De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Book Ten

Introduction

IN WHICH IS TREATED THE HELP OF GRACE most special, which is proper to the Predestined, namely the gift of Perseverance.

IN THE LAST place it must be disputed concerning that great gift of Perseverance, whereby the Predestined infallibly attain to supernatural beatitude; concerning which six points are to be examined.

I. Whether a gift of perseverance is necessary for continuing grace until the end of life.

II. Whether the gift of Perseverance is distinguished from the gift of confirmation in grace.

III. Whether the gift of perseverance, in the character of the gift of perseverance, and its efficacy, depend on the free cooperation of our choice with it.

IV. Whether in the state of innocence the first parents needed a special gift of perseverance in order to persevere in grace until the end of life.

V. Whether the gift of perseverance is common to all the faithful, or is a gift proper to the predestined.

VI. Whether, when all the helps of prevenient grace are entirely equal in two men, it happens that one is converted, perseveres in grace, and is saved, while the other remains in sin and is damned.

Disputatio CIII: Whether the gift of perseverance is necessary to remain in grace until the end of life.

Whether the gift of perseverance is necessary for continuing grace until the end of life.

I. The threefold help of grace.— For an understanding of the title of this disputation it must be noted that theologians usually distinguish a threefold help of grace. The first is a special help, by which God concurs to individual pious acts and assists free choice. The second is a more special help, by which a man once justified perseveres in good works for a long time, but not up to the end of life. The third is a most special help, and proper to the predestined, by which God mercifully grants them to persevere in act until the end, and in common usage it is called the gift of perseverance, of which Christ the Lord says: But he who perseveres to the end, he will be saved. The difficulty therefore is: whether, in order to persevere until the end, this third gift, or most special help of grace, is simply necessary.

The negative part is proved. First: for persevering over a long time, habitual grace and the virtues together with that second special help suffice: therefore for ending life in grace the same help suffices, without any other special gift of perseverance. The consequence is clear: for it is more difficult to persevere in grace for twenty years, even if the man afterwards falls into mortal sin, than to preserve habitual grace for one hour and to end life in it: therefore, if for the first that second special help suffices, without a special gift of perseverance, it will suffice for the second as well.

This is confirmed. For, morally speaking, in one hour there cannot present themselves so many impediments and occasions of sinning that a man endowed with habitual grace and with the special help should need another gift, and a more special help, in order to persevere until the end.

Secondly it is argued. As St. Thomas teaches, 1. 2. q. 109, a. 10, the gift of perseverance is necessary in order that a man be protected against the impulses of temptations: but little children dying with baptism before the use of reason have no impulses of temptations, nor can they have any: therefore at least in them the gift of perseverance is not necessary in order that their habitual grace be continued until the end of life: therefore that gift is not simply necessary.

Thirdly it is argued. The gift of confirmation in grace is not necessary for ending life in grace, nor for obtaining eternal life: therefore neither is the gift of perseverance. The antecedent is most certain; for many are saved who nevertheless were not confirmed in this life: for a privilege of this kind was granted only to the most blessed Virgin, to the Apostles, and to some eminent saints. But the consequence is proved: for the gift of confirmation in grace is not really distinguished from the gift of perseverance: for, as St. Thomas teaches, q. 24 On Truth, a. 9, confirmation in grace imports a certain gift, and a most special divine help, by which, through a special providence, the occasions of sinning are taken away from the just and they are moved to good: but this same thing is conferred on the just through the gift of perseverance, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. 2., in the place cited, and 3 cont. Gent. c. 155. Therefore.

The same antecedent is confirmed. The gift of confirmation in grace is a certain supernatural divine help conferred by way of act, or by way of motion: but it does not belong to the first help, nor to the second, from what has been laid down above: therefore it belongs to the third; but the gift of perseverance likewise belongs to that third: therefore the gift of confirmation in grace and the gift of perseverance are not distinguished: therefore, if confirmation in grace is not necessary for obtaining eternal life, neither will the gift of perseverance be necessary.

II. Concerning this difficulty some assert that the second special help posited above suffices for continuing grace until the end of life: for they say that that same help, continued until the end of life, takes on the character of the gift of perseverance, which they affirm the Councils declare to be necessary for final salvation. But if it is not continued until the end of life, but is interrupted by mortal sin, it does not have the character of the gift of perseverance: and their chief reason is this: for so many helps are multiplied in vain without necessity. The common opinion of the Thomists is that the gift of perseverance is really distinguished from that second help, and that accordingly another special help, that of the gift of perseverance, is necessary for ending life in grace. And since this opinion is according to the mind of St. Thomas, for its explanation let this be laid down:

III. The gift of perseverance is necessary for eternal salvation besides habitual grace and the infused virtues.— First conclusion. According to the Catholic faith it must be asserted that, besides habitual grace and the infused virtues, a special supernatural help is necessary for persevering in good until the end, namely the gift of perseverance. In this all Catholics agree, and it is proved by the authorities of Scripture which Med. adduces, 1. 2. q. 109, a. 10, dub. 1, and from the Councils, which will be adduced for the second conclusion. Furthermore it is proved from Aug., the book On Correction and Grace, c. 12, where he writes thus: If in so great an infirmity of this life, in which infirmity nevertheless, in order to repress elation, virtue had to be perfected, their own will were left to them, so that they would remain in the help of God, without which they could not persevere, if they willed, and God did not work in them so that they will; amid so many and such great temptations their will itself would succumb through its infirmity; and therefore they could not persevere, because, failing through infirmity, they would not will it either. He teaches the same in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, especially c. 20.

Secondly it is proved by the reasoning of St. Thomas. That which is changeable by its nature, in order to be fixed in one thing, needs the help of some immovable mover: but free choice, even of a man existing in habitual grace, still remains changeable and flexible from good to evil: therefore, in order to be fixed in good and to persevere in it until the end, it needs a special help of God.

Second conclusion. For ending life in grace, besides the second special help posited above, that third help is necessary which is the gift of perseverance. And so the gift of perseverance is distinguished from that second help. This conclusion is not as certain as the preceding one; it is nevertheless St. Thomas's, 1. 2. q. 109, a. 10. And it is proved from the Council of Orange, can. 10, where it says: The help of God is always to be implored even by the reborn and the saints, that they may be able to come to a good end, or to persevere in good work. In these words the Council seems to distinguish the help which is given for ending life in grace from that which is conferred for persevering over a long time. Furthermore it is proved. The gift of perseverance is proper to the predestined, as is clear from that: He who perseveres to the end, he will be saved: but the second special help posited above is given many times even to the reprobate: therefore those two helps are distinguished.

If it be said that they are distinguished only in the account of gift, or that the same gift, continued until the end of life, takes on the character of the gift of perseverance; On the contrary: for the very continuation of grace until the end of life, even if it lasts for but one hour, has a special difficulty on account of the many impediments, both intrinsic and extrinsic, which then occur: therefore a man needs the most special help of the gift of perseverance. This is confirmed: for on account of difficulties of this kind David prayed in a special way that the end of his life might be good: for it is said in Ps. 120: The Lord keep thy coming in and thy going out, and Ps. 67: And of the Lord, of the Lord are the issues from death.

Finally it is proved. The second help has this in its formal character, that it is an actual motion, by which free choice is actually moved by God to act well: but the gift of perseverance does not essentially include a motion of this kind, but only the continuation of habitual grace until the end of life, as is clear in little children dying with baptism alone, to whom it is given to persevere until the end without any actual motion of free choice: therefore.

IIII. The gift of perseverance does not have the same effects in all.— From these things it follows that the gift of perseverance does not have an equal effect in all. For in some of the just the effect of the gift of perseverance is the acceleration of death, according to that of Wis. 4: He was taken away, lest malice should change his understanding. And again: For his soul was pleasing to God; for this cause he hastened to bring him out from the midst of iniquities. In others, however, the gift of perseverance has for its effect the prolongation of life, that they may do penance: and it includes many actual helps, by which they are moved to good, and the removal of the temptations to which they would succumb. In others, however, it causes a special strength, so that they overcome the greatest temptations, and other similar effects.

To the first argument it is answered that grace and the virtues give a man the ability to persevere until the end if he wills; but not that he actually wills and perseveres: and the same must be said proportionately of that second help, which gives a man to act well actually, but not continuity in good until the end.

To the confirmation it is answered from what has been said, that the end of life has a special difficulty on account of the reasons given above. Hence, in order that it be good, a man needs the special help of the gift of perseverance.

V. The gift of perseverance is given to predestined little children.— To the second it is answered that the gift of perseverance is given also to little children dying in grace, as it seems may be gathered from the Council of Trent, sess. 6 On Justification, can. 22. where it is said: If anyone says that a justified man can persevere in the justice he has received without a special help of God, or cannot persevere with it; let him be anathema. Where it is defined that the gift of perseverance is necessary for all the justified: therefore it will be necessary also for justified little children, in order that they may persevere until the end. And to the words of St. Thomas adduced it is answered that, when he says that the gift of perseverance is appointed to protect a man against the impulses of temptations, he is not speaking of the adequate effect of the gift of perseverance, but of an inadequate one, and one which is more commonly found in human nature; in little children, however, it has other effects, as has been said.

To the third argument the answer will be clear in the following disputation, where the difficulty which it touches will be resolved.

Disputatio CIV: Whether the gift of perseverance is really distinct from the gift of confirmation in grace.

Whether the gift of perseverance is distinguished really from the gift of confirmation in grace.

I. The first opinion affirms that these gifts are not distinguished. Others say that, although they are distinguished accidentally by the greater or lesser intensity of the same help, they are nevertheless not distinguished really: but the same gift of perseverance, insofar as it more perfects a man in the spiritual life, is called the gift of confirmation in grace. Certain more recent theologians seem to favor this opinion, who assert that confirmation in grace adds something beyond the common gift of perseverance. While explaining this, they say that the gift of perseverance is of itself conferred through ordinary helps and gifts of grace, with God alone furnishing and providing this, that they be given at congruous times and in that number, or multitude of helps, which suffice for such an effect: but that confirmation in grace adds proper and peculiar gifts and helps, by which God precedes a man in individual acts, and especially in the occasions of sin, and moves his will morally most efficaciously, not only according to foreknowledge, but also according to the power of the helps: which, although they do not determine the will, so that it even physically cannot resist, nevertheless morally most efficaciously induce it. Which efficacy, together with the other congruity from foreknowledge, provides confirmation.

This opinion is proved first by the last argument made in the preceding disputation, with its confirmation.

Secondly it is argued. The gift of perseverance makes a man impeccable. But the gift of confirmation in grace effects this very thing, as St. Thomas teaches in question 24 On Truth, articles 8 and 9: therefore these gifts have the same effect: therefore they are not distinguished.

It is confirmed: for just as the gift of confirmation in grace cannot be interrupted by mortal sin, although it admits venial sin along with itself, so too the gift of perseverance is compatible with venial sin, but is never interrupted by mortal sin, as Augustine says in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 6. And its reason is: for a man, by the very fact that he sins mortally, desists from the good begun, and does not persevere: therefore it implies a contradiction that the gift of perseverance be interrupted by mortal sin, or admit it along with itself: therefore the gift of perseverance and of confirmation in grace are not distinguished.

Thirdly. Because no essential difference can be assigned by which these gifts are really distinguished: therefore they are not distinguished among themselves.

The second opinion is that of others, who admit a real distinction between the gift of perseverance and confirmation in grace: they say, however, that the difference consists in this, that in those confirmed in grace there does not remain freedom in the fulfillment of the precepts, but they fulfill them necessarily; which freedom nevertheless remains in those having the gift of perseverance: so think some more recent theologians. From which they infer that those confirmed in that grace in which they were confirmed necessarily persevere, and to that extent are saved not freely but necessarily. And they add that it will not be necessary to defend that predestined persons of this sort, or those confirmed in grace, obtain salvation freely. The strongest reason of this opinion is: for those confirmed in grace are preceded by divine help, by which they are predetermined to the good: therefore they necessarily perform it: therefore they are not saved freely. The consequence is clear: for it is impossible that something be done necessarily and freely. But this opinion is altogether to be rejected, as will be said below.

The third opinion is that of St. Thomas, and the common one of his disciples; for whose explanation let this be laid down:

II. In what way the gift of perseverance is distinguished from confirmation in grace.— The first conclusion. The gift of perseverance and the gift of confirmation in grace are not the same. The conclusion is St. Thomas's, 1 p. q. 100, a. 2, ad 1, where he teaches that if Adam had not sinned, he would not generate sons of hell from himself; namely, in such a way that they would contract sin from him, which is the cause of hell; they could nevertheless become sons of hell through free choice, by sinning, or if they were not made sons of hell through sin, this would not be because they were confirmed in justice, but because of divine providence, by which they were preserved immune from sin. He holds, therefore, that the gift of confirmation and the gift of perseverance are not the same.

Moreover: for otherwise the gift of confirmation in grace would be granted to all the predestined, and to that extent it would not be a singular privilege of certain saints. The sequel is proved: for the gift of perseverance is granted to all the predestined: therefore if the gift of perseverance and confirmation in grace are not distinguished, confirmation itself in grace will be common to all the predestined.

A man purely considered, while he is on the way, is always simply capable of sinning.— But in order that we may explain wherein these two gifts are distinguished, it must be noted from St. Thomas, q. 24 On Truth, a. 9, in the body of the article, that someone can be confirmed in good and made impeccable in two ways. First, totally from within, and simply; namely, in such a way that he has within himself the intrinsic principle of his confirmation, so that he cannot sin, and thus all the blessed are impeccable. Secondly, one can be made impeccable in a certain respect; and not totally from within, but partly from within and partly from without; which happens when some gift of grace is given to someone, by which he is inclined to the good, so that he cannot easily be deflected from it; yet he is not thereby so withdrawn from evil that he absolutely cannot sin, unless he be protected and guarded by divine providence.

Secondly it must be noted, with the same St. Thomas, that in the same way in which some power is impeccable, it ought to be unchangeable from good into evil. For sin then occurs, when a rational power is changed from good into evil. But unchangeability simply, and proceeding totally from within, cannot be found except in the blessed: and the reason for this is the one St. Thomas assigns in the same chapter. For from this the will is rendered unchangeable, because its capacity is totally filled, just as heaven is substantially unchangeable and incorruptible, because the whole capacity of the matter of heaven is filled by its form: but the whole capacity of the rational soul is not filled, except in the fatherland, where it will possess the highest good, and will have it present: therefore the will of man is only in the fatherland totally unchangeable from within, from good into evil: let this be laid down, then:

The second conclusion. Both those confirmed in grace, while they are on the way, and those having the gift of perseverance, are simply capable of sinning. Here we do not speak of Christ the Lord, who was simply and from within impeccable by reason of the suppositum. This conclusion is Ferrara's, 4 cont. Gent. c. 70, Med. 3 p. q. 27, a. 4, conc. 3, where he teaches concerning all the confirmed, that, while they were on the way, they were simply capable of sinning; although in a certain respect they were impeccable. It is proved: for this seems to be the express opinion of St. Thomas, q. 24 On Truth cited, where he says that only the blessed are simply confirmed in good, and 4 cont. Gent. c. 70, rat. 2, he says that the unchangeability of the will cannot belong to a man, except insofar as he attains the ultimate end, which he proves there by most efficacious reasons. And 1 p. q. 100, a. 2, in the body, speaking of confirmation in good simply, he says that from this the rational creature is confirmed in justice, that it is made blessed through the open vision of God, to which, once seen, it cannot fail to adhere, since it is the very essence of goodness, from which it cannot be turned away.

Moreover it is proved by a reason drawn from the foundations laid down. In order that a rational creature be simply impeccable, it must be simply unchangeable from good into evil: but it is not simply unchangeable, except through the beatific vision: therefore. The minor is proved, because only through the beatific vision is the whole capacity of the rational creature filled: therefore only through the beatific vision does it become simply unchangeable from good into evil. From which it follows that both those confirmed in grace and those having the gift of perseverance are only impeccable in a certain respect, and on a supposition, as long as they are on the way.

III. Those confirmed in grace are impeccable in a certain respect.— The third conclusion. The impeccability in a certain respect which is found in those confirmed in grace, comes partly from within, from the perfection of habitual grace and of the virtues; partly from without, namely from God's custody, protection and direction: just as Adam in the state of innocence was immortal partly from within, by reason of the vigor of nature; partly from without, namely on account of the tree of life, from which he fed; and on account of divine custody and providence, to which it belonged to remove everything bodily harmful. This conclusion, as to the first part, is against Durandus, who asserts that the impeccability which is found in those confirmed in grace comes only from without, namely from the direction of the Holy Spirit, removing all the occasions of sin. As to the second part, however, it is against other doctors, who assert that those confirmed in grace are impeccable totally from within, on account of the fullness of grace and of the virtues. But our conclusion, as to both parts, is St. Thomas's and Ferrara's, in the place cited above. And indeed, that that impeccability comes partly from within is proved from St. Thomas, 3 p. q. 27, a. 5, ad 2, where, speaking of the grace by which the most blessed Virgin was confirmed in good, he teaches that she had a certain intrinsic perfection: for he says that in the conception of the Son of God her grace was consummated, confirming her in good. By which words he shows that the grace confirming the Blessed Virgin in good was in itself perfect.

Moreover it is proved. The soul is confirmed in good, insofar as it is so perfectly inclined to it that it cannot easily be turned away from it: in that, through the perfection of grace, the defects inclining to sin are taken away, as St. Thomas teaches in question 24 On Truth cited: but that inclination belongs to the intrinsic perfection of grace itself and of the virtues: therefore the impeccability which is found in those confirmed in grace comes in some way from the intrinsic perfection of grace itself.

IIII. Wherein consists the grace confirming in good.— If anyone inquires wherein consists this greater perfection of the grace confirming in good, it is answered that it does not consist in a greater intensity of the same habitual grace. For grace not confirming in good is sometimes more intense than grace confirming in good, which is clear from this: for many are on the way, not confirmed in grace, who have grace and charity more intense than some who are in the fatherland. It must be said therefore that this perfection is considered according to a certain participation of the grace and charity of the fatherland, which in its mode is of another kind than non-confirming grace or charity, as St. Thomas says, 2 2 q. 24, a. 7, ad 3.

But the second part of the conclusion is proved: for to make a man impeccable totally from within is proper to the charity of the fatherland, as has been said: therefore the gift of confirmation in grace does not make a man impeccable totally from within, but partly from within and partly from without. It is proved moreover: for the grace existing in confirmed wayfarers does not take away from them every origin of sin, because it does not take away all ignorance and inconsideration, from which sin can arise; nor does it bring it about that the intellect and the will are always in second act with respect to the contemplation and love of God, and likewise it does not take away the tinder of sin, or every disorder of the sensitive appetite, from which sin can also arise: therefore it requires a special protection of God in order to make a man impeccable.

Those confirmed in grace are saved freely.— The fourth conclusion. It is by no means to be admitted that those confirmed in grace are not saved freely, but necessarily. It is proved: since, if they were saved necessarily, and not freely, it would follow that they would necessarily, and not freely, fulfill the precepts, and consequently would merit nothing in fulfilling them: which is by no means to be conceded: for otherwise the Blessed Virgin, who in everyone's opinion was confirmed in grace, and Christ the Lord, who by the nature of the divine suppositum was impeccable, would not have merited through acts of virtue, as through passion and death; but the consequent cannot be admitted: therefore.

Moreover: for those confirmed in grace are necessitated to good only by a conditioned necessity and on a supposition, not however by an absolute one: but a conditioned and suppositional necessity, since it is a necessity in a certain respect, does not destroy freedom, as was shown in disp. 25: therefore.

From these it follows that the difference between the gift of perseverance and confirmation in grace consists in this, that the gift of perseverance constitutes no intrinsic perfection in habitual grace itself; which intrinsic perfection, however, confirmation in grace confers on it, as has been said.

V. By these things an answer is given to the first argument from the facts at the beginning, which was the third of the preceding controversy. For we say that the gift of confirmation in grace is indeed not simply necessary for obtaining eternal life: yet from this it does not follow that the gift of perseverance is not simply necessary. And to the attack it is answered that the gift of perseverance and the gift of confirmation in grace, although they agree in some things, yet not in all, as is clear from what has been said: whence they are not simply the same help.

Confirmation in grace includes the gift of perseverance, and not conversely.— To the confirmation it is answered that the gift of confirmation in grace includes the gift of perseverance, and not conversely. For everyone confirmed in grace perseveres to the end: but not everyone who perseveres to the end is confirmed in grace. Whence from the fact that confirmation in grace is not simply necessary for obtaining eternal life, it does not follow that the gift of perseverance is not necessary for that. Secondly it is answered to the same confirmation, that in that division of actual supernatural help assigned above, by which it is divided into those three members, only those helps are comprehended which place no intrinsic perfection in habitual grace itself by way of something permanent, but only the helps by which God, by way of something transient, actually moves a man to perform supernatural works well. Whence it is not necessary that confirmation in grace belong to any of those three helps, because, as has been said, it places some intrinsic perfection in habitual grace.

To the second, with its confirmation, and to the third, the answer is clear from what has been said: for we say that, although the gift of perseverance and of confirmation agree in this, that neither is interrupted by mortal sin, they are nevertheless distinguished from another root, as has been said.

To the fourth argument for the second opinion it is answered that that determination does not take away freedom, but perfects it, because it is not a determination to one thing from necessity, but according to the mode of freedom, namely because it so determines to good that it at the same time leaves in the will the capacity by which it can perform the opposite, if it wills, or not perform it, as was shown in disputation 18 and 22: concerning which also it will have to be treated below, when disputing about the reason for the concord of the freedom of our free choice with the efficacy of the divine helps of grace.

Disputatio CV: Whether the gift of perseverance, in its character as such and in its efficacy, depends on the free cooperation of our choice with it.

Whether the gift of perseverance, in the character of a gift of perseverance, and its efficacy, depends on the free cooperation of our choice with it.

I. This difficulty is almost the same as that which we treated above: namely, whether the efficacy of the help of prevenient grace depends on the free influx of our choice with that same help.

The first opinion, which certain of the more recent theologians follow, asserts that two things are necessary for the gift of perseverance: one on the part of God — namely, that he has determined to confer those helps with which he foresaw that an adult would persevere according to his freedom, although he could have not persevered according to the same freedom; the other on the part of the free choice of the adult, as a condition without which the will to confer such helps would not have had the character of a will to confer the gift of perseverance — namely, that the adult according to his freedom would so cooperate with them as to persevere: which has been placed within his own capacity. Whence on this opinion the efficacy of the gift of perseverance depends on the free cooperation of our choice, as on a condition without which it would not have the character of a gift of perseverance in relation to this man.

This opinion is proved. First from Augustine, in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 6, where he says: Perseverance to the end, which no one has except he who has persevered to the end, many can have, no one can lose. For there is no need to fear that perhaps, when a man has persevered to the end, some evil will should arise in him, so that he should not persevere to the end. By which words he seems to teach that perseverance depends on the free choice of man.

The second argument is from the same Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 6, where he says: If we shall say that this perseverance, so praiseworthy and so happy, is so of man that it is not from God, we make void what the Lord said to Peter: I have prayed for you, that your faith may not fail. Where it is signified that perseverance depends even on man, although not on him alone, but at the same time and principally on the help of grace. Finally, in the book On the Dogmas of the Church, ch. 21, it is said: That we may not slip in the gift of salvation once obtained is the concern of our solicitude and equally of divine assistance. The same is gathered from St. Prosper, book 2 On the Call of the Gentiles, ch. 26, where he says: Whether therefore we consider the beginnings, or the advances of the faithful, or the class of those who persevere to the end, no species of any virtue occurs which is had either without the gift of divine grace or without the consent of our will. By which words he confesses that perseverance to the end depends on the consent of our will.

Thirdly it is argued. With the help on God's part, with which one man does not persevere to the end of life, he can, if he wills, persevere; and similarly with the help with which he does persevere, he can, if he wills, not persevere: therefore to persevere or not to persevere is established in the power of our choice: therefore the gift of perseverance depends on it.

It is confirmed. The gift of perseverance is not efficacious according to its own nature, and as it comes from God himself, antecedently to the free cooperation of our free choice: therefore it is efficacious dependently on the free influx of that same choice. The antecedent is proved: for if it were efficacious antecedently to the consent of our choice, it would follow first that a man would persevere without the use of his own will, and so would persevere necessarily and not freely. Likewise it would follow secondly that the gift of perseverance would cause in us the very willing to persevere before the consent of our free choice. The sequel is proved: for if it is efficacious antecedently, then it effects something, but nothing other than the very willing to persevere: therefore it produces the very willing antecedently to the influx and consent of our choice: and so the choice would comport itself merely passively, receiving the very willing to persevere as produced by God alone.

Fourthly it is argued. An adult does not persevere in grace otherwise than by observing to the end of life all the commandments that bind under mortal sin: for perseverance is not interrupted except by mortal sin. But the observance of the commandments, since it is brought about through our free acts, depends on the influx of our free choice: therefore perseverance also depends on the influx of the same choice, and at the same time on the help of divine grace.

Fifthly it is proved: for, as is clear from the Council of Trent, decree on justification, canon 22, it is the man himself who perseveres: therefore perseverance depends on man.

Sixthly there is the argument which we touched upon at the close of disputation 91: for the efficacy of the gift of perseverance, although it does not depend on the free cooperation of free choice with it, nevertheless presupposes in that same choice a certain disposition, or negative non-resistance, by which it allows itself to be moved by God. For if free choice resists, and does not allow itself to be moved by God — which is placed within its capacity — the motion of God will not be efficacious, nor will it infallibly induce the effect which depends on the free cooperation of that same choice: therefore the efficacy of the gift of perseverance depends on the aforesaid negative disposition; and consequently the gift of perseverance will not be efficacious in itself.

This is confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas, 3 Contra Gentiles, ch. 159, where he says that it is in the power of free choice to impede the reception of divine grace, or not to impede it. And from this he infers that the omission of a supernatural act which is commanded is imputed to man as a fault, even if he cannot fulfill that commandment without the help of grace: therefore St. Thomas admits a negative disposition, or non-resistance, of free choice, on which would depend the conferral of efficacious help, or the efficacy of that same help. The same negative disposition St. Thomas seems to establish in question 3 On Evil, art. 2, in the body, where for receiving the influx and motion of God he requires in a man some disposition according to which a good or an evil act is produced in him. But no positive disposition can be required beforehand, before the influx of God, since nothing positive can be done without God: therefore a negative disposition is required beforehand, or non-resistance, by which the choice gives place to God, so that he himself may do and lead free choice whither he wills.

Seventhly it is proved by all the arguments by which we strove above to prove that the efficacious help of prevenient grace depends on the free influx of our choice; for the same arguments proceed in the same way concerning the gift of perseverance.

II. The contrary opinion is held by St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and the other doctors cited above, who teach that the efficacy of efficacious help does not depend — not even as on a condition without which it would not be — on the free cooperation of our choice: and since this opinion is most true and highly consonant with Catholic doctrine, for its explanation

The gift of perseverance is taken in two ways.— First it must be noted that the gift of perseverance can be taken in two ways. First, for the gift itself formally, or for the help of prevenient grace, through which God actively and properly effects that a man will to persevere and persevere to the end. Secondly, for the effect of the gift of perseverance itself, which in adults includes the free acts, namely the very willing to persevere and the other good moral acts by which he fulfills the divine commandments. The present controversy, therefore, does not proceed concerning the gift of perseverance as it is taken for its effect — for all Catholics confess that the free effects of the gift of perseverance proceed effectively from free choice moved by the help of grace, just as all supernatural free actions depend on free choice — but the difficulty proceeds only concerning the gift itself formally, insofar as it is efficacious perseverance, as it were in first act.

The gift of perseverance is called, and is, efficacious in two ways.— Secondly it must be noted that the gift of perseverance, like any other supernatural help, can be called efficacious in two ways: in one way, as it were in first act; in another way, in second act. It is called efficacious in first act insofar as, prior in the order of nature to the will's operating, it bestows on it most efficacious powers to will. But it is called efficacious in second act insofar as it effects actually, and in the very exercise, the free consent of the will together with the influx of that same will. Let this be laid down, then:

III. The efficacy of perseverance does not depend on the free cooperation of choice.— The first conclusion. The gift of perseverance, in the character of a gift of perseverance, and its efficacy, in no way depends effectively on the free cooperation of our choice; but on God alone, and on the efficacious and absolute decree of his will, who in his mercy bestows that gift on whom he wills. This conclusion is St. Augustine's and St. Thomas's, as will appear below, and all their disciples defend it with unanimous consent.

And it is proved: first from the Council of Trent, session 6, on justification, ch. 13, where it is said thus: Likewise concerning the gift of perseverance, of which it is written, Matth. 10 and 24: He who has persevered to the end, he shall be saved: which indeed cannot be had from elsewhere than from him who can establish him who stands, that he stand perseveringly, and restore him who falls; let no one promise himself anything with absolute certainty. Behold, the Council teaches that the gift of perseverance cannot be had from elsewhere than from God: therefore it does not depend on our free choice; otherwise it could be had from elsewhere than from God alone. They answer this that the gift of perseverance is had from God alone because he alone produces in us effectively, without our freely consenting, the supernatural help with which he foreknows that a man will persevere according to his freedom: but because a man with that help can persevere and not persevere, as often as God foreknows by that middle knowledge that a man will persevere, such help obtains the character of a gift of perseverance. But if God foreknows by the same knowledge that a man, according to the freedom innate to him, will not persevere with that help, such help will not have the character of a gift of perseverance, but will retain the common character of a supernatural help sufficient for persevering. Whence, in the character of a gift of perseverance, it depends, as on a condition without which it would not be, on the future consent of the choice foreknown by God. But against this answer there is the argument: for the Council speaks absolutely and formally of the gift of perseverance: therefore, although the acts produced by free choice moved by God through the gift of perseverance depend on that choice, nevertheless the efficacy of the help in the character of a gift of perseverance in no way depends actively, or as on a condition without which it would not be, on the free cooperation of our choice.

Moreover: for the Massilians, against whom St. Augustine wrote the book On the Predestination of the Saints and On the Gift of Perseverance, explained the gift of perseverance in this way: for they said that God bestowed on man the supernatural help of prevenient grace, without which he could not persevere by free choice; but yet with that help a man persevered actually, if he willed; but if he did not will, he did not persevere. They affirmed, moreover, that that gift could be lost by the will of man; nor did they admit any gift of prevenient grace through which God would actively and properly effect that a man become willing from unwilling, and persevere to the end, as St. Augustine taught; and they were scandalized by his doctrine. This is clear from the words of St. Hilary in his letter to Augustine, where, speaking of the Semi-Pelagians, he says thus: Then they take it ill that grace is so divided — that which was given to the first man then, or is given to men now — that he received perseverance, not that by which it would be brought about that he persevered, but that without which he could not persevere by free choice: but now to the saints predestined to the kingdom through grace there is not given such an assistance of perseverance, but such that perseverance itself is given to them, not only that they cannot be persevering without this gift, but also that through this gift they are not otherwise than persevering. By these words of your holiness they are so moved that they say a kind of desperation is displayed to men. And a little below he adds: Whatever has been given to the predestined, they contend that it can both be lost and be retained by their own will. Which would then be false, if they thought it true that certain persons have received perseverance in such a way that they cannot be otherwise than persevering. Whence St. Augustine, in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chs. 1, 2, 6, 7, 8 and 9, shows that the gift of perseverance cannot be lost by the contumacious will of man, but that through that gift he perseveres infallibly.

IV. It is proved secondly by the express authority of the same St. Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 8, where, explaining that word of Luke 22, I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail, etc., he says: Will you dare to say that, even with Christ praying that the faith of Peter might not fail, it would have failed if Peter had willed it to fail, that is, if he had willed not to persevere in it to the end? As though Peter would in any way will something other than what Christ had asked for him — namely, that he will? For who does not know that the faith of Peter would then have perished, if that will which was faithful had itself failed: and that it would have remained, if the same will had remained? But because the will is prepared by the Lord, therefore the prayer for him could not be in vain. When therefore he prayed that his faith might not fail, what else did he ask than that he might have in faith a most free, most strong, most invincible and most persevering will? And in ch. 12 he says: To the first man, therefore, who in that good in which he had been made upright had received the ability not to sin, the ability not to die, the ability not to desert that good itself, there was given an assistance of perseverance, not that by which it would be brought about that he persevered, but that without which he could not persevere by free choice. But now to the saints predestined to the kingdom of God through the grace of God there is given not only such an assistance of perseverance, but such that perseverance itself is given to them, not only that they cannot be persevering without this gift, but also that through this gift they are not otherwise than persevering. For he said not only: Without me you can do nothing: but he also said: You have not chosen me, but I have chosen you, and I have appointed you, that you should go and bring forth fruit, and that your fruit should remain. By which words he showed that he had given them not only justice, but also perseverance in it. For since Christ so appoints them that they go and bring forth fruit, and that their fruit remain, who would dare to say, perhaps they will not remain? And a little below, explaining that word to the Romans 14, For God is able to establish him, he says: He therefore gives perseverance, who is able to establish those who stand, that they may stand most perseveringly, or to restore those who have fallen: for the Lord lifts up the broken. Behold, he teaches not obscurely that the gift of perseverance is from God alone, who is able to establish the predestined. For although the pious or meritorious operations, which are the effects of the gift of perseverance, are not brought about in adults without the free cooperation of created choice with grace, and consequently depend efficiently on free choice moved by God, nevertheless the gift of perseverance itself, by which God makes his elect persevere to the end, and the efficacy of that same gift, in no way depends on the free cooperation of that same choice, as has been said concerning the efficacy of the other helps of grace. Whence the same Augustine, at the close of the same ch. 12, adds: And therefore God did not will that his saints glory, even concerning perseverance in good itself, in their own powers, but in himself. Because there is given them not only such an assistance as he gave to the first man, without which they could not persevere, if they willed, but he also works in them even the willing. And after a few words: The infirmity of human will has therefore been succored, so that it is acted upon by divine grace indeclinably and inseparably, and therefore, although infirm, it does not fail, nor is it overcome by any adversity.

Finally, in letter 107 to Vitalis, at the beginning, he attacks those who say that God works in us that we may will, as far as in him lies; but if we do not will, we make the operation of God to avail nothing in us: therefore, in St. Augustine's mind, the efficacy of the gift of perseverance does not depend on the free influx of our choice; otherwise a man could effect, and would often effect, that that gift should not obtain its effect in us, nor lead a man to eternal life. The same doctrine St. Thomas teaches, 1-2, q. 109, a. 10, where he distinguishes the gift by which someone perseveres from that by which he can persevere.

Thirdly it is proved by reason. The actual influx of free choice, by which a man wills to persevere and perseveres to the end, is an effect of the gift of perseverance and of its efficacy, although it is not brought about in us without us freely concurring: therefore the efficacy of the gift of perseverance does not depend on that same influx of our choice. The consequence is clear: for the efficacy of an efficient cause does not depend on its effect — as the efficacy of fire, which it has for heating, does not depend on the heating, but on the contrary; and so

V. The efficacy of perseverance precedes the cooperation of choice in the order of nature.— Fourthly it is proved. The efficacy of the gift of perseverance precedes, in the order of reason and of causality, the free influx of our free choice: for the efficacious gift of perseverance belongs to prevenient grace: therefore it does not depend on that same influx. The consequence is clear: for if it did depend on it, then efficacious grace would be subsequent to our choice and its attendant; and consequently the efficacious grace of the gift of perseverance would be joined to human humility and obedience, and would not subject the human will to itself: which nevertheless seems to conflict with the doctrine of the Council of Orange cited above.

Fifthly it is proved: for if the gift of perseverance, and its efficacy, depends on the free cooperation of choice, it follows that the perseverance which is given to the predestined through Christ only grants them to persevere if they will, but does not effect in them that they actually persevere and will; but that the persevering itself is left in their choice; and that if they do not persevere, this proceeds from their own fault. The consequent is false: for otherwise the gift of perseverance which is given to the predestined through Christ would be neither another, nor a greater or stronger gift, than the perseverance conferred on Adam in the state of innocence: because perseverance was given even to Adam, by which he would persevere if he willed: but the actual perseverance, or the very willing to persevere, was left in his choice, and by his own fault he did not persevere. This is proved from St. Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 11, where he says: For such was the assistance, that he would desert it when he willed, and remain in it if he willed, not that by which it would be brought about that he willed. This is the first grace, which was given to the first Adam, but mightier than this is that in the second Adam. For the first is that by which it is brought about that a man has justice, if he wills: the second therefore can do more, by which it is also brought about that he wills; and wills so much, and loves with such ardor, that while the will of the flesh lusts contrarily, he conquers by the will of the spirit. Nor was that indeed a small grace, by which the power of free choice was also shown: since he was so aided that without this assistance he would not remain in good; but he could desert this assistance, if he willed. But this grace is so much greater, that it is a small thing for a man through it to repair lost freedom: a small thing, finally, not to be able without it either to apprehend the good, or to remain in the good if he wills, unless it be also wrought in him that he wills. At that time, therefore, God had given man a good will: for he had made him in that will, who had made him upright. He had also given the assistance without which he could not remain in it, if he willed: but that he should will, he left in his free choice. He could therefore remain, if he willed, because there was not lacking the assistance through which he could, and without which he could not perseveringly hold the good which he willed. But because he willed not to remain, it is assuredly his fault; and it would have been his merit, if he had willed to remain. From these an argument is drawn. All the things that belong to the perseverance which is given to us through Christ would also belong to the perseverance conferred on Adam in the state of innocence, if it be once admitted that the efficacy of the gift of perseverance which is given through Christ depends on the cooperation of created choice. This is shown thus: for if God, or the efficacy of the gift of perseverance, does not truly and efficiently effect that those to whom it is granted will to persevere, but only makes them persevere if they themselves will, and if the fact that they do not persevere proceeds from their fault, while the fact that they do persevere with that same help proceeds from their innate freedom, and therefore it would have been their merit if they had remained — then certainly the gift of perseverance of the second Adam would have no greater efficacy, nor would it be a more powerful or stronger help than the gift of the first Adam: since the perseverance conferred on the first parent in the state of innocence also granted him to persevere if he willed, and by his own fault he did not persevere; and finally it would have been his merit if he had persevered, as is clear from the words of Augustine cited. Therefore it must be said that the efficacy of the gift of perseverance does not depend on the free cooperation of choice, but precedes it, and truly and efficiently effects that free choice will to persevere and actually persevere to the end.

The second conclusion. If the efficacy of the gift of perseverance be taken in second act, for the actual efficiency by which it effects pious operations in us and with us, by which the just man perseveres to the end, such efficacy is not without the free cooperation of choice: yet it does not depend on it. Each part of this conclusion is proved by the same reasons by which it was shown in disputation 90, conclusions 2 and 3, that, although the efficacy of the help of prevenient grace, taken for actual efficiency, is not without the free cooperation of choice, it nevertheless in no way depends on it: for the same reasoning holds a fortiori concerning the gift of perseverance and concerning any other efficacious help, since the gift of perseverance itself is the chief among all efficacious helps.

VI. The gift of perseverance does not take away from man the power of not persevering, if he wills.— The third conclusion. The gift of perseverance does not take away from man the power by which he can not persevere, if he wills, but effects that, when he can not persevere, he nevertheless perseveres infallibly. Whence these two are at the same time compossible: Peter has the gift of perseverance, and Peter can not persevere, if he wills. But these two are at the same time incompossible: Peter has the gift of perseverance, and Peter does not persevere. This conclusion is St. Prosper's, book 2 On the Call of the Gentiles, ch. 28, where he says: What God willed them to will, they willed, who to obey him so gives the willing itself that he does not take away even from those who will persevere that mutability by which one can will not. The same St. Thomas teaches in the places cited in disp. 18, n. 23, of which we shall speak again in disp. 115, n. 4, and disp. 122, n. 19.

Moreover it is proved by reason: for the gift of perseverance effects that a man freely wills to persevere: therefore it leaves in him the free faculty by which he can not persevere, if he wills. It is confirmed: for the gift of perseverance is given for this, that when a man can by free choice fall away from the ultimate end, he may not fall away, according to that word: He who could have transgressed, and has not transgressed; to do evil, and has not done it: therefore the gift of perseverance does not take away from man the power by which he can not persevere, if he wills.

This reasoning can be confirmed from the Council of Trent, session 6, on justification, canon 4, where it is defined under anathema that the free choice of man, moved and aroused by God, cooperates in something by assenting to God arousing and calling, and can dissent, if it wills: therefore the efficacious help of the gift of perseverance, although it effects — as Augustine speaks — that a man perseveres insuperably, indeclinably and most invincibly, nevertheless does not take away from him the true faculty by which through free choice he can dissent, and not persevere, if he wills.

To the first argument it is answered that St. Augustine, in those words cited from ch. 6 of On the Gift of Perseverance, shows a posteriori that the gift of perseverance is unlosable. Whence from that passage it is concluded only that the free effect of the gift of perseverance itself depends on our choice moved by God: but not that the help itself, formally speaking, in the character of a gift of perseverance, depends on the free influx of our free choice. And by this answer is made to the other two passages of St. Augustine.

To the second argument, from the authority of St. Prosper, answer is made by what has been said to the passages of St. Augustine.

He who has the gift of perseverance cannot, in the composite sense, not persevere.— To the third it is answered that with the help by which a man perseveres to the end he can absolutely not persevere, if he wills, because, as has been said, that help does not take away the power of not persevering, but the act: for it effects that a man perseveres infallibly and freely. Whence in the composite sense it is impossible that one having the gift of perseverance should not persevere, since it cannot come about that these two be true at the same time — namely that the gift of perseverance be in a man, and that the man not persevere — as has been said concerning efficacious help in disp. 92 and the two that follow.

To the confirmation the antecedent is denied. To the proof it is answered from what has been said, that if perseverance be taken formally for the help itself, insofar as it is efficacious, as it were in first act, or insofar as it bestows most efficacious powers on the will, such help is in the predestined antecedently to their free consent, not indeed by priority of time, but of causality: and under this aspect it efficaciously predetermines free choice to persevere. But if it be taken for the free effect which it produces in us and with us, it is true that such effect depends effectively on our free choice moved by God with efficacious help. And by this answer is made to the other proof of the same antecedent; and similarly it must be said to the fourth and fifth.

To the sixth argument, certain doctors, even among those who think with us that God by efficacious help physically premoves and predetermines free choice to individual pious acts, admit that negative disposition, or non-resistance, which on the part of free choice is presupposed, in the genus of material cause, for the reception of efficacious help. And they add that, as often as a man is sufficiently aroused to believe, if he allows himself to be led, he will be infallibly determined by God to will to believe; and unless the will thus begins dispositively, it will never be determined by God. They are constrained to assert this, both by the authority of St. Thomas in q. 2 On Evil, adduced in the argument, and also because they think it necessary that the efficacious help which physically predetermines be in the free power of the man aroused by God, so that both the supernatural act and its omission may be voluntary to him.

This way of speaking, however, has never pleased me, nor does it seem to agree with what has been said above from the mind of St. Augustine and St. Thomas concerning efficacious help: and the aforesaid opinion can be impugned. First: for the efficacious help of prevenient grace does not depend on the free cooperation of choice, nor on a positive disposition of it, as was shown above: therefore neither on a negative disposition, or non-resistance. The consequence is proved: for the same inconveniences follow from a negative disposition of free choice preceding grace in some genus of cause, as follow from a positive disposition preceding it. For in the end it would ultimately have to be reduced to that negative disposition, that one man has efficacious grace, perseveres in grace, and is saved, and another not; namely because one of himself begins through that negative disposition, or non-resistance, which efficacious predetermining grace follows; and the other does not. And so, to those asking why this man has efficacious grace and the gift of perseverance, and another not, it could be answered that one of himself had that negative disposition, or non-resistance, and the other not; and thus would fall that sentence of St. Augustine so often repeated: why he draws this man and does not draw that one, be unwilling to judge, if you are unwilling to err. Likewise all the arguments made in disputations 56 and 58 militate against the same opinion, namely those made to prove that there is no law established by God concerning the infallible conferral of the helps of grace on those who do what in them lies from the sole faculty of nature. For it is also inconvenient, and perhaps more so, to assert that the gifts and helps of grace have an infallible order and connection with that negative disposition of free choice, than if it be said that they have an infallible connection with some positive act of the same choice: for then efficacious grace would be owed to nature, and consequently grace would not be grace. Nor is it enough to answer that that negative disposition does not proceed from the sole powers of nature, but on the supposition of the help of prevenient exciting grace: for against this stands that exciting grace does not of itself efficaciously bring it about that the man aroused does not resist that same grace, otherwise no one prevented by exciting grace would resist it. Therefore that this man does not resist exciting grace, but comports himself merely negatively, suspending every act, is referred to his natural freedom: therefore if on account of this disposition efficacious help is infallibly given to him, it seems to follow that the same efficacious help is owed to nature, when it disposes itself by that negative disposition. Secondly the same doctrine is impugned, because that non-resistance of free choice is either altogether natural, and preceding every act of the will, or it is free at least indirectly. If it is merely natural, and a pure negation, it contributes nothing to a man's having efficacious grace, or to its being said that efficacious grace is in the power of free choice; for a disposition merely natural, even a negative one, is not in the power of choice; otherwise it would not be merely natural, but voluntary. But by reason of a disposition which is not in the power of choice, efficacious help cannot be in the power of that same choice. But if it be said that that negative disposition is not merely natural, but free at least indirectly, it follows that that disposition of choice which is presupposed for efficacious grace is not only negative, but positive at least by reason of the act in which it is voluntary. Thirdly the same is proved, because that free choice does not resist but allows itself to be moved by God is an effect of efficacious grace: for efficacious grace overcomes and takes away all the resistance of choice, softens the heart, and first of all takes away its hardness. For Augustine says: This grace, therefore, which is secretly bestowed on human hearts by divine bounty, by no hard heart* is spurned. For it is therefore bestowed, that the hardness of the heart be first taken away. Therefore such non-resistance of choice is not a disposition required beforehand for efficacious grace, and consequently the efficacy of the gift of perseverance does not depend on the same disposition. This is confirmed: for free choice does not resist efficacious grace for the reason that it consents and cooperates with it, but to cooperate with efficacious grace is an effect of that same grace, as was shown in disputation 86: therefore that free choice does not resist, but allows itself to be moved by God, is an effect of efficacious motion: therefore it is not presupposed for the efficacious motion itself. Fourthly the same is proved: for if efficacious grace depended on that negative disposition, or non-resistance of choice, it would follow that before the absolute decree of giving a man efficacious grace, by which he is actually converted and saved, there would be presupposed in God middle knowledge, by which he would certainly know that that negative non-resistance would be future on the hypothesis that the will were moved by such an excitation; and thus middle knowledge would have to be established in God, the contrary of which was shown in disp. 7. Likewise it would also follow that efficacious grace would be joined to that disposition, or human non-resistance, and would be its attendant; which nevertheless cannot be admitted, as is clear from what has been said above.

To the argument, therefore, it is answered that efficacious grace itself brings it about that, although free choice of itself can resist the divine call, it nevertheless does not resist, but freely and infallibly consents, and perseveres to the end. Nor is it necessary that efficacious help be in our power in order that the act which we produce by the power of that same help be free to us.

To the confirmation from the authority of St. Thomas, 3 Contra Gentiles, it is answered that it is indeed in the power of free choice, from the faculty of nature, to impede the reception of grace by dissenting from the divine call: but nevertheless, as the same St. Thomas explains in ch. 160 of the same book 3 Contra Gentiles: What has been said, that it is in the power of free choice not to offer an impediment to grace, applies to those in whom the natural power has been entire. But if through a preceding disorder it has declined to evil, it will not be altogether in its power to offer no impediment to grace. From which words it is had that free choice in fallen nature can indeed, for some short time, from its own powers, not add a new impediment to grace, because it can elicit some good moral work by which it avoids a new sin; but nevertheless the help of grace, especially of efficacious grace, does not have an infallible connection with that good work of nature, and much less can it have one with the negation of the work, or of the contrary vice. Whence as often as non-resistance is infallibly conjoined with efficacious help, it is necessary that that same non-resistance proceed from the efficacious help, from which it comes about that free choice consents, and consequently that it does not dissent, but allows itself to be moved by God. To the other passage of St. Thomas, from question 3 On Evil, art. 2, it is answered that St. Thomas in no way favors the contrary opinion there. For his words are these: When something is in due disposition for receiving the motion of the first mover, a perfect action follows according to the intention of the first mover. But if it is not in due disposition and aptitude for receiving the motion of the first mover, an imperfect action follows. And then whatever of action is there is reduced to the first mover as to its cause; but whatever of defect is there is not reduced to the first mover as to its cause, because such defect follows in the action from this, that the agent falls short of the order of the first mover. But by these words St. Thomas does not wish to teach that on the part of nature a disposition, or negative non-resistance, is presupposed before the motion of the first mover, so that he may move the will efficaciously to supernatural acts; and much less can it be gathered from the same words that efficacious help, predetermining free choice to a pious operation, has an infallible connection with that same negative disposition. The sense of St. Thomas, therefore, is that prior, in a sign of reason, to the will's eliciting a good or an evil act, some disposition is understood in it, by reason of which the operation it produces is good or evil; but nevertheless that same disposition, when the free act is good, is caused by the motion of the first mover; because God, since he is an agent of infinite power, does not await or presuppose in the subject a disposition which he himself does not cause. But if the act be evil, it is understood first that God moves the will to the act of sin insofar as it is an act, as is gathered from the premises in disputation 24. Then is understood the disposition of the will, by which it freely wills the act to which malice is annexed, as it proceeds from that same will failing from the rule of reason: and consequently the produced act has from that same failing will that it is a sin. Whence whatever deformity there is in that act must be reduced to the failing will, and not to God. And this is the legitimate sense of St. Thomas in the passage cited.

To the seventh argument, made at the beginning, answer is made by what has been said in disputation 90. For already there, and in several other disputations, it has been shown that the efficacy of the help of prevenient grace does not depend on the free cooperation of our choice with it, but has it from God alone, although the free operation to which it moves depends efficiently on that same choice aroused and moved by God: which St. Augustine also teaches in the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 3, where, setting out the complaint of the man who did not receive such help, he says: How, he says, is it not imputed to my fault that I did not receive from him, from whom unless it be given there is altogether no other source whence such and so great a gift may be had? By which words St. Augustine supposes that efficacious help, and a fortiori the gift of perseverance, depends on no other than God.

Disputatio CVI: Whether, in the state of innocence, our first parents needed a special gift of perseverance to persevere in grace until the end of life.

Whether in the state of innocence the first parents stood in need of a special gift of perseverance in order to persevere in grace to the end of life.

I. SOME have said that the first parents in the state of innocence, in order to avoid mortal sins and to persevere in grace to the end, did not need a particular help over and above the habits of original justice, of grace, and of the theological virtues. And so, according to this opinion, if the first parents had in fact persevered, they would have persevered by original justice alone, by the habit of grace and of the infused virtues, together with God's general concurrence, with every other special help excluded. They prove their opinion.

First: for it is the common opinion of St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 109. art. 2. 3. 4. and 8, and art. 10, that man in the state of innocence could, through his free choice, with God's general concurrence alone, without any other special help, fulfill the whole law even for the longest time, as regards the substance of the act, which obliged to nothing supernatural: and so could keep himself from every sin, both venial and mortal, for any period, however long: therefore he could have persevered, and would in fact have persevered, had he willed, with the infused habits alone and God's general concurrence, with every other special help excluded. The antecedent is proved, because in that state there was no disorder of the sensitive appetite, no toil, no weariness, and no interior temptation, nor any other impediment standing in the way, that he could not with his free choice observe the whole law even for the longest time, even to the end of life, and keep himself from every mortal and venial sin.

Secondly. According to the common opinion of the doctors, Adam in that same state of innocence could, through the supernatural gifts of faith, hope, charity and grace, with the common and general help of God, work out his salvation and merit eternal life, without other special helps; since habits of this kind are accommodated to eliciting, with the natural powers and God's common influx, the acts to which they are ordered, and there was no difficulty in Adam either in eliciting or in continuing and multiplying those same acts: therefore with those same habits and God's general concurrence, with every other special help likewise excluded, he could have persevered to the end, and would in fact have persevered, had he willed.

It is confirmed. For we, when the habit of supernatural faith, hope or charity is present, can with God's common help elicit one or another act of supernatural faith, hope or charity, and elicit one or another meritorious work, although for a long time we cannot fulfill the whole law, on account of the rebellion of the sentient powers, the weakness of the body, and its irksomeness, as, among others, Soto affirms, book 3 of On Nature and Grace, ch. 4. Since therefore in Adam there was then no weakness, irksomeness or rebellion, it follows that with God's common help he could work out his salvation and merit eternal life, and persevere to the end.

Thirdly they prove the same by the authority of St. Augustine, the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 10 and the two following chapters; where he affirms that the first parents had the fullest freedom, and received grace and help, not indeed such that they could not fail to persevere in grace (for that belongs to the state of eternal happiness), but such that they could persevere and could fail to persevere: and it was by their free choice alone that they did not fulfill it in deed. He affirms likewise that they received the same fullness of freedom, Hypognosticon, book 3, at the beginning. Likewise also ch. 11 of the same book: That grace, he says, the first man did not have, by which he would never will to be evil; but he assuredly had that grace in which, if he willed to remain, he would never be evil, and without which, even with free choice, he could not be good; yet he could abandon it through free choice. God therefore willed that he too should not be without his grace, which he left in his free choice; since free choice suffices for evil; but for good (supernatural, understand, of which the discourse is) it is small, unless it be aided by the almighty good: which aid, if that man had not abandoned it through free choice, he would always have been good: but he abandoned it, and was abandoned. For such was the aid, that he would abandon it when he willed, and would remain in it if he willed; not such as to make him will. And ch. 12 he says: To the first man, therefore, who in that good in which he had been made upright had received the power not to sin, the power not to die, the power not to abandon that good itself, there was given an aid of perseverance, not such as to make him persevere, but without which he could not persevere through free choice. And below: That it might be left to his choice to persevere or not to persevere, his will had such powers, being established without any sin, and nothing from itself resisted it with concupiscence, that worthily with such great goodness, and such facility of living well, the choice of persevering should accompany it. Behold, he says that through the same habitual gifts, by which internal wars had been removed and by which he was inclined to good, Adam in the state of innocence obtained the choice and the capacity of persevering, if he willed.

II. I hold that the contrary opinion is true, and in accord with the mind of Sts. Augustine and Thomas; for whose explanation let this be laid down:

The first parents could persevere in the state of innocence through grace and the gifts conferred on them.— The first conclusion. The first parents in the state of innocence could persevere through the habit of grace and of original justice, through the infused virtues, and through the actual helps which in fact were conferred on them in that state, just as through sufficient help someone can be converted to God, although in fact he is never converted, by sufficient help alone. In this conclusion the authors of both opinions agree, and the arguments made at the beginning prove it efficaciously, and it is the express opinion of St. Augustine in the passages cited in the third argument.

Moreover it is proved: for a reprobate, through grace and the infused virtues, and through the actual helps which are given him by God while he is in grace, can persevere to the end, although actual perseverance to the end is incompatible with reprobation: therefore all the more the first parents in the state of innocence could, through the supernatural habitual and actual gifts conferred on them, persevere to the end, had they willed, although in fact they did not persevere.

It is confirmed. The efficacious help of the gift of perseverance is not necessary in order that one be able to persevere, but in order that one actually persevere; otherwise either all would persevere, or those who do not persevere could not in reality persevere; and consequently it would not be imputed to them as a fault if they did not persevere, because no one sins in that which he cannot avoid: therefore even if the gift of perseverance, by which they would actually persevere, was not conferred by God on the first parents in the state of innocence, they could still have persevered through the habitual gifts and the actual helps conferred on them.

III. Many actual helps of grace were conferred on the first parents in the state of innocence.— I said, through the habitual gifts and actual helps: because it is most certain that in the state of innocence there were conferred on the first parents not only supernatural habitual gifts, but also actual helps of exciting and helping grace, by which during that short time in which they persisted in grace they performed certain good works meritorious of eternal life, although through their subsequent sin they were deadened. For it has already been shown above that for any pious operation, besides the habitual gifts, the actual help of exciting and helping grace is necessary: and that for the reasons assigned there. By these gifts, therefore, the first parents in the state of innocence could have persevered, had they willed, although it was not given them by God that they willed.

IIII. The gift of perseverance was necessary for the first parents even in the state of innocence, in order that they might persevere.— The second conclusion. In order that the first parents in the state of innocence might actually persevere, there was needed a special actual help of the gift of perseverance, distinct from habitual grace and the infused virtues. And so, if they had actually persevered as they could, there would have been conferred on them a special prevenient help of the gift of perseverance, which in fact was not given them, and consequently they would not have persevered by original justice alone, habitual grace and the infused virtues: the conclusion is St. Thomas's, 3. contra gentes cap. 155, where among other things he says: Just as free choice does not suffice for this effect, which is to persevere in good, without God's exterior help, so neither does any habit infused into us suffice for this; for the habits that are infused into us by God according to the state of the present life do not totally remove from free choice its mobility to evil, although through them free choice is in some way stabilized in good: and therefore when we say that man needs the help of grace in order to persevere finally, we do not understand that beyond the habitual grace previously infused for acting well, another grace is infused from above for persevering; but we understand that, when all gratuitous habits are had, man still needs the help of divine providence governing from without. The same he teaches, 1. 2. quaest. 109. artic. 10.

First it is proved by the testimonies of Scripture which St. Thomas adduces for it in the cited 3. cont. gent.: for it is said, Philippians 1: He who began in you a good work will perfect it unto the day of Jesus Christ. And 1 Peter, last chapter: The God of all grace, who called us into his eternal glory, having suffered a little, will himself perfect, confirm and establish you. And: Who are you, that you judge another's servant? To his lord he stands or falls: but he shall stand; for God is able to make him stand. There are also found in sacred Scripture many prayers in which perseverance is asked of God; as in Psalm 16: Direct my steps in your paths, that my footsteps may not be moved. And 2 Thessalonians 2: May God our Father exhort your hearts, and confirm them in every good work and word. This very thing is also asked in the Lord's Prayer, especially when it is said: Your kingdom come: for the kingdom of God will not come to us unless we persevere in good. But it would be a mockery to ask something of God of which he himself were not the giver; therefore perseverance in good is from God for man, in whatever state he has been constituted. If it be said that, if man in the state of innocence had persevered, such perseverance would indeed be a gift of God, but would not have proceeded from a special help superadded, but from the habit of grace and of the infused virtues with God's general concurrence, man's free choice cooperating at the same time; against this it is urged: for, as we said above from St. Thomas, no infused habit is sufficient for persevering in good in this life: for according to the present state habits do not totally remove from free choice its mobility to evil, although through them free choice is in some way stabilized in good: therefore besides the infused habits there is needed for persevering a special help superadded, not only in the state of corrupt nature but also in that of integral nature, in which the infused habits likewise did not totally remove from free choice its mobility to evil.

The second and strongest reason is taken from the Council of Orange, ch. 19, where it is said: Human nature, even if it remained in that integrity in which it was created, would in no way preserve itself, unless its Creator aided it. Hence, since it cannot keep the salvation it has received without the grace of God, how will it be able to repair what it has lost without the grace of God? By these words it seems to be defined that, if human nature remained in that integrity in which it was created, it would have persevered through a special help of helping grace superadded to original justice and the infused habits. They reply supposing first that the Pelagians asserted that the natural powers alone of our choice, considered precisely apart from any help and gift of God superadded, sufficed both for preserving friendship with God and also for restoring and recovering it through penance after it had been lost through sin. They suppose secondly that the Fathers, when they spoke against errors of this kind of the Pelagians, or defined anything, understood by the name of the help of grace all that, being superadded to the powers of our choice, aids them so that they do not succumb and so that they perform supernatural works, whether this was a supernatural habit influencing together with the power, or a motion and influx without a habit. And all that they comprehended under the name of grace, of which they said against the Pelagians that our choice stands in need beyond its natural powers. This foundation once laid, they say that the Fathers of the Council of Orange in that chapter intended chiefly to define this conclusion against the Pelagians: that man cannot recover lost spiritual salvation by his own powers without grace, that is, without God's supernatural aid, in the manner explained a little before. But in order to define it, they premised: Human nature, even if it remained in that integrity in which it was created, would in no way preserve itself (namely, by its natural powers alone, as the Pelagians said), unless its Creator aided it; at least through the influx of the habits of original justice, of grace, and of the theological virtues. Hence, since without the grace of God—by the mere influx, that is, of its natural powers—it cannot keep the salvation it has received, how will it be able to recover what it has lost without the grace of God, that is, by its own powers alone? From this they infer that no one can gather from a definition of this kind that the first parents in the state of innocence needed, in order to persevere in grace, a supernatural help superadded to the habits of original justice, of grace, and of the theological virtues. This solution, however, besides presupposing some things that are false, does not evacuate the force of the argument, nor does it seem to defend the mind of the Council as far as is right. And, to begin from the refutation of the first foundation, we note that, although in the first stage of his heresy Pelagius laid down that the natural powers alone of our choice, considered precisely without supernatural aid and gift of God superadded, sufficed for fulfilling all the precepts of the law, for recovering grace through penance, and for meriting eternal life; yet afterwards, corrected by the brethren because he left no place for the grace of God through Jesus Christ, he added that an internal grace must be admitted for the power of acting, namely the illumination of the intellect and the rousing of the dull will, and God's subsequent aid for the determination of the created will, as is clear from what was said in the first disputation, where we proved this by the most open testimonies of Pelagius himself, which are extant in the books of St. Augustine, and from the opinion of Augustine himself.

V. What the holy Fathers meant by the name of the help of grace when disputing against the Pelagians.— Nor is that to be admitted which is insinuated in the second foundation, namely that the Fathers, when they defined against the errors of the Pelagians, understood by the name of the help of grace only the gift superadded to the powers of our choice, whether it was a supernatural habit or a concomitant motion; or that they understood the habits of grace and of the infused virtues to suffice for accomplishing the works of piety, which habits, together with our free choice determining itself, would influence those same pious operations without any other special actual help superadded to those same habits. For although under the name of gratuitous help they comprehend also habitual grace and the infused virtues, as St. Thomas understands, 1. 2. q. 111. art. 2. and 3, yet most of all in many definitions they are understood to mean the actual help superadded to the infused habits, as is clear from the Council of Mileve, can. 4, and of Orange, can. 4. 6. 9. 10. and 20, where it speaks expressly of the special help superadded, by which God works in us and with us, that we may work.

This is confirmed by all the arguments by which it was shown in Disputation 88 that in one who has the infused habits for eliciting a supernatural act, a special help is necessary, not only of exciting but also of helping grace, superadded to those same infused habits.

Thirdly the conclusion is proved by showing that the Council of Orange, in the cited canon 19, understands by helping grace a special help superadded to habitual grace and the infused virtues: for in the first part of that canon it speaks of the first parents in the state of innocence, in which they were endowed with original justice, habitual grace and the infused virtues; and it defines that in them the aid of grace was still necessary in order to keep the salvation they had received: therefore it speaks of an aid, or special help, superadded to those same infused habits. Nor is it enough to answer that the very habit of grace and of the virtues, insofar as it influences a pious operation together with the free choice determining itself, has the character of a special actual help. For against this militate all the arguments by which it was shown in Disputation 18 that the special help of God, like general concurrence, is an immediate influx into free choice, as into the cause, and something prior to the influx of that same choice, by which God premoves, applies and predetermines our will, that it may freely and infallibly cooperate with the moving grace.

VI. The supernatural habit, and that by which it is determined to act.— It is confirmed: for it would follow from the opposite opinion that man's free cooperation with the infused habits would be the cause that the habit of grace and of charity has an influx into the pious operations by which he perseveres to the end, and consequently that the gift of perseverance would depend, at least as on a condition without which it does not occur, on the free cooperation of our choice: the contrary of which was shown in the preceding disputation. The sequel is proved: for if a prior motion and determination through a special help is not required in order that the habit of grace and of charity influence pious operations together with free choice, then the free cooperation and determination of choice will be the cause that the habit of grace and of charity has a new influx into the operations by which man perseveres to the end, and consequently the gift of perseverance depends on the free cooperation of choice.

Fourthly it is proved. For in us, besides the habitual gift itself of sanctifying grace and the infused virtues, a special help of the gift of perseverance superadded to those same infused habits is necessary in order that we actually persevere to the end: therefore likewise in Adam in the state of innocence. The antecedent is the express opinion of St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 109. art. 9. and 10, and it is had as defined in the Council of Trent, sess. 6. de iustificat. can. 22, in these words: If anyone says that a justified man can persevere in the justice received without a special help of God, or that with it he cannot; let him be anathema. The consequence, moreover, is proved: for the reason on account of which St. Thomas teaches that he who has already obtained justifying grace needs a special help superadded, in order to work good and persevere to the end, is that no created thing can go forth into any act whatever except by the power of divine motion: but this reason also applies to the first parents in the state of innocence: therefore. VII. They reply by denying the consequence, and they assign the reason for the difference: for original justice restrained the lower part, lest it wage war against the higher, and lest the passions or temptations of the sensitive appetite rise up against reason; which habitual grace nevertheless does not effect in the state of fallen nature: and therefore the just man after the fall needs a special help superadded in order actually to persevere, but not so in integral nature. But against this solution there is an efficacious argument: for St. Thomas assigns a twofold reason why he who has already obtained grace needs, in order to act well, a special help superadded, by which he is moved by God to act rightly: First, for a general reason, namely that no created thing can go forth into any act whatever except by the power of divine motion. Secondly, for a special reason, on account of the condition of the state of human nature, which indeed, although it is healed by grace as regards the mind, yet there remains in it corruption and infection as regards the flesh, through which it serves the law of sin, as is said in Romans 7. Therefore although in the state of innocence this second reason does not apply, the first reason still has place in it, and consequently, on account of it, it must be said that the first parent in the state of innocence needed a special help, superadded to the infused habits, in order actually to persevere.

VIII. The gifts of grace conferred on us through Christ are greater than the gifts of the state of innocence.— Fifthly it is proved: for St. Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace cited above, and with him St. Thomas, teach that we have received through Christ a greater gift than Adam received in the state of innocence; in that to Adam was conferred only the gift by which he could persevere if he willed, but not that by which he would actually persevere and will: whereas to the predestined there is given through Christ not only the gift by which they can persevere if they will, but also that by which they actually persevere and will. They hold, therefore, that the first parent in the state of innocence, in order actually to persevere, needed some special help or gift, which nevertheless was not conferred on him, as it is conferred on the predestined through the grace of Christ.

Had Adam persevered in the state of innocence, he would have persevered by a special gift.— It is confirmed: for, as was said above, it is one thing to be able to persevere, another actually to persevere; just as it is one thing to be able to act, another actually to act: but both to be able to persevere and actually to persevere are a gift of God; for Augustine says: It is his not only that we are able to do what we will, but also that we will what we are able: therefore if Adam had persevered as he could, he would have persevered by some gift of God superadded: which nevertheless in fact was not conferred on him; and consequently he needed in the state of innocence a special help in order actually to persevere. They reply that St. Augustine and St. Thomas understand this on the part of the effect, because the grace of Christ had a greater effect in adults who persevered to the end of life—their own free choice nevertheless cooperating unto perseverance—than the grace conferred on Adam had, by which, through Adam's defect in not willing to cooperate with it, he did not persevere: but that they did not deny, nor can they deny, that the grace conferred on Adam, if it had not been through Adam's choice, could in reality have had both effects, and that it was by Adam's fault alone that he did not have it. This explanation, however, does not agree with the words of St. Augustine and St. Thomas: for St. Augustine expressly distinguishes the aids of grace themselves: Those aids themselves, he says, are to be distinguished: one is the aid without which something is not done, and another is the aid by which something is done. And a little before he had premised that the grace given to the second Adam is more powerful than the first grace, which was given to the first Adam. He holds, therefore, that on the part of grace itself, and not only on the part of the effect, the grace conferred on the predestined through Christ, and on those persevering to the end, is more powerful and greater than the grace conferred on Adam in the state of innocence.

In addition to this: for if the same grace conferred on two men has in one the effect of persevering to the end, but not in the other, and this is not from elsewhere than because one, according to his innate freedom, willed so to use the same grace well as to obtain eternal salvation, and the other did not; it would follow that actual perseverance would in the end be reduced to the powers of nature, or to the innate freedom of created choice; which nevertheless cannot be admitted. Nor does the solution of those who assert this satisfy: that if Adam had persevered as he could, certainly an effect of this kind, that is, perseverance itself in grace, by keeping himself from every mortal fault, would not have been from Adam's powers alone, but principally from God's cooperation through the habitual gifts which he had conferred on him for persevering, and that it was through Adam alone that they did not have that effect for which, dependently nevertheless on his choice, they had been conferred on him. This solution, I say, does not stand; for it has already been shown above that our salvation is not to be reduced to grace itself alone as to a partial and even principal cause, but as to a total and adequate cause, because although our choice freely cooperates with God exciting and moving it, it is grace alone that effects that the choice itself cooperate. We confess therefore most willingly that it was through Adam alone that the grace conferred on him, by which he could persevere, did not have its effect; yet with this it is also necessary to confess that, if such an effect had in fact followed, with the free choice of the first parent cooperating, that effect would not have proceeded from the grace alone conferred on Adam and his free choice with God's general concurrence, but from a special help premoving his free choice to persevere, and granting him not only to be able to persevere but also to will.

IX. Finally it is proved by the reason of St. Thomas, 3. cont. Gent. c. 155. For everything that is of itself changeable, in order that it be fixed in good, needs the help of some unmoved mover; but man is changeable both from evil into good and from good into evil; in order therefore that he persevere immovably in good, which is to persevere, he needs divine help. But this reason also applies to man in the state of innocence; for his free choice was changeable from good into evil, since in fact it was changed: therefore.

It is confirmed by another reason of the same St. Thomas: for although man through his will and free choice is master of his act, he is nevertheless not master of his natural powers: and therefore, although he is free to will or not to will something, yet by willing he cannot bring it about that the will, in that which it wills, hold itself immovably toward that which it wills or chooses: but this is required for perseverance, namely that the will remain immovably in good. Perseverance, therefore, is not in the power of free choice: there is need, then, that the help of divine grace be present to man in order that he persevere. Which reason also applies to man in the state of integral nature. Let the other reasons in the same ch. 155 be consulted.

TO the first argument it is answered that that opinion is not only not St. Thomas's, nor common, but not even probable, which asserts that man in the state of innocence could, through his free choice with God's general concurrence alone, without any other special help, fulfill the whole law even as regards the substance of the act, or persevere to the end. For although he could by the capacity of nature, without special help, fulfill the whole natural law, yet he could not without a special help superadded fulfill the supernatural precepts, as is had 1. 2. q. 109. art. 4. in corp. But in order to persevere to the end it is necessary to observe not only the natural but also the supernatural precepts. Nor is it to be admitted that precepts of this kind can, as regards the substance of the act, be observed by the powers of nature alone, however integral and perfect, as is clear from what was said in Disputation 65. We add moreover that man in the state of innocence needed, for observing the natural precepts, the help of God moving, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. 2. cited, q. 109. ar. 1. 2. 3. and 4. Hence, absolutely speaking, man in the state of integral nature could not, without a special help superadded to the infused habits, persevere to the end.

X. To the second, with its confirmation, it is answered similarly that, as was shown in Disputation 88, besides the infused habits, in order that one once justified may produce any pious operation, a special help of helping grace is necessary not only in fallen nature but also in integral nature; and that for the reasons assigned in the same disputation. Nor does Master Soto, in the place cited above, teach that anyone, when the habit of supernatural faith, hope or charity is present, can with God's general concurrence alone elicit one or another act of supernatural faith, hope or charity; but rather he teaches the opposite, from the opinion of St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 109. ar. 9. Master Soto speaks only of a morally good work, which he thinks is in a just man meritorious of eternal life even if it be elicited without a special help of grace, just as it can be elicited by a man existing in mortal sin, as was shown in Disputation 50.

To the third it is answered that from all those passages of St. Augustine it is only gathered that there was given to the first parents in the state of innocence an aid of grace by which they could persevere, and would persevere if they willed; which we also willingly confess; nevertheless, according to the opinion of the same St. Augustine in the passages cited above, in order actually to persevere even in the state of innocence they needed a special help of preoperating grace, confirming free choice in good.

Disputatio CVII: Whether the gift of perseverance is common to all the faithful, or is a gift proper to the predestined.

Whether the gift of perseverance is common to all faithful men, or is rather the proper gift of the predestined.

I. Some distinguish a twofold gift of perseverance: the one, they say, consists in a certain special help and protection, by which God so protects and fortifies certain men that they persevere in grace to death indeclinably and infallibly: such as was granted to the Apostles after they had received the Holy Spirit, and to those who are said to be confirmed in grace: which accordingly is not common to all the just. The other is the gift of perseverance, which consists in a certain help and protection by which God is so present to men that they can persevere in grace, if they will; and this gift, they say, is necessary for salvation and is given to all the just immediately in first act. This opinion can be proved.

First from St. Augustine in the places cited above, in which he expressly distinguishes a twofold gift of perseverance. The one, by which a man can, if he will, persevere to the end, but by his own fault does not persevere, such as was the perseverance conferred on our first parents in the state of innocence. The other, by which he not only can persevere, but also actually perseveres to the end; such is the gift conferred on the predestined through Christ. He holds, therefore, that there is some gift of perseverance common to all men, just and unjust, even if they be reprobate.

Secondly. Any just man, through habitual grace and the infused virtues, can in first act do any good whatever and fulfill all the precepts of the law: therefore he will be able also in first act to persevere, if he will, to the end: therefore to all the just there is given, together with grace itself and the infused virtues, the power of persevering to the end: therefore the gift of perseverance, by which they can persevere if they will, is common to all the just.

Thirdly. With the help on God's part, with which someone perseveres to the end, he can, if he will, not persevere; otherwise he would persevere necessarily and not freely: similarly also with the help with which someone does not persevere to the end, he can persevere, if he will; otherwise he would not sin by not persevering: therefore the gift of perseverance, as far as lies on the part of divine help, is common to the just who persevere and to those who do not persevere to the end: and the difference between them consists in this, that some, by the freedom innate to them, willed to use that help well, so as to persevere to the end, while others willed not to.

Fourthly. Predestination, as far as lies on God's part and on the part of the helps of grace, is common to the predestined and the non-predestined; for if the non-predestined had so rightly used their free choice as to obtain eternal salvation through the helps of grace conferred on them, they would have remained predestined, like the others who, rightly using their free choice, were saved with the same helps: therefore the gift of perseverance in first act is common also to those who are saved and to those who by their own fault perish, not using the same gift well.

II. Yet this opinion is neither true, nor does it seem founded on any probable reason. Hence let this be laid down:

The gift of perseverance is not common to all, but proper to the predestined.— First conclusion. The gift of perseverance is so proper to the predestined that it belongs to no one else. It is proved first: for the councils and the Fathers, especially Augustine, acknowledged no other perseverance than that of which it is written: But he who has persevered to the end, this one shall be saved. But perseverance of this kind belongs to the predestined alone: for they alone are truly saved: therefore. The major is proved from those words of the Council of Trent, session 6, on justification, ch. 13: Likewise concerning the gift of perseverance, of which it is written: He who has persevered to the end, this one shall be saved: which indeed cannot be had from elsewhere, except from him who is able to establish him who stands, that he stand perseveringly; and to restore him who falls; let no one promise himself anything certain with absolute certainty. And can. 16: If anyone shall say that he will certainly have that great gift of perseverance to the end with absolute and infallible certainty, unless he has learned this from a special revelation: let him be anathema. From which definition two things are had. The first is that the gift of perseverance is not that by which the just man can merely persevere, if he will, but that by which he actually perseveres to the end, as the passage of Matt. 10 adduced by the Council declares, and those words: Of which gift no one ought to promise himself anything certain with absolute certainty. And yet anyone can most certainly promise himself that God will be present to him, so that he can persevere, if he will. The Council holds, therefore, that for the gift of perseverance it is necessary that he to whom it is granted actually persevere to the end: this gift, therefore, is not common to all the just, not even to the reprobate. The second is that this gift cannot be had from elsewhere except from God, by which the opinion of those seems to be excluded who, as we shall observe in disputation 108, say that with an equal help of grace one perseveres to the end and another does not persevere; and that this is from no other source than that, by innate freedom, one willed to use the same help well so as to obtain eternal salvation, and the other did not. For since the sacred Council teaches that the gift of perseverance cannot be had from elsewhere except from God, it consequently seems to affirm that a gift of this kind, formally speaking, in the character of the gift of perseverance, is not had from created free choice, nor depends on its cooperation, even as on a condition without which it does not occur, as we showed in disputation 105.

III. Secondly it is proved by the authority of the Saints, who unanimously teach that the gift of perseverance is proper to the predestined, and that through it God grants to all of them not only to be able, but also actually to persevere to the end; so that they persevere indeclinably and infallibly. For St. Hilary, in his letter to Augustine, recalling the tenets of the Semi-Pelagians, says: But they are unwilling that this perseverance should be preached in such a way that it cannot either be suppliantly merited or contumaciously lost: nor do they wish themselves to be brought to the uncertainty of God's will, where, as far as they think, it is evident to them for obtaining or for losing, whatever sort it be, the beginning of the will. And a little after: Then they take it ill that grace, which was either given to the first man at that time, or is given to all now, is so divided, that he received perseverance, not that by which it should come about that he persevered, but without which he could not persevere by free choice: but that now to the Saints predestined to the kingdom through grace there is not given such an aid of perseverance; but such that perseverance itself is given to them, not only so that without this gift they cannot be persevering, but also so that through this gift they are not otherwise than persevering. And below: Hence they will that the nature of all men differ from the first man in this alone, that grace helped him willing, with the powers of his will entire, without which he could not persevere: but these, their powers lost and ruined, being only believers, it not only raises up the prostrate, but also supports those who walk. Otherwise, whatever may have been given to the predestined, they contend that they can both lose it and retain it by their own will. Which would then be false, if they thought it true that some received that perseverance in such a way that they cannot but be persevering. From which testimony it seems to be gathered that the opinion of the Massilians, which St. Prosper impugned, was that the gift of perseverance does not grant to the predestined through Christ that they persevere indeclinably and infallibly, but that they can persevere if they will; and that actual perseverance proceeds from the innate freedom of choice, because one willed to persevere with that help with which another did not persevere, because he willed not to.

St. Augustine confirms the same doctrine in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 6, where, replying to Prosper and Hilary, he says: But these brethren, as you write, are unwilling that this perseverance should be preached in such a way that it cannot either be suppliantly merited or contumaciously lost; in which they attend too little diligently to what they say. For we speak of that perseverance by which one perseveres to the end; which, if it has been given, one has persevered to the end; but if one has not persevered to the end, it has not been given: which we have already sufficiently treated above as well. And below: But perseverance to the end, since no one has it except he who has persevered to the end; many can have it, no one can lose it. For it is not to be feared that perhaps, when a man has persevered to the end, some evil will should arise in him, so that he not persevere to the end. This gift of God, therefore, can be suppliantly merited; but once it has been given, it cannot be contumaciously lost. For when anyone has persevered to the end, he can lose neither this gift, nor the others which he could lose before the end. For how can that be lost, through which it comes about that even what could be lost is not lost? By which words the holy Doctor most openly teaches that the gift of perseverance has infallibly joined to it actual perseverance to the end, and cannot be interrupted by the will of man or contumaciously lost. He holds, therefore, that the same gift is not common to all the just, since some of them persevere and some do not persevere to the end.

IIII. There is another distinguished testimony of St. Augustine for proving the same, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 12, where, establishing the difference between the gift of grace conferred on the first parents in the state of innocence and that which is conferred on the elect through Christ in fallen nature, he teaches that by the gift conferred on the first parents it was given to them that they should persevere if they willed, but it was not given to them that they should will. But to the predestined through Christ it is also given that they will to persevere and do persevere. Augustine's words are: That the first man, then, should not receive this gift of God, that is, perseverance in good, but that it should be left to his choice to persevere or not to persevere, his will had such powers, which had been established without any sin, and nothing from itself resisted it concupiscentially, that the choice of persevering might worthily be entrusted to such goodness and to such facility of living well: God indeed foreknowing what he would do unjustly, foreknowing nevertheless, not compelling to it, but at the same time knowing what he himself would do concerning him justly. But now, after that great freedom has been lost by the merit of sin, infirmity has remained to be helped even by greater gifts. For it pleased God, whereby he might most extinguish the pride of human presumption, that no flesh should glory before him, that is, no man. And he teaches the same in other words adduced above, but especially in these: The infirmity of the human will has therefore been helped, so that by divine grace it should be acted upon indeclinably, and inseparably: and therefore, although infirm, it should not fail, nor be overcome by any adversity: and in those: For to the strongest he let go and permitted to do what he willed: for the weak he reserved it that, by his giving, they should most invincibly will what is good, and be most invincibly unwilling to desert this. Behold, St. Augustine says that help was given by the gift of perseverance not only to the Apostles and to others confirmed in grace, whereby they were acted upon indeclinably and persevered to the end, but also to human infirmity, which is found in all the elect: therefore, according to Augustine, this gift of perseverance is proper to all the predestined; so that it belongs to no one else. The consequence is proved: for to the reprobate there is not conferred by God any gift by which they should most invincibly will what is good, and be most invincibly unwilling to desert it; otherwise they would not fall from the grace which they received.

Hence St. Prosper, in his Response to the Chapters of the Gauls, ch. 7: How, he says, would the election preordained in Christ have them, when there is no doubt that perseverance in good to the end is a gift of God; which these men manifestly did not have from the very fact that they did not persevere? If therefore, according to Prosper, it is manifest that those who did not persevere in good to the end did not have the gift of perseverance, how is it asserted that such a gift is common to all the just? It must be said, then, that it pertains to the predestined alone.

V. Thirdly it is proved by reason. If the gift of perseverance is common to all the just, it follows that of itself, and as it proceeds from God, it grants them only to be able to persevere. The sequel is proved: for actually to persevere to the end is not common to all the just; otherwise one once justified would never sin mortally, nor fall from grace: which nevertheless is repugnant to the definition of the Council of Trent: therefore only to be able to persevere is common to them; and consequently, if the gift of perseverance is common to all the just, it will grant them only to be able to persevere, and those who actually persevere would have from the gift of God only to be able to persevere if they will: but actual perseverance they would have from themselves; namely because, by the freedom innate to them, together with the help granting only the ability, they willed actually to persevere to the end: which nevertheless is not to be admitted.

VI. Predestination to glory is not common to all the just.— Fourthly. Predestination to glory is not common to all the just, but only to those who in fact are saved: therefore neither is the gift of perseverance. The antecedent is clear from the words of the Apostle to the Romans 8: For those whom he predestined, he also called; and those whom he called, he also justified; and those whom he justified, he also glorified. And John 10, where Christ the Lord, speaking of the predestined, says: My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me, and I give them eternal life, and they shall not perish forever, and no one shall take them out of my hand. Hence predestination too, as regards the execution of the effect, is certain and infallible with the certainty of the order and causality of the means, as was shown in disp. 41. But the consequence is proved: for the gift of perseverance is the proper effect of predestination to glory: therefore, if predestination to glory is not common to all the just, neither will the gift of perseverance be common to them.

To this a certain author replies that predestination to glory is common to all men, at least to the just: for whose explanation he distinguishes a twofold predestination of God, complete and incomplete. Complete predestination he says to be that which extends to the whole series of means by which a man in fact attains salvation and perseveres to the end, such as that of which Augustine says in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 14: Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, by which all who are liberated are most certainly liberated. Incomplete predestination he calls that which extends only to some series of benefits by which one tends to salvation, especially up to the grace of justification; but does not extend to the final term of life. He says, therefore, that incomplete predestination is common to all just men; but that complete predestination is not common to all, but proper to those who truly, with the help of prevenient and exciting grace, persevere to the end and are saved. But he says that this complete predestination depends on foreseen merits subsequent to prevenient grace: and the reason for this is that he thinks the elect, even the Apostles, John the Baptist, and other outstanding Saints, were not predestined to glory by God with an absolute and efficacious will, except under a tacit condition, if they should persevere to the end; he excepts, however, the Blessed Virgin out of reverence for her. In the same way he distinguishes a twofold gift of perseverance; one incomplete, by which a man can persevere if he will, which he calls the gift of perseverance efficacious in first act: the other complete, by which he actually perseveres to the end, and it is called the gift of perseverance in second act. Incomplete perseverance he says to be common to all the just; but complete perseverance, which he calls efficacious perseverance in second act, he judges to be proper to the predestined. He adds, however, that the efficacy of this depends on the free cooperation of choice; as he had said before of complete predestination to glory: for he thinks that no help of prevenient grace, in the respect in which it is prevenient, is prior in the order of causality to the free cooperation of our choice.

Yet this way of speaking contains many things which involve no little difficulty, and from what has been said above they remain sufficiently refuted. And in the first place, that distinction of a twofold predestination to glory, namely of complete and incomplete predestination, does not seem to be admitted; because it is found neither in St. Augustine nor in St. Thomas nor in any other weighty Doctor; but rather by the name of predestination to glory they understand only that predestination by which the elect are efficaciously ordered and conveyed to eternal life, whose effects are calling, justification, meritorious works which are done through free choice moved by God, and perseverance in grace to the end. But the other predestination to glory ought not to be called absolutely predestination to glory, but a common supernatural providence, which God has concerning the reprobate, whom he has not ordered efficaciously, or by consequent will, to eternal life, but only sufficiently, and by antecedent will, as was said above: they can nevertheless be called predestined to the gifts of grace which God confers on them, so that they can attain eternal salvation if they will: therefore, absolutely speaking, predestination to glory ought not to be called a gift common to all the just, but proper to those who in fact attain eternal life; and consequently the same must be said of perseverance to the end, since it is the effect of predestination to glory: for God's predestination is truly the efficient cause of all the benefits or means by which the predestined attain eternal life.

Moreover the same is impugned: for it would follow that God on his part only predestined men to glory with incomplete predestination; but that man himself, by using exciting grace well and by persevering with it to the end according to his innate freedom, made himself predestined with complete predestination; and consequently incomplete and imperfect predestination would be attributed to God, but perfect and complete predestination to man, and would depend on him: which does not seem able to be admitted. For although some effects of predestination depend efficiently on man's free choice, moved efficaciously by God, such as the pious and meritorious operations by which in execution he attains eternal life, nevertheless God's preordination, by which with absolute and efficacious will he determined to confer eternal life on the elect, in which the character of predestination consists, in no way depends on the free cooperation of free choice, or on foreseen merits, however much it be asserted that merits of this kind do not proceed from the powers of nature alone but presuppose a supernatural excitation of God, because even the cooperation of choice is in the predestined an effect of divine predestination, as was shown in disputation 36. Hence it is not to be admitted that God with absolute and efficacious will did not predestine all his elect, and a fortiori the Apostles and other outstanding Saints, to glory before the foresight of merits subsequent to God's excitation, or before the foresight of their cooperation by which they will to cooperate and persevere to the end. For already in disputation 37 it was shown expressly how, according to the mind of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, absolute and efficacious predestination to glory does not depend on foreseen merits of grace.

What complete and incomplete perseverance is called.— But what the author says about the twofold efficacious help of the gift of perseverance, namely complete or incomplete, or in second act or in first act, does not seem to satisfy, nor to agree with the doctrine of St. Augustine: for if by the incomplete efficacy of the gift of perseverance, or in first act, he understands, as he seems to understand, the gift of perseverance by which one can persevere if he will: this is in truth not an efficacious gift for persevering, but only a sufficient one; nor is it the perseverance of the second Adam, but of the first, as Augustine says in the places adduced above. But if by the name of incomplete efficacious perseverance, or in first act, he understands the efficacy of the gift of perseverance insofar as in the order of reason and causality it precedes the free cooperation of our choice with it, and effects that we persevere to the end, his doctrine does not seem to stand: both because the perseverance of which we speak is not perseverance in first act, from which the second act of persevering to the end may sometimes be separated, as is clear from the words of Augustine adduced above. For this perseverance is not properly first act; otherwise it would only grant to those redeemed through Christ to be able to persevere if they will, and would not effect that they will: which is against St. Augustine in the places cited: but it is a certain mean between first and second act, and pertains to the complement of first act, as was said above of any other efficacious help. Nor is it to be admitted that the perseverance of which we speak, or its complete efficacy, depends on the free cooperation of choice: for that free cooperation itself is an effect of the efficacious gift of perseverance, although it does not effect it without us freely concurring. Hence the very willing to persevere, or the pious operations by which we persevere to the end, do indeed depend efficiently on our free choice moved by God with efficacious motion; but the efficacy of the gift of perseverance, and that by which it is formally constituted complete in the character of a gift of perseverance, does not depend on the free cooperation of choice, although it is never given without it. From which it is inferred that it is not in the power of our choice to make that we be predestined by God with absolute and efficacious will; or that God's predestination be complete and perfect predestination: for that alone is in the power of God, who by his mere and gratuitous will, which can be hidden but not unjust, has predestined to glory whom he wills: and whom he wills not, he has not predestined. Hence God himself by his grace effects that all the effects of predestination, from the first to the last, which is glorification, be completed. Which St. Augustine not obscurely teaches when he says: When therefore God promised to Abraham in his seed the faith of the nations, saying: I have made you the father of many nations; whence the Apostle says: Therefore it is of faith, that according to grace the promise might be firm to all the seed, he promised not of the power of our will, but of his predestination. For he promised what he himself was to do, not what men were to do: because even if men do the good things which pertain to the worship of God, he himself makes them do what he has commanded: not they make him do what he promised: otherwise, in order that God's promises be fulfilled, it would be in the power not of God but of men, and what was promised by the Lord would be rendered to Abraham by them. But Abraham did not so believe, but believed, giving glory to God; because what he promised, he is able also to do. He did not say, to foretell; he did not say, to foreknow: for he can foretell and foreknow even the deeds of others; but he said: He is able also to do, and by this, deeds not of others but his own. And below, after he had shown that the things which God requires of us in order that we come to eternal life are given to us by God himself, he adds: For therefore these things are both commanded to us, and shown to be gifts of God, that it may be understood that both we do them, and God makes us do them: as through the prophet Ezekiel he says most openly. For what is more open than where he says: I will make you do? Attend, dearest brethren, to that very passage of Scripture, and you will see that God promises that he will do those things, that they may do what he commands, that they may be done. From which words we have that the efficacy of divine absolute predestination and of the helps of grace, especially of the gift of perseverance, does not depend on the free cooperation of our choice: but rather, on the contrary, that our free cooperation, by which we persevere to the end, depends on the efficacious and absolute predetermination of God predestining; and consequently on the efficacy of the helps of grace, through which he makes us do, and works that we work: therefore the gift of efficacious perseverance is not common to all just men, but the proper gift of the predestined, or of those who attain eternal life.

VII. The gift of perseverance is common to all the predestined.— Second conclusion. Not only to the Apostles and to those confirmed in grace and to other Saints of outstanding virtue, but also to all the predestined is that great gift of perseverance common, by which God effects that they persevere infallibly and indeclinably. The conclusion is gathered from the Council of Trent and from the places of St. Augustine and Prosper cited above; for they make no distinction between the gift of perseverance granted to the Apostles or to others confirmed in grace, and that which is given to the rest of the predestined: but rather St. Augustine, in the book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 12, cited, teaches not obscurely that a gift of perseverance of this kind is common to all the elect, as was shown above from the words of the same Augustine.

Secondly it is proved by the reason of the same Augustine in the place cited: for otherwise some of the predestined could glory in actual perseverance in themselves, or in their own powers, and not in God, and say: I give you thanks, Lord, who gave me only the kind of aid which was granted to the first man, without which I could not persevere even if I willed; but thanks be to me, who by the innate freedom of my choice willed to persevere, with you neither working nor effecting that I should will indeclinably, inseparably, and most invincibly. But the consequent seems to be repugnant to the words of the Apostle: What then do you have that you did not receive? But if you have received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it? therefore it must necessarily be said that the gift of perseverance of which our conclusion speaks is common to all the predestined, and cannot be restricted to the Apostles alone, or to those confirmed in grace.

Thirdly it is proved: it would follow from the opposite opinion that the predestined, with the Blessed Virgin, the Apostles, and those confirmed in grace alone excepted, do not differ from the non-predestined as regards the order and causality of the means, but only as regards the foreknowledge of the event; namely because God foreknew that the predestined would use their choice well, and the grace received, so as to persevere in it and obtain eternal salvation; but the reprobate not so. But the consequent seems to be against the most open passages of Scripture and the sayings of the Saints, as St. Thomas teaches in question 6 On Truth, article 3: and it is clear from what was said in disputation 37, especially number 12. Therefore the gift of perseverance, by which all who persevere persevere infallibly and indeclinably, is common to all the predestined.

VIII. A certain new distinction concerning perseverance is impugned.— Third conclusion. That distinction of a twofold gift of perseverance cannot be admitted in the predestined, of which one should belong only to the Apostles and to those confirmed in grace, and the other to the rest of the predestined. This conclusion remains sufficiently proved from what was said in the two preceding. Moreover it is proved: for that distinction is not found in the ancient Fathers or in the Scholastic Doctors: but such a doctrine, especially in theological matters, is to be avoided, as Vincent of Lérins and the other Doctors cited in disp. 5, no. 5, say: therefore. Secondly it is proved: for the aforesaid distinction of the gift of perseverance does not seem unlike the other which Ambrose Catharinus establishes concerning predestination, distinguishing two classes of the predestined; to the first of which he says belong the Blessed Virgin, the Apostles, and a very few others, whom God from eternity by absolute decree and efficacious will predestined, and decreed to confer so many helps of grace that, with the freedom of choice preserved, they cannot fall away from eternal salvation. To the second class he recalls the rest of the predestined, whom he thinks are not predestined by God by an absolute, immovable, and efficacious decree of his will, but under a certain mutable condition of the good use of free choice; namely, if they themselves will to use the helps of grace well. For what Ambrose Catharinus established concerning predestination, this opinion which we impugn attempts to persuade concerning the gift of perseverance. But that distinction of the predestined of Ambrose Catharinus, as new, and involved in many difficulties and no few straits, is disapproved by learned and pious theologians, as we showed above from Sixtus of Siena, a disciple of the same Ambrose, and from other theologians in disputation 37 at the beginning: therefore in like manner the aforesaid distinction of the gift of perseverance will likewise be to be rejected. IX. Thirdly the same is proved: for it would follow from the opposite opinion that the gift of perseverance is not of the same kind in all the predestined; which nevertheless seems to be repugnant to the common consent of the Saints. The sequel is proved: for to be able to persevere and actually to persevere are distinguished in species, as act and potency, or habit: therefore if the gift of perseverance grants to some of the predestined only to be able to persevere if they will; but in others effects that they persevere infallibly; it follows that the gift of perseverance is not of the same kind in all the predestined.

To the first argument it is answered that that gift by which a man can persevere to the end if he will is not simply the gift of perseverance, but in a certain respect; because it is only perseverance in potency. Hence it must be established that there is another gift of perseverance, by which God effects that the predestined infallibly persevere to the end. And according to this doctrine are to be understood the things which St. Augustine says in the places cited above.

X. To the second it is answered that, as St. Thomas teaches in the first part of the second, q. 109, a. 9, in the body, he who has already obtained grace cannot by himself work good and avoid sin without a new help of God moving, directing, and protecting him: which was also shown expressly in disputation 88. Hence much less will he be able, by grace and the infused virtues alone, without a special help, to persevere to the end.

To the confirmation it is answered that the gift of perseverance, antecedently to the free cooperation of choice, grants the predestined not only to be able to persevere if they will, but most efficacious powers, by which God effects that they persevere freely and infallibly, as was said above of any other efficacious help. For between to be able to persevere and the pious operations by which one actually perseveres to the end, a mean is given, as is sufficiently clear from what was said in disputations 18 and 19. Hence it does not follow that free choice is merely passive in relation to the good acts by which it perseveres to the end: nor does it follow either that actual perseverance, taken for the actual efficacious help by which one perseveres to the end, depends on the free cooperation of choice, although the effect of the gift of perseverance in adults, namely the pious operations, proceed efficiently not from the gift of perseverance alone, but also from the free cooperation of choice with it, as was explained in disputations 90 and 105.

To the third it is answered that with the help on God's part by which one perseveres to the end, one can indeed, if he will, not persevere, absolutely speaking and in the divided sense; not however in the composite sense, as is clear from what has been said above: nor does it follow from this that he perseveres necessarily. Similarly also with the help by which one does not persevere to the end, one can persevere if he will, absolutely speaking; but yet with that help alone he will never persevere. For more things are required for a man actually to persevere than for him to be able to persevere, as was said above when the sufficient and efficacious help was discussed. Hence it does not follow that the gift of perseverance is common to all the just, whether they persevere or do not persevere to the end; or that the difference between those who persevere and those who do not is to be drawn only from the free cooperation of the one, which the other was unwilling to apply.

To the fourth it is answered that predestination is not common to all the just, but special to some, namely to those who in fact are saved. Nor is any case to be admitted in which the non-predestined should so use their free choice well as to persevere to the end with the helps of grace conferred on them and be saved. For although the non-predestined, absolutely speaking and in the divided sense, can die in grace and be saved; yet that is impossible in the composite sense, as was said above. Hence it does not follow that the gift of perseverance in first act is common to all the just, even the non-predestined.

Secondly it is answered that the gift of perseverance in first act can be taken in two ways. In one way for incomplete first act; namely for the very ability to persevere; or for the help by which one can persevere if he will; and in this acceptation it is common to all the just, even those who do not persevere. But this perseverance is not simply perseverance and in act, but in a certain respect and in potency, as has been said; nor does Christ the Lord speak of it when he says: But he who has persevered to the end, this one shall be saved. In another way it is taken for the last complement of first act; namely for the help by which free choice is efficaciously premoved to persevere, and forthwith perseveres to the end; and in this acceptation the gift of perseverance, even in the last complement of first act, is neither common to all the just, nor belongs only to the Apostles and to others confirmed in grace; but is the proper gift of all the predestined.

Disputatio CVIII: Whether, when all the helps of prevenient grace are entirely equal in two persons, it is possible, and sometimes happens, that one is converted, perseveres in grace, and is saved, while the other remains in sin and is damned.

Whether, when all the helps of prevenient grace are entirely equal in two men, it can happen, and does sometimes happen, that one is converted, perseveres in grace, and is saved, while the other remains in sin and is damned.

I. Some theologians follow the affirmative part, and they strive to defend the opinion of those who say that in the case posited it sometimes happens, by the sole freedom of each, that one believes and the other does not believe. It is true that they limit their opinion to the helps of prevenient grace in that respect in which it is prevenient: for in the one who is converted they acknowledge that there is a new simultaneous influx of grace, by which God produces the free consent together with free choice.

This opinion is proved. First, from that passage of Matth. 11: If the mighty works had been done in Tyre and Sidon which have been done in thee, they would long ago have repented in sackcloth and ashes. By these words it is signified that by the same signs and helps by which the Jews were not converted, the Tyrians and Sidonians would have been converted: therefore.

Secondly, the argument is made from two testimonies of St. Augustine, in which he seems expressly to hold this opinion. The first testimony is found in the book On Predestination and Grace, ch. 15, where, speaking of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar, he says thus: As to nature, both were men; as to dignity, both were kings; as to the cause, both were holding captive the people of God; as to the punishment, both were admonished with scourges. What then made their ends different, except that the one, feeling the hand of God, groaned in the remembrance of his own iniquity; the other fought against the most merciful truth of God with a free choice? By these words he seems expressly to confess that, while the helps of grace stood entirely equal, one was converted because he willed it; the other was not converted because he willed it not. The other testimony is found in book 12 of The City of God, ch. 6, where, speaking of two men equally affected in mind and body and tempted by the same temptation, he says: If both are tempted by the same temptation, and one yields to it and consents, while the other remains as he was, what else appears but that one willed and the other willed not to fall from chastity? Whence, unless from their own will, when the affection of body and soul had been the same in both? Behold, he teaches that of those two men equally affected, one persevered in good because he willed it; the other consented to sin because he likewise willed it: therefore, with equal helps of prevenient grace, it will sometimes happen that one is converted to God, perseveres in grace, and is saved, while the other sins, persists in sin, and is damned.

Thirdly. The helps of prevenient grace do not predetermine the will to one side; and therefore whoever is moved by helps of this kind can, by his free faculty, consent to them and dissent from them, if he wills, as is gathered from the Council of Trent, session 6, On Justification, ch. 5, and canon 4. Then the argument is: if a possible thing is posited in being, no inconvenience follows: therefore no inconvenience follows if it be posited that in the case posited one is converted, as in reality he can be converted with those helps, while the other is not converted, as in reality he also can not be converted: therefore it will sometimes happen that, with the same helps of prevenient grace insofar as they are helps of prevenient grace, one is converted and the other persists in sin.

Fourthly. Of two men equally justified by God it happens that one perseveres in grace and is saved, while the other falls into mortal sin and is damned: therefore in like manner it can come about that of two men having equal helps of prevenient grace, one is converted and perseveres to the end, and the other is not.

Fifthly. The same is confirmed by all the arguments with which above we strove to prove that the same sufficient help which in one man is inefficacious, because he wills not to use it well, is efficacious in another, because he uses such a help rightly.

For the resolution of this difficulty it must be supposed that at present we can speak of all the helps of prevenient grace, both external and internal; secondly, we can speak only of external helps, or of internal sufficient ones.

II. With equal helps, external and internal sufficient, it holds that one man is saved and the other damned.— First conclusion. If the discourse concerns the external helps of prevenient grace, or even only the internal sufficient ones, it can happen, and often does happen, that of two men equally called by God, one is converted while the other persists in sin; indeed it sometimes happens that he who is supported by the lesser sufficient help is converted, while the other, to whom greater external helps or internal sufficient helps were given, persists in sin. In this conclusion all agree, and the arguments made at the beginning prove it effectively, especially the authority adduced from ch. 11 of Matthew.

When all helps are equal in two men, it does not hold that one is saved and the other damned.— Second conclusion. If we speak universally of all the helps of prevenient grace, including the internal ones, it is impossible that, when the helps of grace are entirely equal in two men, one be converted and the other not; but always he who is converted receives some greater help of prevenient grace, which he who is not converted did not receive: and the same must be said of him who perseveres in grace to the end. This conclusion is St. Augustine's, book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 5 and 6. The same conclusion all Thomists teach. And it is proved from what has been said above: for he who is converted has an efficacious help, while he who is not converted does not have an efficacious help; for if he had it, he would be converted infallibly, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. 2. q. 79, ar. 2, in the body, and 1. 2. q. 112, art. 3: therefore always he who is converted has some help of prevenient grace which he who is not converted does not have. The consequence is plain: for, as has been shown above, the efficacious help of prevenient grace is distinguished, according to some real power, from the help which is only sufficient.

It is confirmed, first. An efficacious help is a much greater help than all the other helps without the efficacious help: since, then, he who is converted has an efficacious help, which he who is not converted does not have, it manifestly follows that he who is converted has some greater help of prevenient grace.

III. Grace distinguishes the just man from the sinner.— It is confirmed, secondly: for otherwise one man would distinguish himself from another by something which he did not receive from the gift of grace, contrary to that word of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 4: For who distinguishes thee? The sequel is proved: for, as we suppose, the helps are equal, and yet one is distinguished from the other: therefore it is not by the helps, but by himself, or by his innate freedom, that he distinguishes himself from another; which is repugnant to the Apostle, as is plain from Augustine, book On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 5, where, expounding the aforesaid passage of the Apostle, he says: For are men distinguished from men by those gifts which are common to all men? But here he said first, For who distinguishes thee? and then he added, What hast thou that thou didst not receive? For a man puffed up could say against another: My faith distinguishes me, my righteousness; or whatever else. Meeting such thoughts, the good teacher says: What hast thou, then, that thou didst not receive? From whom, unless from him who distinguishes thee from another, to whom he did not give what he gave to thee? But if thou hast also received it, he says, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it? And a little after: Grace distinguishes the good from the evil, not that grace which is common to the good and the evil: therefore, according to Augustine, the good man is distinguished from the sinner by grace, which was not given to the other sinner.

IIII. That the greater help is so called in the respect of a benefit.— Nor does the solution which they apply satisfy; for they answer that he who is converted has a greater help in the respect of a benefit and in the respect of a gift: just as a sword given to someone in time of war, in which he is going to use it to avoid death, although it is physically the same, is nevertheless morally greater in the respect of a benefit and of a gift than if it were given to the same man in time of peace, when he does not need it and is not going to use it. For this solution does not seem to empty the force of the argument: for that it is a greater benefit and a greater gift is ultimately taken from the fact that free choice, in accordance with its innate freedom, will use such a help well and will cooperate with it: therefore the difference is ultimately traced back to the innate freedom of this man, and not to something received from grace.

To the first argument it is answered that the Tyrians and Sidonians would not have been converted by those outward signs and sufficient helps alone, but by an efficacious help, which God would have given them mercifully if those signs had been done among them, as was explained in disp. 7. n. 23.

V. Whence Nebuchadnezzar's repentance proceeded.— To the second argument, from the authority of St. Augustine, it is answered that the holy Doctor expressly holds our opinion in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, cited above; indeed even in the passages adduced in the argument he hands it down in the words that follow: for after those words adduced from the book On Predestination and Grace, ch. 15, asking the reason why of those two kings one was converted, he says thus: Whoever answers here that to the one, namely Nebuchadnezzar, a divine protection was present so that he might be changed, and to the other, so that he might be hardened, it was absent; and contends that this is unjust — wherefore the Apostle, establishing the ends of things themselves in the will of God, said: On whom he wills he has mercy, and whom he wills he hardens; the Lord saying: Without me you can do nothing — let him understand that all those things are either accomplished with the Lord's help, or permitted when he forsakes. By these words he openly teaches that Nebuchadnezzar, in order to be converted, had a divine protection, that is, an efficacious help conferred on him by the gratuitous will of God, which nevertheless, by the just judgment of God, was not given to Pharaoh, who remained in sin.

To the other passage, from book 12 of The City of God, it is answered that in those words he only teaches that of those two men one sins voluntarily, and the other also voluntarily perseveres in chastity, which is most true. But immediately St. Augustine in ch. 7 and 8 seeks the first root, whence the evil will arises and whence the good. And in ch. 7 he teaches that the first and sole cause of defect and of sin is from our choice, because it was made from nothing; whence also it is capable of sin. And in ch. 9 he adds that the good will is not from us, but from God, from whom is the will: which he proves in the angels, saying: But if the good angels were first without a good will, and made it in themselves with God not working it, then they were made better by themselves than by him. Which teaching he confirms in book 1 of the Retractations, ch. 9, where he says: And because all good things, as has been said, both great and middle and least, are from God, it follows that from God is also the good use of free will, which is a virtue and is numbered among the great goods. And in the book On the Grace of Christ, against the Pelagians and Caelestians, ch. 13, he says: If it was given, it is not called our righteousness, but God's; because it is so made ours that it is to us from God, and the same he says in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 14, and in book 2 On the Merit and Remission of Sins, ch. 14.

Efficacious grace predetermines free choice to act piously.— To the third argument it is answered that God through efficacious grace predetermines the will to act piously, not indeed by necessity, but according to the mode of a free power, as St. Thomas explains, 3 contra Gentes ch. 90, and 1. p. q. 23, art. 1, ad 1, and On Truth q. 5, art. 5, ad 1, and in the other passages adduced by us in disputation 25, where we treated this matter ex professo. Hence he who is moved by God with an efficacious help, even in the very instant in which he is moved, can dissent, if he wills; but he will not dissent: for grace itself brings it about that, although a man by free choice can dissent, he does not dissent, but freely and infallibly consents, just as the predestined man can be damned, but will never be damned. And when it is argued — for if a possible thing is posited in being, no inconvenience follows — it is answered with St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 23, ar. 6, ad 2, that if a possible thing be posited in being, another incompossible thing being supposed, a great inconvenience follows, namely one impossible thing, that is, that contradictories or contraries be verified simultaneously of the same subject, as is plain from a most evident example. For it is possible that Peter be white: if this possible thing be posited in being absolutely, no inconvenience or impossibility follows, because only this follows, that Peter is white; but if it be posited in being while it is supposed that blackness remains in Peter, which is incompossible with whiteness, one impossible thing follows, namely that the same Peter be simultaneously white and black. Proportionably we say in the present case that if this possible thing be posited in being absolutely — Peter, for example, can not be converted — no inconvenience follows; but if it were posited in being while it is supposed that he has the efficacious motion of God, one impossible thing follows, namely that the efficacious motion is not efficacious, or else that the absolute will of God is inefficacious and powerless, which is impossible.

To the fourth it is answered by denying the consequence. And the reason for the difference is: for habitual grace does not grant a man that he persevere to the end, but only that he can persevere. Whence it happens that of two equally justified men, one falls into sin by his own freedom and is damned, while the other through God's mercy perseveres to the end; because God grants to him the gift of perseverance, which he did not give to the other by a hidden but most just judgment. But efficacious help grants a man to act well, or to persevere to the end. Hence he who acts well, or perseveres, always has some actual help of prevenient grace which the other does not have, who falls into sin or persists in sin.

But the argument presses: we use habits when we will: therefore if the just man uses them, as he can, to the end, he will be saved; but if he does not use them, while he is bound to use them, he will sin and be damned: therefore with equal helps on God's part it will sometimes happen that one man is saved and the other damned. It is answered that we indeed use habits when we will: but in order that we will to use them, the efficacious motion of God is prerequired, premoving free choice to use the habit for acting and to perform the good, especially when the habits are supernatural: because, since they belong to a higher order, they have a special character on account of which a merely natural power does not use those habits unless it be moved by a special help of God to use those habits, since things of a higher order are not subject to things of a lower order. Nor does that passage of 1 Cor. 14 stand in the way: And the spirit of the prophets is subject to the prophets: for the sense is not that the interior prophetic knowledge is subject to the prophets, or is in their power — for prophecy is not given by way of a habit, but by way of a transient motion — but the sense is that the spirit of prophecy is subject to the prophets, as regards utterance, as St. Thomas explains, because they can pronounce what has been revealed to them, and not pronounce it. But nevertheless, in order to pronounce it, they are also moved by God, as also to other good operations.

To the fifth argument an answer has been given in disputation 73 and 90.

The End of the Tenth Book.

Book Eleven

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