt they put an obstacle to grace, and so it is imputed to them as sin if they are not converted, even if they cannot do this without the help of grace. Finally, in 1.2, q. 112, a. 3, ad 2, he says that the defect of grace has its first cause from ourselves, but the conferring of grace has its first cause from God, according to that word of Osee 13: Thy perdition is from thyself, O Israel; only in me is thy help. And the same he teaches in 1 Sent. d. 40, q. 1, a. 2. Therefore there is on our part a cause of the whole effect of reprobation.
This is confirmed. God could have reprobated a man on account of original sin; for in itself it is a sufficient cause of reprobation, and it was fitting for divine mercy to do so, lest men under any color, even an apparent one, might be able to complain of him: therefore in fact he reprobated men on account of sin, at least original.
Eighth. The permission of the first sin, at least original, cannot be an effect of reprobation: therefore from the fact that no cause is given on our part of that permission, it does not follow that no cause is given of the whole effect of reprobation. The antecedent is proved: since of the same sin there is not a twofold permission, but original sin is understood as permitted, and as future, before reprobation is understood: therefore the permission of the same sin cannot be understood as after reprobation, and so it will not be its effect; otherwise the same sin would be permitted twice by God, or the same thing would be both prior and posterior in respect of the same.
This is confirmed first. God in fact permitted that all men should sin originally, and in like manner he permits that many of the predestined should sin mortally, and yet the permission of original sin is not in all an effect of reprobation, and in like manner the permission of actual sin: therefore neither is it in any. The consequence is clear: for such permission stands equally towards all.
This is confirmed secondly. As is said in the Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 11: God does not desert those once justified by his grace, unless he is first deserted by them: therefore before the divine permission by which he deserts a man and permits him to fall, something is always presupposed on the part of the man, by reason of which God deserts him; and consequently that first permission of sin supposes a cause on our part.
This is confirmed thirdly: for St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 94, a. 4, ad 5, says that in the temptation help was not given to Adam, because sin had already gone before in his mind, and he had not recourse to the divine help: therefore according to St. Thomas, before the permission of sin some negligence is presupposed on the part of man.
For the contrary, St. Thomas seems to be adduced, 1 p. q. 23, a. 3, in the solution to the second and third, where he speaks indifferently of predestination and reprobation, and teaches that it is not from foreknown merits.
IIII. First opinion.— In this difficult question a certain author, in order to establish in God a predestination and reprobation that quiets the human intellect, by which he may easily meet the arguments that seem to lead either to despair or to slackness and torpor, distinguishes a twofold reprobation, as was said above concerning predestination. The first he calls incomplete and conditional reprobation, which has a tacit condition understood along with it, and imports the act by which God conditionally wills not to admit some into his kingdom, but to punish them with eternal penalties for their sins, if they themselves have sinned and persevered in sin even to the end. The second they call complete and absolute reprobation, and this they hold to presuppose in God the foreknowledge of final impenitence, or of perseverance in sin even to death, and on the part of man to suppose sin itself and its continuation even to the last term of life: and thus such reprobation to be from foreknown demerits. From this he infers that no one is reprobated by the absolute will of God before the forevision of his end in the state of sin. He infers also that God has not determined by an absolute decree, before the forevision of works, who are to be saved and who to be damned. He is compelled to establish this opinion.
First from the sacred Scriptures: for in Matthew 25 it is said to the reprobate: Go, you cursed, into the everlasting fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels: and the reason is added: For I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat, etc. where that causal word for signifies the demeritorious cause foreknown by God, on account of which they were reprobated. Likewise Ezechiel 18: The death of the wicked is not of my will. Ezechiel 33.1 As I live, says the Lord, I do not will the death of the sinner, but rather that he be converted and live. Sapient. 11: You love all things that are, and hate nothing of the things you have made, etc. And 1 Tim. 2: Who wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. But with this will an absolute reprobation of some, before their demerits are foreseen and their perseverance in them even to the end, does not in truth comport. For how does he truly and sincerely will all to be saved, if in that first decree concerning the men to be saved, which he conceived of himself, he chose so few for salvation and excluded so immense a number, and in the second instant prepared for them no grace except an incongruous one, at least for the term of life?
Secondly he proves it from the Fathers: for St. Jerome on ch. 1 of Malachias:2 The love, he says, and the hatred of God are born either from the foreknowledge of future things or from works: otherwise we know that God loves all things, and hates nothing of those things he created: but he properly claims for his own charity those who are the enemies and rebels of vices; and on the contrary he hates those who desire to build again what God has destroyed. Where he openly suggests that hatred is born from works. The same in the epistle to Hedibia, q. 10: The vessels of mercy, which he prepared unto his glory, he saves not irrationally; and not apart from truth, but from preceding causes: because some did not receive the Son of God, while others willed of their own accord to receive him. From which it is shown that it is not nations that are chosen, but the wills of men. But this would not be true if, before all forevision of wills, he chose these to glory and not those out of his mere good pleasure. Likewise also Ambrose, book 5 de fide, ch. 3, explaining that word of the Apostle:3 Whom he foreknew, he also predestinated,4 says: For he did not predestinate before he foreknew; but the merits of those whose merits he foreknew, he predestinated. Moreover Fulgentius, to Monimus, on the twofold predestination, ch. 24, says thus:5 God therefore, about to show what he foreknew was to be rendered and what was to be given, predestinated to punishment those whom he foreknew would depart from him by the vice of an evil will. St. Prosper, in reply to the objections of Vincent, resp. 12, says:6 Because they were foreknown as about to fall, they were not predestinated; but they would be predestinated if they were about to return. And in the reply to the chapters of the Gauls, respon. 7: Because he himself foreknew that they would fall by their own will, for this reason he distinguished them by no predestination from the sons of perdition. By which words the foreknowledge of works is openly presupposed to election and reprobation: therefore before foreseen merits or demerits there is not in God an absolute predestination and reprobation, but a conditional one.
Thirdly: for the divine promises and comminations, by which he promises eternal life to the elect and threatens eternal punishment to the reprobate, are conditional, and always contain a tacit or express hypothesis, namely, if they have kept the commandments and persevered even to the end, or if they have fallen and not done penance, as is clear from the Council of Trent, session 6, on justification, canon 20: If anyone says that a man justified, and however perfect, is not bound to the observance of the commandments of God and of the Church, but only to believe; as though the Gospel were a bare and absolute promise of eternal life, without the condition of observing the commandments: let him be anathema. And the same condition is expressed in ch. 13 of the same session: For God (unless they themselves fail his grace) as he has begun the good work, so will he also perfect it, working both to will and to perform: and in canon 32 it is defined that the justified man merits eternal life by good works, and the obtaining of that eternal life itself (provided however that he departs in grace). Which condition is expressed also in Matthew 19: If you will enter into life, keep the commandments: and in Luke 13: Unless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise perish: therefore absolute reprobation is not in God before demerits are foreseen.
Fourth. Absolute reprobation before foreseen demerits does not seem to agree with the divine goodness, to which it is not consonant that, in the goods which of himself, before all forevision of future things, he prepares for the rational creature, he should except some. Nor does it seem to agree sufficiently with justice either: for in the damnation of the wicked and the rewarding of the just, there does not seem to shine out in that manner of predestination and reprobation so much equity as there would be if it were from foreseen merits or demerits. Moreover, according to that manner it would be difficult to explain how the greatest part of men is not predestinated to evil by divine power, and created in order to perish: therefore.
Fifth: for experience teaches that some, from an absolute predestination and reprobation before foreseen merits or demerits, have fallen into the gravest fits of melancholy, others have cast aside the pursuit of piety and the perfection of religion, others pass almost their whole life in anxiety, always holding the predestination of God suspect. For if concerning all men, before all forevision of what we are going to do, it is already firmly and by absolute decrees determined; if the number of those to be saved, which can neither be increased nor diminished, is immutably defined with no regard had to our works or labors; if before the examination of works it is determined concerning all by an irrevocable prejudgment; it seems perspicuous that all solicitude for living rightly is taken away: because if you are comprehended in that number, no injury will bring it about that you fall out; if you are not comprehended, no solicitude will help you to enter: therefore that account of predestination and reprobation must be established which may bring solid consolation of mind, which may stir up the pursuit of good works, contempt of the world, and the love of Christian perfection. But these things we attain if we say that predestination and reprobation on the part of God are not absolute before foreseen merits or demerits, but conditional: therefore, etc. The other reasons which are brought forward for this opinion I omit: both because they are comprehended in those adduced above, and also because they tend to impugn the absolute predestinations or predeterminations of God, of which I have already treated professedly in disputation 22 and 23.
V. That the cause of reprobation was original sin; what they hold.— The second opinion is that of those who assert that the meritorious cause of reprobation in men was original sin foreknown by God, by which the whole human nature was infected in the first parent: and consequently that all who sinned in Adam merited for themselves in him wrath and eternal punishment, according to that word of Eph. 2: And we were all by nature children of wrath. This opinion many Thomists follow, convinced by the authorities of Augustine in the places alleged above, and they affirm two things. The first is that original sin is the general cause of reprobation in men:7 for God foresaw from eternity the whole mass of human nature infected on account of the sin of the first parent. Then out of this mass of perdition he chose, of his mere liberality, some in particular, and predestined them, in order to show in them the abundant riches of his mercy; but others he justly left in the same mass of perdition, and reprobated on account of the sin of nature, to which eternal punishment was due: according to that word of Gen. 3: In whatever day you shall eat of it, you shall die the death: in which no injury was done to anyone: just as, if two men were in prison condemned to death for the same cause, and the King should enter and of his mercy wish to grant life to one and snatch him from death, but leave the other in prison to be hanged for the crime committed, in order to manifest in him the justice of the prince, no injury would be inflicted on anyone. On which account also St. Augustine says:8 O man, if you do not receive what is due, you have reason to rejoice; but if you do receive it, you have nothing to complain of. The second statement is that actual sins foreknown are not the cause of reprobation,9 which they prove from the authority of St. Augustine and from that word of Rom. 9: Before they were born, or had done anything good or evil, etc. from which testimony the following argument is drawn. The same is the reason of the reprobation of Esau, of which the Apostle speaks, and of the other reprobate; but Esau was not reprobated on account of his own actual demerits: therefore neither were the others.
This is confirmed: for the Apostle, although he speaks of Esau, of whom mention is made in the passage of Malachias which he adduces, nevertheless hands down a general doctrine concerning predestination and reprobation.
The third opinion is that of those who assert that a cause of reprobation is indeed given on our part, but that it is not the same in all. For they say that in some, namely in little children dying without a remedy against original sin, the cause of reprobation was original sin foreseen by God: but in some the cause of reprobation is only mortal sin, as in the reprobate angels and in baptized adults who are damned only on account of mortal sin: in others, finally, both together, as in infidels who die with original and actual sin. This opinion M. Soto held in his commentary on ch. 9 of Romans, although in the retractations which he added at the end of book 4 of the Sentences he did not obscurely change it. The strongest arguments of this opinion have been set out from the beginning.
VII. The fourth opinion is that of other Thomists, who assert that of reprobation, as regards the last effect, a cause is given on our part, namely guilt, whether original or actual, and likewise as regards hardening and perseverance in sin even to the last of life. But as regards the first effect of reprobation, which is the first permission of the sin on account of which the reprobate is damned, whether that be original or actual, no cause is given on our part, but the cause of that permission is the mere will of God: and consequently they teach that no cause is given of the whole effect of reprobation. This opinion M. Bañes defends, 1 p. in the article cited, M. Zumel, disp. 4, and many other most learned Thomists.
VIII. The difference between predestination and reprobation.— For the resolution, however, of this difficulty it must be supposed first that, as St. Thomas teaches in the places cited above, divine predestination stands otherwise in order to the predestined, and reprobation otherwise in order to the reprobate: for predestination is not only the cause of the last effect, namely the conferring of glory, but is also the cause of all those things by which the predestined is disposed to the obtaining of that last effect, whether by way of merit or by way of material cause, even if no merit intervenes there; as happens in the dispositions antecedent in time to the infusion of grace. But reprobation, although it is a cause inferring the last effect of reprobation, which is eternal punishment, is not however the cause of the means by which the reprobate merits eternal punishment, because it is not the cause of the sin, or demerit, of the reprobate himself.
It must be supposed secondly that in the process of reprobation, as regards its effect, or as regards those things which are supposed for the obtaining of the last effect, this order is found. For first is the permission of sin: for it is not intelligible, and much less possible, that any sin should be future unless God permits, as St. Augustine teaches in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, ch. 95 and 96: Nothing, he says, is done unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by doing it himself, or by permitting it to be done. Secondly, after the permission of sin, the sin itself is understood as future. Thirdly, the perseverance of sin even to death, or even to the term of the way, as in the angels. Fourthly and lastly, eternal punishment, whether it be of sense or of loss.
It must be supposed thirdly that the chief difficulty of this controversy consists in this: namely, whether the permission of the guilt on account of which the reprobate is damned is to be numbered among the effects of reprobation. For, as Zumel noted in the place cited above, if the first permission of sin is an effect of reprobation, it is evident that no cause of reprobation is given on our part, as regards its entire effect, just as no cause of predestination is given; but if the permission of guilt is not an effect of reprobation, it must be conceded that a cause of the same reprobation is given on our part.
It must be supposed fourthly that the present question concerning the cause of reprobation can be understood in two ways. In the first way, absolutely, or in general: namely, whether the fact that some are reprobated has a cause on their part. In the second way, in particular and comparatively, and then the sense is: whether a cause is given on the part of the reprobate, on account of which these in particular were reprobated rather than others.
Let this be the first conclusion. Reprobation, by which God determined not to give eternal life to some and to permit their sin, is not conditional but absolute, nor does it presuppose in God the foreknowledge or forevision of the demerits of the reprobate himself, or of his perseverance in sin even to the last of life. This conclusion remains sufficiently proved from the things said in disputation 36 and 37 concerning predestination, and will be made plainer from the things to be said in the following conclusions and in the solutions of the arguments.
IX. In the angels no cause of reprobation was given.— The second conclusion. In the angels who fell, no cause of reprobation is given on their part as regards its entire effect, but before the foreknowledge of their future sin God, of his own will, reprobated some of them and permitted them to fall into sin: and by the name of cause we comprehend any reason whatever, or motive, or condition without which not, holding on the part of the angels. The conclusion is proved: for St. Augustine only concedes that original sin is the cause of hardening, but not actual sin: therefore since in the angels there was no original sin, but only actual, in them no cause of reprobation is given. Secondly it is proved from that word of Rom. 9: Not of works, but of him that calls, it was said: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated. And after a little: Has not the potter power, of the same mass, to make one vessel indeed unto honor, but another unto dishonor? From which testimonies St. Thomas proves that actual sin is not the cause of reprobation, as regards its first effect. Thirdly it is proved from the things said in the preceding disputation, where we showed that God by a positive act, before the foreknowledge of future sin, even on a hypothesis, decreed not to admit some into his kingdom; and this conclusion will be made plainer from the reasons to be adduced for the fourth conclusion.
X. Of comparative reprobation no cause is given in little children.— The third conclusion. In little children departing with only original sin, no cause of reprobation is given on their part, if they be considered in particular and comparatively in order to others who are not reprobated: and the same must be said proportionably of adults. In this conclusion all the Thomists agree, and it is the express opinion of St. Thomas in the solution to the third, art. 3 cited, and in 3 cont. Gent. ch. 161, and Ferrara there. It is proved by the reason which St. Thomas touches in the third argument and in its solution: for as regards nature all little children are equal, and likewise as regards original sin: for on account of that sin all are equally by nature children of wrath, and equally merit eternal damnation: therefore on their part no reason or particular cause can be assigned on account of which one rather than another is reprobated. This argument proves the same thing concerning adults: for although one may have greater actual sins than another, yet in this all are equal, that on account of original sin they could be left in the mass of perdition.
This is confirmed by the examples adduced by St. Thomas in the same solution to the third, from natural and artificial things; for no reason can be assigned on the part of prime matter on account of which from the beginning this part of matter was produced under this substantial form and that part of matter under another: but this depended on the simple will of God; because any part of matter, in itself, stands indifferently towards any form. In like manner in artificial things no reason can be assigned on account of which, out of two equal stones, the craftsman places one in the foundation and the other on the top of the building, but this depends on the simple will of the craftsman: therefore proportionably, out of two men infected with the same original sin, no reason can be assigned on their part on account of which one rather than the other is left in the mass of perdition and the other is taken up into the kingdom.
XI. No cause of reprobation is given, absolutely speaking.— Fourth conclusion. Not only comparatively, but also absolutely speaking, no cause of reprobation is given. And so neither actual sin, nor original, nor both together foreseen by God, was in fact the meritorious or motive cause of the reprobation of anyone, as regards all its effects. This conclusion is held, and not obscurely, by Cajetan10 at the end of the same article 3, where he confesses that the permission of sin is an effect of reprobation. The same conclusion Durandus teaches, in the first book of the Sentences, d. 41, q. 2, especially no. 14; Master Bañes and Zumel in the place above; and Master Soto, at the end of the fourth book of the Sentences, seems rather to incline to the same view. Many most weighty Thomists also defend it, and I judge that St Thomas definitively taught the same view; for in the cited article 3, in the body of the article, he says that as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory, so reprobation includes the will to permit someone to fall into fault, and to bear the punishment of damnation for the fault: and he says the same in the reply to the second. From which place Cajetan, according to the view of St Thomas, deduces that reprobation is foreknowledge together with the will to permit fault and to damn for fault: therefore according to St Thomas the permission of the first sin, on account of which the reprobate is damned, is an effect of reprobation; but of that permission no cause is given on the part of the reprobate: for before the permission of the first sin, and before the first sin, no other preceding sin is given; otherwise that would not be simply first, or another sin, committed with God not permitting it, would precede it in the man, which is against St Augustine, Enchiridion to Laurentius, cc. 95 and 96. Therefore according to St Thomas no cause is given of the whole effect of reprobation. Likewise also in the same article 3, in the reply to the first, he says that inasmuch as God does not will this good for certain ones, which is eternal life, he is said to hate them, or to reprobate them; but it proceeds from the simple will of God that he does not will this good of eternal life for some: for in gratuitous things one can, according to his own good pleasure, without any other cause, give something to this one and not give it to that one: as St Thomas says, in the reply to the third of the same article, and in q. 6 de veritate, a. 2, ad 8. Moreover, in the same reply to the third, inquiring into the cause of predestination and reprobation, he assigns no other than the divine will: for he says: Why he chooses these to glory and reprobates those has no reason except the divine will; which he also explains by examples. Nor is it enough to answer that St Thomas speaks comparatively of the reprobation of some in preference to others; for he speaks in the same way, as regards the cause, of reprobation and of predestination; but no cause of predestination is given, according to the mind of St Thomas, as regards the whole effect of predestination, not only comparatively, but not even absolutely: therefore neither of reprobation. It adds weight that, although the holy Doctor, in q. 6 de veritate, a. 2, ad 9, had assigned a twofold cause of reprobation in men, one according to St Augustine, namely original sin, the other the divine will, which can reasonably will to deny to someone something that is not owed to him, yet in the first part, in the third article cited, where he treats the same question ex professo, he passed over the first cause in silence and assigned the second: he holds therefore that original sin was not the cause of reprobation as regards its whole effect. But what the view of St Augustine was I will say afterwards. For I judge that in this part too St Thomas does not depart from him.
It is proved secondly by reason. The first permission of sin, on account of which the reprobate is damned, whether it be original or actual, is the first effect of reprobation; but of it no cause is given on our part, as has been said above: therefore no cause is given of the whole effect of reprobation, and consequently neither of reprobation itself. The major is St Thomas's, in the place above; and it is proved; for that which is required beforehand in order that the last effect of reprobation may follow, if it does not have the character of fault, is an effect of reprobation itself: but the permission by which God permits the sin on account of which he inflicts on the reprobate the last effect of reprobation is necessary in order that that effect may follow; for if God does not permit the sin, there will be no sin, since nothing is done unless God wills or permits it, and consequently neither will there be eternal punishment for sin. And on the other hand the permission of sin does not have the character of fault, but is good: for St Augustine says, in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, ch. 95: Nor is it to be doubted that God does good even by suffering whatever things are done ill: therefore the permission of sin, on account of which the reprobate is damned, is an effect of reprobation.
It is confirmed: for in the angels the permission of sin was an effect of their reprobation: therefore also in men, when we speak of the sin on account of which someone is damned. Some Doctors regard this argument as so effective that they think it evidently demonstrates our conclusion. But the arguments by which it is proved that the first permission of sin, on account of which someone is damned, is not an effect of reprobation but is presupposed to it, at least when the sin is original, we shall bring forward and solve below.
It is proved thirdly. In those to whom original sin has been remitted through baptism, original sin itself is not a cause of reprobation: therefore at least in all reprobate men original sin will not be the cause of reprobation. The antecedent is proved: for through baptism original sin is truly remitted as regards all that which has the true and proper character of sin, as is defined in the Council of Trent, session 5, decree on original sin, last canon; which the Council proves by the authority of the Apostle, Romans 6, when it adds: For in those who are reborn God hates nothing, because there is nothing of condemnation in those who have been truly buried together with Christ through baptism into death: where the Council speaks indifferently of the baptized, whether they be elect or reprobate: therefore through baptism, according to the mind of the Council, the debt of fault and of eternal punishment is truly remitted: therefore an adult who has been baptized is not reprobated on account of original sin that has been dismissed; otherwise there would be something of condemnation for those who have been reborn through baptism, and consequently either original sin would afterwards return, or it would not have been truly remitted through baptism, but would only be said to be erased, or not to be imputed: which is against the Council.
It is confirmed. The sin on account of which someone is reprobated is the cause of the last effect of reprobation, but original sin, remitted through baptismal grace, is not the cause of the last effect of reprobation, namely of eternal punishment, otherwise it would not have been truly remitted through baptism as regards the debt of eternal punishment; and consequently neither as regards the fault: for the debt of eternal punishment cannot remain unless the fault remains: therefore.
To this argument many solutions are applied, but plainly difficult ones. The first is that through baptism original sin is truly remitted as regards the fault and the debt of eternal punishment:11 and accordingly afterwards, in execution, the original sin that has been dismissed is not in itself a cause of reprobation as regards its last effect: nevertheless the original sin itself, foreseen before its remission, was a true motive cause of the ordination to eternal punishment in the intention of God, and so it is called a cause of reprobation, because by baptismal grace that eternal decree of God was not changed, but only according to present justice is such a baptized reprobate made pleasing and acceptable to God unto eternal life. But this solution does not evacuate the force of the argument:12 for God by his eternal decree has not ordained anyone to eternal punishment on account of original or actual sin that is truly to be remitted in time, as regards the fault; but only on account of the sin in which he is to persevere until death: therefore it is impossible that on account of original sin truly to be remitted, as to fault, God should have had an eternal decree of ordaining someone to eternal punishment.13
The second solution, that of others, is that original sin dismissed is not in itself a cause of reprobation, but only per accidens,14 inasmuch namely as it was the cause that all who are born children of wrath were reprobated on account of that sin committed in the first parent; which decree indeed remains in God in respect of those who depart this life in some mortal sin, whether original, or both together. Yet this solution seems to beg the question:15 for this is what we contend, that God from eternity did not have the decree of reprobating someone on account of a sin truly to be remitted as regards the fault. Moreover: for a sin perfectly remitted stands in the same way in relation to reprobation as if it had not been committed, as is clear from that text of Ezechiel: In whatever day the sinner shall groan, I will remember all his iniquities no more.16 But if it had not been committed, it would in no way be a cause of reprobation, even per accidens: therefore neither if it was committed or contracted, if afterwards it was really dismissed through grace. It is confirmed: for the cause being removed, the effect is removed: therefore, if original sin is in all the cause of reprobation, original sin being removed, reprobation is removed.
The third solution is that original sin, although it is remitted through baptism as regards the fault and eternal punishment,17 yet remains as regards a certain effect; namely as regards the fomes, as regards the hardships of the body, and as regards temporal death. Therefore just as God justly inflicts temporal death in punishment of original sin already remitted, so in punishment of the same sin he leaves some, in a certain common supernatural providence, with helps sufficient for salvation and without efficacious help, at least of the gift of perseverance, knowing that they will sin and be damned. Many learned men employ this solution: but against it the argument presses:18 because no one is punished with a spiritual punishment on account of a sin already dismissed, but the withdrawal of efficacious help is a great spiritual punishment: for, that being posited, the damnation of the man follows infallibly. Moreover: for, in order that something be called simply the cause of reprobation, it must be the cause of the whole effect of reprobation, as has been said of the cause of predestination; for on this account works proceeding from grace are not simply the cause of predestination, because they are not the cause of the whole effect of predestination; for they are not the cause of the first call: but original sin dismissed is not the cause of the whole effect of reprobation, because it is not the cause of the infliction of eternal punishment, as has been said: therefore it cannot be the cause of reprobation.
The fourth solution is that of others, who, to escape the difficulty of the argument, confess that the cause of reprobation in baptized men was not original sin but actual,19 and contend that this is the mind of St Augustine. For, although for the most part he seems to refer the cause of reprobation to original sin, by reason of which the whole human race has been made as it were a certain damned mass, he does this because thence begins the damnation of all the reprobate. And although some are rescued from this mass through baptism, as Augustine says, epistle 54 to Dardanus, q. 2, yet again through actual sin they return to the mass; and therefore they are so regarded by God as though they had never been separated from that mass; and they bring forward for this view St Augustine, in the book de correptione et gratia, cc. 7 and 13, and Prosper, at the second chapter of the Gauls. This solution does not seem to be according to the mind of St Augustine:20 for in the places cited above he expressly teaches, on account of the passages of the Apostle adduced, that actual sin is not the cause of reprobation: nor does he anywhere say the opposite: for in the book de correptione et gratia he only asserts that those who are justified and live piously, but are not going to persevere, are beyond doubt not to be counted in the number of the elect even at the time when they live well and piously; because they have not been separated from that mass of perdition by the foreknowledge and predestination of God: which in everyone's judgment is most true. Yet St Augustine, or St Prosper in the place above, does not there say that they were reprobated on account of actual sin, unless the discourse be of reprobation as regards the last effect, concerning which there is no controversy.
The last solution, that of others, is that original sin dismissed through baptism returns as regards ingratitude, on account of the actual sins that follow,21 just as sins dismissed through penance also afterwards return as regards ingratitude through a subsequent sin, as St Thomas teaches, 3 p. q. 88, a. 2; and by this reasoning all who are damned were reprobated on account of original sin, and not on account of actual sin alone. But against this:22 for it can happen that someone invincibly ignores that original sin was dismissed in him through baptism, as if a boy had been baptized before he came to the use of reason, and were carried off by infidels and brought up in the woods, where he would hear nothing of baptism; such a boy, if he afterwards sins mortally and is damned, that actual sin would not have the circumstance of ingratitude by reason of the original sin already dismissed through baptism. Moreover: for that ingratitude is not original sin, but actual, or a circumstance of it: therefore those once baptized are not reprobated on account of original sin.
XII. Fourthly the conclusion is proved from the words of the Apostle, Romans 9: For when they were not yet born, nor had done anything good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might remain, not from works, but from him who calls, it was said to her: The elder shall serve the younger, as it is written: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated. And below: Has not the potter power, out of the same mass, to make one vessel indeed unto honour, but another unto dishonour? In which testimony, as we showed in disputation 37, no. 9, from the doctrine of St Augustine and St Thomas, it is openly signified that in the absolute election and reprobation of men God did not have regard to foreseen merits or demerits, but by his good pleasure chose this one and predestined him to glory, and did not predestine that one, but by an absolute will determined to permit his sin and hardening, or perseverance in the same sin up to the end of life, and to inflict eternal punishment on account of the same sin, whether that punishment be only of loss, as in little children dying with original sin alone, or also of sense, as in adult reprobates who have added actual sins: which those words of the Apostle also signify: That the purpose of God according to election might remain:23 for election is among several, out of whom one is taken up and another left: therefore according to the Apostle absolute predestination and reprobation precede in a sign of reason foreseen merits or demerits, at least actual ones: for what is to be thought of original sin according to the mind of St Augustine and St Thomas will be said below.
To this passage of the Apostle the author of the first view applies two explanations. The first is that by that word, not from works, only works already done are excluded; but not works foreseen: or if works foreseen are also excluded, as Augustine and many others following him hold, that passage is not to be interpreted of absolute election to glory, but of election to grace. This explanation there is no need to impugn again in the present place, since it has already been excluded as insufficient in disputation 37, no. 17.
The second explanation is of election to the benefits of this life, partly temporal and partly spiritual. For when God had chosen Jacob and his posterity, so that from them Christ should be born, he determined to pursue them with singular benefits and to dispose them for the advent of Christ, and that not with a view to works, but from his own good pleasure. But for Esau and his posterity he did not prepare such excellent benefits. And that the whole discourse of the Apostle in that chapter may be better understood, he notes that it is not the Apostle's scope there to show that God, in the call to faith or in the election to the grace of justification, has no regard for works good or evil, but does all things from a bare good pleasure conceived before all foresight of works: That is not his mind, he says, but his scope is to teach that God, in conferring salvation, the grace of justification, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, has no regard for external works, especially of the law, which the Jews made so much of, and on account of which they thought all things were owed to them, and that they were to be preferred to all others, but only for faith and the inward affection toward God and toward Christ. But those words which the Apostle took from Malachi: But Esau I have hated, he says are so to be taken that by the name of hatred is not signified a true hatred, whereby according to his good pleasure he wills evil to Esau or to his posterity, but a lesser love, which in comparison with the favour bestowed on the other can be called hatred. For the same explanation Bartholomew Camerarius is adduced, in the Catholic Dialogue, ch. 6, § 1, and John of Bologna, opuscule on predestination, part 1, § But that we may return to it.
But whatever be the case with this interpretation, it cannot be denied that the Apostle speaks in that chapter 9 of predestination and reprobation in comparison with the supernatural gifts of grace and glory, as is clear from what has been said in the disputation on predestination. Nor is the authority of Bartholomew Camerarius and John of Bologna so great that on account of it, to escape the difficulty of the argument, one should depart from the common explanation of the holy Fathers24, who interpret the passage of the Apostle of predestination and reprobation in comparison with the supernatural end. It adds weight that from the context of the Apostle in the same chapter 9 and in the preceding chapter 8 it is gathered, and from it the holy Fathers, Latin and Greek, gather, that the Apostle speaks of the predestination and reprobation of which we now treat: for those words of chapter 8, Whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be made conformable to the image of his Son; and those, Who shall accuse against the elect of God? God, who justifies: who is he that condemns? And what he adds in chapter 9, Therefore it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy; and those, Therefore he has mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardens; are not to be narrowed to some particular person, or to mercy or the denial of temporal benefits, but are to be understood universally of mercy, or of predestination and reprobation, in comparison with supernatural goods: which those following words in the same chapter confirm: But if God, willing to show his wrath and to make known his power, endured with much patience the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he has prepared unto glory; whom he has also called, not only from the Jews, but also from the Gentiles, etc. Certainly vessels of wrath fitted for destruction are called nothing but reprobates, who fail from the supernatural end, and vessels of mercy are called those predestined to eternal life; which those words indicate, which he has prepared unto glory.
XIII. Fifthly our conclusion is proved: for if absolute predestination and reprobation is not in God before the foresight of merits or demerits, it would follow that the mystery of predestination and reprobation would not be so inscrutable and unsearchable; for to the objection which the Apostle proposes on the part of the reprobate, Why then does he still find fault? for who resists his will? it could easily be answered that it is no wonder that these were absolutely predestined and those reprobated: for by their own freedom these willed to cooperate with the helps of prevenient grace, but not those: and accordingly it seems to follow that that reproof of the Apostle, and the answer,25 O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? are superfluous, and that there would have been no need to have recourse to that admiration:26 O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how incomprehensible are his judgments, and his ways unsearchable; and consequently that saying of St Augustine, so often repeated, would collapse: why he draws this one and does not draw that one; do not be willing to judge, if you do not wish to err. And that one:27 From two little ones, therefore, bound by original sin, why is this one taken up and that one left? and from two impious men already advanced in age, why is this one so called that he follows him who calls, while that one is either not called, or is not so called that he follows him who calls? The judgments of God are inscrutable. But from two pious men, why is perseverance unto the end given to this one and not given to that one? The judgments of God are more inscrutable. Whence the same Augustine, epistle 105 to Sixtus, weighing that same passage of Romans 9 and of Malachi 1, and excluding predestination and reprobation on the basis of foreseen merits, says: To which view the blessed Apostle also took up the testimony of a Prophet far later: Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated, so that it might be understood that this, afterwards made open through the Prophet, was before they were born in the predestination of God through grace. For what did he love in Jacob, before he was born and had done anything good, except the gratuitous gift of his mercy? And what did he hate in Esau, before he had done anything evil, except original sin? For he would neither love justice in the one, which he had done none of, nor hate nature in the other, which he himself had made good. But it is a wonder, when they are hemmed in by these straits, into how great precipices they cast themselves, fearing the nets of truth. Therefore, they say, he hated one of those not yet born and loved the other: because he foresaw their future works. Who would not wonder that this most acute insight was lacking to the Apostle? For he did not see this, when, to the question set before him as it were by an opponent, he did not rather answer that which is so brief, so open, so (as these think) true and absolute. For when he had set out the astonishing matter, how it could rightly be said of those not yet born, and doing nothing good or evil, that God loved one and hated the other, he himself, expressing by the question set before him the movement of the hearer, says: What then shall we say? Is there injustice with God? Far be it. Here, then, was the place for him to say what these hold. For God was foreseeing their future works, when he said that the greater would serve the less. But the Apostle does not say this; rather, lest anyone should dare to glory in the merits of his own works, he willed that what he said should avail to commend the grace and glory of God. For when he had said: Far be it that there be injustice with God, as if we were saying to him: Whence do you show this, when you assert that it was said, not from works, but from him who calls: The greater shall serve the less? For Moses, he says, saith: I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will show mercy to whom I will be merciful. Therefore it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. To these and similar words of St Augustine the author answers that he speaks against those who held that predestination is from foreseen merits proceeding from the powers of nature alone, as the Pelagians said: but not against those who say that predestination is from foreseen merits proceeding from grace, as the first view asserts. Nevertheless I judge that it cannot be affirmed that predestination is from foreseen merits of grace, as will be clear below. But someone will argue from the context of the same epistle. For immediately after the words adduced he adds: Where now are merits, where works, whether past or future, as it were of the powers of nature, whether fulfilled or to be fulfilled? Of the powers of nature, he says, not of the powers of grace. And in the book on the predestination of the Saints, ch. 17: He foreknew, therefore, says the Pelagian, who would be holy and immaculate through the choice of free will: and therefore before the foundation of the world he chose them in his own foreknowledge such as he foreknew they would be. He chose them, therefore, he says, before they were, predestining the sons whom he foreknew would be holy and immaculate: surely he did not himself make them, nor did he foresee that he would make them, but that they would be. Here he speaks only of predestination from foreseen merits of nature, which those words through the choice of free will indicate, and it is only this predestination, which the Pelagians established, that Augustine impugns in those places and in many others.
Yet this solution could somehow have a place, if it were said that predestination is from foreseen merits of grace, or of the divine call, not of any call whatever, but of that by which God not only grants the power, nor only grants to act piously and to persevere, if we will: nor only concurs with us to pious operation, or to other free acts, by a simultaneous concurrence, if we will to cooperate, but also by his grace truly and efficiently makes us will and persevere unto the end. For of this call St Augustine speaks, as is clear from the same Augustine, in the book on the predestination of the Saints, ch. 16, where he says: He said therefore, not from works, but from him who calls, not by any call whatever, but by that call by which one is made a believer. And ch. 17 he says: But they were chosen out of the world by that calling by which God fulfilled what he predestined. For whom he predestined, them he also called, namely by that calling according to purpose. And he says the same in ch. 16 and 19 of the same book: therefore he speaks of the call by which God not only makes it possible for us to believe, to act piously, and to persevere, if we will, or by which we persevere, if we will: but of that by which God effects that we will. For as the same Augustine says in the same Epistle: The help of the Holy Spirit is so expressed that he is said to do what he does in order that we may do. Which he confirms from that text of Romans 8: The Spirit helps our infirmity. On which we have said more in disputation 86. Which is also certain: for, as was shown in disputation 99, no. 2, the controversy, at least the most important one, of Augustine with the Pelagians was not about exciting grace, but about helping grace, through which God effects that we will. For if God through grace does not in this way effect that we will, but leaves it to the inborn freedom that, if it wills, it determine itself, and if it does not will, it work nothing, all the arguments against predestination from foreseen merits subsequent to exciting grace seem to proceed, which are usually brought against predestination from foreseen merits of nature. Nay, it must be added that even if all this be admitted, there would still have to be solved by the author of the first view that argument by which St Thomas, in the first part, q. 23, a. 5, and on Romans 9, lecture 2, at the end, excludes the view which asserts that predestination depends on foreseen merits of grace: for since merits of this kind28 are effects of predestination, they cannot be the reason, or a condition without which it is not, on which that same predestination depends under the aspect of absolute predestination, as has been said in disputation 37.
But to that which we objected concerning the depth and inscrutability of the divine predestination and reprobation, the author of the first view answers that it is not an inscrutable judgment of God that of two who are called one follows and the other does not follow; or that of two just men one perseveres and the other does not persevere; as some will, referring the cause of this distinction, as to its first origin, to that discretion by which God of himself chose this one to glory and did not choose that one. For it is certain that the cause why this one does not follow the divine call, or does not persevere, is not a defect of grace or of divine election, but the freedom of choice, according to that text of Osee 13: Thy destruction, O Israel, is from thyself; only in me is thy help. And that this one follows and perseveres, the true and proper cause is the freedom of choice, furnished with divine help; which, as in natural things, so in supernatural things, can bend itself in either direction. From which he infers that it is not inscrutable either why the call is efficacious in second act in the one and inefficacious in the other: for that depends on the freedom of choice, in whose hand it is to make it efficacious or inefficacious. He says the same of the helps which are given for persevering: for that these helps have the character of the gift of perseverance, or do not have it, depends similarly on the freedom, which through them can actually persevere or not persevere. And indeed, if it perseveres, those helps will have the character of the gift of perseverance; if it does not persevere, they will not. He adds that in these things St Augustine does not place that inscrutability of the judgments of God; but in this, that when God, before he determines to distribute his graces, foreknows concerning anyone which graces will be efficacious in him and which inefficacious, he nevertheless wills to give to this one the one which he knows will be efficacious, and to that one the one which will be inefficacious. For why does he not also give an efficacious one to the other? why does he give an efficacious one rather to this one than to the other? This cannot be known by us certainly and in particular.
This reply is very difficult, and it does not satisfy our argument. We indeed confess that the proper cause why this man does not assent to the divine call, or does not persevere in grace to the end, is that he himself wills not to consent nor to persevere, as is clear from what was premised in disputation 102: nor do we in any way refer to divine reprobation the fact that the reprobate contradicts grace, or persists in sin to the end, but that alone is referred to the created will as failing. For, as St. Thomas says, 1. p. q. 23, art. 3, ad 2: Reprobation stands otherwise in causing than predestination; for predestination is the cause both of that which is awaited in the future life by the predestined, namely glory, and of that which is received in the present, namely grace. But reprobation is not the cause of that which is in the present, namely guilt, but is of abandonment by God. It is nevertheless the cause of that which is rendered in the future, namely eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free choice of him who is reprobated, and he is deserted by grace. And according to this the saying of the Prophet is verified, namely: Thy perdition, O Israel, is from thee. We contend, however, that the first root and the cause of the first effect of reprobation, namely of the permission of the first sin, on account of which sin the reprobate is damned, is to be reduced to the absolute decree of the divine will, and does not presuppose on man's part any foreseen demerits (otherwise that permission would not be of the first sin, but another sin would be supposed before it), and consequently that no cause of reprobation is given on our part as regards all its effects, although a cause is given as regards some, namely as regards hardening in sin and perseverance in it to the end. For the demeritorious cause of this effect is man's sin itself: nor do they impugn this, but rather the arguments made for the opposite opinion confirm it. We contend secondly that, although the proximate cause why the predestined man consents to God exciting and admonishing him is that he wills to consent (for in truth he consents freely, and can dissent if he wills), nevertheless the first origin, and the cause that he wills to consent and to persevere to the end, is the absolute and efficacious predestination of God, who through the special help of pre-operating grace truly, as an efficient cause, brought it about that the predestined man should consent and persevere to the end; which help was certainly not conferred on the other, who did not persevere, as was shown above. Nor is it to be admitted that it depends on the free cooperation of our choice whether the prevenient help of God has or has not the character of the gift of perseverance, or whether it is efficacious or not efficacious for bringing it about that free choice consents: for it has this inasmuch as it comes from God; although consent or dissent itself proceeds as from an efficient cause from free choice — consent indeed from free choice roused and moved by God through efficacious grace, but dissent and sin from free choice of itself and from its own natural faculty. For it has from itself that it sins, but from God that it works good and perseveres in it to the end, as has been said.
XIIII. But that which is added in the solution we are attacking, concerning the inscrutability of predestination and of the judgments of God, does not seem to agree well enough with the doctrine of St. Augustine and with the context of the Apostle. First, because the Apostle says that the predestined are elect and called according to purpose, as is plain from Rom. 8: who are called according to purpose, saints: and Augustine often says that the predestined are called according to purpose, but that the reprobate are not called according to purpose — which must be understood of the purpose of God, not of the purpose of man foreseen by God, as we showed in disp. 38, no. 14: therefore from that same purpose, before foreseen merits or demerits, God predestined some to eternal life, reprobated others, and willed to permit that they should fail from this end.
Nor, according to Augustine's mind, is the inscrutability of predestination and of the judgments of God to be reduced to that will alone by which he willed to distribute his gifts of grace to certain men in those circumstances in which he foreknew29 that they, by their innate freedom, would cooperate with that same grace and persevere to the end, while to others he determined to distribute the same gifts of grace in such circumstances in which he foreknew that they, by the same freedom, would not cooperate or persevere to the end: for, first, this way of speaking presupposes that there is in God, before every free decree of his will, a middle knowledge by which he knows with certainty what in particular the created will would do by its innate freedom on the hypothesis that it were touched in such circumstances by such an excitation — a foreknowledge which nevertheless St. Augustine did not acknowledge but rather excluded, as was seen in disputation 7: then also because, if the whole mystery of predestination and reprobation and the inscrutability of the judgments of God were to be reduced to this, it seems to follow that the ultimate resolution, into which it must be resolved that this man is predestined by God with an absolute will, would be the future cooperation of his choice foreseen by God, or foreknown through that same knowledge, and that God, in placing a man in those circumstances, would be only a condition without which that man would not be predestined; or at most he would grant that man only that he can act piously and persevere to the end if he wills, but would not bring it about that he wills, perseveres to the end, and is saved: which nevertheless is not to be admitted, as was shown above.
XV. As regards the last effect, a cause of reprobation is given on our part.— Fifth conclusion. Reprobation, as regards the last effect, presupposes in the sign of reason the foreknowledge of original or actual sin, on account of which sin the reprobate is damned. And so not only in execution but also in efficacious intention God did not have the will to punish anyone with eternal punishment except on account of foreseen guilt. This conclusion St. Augustine seems to teach in book 6 of the Hypognosticon and in the other passages alleged above. And it is proved: for the will to punish the reprobate forever belongs to vindictive justice, which necessarily presupposes guilt; for God is not the avenger except of sins which we have committed by our own will, or by the will of our first parent, which is reputed ours. And if anyone objects:30 for God, before foreseen merits, had the efficacious intention of conferring glory on the elect, as was said above: therefore in like manner, before foreseen demerits, he had the efficacious intention of inflicting eternal punishment on the reprobate, for the showing forth of his justice, even if afterwards he does not bring it into execution except on account of guilt; it is answered31 by denying the consequence, and the reason for the difference is: for the infliction of eternal punishment cannot in any way have the character of a gratuitous gift, but belongs necessarily to vindictive justice, which supposes guilt; whereas the efficacious intention of giving glory has the character of a gratuitous gift, insofar as in the sign of reason it precedes the foreknowledge of merits; whence glory itself is called in the sacred Scriptures not only a crown of justice but also a crown of grace; whence there is no parity.
XVI. To the arguments, however, made at the beginning, it is answered that they prove only the fifth conclusion; but insofar as they militate against the fourth conclusion set down above, the answer is given to the first. The Council of Valence does not say that in eternal reprobation evil merit precedes the just judgment of God, but that in the damnation of those who perish evil merit precedes the just judgment of God. The Council therefore speaks of damnation, or eternal punishment, which is not inflicted except on account of guilt, as has been said; but it does not speak of reprobation insofar as that imports the eternal decree of God by which God, with consequent will, willed not to confer on certain men eternal life, which was not owed to them, and to permit sin: for God had this will before foreseen sin, even original, if that sin be considered as the cause of reprobation. But the passages of Scripture adduced in the same argument have already been explained by us in disputation 33, in the solution to the 3rd and 4th.
Augustine's view concerning reprobation is weighed.— To the second argument, from the authority of St. Augustine, some Thomists answer that he had followed that opinion in order to temper the harshness which predestination and reprobation, as handed down by that same holy Augustine and drawn from the sacred Scriptures, seemed to the Pelagians to have. But it is answered in the second place that the passages of St. Augustine can be explained, first, as regards sufficiency; for original sin foreseen before the incarnation of the Word was a sufficient cause why God, if he had willed, could without injury to anyone have reprobated all men; in fact, however, it was not foreseen before reprobation as its cause, but only as the object, or disease of nature, for whose remedy Christ came. And in this reprobation differs from predestination, that in respect of predestination no cause is given on our part, not only efficacious but not even sufficient, on account of which God could have predestined anyone, because grace, which is not owed, precedes all our good merits. Secondly, St. Augustine can be explained concerning reprobation as regards the intermediate effect, which is hardening in sin; for its cause is preceding sin, at least original, as is plain from that passage to the Romans 1: For which cause God delivered them up to a reprobate mind, and also as regards the last effect, which is eternal punishment; for its cause is preceding guilt. But in predestination the merits of grace cannot be the cause on account of which God confers the gift of perseverance, because, as St. Thomas teaches, p. 2. q. 114. art. 9, perseverance does not fall under merit. And that this was the mind of St. Augustine is clear from this: for in the passages adduced above for the contrary opinion, and wherever he speaks of this matter, he never said that a cause of reprobation is given, but only said that on our part a cause of hardening, or of abandonment in sin, is given. The demeritorious cause of this hardening is indeed sin itself: but before that sin, even original, there is understood in God the permission of that same sin; which, in comparison with the reprobate, is the first effect of reprobation; and of this permission no cause is given on the part of the reprobate: and so no cause is given of the whole effect of reprobation. And if the argument be made:32 for a cause is also given on our part of the last effect of predestination, because glory is conferred on men on account of their merits, and in like manner a meritorious cause is given of the intermediate effect, namely of the increase of grace, as was shown in disputation 60, no. 12: therefore as regards this there is no difference between predestination and reprobation; it is answered33 that although good works proceeding from grace are the meritorious cause of the last effect of predestination, just as evil merits are the cause of the last effect of reprobation, there is nevertheless a difference: that the good merits of grace are not in us from ourselves, but from God, as Augustine often teaches; but evil merits are in us from ourselves, and not from God. Whence St. Thomas, on Romans 9, lecture 2, at the end, says: The foreknowledge of merits cannot be any reason of predestination, because foreseen merits fall under predestination; but the foreknowledge of sins can be some reason of reprobation on the part of the punishment which is prepared for the reprobate, insofar as God proposes to punish the wicked on account of the sins which they have from themselves, not from God; but he proposes to reward the just on account of the merits which they do not have from themselves, according to that word of Hosea 13: Thy perdition, O Israel, is from thee; thy help is only in me. And it is in this same sense that Augustine speaks when he says: We seek the cause of predestination, and we do not find it; because, namely, even as regards the last effect we do not find in us a cause which is from us: but the cause of hardening we seek, and we find it, namely one which is in us from us in respect of the last effect of reprobation. But if the argument be made:34 for by the same reason it could be conceded that actual sin is the cause of reprobation, just as original sin is, which conflicts with the doctrine of St. Augustine; it is proved: for actual sin also is the cause of hardening, or of abandonment in sin, and in like manner is the cause of the last effect of reprobation, and is in us from us. It is answered35 that original sin is, in itself, a sufficient cause of reprobation in respect of all men, because it is the common sin of the whole of nature; but actual sin is not found in all, and so it could not be the cause of reprobation as regards sufficiency in respect of all men: but St. Augustine was speaking of the common cause of reprobation.
To the confirmation it is answered that St. Thomas does not say absolutely that the foreknowledge of sins can be any reason of reprobation, but with the addition, namely, on the part of the punishment. And although sin is not an effect of reprobation but something presupposed to it as regards the last effect of that same reprobation, nevertheless the permission of the sin on account of which the damned man is reprobated is truly an effect of reprobation according to St. Thomas, as has been said above.
To the other passage, however, adduced from 1. p. q. 23. ar. 5. in the solution to the 3rd, it is answered that it concludes only that predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of original sin insofar as it is the object for whose remedy Christ came, and insofar as it was the proximate final cause of the incarnation of the Word, but not insofar as it denotes an order to reprobation.
XVIII. What it is for God to hate someone.— To the third it is answered that God is said to hate someone not only insofar as he wills for him the evil of eternal punishment on account of guilt, but also insofar as, before foreseen demerits, of his own good pleasure and by a positive act, he willed not to give eternal life to certain men. Whence St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 23. ar. 3. ad 1, says that God loves all men, and even all creatures, insofar as he wills some good to all; yet he does not will every good to all. Therefore insofar as he does not will to certain men this good, which is eternal life, he is said to hate them, or to reprobate them.
To the fourth it is answered that it proves only that original sin was a sufficient cause of the reprobation of men, but not that in fact men were reprobated on account of it.
Original sin, as it was opposed to original justice, was not an effect of reprobation.— It is answered in the second place that, just as the grace of Adam in the state of innocence was not conferred on him from the merits of Christ, nor was an effect of his predestination, but belonged to a certain general supernatural providence, for the reason that it was not the grace of a redeemed man, so also original sin, insofar as it was opposed to the state of innocence and to original justice, was not the effect of anyone's reprobation, nor did it denote an order to reprobation, but is considered only in that prior stage, as the disease of nature and as the object for whose remedy Christ the Lord was predestined. Whence, insofar as it is understood beforehand, before the predestination and reprobation of men, it was not in fact foreseen as the cause of reprobation. If, however, the same sin be considered insofar as it is opposed to the grace of the Redeemer, then it is understood as subsequent to the reprobation of those who are damned on account of that sin; for the permission of that sin under this consideration was the first effect of reprobation, as has been said above. Whence to the argument in form it is answered that that consequence from the first to the last is null, because the kind of cause is changed, from an objective or proximate final cause into a meritorious cause; for in the antecedent the discourse concerns the proximate final cause of the incarnation, but in the consequent the meritorious cause of reprobation.
XIX. To the fifth argument it is answered that God wills all men to be saved with antecedent will, which is a will in a certain respect, but not with consequent will, which is will absolutely, as was explained in disputations 33 and 34.
To the sixth argument it is answered that reprobation, as regards the last effect, is an act of vindictive justice, and therefore, as regards that effect, presupposes guilt on our part; but as regards the first effect, which is the first permission of sin, in which the reprobate perseveres to death, it is not an act of vindictive justice, but of the simple will of God, as has been said.
God is not cruel in the reprobation of men.— To the confirmation it is answered that, just as God is not cruel in reprobating the angels before the foreknowledge of their future sin, so neither is he in reprobating men; for there is no cruelty, nor even unmercifulness, in not giving someone what is not owed to him. Whence even if God, before foreseen guilt, wills not to give glory to some, which is to reprobate them, there is no unmercifulness or injustice, since glory is owed to no one according to its nature.
To the seventh argument the antecedent is denied. To the proof it is answered that among the effects of reprobation is numbered the first permission of sin, on account of which sin the reprobate is damned, as St. Thomas teaches in the other passages adduced above, and that of this permission no cause is given on our part. This permission, then, the holy Doctor comprehends under the name of the withdrawal of efficacious help; for divine permission is presupposed to the sin on account of which God withdraws efficacious help. And by these points the answer is clear to the other passages of St. Thomas adduced in the same argument.
To the confirmation it is answered that even in reprobation made before the foreknowledge of future sin, men cannot reasonably complain of God, just as neither can the angels, as was shown from the authority of the Apostle in Rom. 9.
To the eighth it is answered by denying the antecedent; and to the first proof it must be said that, although of one sin there is only one permission according to one respect, nevertheless the same permission, or the same sin under one respect, precedes the predestination of Christ, and consequently also precedes the predestination and reprobation of men; and under another respect it is understood as subsequent to reprobation itself. Nor is it unfitting that the same thing, in respect of the same thing, according to a different respect and in a different kind of cause, be prior and posterior.
To the first proof it is answered that, although sin in itself stands equally toward all men, God nevertheless, by his will, which cannot be unjust, willed that in some the permission of sin should not be an effect of reprobation, but should be so in others.
To the second confirmation it is answered that the legitimate sense of the Council of Trent is that God does not deprive of habitual grace those once justified, unless they first in the order of nature commit mortal sin, by which they desert God and merit to be deprived of justifying grace; yet before that mortal sin by which man deserts God, there is understood in God the permission of that same sin, as has been said. And by these points the answer is given to the authority of St. Thomas: that before that negligence of Adam there preceded God's permission, of which Adam was not the meritorious cause; for before the first negligence no sin is understood. From these points the solution to the arguments of the second opinion is easy.
XX. To the first it is answered that from those passages it is gathered only that a cause of reprobation is given on our part as regards its last effect. Whence that causal particle for in the passage of Matthew adduced imports the cause on account of which the reprobate are punished with eternal punishment: but nevertheless before all sins there is understood the divine permission by which he permits the first sin of the reprobate, which permission is indeed the first effect of reprobation, and of this permission no cause is given on the part of the reprobate. In like manner it must be said, in regard to the passage of Ezechiel 18 and Ezechiel 33,36 that God does not will eternal death for sinners, that is, the punishment of sin, except on the supposition of the sin itself and of perseverance in it to the end: but nevertheless before every sin he willed to permit the first sin, as has been said. Secondly, those same passages can be explained of sin itself, or spiritual death, which God does not will but only permits. To the passage of Wisdom 11 it is answered that God loves all things that are, especially men, because he wills good to all, and the being that they have; but nevertheless he does not will this good, which is eternal life, to all men with consequent will: and according to this he is said to hate them, or to reprobate them. The solution is St. Thomas's, 1. p. q. 23. ar. 3. ad 2. To the passage of 1 Timothy 2 it is answered that God with antecedent will wills all men to be saved, but with consequent will he does not will all, but some, namely the predestined, to be saved. But how these two wills cohere with each other has already been explained above.37
To the second argument it is answered by what has been said to the passages of Scripture adduced, and to the other like authorities of the Fathers, to which an answer was given in disp. 37. n. 18. and 20. But especially to those words of St. Prosper: They would then be predestined, if they were going to return; it is answered that he speaks according to a certain concomitance of inference. For it follows by a certain argument drawn a posteriori, or from the effect, that if a sinner returns to God and perseveres to the end, he is predestined; yet this return to God is not the cause of absolute predestination, but its effect, according to that word: If they had been of us, they would surely have remained with us.38
To the third it is answered that, as was said in disp. 30, election and predestination to glory, insofar as it is in the divine intention, supposes no condition on our part, but before all foreseen merits of grace God in his intention willed eternal life absolutely for the elect; and this intention being supposed, he determined to provide the means by which he would efficaciously lead the elect to eternal life. But insofar as it is in execution, eternal life is never given to predestined adults except on the supposition of the merits of grace, because God neither willed nor ordained that in the exercise the elect should be saved whether they work good or work evil, but that they should be saved through good works, which also fall under divine predestination and are its effects. God therefore promised eternal life, to be obtained in the exercise, under the condition of good works; but God himself by his grace brings it about that that condition is put in being, and that the cooperation of our choice itself is put in being: for he makes us to do, and works that we may work. Whence St. Augustine, epistle 105, says: For the Apostle was dealing sufficiently with grace itself, and therefore he commended the children of the promise. For what God promises, none but God does: for it has something of reason and of truth that man promise and God do; but that man should say that he does what God has promised is the reprobate sense of proud impiety. And the Apostle signified this when he said:39 Therefore it is of faith, that according to grace the promise may be firm to all the seed. Explaining this passage, the same Augustine, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 10, says: He promised not from the power of our will, but from his predestination. For he promised what he himself was going to do, not what men were to do: because even if men do the good things that pertain to worshipping God, he makes them do what he has commanded; they do not make him do what he promised: otherwise, for God's promises to be fulfilled, it would be in the power not of God but of men; and what was promised by the Lord would be rendered to Abraham by them. Whence the good works by which we obtain eternal life, although they are our merits, because they are freely elicited by us with the help of grace, are nevertheless accepted by God, who wills that to be our merits which are his own gifts. But in reprobation the last effect, which is perpetual damnation, is not inflicted on the sinner except on the supposition of sin, which sin nevertheless the reprobate does not have from God but from himself, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. p. q. 23. art. 3. ad 2.
XXI. To the fourth it is answered that reprobation absolute, before foreseen demerits, derogates nothing from the divine goodness or from his justice, but agrees most fully with both. With goodness indeed, because his mercy is shown the more in the elect if, before foreseen merits or demerits, he chose this man and predestined him because he willed; and did not predestine that man, but permitted that he should fall into sin and fail from the supernatural end, because so it pleased him: which Christ the Lord seems to have signified when he said: Yea, Father; for so it was pleasing before thee.40 The divine goodness and mercy is shown also in the reprobate, while he confers on them helps by which they can act rightly and come to eternal life if they will, and offers efficacious helps, as far as lies on his part, to which nevertheless they themselves put an impediment by their own malice. Likewise also, because he does not permit them to fall into all the sins which they could commit by their free choice; because, as Augustine says: There is no sin that one man commits which another man would not commit, if there were lacking the helper by whom man was made.41 Whence the same Augustine says: I ascribe to thy mercy, he says, Lord, the sins which I have not committed. Finally, as St. Thomas says, 1. p. q. 21. artic. 4. ad 1, even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy appears, not indeed wholly remitting, but in some way lightening, while it punishes short of what is deserved. But the justice of God appears especially in the reprobate, while in many wondrous but true ways he punishes them forever for their offenses. Nor does he inflict injury on anyone if, of his good pleasure and without foreseen merits or demerits, he chooses one man and predestines him to glory, and does not predestine another but permits him to fail from the supernatural end. For since the beatific vision is not owed to any pure creature, but is a gratuitous gift of God, even if of two men existing in an equal case one be taken up and the other left, no injury is done to anyone: since, as St. Thomas says, and before him St. Augustine, in gratuitous things there is no place for respect of persons, or for injustice.4243 For one can do a favor to one man because he wills, and not do it to another because he wills not. Nor does it follow from this that the greatest part of men is predestined by divine power to evil, or created in order to perish; because God, although he permits the sins of the reprobate and their perseverance in them to the end of life, is nevertheless not the cause of their sinning, as was shown in disp. 24, nor did he create them for this end, that they should perish, but he permits them to sin and inflicts eternal punishment on them for their sins, so that divine justice may shine forth in them, and greater mercy in the elect, as will be clear in the following disputation.
XXII. To the fifth it is answered that the same objection was once proposed against the doctrine of St. Augustine concerning predestination and reprobation before foreseen merits or demerits, as he himself reports in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 11, in these words, to which words and to the objection he answers:44 Indeed, since the Apostle says: Therefore it is of faith, that according to grace the promise may be firm: I wonder that men prefer to commit themselves to their own infirmity rather than to the firmness of God's promise. But, he says, the will of God concerning myself is uncertain to me. What then? Is your own will concerning yourself certain to you, and do you not fear? Let him who seems to stand see that he does not fall. Since, therefore, both are uncertain, why does not man commit his faith, hope, and charity to the firmer rather than to the weaker?45 and again he says:46 We therefore live more safely if we give the whole to God, and do not commit ourselves to him in part and to ourselves in part. And the reason for this is: for our hope, which, as the Apostle says, we have firm and secure for the soul, is founded not in man, not in our free choice, but in God: for the Prophet says:47 Cursed is the man who trusts in man, and puts flesh as his arm, and whose heart departs from the Lord. Whence the certitude and firmness of our hope ought to proceed from God himself and not from us, and consequently the predestination and absolute election of God according to his mere will ought to be reputed safer and firmer, because God is able to fulfill what he has predestined. The best counsel, therefore, will be for those who are disturbed by various perturbations concerning predestination and reprobation not to enter into this deep, but to think of the Lord in goodness, to seek him in simplicity of heart, to attend diligently to prayer and good works, and to keep his commandments. For it is most certain that he who perseveres to the end, he shall be saved.48 With this affection, with this due subjection of mind toward God, he expelled all perturbations and anxieties of heart in the consideration of God's judgments, who said:49 I have not departed from the commandments of his lips, and in my bosom I have hidden the words of his mouth. For he himself is alone, and no one can turn away his thought, and his soul, whatever he willed, that he has done. And when he has fulfilled in me his will, and many other like things, they are ready for him. To which agrees that word:50 But if he shall say to me, Thou dost not please; I am ready, let him do what is good before himself. Let the theologian read St. Augustine, book On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 14, and he will see all things touched and solved by St. Augustine which are inferred in the argument we are now treating from predestination and reprobation before foreseen merits of grace or one's own demerits. He will see also that St. Augustine, on account of those inconveniences, did not recede from the opinion which in his books he constantly taught and defended concerning that same predestination and reprobation. Let him read besides the above-mentioned disp. 2. num. 1. and 16, and from them he will gather how far the first opinion proposed above is distant from the doctrine of St. Augustine. Let St. Augustine also be seen, book 1, q. 2, to Simplician, where he treats the present difficulty at length.
But to those things which are brought forward for the second and third opinion, the answer is already clear from what has been said.
Disputatio CXI: Whether a sufficient cause of reprobation can be assigned on God’s part.
Whether a sufficient cause of reprobation can be assigned on the part of God.
I. Since, therefore, it is supposed that no cause of reprobation is given on our part, as regards all of its effects, it must be asked whether one is given on the part of God. And the difficulty is: whether the manifestation of divine justice in the reprobate, and the greater splendor of divine mercy in the elect, is the chief and of itself sufficient cause of reprobation, as regards its first effect, which is the permission of sin, on account of which the reprobate is damned. Some defend the negative part, for which
It is argued first: for to will, with such great loss and harm to a rational creature, to permit its sins for this sole or chief reason, namely that he may have something to punish, and in which his justice may shine, is altogether repugnant to divine clemency and mercy: therefore. The antecedent is proved: for a prince would be reckoned by all to be blameworthy and devoid of clemency and mercy, if, when he could prevent all the sins of his commonwealth, he willed nevertheless to permit some for this sole or chief reason, that he might have something to punish justly, and in which to exercise his vindictive justice: therefore.
Secondly. There are many other chief ends for the sake of which God permits sin: therefore. The antecedent is proved: for the first end is that he permit an intellectual creature to act freely according to its own nature, and permit defective causes sometimes to fail: which end St. Thomas seems to assign, 1 p. q. 23, art. 3. The second end is that on the occasion of sins other greater goods should follow in some, such as the incarnation of the Word and the crowns of the martyrs, which would not have come about if God had not permitted the sins of the first parent and of tyrants.
Thirdly. God did not create the reprobate for this end, that he might damn them for ever; rather he ordained them to eternal life as to the ultimate supernatural end of the intellectual creature: therefore he did not create them for this chief end, that he might show his justice in them: therefore in like manner he did not permit their sins for this chief end, that he might show in them his vindictive justice.
This is confirmed: for otherwise it would have to be conceded that God by his providence destined the reprobate to eternal punishment, just as he predestined the elect to glory; and consequently that God by his providence procures that the damnation and punishment of the reprobate should follow: which seems contrary to that word of Eccles. 15: Do not say, He has led me astray. The consequence is proved: for it pertains to the providence of God to procure that the chief end which he intends should infallibly follow: therefore if the showing of divine justice is the chief end intended by God through reprobation, it follows that it pertains to God to procure that such an end should follow.
Fourthly. The splendor of divine justice is manifested most abundantly in the punishment of the angels: therefore it is superfluous to permit so great a multitude of men to be damned, in order that divine justice may shine in them.
II. The contrary opinion is taught by St. Thomas in the solution to the third objection of the same article; for the explanation of which it must be noted that God in his works ad extra does not intend to acquire any perfection at all in himself, but rather to communicate and manifest his own to others. Hence in creation he showed his omnipotence, in the distinction of things he manifested his wisdom, and in their adornment his goodness; and since the perfections of God are infinite, it was necessary that his goodness be communicated and manifested in many ways in created things: as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 23, art. 3, on which Father Romeus Castilionus, formerly General of our order, treats excellently in his book On Freedom and the Necessity of Works, verit. 12; and so it was necessary that divine justice also, and mercy, be manifested. Let this, then, be laid down:
The splendor of divine justice and mercy is, on the part of God, a sufficient cause of reprobation.— First conclusion. The splendor of divine mercy in the elect, and likewise the showing of divine justice in the reprobate, is truly and properly the final cause for which God permits sins, both in men and in the reprobate angels. This conclusion, as it stands, is of faith, and the authors of the opposite opinion do not deny it: for it was handed down by St. Paul, Romans 9, when he says that if God, willing to show his wrath and to make known his power, endured with much patience the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches of his mercy and glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he prepared for his glory: by which words the Apostle teaches that the manifestation of his justice and mercy was the cause for which he permitted sins. The same he shows in the same chapter from the authority of Exodus 9, where it was said of Pharaoh: For this very thing have I raised you up, that I might show in you my power.
It is proved by reason: for God works all things for himself, according to that word: The Lord has wrought all things for himself, even the wicked for the day of evil:1 therefore the end for which God permits sins is the showing of divine justice and mercy. The consequence is clear: for God cannot intend any perfection which he would acquire anew through works ad extra, as has been said: therefore he intends the manifestation of his own perfections; but through the permission of sin divine justice is most especially manifested in the reprobate: therefore. Let those words be noted: Even the wicked for the evil day; by which it is signified that God created man, who by his own fault would be wicked, and permitted sin, that on the evil day, the day of judgment, he might show his justice in his punishment. Thus Aymo on the same passage, and Lyranus, Rodulphus, and several other expositors explain that place. Moreover, to permit the evil of fault is absolutely good, as St. Augustine teaches in2 Enchir. ad Laur. c. 95; likewise the infliction of eternal punishment, guilt being supposed, is good: therefore it is reasonably ordered to the showing of divine justice, which is a greater and more universal good. The consequence is clear, because the lesser good is ordered to the greater good.
III. Second conclusion. The showing of divine justice is not so the cause of reprobation as to exclude other causes and particular proximate ends. We concede this conclusion to the arguments made for the first opinion, which the second argument especially proves. Moreover: for a universal end does not exclude other particular and proximate ends; but the showing of divine justice is the universal and ultimate end of the permission of sin in the reprobate: therefore.
Third conclusion. The showing of divine justice in the reprobate, and the splendor of divine mercy in the elect, is the chief end and of itself sufficient cause for which God permits the sins of the reprobate and punishes them. The conclusion is St. Thomas's, 1 p. q. 23, art. 3, where he says that this is the reason why he chose some and reprobated others, namely that the goodness of God might be represented in the elect by way of mercy, in sparing, and in the reprobate by way of justice, in punishing. And St. Thomas intends to assign the chief cause of predestination and reprobation, as is clear in the argument to which he responds; and Cajetan teaches the same in the same solution, in the response to a certain confirmation of Aureolus, where he says that reprobation, as regards the permission of demerit (even if there were no other cause but the refulgence of divine justice), would not be evil. And all the Thomists teach the same. It is proved first: for sacred Scripture, and especially the Apostle, assigns this cause for which God permits sins, namely that divine justice may be manifested in the reprobate: therefore this is the chief and of itself sufficient cause. The consequence is clear: for from this St. Thomas, 3 p. q. 1, art. 3, proves that the redemption of the human race is the chief and of itself sufficient cause of the incarnation of the Word, namely because sacred Scripture assigns this cause when it treats of the coming of Christ. It is proved secondly: for the showing of divine justice is the most universal end of the permission of sin, containing under itself the other particular ends: therefore it is the chief. The consequence is clear: for the universal end is the chief of all, as victory, because it is the universal end, is principally intended through war, and is of itself sufficient to set a just war in motion.
It is proved finally by an argument ad hominem: for the showing of divine justice is truly and properly the end for which God permits sins and punishes them: but it is not a less principal end, otherwise the glory of God would be ordered to us as to a chief end: therefore it is the chief end.
IIII. God does not permit sin in order to punish it.— To the first argument it is answered from Cajetan that God does not permit sin in order to punish it, but permits and punishes sin in order that divine justice may shine. And the reason for this is that the permission of sin and its punishment, in themselves, have not and cannot have the character of an end, because in themselves they have nothing on account of which they are desirable; but they have it through their relation to the glory of God and the showing of his justice, which is absolutely good; as a most bitter medicine is not desirable in itself, but only for the sake of the health to be obtained. And to the comparison introduced in the argument it is answered that there is not the same reason for a temporal prince and for God: for the commonwealth is not ordered in itself to the prince, nor to the manifesting of his glory as to an end; but rather the prince is ordered to the good of the commonwealth: whereas creatures are ordered in themselves to God himself as to their ultimate end, and to the manifesting of his glory. Moreover: for a prince is a particular governor, and therefore is bound, as far as he can, to prevent the sins of his commonwealth: but God is an agent and governor absolutely universal; and therefore it pertains to his providence to permit certain particular evils, in order to bring out of them greater goods.
It is answered secondly that even a particular prince justly permits lesser sins in order that greater ones be avoided: as he permits harlots, in order that sins against nature, which are graver, be avoided.
To the second it is answered that it proves only the second conclusion.
V. God did not create the reprobate for this end, that he might damn them.— To the third it must be said that God did not create the reprobate for this end, that he might damn them; since their damnation in itself has nothing on account of which it is desirable; but he created the reprobate, and permitted their sins, and damned them for ever for their sins, in order that divine justice and power might be shown in them. Nor does it follow from this that God procures that sins be committed for the obtaining of this end; but only that he permits them, since sin cannot stand on the part of God, but is supposed on the part of man, in order that the ultimate end of reprobation may follow, as St. Thomas teaches, art. 3 of the cited question, ad 2. And by these things the answer to the confirmation is clear.
To the fourth it is answered that even in men it was necessary that divine justice and mercy be manifested. But mercy shines the more in the elect if fewer are saved; since everything rare is precious, according to that which is said in 1 Reg. 3: The word of God was precious, namely rare, as the holy Doctors explain. And Isaias 13: A man shall be more precious than gold, and a man than refined gold: by which words it is signified that on account of future wars so many men would die that very few would be found, and therefore they would be more precious than gold.
Disputatio CXII: Whether God grants all people, however hardened and reprobate, sufficient supernatural helps through which they can attain eternal life and actually attain it if they will.
Whether God grants to all men, however hardened, and to the reprobate, supernatural helps sufficient, through which they can attain eternal life, and in fact attain it, if they will.
I. The affirmative part is proved by many authorities of sacred Scripture: for it is said in Apoc. 3.1 Behold, I stand at the door, and knock; if any man shall open to me, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me: now to stand at the door is to confer sufficient helps; for to knock is to rouse and to move men to that supernatural good which is signified by the supper. Again, it is also said in Eccli. 15: God established man in the hand of his own counsel, and again: Say not: It is through God that he is away, etc. But if God did not give to all helps sufficient for salvation, the fault would lie with God that someone is not converted to him, nor would every man be placed in the hand of his own counsel, as long as he is on the way. Again, the Apostle also says in 1 Tim. 2: God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth: therefore he gives to all helps sufficient for salvation. Moreover, in 2 Cor. 5 he says: Christ died for all. And again he says that he is the Savior of all: but for this reason he is said to have died for all, and to be the Savior of all, inasmuch as he gives to all sufficient helps, by which, if they will, they can be saved. For on this account he did not die for the demons, nor is he called their Savior, because he gave them no help by which they could be saved: therefore.
Secondly, the argument is drawn from the Council of Sens, where it is said:2 Nor does so great a necessity of grace prejudice free choice, since it is always at hand, nor does even a moment pass in which God does not stand at the door and knock, etc. therefore a help sufficient for salvation is given to all.
Thirdly. Any sinner, as long as he is on the way, can be converted to God: otherwise some state of a sinner would be given, of whose salvation one must despair, and some sin of one existing on the way, which could not be blotted out by true penance, which nevertheless is erroneous, as St. Thomas proves 3. part. q. 86. art. 1. therefore any sinner, as long as he is on the way, has a supernatural help sufficient for salvation; otherwise he could not be converted to God, since without a help of this kind no one can be converted to God and be saved.
II. Fourthly. He who does not fulfill the precept of penance sins mortally, and the same holds of the precept of charity and of the others: therefore he has a help sufficient for fulfilling precepts of this kind: otherwise men would be bound to what is impossible, which is false, since no one sins in what he cannot avoid, as St. Aug. teaches lib. 3. de libero arbitrio cap. 18. and 19. and in the other places adduced in disp. 54. num. 7.
Fifthly. As St. Thomas teaches p. 2. q. 89.3 art. 6. anyone arriving at the use of reason is bound at that time to convert himself to God: which if he does, he will be justified; and from this principle he concludes that a venial sin cannot be given together with original sin alone: therefore anyone arriving at the use of reason receives from God a supernatural help, at least sufficient, by which he can convert himself to God, if he wills: otherwise to one doing what is in him by the powers of nature alone grace would sometimes be given infallibly; which nevertheless is against the teaching of St. Aug. as was shown disp. 56. nu. 6. and following.
A sufficient help for believing immediately is not given to all.— On the contrary: for St. Th. 2. 2. q. 2. ar. 5. ad 1., speaking of the help of grace without which man cannot love God and his neighbor and believe the articles of faith, says that this help, to whomsoever it is given by God, is given mercifully; but to whomsoever it is not given, it is not given from justice, in punishment of preceding sin, at least original, as St. Aug. says lib. de correp. et grat. c. 5. and 6. He therefore holds that to some the help of grace is not given by which they could believe and love God. And q. 10. ar. 1. he teaches that some are unbelievers only negatively, who are damned on account of sins committed against the natural law: but if all had sufficient help for believing, no adult would be an unbeliever only negatively; but all who do not believe would be unbelievers contrarily: for all are bound to believe: therefore if they can believe through the sufficient help which they have, and do not believe, they sin mortally against faith: for these three suffice for unbelief to be imputed to them as guilt. Moreover St. Aug. tract. 19. on John and epist. 105. to Sixtus says that in those who have not heard, nor could have heard, not to believe is the punishment of sin, but not sin: he therefore holds that sufficient help for believing is not given to all.
Concerning this difficulty, the first opinion is that of those asserting that there are some sins of a man on the way which cannot be blotted out by true penance: but this opinion theologians commonly reject as erroneous, with St. Th. 3. p. q. 86. cited, where it is expressly disputed whether there is any sin of one existing on the way which is truly irremissible.
III. The second opinion says that God sometimes, in punishment of preceding sin, does not give to some adults a help sufficient for salvation: which many follow, and it can be proved from the places of St. Aug. and St. Th. adduced by us in the counter-argument.
The third opinion absolutely concedes that a help sufficient for salvation is conferred by God on all men universally, with no distinction made between the faithful and infidels: which opinion all the arguments made from the beginning prove.
The fourth opinion distinguishes between faithful and infidel men, and teaches that to all the faithful helps sufficient for salvation are given: for faith very often rouses them to pursue and to love the supernatural good. But if the discourse is about infidels, and especially about those who never heard the Gospel, this opinion asserts that to many a help sufficient for obtaining eternal life is not given, but is denied in punishment of preceding sin, as has been said: which the places adduced from St. Aug. and St. Thomas seem to prove.
IIII. The fifth opinion is that of Master Bañes 1. p. q. 23. a. 3. dub. 3. especially concl. 8. and 9., where he teaches that the word give is taken in two ways. First, as it is correlative to receive; and in this sense God does not give to all men, even those arriving at the use of reason, the supernatural help of preparing grace, whether for believing or for repenting: which he proves by the authorities of St. Th. and St. Aug. adduced above. In the second way it is taken as it signifies the same as to be ready, as far as lies on his part, to confer a help of this kind on all; and in this sense he says that God gives, that is, is ready to give, to all men, as long as they are in this life, a help by which they can be converted, and are converted, if they will.
The extrinsic and intrinsic helps of God, and what they are called.— For the resolution of this difficulty it must first be noted that the helps of God are of two kinds: some are extrinsic to us, such as the passion of Christ the Lord, his example, the sacraments, the exterior preaching of the Gospel, miracles, and the law itself, of which it is said psalm. 118. And thy judgments shall help me. But other helps are intrinsic, and divine motions inhering in us, through which we can work those works which exceed the powers of nature. Secondly it must be noted that these intrinsic helps are sometimes given for acts which, from their formal object and as to substance, are supernatural, such as the acts of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity; sometimes they are given for acts which, according to their object and formal reason, do not exceed the capacity of nature, absolutely speaking; yet they exceed the powers of fallen nature. Of this kind are the act of natural love of God above all things, and the absolute and efficacious conversion to the good of reason proportionate to nature; to which conversion a child is bound by the natural precept as soon as he arrives at the use of reason. But in what ways and by what means God is wont to move men to good, St. Prosper explains excellently lib. contra collat. c. 14.
V. Extrinsic helps for salvation God gives to all.— First conclusion. If we speak of extrinsic helps, God gives to all helps sufficient for salvation, proposes and offers them to all, as far as lies on his part, although in fact some do not receive them. The places of Scripture adduced in the first argument prove this conclusion: for Christ died for all, for all he instituted the sacraments, and to every creature he commanded the Apostles to preach the Gospel, as is said Marc. ult.
A sufficient intrinsic help for fulfilling the natural precepts God confers on all.— Second conclusion. God gives to all, according to place and time, a supernatural intrinsic help, and sufficient for fulfilling the natural precepts, which, supposing sin, cannot be fulfilled from the powers of nature alone. For example, to a child, when he arrives at the use of reason, he gives a sufficient help by which he can be converted to the good proportionate to his nature, and propose to live according to reason; and the conclusion is understood to mean that in fact all receive a sufficient help of this kind, at least for the place and time in which a precept of this kind obliges. The fourth and fifth arguments from the points made at the beginning prove this conclusion efficaciously. It is proved moreover: he who does not fulfill a natural precept at the time in which it obliges sins mortally, nor is he excused by invincible ignorance, because precepts of this kind are known to all through the light of reason: therefore it is necessary that he have in himself a supernatural intrinsic help, and sufficient, by which he can fulfill that precept; for, as we suppose, by the powers of nature alone he cannot fulfill it. It is confirmed: for otherwise the transgression of that precept would not be imputed to men as guilt, since by natural means alone they cannot fulfill it; but no one sins in what he cannot avoid.
VI. Some respond to this argument that, when someone through his own fault lacks the sufficient help for fulfilling some precept, his transgression is nevertheless imputed as sin, although it would not be imputed if he were destitute of a help of this kind without any preceding fault: just as inculpable drunkenness, or invincible ignorance, excuses from the sin which one commits in that drunkenness or ignorance, for example the killing of a man; but it does not excuse when the ignorance or drunkenness was culpable.4 And this solution seems to have a foundation in St. Th. 3. con. Gent. c. 160. near the end, where he says: Although those who are in sin cannot by their own power avoid presenting or placing an impediment to grace, unless they are prevented by the help of grace, nevertheless this is imputed to them as guilt; because this defect is left in them from a preceding fault, just as a drunkard is not excused from homicide which he commits through drunkenness, which he incurred by his own fault: and from this he concludes that not undeservedly is it imputed to him as guilt. Which St. Aug. also teaches lib. de corrept. et grat. c. 11., where, speaking of the assistance of grace by which Adam could have persevered if he had willed, he says: But if this assistance had been lacking to the angel or to man as soon as they were made, since their nature was not made such that it could remain without divine assistance if it willed, they would certainly not have fallen by their own fault. For the assistance would have been lacking without which they could not remain. But now, to whom such assistance is lacking, it is already the punishment of sin. He therefore holds that even if a help is not given to a man by which he could act piously or persevere if he willed, the sin that follows is imputed to him, because in punishment of preceding sin the help of grace was not conferred on him by which he could avoid that sin.
But against this solution there is an argument: for St. Aug. lib. 3. de lib. arb. c. 18. and 19. and lib. de natur. et grat. cap. 67. teaches that a man does not always sin in what he cannot avoid, even if that impotence arises from a preceding sin. And reason persuades this: for otherwise he who by his own fault falls into madness would sin mortally by not fasting, or not hearing Mass at his time: for he has also been made impotent by his own fault to fulfill precepts of this kind. In like manner, too, the inordinate motions of the sensitive appetite, which can in no way be guarded against, would be imputed as guilt in infidels, because the impotence to guard against such motions took its rise from preceding original sin. And to the place adduced from St. Th. it is answered that he speaks openly of the privation of efficacious help, as is clear from what he says in the preceding words: for in c. 159. he openly teaches that God, as far as in him lies, is ready to give grace to all: and he explains this by the example of the sun, which on its part illuminates all. And to the place adduced from St. Aug. it is answered that he only teaches that in fallen nature it is a punishment of sin that no help is given it by which it could persevere: he does not, however, hold that it is a new sin if a man does not do what he cannot do from the corruption of original sin, unless a help is given him by which he can do it: as is clear in negative unbelief; and so Augustine explains himself in the c. 67. cited. The greater difficulty is about the sufficient help which is given immediately for the supernatural acts of faith, hope, and charity. For some Thomists answer that helps of this kind are given to men for the time in which they would sin, if they did not fulfill these precepts, and are so given that all in themselves receive intrinsic helps of this kind, and sufficient: which doctrine, although it is true, nevertheless does not seem to explain exactly the state of the question. Hence it is that
VII. A sufficient help for believing immediately not all receive.— Third conclusion. It must absolutely be said that if the word give is taken as correlative to receive, God does not give to all, even those arriving at the use of reason, a supernatural and intrinsic help sufficient for producing immediately the supernatural acts of faith and hope. And so not all receive a physical and intrinsic help sufficient for them to be able to believe immediately: but this help is not given to many in punishment of preceding sin, at least original. The conclusion is Master Bañes's, in the place above, and sufficiently common among Thomists, and in my judgment is expressed in the places of St. Aug. and St. Th. adduced in the counter-argument; otherwise there would be no negative unbeliever, as we deduced in the same argument. It is proved moreover: for, as is said in Rom. 10. How then shall they believe him whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? But there are some who have never heard anything of supernatural faith, such as children brought up among barbarians in the woods: therefore. The consequence is clear: for without a preacher, interior or exterior, of supernatural faith, no one is said to have a sufficient help for believing immediately. I said in the conclusion, for believing immediately: for whether mediately or immediately, all receive, according to place and time, a sufficient help, if they arrive at the use of reason: for, as we said above, if an infidel child arriving at the use of reason should do what is in him from a special help, converting himself to God and to the good of reason proportionate to nature, God would enlighten him concerning the mysteries of faith, and he would be justified by grace. And according to this doctrine are to be understood the things St. Th. teaches q. 14.5 de verit. ar. 11. ad 1., where he says: But if anyone brought up in the woods follows the guidance of natural reason in the appetite of good and the flight from evil, it is most certainly to be held that God would either reveal to him by internal inspiration the things necessary for believing, or direct some preacher to him.6 And in 2. sent. d. 28. q. 1. art. 4. ad 4. he says: That for having faith someone can prepare himself by what is in natural reason. Whence it is said that if anyone born among barbarous nations does what is in him, God will reveal to him what is necessary for salvation, either by inspiring or by sending a preacher. For the sense is not that to one doing what is in him from the powers of nature alone the help of grace is given infallibly; or that for having faith someone can prepare himself by what is in natural reason done from the faculty of nature alone, as some think; but by what is natural from its object, yet done from the special help of prevenient grace, as has been said; otherwise the first preparation for the help of grace would be in us from ourselves: which cannot be admitted, as was shown disp. 55. Let what Master Medina 1. 2. q. 89. ar. 6. and Master Bañes in the place above, and 2. 2. q. 10. ar. 1. dub. 2. ad. 4. teach concerning this doctrine of St. Th. be consulted. To all the arguments made from the beginning it is answered that, for the most part, they prove the first and second conclusions; but as far as they seem to proceed against the third, answer is made to each singly.
VIII. To the first, from c. 3. Apoc., it is answered that God, through the means of creatures and the light of reason, knocks at the door of all, according to place and time, that they may follow the good of reason proportionate to nature: and in like manner he knocks, according to place and time, at the door of all by a special help, that they may follow the same good, especially when they arrive at the use of reason, as has been said; yet he does not always knock by giving to all a supernatural help sufficient for believing immediately, so that all receive this help, as is clear from what has been said. And by these things answer is easily made to the other places of Scripture, and by what has been said in the first and second conclusions.
To the second argument, from the Council of Sens, answer is made from what has been said to the first. For the sense is not that at every moment any sinner receives in himself a help sufficient for salvation: for when he sleeps, certainly he is not moved by a sufficient help in act: but the sense is that, as far as lies on God's part, he always has it at hand, as St. Thomas teaches 3. cont. Gent. c. 159. and 160.
IX. That something can be comes about in two ways, namely through the power of another, or through a power which is in it.— To the third it is answered that, as St. Th. says q. 6. de verit. ar. 3. ad 7., Something can be said to be able in two ways: in one way by considering the power which is in it, as we say that a stone can be moved downwards; in another way by considering what is on the part of another, as if I were to say that a stone can be moved upwards, not by a power which is in it, but by the power of the thrower. Proportionably we say in the present matter that when it is asserted that any sinner, as long as he is on the way, can be converted to God and be saved at any time and moment, this can be understood in two ways. First, that he can be converted by a proximate and physical power which is in act in him, at any time and moment. Secondly, by a power, or special help, which God, as far as lies on his part, is ready to give to all at any moment, as has been explained above: and in this second sense that proposition is most true; but not in the first, since by the faculty of nature alone a man cannot be converted to God and be saved by a proximate power. In like manner, too, not all have in themselves received, at every moment, a supernatural sufficient help by which they could proximately be converted to God and be saved, since not at every moment is one roused in act by God to follow good, as is clear in those who sleep and in many others. Nevertheless at any moment any sinner, as long as he is on the way, can have a special help by which he can be saved,7 and this power is founded on two things, as St. Th. teaches excellently 3. p. q. 8. art. 3. ad 1. first indeed, and principally, on the power of Christ and on the mercy of God, which is sufficient for the salvation of the whole human race: secondly, on the freedom of choice: for, as long as man is on the way, he has free choice flexible to good and to evil.8 And as to this there is a difference between men on the way and the damned: that the damned cannot, according to ordinary power, have a special help for salvation, even sufficient; and much less will they have it, nor is God ready to give them a help of this kind: and on the other hand their free choice, since it is at the term, is inflexible and obstinate in evil, which indeed does not belong to those on the way, however hardened and reprobate. Whence the account of both is not the same.
X. To the fourth argument it is answered that those who neither receive in themselves nor have a sufficient help for believing immediately do not sin against faith, as St. Aug. and St. Th. teach in the place above: which is manifestly gathered from that authority of John: If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin, namely of unbelief, which they committed by not receiving Christ the Lord, as St. Aug. often explains; and the same holds of the other supernatural precepts as to the substance of the act which is commanded, as is the precept of supernatural hope. This however is to be understood when he who transgresses the precept does not by a new act impede the help, even a sufficient one. As for example, if God imposed on someone the precept that he fly, and he should answer, I have no wings with which I can fly, and God should offer him wings for flying; certainly if he should answer, I neither wish to have wings nor to fly, the transgression of the precept would be imputed to him as guilt. So proportionably it must be said of the act of faith: for if he should impede the Gospel from being preached to him, he would now sin at least indirectly against faith, because he is bound by the precept of faith not to impede a sufficient proposal of the Gospel. But when the precepts are natural on the part of the object, man always has a sufficient help for fulfilling them, when the precept obliges, and so he who does not fulfill it is not excused from guilt. See, concerning this solution, St. Th. 2. 2. q. 2. ar. 5. ad 1. and 3. cont. Gent. c. 159.
To the fifth argument the solution is clear from what has been said concerning the third conclusion.
Disputatio CXIII: Whether God from eternity, with absolute and efficacious will, before foreknowledge of the future determination of the created will, decreed not to give sufficient or efficacious supernatural helps to those who in fact do not receive them in time.
Whether God from eternity, by an absolute and efficacious will, antecedently to the foreknowledge of the future determination of the created will, determined not to give supernatural helps, sufficient or efficacious, to those who in fact in time do not receive them.
I. There have not been lacking those who think it cannot be granted that God, by the eternal, absolute and efficacious decree of his will, decreed in fact not to give the helps of grace to those who in time do not receive them: and they assert this opinion to be so certain that they reckon the opposite to be not only a danger and an offence to pious ears, but also a ground for despair and for the abandonment of good works. This can be proved.
First: for it would follow that God denies both to all those who in fact are not converted, and to the just who do not actually act well, the sufficient help by which they might be converted and act piously. The consequent is contrary to the holy Fathers and Doctors, who affirm, as a principle certain beyond controversy, that God denies the sufficient help to no one: therefore, etc. The consequence is proved. For if by an immutable will, and before the foresight of the determination of the human will, God determined not to confer the supernatural helps, whether sufficient or efficacious, which are necessary for conversion or for pious action, then he denies, as far as lies on his part, the help necessary for salvation.
It is confirmed, and the force of the preceding argument is explained. If God were unwilling to produce a species in the eye, or light in the air, which are altogether required for seeing, man in fact would not have what is necessary for seeing, and consequently in fact could not see: therefore in the same way, if God by an absolute and efficacious will, before the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, determined by an immutable decree not to confer on some men the helps necessary for salvation — especially that help which predetermines the will, which is asserted to be necessary for conversion and for every supernatural action — it follows that God denies them the sufficient help, since such a help is no less necessary for conversion and for supernatural operations than light and species are necessary for seeing.
It is confirmed secondly. As often as anyone lacks some principle necessary for producing some act, and it is not in his power to have it, by that very fact he lacks a principle sufficient for such an act. For if someone be in a dark place, from which he cannot go out, even if he has the vital power of seeing, nevertheless, because he lacks the light and the visible species, which are necessarily required for seeing, he cannot truly be said to have a sufficient principle of seeing, since he also lacks the power of going to the place where the light shines: therefore, if God by an absolute will determined this — and that independently of the foreknowledge of the created will — and the will of man cannot in any way be converted without these helps and that determination, it follows that men of this kind do not have a sufficient principle for conversion and for other supernatural operations, especially since it is not in their power to have these helps and the divine predetermination.
II. Secondly. The will, when it lacks understanding, does not have a sufficient principle of willing, since understanding is altogether necessary for willing: therefore, if those helps and God's predetermination are necessary for supernatural acts, when man lacks them because God from eternity by an absolute will determined not to confer them and not to determine the will, the will will not have a principle sufficient for acting well and supernaturally.
Thirdly. This help determining the will is no less necessary for man to be converted and to act supernaturally than God's physical concurrence is necessary for the local motion of a creature: but if God determined independently of the created will not to give physical concurrence for local motion, then man would truly lack the necessary help, namely God's concurrence, necessarily required for local motion: therefore by equal reason, if God independently of the human will denies the help necessary, and the cooperation required, for conversion and for supernatural actions, man truly lacks the help necessary for them and the principle sufficient for them.
Fourthly: for it would also follow from the opposite opinion that it is not to be imputed to man that, when the precept presses, he is not converted to God, and — what is greater — that the precept of conversion to God could not be imposed on that same man. This is proved: for if God has already decreed not to give some man the sufficient or efficacious help necessary for conversion, and it is not in his power to obtain it from God, then it will not be imputed to him that he is not converted, because in fact without that help he cannot be converted: for this reason also negative unbelievers, who on account of sins committed are deprived of the knowledge of the things of faith, do not sin against faith by not believing, because they do not have a principle sufficient and necessary for believing: For how shall they believe him whom they have not heard; and how shall they hear without a preacher?1 And consequently they could not be obliged by any precept to conversion; or else one would have to say that God's precepts are impossible to fulfil, against the express doctrine and definition of the Council of Trent.2
III. Fifthly: for from the same doctrine it follows that man is forsaken by God before he himself forsakes God; which is opposed to those words of Hosea 13, Thy destruction is from thyself, O Israel, and of Ecclus. 15, Say not: It is through God that he is away: and to the definition of the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 11, whose words are: For God does not desert those once justified by his grace, unless he be first deserted by them: in which passage it is clear that the Council treats not only of habitual grace but of any help of grace, from the end which the Council had in view in that chapter, inasmuch as it wished to exhort men to obey the divine law. And it is clear besides from the very title of the chapter, which is on the observance of the commandments, on its possibility and necessity: therefore God denies this grace, or help, to no one except to him who has first deserted God.
It is confirmed from those words3 of chapter 13 of the same session: God, unless they set themselves against his grace, will perfect the good work he has begun, even unto the day of Christ: but no greater dereliction can be imagined than that by which God, before the foreknowledge of any determination of the created will, decreed by a firm purpose not to confer on a man the help without which man cannot be converted, nor act well, nor resist a grave temptation: therefore it must necessarily be said that God, before the foreknowledge of the determination of the created will, did not determine by an absolute and efficacious will not to confer those helps on those who in time do not receive them.
Sixthly there is an argument from the authority of St Thomas, 2. 2. q. 2. art. 5. ad 1, where he says that if something be said to be in man's power, with the help of grace excluded, then man is bound to many things which he cannot do without preparing grace, such as to believe and to love God above all things: yet he can do this with the help of grace, which help indeed is given mercifully to whomever it is given by God; but to those to whom it is not given, it is not given from justice, in punishment of a preceding sin, at least original, as Augustine says in the book de correp. et gratia, chapters 5 and 6. From these words an argument is drawn. Whatever God himself does or does not do in time, he must have determined from eternity to do or not to do; but in time the matter stands thus according to the doctrine of St Thomas and St Augustine, that as often as God does not confer on someone the help of grace for believing, acting, or loving God, he does not confer such help except in punishment of a preceding sin, at least original: therefore from eternity he determined not to confer that same help except in punishment of a preceding sin, and not otherwise: therefore before the foreknowledge of that same sin he did not determine by an absolute or consequent will not to confer that same help on those who in time do not receive it. There is another passage of St Thomas for proving the same, 1. 2. q. 112. artic. 3. ad 2, where he says that the defect of grace has its first cause from us, but the conferring of grace has its first cause from God, according to that of Hosea 13: Thy destruction is from thyself, O Israel; only in me is thy help. By which words he teaches most clearly that the defect of grace and of divine help is not to be referred to God's simple will, but to man's preceding fault, on account of which God does not confer that same help: and consequently on account of that same fault, and not otherwise, he determined from eternity not to give that same help to those who in time do not receive it. Likewise 3 cont. Gent. cap. 159 he says that they alone are deprived of grace who present an impediment to grace in themselves. And 1. p. q. 94. art. 4. ad 5 he says that in the temptation help was not brought to the first parent lest he be deceived, although he then especially needed it, because sin had already preceded in his mind, and he did not have recourse to the divine help. He holds, therefore, that God never denies the help of grace except on account of a preceding sin, and consequently that before the foreknowledge of it he did not decree not to confer that same help on those who in time do not receive it.
Finally, the same can be proved by all the arguments adduced in disputation 101 to prove that the denial of efficacious help is not the cause why a man is not converted to God, even if the non-conversion be taken as it signifies a pure negation.
IIII. The opposite opinion is taught by the Thomists, among whom is M. Bañes, 1. p. q. 23. artic. 3. dub. 3. conc. 10, where he says: God from eternity determined by a will either absolute or consequent not to give supernatural helps to all, namely to those who in fact will not receive them: and M. Bañes speaks in that sense in which the word “to give” is correlative to the word “to receive”, as is clear from the 8th and 9th conclusions of the same doubt, and from what has been said by us in the preceding disputation. For if the word “to give” be taken absolutely and simply, he acknowledges that God, as far as lies on his part, is prepared to give to all men, as long as they are in this life, the help by which they are made able to be converted; nay rather, even a more special help by which they may be converted, if they will. And in this sense I reckon this second opinion to be true, and necessarily to be defended by those theologians who hold that no cause of reprobation is given on our part, as regards its entire effect.
The denial of supernatural help can be considered as it is a mere negation, and as it is a privation.— To make this clear, it must be observed that, just as non-conversion is taken as it is the pure negation of conversion and as it is its privation, and consequently as sin, as we explained more fully in disput. 101, so also the denial of supernatural help can be taken in two ways: First, as it is a simple negation, which can be said both of that which is and of that which is not: for we truly say that God does not confer the help of grace on men, or on possible angels who never were, nor are, nor will be, or even on stones, which are not capable of that help. Secondly, it can be taken as it signifies the privation of help, and as it formally has the character of punishment.
V. God, before the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, determined not to give some the supernatural helps for believing immediately.— The first conclusion, then, is: God, before the foreknowledge or foresight of the determination of the created will, determined from eternity by an absolute or consequent will not to give supernatural helps to those who in fact do not receive them, if the word “not to give” be taken as it signifies the mere negation of help, that is, an absolute and consequent will of not giving such help.
This conclusion is proved first: for, as was shown in disp. 110, on our part no cause of reprobation is given, as regards its entire effect: but just as predestination, as regards its first effect, is resolved into God's gratuitous will alone, so also reprobation, as regards its primary effect, which is the first permission of sin, on account of which the reprobate is damned, is attributed to God's simple will: nor could there be, or be foreknown, any other sin before that permission; otherwise that first sin would not be the first: therefore, before any sin is understood as preceding in the man who is reprobated, there is understood in God the absolute will of permitting that sin; but in the will of permitting sin there is necessarily included the absolute will of not giving the efficacious help for avoiding that sin: for, as St Thomas teaches 1. 2. q. 79. art. 2, if God gave man this help, man would not sin: therefore before all foreknowledge of future sin there precedes in God an absolute or consequent will of not giving efficacious help to those who in time do not receive it.
It is confirmed. For this reason no cause of predestination is given on our part, because in fact no cause of the first effect of predestination is given, as is clear from the premises of disp. 37: therefore, if no cause of reprobation is given on our part, neither will a cause of the first effect of reprobation be given. Since, then, in the first effect of reprobation there is included the absolute will of not giving the efficacious help by which man may avoid that first sin on account of which he is damned, it remains that God, before the foreknowledge of the evil use of created free choice, determined by an absolute will not to give that help to those who do not receive it.
Secondly. A negation, simply speaking, is something higher than a privation, which is on account of fault, since every privation is a negation, and not conversely: therefore wherever there has been a privation of divine help, there is understood prior its negation, by which God does not bestow that help, or wills not to bestow it: but for a negation of this kind no sin is presupposed of necessity on our part: for since that help is not owed to anyone, but is purely gratuitous, God can, by his own will alone, give the same help to whom he has wished, and not give it to whom he has not wished: therefore, etc.
It is confirmed. If some preceding sin of man were presupposed of necessity, so that God should have determined by an absolute will not to give him efficacious help, it would follow that even before God had determined simply not to give the efficacious help for avoiding the first sin, and before the permission of that same sin, another sin would be foreknown; which is impossible: both because that sin which we suppose to be the first would in fact not be the first, but there would be another before it, and the same difficulty would proceed concerning that sin, and so there would be a process to infinity: and also because it would follow that some sin is committed while God does not permit it, which is against the express doctrine of St Augustine in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, chapters 95 and 96. For to the permission of any sin whatsoever it is necessarily required that there precede in God the absolute will, or the consequent will, of not giving the help by which that sin is avoided. Hence if before the first sin there did not precede in God the absolute or consequent will of not giving help of this kind, such a sin would be committed with God not permitting it; from which again it would follow that a positive act, to which the malice of sin is conjoined, is produced, inasmuch as it is an act, with God not willing it. For if any sin is committed without divine permission, then consequently also the entity of the act, without which the evil of sin cannot be, would be produced by man before God wills that act, since no supreme evil can be given — which, as was shown above, cannot be admitted.4
VI. Thirdly. God, by a consequent and absolute will, before all foreknowledge of the evil use of the created will, willed not to admit the reprobate to his kingdom, as was shown in disputation 109: therefore in like manner he willed, before the foreknowledge of that same evil use, not to confer on them the helps of grace by which they would come to that same kingdom. The consequence is proved: for the absolute or consequent will of not conferring on someone efficacious helps for eternal salvation is intrinsically included in the absolute and consequent will of not admitting him to the kingdom of heaven.
Fourthly. As was shown in disput. 34, the consequent will of God is that by which God wills some good considered according to all its circumstances; whereas the antecedent will of God is that which is borne toward some good considered absolutely and according to itself; and therefore by his antecedent will God wills all men to be saved,5 and to confer on them helps for salvation, because this object is good according to itself; yet because this good has annexed the privation of another greater good, namely the splendour of divine justice in the reprobate, and of greater mercy in the elect, therefore by his consequent will God does not will all men to be saved, but only the predestined, as St Thomas teaches 1. p. q. 19. art. 6. ad 1. Therefore in like manner by his consequent will, which is the will simply, God does not will to confer on all efficacious helps for producing supernatural acts, but on some only, namely those who receive them in time. The consequence is proved: for although it be absolutely and according to itself good that all should have in themselves and receive helps of this kind, yet it is not reckoned good, all particular circumstances being considered, because it has annexed the lack of a greater good, namely of the greater splendour of divine mercy in the gratuitous conferring of these helps: therefore although God by his antecedent will wills that all have the helps of grace for eliciting supernatural acts, yet he does not will this by his consequent will.
If it be said that the consequent will in God is that which has its origin from our fault and presupposes it, and therefore that God by his consequent will did not, before the foreknowledge of the evil use of our free choice, decree not to give someone the helps of grace for producing supernatural acts, but only on the supposition of the evil use of that same free choice foreknown and foreseen by God;6 against this militate the arguments by which it was shown in disputation 34 that the consequent will of God does not presuppose of necessity the evil use of created free choice, nor take occasion from it, otherwise God would not have willed by his consequent will the eternal salvation of the predestined angels: for such a will does not presuppose any evil use of the free choice of those same angels, nor did it take from it the occasion of predestining them.7
VII. Fifthly. The consequent will of God is always fulfilled, as St Thomas teaches 1. p. q. 19. art. 6: therefore, if God by his consequent will determined from eternity, and willed, that all should receive in themselves the helps of grace, sufficient or efficacious, for producing supernatural acts, it follows that all, according to place and time, do receive helps of this kind in themselves; and so no one would be a purely8 negative unbeliever: for indeed if anyone has sufficient help for believing, since he is bound to believe, he will sin mortally against faith if he does not believe, and consequently whoever does not believe will be a contrary unbeliever, which manifestly conflicts with the doctrine of St Thomas 2. 2. q. 10. art. 1; it must therefore be said that God by his consequent will, antecedently to the foreknowledge of the evil use of free choice, willed not to give some the helps of grace, sufficient or efficacious, for immediately producing supernatural acts, namely those who in time do not receive them.
This is confirmed specially concerning efficacious help: for if God by his consequent will wills that all men receive in themselves the efficacious help for believing and loving God, then all receive help of this kind according to place and time: for, as has been said, the consequent will of God is always fulfilled, and so all would believe and love God when the precept presses: which is false, and contrary to experience itself.
VIII. That men do not receive sufficient or efficacious help in execution is their own fault.— The second conclusion. In execution, as often as God, according to place and time, does not give someone the sufficient or efficacious help for believing, loving, and exercising other supernatural works, he always does not bestow it except in punishment of a preceding sin, and at least of original sin, whether such a sin have preceded in the order of time or only in the order of nature. In this conclusion the authors of both opinions agree, and it is expressly that of St Augustine and St Thomas in the passages cited above, and the arguments made at the beginning prove it efficaciously.
Moreover it is proved by a reason drawn from St Thomas, 3 cont. Gent. cap. 159: for God, as far as in him lies, is prepared to give grace to all. For he wills all men to be saved, as is said 1 Timoth. 2. But they alone are deprived of grace who present an impediment to grace in themselves; just as, when the sun illumines the world, it is imputed as a fault to him who closes his eyes, if some evil follow from this; although he cannot see unless he be preceded by the light of the sun: therefore as often as God does not bestow on someone the help of grace, sufficient or efficacious, for believing or for eliciting other supernatural acts, he denies it in punishment of a preceding sin.
Secondly. For although God, before the foreseen evil use of free choice, determined not to admit the reprobate into his kingdom, inasmuch as non-admission imports the mere negation of that which is not owed to anyone, nevertheless in execution he excludes no one from that same kingdom except on account of a preceding sin, at least original; because such exclusion has the character of punishment, which consequently is not inflicted on anyone except on account of fault: therefore in like manner, although God before the foreseen evil use of free choice determined not to give some the sufficient or efficacious help, inasmuch as this imports the simple negation of supernatural help, which is owed to no created substance, yet in execution he never deprives anyone, according to place and time, of help of this kind except on account of a preceding fault: for this privation too has the character of punishment, because it necessarily presupposes fault, at least preceding in the order of nature, as it is presupposed in him to whom God does not in fact give, but only offers, the efficacious help for avoiding the first sin, through which he loses justifying grace: for then no sin is presupposed as preceding in time the privation of grace or of efficacious help, but only in nature: for God gives to the justified man the exciting and sufficient help for avoiding any sin whatsoever, being prepared to confer the efficacious help, unless he himself by his own malice present an impediment to that same help. But if that man sin mortally, on account of a sin of this kind God does not confer on him efficacious help: for that sin is an impediment with which efficacious help for avoiding such a sin is not compatible.
IX. And if an argument be made: for with mortal sin there is compatible the sufficient help for believing and for eliciting other supernatural acts: therefore through that sin man does not present an impediment to that same help; it is answered that, although with mortal sin the sufficient help be compatible, nevertheless through that same sin, as also through original sin, man is made unworthy that such help be conferred on him: and on this side, as far as lies in himself, he presents an impediment to that same help.9 Nevertheless, even if, inasmuch as the order of things requires it, that sinner ought not to receive prevenient grace, because he is unworthy of it, yet because God can act beyond the order implanted in things, as when he enlightens a blind man or raises a dead man, sometimes out of the abundance of his goodness he also precedes with his help those who present an impediment to grace, turning them away from evil and converting them to good, as St Thomas says 3 cont. Gent. cap. 161. Much more, therefore, regularly will he give sufficient helps out of the abundance of that same goodness for eliciting supernatural acts, even to those who through sin are unworthy of helps of this kind, although sometimes he does not in fact confer them on some, in whom he wills the order of his justice to be manifested. Hence we see that of two unbelieving men who are held fast by the same sins, he precedes one, giving him sufficient help for believing, teaching him by the ministry of preachers, and inwardly arousing and moving him to faith; but the other he permits to proceed according to the order of things; nor is a reason to be sought why he precedes or converts these rather than those; for this depends on his simple will; just as it proceeds from the simple will of the craftsman that from the same matter similarly disposed he form some vessels for noble uses and some for ignoble, as St Thomas shows from the Apostle, Rom. 9, Hath not the potter power over the clay, etc., 1. p. q. 23. art. 5. ad 3.
The third conclusion. There is a cause on the part of the reprobate, on account of which God permits him to fall into the other sins which he commits after the first sin in which he is found, and the demeritorious cause is the preceding sin. Some of the arguments made at the beginning prove this conclusion. Moreover it is proved: for in order to save the claim that no cause of reprobation is given on the part of the reprobate as regards its entire effect, it suffices that no cause of the permission of the first sin be given, on account of which the reprobate is damned: therefore it is not unfitting that a cause of the permission of the subsequent sins be given: therefore just as in predestination an intermediate effect is the cause of the last effect, as is clear from what was said in disp. 37, so also in reprobation a sin committed after the first permission of God is the cause, not only in execution but also in the divine intention, of the permission of the subsequent sins.
X. To the first argument it is answered that God gives to all, as far as lies on his part, the sufficient help, nay even efficacious, for salvation and pious action, because it does not fail through him if men do not receive it; yet in fact he does not confer on some the help, even sufficient for believing immediately, so that they receive such help, as was shown in the preceding disputation concerning purely negative unbelievers. And although in his purpose by an absolute will, before the foreseen determination of the created free choice by which he wills to commit that sin which follows from man's fault after that permission, he determined not to give these helps to those who in time do not receive them, if the word “not to give” be taken as it signifies a simple negation; yet in execution he deprives man of helps of this kind on account of fault, as has been said: whence it does not follow that, as far as lies on his part, he denies anyone the sufficient or necessary help for salvation.
To the first confirmation it is answered that if God, as far as lies on his part, were prepared to produce a species in the eye and light in the air, and in execution man through his own fault did not have these, because namely he presents an impediment to both; then he would truly have them at least in another, namely in God, who is prepared to confer these aids for seeing, which on the part of the species and of the light are necessary for seeing; and so through the intrinsic visual power which he has he could see, although in fact through his own fault he does not see, because he has placed an impediment that a species should not be produced in the eyes and light in the air. Since, therefore, God, as long as the precept of believing obliges, so that a man sins by not believing, gives in fact to every man an intrinsic and supernatural sufficient help by which he can believe, being prepared to give him efficacious help unless he present an impediment to that same help: therefore it does not follow that God denies the sufficient help to all who are not converted to God when they are bound to be, and do not perform other supernatural acts, as was also said above. I add that, as was shown above from Cajetan and Ferrariensis, some principle is said in two ways to be sufficient for some operation.10 First it is said to be sufficient in the account of power, or of a principle bestowing the ability to act, and in this way the visual power is said to be sufficient for seeing even if it lack the intelligible species11, or be situated in a dark place, because, as far as lies on the part of the power which bestows the ability to see, man has all things necessary for seeing. Secondly it is said to be sufficient in all ways and in every kind, because namely it contains virtually all things, both intrinsic and extrinsic, required for the operation: and in this way he who lacks the visible species, or is in a dark place from which he cannot go out, truly does not have a sufficient principle of seeing. Proportionally it must be said in the proposed matter that even if someone does not have efficacious help received in himself, yet if he be aroused by God and moved to supernatural acts, he is truly said to have a principle in its kind sufficient for producing those acts, namely in the kind of help bestowing the ability, although it is not sufficient in all ways. And through these things the solution to the second confirmation is clear.
XI. To the second argument it is answered in the same way, that the will, even if the intellect propose nothing to it, has in itself a power sufficient for willing in the account of power, although the power of that same will alone is not sufficient in all ways for actually willing.
To the third it is answered that just as one who lacks God's physical concurrence (if nevertheless he have an integral and sound power of walking) truly has a power sufficient for local motion, although he is not actually moved; so also he who lacks the efficacious predetermining help lacks indeed the principle necessary for being actually converted, yet nevertheless has the sufficient help by which he can be converted, as has been said, and through his own fault presents an impediment to the efficacious help offered to him by God.
To the fourth argument an answer has already been given sufficiently, as I think, in disput. 18. num. 20, and in disput. 22 and 23. And now we say with Ferrariensis that, if anyone by his own will falls into some evil from which he cannot be freed by himself, if he be not freed, it is not without imputation to him:12 for he ought to have taken care not to fall into that evil, from which he knew that he could not be freed by his own power: just as it is not without imputation that someone does not get out of a pit, out of which he cannot get out unless he be helped by another, when he has thrown himself into it by his own will.13 But man, when he sins, falls by his own will, through which he is deprived of grace, which he cannot acquire by himself; therefore it is deservedly imputed to him if he does not have grace, even when divine help, necessary for the preparation of grace, fails him. Hence, as is gathered from St Augustine, lib. de corrept. et grat. c. 11, the proposition assumed has truth only when he who is thus deprived was not, on account of some fault of his own, the cause of such a privation: but if he himself by his own fault was the cause of this kind of lack and privation, it is not universally true, as is gathered from St Thomas saying:14 that, although those who are in sin cannot by their own power avoid presenting or placing an impediment to grace, as has been shown, unless they be preceded by the help of grace; nevertheless this is imputed to them as fault, because this defect is left in them from a preceding fault, just as a drunkard is not excused from homicide, which he commits through drunkenness, which he incurred by his own fault. And when it is argued: for man would be obliged to the impossible; it is answered with the same Ferrariensis that it is not unfitting that man be obliged to something which has been made impossible for him by his own powers through his own fault, as happens in the proposed matter: but it is indeed unfitting that he be obliged to that which is absolutely impossible, on which St Thomas is to be consulted, 2. 2. q. 2. ar. 5. ad 1.15 Secondly it is answered better, that even he who lacks efficacious help is not obliged to the impossible: for through the sufficient help received in himself he can perform the supernatural act which is in the precept, and through his own fault he is unwilling to perform it. Nor does it follow from this that purely negative unbelievers sin by not believing. For although through their own fault they do not have faith, yet that fault was not committed against supernatural faith, because they have heard nothing of it, but against the law of nature: and therefore they will be damned on account of original sin, and on account of other things committed against the natural law, but not on account of the sin of unbelief, as has been said above.
XI.16 Man deserts God before he is deserted by God.— To the fifth it is answered that, if he who does not receive from God the sufficient or efficacious help for believing or for eliciting other supernatural acts be in original or mortal sin, he has already first deserted God before God deserts him by not actually giving him those helps. But if he be in grace, God never deserts him by taking away from him justifying grace, unless he himself first in the order of nature desert God, by converting himself to a changeable good through mortal sin, which is incompatible with habitual grace; nor does God even desert the just man by withdrawing from him the sufficient help by which he can do good and persevere unto the end. But if sometimes he does not give him the efficacious help by which he may actually do good and persevere unto the end, it is not to be imputed to God, but to man: for through the sufficient help he could have persevered, and through his own fault he was unwilling to persevere: whence in execution he himself first, in the kind of demeritorious cause, deserted God by sinning, before God deprived him of efficacious help, as has been said above.
XII. To the sixth it is answered that the passages of St Thomas adduced prove only the second conclusion, as is clear from what has been said about it. And to the reason founded on that passage of 3 cont. Gent. it is answered that, just as God in execution on account of a preceding sin often deprives men of the help of grace, so from eternity he determined in execution to deprive them of that same help on account of those same sins; and just as from eternity, before the foresight or foreknowledge of the evil use of the created will, he decreed not to give some that same help, inasmuch as “not to give” is a pure negation, so also in execution, from his simple will, he does not give it to those who do not receive such help: but because that negation in execution is not a mere negation, but also a privation and a punishment, because it finds a fault antecedent at least in the order of nature:17 therefore on this side in execution there is also presupposed fault on the part of man, on account of which God does not bestow on some, in punishment, the helps of grace which he was prepared to give to all. This solution can be explained and confirmed by an example: for, as we were saying in disput. 100, the negation of efficacious help is the adequate cause of non-conversion, if it be considered as it is a mere negation; but not as it is the privation of a conversion that ought to be present: for under this aspect it is attributed only to the malice of the created free choice. Proportionably, therefore, we can say that God's simple will alone is the cause of the non-conferring of efficacious help, as it is the mere negation of a help not owed, but not as it is a privation and punishment: for under this aspect it is referred to the free choice of man as to a demeritorious cause. And through these things an answer is given to the other passage of St Thomas adduced from p. 2 and 3 cont. Gent. Or it must be said that in 1. 2 St Thomas speaks of habitual grace, which God does not confer on those who are unwilling to prepare themselves for it: but actual help does not prerequire a preceding preparation, because that preparation would have to be made through another help, and for that again another help would be necessary, and so there would be a process to infinity. When, therefore, God deprives someone of the help of grace, he does not for this reason deprive him, that he has not prepared himself to receive that help; but because he places, or has placed, an impediment of sin, with which the efficacious help for avoiding that sin is incompatible, or through which he merits that God not confer such help on him.
XIII. To the other passage from the first part it is answered that, before Adam sinned by an exterior act, by eating of the forbidden tree, he had already sinned by an interior act of pride: and in punishment of this sin, and because he did not have recourse to the divine help, help was not brought to him lest he be deceived;18 but before that sin committed by an interior act, it is understood that God did not bestow on Adam the efficacious help by which he would avoid sin. For if he had received such help, he would not have sinned, as St Thomas says generally of all, prima secundae, quaest. 79. artic. 2. in corp. But because he received the sufficient help by which he could avoid that sin, and through his own fault was unwilling to persevere in the accepted justice, but placed an impediment to efficacious help, therefore that first sin was deservedly imputed to him as fault.
Disputatio CXIV: Whether infants dying with original sin will remain forever in limbo, condemned to death, or will lead a blessed life in this world after the day of judgment.
Whether little children departing with original sin are to remain forever in limbo, damned to death, or whether after the day of judgment they are to lead a blessed life in this world.
I. SOME have said that little children departing with original sin alone, after the day of judgment, when their souls have been restored to their bodies, will be supernaturally freed from all the troubles and hardships to which we are subject in this mortal life, and will lead for eternal ages a better life in natural things, free from every defect of mind and body, than any mortal ever led.1 This opinion was taught earlier by Ambrosius Catherinus on ch. 3 of the second epistle of St. Peter, where, explaining those words, But new heavens and a new earth, he says: But to what use is the new earth, if no one is to dwell in it? Therefore it is most fittingly believed by many that those who by their own sin did not deserve hell, and yet were not received by Christ through grace — such as children departing without baptism — will possess this new earth, much more beautiful, pure from all defilement and corruption, where they will praise the Lord God forever. He teaches the same as his own view in the little work On the State of Children Departing without Baptism, and several other doctors to be cited below seem to favor it. And it is proved.
First, from that passage of Ecclesiastes, ch. 4: I judged him happier than both, who has not yet been born, nor seen the evils that are under the sun; by which words it seems to be signified that the aforesaid little children, after the day of judgment, will enjoy a more pleasant life than can naturally be had in this world. Thus Nicholas of Lyra explains this passage, saying: Happier, that is, less miserable than either — namely, than the wicked man dead and the wicked man living — I judged him who has not yet been born, the abortive child, who has no experience of any evil of punishment or of actual guilt, and thus suffers no sensible punishment, but has a life more delightful than can be had in the present life, according to all the doctors who speak of those sleeping in original sin alone.
Secondly, the same is proved by the authority of the Scholastics, who seem to adhere to this opinion. For Ricchardus, on the second book of the Sentences, distinction 33, article 3, question 2, expressly teaches that they will have many goods and will receive joy from them, and perhaps more joy from created goods than sinners have in this life. Scotus too, in the same distinction, the single question, § And if it be asked, leaves it as probable that they will obtain a far greater knowledge of natural things than the philosophers had; the words of Scotus are: It seems probable to concede that they can naturally have knowledge of all things naturally knowable, more excellently than some philosophers had for this state: and thus they will be able to attain some natural beatitude from God known in a universal way. And Bassolis, in the same distinction, question 1, article 3, says: As for the place where they will be, I do not know. Some say that they will dwell on this earth, in pleasant places, together with mutual and pleasant company, more beautiful and more delightful than certain sinners have now. Finally St. Thomas, on the second book of the Sentences, distinction 33,2 question 2, article 2, in the body of the article, teaches that they will have perfect knowledge of those things which are subject to natural knowledge. And in the reply to the fifth he adds these words: Although unbaptized children are separated from God as regards that union which is through glory, nevertheless they are not wholly separated from him; rather they are united to him by participation in natural goods: and so they will even be able to rejoice in him by natural knowledge and love. From these words an argument is drawn: for little children will know God with the perfect knowledge that can naturally be had, and will love him above all things insofar as he is the author of nature, and will suffer no trouble at all in the body: therefore they will forever lead a better life in natural things, free from every defect of mind and body, than any mortal ever led.
II. Thirdly it is proved by an argument by which certain authors of this opinion are convinced: for reprobate little children, except in obtaining or losing gratuitous gifts, will in all other respects be situated just as if they had been constituted in natural things alone; but if they departed in the pure state of nature, after the day of judgment, with their bodies resumed, they would lead a better life in natural things, free from every defect of body and mind, than any mortal ever led: therefore they will lead the same life, even supposing that man was ordained by grace to eternal life.
Fourth. After the day of judgment this visible world will be renewed, and the earth will be purer from all defilement, and likewise the air, than it was before, as St. Jerome on the same passage, St. Isidore in the book On Doctrine and Faith, ch. 36, Euthymius on Psalm 101, and all the theologians together with the Master, in 4 Sent., distinction 47, gather from those words of Isaiah 65, Behold, I create new heavens and a new earth. But a renewal of this kind would be superfluous if no man — for whose sake these sublunary things were created — were to inhabit this visible earth. Since, then, the blessed are not to inhabit it, but the empyrean heaven, nor are the adult reprobate, who for their actual sins will be tormented with eternal fire in hell: it remains that after the day of judgment it is to be inhabited by little children departing with original sin alone.
Fifth. If little children were to remain after the day of judgment in a dark limbo existing beneath the earth, they would be afflicted with great sadness and grief: for since man is endowed with the visual power, a friend of light, he cannot but be disturbed and grieve at seeing himself shut up in a dark prison for eternal ages, without the ability to see bodily creatures, which were made for his sake; but such little children after the day of judgment will have no sadness or grief or sensible punishment at all: for, as St. Thomas teaches, such punishment is due only to actual sin, by reason of the disordered conversion to a changeable good: therefore little children, after the day of judgment and the universal resurrection, will not remain in limbo, but will inhabit this visible earth and will forever lead in it a better life than any mortal ever led.
III. On the contrary: for little children departing with original sin are enemies of God, and turned away from him, and reprobate, and they will endure forever the punishment of loss, although they will not know it, and therefore will not be afflicted with sadness on account of it: therefore after the day of judgment they will not lead a better life in natural things, free from every defect of mind and body, than any mortal ever led.
I touched briefly on this difficulty in connection with Isaiah 52, but now it must be examined more fully and resolved; and concerning it three things must be determined.
First: whether in truth little children departing with original sin alone are to be thrust forever into limbo, or into some place existing beneath the earth, or whether they are to inhabit the earth. Second: whether they are to have some natural happiness, free from every defect of mind and body. Third: whether they are to suffer, on account of original sin, any sensible punishment, however mild.
IIII. Little children departing with original sin are immediately received into limbo.— The first conclusion, then, is this: before the day of universal judgment, all little children departing in original sin alone, whether they departed under the law of nature, or under the written law, or under the law of grace, are immediately received into the limbo of children, and will remain shut up in it until the day of universal judgment. In this conclusion all Catholics agree. And, as M. Soto says, in 4 Sent., distinction 48, question 2, article 4, reply 4, it is the received opinion of all the Fathers, which St. Augustine teaches in the book On the Baptism of Little Children; and it is cited in De consecratione, distinction 4, ch. Nulla praeter. The theologians who, with the Master of the Sentences and the holy Fathers, distinguish five receptacles of souls after death teach the same.34 The first is the empyrean heaven, the second is hell, the third purgatory, the fourth the limbo of children, the fifth the limbo of the fathers.5 Soto gathers their distinction and sufficiency from the sacred Scriptures.6 And the Council of Florence in the decrees of faith makes express mention of three of the aforesaid receptacles; for it speaks thus: Likewise we define that if those truly penitent have departed in the love of God before they have satisfied by worthy fruits of penance for what they have committed and omitted, their souls are cleansed by the punishments of purgatory: and that, in order that they may be relieved from punishments of this kind, the suffrages of the living faithful profit them, namely the sacrifices of masses, prayers and alms, and other works of piety which the faithful are accustomed to do for other faithful, according to the institutions of the Church. Also the souls of those who after receiving baptism incur no stain of sin at all, and those too which after contracting the stain of sin have been cleansed, either in their bodies or after being stripped of the same bodies (as has been said above), are immediately received into heaven and clearly behold the triune and one God himself, as he is, yet according to the diversity of merits, one more perfectly than another. But the souls of those who depart in actual mortal sin, or in original sin alone, immediately descend into hell, yet to be punished with unequal punishments. But the other two receptacles, namely the limbo of the holy Fathers and the limbo of children, are gathered from the passages of Scripture which M. Soto adduces in the place cited above. For concerning the limbo of the fathers it is said in Gen. 44 of Jacob: You will bring down my old age with sorrow to the nether world. And in Luke 16 the same limbo is called Abraham's bosom. But mention of the limbo of children is made in the chapter Nulla praeter, De consecratione, distinction 4, where it is said: No salvation is promised to infants other than through the baptism of Christ, because infants, if through the sacrament divinely instituted for this purpose they do not pass into the number of believers, assuredly remain in darkness. And this chapter is taken from Augustine, book 1 of On the Merits and Remission of Sins, ch. 26.
V. Now the doctors gather the necessity and sufficiency of these receptacles by this reasoning: for the soul in this world is in a state of meriting and demeriting; but when it has departed from the body, it must be received in the place that it merited while it was in the body, because in this life all merit or demerit is acquired. Therefore it either merited a perpetual reward, which is the inheritance of the heavenly kingdom, or perpetual exile from that same kingdom. If a reward, then it either has some impediment by which it is delayed from entering it, or none; if none, the receptacle appointed for it is the heavenly paradise. But if it has some obstacle, either it is by reason of the person, on account of venial sin or the remnants of mortal sins, and then its receptacle is purgatory; or by reason of nature, because it was not yet redeemed by the death of Christ, and therefore in former times the limbo of the fathers was assigned. If, however, the soul is relegated to exile, then either on account of mortal sin, and for this it is thrust into hell; or on account of the original stain, and then it is received into the limbo of children. From these things the first conclusion remains sufficiently established: for every soul, when it leaves the body, is received into one of the five receptacles set out above; but the souls of little children departing with original sin alone are not received into the empyrean heaven, because they are defiled by original sin, and nothing defiled will enter that heavenly city, as is said in Apoc. 21; nor are they received into the hell of the damned, since they have committed no actual sin; nor into purgatory, for in that place only souls departing in grace are received, in which are found remnants of sins to be purged, or also venial sins to be forgiven; and much less are they received into the limbo of the fathers, as is clear from what has been said above. It remains, therefore, that they are received into the limbo of children departing without the sacrament of salvation.
VI. All little children will appear in judgment so as to be judged together with the others.— Second conclusion. All little children departing with original sin alone, at the time of the universal judgment, will come forth from the limbo in which they are now held, and will appear in person before the judge of all, so as to be judged together with the others. Some do not admit this conclusion, convinced by this argument: for the Apostle says in 2 Cor. 5,7 We must all be made manifest before the tribunal of Christ, so that each one may receive the things proper to his body, according as he has done, whether good or evil. And in Rom. 14: For we shall all stand before the tribunal of Christ, and each of us will give an account of himself to God. But little children have done nothing good or evil in the body: therefore they need not be made manifest before the tribunal of Christ. Our conclusion, nevertheless, as Soto says, is most widely accepted; and Augustine answers this objection by saying that the Apostle's words are to be understood of all who, while they were in the body, did something good or evil, whether through themselves or through others; but little children, although by their own will they did nothing through themselves while they were in the body, yet did this through others.8 The words of Augustine are:9 We know that we shall all stand before the tribunal of Christ, so that each one may receive according to the things he did through the body, not according to the things he would have done, whether good or evil, had he lived longer. We know also that little children will receive good or evil according to the things they did through the body. But they did them not through themselves, but through those who, answering for them, are said to renounce the devil and to believe in God; whence they are also counted in the number of the faithful, belonging to the sentence of the Lord who says: He who believes and is baptized will be saved.10 For which reason, even for those who do not receive this sacrament, there follows what comes next: But he who does not believe will be condemned. Whence even they, as I said, if they die in that tender age, are judged according to the things they did through the body, that is, in the time when they were in the body, when through the hearts and mouths of those who carried them they believed or did not believe, when they were baptized or were not baptized, when they ate the flesh of Christ or did not eat it, when they also drank his blood or did not drink it. According to these things, therefore, which they did through the body, not according to those which they would have done had they lived here longer, are they judged. The conclusion is therefore proved by the most evident testimonies of sacred Scripture; for it is said in Matth. 25: And all nations will be gathered before him, and he will separate them from one another, as a shepherd separates the sheep from the goats, and he will set the sheep indeed at his right hand, but the goats at his left. From these words an argument is drawn: for on the day of the universal judgment there will be at the judge's right hand, among the sheep, little children who departed with the sacrament of salvation, as is clear from Matth. 24, where it is said: And he will send his angels with a trumpet and a great voice, and they will gather his elect from the four winds, from the heights of the heavens to their ends. Therefore there will also be among those at the left little children departing with original sin. The consequence is proved: for just as reprobate little children did nothing through themselves in the body, but only through their parents, from whom they contracted the original sin for which they are damned, so too the elect little children did nothing through themselves in the body, but through those by whose ministry they received the sacrament of regeneration.
VII. Secondly it is proved from that passage of Acts 10,11 He is the one who has been appointed by God judge of the living and the dead. Here no exception is made for little children, but it is determined that Christ the Lord is judge of all mortals. And Apoc. 1,12 He will come, and every eye will see him. It is confirmed: for that last judgment is called universal for the reason that all will appear at it universally, to receive reward or punishment from the supreme judge of all, Christ the Lord. But against this conclusion there is an argument:13 for the judge's sentence will not include little children who departed without the remedy; for it will not be said to them: Come, you blessed of my Father, receive the kingdom: since, as has been said above, they will not enter the kingdom of heaven, which the Lord also taught in John 3: Unless one is born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God. Nor will that sentence include them: Go, you cursed, into the eternal fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels: for the torment of fire is due only to the reprobate who have sinned mortally. Therefore in truth they will not appear in judgment.
Solution.— That sentence, Go, you cursed, will also include reprobate little children.— It is answered that those words, Go, you cursed, by which is signified the punishment of loss, or separation from God as he is the ultimate supernatural end, will also include little children infected with original sin: for to original sin there truly corresponds the punishment of loss and the privation of the divine vision, as Innocent says in the Decretals, and St. Thomas, q. 5 On Evil, article 1.14 But the remaining words, namely into the eternal fire, will be directed chiefly to those who have sinned actually: for the punishment of sense and interior pain are due only to actual sin, as St. Thomas teaches in the same q. 5 On Evil, articles 2 and 3.
VIII. Reprobate little children after the day of judgment will be thrust with their bodies into limbo.— Third conclusion. When the judgment is completed, little children will again be thrust into limbo, where they will remain in death for eternal ages. St. Augustine teaches this conclusion in the passages to be cited below, and it is the common opinion of the theologians who assert that they will remain under the earth in darkness; so M. Soto teaches, in 4 Sent., distinction 48, question 2, article 4, in reply to the fourth argument. And it is proved. First, from sacred Scripture: for it is said in John 12: I have come into the world, so that everyone who believes in me may not remain in darkness, where, by the contrary sense, he seems to declare that those who have not believed in act or in habit will remain in darkness forever. Thus St. Augustine understands this passage, when he says:15 By this saying, what does he show but that everyone who does not believe in him is in darkness, and that by believing he brings it about that he not remain in darkness? These darknesses, what do we understand them to be but sins? But whatever else these darknesses are understood to be, assuredly he who does not believe in Christ will remain in them; and they are certainly penal, not as it were nocturnal darknesses necessary for the rest of living things. Accordingly, if little children do not pass into the number of believers through the sacrament divinely instituted for this purpose, they will assuredly remain in these darknesses. Likewise also it is said in John 3: Unless one is born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God. From this testimony Augustine argues thus: unbaptized little children will not be in the kingdom of heaven; therefore they will be in hell, that is, in limbo. The consequence is proved: for after the day of judgment there will be no middle place between these two. The words of Augustine are:16 Behold, the unbaptized child, deprived even of vital food and drink, is divided from the kingdom of heaven, where Christ remains the fountain of the living: give me, besides this, another place where the rest of life can be perpetual. For the first place the faith of Catholics, by divine authority, believes to be the kingdom of heaven, from which, as I said, the unbaptized child is excluded. The second, hell, where every apostate or one alien from the faith of Christ will experience eternal punishments. The third we utterly do not know; indeed we do not find in the holy Scriptures that it exists. Fashion, O Pelagian, a place from the workshop of your perverse dogma, where little children alien from the grace of Christ can possess a life of rest and glory.
Furthermore: for to all those who will be at the judge's left it will be said: Go, you cursed, into the eternal fire, that is, into the place of punishments corresponding to their own offenses: for, as St. Thomas teaches, eternal fire, or punishment, sometimes signifies the punishment of loss, which is the privation of the divine vision;17 and thus he understands that saying of Augustine, On Faith to Peter, ch. 27: Hold most firmly and by no means doubt that little children who have passed from this world without the sacrament of baptism are to be punished with eternal punishment. But little children departing without the sacrament of regeneration will be at the judge's left among the goats on the day of judgment: therefore, according to the sentence of the same judge, they will go into the place of punishments corresponding to original sin, for which alone they are damned; which the Lord himself at once explained when he added: And these will go into eternal punishment, but the just into eternal life.18 Since, then, the place of the punishment of loss appointed for those who departed with original sin alone is the limbo of children, and not the surface of the earth, it remains that on the day of judgment the said little children are to be thrust into that dark prison. He teaches the same, and proves it more fully, in book 1 Against the Two Epistles of the Pelagians, ch. 22, whose words we adduced and weighed above when treating of original sin.
Secondly it is proved from Pope John VIII, in his epistle to Anselm, bishop of the church of Limoges, and it is cited in the chapter Ad limina beatorum, 30, q. 2, where he teaches that little children departing without baptism will remain under the power of the author of death and of darkness. The words of the pontiff are: Whence, if the aforesaid father, seeing his son dying in the body, lest he should let the soul perish in perpetual death, washed him with the wave of sacred baptism, so as to snatch him from the power of the author of death and of darkness, and without doubt send him into the kingdom of Christ, there to reign; he is praised for having done well. The same St. Augustine also teaches in the book On Faith to Peter, ch. 27, cited in De consecratione, distinction 4, ch. Firmissime, saying: Hold most firmly and by no means doubt that not only men already using reason, but also little children — whether they begin to live in their mothers' wombs and die there, or, having been born of their mothers, pass from this world without the sacrament of holy baptism, which is given in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit — are to be punished with everlasting fire: because, although they had no sin of their own action, they nonetheless drew the condemnation of original sin by carnal conception and birth.
Thirdly it is proved by reason: for, as has been said above, before the day of judgment all little children departing with original sin alone remain bound in limbo as in a dark prison: but no sufficient reason can be assigned why, once the judgment is completed, they should be freed from that prison, since even after the day of judgment they are truly reprobate, enemies of God, and infected with original sin, for which they were damned to that prison-house: therefore.
It is confirmed: for just as those who departed with mortal sin are thrust into hell to be tormented with fire, so too little children, on account of original sin, are immediately after death thrust into limbo, where they are afflicted with the punishment of loss: but the former will not be freed from their prison after the day of judgment, but will remain in hell forever: therefore neither will the latter be freed from limbo, but will return to it again.
IX. Little children after the day of judgment will not have a blessed life, even a natural one.— Fourth conclusion. It cannot be said that little children, after the day of judgment, with their bodies resumed, will have natural happiness, or will lead a better life in natural things, free from every defect of mind and body, than any mortal ever led. The conclusion is St. Augustine's, in the passages cited above and to be adduced below, and M. Soto's in the place cited above. And it is proved. First: for, as has been said, those little children will be in death and perpetual damnation, and will exist in darkness beneath the earth in their resumed bodies: but with these things man's natural happiness is in no way compatible, nor a better life in natural things than any mortal ever led: therefore.
Secondly it is proved from St. Augustine, epistle 106 to Boniface, where, explaining that word of the Apostle, Through one man sin, and through sin death, and that other, As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive: Whence it comes about, he says, that unbaptized infants cannot have not only the kingdom of heaven, but even eternal life? And in book 2 of On the Soul and Its Origin, ch. 12, explaining that word of Mark 16, He who believes and is baptized will be saved; but he who does not believe will be condemned, he says: The mystery of this belief is fulfilled in little children through the response of those by whom they are carried; lest, if this were not done, all should go into condemnation from the one man; and yet, against voices so manifest, which the truth sings in harmony, you come forward — a vanity more senseless than merciful — and it says: Little children will not only not be in damnation, even if no bath of the Christian faith absolves them from the bond of original sin, but they will even enjoy the happiness of paradise after death in the meantime, and after the resurrection they will possess even the happiness of the kingdom of heaven. Would this man dare to say these things against the Catholic and most firmly founded faith, if he did not dare to undertake the question to be solved concerning the origin of the soul, which exceeds his powers? By these words he openly attacks that doctrine which grants happiness after death to unbaptized little children; and he had taught the same in book 1, ch. 9.
Thirdly it is proved: for a little child infected with original sin differs from a little child who would be born without any sin in the pure state of nature: therefore the state he will have after the universal resurrection differs also from that which he would have had if he had been constituted in the pure state of nature: but no other difference can be assigned except that one existing in original sin is in perpetual misery, and enjoys no natural happiness even after the resurrection, which nevertheless he would have had in the pure state of nature: therefore.
Fourth. Original sin infects not only the soul but also its powers, as has been said above; and consequently it is a defect of the mind, worse than every defect of the body. Since, then, little children even after the resurrection are to remain in the original sin in which they departed, it remains that they will not have a better life in natural things, free from every defect of mind and body, than any mortal ever led.
Fifth. M. Soto proves this in the place cited above: for since little children have acquired no knowledge in this life, nor is it due to their merits that natural knowledge be divinely infused into them after death, no reason appears why it should be infused into them by God after death, so that they may have perfect knowledge of all natural things, in which natural happiness consists: it must not be said, therefore, that they will have natural happiness, or a life in natural things more perfect than any mortal ever led.
X. Reprobate little children even after the day of judgment will suffer no punishment of sense, but only of loss.— Fifth conclusion. Little children departing with original sin alone will be afflicted with no punishment of sense at all, even after the day of judgment, but will be punished only with the punishment of loss, which consists in the privation of the divine vision; and Augustine teaches that this is the mildest punishment to be inflicted on them. Thus Innocent III expressly teaches in the chapter Maiores, On Baptism and Its Effect, where he says that the punishment of original sin is the privation of the divine vision, but that of actual sin is the perpetual torment of gehenna. St. Thomas teaches the same opinion, q. 5 On Evil, article 2, and says that it is common; the Master teaches it in 2 Sent., distinction 33, St. Thomas in the same distinction, question 2, article 1, and several other doctors. St. Thomas proves this conclusion by a threefold reason:19
First: because any person is the supposit of some nature: and therefore he is ordered per se and immediately to the things that are of nature; but to the things that are above nature he is ordered through the medium of nature. That some person, therefore, suffers some detriment in the things that are above nature can happen either from a defect of nature or from a defect of the person; but that he suffer detriment in the things that belong to nature does not seem able to happen except on account of a defect proper to the person. But, as is clear from what has been premised, original sin is a defect of nature, whereas actual sin is a defect of the person; but grace and the divine vision are above human nature. And therefore the privation of grace and the lack of the divine vision are due to a person not only on account of actual sin but also on account of original sin. But the punishment of sense is opposed to the integrity of nature and to its good condition: and therefore the punishment of sense is due to no one except on account of actual sin.
Second: because punishment is proportioned to guilt: and therefore to actual mortal sin, in which there is found an aversion from the unchangeable good and a conversion to a changeable good, there is due both the punishment of loss, namely the privation of the divine vision, corresponding to the aversion, and the punishment of sense corresponding to the conversion. But in original sin there is no conversion, but only aversion, or something corresponding to aversion, namely the destitution of the soul of original justice: and therefore to original sin there is not due the punishment of sense, but only the punishment of loss, namely the privation of the divine vision.
Third: because the punishment of sense is never due to a habitual disposition. For no one is punished for being disposed to steal, but for actually stealing: but to a habitual privation, without any act, some loss is due; for example, one who does not have knowledge of letters is by that very fact unworthy of promotion to the episcopal dignity. But in original sin there is indeed concupiscence in the manner of a habitual disposition, which makes a little child apt to desire, as Augustine says, but the adult actually desiring:20 And therefore to a little child who has died with original sin there is not due the punishment of sense, but only the punishment of loss: because, namely, he is not fit to be brought to the divine vision on account of the privation of original justice.
Nor does it stand in the way that Augustine says that little children who depart will experience gehenna: for there gehenna is understood as the punishment, and the species is put for the genus.21 So too is that to be understood which he says in the book On Faith to Peter, ch. 27, that the same little children are to be punished with eternal punishment; as St. Thomas explains, article 2 cited, in reply to the first argument.
XI. Little children departing with original sin alone will suffer no internal sadness on account of the lack of the beatific vision.— Sixth conclusion. Little children departing with original sin alone will suffer no internal pain or sadness at all on account of the lack of the divine vision. The conclusion is expressly St. Thomas's, q. 5 On Evil, article 3, and in 2 Sent., d. 33, q. 2, art. 2; and the Doctors commonly teach it, especially those alleged above. And it is proved by a threefold reason of St. Thomas. First: for the pain, or affliction, of punishment is due to the delight of guilt, according to that word of Apoc. 18: As much as she glorified herself, and was in delights, so much give her torment for mourning; but in original sin there was no delight; for the latter belongs on the side of conversion to a changeable good, whereas original sin consists formally in the privation of original justice, as was said above: therefore.
Second. Interior affliction is far more penal, and far more opposed to the mildest punishment which St. Augustine attributes to those same little children,22 but in them there will be no punishment of sense at all, as was said above: therefore neither will there be interior affliction, or pain, or sadness.
Third. Although the souls of those children, separated from the body, are not deprived of natural knowledge, such as is due to a separated soul according to its nature, nevertheless they lack the supernatural knowledge which here is planted in us by faith, because they neither had faith here in act, nor received the sacrament of faith. Since, then, that glory which the saints possess is above natural knowledge, and is made known to us only by divine revelation, according to that word:23 Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it ascended into the heart of man, what God has prepared for those who love him; but to us he has revealed it through his Spirit; it remains that little children do not know that they have been deprived of supernatural beatitude on account of original sin, nor even whether there is such a beatitude; and consequently they do not grieve that they have lost that same beatitude on account of original sin, which they do not even know they have lost: just as a rich man would not grieve if a thief had taken a thousand gold pieces from him, supposing that he did not know that he had been deprived of those same gold pieces.
XII. But against this reason there is a difficult argument: for all little children will appear in the universal judgment, that they may receive reward or punishment according to what, while they were in the body, they did or did not do through others: but in judgment the crime on account of which the accused are condemned is set before them and disclosed, and the punishment to be inflicted is made known to them: therefore, at least after the day of judgment, they will recognize that on account of original sin they have been deprived of the glory of the blessed and justly condemned to perpetual prison; and consequently they will grieve from that time on, and be affected with great sadness, that they have lost by original guilt that kingdom to which they could have come through the laver of regeneration.
Certain more recent theologians answer that just as their bodies after the day of judgment will receive nothing evil from contraries or from causes acting from outside, so too knowledge of this kind will bring in no grief or pain, because God will remove and withdraw his operation, so that their will grieve and sorrow at nothing. And if the argument be made — for that is to posit a miracle without necessity — they answer that it is not to be attributed to a miracle: for just as the other natural causes at that time will not act according to the order of nature customary in this life, but according to the prescribed laws of divine justice, so too the knowledge of the mind, which now is naturally wont to beget sadness, will then induce or bring in no grief, being divinely hindered. And this solution seems to have a foundation in St. Thomas, q. 5 On Evil, art. 2, reply to 5, where the reason is assigned why the bodies of those children after the resurrection, although they do not have the gift of impassibility, do not suffer the punishment of sense in the presence of causes acting from outside; he says that in the state of the future life, fire and other such active things do not act upon the souls or bodies of men according to the necessity of nature, but rather according to the order of divine justice, because that state is one of receiving according to merits. Hence, since divine justice does not require that the punishment of sense be due to children who depart with original sin alone, they will suffer nothing of this kind from such active things.
Little children departing with original sin alone will have no knowledge of supernatural beatitude.— But this solution is not really according to the mind of St. Thomas: for in the places alleged above he attributes to little children departing with original sin alone only natural knowledge; and he expressly denies that they know supernatural beatitude, and that on account of original sin they have been deprived of that same beatitude; nor does he distinguish between children before and after the day of judgment. Moreover, for that withdrawal of general concurrence, or that knowledge24, which now is naturally wont to beget pain, to affect the little children with sadness, cannot be without a miracle, since by nature the knowledge of the privation of a good torments a man, a good which he could have had, and lost by his own guilt and by the negligence of his own people. Nor is the reason the same for causes acting from outside, or inflicting the punishment of sense: for when the motion of the first movable ceases, which without doubt will cease after the day of the universal judgment, every other motion or alteration of the lower corporeal agents naturally ceases, because, as St. Thomas teaches, every motion and alteration of lower bodies depends on the motion of the heavenly bodies, and especially of the first movable.25 And therefore, without any miracle, although the children do not have the gift of impassibility, they will not be able after the day of judgment to suffer the punishment of sense from any corporeal agent. But interior affliction does not depend per se on the motion of the first movable. Hence, just as it was a miracle that God did not concur with the fire of the Babylonian furnace to inflict molestation on the three boys, so too it would be a miracle if he were to withdraw his operation, or general concurrence, so that the children should not be saddened and grieve from the lack of the divine vision proceeding from original sin, once the knowledge of that same privation is established in them after the day of judgment.
Otherwise, then, the answer is made to the argument: that since little children are not damned on account of any actual or personal guilt, but on account of original sin, which pertains to nature, it is not necessary that the original guilt on account of which they are damned be revealed or made manifest to them on the day of judgment: for, as St. Thomas teaches,26 Even children who die before the perfect age will appear in judgment, not that they may be judged, but that they may see the glory of the judge. And if the argument be made: for it would follow that it is not to be revealed even to adult unbelievers on the day of judgment that they have been deprived of supernatural beatitude on account of original and actual sin:27 for they too will not rise again, nor appear in judgment, that they may be judged, since, as is said in John 3, He who does not believe is already judged: but they will appear to behold the glory of the judge, as St. Thomas says in the same art. 5, reply to 2. It is answered by denying the consequence:28 for adult unbelievers will be damned not only on account of original sin, but also on account of actual sins, on account of which they are to be tormented with the punishment of sense, and with interior affliction, and with the worm of conscience, which will not die; and therefore it pertains to their state and damnation that they should know, to their own confusion, the glory and supernatural beatitude which they lost by their own guilt, according to that which Isaiah says:29 Let the zealous peoples see and be confounded, and let fire devour thy enemies; whence the Psalmist sings:30 The sinner shall see, and shall be angry; he shall gnash with his teeth, and shall pine away: the desire of sinners shall perish. But these things have no place in little children; whence there is no parity.
XIII. What Job understands by the name of the abortive.— To the first argument the answer is that in that place no comparison is made between the abortive on the one side and dead or living men on the other, but between a man who never existed and a man dead or living. And the reason for this is that otherwise the extremes of that comparison would coincide with each other; which is shown thus: for either the abortive fetus was animated, or it was not; if it was animated, it is plainly counted among the dead, and so the comparison would be of the same with itself, namely of a dead man with a dead man; but if it was not animated, then it was not a man: for before the infusion of the soul there is no man, and consequently no original sin is contracted. The legitimate explanation of that place, therefore, is the one St. Jerome assigns: namely, that it is better, or less evil, simply speaking, not to be at all than to be or live unhappily, that is, with actual sin. For it is said in Marc. 14 of Judas the traitor: It were good for him if that man had not been born. And Apocalypse 9: In those days men will seek death, and will not find it, and they will desire to die, and death will flee from them. And if the argument be made: for although, to avoid the greatest misery, it is more to be desired not to be than to be unhappy, nevertheless it is not more to be desired not to be at all than to see the calumnies of the innocent and no one to console them:31 but Ecclesiastes speaks of those very men who see the calumnies of the innocent, as is clear from the letter itself. It is answered that what we have said has place in princes, of whom Solomon speaks:32 for to them are imputed as guilt the many calumnies and injustices which are done to the innocent; because they are either their direct cause, when they command them to be done, or their indirect cause, because they could and ought to have forbidden them, and did not forbid them, and so commit mortal sin, which is a graver evil, and places a man in a worse state than when he did not exist at all. The reason for this is: for the good to which mortal sin is formally opposed is the divine being which we participate through grace; but this good is much more excellent than rational life, or the natural being which we receive through creation, since it is of a higher order: therefore it is a greater evil to lose that divine good through sin than never to have been born. Hence that which is said in the person of the damned, Wisdom 5: Being born, we immediately ceased to be, and in our malice we were consumed. As if they said: Our sins have consumed what we received. Secondly, that passage can be explained thus, that Solomon speaks after the manner of preachers, exaggerating that evil, as if he said: I was affected with such sadness, seeing the calumnies of the innocent, that I would rather have wished for death, or never to have existed, than to see so many evils with my eyes: I desire to be as far from the calumnies which are done to the innocent as are the dead, or rather those who never had being.
XIIII. All little children will rise again in the age of manhood, and without any natural defect of body.— To the authority of Lyranus the answer is that children infected with original sin alone will rise again in the age of manhood, and without any deformity, whether arising from the defect of some member, or from an undue disposition of the parts, or from undue quantity, or quality, or situation, and similar defects, such as fevers and other illnesses of this kind, as in 4 Sent., d. 44, q. 1, art. 2, quaestiunc. 1, and in the same distinction, q. 3, art. 1, quaestiunc. 1, St. Thomas teaches, speaking of the damned.33 And as regards this, it is certain that little children will lead a better life after the day of judgment than mortals lead in this world. Likewise also, as St. Thomas teaches, they will know natural beatitude and will love God as the author of nature, and will not be separated from God as regards the participation of the natural goods which they know; yet because they will be separated from God as he is the supernatural end, and infected with original sin, therefore, simply speaking, they will not have natural happiness, or a more perfect life in natural things, than any mortal ever led; and this is all that Lyranus intends to teach, together with the Doctors alleged above. And by these things the solution to the second is clear, and likewise to the other passages adduced.
To the third the answer is made by denying the major; for it has already been shown in disp. 45 and the two following that man in fallen nature does not differ from man constituted in the pure state of nature only in this, that the one is naked and the other despoiled, but also because in fallen nature he is wounded and injured in natural things by sin, with which not even natural happiness is compatible; whereas in the pure state of nature he would not have been wounded by sin, and therefore there is no parity.
XV. For what end the renewal of the world will be.— To the fourth the answer is that the renewal of the world is not to come about in order that little children departing with original sin may inhabit the face of the earth, but for the perfection of the universe, and as a testimony to the glory of the blessed, as M. Soto says; which the Apostle also seems to hint when he says:34 For the expectation of the creature awaits the revelation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who subjected it in hope: because the creature also itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the sons of God. For we know that every creature groans, and travails even until now.35 By these words, as St. Thomas explains, it is signified that sensible creatures, which are now subjected to vanity, that is, to mutability, are in the renewal of the world to be freed from36 such mutabilities into the liberty of the glory of the sons of God, because namely this too is fitting to the liberty of the glory of the sons of God, that as they themselves have been renewed, so also their dwelling should be renewed, according to that word of Isaiah 65:37 Behold, I create new heavens and a new earth, and the former things shall not be in memory, that is, the former mutability of the creature shall be no more.
To the fifth the solution is clear from what was said in the fifth and sixth conclusions.
The End of the Eleventh Book.