De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Book Nine

Introduction

IN WHICH THE HELP OF OPERATING AND COOPERATING, HELPING, OR EFFICACIOUS GRACE IS TREATED.

HAVING considered the helps of exciting and sufficient grace, it remains for us to dispute the helps of helping, operating, and cooperating, or efficacious, grace. Since these helps can be considered in two ways, namely, in themselves and by comparison with the helps of exciting and sufficient grace, we must first treat these helps in themselves; afterwards they are to be considered by comparison with the helps of exciting and sufficient grace. In the first matter, fourteen points must be examined.

I. What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how the latter is distinguished from operating grace.

II. Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it is cooperating or helping, is prevenient, or premoves free choice toward consent; or whether it merely flows into the same consent simultaneously with free choice.

III. What efficacious help is, and in what its efficacy consists.

IIII. How many kinds of efficacious help there are.

V. Whether the help of helping, cooperating, or efficacious grace and free choice, in relation to a pious act, are two partial causes, like two people pulling a ship.

VI. Whether God, through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, causes free choice to exert its own influx upon consent, properly as an efficient cause or in the manner of a physical cause; or whether he effects this only morally, by persuading, inviting, and attracting.

VII. Whether actual efficacious help is subject to our power of choice as regards its use, just as the habits we use when we will are subject to us.

VIII. Whether, in one who has infused habits for eliciting a supernatural act, a special help is necessary—not only of exciting grace but also of helping grace—really distinct from the help of the infused habit.

IX. Whether created free choice is the first cause, or the first root, of its own determination.

X. Whether the help of grace, in its character as efficacious help, depends on the free influx of created choice together with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God antecedently to the free consent of that same choice. Here certain ways of speaking about the nature of efficacious help are weighed.

XI. Whether God, through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, predetermines free choice to consent.

XII. Whether free choice, moved by God through efficacious help, can also, in the composite sense, reject that same help, dissent, and fail to be converted. Here certain decrees of the Council of Trent and of Sens are weighed and explained.

XIII. Whether a person's free choice can resist efficacious help.

XIV. How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that a person's free choice, moved by God through efficacious help, cannot in the composite sense dissent or fail to be converted, but only in the divided sense.

Disputatio LXXXI: What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they differ from one another.

What operating grace and cooperating grace are, and how they are distinguished from one another.

I. The resolution of this difficulty is very necessary for understanding and explaining the nature and property of efficacious grace, for laying open the mind of Saints Augustine and Thomas concerning the power and efficacy of this same grace, and for reconciling various passages of Augustine that at first sight seem contrary to one another. There are as many opinions on this matter as there are heads, but those most commonly circulated among theologians are reduced to four. The first is that of those who assert that grace is called operating with respect to interior acts, but cooperating with respect to exterior acts. They prove their opinion.

First, from St. Thomas, I–II, q. 111, a. 2, where he says that, with respect to the interior act, the will is as something moved; and therefore, insofar as God moves the will to this act, grace is called operating. Further below he adds that, with respect to the exterior act, grace is called cooperating. He says the same in II Sentences, d. 26, q. 1, a. 5.

Second, an argument is made from the authority of St. Augustine, On Grace and Free Choice, ch. 17, where, explaining the words to the Philippians 2, “It is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish: For a good will,” he says: “He himself works that we may will, beginning the work; he cooperates with those who will, bringing it to completion.” And immediately he adds: “That we may will, he works without us; but when we will, and will in such a way as to act, he cooperates with us.” By these words he attributes willing itself, which is an interior act, to operating grace; but the exterior work, which the word “to act” signifies, he attributes to cooperating grace.

This is confirmed by the authority of St. Bernard, who, explaining the same passage to the Philippians 2, says that since there are three things—thinking well, willing well, and acting well—the first two belong to God, while the third is said to be both God’s and ours. There he attributes the interior act itself, namely thinking well and willing well, to operating grace; but he refers the good exterior act to God cooperating with us.

II. The second opinion is held by certain more recent theologians, who affirm that operating grace is identical with exciting, attracting, inviting, or morally moving grace, which moves free choice toward supernatural acts; while cooperating grace is identified with helping grace, or with grace that flows into a pious act jointly with free choice. For they say that one and the same grace, insofar as it excites, attracts, and invites our choice to acts of believing, hoping, loving, or repenting, is called prevenient and exciting grace; and under this aspect it precedes our choice toward such acts. But insofar as, once our choice is already consenting and cooperating in the acts to which that grace invites and attracts, grace itself also cooperates in those same acts with a new influx and action, it is called helping and cooperating grace. In support of this opinion there is

A third argument, which its proponents often press, is taken from the Council of Trent, Session 6, on Justification, chapter 5, whose words we cited in disputation 74, no. 1. There the Council calls it prevenient, exciting, and helping grace, and says that free choice is disposed to justification by assenting to and cooperating with that same grace. Therefore, that disposition takes place with free choice cooperating and consenting together with prevenient and exciting grace; and consequently, that same grace which precedes free choice and excites it to such an act cooperates at the same time with it. Thus prevenient, cooperating, and helping grace are not distinct graces, but one and the same grace: considered before free choice cooperates with it and elicits the free act by which it is disposed to justification, it is called prevenient; but considered insofar as, once free choice is cooperating with it, it too cooperates and flows into that same act, it is called cooperating and helping grace.

This is confirmed by those words in canon 4 of the same session: “If anyone says that the free choice of a human being, moved and aroused by God, cooperates in no way by assenting to God who arouses it, etc.” Here you see the Council affirming that free choice cooperates with God who arouses it, when it assents and disposes itself to justifying grace; and consequently, that God also cooperates with it toward the same disposition through exciting grace. For one who cooperates with a cooperator is called cooperating; therefore operating grace is the same as exciting grace, and cooperating grace is the same as helping grace.

III. Fourth, they prove the same from the authority of St. Augustine, On Grace and Free Choice, book 1, chapter 16, who says: “It is certain that we keep the commandments if we will; but because the will is prepared by the Lord, we must ask him that we will as much as suffices for us to act by willing. It is certain that we will when we will, but he makes us will the good, of which it is said: ‘The will is prepared by the Lord, and the steps of a man shall be directed by the Lord’”; “and: ‘It is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish’”; “It is certain that we act when we act; but he makes us act, by supplying the will with most effective powers, he who said: ‘I will cause you to walk in my statutes.’” And in chapter 17 he says: “Who had begun to give this charity, even if small, unless he who prepares the will and, by cooperating, brings to completion what he began by operating? For he himself works that we may will, beginning the work; he cooperates with those who will, bringing it to completion. Therefore, that we may will, he works without us; but when we will, and will in such a way as to act, he cooperates with us. Yet without him, whether operating so that we will or cooperating when we will, we have no power for good works of piety.” From this testimony it is gathered that operating grace is that by which the will is prepared by the Lord, and that this same grace is meant when God is said to make us will or act. It is clear, however, that God does this in us through exciting grace: for by that grace he enlightens us and directs our steps, which Augustine there attributes to this operating grace; and by attracting the will he prepares it sweetly to will to believe, love, or act. Therefore, according to Augustine, operating grace is the same as exciting grace, and cooperating grace is the same as helping grace.

IIII. Fifth. God is not said to work in us so that we may will because he alone brings about willing itself in us, but because he is the one who works in us the beginning of a good will, which is not brought to completion without us. This is what Augustine says: “He himself works that we may will, beginning the work; he cooperates with those who will, bringing it to completion.” But God works in us the beginning of salvation only through exciting grace, as is clear from the Council of Trent. Therefore the function of operating grace and of exciting grace is the same, and consequently the function of cooperating grace and of helping grace will also be the same.

Sixth. This is proved from the very meaning of the names. For the designation “cooperating grace” is self-evident and fits helping grace most clearly, since it cooperates with human efforts, as Ambrose rightly said in his second book on Luke. And—and this is very much to be noted—that word indicates a certain simultaneous conjunction of the will and helping grace in the same act or action, in which they are said to cooperate with one another, so that under this aspect neither precedes or impels the other, but they merely act together. Operating grace, as can be gathered from Augustine, is so called either because through it God works in us without us, or because through it God, even alone and without us, works so that we may will, in keeping with the words of the Second Council of Orange, chapter 20, from Augustine, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, book 2, chapter 8: “Many good things are done in a human being which the human being does not do; but the human being does no good things which God does not grant him to do.” Therefore.

Seventh. For St. Augustine often attributes cooperation to God’s help, that is, to helping grace, but operation to calling, that is, to exciting grace. For God calls through exciting grace, as the Council of Trent said, and through that same grace works in us a good will. This is what those words of St. Augustine signify: “For God provides in one way that we may will, and in another what we have willed: that we may will, he wished to be both his and ours—his by calling, ours by following. But what we have willed he alone provides, that is, the power to act well and to live always in blessedness.” There he attributes to God’s calling, that is, to exciting grace, in the same way the role of being that by which God works in us so that we may will, although willing itself does not take place without us.

V. The third opinion is that a good work, insofar as it proceeds from God as its principal cause, is called operating grace; but insofar as it proceeds from our free choice, it is called cooperating grace. The chief reason for this opinion is that we cooperate with God, as is defined by the Council of Trent: therefore God’s operation is called operating grace, while our cooperation will be cooperating grace.

The fourth opinion is that of Cajetan, I–II, q. 111, a. 2, and Master Soto, On Nature and Grace, book 1, chapter 16: grace is called operating insofar as it causes in us an intention of the end, but cooperating insofar as it cooperates with us in a right choice of means. Many recent Thomists defend this opinion, and it seems to be the express opinion of St. Thomas in the cited I–II, q. 111, a. 2, where he says: “There is in us a twofold act. The first is an interior act of the will; with respect to this act, the will is as something moved, while God is as the mover, especially when the will begins to will the good, after previously willing evil. And therefore, insofar as God moves the human mind to this act, grace is called operating.” There he proves this by the authority of St. Augustine cited above, who says: “That we may will, he works; but when we will, he cooperates with us so that we may bring it to completion.” And in his reply to the third objection he adds: “Someone is said to cooperate with another not only as a secondary agent with a principal agent, but as one who helps toward an end already presupposed. Now through operating grace a human being is helped by God to will the good. Therefore, once the end is already presupposed, it follows that grace cooperates with us.”

VI. To resolve this difficulty, however, we must first assume with St. Thomas, in the cited article 2, “that the operation of an effect is attributed not to what is moved, but to what moves. Therefore, in an effect in which our mind is moved and does not move, while God alone moves, the operation is attributed to God; and in this respect grace is called operating. But in an effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is attributed not only to God but also to the soul; and in this respect grace is called cooperating.” He teaches the same in On Truth, q. 27, a. 5.

The will moves itself morally and physically.— Second, it should be noted that the will can move itself in two ways. In the first way, morally: this occurs when, from a prior willing of the end, it applies itself to the choice of means. In the second way it can move itself physically, namely, when it freely produces an act even if it does not properly deliberate about it; for an act can be free even if it is not deliberated, as happens in willing the end. For when someone desires health as an end, or turns to God through an act of charity as to the ultimate end, it is certain that such an act is absolutely free, since it is meritorious of eternal life. Yet it is not called deliberated, because it does not presuppose any deliberation of reason. For deliberation is not about the end as an end, but about the means to the end; and therefore in that act the will does not move itself morally, but only physically.

The will moves itself morally only with respect to the means.— Third, it should be noted that in every free operation, whether it concerns the end or the means, the will always moves itself physically, because, as was said above and will be shown more fully below, it belongs to the nature of a voluntary act that it have as its efficient cause an intrinsic principle that moves itself at least physically. Yet it is not necessary that in every operation of the will, even a free one, it move itself morally through deliberation, as is clear in willing the end. The reason is this: as St. Thomas teaches in the First Part of the Second Part, q. 13, a. 3, and q. 14, a. 2, deliberation and counsel do not concern the end, but only the means. Therefore, when someone wills the end as an end, the will does not move itself morally; for in order to move itself morally, it must deliberate and take counsel about the exercise of the act. I say, when someone wills the end as an end; for if an intermediate end is considered insofar as it has the character of a means ordered to a further end, the will can indeed move itself morally when it desires that end. The reason is that an end, insofar as it takes on the character of a means, is an object of deliberation and counsel. For someone can deliberate: “Whether, in order to attain eternal life, it is useful for me to have perfect health”; although health, as the end of medicine, does not fall under consultation and deliberation.

VII. Operating grace morally is the same as exciting grace.— Let our first conclusion, then, be this: operating grace morally is the same as exciting grace. We grant this conclusion to the proponents of the second opinion; it alone is proved by the arguments adduced for that opinion, if they prove anything at all. It is proved further as follows: operating grace morally is that which, by attracting, inviting, and persuading, makes us act and works so that we may act, as is clear from what was said above. But all this belongs to exciting grace: through it, God enlightens the intellect and attracts the will to follow the good, as was said above. Therefore, and so forth. It follows that cooperating grace morally alone does not differ from exciting grace: for one who excites another and persuades him to do good is the moral cause of that same good; therefore he cooperates with him morally in willing or carrying out such good; therefore cooperating grace morally alone is the same as exciting grace. However, because Sacred Scripture, the Councils, and the Fathers—especially St. Augustine and Thomas—do not speak of operating or cooperating grace only in this sense, but also in a higher one, namely, of grace that physically, or truly as an efficient cause, makes us act and so works that we may act, let us proceed as follows.

VIII. Operating grace physically is really distinct from exciting grace.— Second conclusion: operating grace physically is really distinct from exciting grace. This conclusion is opposed to the proponents of the second opinion, who, as was seen above and will be clear below, admit no operating grace that truly as an efficient cause, or by physically predetermining the will, makes us act; and they explain all the passages of Scripture, the Councils, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas that are brought against them as referring to grace that operates morally beforehand. Our conclusion, however, is taught by all recent Thomists, and was taught earlier, not obscurely, by Saints Augustine and Thomas, as will be treated expressly in disputation 86. There, through many testimonies of Sacred Scripture, definitions of Councils—especially the Council of Orange—the clearest passages of the holy Fathers Augustine and Thomas, and theological arguments, it will be made evident that God, through the help of pre-operating grace, makes us act and works so that we may act, not only by persuading, attracting, inviting, or otherwise drawing us inwardly in a moral way, but also by truly and efficaciously causing, as an efficient cause, free choice itself to cooperate and freely consent to God who moves and calls it. For from this it is clearly concluded that this operating grace is really distinct from exciting grace, since exciting grace does not have this sort of effect, as the proponents of the contrary opinion admit. Nor is it enough to reply that exciting grace fails to have this sort of effect through the fault of the person who is moved and aroused, because free choice does not wish to cooperate or consent to God who moves and excites it. For we maintain that God, through the operating grace of which we are now speaking, certainly and infallibly subjects the human will to himself and makes the unwilling willing, and the resistant consenting. Yet he does not accomplish this through exciting grace alone, as is clear from what was said above about the effects of exciting grace.

IX. Second, the same point is proved. Cooperating grace is really distinct from exciting grace; therefore operating grace is too. The inference is proved: operating and cooperating grace are not distinct, but are one and the same grace according to different effects, as St. Thomas teaches in I–II, q. 111, a. 2, in the body of the article and in reply to the fourth objection. The antecedent is proved: cooperating grace acts upon a pious act as an efficient cause, whereas exciting grace does not produce that same act as an efficient cause, or physically; it reaches the will’s consent only morally. Consequently, when a pious act is produced, such exciting grace often does not exist. Hence it cannot act as an efficient cause, because what does not exist does not operate, since each thing operates insofar as it is in act. Therefore operating grace is really distinct from exciting grace.

Furthermore, our conclusion is proved by all the arguments with which, in disputations 22 and 23, it was shown that God physically predetermines free choice to cooperate with and consent to God who calls, through the motion of pre-operating grace. Since exciting grace does not thus predetermine free choice to act, but leaves it so indeterminate that dissent by that same choice can coexist with that very grace exciting it to consent, it follows that such exciting grace is really distinct from operating grace.

Operating and cooperating grace concur in every pious act.— Third conclusion. In every pious act, whether it is an intention of the end or a choice of means, whether it is an interior or an exterior act, operating grace always concurs, at least physically, as does cooperating grace. This is proved as follows: operating grace physically is that through which God works so that we may act, by predetermining our will to consent; cooperating grace, in turn, is that through which God works a pious act with us. But in every pious act God truly acts as an efficient cause through his grace to make us act, and likewise works the act itself with us, as is clear from the definition of Conc. Araus. can. 9: “Whenever we do good, God works in us and with us, so that we may act.” There the phrase “in us” denotes the effect of operating grace, just as the phrase “with us” denotes the effect of cooperating grace. Therefore, in every pious act operating grace concurs in us, through which God works so that we may act, making us act—something that he alone effects, as was shown above; and cooperating grace also concurs, through which he effects the pious act itself with us.

Second, this is proved as follows. Our free choice does not perform any supernatural act unless it is moved by God, as stated in Trident. sess. 6. de iustif. can. 3. et 4. Therefore, in every supernatural act, free choice is both moved by God and moves itself at least physically. Therefore both graces are present: operating and cooperating. The inference is proved as follows: according to St. Thomas, operating grace is named with respect to an effect in which our will is related only as something moved; cooperating grace is named with respect to an effect in which the will, once moved, moves itself.

This is confirmed. In relation to the prior motion by which our will is moved by God to supernatural acts, it is passive, since such motion is not produced actively by our free choice but only by God, from whom comes the help of pre-operating grace. Therefore, with respect to that effect, grace alone operates, and so it is operating grace. Again, the will, moved by God, actively and freely produces supernatural acts meritorious of eternal life and other free supernatural acts. Therefore cooperating grace concurs in that case.

Third, this is proved by the clearest testimonies of St. Augustine, in which he teaches our opinion, but especially in On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 16, where he says: “It is certain that we will when we will; but he makes us will the good,” and below: “It is certain that we act when we act; but he makes us act, by supplying the will with most effective powers.” By these words the holy Doctor distinguishes two things in every pious act. The first is that he makes us will, which, as will be clear below, must be understood as true efficient causality after the manner of a physical cause. This he attributes to God alone, and consequently to operating grace; for grace is called operating in relation to an effect in which the will is related only as something moved, while God alone moves, as was said above. The second is the very willing of our will, of which not only God, or his grace alone, is the efficient cause, but our free choice too, together with that grace, in keeping with the Apostle’s words: “I labored more abundantly than all, yet not I alone, but the grace of God with me.” Therefore, in relation to this effect, our mind is not only moved by God, but at the same time also moves itself at least physically; consequently, such an effect must necessarily be attributed to cooperating grace. St. Augustine therefore holds that operating and cooperating grace concur in every pious act. This is confirmed more fully by those words of his in the same book, chapter 17: “That we may will, he works without us; but when we will, and will in such a way as to act, he works with us. Yet without him, whether operating so that we may will or cooperating when we will, we have no power for good works of piety.” He proves this by the authority of the Apostle, adding: “Of him operating so that we may will, it is said: ‘For it is God who works in you also to will.’” “Of him cooperating when we already will and act by willing, he says: ‘We know that all things work together for good for those who love God.’” And in To Simplicianus, book 1, question 2, near the middle, he says: “God provides in one way that we may will, and in another what we have willed. For that we may will, he wished to be both his and ours: his by calling, ours by following. But what we have willed he alone provides”; as though he were saying: we will with God, but God alone makes us will. More will be said about this in disputation 100. Finally, in On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 13, he concludes in this way: “Therefore we will, but God works in us also to will; therefore we act, but God works in us also to act, for a good will. It is fitting for us both to believe and to say this: it is pious, it is true, so that our confession may be humble and submissive, and all may be given to God.”

They reply to the first testimony, from On Grace and Free Choice, that Augustine said God makes us will even if we will when we will, and makes us act even if we act when we act, because by such a secret calling he prepares our will so that it may readily elicit consent. They say that in the second testimony and all the others he intended to teach exactly the same thing, and nothing else.

This solution, however, is ambiguous and can be adapted to our opinion as well as to theirs. Hence we argue against it as follows. When they say that God makes us will and act because by such a secret calling he prepares our will, etc., they either understand by this secret calling a calling by which God makes us will and act only by persuading, attracting, inviting, or otherwise drawing the will inwardly in a moral way. This is not at all consistent with the teaching of St. Augustine, because in his opinion God, through pre-operating grace—which he often called a deep and secret calling—does this not only in the moral way just explained, but also truly as an efficient cause, or after the manner of a physical cause: he causes us to cooperate and to apply a free influx to consent, as will be made clear in disputation 86. If, however, they understand a deep and secret calling that makes us cooperate in both ways, namely morally and physically, or after the manner of a physical cause, they agree with our opinion. Consequently, they must admit that God, through the help of pre-operating grace, physically determines the will to every particular pious act with all its circumstances, as we said in disputations 22 and 23, and will be shown more fully in disputation 91. Moreover, when they add that God prepares our will by a secret calling so that it may readily elicit consent, the word “readily” causes a difficulty. Why, then, do they insert this word? Would the sense not have been complete if they had said “so that it may elicit consent”? For, as will be made clear in disputation 88, the help of grace is necessary not only for free choice to elicit consent to a pious act readily, but for it to elicit that consent at all.

If it is said that God makes us act as an efficient cause and physically because he physically and as an efficient cause produces in the intellect and will indeliberate illuminations and excitations for this purpose and with this intention—that we may act—we reply: this is to produce those indeliberate motions in us physically, by which God makes the will cooperate only morally, in the manner of one persuading and inviting. But this does not preserve the claim that God, through his pre-operating grace, truly as an efficient cause, or physically, makes us cooperate.

Fourth, this is proved as follows. Two things are necessary for every pious act: the concurrence of God and the concurrence of created free choice. But God’s concurrence is prior, since he is the first cause, which by its operation influences all secondary causes prior in reason and causality than they reach their effects, as was shown in disputation 18. Therefore, in every pious act there is something attributed to God alone and to operating grace, namely, the influx into free choice as a cause, by which it is prepared or predetermined to act piously; and there is the pious act itself, which proceeds from God and free choice and therefore must be attributed to cooperating grace.

X. The opinion of Cajetan, Master Soto, and the other Thomists is to be understood in accordance with this teaching. For they do not intend to deny this third conclusion, but only to teach that, in intending the end, our will does not move itself morally through deliberation of reason, but is moved by God alone with respect to the specification of the act. Consequently, grace is called operating in relation to the end, in the way explained above, and cooperating in relation to the means. The first opinion can be understood in the same sense: by the interior act of the will it means the intention of the end, and by the exterior act, the choice of means. St. Thomas uses “interior act” and “exterior act” in this sense in the First Part of the Second Part, q. 18, a. 6, in the body, when he says: “In a voluntary act a twofold act is found, namely, the interior act of the will and the exterior act; and each of these acts has its own object: for the end is properly the object of the interior voluntary act.” In these words, as Cajetan explains there, by the interior act of the will he means the intention, which concerns the end; and consequently, by the exterior act he means choice. Hence, in the reply to the second objection of the same article, he says that being ordered to such an end, although it is incidental to the exterior act, is not incidental to the interior act of the will, which is related to the exterior act as the formal to the material.

By these points the reply to the first and second arguments, together with the confirmation offered for the first opinion, is clear.

XI. To the third argument on behalf of the second opinion, we reply that, in adults, the first and remote beginning of justification is taken from exciting grace, but its proximate beginning from helping grace, which includes operating and cooperating grace, through which God works in us and with us so that we may act. Therefore, we must deny that the Council of Trent, in the words cited, meant that operating grace, of which we spoke in the third conclusion, is the same as exciting grace. For exciting grace does not act as an efficient cause together with free choice in producing a pious act, but only morally, as is clear from what was established above. Helping grace, however, is that which effects the same pious act in free choice and together with it. Insofar as this grace moves free choice and physically predetermines it to consent, it is called operating, because in relation to this effect our will is moved and does not move, while God alone moves. But insofar as it produces a pious act as an efficient cause together with free choice thus moved by God, it is called cooperating grace, because in this effect our will both moves itself and is moved; and therefore the operation is attributed not only to God but also to the soul. Thus helping grace is called operating insofar as it moves and determines free choice to act, but cooperating insofar as it produces a pious act together with free choice moved by God. This is the legitimate sense of the Council of Trent, as is clear from the cited canon 4, where, antecedently to free consent, it requires not only an excitation through which God morally makes us act, but also an efficacious motion through which God truly acts as an efficient cause to bring about our consent. We call this predetermining motion physically operating grace. And by these points the reply to the confirmation is clear.

XII. To the fourth argument we reply that those passages of Augustine powerfully confirm our opinion and completely overturn the contrary one. For from them we learn, first, that although a person’s free choice wills freely, God alone is the one who makes that person will—not only by morally persuading through exciting grace, but also by truly acting as an efficient cause through operating grace, making free choice itself consent and cooperate, while at the same time cooperating with us in the consent itself. Second, we learn that God prepares the will to consent in two ways. First, by a certain moral persuasion, which is through exciting grace. Second, by a motion that predetermines the will to consent, which takes place through operating grace, precisely insofar as it operates.

To the fifth argument we reply that God is said to work in us so that we may will because he alone makes us will. For although a human being wills freely, the human being does not make himself will; God alone effects this through operating grace, as we shall show in disputation 100 from various passages of St. Augustine and other Fathers. God makes us will and works in us the beginning of a good will not only by morally persuading, but also by truly and efficaciously causing us, as an efficient cause, to consent freely. With respect to this effect Augustine said: “He himself works that we may will, beginning the work.” But because we too cooperate freely, he therefore adds: “He cooperates with those who will, bringing it to completion.” Thus, although the function of grace in morally producing our willing is the same as that of exciting grace, the role of operating grace physically is not the same as that of exciting grace; consequently, these two graces are really distinct from one another.

XIII. To the sixth argument we reply that we infer our opinion from the very meaning of the names: for operating only morally is not properly operating, but metaphorically, as was shown above. Hence, when Augustine says that God alone operates, beginning the work, or that he alone works so that we may will, he is not to be understood as speaking only of moral operation—that is, of an operation by which willing itself first begins only in a moral way—but also of physical operation, through which God first initiates our willing, making us cooperate with him and consent freely. Nor do we admit that helping or cooperating grace, insofar as it is helping, concurs with our free choice in a pious act only by a simultaneous influx. For, as will be made clear in the following disputation, helping and cooperating grace, although simultaneous in time with the influx of free choice, nevertheless precedes it in the order of reason and causality.

To the seventh argument we reply that in those words, under the name “calling,” St. Augustine includes not only exciting grace, which operates morally so that we may will, but also the grace by which God truly acts as an efficient cause to make us act, as was said. Hence St. Thomas, I–II, q. 113, a. 1, ad 3, understands by the name “calling” the help of exciting grace and of grace that moves, that is, efficaciously helps. For he says: “Calling refers to the help of God inwardly moving and arousing the mind to abandon sin; this motion of God is not itself the remission of sin, but its cause.”

Disputatio LXXXII: Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient or premoves free choice to consent, or only acts together and simultaneously with it in a pious operation.

Whether cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient, or premoving free choice to consent; or whether it merely flows jointly and simultaneously with it into a pious operation.

I. We briefly touched on this difficulty in disputation 72, conclusion 2, but now it must be discussed and explained more fully, since from understanding it the efficacy of the helps of grace—which, in keeping with the teaching of the holy Fathers Augustine and Thomas, we are endeavoring to defend—will appear more clearly.

Some more recent theologians, then, hold that cooperating grace, precisely insofar as it is cooperating, does not precede the influx, or free cooperation, of our free choice, but flows jointly and at the same time with it into acts of believing, hoping, loving, and so forth. They prove their opinion.

First, by the authority of Saint Bernard, in his book On Grace and Free Choice, where, explaining the nature of operating and cooperating grace, he says: It arouses free choice itself when it sows a thought; it heals when it changes the affection; it strengthens in order to bring it to act; it preserves it lest it experience failure. Grace thus works with free choice in such a way that it only precedes it at the first stage, while in the others it accompanies it. It precedes it for this very purpose: that thereafter it may cooperate with it. Yet what was begun by grace alone is completed jointly by both, so that they work together, not separately, at the same time, not in turn, through each advance. It is not partly grace and partly free choice: each accomplishes the whole by an undivided act. By these words he expressly teaches that God’s grace only precedes free choice when it arouses it; for, he says, in the other matters grace accompanies free choice, namely, when it cooperates with it. And when he says, what was begun by grace alone is completed jointly by both, he shows most clearly that the help of cooperating grace is not prevenient, but flows into a pious operation jointly with our will. Chrysostom teaches the same in Homily 12 on the Epistle to the Hebrews, saying: It does not precede our wills, lest free choice be harmed. These words are to be understood of cooperating grace, for elsewhere he had taught that exciting grace precedes that same choice.

Second. To cooperate with another toward some effect is to produce that same effect jointly with the other; for “cooperating,” as is clear from the very meaning of the word, denotes a relation to another who acts at the same time. Therefore cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, in no way precedes the free influx and cooperation of our free choice, but is simultaneous with it both in the order of nature and in time.

This is confirmed. The one with whom another cooperates does something, as Augustine teaches; but before our own influx, free choice does nothing, since the operation of choice cannot exist or even be conceived without its influx. Therefore, before such an influx, God does not cooperate with free choice; and consequently cooperating grace does not precede the influx of that same choice.

II. Third. The cooperation of grace toward our conversion, or toward any other pious operation, depends on the free cooperation of our free choice, just as the concurrence and influx of the habits of the virtues into our operations depend on the cooperation of the faculties themselves. This is why we use the habits for our operations when, according to our own choice, we wish to act, and do not use them when, according to that same choice, we wish to cease acting. Therefore cooperating grace does not precede, but accompanies, the free influx and cooperation of our free choice, just as the influx of a habit into an operation accompanies the influx of a faculty. The consequence is proved as follows: what depends on another does not precede it, even in the order of nature, because what is prior does not depend on what is posterior.

Fourth. Cooperating grace and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people towing a ship. But partial causes towing a ship, or concurring to produce some other effect, concur together toward that effect in such a way that neither precedes the other, but rather each depends on the other in producing that effect. Therefore cooperating grace neither precedes nor is prevenient to the cooperation of our free choice, but is altogether simultaneous with it.

Fifth. One who cooperates does something cooperatively; but the help of divine grace, at that prior sign of reason, or instant of nature, before free choice flows into consent, does nothing cooperatively, because it does not cooperate in the consent itself—for otherwise, before the cooperation of choice, the consent itself would be understood to have been produced by grace alone, and thus free choice would be merely passive in its cooperation in that same consent, which is contrary to the definition of the Council of Trent; nor does it cooperate in anything else at that prior point, since it cannot be specified what that would be. Therefore, before the free influx of our choice, cooperating grace is not understood to be present; consequently, such grace does not precede that same influx, or the cooperation of choice, even in the order of nature. If it is said that cooperating grace is prevenient to the free cooperation of our choice in the order of nature to the extent that, through it, God makes us act and works so that we may act—which God indeed does in us antecedently to the influx of that same choice—and that from this side cooperating grace is prevenient, although in relation to the pious operation itself it concurs at the same time with free choice, the following is an objection to this.

III. Sixth argument. The grace of God, insofar as it makes us act, is not cooperating grace, but physically operating grace, as was said in the preceding disputation. For, in relation to this effect, our will does not move itself, but is only moved by God. Therefore cooperating grace, formally speaking, insofar as it cooperates, is not prevenient, but accompanies the free influx of our choice.

To the contrary. We cooperate with the grace of God by following it; therefore the grace of God cooperates with us by going before us; and consequently cooperating grace precedes the cooperation of our choice in the order of nature. The premise is expressly stated by Pope Gelasius I in his Epistle 5 to all the Bishops throughout Picenum; where, explaining the passage in 1 Cor. 15, Yet not I, but the grace of God with me, he says: What Christian, then, would dare to say that he has anything good without grace, when the Teacher of the nations cries out, briefly gathering all gifts into himself: “By the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace in me was not in vain”—to show that he himself did not go before the gift of grace, but followed it, and to demonstrate that he was a cooperator with grace by following it? “But I labored more than all of them,” he says. And again, fearing that he might seem to presume upon himself, he added: “Not I, but the grace of God with me.” He did not say, “I, and the grace of God with me,” but put the grace that went before him first and then added himself. What, then, can be had without grace, when faith itself is through grace? The consequence is proved because it cannot be true that free choice cooperates with grace by following it unless grace cooperates with that same choice by preceding its influx in the order of causality.

IV. To explain this difficulty, it should be noted that here we are not speaking of antecedence, or priority, in the order of time. For all theologians agree that cooperating grace is in the same instant of time as the influx, or cooperation, of created choice. Nor are we speaking of priority in dignity, since all acknowledge that God’s cooperation is the more excellent and more principal cause of a pious operation than the cooperation of free choice. The Semi-Pelagians too, especially Faustus, frankly acknowledged this, as was seen in disputation 2, no. 8. We are speaking, then, of antecedence, or priority, in the order of reason and causality. The controversy is this: whether cooperating grace, formally speaking, precedes the cooperation of our choice in the order of reason and causality, so that this causal proposition is true: “Because God cooperates, free choice cooperates”; while this one is false: “Because free choice cooperates, God cooperates.” This causal proposition is to be treated expressly in disputations 98 and 99.

V. Second, it should be supposed, on the basis of what was said in the preceding disputation, that cooperating grace is really distinct from exciting grace; for this is one of the principal foundations of our opinion. We should also recall what was said about general concurrence and the way in which God concurs with secondary causes in their operations, in disputations 18, 22, and 23; what we wrote about the dependence of the free cooperation of that same choice upon God, especially in supernatural acts, in disputation 36; and what we will say about the same matter in disputations 85 and 86, and from disputation 96 onward through disputation 100. For from what was said, and will be said, in the disputations cited above, the resolution of the present difficulty can readily be gathered.

VI. Cooperating grace is prevenient to the concurrence of free choice.— The first conclusion, then, is this: cooperating grace, insofar as it is distinguished from exciting grace, is prevenient to the free cooperation of created choice. This conclusion is opposed to the authors of the first opinion; nevertheless, Master Medina expressly teaches it in the First Part of the Second Part, question 111, article 2, section “This doctrine,” where he says: Operating or prevenient grace is twofold. One kind precedes the sinner so that he may rise; the other is that by which the sinner, assenting to God who goes before him, now rises. God precedes the will in both, but in the former, by supplying it, he often works alone, while putting a good thought into our hearts and rousing us. In the latter, our will, following God who goes before it, cooperates with him by willing, or by assent, while, aroused and moved by God, it begins to act well. By these words he plainly teaches that helping, or cooperating, grace is prevenient, and that the cooperation of our choice follows that same grace in the order of causality. He explains this further about the middle of his commentary, saying: Therefore, to will to repent, to will to come to one’s senses, to will to receive remission of sins, does not come from the will alone; rather, God works that together with us, making the ill-willed will well-disposed and consenting to his will. Thus God indeed changes our will by his operating grace, and so works willing in us; yet, because an unwilling will cannot be changed against its will, it cooperates with God by consenting to him. See: he says that the grace by which God works willing in us—which he distinguishes from exciting grace—is prevenient. All the proponents and defenders of efficacious grace, which physically predetermines free choice to consent, defend the same opinion. It is certain and very much in conformity with Sacred Scripture, the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs and Councils, and the teachings of the holy Fathers, especially Augustine and Thomas. It is proved from the passage in Philippians 2: For it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish. And from Isaiah 26: You, O Lord, have wrought all our works in us. For in saying he works in us, it signifies a certain antecedence by which God, through cooperating grace, brings about those same works together with us. Hence Saint Prosper, in his letter to Augustine, calls that same grace pre-operating, on account of this kind of antecedence and priority in the order of causality. The same may be proved from other passages of Scripture and from the definitions of Councils. In disputation 86 it will be made clear that God, through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, actively and properly, or in the manner of a physical cause,causes free choice to apply its own influx and cooperation to consent. Moreover, the authority of Pope Gelasius, introduced in the argument to the contrary, confirms the same point.

Second, it is proved by the authority of Saint Thomas, in the First Part of the Second Part, question 111, article 2, in the body of the article, where he says: In that effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is attributed not only to God but also to the soul; and in this respect it is called cooperating grace. By these words he plainly teaches that our mind, or free choice, in relation to the effect attributed to cooperating grace, is both moved by God and moves itself. Therefore cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, both moves free choice and, together with it as moved by God, produces a pious operation. But every mover, insofar as it moves, precedes the motion of the movable thing at least in the order of nature. Therefore cooperating grace precedes, in the order of nature, the cooperation of created free choice by which it moves itself and freely consents to God who moves it.

This is confirmed by that definition, Conc. Trid. sess. 6. de iustif. can. 4: If anyone should say that the free choice of man, moved and aroused by God, cooperates in no way by assenting to God who arouses and calls it, etc., let him be anathema. See, it says that free choice of man cooperates, yet is moved by God. This certainly occurs not only through exciting grace, but also through helping and cooperating grace, which it had taught without obscurity to be prevenient in chapter 5 of the same session, as was explained above.

VII. Third, it is proved as follows. Every meritorious work of the children of God is an effect of cooperating grace, as Saint Thomas teaches in 1. 2. q. 114. in prooemio, saying: Next we must consider merit, which is an effect of cooperating grace. But in every meritorious work our will not only moves itself physically, but is also moved by God, as is clear from Roman. 8. Those who are led by the Spirit of God are the children of God. From these words Saint Augustine, in the passages cited in disputation 18, number 16, concludes that the children of God are led so that they may act, not so that they themselves do nothing. Therefore it is prior that the children of God be led, or moved, by God, before they themselves do anything. They are led physically by helping, or cooperating, grace; for through exciting grace they are only moved morally toward free consent, as was said above and will be shown more fully below. Therefore helping, or cooperating, grace precedes the free cooperation of choice in the order of nature and causality.

Fourth. Cooperating grace—or God himself, as he flows in through cooperating grace—and free choice are not two partial causes of a pious operation, but total causes, one of which, namely free choice, is intrinsically subordinated to the other and depends on it, as on a superior and prior efficient cause, not only in its existence but also in its cooperation, as will be made clear in disput. 85. 96. et 97. Therefore cooperating grace precedes the cooperation of choice in the order of reason and causality. The consequence is proved as follows: wherever one thing really depends on another, there is an order of prior and posterior according to the order of nature.

VIII. They reply that, just as one relative depends on its correlative, yet is neither prior nor posterior to it but simultaneous in nature, as Aristotle teaches in the category of relation, and depends on it reciprocally, so that when one relative is posited, the other is posited in reality, and when it is removed, the other must necessarily be removed, so, by analogy, although the cooperation of free choice is subordinated to divine cooperation, neither is prior to the other; rather, they depend on each other and are posited or removed together in nature. Yet this solution is easily refuted: for one correlative is not subordinated to the other as to a per se efficient cause, but as to a terminus in relation to which it is essentially defined. For that reason one relative cannot be understood without the other, and consequently they are simultaneous in nature. The cooperation of our choice, however, depends on God who cooperates as on a prior per se efficient cause, as was said above and will be shown below. Hence divine cooperation must precede the cooperation of created choice in the order of nature and causality.

Fifth, it is proved as follows. Faustus of Riez, as was seen in disput. 2. nu. 5. et 8, asserted that grace and free choice are joined together in matters pertaining to salvation, and that grace is a companion, not a forerunner, of human merits. Yet he attributed the principal role in the work of our salvation to grace alone, and was speaking of helping, or cooperating, grace. For, as is clear from what was said in disput. 2. nu. 6. et 7, he did not deny but expressly conceded that human wills are preceded by exciting grace in pious operations that follow faith, although he asserted that faith is from ourselves, within us. Nevertheless, the Saints who wrote against him contend that helping, or cooperating, grace is not merely a companion but also a forerunner of human merits. Therefore.

IX. Second conclusion. Cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, precedes the cooperation of created choice with it in the order of reason and causality. This conclusion follows from the preceding one: for cooperating grace, insofar as it is distinguished from exciting grace, is prevenient, as was shown; but insofar as it cooperates, it is really distinct from exciting grace, as is clear from the premises. Therefore, insofar as it cooperates, it is prevenient to the influx of created choice. This conclusion will be made clearer by the solution to the final argument.

Saint Bernard’s authority concerning cooperating grace is examined.— The reply to the first argument, then, is that Saint Bernard’s meaning is that grace precedes the cooperation of choice only in the act of arousing, according to the order of time; for, generally speaking, exciting grace precedes the free consent of choice in time. When he adds that in the other matters it accompanies it, he is speaking of accompaniment according to the temporal instant, not according to the instant of nature. For in the same context he quite clearly acknowledges that the cooperation of grace precedes the cooperation of choice in the order of nature and causality; for he immediately adds: It is not partly grace and partly free choice, but each accomplishes the whole by an undivided act. The whole indeed belongs to free choice, and the whole comes from grace; but just as the whole is in free choice, so the whole comes from grace. It is as if he said: although grace and free choice jointly and simultaneously produce a pious operation in time, nevertheless the cooperation of grace precedes in the order of nature and causality. Those words repeated twice by Saint Bernard indicate this, namely, the whole is from it. By them he indicates that the cooperation of choice depends on the cooperation of grace; consequently grace precedes the cooperation of that same choice in the order of causality. The authority of Chrysostom introduced in the same argument is to be understood in accordance with this teaching; more was said about it in disp. 22. nu. 22. et 23.

X. The reply to the second argument is that cooperating with another toward some effect is to produce that same effect at the same time as the other; it is not, however, necessary that both concur simultaneously in the order of nature, or of causality.

In reply to the confirmation, it is said that for grace to cooperate with free choice, it is sufficient that at the same instant of time in which grace cooperates, choice itself also cooperates by freely flowing into consent; although, according to the instant of nature, the cooperation of grace precedes—not by eliciting a pious operation without us, but by causing us to consent freely and infallibly.

The difference between a habit and actual help.— The reply to the third argument is that, although the cooperation of grace occurs only if the free cooperation of choice is present at the same instant of time, it does not depend on that cooperation, just as the sun does not depend on a ray, although it is never without one. The same account does not apply to the cooperation and influx of habits and to the influx of cooperating grace. For a habit does not predetermine a faculty with respect to the exercise of an act, since its actual use is subject to the power of free choice: for we use habits when we wish. Cooperating grace, however, is not subject, with respect to its use, to the power of our will; rather, it subjects our will to itself and makes it obedient, as will be clear in disp. 87. Hence the cooperation of grace precedes the cooperation of our choice in the order of nature; the influx of a habit into works of piety, however, does not precede in the order of nature, but accompanies the influx of the faculty that produces those same works.

As for the fourth argument, the premise is denied; it will be treated expressly in disp. 85.

XI. The reply to the fifth must be given at greater length in disp. 98. For now, we say briefly that an instant of nature is not an instant in which something occurs, but an instant from which it occurs. Hence there is no need to assign, for some instant, something produced by cooperating grace alone and not by free choice; it is enough to understand the dependence that the influx of choice has upon the cooperation of grace. It does not follow, then, that free choice is merely passive, receiving a consent produced by grace alone.

Second, it is replied that, although the consent of free choice does not proceed as an efficient effect from grace alone, but from grace and free choice, nevertheless the first beginning of that same consent proceeds from helping grace alone. For it is this grace which, once exciting grace is presupposed, first initiates our consent by moving and applying free choice to act, as will be clear in the same disputation 98.

The effects of operating and cooperating grace.— The reply to the sixth argument is that the proper effect of operating grace is to move only. For, as was said on the authority of Saint Thomas, grace is called operating in relation to that effect in which our mind is moved and not moving, God alone being the mover; the effect of cooperating grace, however, is that in which our mind both moves and is moved. Nor does it follow from this that grace is called operating and cooperating in relation to the same effect. For one effect of grace is merely to move the will; another is, by moving that same will, to produce a pious operation simultaneously in time with it. The first effect is attributed to operating grace, and the second to cooperating grace. Hence not only operating grace, but also cooperating grace, insofar as it cooperates, is prevenient.

Disputatio LXXXIII: What the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.

What the efficacious help of pre-operating grace is, and in what its efficacy formally consists.

I. For a proper understanding of the true state of this controversy, we must presuppose and recall what we observed at the beginning of disputation 23 concerning the title of the question, lest the truth we earnestly seek happen to be obscured by ambiguous expressions that can give rise to confusion. To this question, then, some doctors answer that such efficacy does not consist in only one thing, but in three things that are necessarily required to constitute it. The first is the reality of the divine motion on the part of both the intellect and the will: that is, God illumines the intellect and moves the will inwardly, inclining and enticing it as one who persuades, so that it consents to God who arouses and calls it. The second is the congruity of that motion with a subject so disposed and situated in such circumstances. For a motion of prevenient grace is congruous with respect to one person who has such a temperament and inclination, or lesser sins, or is not troubled by the temptations of the devil or the goadings of the flesh; yet it is not congruous with respect to another, either because that person has a hard temperament, or greater sins, or is continually troubled by the temptations of the devil or the flesh. From this they infer that a certain prevenient grace is congruous and efficacious if bestowed on someone at such a time and in such circumstances, though it would not be congruous or efficacious for that person if it were given at another time or in other circumstances. The third is middle knowledge, by which God, before the efficacious decree to convert a person, certainly foreknows, as they say, that this motion is so suited and congruous to this particular person’s will that, if that person were premoved by it in such circumstances, he would infallibly consent.

II. Where some say the efficacy of the help of prevenient grace consists.— They say, first, that the complete efficacy of this call consists in this: by his infinite wisdom, God foresees what each cause, or will, would do in every event and circumstance if placed there; he also knows when, and to which call, each will would give its assent if the call were given to it. Hence, when he wills to convert a person, he also wills to call him at the time and in the way in which he knows that he will consent. This call is called efficacious because, although of itself it does not have an infallible effect, insofar as it is subject to that divine knowledge it will infallibly have that effect. Sometimes this may happen with a special congruity and moral efficacy of the call, and sometimes without it, with free choice cooperating with the general influx of God’s grace. In either way grace will be efficacious, although one is more copious than another.

From this they infer that this efficacy is not physical, but moral, and is not to be considered from the call itself taken in itself—that is, according to the reality or motion it places in a person—but insofar as it proceeds from God and is under his intention, knowledge, or direction. By “knowledge” they mean middle knowledge, which we mentioned in disputation 7.

They say that the teaching of Augustine is to be understood according to this mode of efficacy, and they explain their reasoning: Augustine considered not only the congruity that a call in itself has with a person’s temperament or nature, which is a congruity, as it were, in first act, but also, and especially, the proportion that consists in the call being given when it is going to produce its effect. This properly consists in second act, and can be called most congruous, because it is most fitting for a person to be called when he is going to respond, even if he is called gently, rather than to be called forcefully when he is not going to consent. They prove this opinion.

First, by the authority of Saint Augustine, who, in addition to the reality of the motion received in the intellect and will, requires the aforementioned congruity for efficacious grace, which he often calls grace according to purpose. For he says: Those are the elect who were called congruously; those, however, who did not correspond and were not attuned to the call were not elect, because they did not follow, although they were called. And a little later: It is not of one who wills, he says, nor of one who runs, but of God who has mercy, who called in this way, in a manner suited to those who followed the call. For whomever he has mercy on, he calls in a way he knows will suit him, so that he will not reject the one calling. And he seems to allude to the same thing in lib. de spiritu, et litt. cap. 34., saying: By the persuasions of things seen, God acts so that we may will and believe, whether externally through the exhortations of the Gospel or internally, where no one has control over what comes into his mind; but to assent or dissent is properly a matter of the will. And he immediately adds: In these ways, then, God acts with the rational soul so that it may believe. By these words he plainly signifies that God brings it about that we believe through moral persuasion. Likewise, in lib. 2. de peccatorum meritis, et remiss. cap. 17., explaining where the efficacy of the call consists, he says: People are unwilling to do what is just, either because it is hidden whether it is just, or because it is not pleasing. For the more certainly we know that something is good, the more strongly we will it, and the more ardently we delight in it. But that what was hidden may become known, and what was not pleasing may become sweet, is the grace of God, which helps human wills. And in tract. 16. in Ioannem, explaining the passage: Unless the Father who sent me draws him, he understands this drawing as moral, for he says: I believe willingly if I am drawn; it is too little to be drawn willingly—you are drawn also by delight, not by necessity. And a little later: Nuts are shown to a boy, and he is drawn—drawn by love. If it is true that each is drawn by his own pleasure, will not Christ, revealed by the Father, draw him? By these words he signifies that a person is drawn to Christ through moral persuasion. And in epist. 105. he says that through that deep and secret call, God so acts upon the understanding that he adapts assent to it: for by those particles so and that he signifies that in this call God preserves a manner suited to each person, so that the person is led to assent, or consent. The same is indicated in lib. de praedest. Sanct. cap. 8., where he says: This school is very far removed from the senses of the flesh, in which the Father teaches in this way; he does not act through the ear of the flesh, but through the heart. Likewise, in libro de dono perseverantiae cap. 14., after saying of the Tyrians and Sidonians: Since it was not given to them to believe, even the means by which they might believe was denied to them, he adds: From this it appears that some have, in their very disposition, a divinely bestowed natural gift of understanding, by which they may be moved to faith if they either hear words suited to their minds or behold signs, etc. By these words he seems to require, for the efficacy of grace, a congruity of the call consisting in a certain proportion involving such an illumination or inspiration, effected by God in such a way in a person of such temperament, nature, and condition.

III. Second, they also prove that this kind of congruity is not sufficient for the efficacy that Augustine intends to attribute to such a call, namely, that its effect follow altogether infallibly. For this infallibility must be so great that its ever failing would involve a contradiction; but such infallibility cannot arise from the force of congruity alone. Therefore that congruity is not sufficient for the efficacy of the call. The major premise is clear: this call is a means suited to God’s efficacious intention, but it involves a contradiction for God’s efficacious will not to be fulfilled. Therefore that call cannot be a proportionate means unless it is so infallible that it is wholly impossible, and involves a contradiction, for it not to attain its effect. The minor premise is proved as follows: all that congruity of itself produces is a certain moral certainty, which is not absolutely incompatible with free choice resisting a call that is congruous in this way, to the extent that Anselm said that Paul could have resisted his call, however efficacious it was. For he says in Math. 6, concerning these words: Your will be done: Although Paul was struck, his will was free to resist, if he wished. For this reason, Chrysostom, in homil. 31. et 56. in Matth., speaking of the calls of Matthew and Paul, says that God did not call him earlier because he foresaw that the call would then penetrate his soul. He holds, therefore, that the efficacy the call could have had from a special congruity with the character or condition of Paul or Matthew was not sufficient; rather, God also had to observe a time at which he foresaw that the call would have its effect if it were given to him.

Third, they prove this because Saint Augustine does not place the efficacy of this call in necessity, but in infallibility and certainty, to indicate that the aforementioned foreknowledge of God is necessary for this same efficacy. For necessity pertains to a cause, whereas certainty and infallibility pertain to foreknowledge, as Capreolus previously noted in 1. dist. 40. quaest. 1. art. 1. ad 1. contra 2. conclusionem. Hence, in Augustine’s de bono persever. cap. 14., he says that this call pertains to those benefits by which all who are freed are freed most certainly. For this reason, too, he never said that the will cannot resist such a call, but only that it will never resist it, as is clear in lib. de praede. SS. cap. 8., because foreknowledge does not take away the power, simply speaking, to do the opposite of what has been foreseen.

IIII. They say that Chrysostom signified this same mode of the efficacy of the call in the cited passages, and that Ambrose—or whoever explains those words under his name—indicated it as well: Those who have been called saints according to purpose, in Rom. 8, saying: Those are called according to purpose whom God foreknew would be believers fit for him, so that before they believed they were known. For the same opinion they also cite Origen, who says in Rom. 9, It is certain that God not only knows each person’s purpose, but also foreknows it. As a good and just steward, knowing and foreknowing beforehand, he uses the motions and purpose of each person to accomplish the things that each person’s mind and will have chosen. Therefore, and so forth.

They confirm the same opinion with all the arguments brought forward in disput. 7., by which they endeavor to persuade us that this middle knowledge must be posited in God: through it, before any free decree of his will, they think God certainly foreknows what our free choice, by its innate freedom, would do on the supposition that God placed it in such circumstances and moved it by one or another arousal.

Fourth, they prove this on the ground that the efficacy of the help of grace cannot be explained in any other suitable way. And this way is entirely sufficient and most apt both to reconcile freedom with grace, and to explain how the efficacy of grace, which achieves its effect, does not exclude the sufficiency of grace that does not achieve its effect, and finally to reconcile the various statements of the Saints concerning divine predefinition, or predestination, regarding a person. They prove the premise: another account of efficacy, consisting in physical predetermination of the will to consent and cooperate with God who arouses and calls, is repugnant to freedom and takes away the sufficiency of grace from those to whom this physically predetermining grace is not given. Nor would God need to observe the time and manner of arousing and calling the person he wished to convert, because this physical predetermination will always and necessarily have its effect if applied. Hence it would also make no difference if a greater call, or arousal, were given so that a person might be converted more fervently, since God can predetermine free choice as he wishes, and everything depends on this predetermination. That this way is entirely sufficient and most apt to reconcile freedom with grace is proved as follows: the causality of the call is moral, for it occurs by way of persuasion and inducement. But moral persuasion and inducement are not repugnant to the freedom of choice, as is self-evident, nor is infallibility that arises from foreknowledge; for, considered as such, it does not arise from a cause or from an antecedent supposition, but from the supposition of the thing itself as future, in the aspect of a true and knowable object. From this it is then readily understood how, without this efficacy of grace, there can be sufficient grace in those who are not converted: this can come about from their will alone, which can fail to consent even if grace in first act has all sufficiency. Scripture speaks in this way: How often I wished to gather your children, and you were unwilling? And many times elsewhere.

V. Fifth. Grace that is efficacious with respect to one person is inefficacious with respect to another; and likewise, the same grace, with respect to the same person, is efficacious if conferred at this time and in these circumstances, and inefficacious if conferred at other times or in other circumstances. Therefore the efficacy of grace does not consist in a motion that physically predetermines free choice to consent. For this predetermining grace infallibly obtains its effect whenever it is conferred and in whatever circumstances. Therefore it consists in a motion congruous and adjusted to the constitution, quality, and disposition of the subject, which God foreknows will have its effect if conferred on that person. The premise is proved as follows: in natural things, because of the differing disposition or resistance of what is moved, exactly the same motion is effective in moving one subject and ineffective in moving another. For if someone with a motive power of four attempts to move a subject with a resistance of eight, he will not move it, because, as Aristotle says, action does not arise from a ratio of lesser inequality. But if he moves a subject with a resistance of two, it will be moved effectively, because the resistance of the thing acted upon is less than the motion of the mover. The same occurs in free actions, even supernatural ones: one subject may have greater resistance than another, namely, because it has a hard temperament, a perverse inclination, or is entangled in more sins. This may also occur with respect to the same subject at different times: at one time it is well disposed toward divine things, has lesser sins, and is incited to evil by no temptations of the devil; at another time it is stubborn, badly disposed or affected toward divine things, bound by more sins, and harassed by some vehement temptation. Therefore the same motion of prevenient grace will be efficacious with respect to one subject and inefficacious with respect to another; and the same must be said of prevenient grace with respect to the same subject at different times, when it happens to be differently disposed.

This argument can be confirmed by all the arguments to be brought forward in disput. 108., by which the authors of the contrary opinion contend that, when the helps of prevenient grace are altogether equal in two people, it can happen that one is converted, perseveres in grace, and is saved, while the other remains in sin and is damned. For if this principle is once admitted, it follows that prevenient grace is not efficacious according to its real and intrinsic power, but through the aforementioned congruity together with foreknowledge, by which God knows that, if free choice is premoved by it, it will infallibly render its consent.

VI. To the contrary. For, as is clear from the foregoing, God, insofar as he is the author of nature, by means of general concurrence and in the manner of a physical cause predetermines all secondary causes, even free ones, to their operations according to the mode of their proper nature. Therefore, insofar as he is the author of grace, through supernatural help he predetermines our free choice, in the manner of a physical cause, to consent to God who arouses and calls.

VII. The efficacy of divine help presupposes moral motion.— The resolution of this difficulty can be gathered from what was said in lib. 3. de concursu Dei generali, and especially from the points noted in disput. 18. 22. 23. and the two following disputations, in which the foundations have been established for the opinion that God, through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, physically predetermines our will so that it freely and infallibly cooperates with God who arouses and calls. For a fuller explanation of this difficulty, however, we must first suppose that, according to everyone’s opinion, the efficacious help of pre-operating grace presupposes a moral motion, or a motion by way of persuasion, which occurs through an appropriate presentation of the object, by which that object appears lovable and suitable to the will. The reason is this: since nothing is willed unless it is first known, the will cannot desire anything unless it is first presented to it through the intellect as suitable. From the object’s being presented in this way as lovable, the will is morally inclined, allured, and, as it were, invited to will it. But because the will, while it is a wayfarer, cannot be moved efficaciously by any object, as Saint Thomas expressly teaches; this moral motion alone, however perfect it may be, cannot infallibly bring about the will’s consent. Therefore the infallibility of the future consent must come from another source, for persuasion does not compel an unwilling person, as Saint Thomas teaches from Saint Augustine in quaest. 3. de malo, art. 3. in corpore.

Efficacious grace is always congruous, so that free choice may act through it.— Secondly, we must suppose that, according to everyone’s opinion, efficacious grace is congruous, by which the will is moved in such a way that it will infallibly render its consent. For since God reaches powerfully from end to end and orders all things sweetly, if he moves the will efficaciously so that it consents, he moves it congruously and in a way that accords with the nature of the will. Hence Saint Thomas says in p. 2. q. 10. art. 4.: it would be more repugnant to divine motion if the will were moved by it necessarily, which does not accord with its nature, than if it were moved freely, as accords with its nature. The difficulty, then, is where this congruity of grace comes from: whether the help itself, which is called efficacious, brings this congruity with it, so that to whomever it is given and in whatever circumstances, it is congruous for moving the will efficaciously; or whether this congruity is extrinsic, or is drawn from circumstances extrinsic to the efficacious help itself, so that it varies according to the different circumstances and qualities of the subject, so that a motion that is congruous with respect to one person would not be congruous with respect to another; and likewise, a motion that is congruous with respect to one person at this time and in these circumstances would not be congruous with respect to that same person at another time and in other circumstances.

VIII. The congruity of efficacious grace is intrinsic to it.— The first conclusion, then, is this. The efficacious help of pre-operating grace, according to its real power and intrinsic perfection, which it has insofar as it comes from God, is congruous for the will to be moved efficaciously through him, in whatever circumstances it is given to the person. Thus the congruity of that help does not depend on the subject’s natural constitution or any other accidents of the subject, nor does it vary with the diversity of those who are aided by efficacious motion. This conclusion is proved as follows. For, as was shown in the preceding disputation and in disput. 73., the help of pre-operating grace does not depend for its efficacy on the free influx and cooperation of created choice with that same help, even as a condition without which it would not be efficacious. Rather, it has its efficacy intrinsically, namely, from the real power and perfection it brings with itself insofar as it comes from God and inasmuch as it is an instrument of the will of God, who, without any middle knowledge being presupposed, efficaciously wills to convert to himself the person whose heart he moves. Therefore, to whomever it is given and in whatever circumstances, it is congruous that, by its power, free choice will infallibly consent and cooperate with God who arouses and calls. This is confirmed. For, as will be clear in disput. 87., after God has aroused a person, he does not wait for that person’s will to want to be cleansed; rather, through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, he actively and properly brings it about that the person wills. We will show this more fully in disput. 95. and the following ones. Therefore, considered in itself and insofar as it comes from God, it is congruous that, if a person’s free choice, placed in whatever circumstances, is premoved through it, that choice will infallibly consent.

IX. The will of God is most efficacious.— This is proved secondly. When an agent of infinite power moves a subject, that subject is moved infallibly, because the resistance of the thing acted upon neither exceeds nor equals the power of the agent. But God is an agent of infinite power; for it is said in Esther 13: O Lord, O Lord, almighty King, for all things are placed under your dominion, and there is no one who can resist your will, if you decree to save Israel. Hence Saint Thomas says in 2. 2. q. 24. art. 11. in corp. that the Holy Spirit infallibly effects whatever he wills, and in 1. 2. q. 113. ar. 3. in corp. he says: If it is from the intention of God who moves that the person whose heart he moves should attain grace, he infallibly attains it, according to the words in Ioan. 6.: Everyone who hears from the Father and has learned comes to me. Saint Augustine also shows this expressly in Enchirid. ad Laur. cap. 95. and in other passages cited by us in disput. 31. and 32. Therefore the efficacious motion of God with respect to any person, placed in whatever circumstances, will be a congruous and suitable means for infallibly bringing about the effect for which it is given by God’s intention, and thus will cause the person to consent freely and act piously; otherwise the effect of the divine will would be prevented by the human will, which we showed above to be impossible. They reply that God does not have an absolute and efficacious decree to convert a person unless middle knowledge is presupposed, by which, before the decree of his will, he certainly knew that if Peter were moved by such help in such circumstances, he would infallibly consent by his innate freedom. But this solution rests on a false foundation. For above, in disput. 7., we showed expressly that this middle knowledge, which they posit before the free decree of his will, does not exist even in God.

Third, it is proved as follows: for it would follow that the ultimate differentiating reason why the help of grace is congruous with respect to this subject, and consequently efficacious, must be traced back to something natural, namely, to the particular constitution of this individual, or to some constellation of the heavens, or to some taking of food or drink. The consequence is false, for it would be to reduce grace to nature. Therefore. The consequence is proved as follows: according to the authors of the contrary opinion, the same help of God given to a person in circumstances in which that person has a cheerful heart or is disposed with such a constitution is congruous with that person, whereas in other circumstances it would not be congruous. But such a constitution or disposition can arise from a constellation of the heavens or from another natural cause. Therefore.

X. This argument is confirmed by the authority of St. Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 5, where he rejects all natural endowments when the subject is the grace of Christ; for he says: Given this most evident intention of the Apostle, by which he speaks against human pride, so that no one may glory in a human being but in the Lord, it is altogether absurd, as I judge, to suppose that God’s natural gifts are meant—whether one means the whole and perfect nature as it was bestowed in the first creation, or whatever remnants of a corrupted nature there may be. He says the same in Question 2 to Simplicianus, in the words cited in Disputation 55, no. 8. Nor is it enough to reply, that in these passages St. Augustine intends only to teach that no merit, reason, or condition is supplied on the part of nature on account of which God might confer on someone a congruous grace, adapted to his constitution or disposition; yet that he does not deny that some condition is supplied on the part of nature—that is, of the person’s constitution or disposition—without which the prevenient grace that God confers on such a subject solely from his own gratuitous generosity would not be adapted or congruous to him, so that, if he were premoved by it, he would infallibly consent; for in the other passages cited above he seems plainly to teach the contrary. For this reply was sufficiently, as I judge, refuted above, when we were treating God’s gratuitous predestination. There it was shown, in accordance with the teaching of St. Augustine, that no reason or condition is supplied on our part without which the plan for ordering means to an end, pre-existing in God, would not have the character of predestination in relation to this or that person. Therefore, likewise, no reason or condition can be supplied on our part without which prevenient grace would not be congruous or efficacious in relation to this or that person; for the same arguments apply to predestination itself and to congruous and efficacious grace, which is its effect.

XI. The efficacy of grace does not depend on the circumstances of the subject, place, time, etc.— Fourth, it is proved. The congruity of the help of prevenient grace, or its efficacy, does not wait for the human will to wish to be cleansed; rather, it makes the will wish this, as will be clear in Disputation 95. Nor does it take account of, or necessarily require, circumstances of time or place, or other dispositions belonging to the subject, as is clear from St. Prosper, On the Ungrateful, ch. 15, where he says:

But when almighty grace saves a human being:

It itself completes its own work, for which the time to act

is always at hand, whatever it wills to be done; no delay

Arises for it from dispositions, nor does any cause hold it in doubt;

Nor does it accomplish by the care and duty of a minister

What it alone can do, nor entrust to servants the task of acting in its place.

By these words he plainly teaches that the grace of God is in itself so congruous and efficacious for accomplishing what God wills to work through it that, whenever it is conferred and under whatever circumstances, it brings about what it is appointed to bring about by God’s efficacious will and intention. No disposition or constitution of free choice either gives or takes away from it the opportunity to act. Therefore, the congruity of this same prevenient grace does not depend—even as on a condition without which it could not be—on this or that constitution or disposition of the subject, or on other circumstances in which it is conferred. Consequently, efficacious grace itself, according to its real power and as it comes from God, brings with it the congruity required for its efficacy.

XII. The efficacy of grace does not depend on foreknowledge of the good use of free choice.— Second conclusion. The efficacy of the help of prevenient grace does not depend—even as on a condition without which it could not be—on middle foreknowledge, that is, on God’s foreseeing by that same middle knowledge the good use of free choice; nor does it presuppose that foreknowledge in God in any way. This conclusion is proved by all the arguments with which, in Disputation 7, we showed that this middle knowledge does not subsist and, consequently, is not in God.

Efficacious grace predetermines free choice to cooperate.— Third conclusion. By the efficacious help of grace, God physically predetermines created free choice, or predetermines it in the manner of a physical cause, so that it freely and infallibly consents and cooperates with God as he rouses and calls. All Thomists defend this conclusion, which I judge to be the explicit teaching of St. Thomas and to have been handed down in equivalent words by St. Augustine and the other Fathers. It is proved by all the arguments with which, in disp. 23, it was shown that God, insofar as he is the author of nature, through general concurrence by means of a prior motion inhering in the cause, predetermines every secondary cause, even a free one, in the manner of a physical cause, to each particular good act, together with all its circumstances, while preserving the properties and nature of those causes. For from this principle it follows all the more strongly that God, insofar as he is the author of grace, through the special concurrence of efficacious, or helping, grace, predetermines created free choice in the same way to supernatural acts, while preserving its properties and freedom.

XIII. It is proved further. The help of helping grace is efficacious in itself, as it comes from God prior to the free cooperation of our free choice, since it does not depend on that cooperation for its efficacy, even as on a condition without which it could not be, as is clear from what was said above: therefore it physically predetermines the will to consent. The inference is proved: for, as some proponents of the opposing view admit, help or predetermination efficacious in itself means the same as physically predetermining help; and there is no need to quibble over the word.

It is proved secondly. The efficacious help of helping grace, insofar as it is efficacious and helping, is not God’s immediate influx together with our free choice into the operation of both, but an immediate influx into free choice itself, as into a cause, as is clear from what was said in disp. 18. about God’s general concurrence. Therefore it physically predetermines free choice to cooperate with God as he rouses and calls. The inference is proved: for this kind of immediate influx of God into free choice as a cause cannot exist, nor even be understood, without physical predetermination. Hence the proponents of the opposing view, who attack this kind of predetermination, consistently teach that the help of helping, or efficacious, grace, insofar as it is helping, is not God’s immediate influx into free choice as a cause, but an influx simultaneous and co-instantaneous with free choice into its effect, as we saw in disput. 82.

XIIII. Thirdly. By the efficacious help of helping grace, God brings it about not only by persuading, inviting, and enticing, or in some other way by drawing us inwardly in a moral manner, that we act; he also truly effects this as an efficient cause, as must be proved in disp. 86. This will become still clearer in disp. 96. 97. et 100., where it will be evident that the influx, or cooperation, of free choice with grace does not arise from its innate freedom alone, but must ultimately be traced back to God himself and his help, as to a prior per se efficient cause. Therefore, he physically predetermines free choice to consent. The inference is proved: for physically to predetermine is nothing other than truly to act as an efficient cause in bringing it about that free choice itself freely and infallibly cooperates with God as he rouses and calls, as is clear from the very meaning of the term.

This is confirmed: whoever causes free choice to determine itself predetermines it to act. For to predetermine is to determine first, in the order of reason, or to cause something to determine itself; but by efficacious help God truly causes free choice physically to determine itself by cooperating and consenting to God as he calls. Therefore, he physically predetermines it.

Fourthly. The efficacious help of helping grace is not subject, as regards its use, to the power of our free choice, as are habits, which we use when we wish; rather, it subjects free choice itself to itself, as will be clear in disp. 87. Therefore, it physically predetermines free choice to consent and cooperate.

Fifthly. Created free choice is not simply the first cause of its own determination, especially in relation to supernatural acts, nor does it begin that determination as the first, as we will show at length in disp. 89. Therefore, it is predetermined by another, prior cause, namely God. This predetermination, in relation to supernatural acts, takes place through efficacious help. Therefore, by efficacious help God physically predetermines free choice to exert influence in supernatural acts.

Sixth. Efficacious helps of prevenient grace, like divine predestination, certainly and infallibly bring about the effect for which they are given, as was shown in disp. 30. et 41. But this certainty and infallibility are not founded on middle knowledge. For, as is clear from what was said in disp. 7., such middle knowledge does not exist in reality, even in God, nor is its object knowable before the decree of the divine will. Therefore, they must necessarily be founded on predetermination, by which God, through his absolute and eternal decree and, in time, through those same helps, predetermines free choice to cooperate with God’s grace. The inference is proved: once certainty and infallibility arising from middle knowledge—or from the future cooperation of free choice, foreknown by God through that same knowledge—are set aside, no other foundation remains on which such certainty can rest except predetermination, by which God, through efficacious help, physically predetermines free choice to cooperate with that same grace, as the proponents of the opposing view admit. For moral predetermination alone does not make free choice consent infallibly, since by its freedom it can dissent from any persuasion, even in the composite sense. Therefore, one must necessarily assert that God, through the efficacious help of grace, physically predetermines free choice to consent to and cooperate with that same grace.

This is confirmed, and the force of this argument is further clarified. To explain it, we must consider that, as Aristotle and the other philosophers teach, arts are of two kinds, some are called demonstrative, while others are conjectural. Demonstrative arts are those which, when their means are applied according to the rules of the art, infallibly attain the intended end, because all that is necessarily required to attain the end lies within the craftsman’s power. This is evident in the art of housebuilding, by which a house fit to protect people from rain is infallibly built, because all the means by which this end is attained lie within the craftsman’s power. The Philosopher calls those arts conjectural which, although they proceed according to the rules of the art, do not infallibly attain the intended end, because they do not have within their power all the means by which the end intended through that art is attained. Medicine provides an example. For although a physician applies to a sick person, according to the rules of medicine, all the remedies suited to curing the illness in order to heal the patient, he does not infallibly attain this end, because he does not have within his power the power of nature, or the patient’s own natural heat, without which the remedies do not cooperate toward the patient’s health. Likewise, the art of oratory is not demonstrative but conjectural: although an orator uses all the means, according to the rules of a perfect orator, to move Peter’s will to love his enemy, he does not infallibly attain this end, because Peter’s will, which is necessary for the orator to prevail and attain this end, is not within the orator’s power, and he cannot effectively change or incline it wherever he wishes. With this established, the argument proceeds as follows. The art of the supreme physician, our Lord Christ, who came to seek and to save what had been lost, is not conjectural but demonstrative, and therefore infallibly attains the end that he intends by an absolute and efficacious will, as is clear from what was said in disput. 30. et 41. But he would not infallibly attain his intended end—namely, the sinner’s conversion and final salvation—unless he had the will of that same sinner within his power and could efficaciously incline and determine it by his grace wherever he wished, because the sinner’s conversion and salvation do not occur without the cooperation of that person’s free will, in accordance with Augustine’s saying: He who made you without you will not save you without you. Therefore, through efficacious grace God physically, or as an efficient cause, predetermines the will to consent and cooperate with helping grace.

What the help of grace that physically predetermines is, how it is distinguished from helps that predetermine only morally, and how our freedom and its actual exercise cohere with that same predetermination, has been explained fully enough in disput. 18. 22. et 23. In those disputations we also adduced many further testimonies from St. Augustine, St. Thomas, the other Fathers, and the Scholastics, who taught our position; for that reason, we deliberately omit them in the present disputation.

XV. The efficacy of divine help is not merely moral but also physical.— Fourth conclusion. The efficacy of the help of pre-operating grace, insofar as it precedes the cooperation of our free choice in the order of causality, is not merely moral efficacy but also physical efficacy, which, in the manner of a physical cause, efficaciously premoves free choice to consent, to act piously, or even to persevere to the end. This conclusion is against the authors of the first opinion; nevertheless, it follows by evident inference from the premises. For efficacy that is merely moral is that which, only by persuading, enticing, inviting, or otherwise drawing inwardly in a moral manner, causes free choice to cooperate with God as he rouses and calls. But the efficacious help of operating grace causes free choice to cooperate not only in those ways; it also truly brings this about through efficient causality, as was shown in disp. 86. Therefore, the efficacy of this same help is not merely moral but also physical, or in the manner of a physical cause.

Secondly. Moral efficacy does not physically predetermine our will to act, but leaves it undetermined and thus indifferent, so that, if it wills, it acts; if it does not will, it does nothing. But the efficacy of the help of prevenient grace—that is, God through efficacious help—physically predetermines our will to act, as was shown in the preceding conclusion and in disp. 23. Therefore, the efficacy of the help of helping grace is not merely moral.

Thirdly, for it would follow that God, through his grace, draws us to the good with no efficacy different from that with which the Devil, through his malice, draws sinners to evil. For the Devil, too, makes people sin by a certain moral efficacy; in this sense Scripture says, that the Dragon—that is, Lucifer—with his tail—that is, by moral persuasion and example—dragged a third part of the stars down to earth. The consequence, although some authors of the opposing view concede it, does not seem admissible. Therefore.

Mere moral efficacy does not infallibly bring about the effect.— Fourthly. As the proponents of the opposing view admit, moral efficacy or determination alone, even if it attains the highest degree of perfection, does not make the will consent infallibly with metaphysical certainty in such a way that, given such efficacy, it would be impossible in the composite sense for the will moved by moral efficacy not to consent or to dissent. But the predetermination and efficacy of the help of pre-operating grace make the will consent to God as he rouses and calls so certainly and infallibly that, even speaking metaphysically, it is impossible in the composite sense for the will not to consent or to dissent, as will become clear in disp. 92 and the two following disputations. The same antecedent is confirmed by the sixth reason given for the preceding conclusion and by the other arguments adduced in disput. 23. nu. 16. 17. et 18.

XVI. To the first argument, the reply is as follows. According to St. Augustine’s meaning, efficacious grace is congruous—not with a congruity that depends on some natural disposition of free choice or on other extrinsic circumstances of place and time, but with the congruity that the efficacious help itself brings with it—as was said in 1. conclus. of this disputation and disp. 7. n. 28., where we explained the authority of St. Augustine cited from quaest. 2. ad Simplicianum. To the other passage, from c. 34, On the Spirit and the Letter, the reply is that St. Augustine does not assert that God acts only through the persuasions of things seen, or only in these ways, so that we may will. For this is expressly contrary to the teaching of the holy Doctor himself in lib. de gratia Christi contra Pelag. et Caelest. cap. 7. et 10., and in many other passages, where, in addition to external and internal persuasions, he requires something else on the part of grace in order that we may believe and act piously. Rather, he teaches that through the persuasions of things seen—or through two persuasions—God moves people to faith, namely, by persuading externally and internally and setting the object before them; this is entirely true. But, in addition to this motion, Augustine himself establishes in the same passage another motion on the part of the power, through which God actively and properly causes us to act and works so that we may act. For in c. 35. seq. he says that a human being does this in no way unless God grants it and works it, and he is speaking of operation properly so called, not merely of moral operation, as is clear from other passages of the same St. Augustine cited above and to be cited below. Secondly, the reply is that St. Augustine sometimes uses the term persuasion or teaching to mean an efficacious motion that predetermines free choice to consent, one that persuades in such a way as to convince and infallibly bring about the effect, as is clear from the same Augustine’s lib. de gratia Christi contra Pelag. et Caelest. c. 13, where he says: If this grace is to be called teaching, let it certainly be called so in this way: God is believed to infuse it more deeply and inwardly, with ineffable sweetness, not only through those who plant and water outwardly, but also through himself, who secretly gives its increase, so that he not only shows the truth but also imparts charity. For in this way God teaches those who are called according to his purpose, at once granting them to know what they should do and to do what they know. From this the reply is clear to the other passages of St. Augustine cited in the same argument from epistola 107. and cap. 8. On the Predestination of the Saints.

Augustine’s view, from which it appears, etc., is explained.— To the other testimony, from cap. 14. On the Gift of Perseverance, the reply is that St. Augustine does not mean that the Tyrians and Sidonians would have believed solely through those outward signs, suited to the natural power of the intellect, if such signs had been performed among them. Rather, he is plainly speaking of what is required on the part of the presentation of the object for faith. The sense is that some people have a natural intellect so disposed that, as far as the object is concerned, they are more affected and moved objectively by these signs or deeds than by others. But in addition to this motion, Augustine himself requires another on the part of the power, so that a person actually believes; this is the efficacious help that predetermines the will to consent. This explanation is gathered from the same context, for he adds: But it did not benefit them, namely, the Tyrians and Sidonians, that they were able to believe, because they had not been predestined by him whose judgments are inscrutable and whose ways are unsearchable; nor had it harmed those, that is, the Jews, that they were unable to believe, if they had been predestined, so that God might enlighten them, blind as they were, and might will to take away the heart of stone from those who were hardened. A little later he says: For those to whom this has been given hear these things and do them; but those to whom it has not been given do not do them, whether they hear them or do not hear them.

XVII. To the second argument, the reply is that, according to the mind of St. Augustine, efficacious grace brings with it a congruity such that it would be contradictory for it ever to fail and for the human heart on which it is conferred not to turn to God. For although, speaking absolutely and in the divided sense, a person’s free choice can dissent from an efficacious call, this is nevertheless impossible in the composite sense, as will become clear in disput. 92. Hence, for an efficacious call to obtain its effect infallibly, neither middle foreknowledge of the future cooperation of free choice nor God’s waiting for or observing a favorable place and time is required or presupposed in God, as is clear from what was said above. For he knows that an efficacious call will certainly and infallibly have its effect, whenever and under whatever circumstances it is conferred on a person, as was said above. Therefore, when Anselm says that Paul’s will could resist an efficacious call if he wished, this is understood absolutely and in the divided sense, but not in the composite sense. And he means resistance in the common sense, according to which “to resist” means the same as “to dissent”; this will be treated in disput. 93. Or one may say that Anselm’s statement is to be understood under the condition of the will. For this conditional is true: St. Paul could resist the efficacious call, if he wished. It is in this sense that St. Thomas, q. 1. de potentia, ar. 6. ad 3., explains that statement of the Philosopher in lib. 4. Topicorum, cap. 5.: God and the virtuous person can do evil things. For he says: The Philosopher’s statement is to be understood under the condition of the will. For this conditional is true: God can do evil things, if he wills. Nothing prevents a conditional from being true even though its antecedent and consequent are impossible, as is clear in this conditional: If a human being flies, he has wings. Thus Paul could resist God’s most efficacious call, if he wished, but grace itself caused him not to resist. As for the passage of Chrysostom, the reply is that it is to be understood of the foreknowledge that follows the decree of the divine will, by which God fulfilled what he had predestined, and not of foreknowledge of the good use of free choice that precedes that same decree, as was said in disp. 7. Hence it does not follow that middle knowledge is necessary for the efficacy of the helps of grace.

XVIII. The necessity on the supposition of the divine decree does not take away the freedom of the act.— To the third argument, the reply is that St. Augustine located the efficacy of the call not only in the infallibility and certainty of its effect but also in the causality of the help, as was shown in disput. 25. 30. et 41. For just as certainty and infallibility derived from foreknowledge do not take away from free choice the free capacity by which, speaking absolutely and in the divided sense, it can refrain from acting, if it wishes, so the necessity on the supposition of the absolute decree of the divine will, or of efficacious help, likewise does not take away that capacity, as was shown above. As for the objection that necessity pertains to the cause, while certainty and infallibility pertain to foreknowledge, the reply is that the certainty of the order of means to an end pertains to the cause, as we said in disp. 41., following St. Thomas, when we were treating the certainty of predestination. The words of Chrysostom, Ambrose, and Origen that are adduced to prove the necessity of middle knowledge have already been explained by us above.

We have answered the confirmation fully in disputation 7.

To the fourth, the antecedent is denied. To the proof, the reply is that the way of explaining the efficacy of grace that we have set out in no way conflicts with freedom or takes away the sufficiency of grace, as was shown above, because, if such efficacy is applied, it will indeed have an effect necessarily, by a conditioned necessity, or necessity on a supposition, but not by absolute necessity. This was shown in disput. 25. On the contrary, the way of explaining the efficacy of grace that is based on middle foreknowledge brings with it many difficulties, some of which we touched on in disputation 7. and which will be explained more fully in disputation 120.

To the fifth, the antecedent is denied. To the proof, the reply is that when the agent has infinite power, as God does when moving through efficacious grace, he overcomes any resistance of the patient, because no creature can resist him or prevent the effect he wills to produce from following, as was said in disp. 31. et 32. This will be discussed further in disput. 93.

A reply to the confirmation will be given in Disputation 108, where the question touched on in that same confirmation will be treated directly.

Disputatio LXXXIV: How many kinds of efficacious help of prevenient grace there are.

How many kinds there are of the efficacious help of prevenient grace.

I. Since the acts to which efficacious help is given are diverse, it is reasonable to raise the question: Should efficacious helps be distinguished according to the diversity of supernatural acts, so that, for example, efficacious help for believing is distinguished in kind from efficacious help by which God is loved, just as acts of believing and loving are distinguished? The same difficulty concerns other acts, both natural and supernatural.

And the first reason for doubting is this. Sufficient help is not distinguished in kind according to the diversity of the acts to which it is given; for the same sufficient help can be the principle of acts that differ in kind, such as desiring, fearing, and so on, which, since they are elicited by different powers, must differ in kind. Therefore, neither is efficacious help.

Secondly. Efficacious helps should not be multiplied without necessity; but no necessity appears for establishing as many efficacious helps as there are supernatural acts. Otherwise there would be almost infinitely many such helps, since supernatural acts are almost innumerable. Therefore.

Thirdly, for otherwise it would follow that several efficacious helps are necessary for believing. This consequence is contrary to the common opinion of theologians. Therefore. The consequence is proved: several acts that differ in kind concur in the act of believing—namely, considering what is to be believed, desiring, willing, believing, asking this of God, and the very act of believing. Willing or believing, on the one hand, and actually believing, on the other, are acts that differ in kind, since they are elicited by different powers. Therefore, if efficacious helps are to be distinguished according to the specific diversity of acts, it follows that several efficacious helps are necessary for a single act of believing.

II. Those authors cited in Disputation 71 who consider the division of help into sufficient help and efficacious help vain and useless hold that, properly speaking, help can be called efficacious only if it is the help by which someone perseveres to the end and is saved. Consequently, they hold that no distinction should be sought among efficacious helps. They prove this by the following arguments, which are set out in order.

Fourth argument. Efficacious grace is that by which someone is certainly and infallibly set free, as is clear from Augustine, who says: Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of God’s benefits, by which all who are set free are set free with the greatest certainty. But those who do not persevere to the end, however much they may live in grace and engage in works of charity during the course of their lives, are not, properly speaking, set free but are damned. Therefore, they truly and properly had no efficacious help, and consequently there will be only one efficacious help: namely, the gift of perseverance.

This is confirmed: efficacious grace is the effect of divine love, by which those who receive this grace are brought to eternal life. For the Apostle says: Those whom he predestined, he also called; and those whom he called, he also justified; and those whom he justified, he also glorified. Therefore, efficacious grace is conferred only on the predestined. Therefore, no help other than the gift of perseverance should properly be called efficacious help.

Fifthly. Augustine often calls an efficacious call a call according to purpose; this expression is taken from the Apostle’s words: For those who love God all things work together for good—for those who are called saints according to his purpose. This is to be understood not as referring to a person’s purpose but to God’s purpose, by which he mercifully wills to save those whom he has called, as the same Augustine explains in other passages. But only the call, or help, by which the predestined are saved is a call according to the purpose of God’s grace. Therefore, only this help should be called efficacious.

Sixth, this can be proved in the same way. For help that is merely sufficient in relation to a further effect, toward which it is principally ordered, although efficacious in relation to another effect, is not called simply efficacious help, but is so called with a qualification and in a qualified sense, as is gathered from what was said in disputation 80. But all help of grace is principally ordered to attaining eternal life, since eternal life is the ultimate end to which means must be principally ordered. Therefore, since only the gift of perseverance is efficacious with respect to attaining eternal life, it follows that no other help can be called simply efficacious help.

On the contrary: habits are distinguished in kind according to the specific diversity of acts, because habits are specified by acts, and acts by their objects. But efficacious helps are likewise specified by the acts to which they are ordered, since they are active principles by which our free choice performs those same acts. Therefore, efficacious helps ought to be distinguished in kind according to the specific diversity of acts.

III. I find little or nothing written on this difficulty by the Scholastic Doctors; therefore it must be resolved solely from theological principles. To make this clear, it should be considered that, since efficacious help is something inhering in a power and prior to its operation, as is clear from what was said above, its distinction may be drawn not only from the object but also from the subject and from other circumstances of place and time. Its distinction in number is taken from the subject, as with other accidents. Hence efficacious help conferred on Peter for believing differs numerically from efficacious help conferred on Paul for the same act, because these helps are in different subjects. Likewise, efficacious help conferred on Peter at one time for loving God differs numerically from efficacious help conferred on the same Peter at another time to elicit an act of love. For just as a difference in time suffices for the numerical diversity of motion, as is said in the books of Physics, so it also suffices for the numerical distinction of efficacious help, since efficacious help is a certain motion flowing along with the act for which it is conferred, as is gathered from what was said in disput. 18. et 19. And in this, as I judge, there is no controversy among theologians. The greater difficulty concerns the specific distinction of efficacious help and consists in this: Are all efficacious helps of the same species or of different species, and from what is this unity or diversity to be drawn? For the explanation of this, let the following be stated:

IIII. Several other efficacious helps are given besides the gift of perseverance.— First conclusion. Not only the gift of perseverance is to be called efficacious help; several other helps too must be called efficacious simply and absolutely, such as the help by which the reprobate are converted to God or obtain justifying grace. This conclusion is most certain, explicit in St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and commonly received by theologians; I prove it. First, the help by which God causes us to act and works so that we may perform any pious act is efficacious help, as was said above and is clear from the words of Ezech. 36., I will cause you to act, and Philipp. 2., For God is the one who works in us both to will and to bring to completion, and Conc. Araus., Whenever we do good, God works in us and with us so that we may act: these testimonies have always been understood by the holy Fathers, especially Augustine, as referring to efficacious help. But by his grace God not only causes the predestined to perform pious acts; he also effects this in the reprobate, who do not have the gift of perseverance. Therefore, besides the gift of perseverance, other helps that are efficacious simply are given.

Secondly. Habitual grace, by which the reprobate are justified and for a time are friends of God, is true grace, speaking absolutely and simply, as is clear from that definition of Conc. Trid. sess. 6., decree on justification, can. 17.: If anyone says that the grace of justification comes only to those predestined to life, while all the rest who are called are indeed called but do not receive grace, as though they had been predestined to evil by divine power, let him be anathema. Therefore, in the same way, the help by which God effects that they perform works of piety is absolutely true efficacious help of grace.

Thirdly, it is proved as follows. As was shown in disp. 71., the division of the help of grace into sufficient help and efficacious help is adequate. But the help by which the reprobate, while in a state of grace, perform works meritorious of eternal life is not merely sufficient help. Therefore, it is truly and properly efficacious help. The minor premise is proved: for, as we said in disput. 79., sufficient help is that which gives only the ability to act piously, whereas efficacious help is that which gives the actual performance of a pious act. But the help by which the reprobate perform works meritorious of eternal life gives not only the ability to act piously but the pious act itself. Therefore, it is not merely sufficient help. It follows, then, that it is truly and properly efficacious help; and consequently, besides the gift of perseverance, which is proper to the predestined, other efficacious helps must be acknowledged. What these helps are, and how they are distinguished from one another, will be clear from the following conclusion.

V. Efficacious helps: from what they derive their specific distinction.— Second conclusion. Efficacious help by which free choice believes is distinct in species from efficacious help by which it loves God above all things or produces other supernatural acts. To make this conclusion clear, we must assume that, since even unformed faith is a gift of God, as St. Thomas teaches in 2. 2. q. 6. ar. 2., and as we have shown in part in disp. 49., efficacious help is necessarily required for faith to come into act. Hence St. Augustine, lib. de praedest. Sanctorum, cap. 16., explaining the words of Rom. 9., It was said to her, not from works but from the one who calls: “The elder shall serve the younger,” says: Did he say, “Not from works, but from the believer”? He took even this entirely away from the human being, so as to give the whole to God. He said, then, “But from the one who calls”—not by just any call, but by that call through which a person becomes a believer. He thus teaches plainly that God gives efficacious help by which he makes a person a believer. With this established, our conclusion can first be proved by the argument made above on the contrary side.

It is proved further. Efficacious help is that by which free choice actually acts, as was said above. Therefore, efficacious help for believing differs in species from efficacious help for loving. The inference is proved: for the active principle by which we perform the act of believing is not of the same species as the active principle by which we produce the act of loving, since active principles are distinguished according to their termini.

Secondly. Motions toward termini that differ in species also differ in species, as Aristotle teaches in 3. physic. But efficacious help is a certain motion, or moving, by which God moves free choice toward termini that differ in species, namely, toward pious acts of different species. Therefore, efficacious helps ought to be distinguished in species according to the distinction among the acts.

Thirdly. According to the opinion of certain theologians, which we discussed in disput. 19., efficacious help is not really distinct from the act produced through it, as one thing is distinct from another; it is distinct only formally. Therefore, help by which we believe is identical in entity with the act of believing, and help by which we love God will be identical in entity with the act of loving. But acts of believing and loving differ in species. Therefore, help by which we believe differs in species from help by which we love God; and the same must be said proportionally of other acts.

VI. And if an argument is made: that which is not directly in a genus or species cannot differ in species from another; but efficacious help is not directly in any genus or species, since it is something incomplete and flowing, like motion, as was shown in disput. 18. et 19. Therefore, one help cannot differ in species from another.

The reply is that efficacious help can differ in species from another help in the way in which it is placed in a genus or species, just as motion toward quality differs in species from motion toward quantity. Although it is not directly in any genus or species, it belongs by reduction to the species of its terminus, just as the incomplete is referred to the species of its complete counterpart: for example, a human embryo is referred to the species of human being, and a horse embryo to the species of horse, as St. Thomas teaches in q. 3. de potentia, art. 9. ad 10.

From these points follows the fifth conclusion, which directly answers the question. The efficacy of the help of prevenient, or pre-operating, grace consists formally in a certain motion received in the intellect and will, by which God truly premoves human free choice as an efficient cause, or in the manner of a physical cause, and causes it freely and infallibly to cooperate with God as he rouses and moves it. St. Augustine often calls this motion a deep and secret call, a call according to purpose—not the purpose of a human being, but that of God, who by his absolute and efficacious will wills to convert to himself the person whose heart he moves, through that person’s pious and free action, without presupposing middle foreknowledge of that future cooperation, even on the hypothesis that the person would be touched and moved by such an excitation. And because, by the aforesaid decree of God who predestines, a certain special power is communicated in an intentional mode to the efficacious motion of prevenient grace—a power that is not in the help of exciting grace or of sufficient grace—St. Augustine teaches that by this motion God gives the will most efficacious strength, and makes the unwilling willing and the resisting consenting, removes the hardness of the heart, softens it, and turns it to himself. Yet this does not take place without our freely consenting and cooperating simultaneously in time, though subsequently in the order of reason and causality. All these points remain sufficiently proved from what was said both in the preceding conclusions and in disput. 18. 22. 23. 73. et 82.; they will become clearer from what is to be said in disput. 86. 90. and the three following disputations. And if someone asks whether this kind of efficacious help of pre-operating grace is a quality, the reply is that it is not a quality but a motion of God endowed with causal power, which gives free choice the final completion of the first act, just as was said in disputation 19. about general concurrence, by which the first cause premoves and determines secondary causes to act.

VII. How many kinds of sufficient help there are.— To the first argument, drawn from points made at the beginning, the reply is that the same should be held about sufficient help as was said about efficacious help. To make this clear, we observe that sufficient helps of prevenient grace are of two kinds. Some first precede us, with no other help preceding them; and since such helps are not formally vital acts but something prior to a vital act, as we showed in disp. 74., they must also be distinguished in species according to the specific diversity of the vital acts they bring about in us. For we have already said in disput. 80. that every sufficient help is efficacious in a qualified sense, namely, in relation to the effect that it actually produces in us. Other sufficient helps do not first precede the will but are themselves preceded by prior helps, and have the character of a subsequent help in relation to one effect and of a prevenient help in relation to another. These helps are formally vital acts, as was said in the aforementioned disp. 74. Hence they must be distinguished in species according to the specific diversity of the formal object, just as, speaking physically, an illumination of the intellect differs in species from a pious affection of the will. But if such imperfect acts are considered morally, their specific unity or difference must be assessed with respect to the perfect act to which they are ordered. For example, illumination of the intellect concerning matters of faith, consideration of what is to be believed, desire to believe, asking, and a pious affection of the will concerning those same objects, along with other such acts, although they differ in species in the order of nature, since they are elicited by different powers, are nevertheless of the same species in the moral order, because they are ordered to the same end, namely, to produce an act of faith. The same must be said proportionally of other similar acts.

To the second argument, the minor premise is denied. To the proof, the reply is that efficacious helps are not infinite but are determined according to species, although they can multiply infinitely in number.

To the third, the inference is denied. To the proof, the reply is that all those imperfect acts that temporally precede the act of faith itself, or free assent, concerning what is to be believed, are included under sufficient help for believing and belong to the same species of help in the moral order, although they differ in species in the order of nature, as was said.

VIII. To the fourth argument, which intends to prove that no efficacious help exists besides the gift of perseverance, the reply is that efficacious grace is that by which someone is certainly and infallibly delivered. However, for grace to be efficacious, it is not necessary that the person to whom it is given be delivered from eternal damnation; it is enough that he be delivered according to present justice, or that through it he be delivered from a sin he would commit if he performed the contrary act.

How efficacious help is an effect of divine love.— To the confirmation, the reply is that efficacious grace is an effect of divine love, whether that love is considered according to eternal predestination or according to present justice, and whether it is simply supernatural or supernatural in a qualified sense. I say this on account of those to whom God gives actual faith or hope while they are in mortal sin. For, speaking absolutely, God does not love them with supernatural love, since they are absolutely his enemies; he loves them only in a qualified sense. That God loves them with some supernatural love is clear from this: by loving creatures, God communicates to them the good they have, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. p. q. 20. ar. 2. in corp. Hence God’s love, from which that good proceeds, must be of a corresponding kind. The gift of faith, however, is a supernatural gift; therefore, the love by which God loves a sinful person who has faith, insofar as that person is faithful, must be supernatural. But, speaking absolutely, God does not love sinners with supernatural love; rather, he simply hates them, in accordance with the saying in Sap. 14.: The ungodly and his ungodliness are hateful to God. It follows, then, that he loves them in a qualified sense, when he communicates some supernatural gift to them.

To the fifth, the reply is that every efficacious call is according to the purpose of God’s grace, by which he absolutely wills to bring a rational creature to eternal life, or to move that creature efficaciously toward some supernatural good.

IX. To the sixth, the reply is that when supernatural acts are imperfect and by their nature are ordered to other acts, as thinking, desiring, and asking are, then help that is called efficacious in relation to these acts should not be called efficacious simply, but efficacious in a qualified sense, as was said in disput. 80. However, when acts are perfect in their own genus, as acts of faith and charity are, then help that is efficacious in relation to these acts should be called efficacious simply and absolutely, even if afterward the person to whom it is given falls into mortal sin and is damned. A second reply is that, as St. Thomas teaches, something can be called such simply in two ways. In one way, “simply” means the same as “absolutely,” as when something is said simply without qualification, as the Philosopher says in 2. topic. In this sense, help by which we believe or love God is called efficacious simply, even if the person to whom it is given does not persevere to the end. In another way, “simply” means in every way, or entirely; and in this sense only the gift of perseverance can be called efficacious simply, because this gift alone makes a person act well in every way and entirely, so that the person does not turn away from the supernatural end.

Disputatio LXXXV: Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, like two people pulling a ship.

Whether God, or efficacious help, and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent, as two men hauling a ship.

I. CERTAIN more recent theologians defend the affirmative side. To explain it, they say that the whole effect is both from God and from secondary causes, yet from neither God nor the secondary causes as a total cause, but as a part of a cause that at the same time requires concurrence and another influx. It is just as when two men haul a ship: the whole motion proceeds from each of the haulers, but not as from the total cause of the motion, since each of them together with the other produces every part, and each individual part, of that same motion. They extend this doctrine to supernatural acts, in producing which they hold that God, by his concurrence, and free choice are two partial causes of those same acts, as two men hauling a ship are, with respect to the ship's motion. This opinion is proved.

First: according to the Catholic faith, defined at the Council of Trent against the Lutherans, not only God, or grace alone, is the efficient cause of supernatural consent, but free choice too is its true efficient cause, and cooperates with God. Therefore God and free choice are partial causes of the same free act, as two men hauling a ship. The consequence is proved: for a partial cause, in relation to some effect, is one that has the partnership of another cause, just as a total cause is said to be one that does not have the partnership of another cause.

Second. God and free choice do not flow into a free act by the same influx; rather, both God and free choice have their own proper and distinct influx, necessary for the same effect. Otherwise free choice would not be the principal secondary cause of supernatural acts, but a mere instrument, because it would have no proper active power, nor its own activity and influx with respect to those acts; instead it would operate only through the influx of the principal agent, as a brush produces an image. The contrary was shown in Disputation 68. Therefore God and free choice, by what they call causal partiality, truly are two partial causes of the same effect.

Third, this is proved by the authority of theologians who expressly teach that God and free choice are two partial causes of the same effect. For Capreolus speaks in this way in 2 Sentences, distinction 28, question 1, article 3, reply to the twelfth argument against the third conclusion, where he says: God not only helps toward the good by partially co-producing it, which is the common mode in which he concurs in the effect of every agent, etc. Gregory of Rimini has the same exact words in the same reply to the twelfth argument. Likewise Gabriel says in 2 Sentences, distinction 1, question 2, article 1: God, producing an effect in a secondary cause, is a partial cause, just as the secondary cause is. And in distinction 37, question 1, article 1, replying to the argument concerning the fourth way: By willing, God causes all things; yet he is not for that reason a total cause, because he wills other causes to concur with him. St. Bonaventure says in 1 Sentences, distinction 40, question 1, article 2: Predestination, insofar as it expresses the character of a cause, does not necessarily posit an effect, because it is not a cause by necessity. And again: It is not the total cause, but acts with another contingent cause, namely, with free choice. Olcoth says in 2 Sentences, question 1, article 3, at the beginning: One must imagine that God and creatures are two partial causes. Lychetus says in 2 Sentences, distinction 37, question 2, under “reply to the solution,” that although the divine will always concurs in every action of ours as a partial cause, it nevertheless wills the secondary cause to cooperate with it. Raphael Venustius, Book 2 On Predestination and Free Choice, where, arguing against Luther, he says: He does not notice that God is a partial and total cause of our work, but a cause whose influx is not total. Finally Thomas Elysius, of the Order of Preachers and Master of Sacred Theology, says in his treatise On the Gifts of the Holy Spirit, page 478: The sufficiency of dispositions comes from God and from us, as from two partial causes making one total cause. Since so many weighty Catholic authors, then, acknowledge that God and free choice—and any secondary cause whatsoever—are partial causes, or concur partially in producing the same effect, it follows that this opinion and manner of speaking is at least very probable.

Fourth. The same point can be supported by all the arguments brought forward above to prove that God, by his influx, does not physically predetermine free choice and the other secondary causes to act, nor bring it about that they cooperate with him. For from this principle it clearly follows that God and free choice are partial causes of the same effect, as two men hauling a ship are, although the likeness does not hold in every respect, but in this respect: God and free choice have their own effort and influx into the free act, as two men hauling a ship do in relation to the ship's motion.

This opinion can also be confirmed by the arguments to be brought forward in Disputation 97, by which they contend that the influx of free choice, by which it freely cooperates with God as he excites and moves it, proceeds by efficient causality from its own innate freedom alone, and is not to be reduced to God or to the efficacious help of grace as to a prior cause that exercises efficient causality in its own right. For if this is once established, it follows that God and free choice are partial causes of free consent, as two men hauling a ship are, in the sense intended by the authors with whom we are disputing.

II. St. Thomas explicitly teaches the contrary opinion, 4. Against the Gentiles, ch. 7, no. 16. and book 3, ch. 70, at the end, which St. Augustine had taught earlier in the passages to be cited below and in others that we shall bring forward in Disputation 100 to prove that the imparting of efficacious help is the adequate and sole efficient cause by which free choice is converted and acts piously. All the Thomists follow this opinion, among them Master Bañez: first part, question 23, article 3, doubt 3, reply to the third argument; and second part of the second part, question 10, article 1, doubt 2, doc. 3; and from the things already said.

Partial causes of a supernatural act: in what sense grace and free choice are called so.— To make this clear, let us separate the points on which the authors of both opinions agree and lay out the point on which they disagree. We must note that two causes can be called partial or be partial, in relation to some effect, in two ways. In the first way, because each of them, in producing the same effect, has the partnership of another cause cooperating and flowing into that same effect. In this sense the authors of both opinions unanimously acknowledge that God and free choice are two partial causes of supernatural consent. They teach the same about the concurrence of God and other secondary causes, even contingent ones, in relation to natural effects, because it is not God alone who produces that effect by efficient causality; the secondary cause too produces that same effect by efficient causality, as St. Thomas shows in 3. Against the Gentiles, ch. 69 and 70., against the position of those who took away from natural things their proper actions. He proves this especially also of the choices of the human will, in chapters 89., 90., and 91. of the same book. In the second way, two causes can be called partial because, although one gives the other a power or active capacity in first act, by which it can produce an effect together with the other, each of them nevertheless applies its own effort of itself in such a way that it flows with the other into the effect, yet does not receive that effort and actual influx from the other as from a proper efficient cause. For example, let us suppose that two horses, one begotten by the other, are moving a cart. Each applies its own effort and influx to that motion, and the influx of one does not depend on the other as on an efficient cause, although it depends on it as on a cause that confers the power or capacity to move. In this sense, then, the authors of the first opinion assert that God, through the help of grace, and free choice are partial causes flowing jointly into a supernatural act. For although God grants free choice its existence as a power of willing, and sufficient help or a habit by which it can proximately exercise influx into a supernatural act, they nevertheless say that the actual influx and effort by which free choice—moved by exciting grace or aided by a supernatural habit—elicits supernatural acts must be attributed to free choice as an efficient cause exercising influx in accordance with its innate freedom, so that this actual influx and effort do not depend on God or on efficacious help as on a prior cause that exercises efficient causality in its own right, but only as on a cause that allures, invites, persuades, or otherwise draws it inwardly in a moral way. Otherwise, they think, the freedom of our choice cannot be preserved unharmed. Against this opinion, let the following be stated.

III. God and free choice are not properly partial causes of a supernatural operation.— First conclusion. God, or his efficacious grace, and free choice are not partial causes of the acts of believing, hoping, and loving, and of other supernatural acts, as two men hauling a ship are; rather, each is a total cause in its own order. One of them, namely free choice, in its influx and cooperation, is subordinated to the other, namely God, as to a prior cause—not only as to one who persuades or moves it inwardly in a moral way, but also as to a cause that truly brings it about by efficient causality that free choice itself concurs and cooperates with him. The following testimonies show that this conclusion is the express teaching of the holy Fathers, especially St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and of the other doctors who defend their opinion.

First of all, St. Augustine, explaining the passage in Romans 9, It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, and attacking a certain explanation of those who asserted that it was said, “not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy,” for this reason: that the result comes partially from both, that is, from the man's will and God's mercy—draws from this explanation the conclusion that, conversely, one could also rightly say, “It is not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills,” because God's mercy alone does not bring that about. Hence the holy Doctor concludes as follows: Now, if no Christian would dare to say, “It is not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills,” lest he plainly contradict the Apostle, it remains that the words, “It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy,” must be understood to have been rightly said so that the whole may be given to God, who both prepares man's good will to be helped and helps it once prepared. And in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 2, attacking those who assert that God and free choice are partial causes of the supernatural act of faith, he says: Although unwilling to oppose such clear testimonies, yet wishing that his believing came to him from himself, a man might, as it were, make a bargain with God, claiming one part of faith for himself and leaving a part to God; and, what is more arrogant, he takes the first part for himself and gives God the later one; and in saying that it belongs to both, he makes himself first and God second. The most blessed Cyprian, that pious and humble teacher, did not think in this way; I mean the one who said that one should glory in nothing, since nothing is ours. To show this, he called the Apostle as witness, saying: “What do you have that you did not receive?” And in chapter 7 of the same book he says: Whatever good, therefore, Cornelius did before he believed in Christ, as he believed, and after he had believed, must all be given to God, lest anyone be exalted. And in chapter 16 he says: The Apostle says: “Not from works, but from him who calls,” it was said to him, “The elder shall serve the younger.” Did he say, “not from works, but from him who believes”? He utterly took this away from man too, in order to give the whole to God. He therefore said, “But from him who calls”—not by just any calling, but by that calling through which one becomes a believer. And in On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 6, he concludes as follows: We therefore live more securely if we give the whole to God, and do not entrust ourselves partly to him and partly to ourselves. And in chapter 13 of the same book: We therefore will, but God works in us also the willing; we therefore act, but God works in us also the very acting for a good will. It benefits us to believe and to say this. This is pious; this is true: that the confession be humble and submissive, and that the whole be given to God. By these words St. Augustine proves that the whole must be attributed to God because, although man wills and acts freely, God nevertheless by his grace brings it about that man wills and acts. Hence, in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 2, the same Augustine says: He himself, then, made the faith of the nations, since he is able to do what he promised. But if God works our faith, acting in a wonderful way in our hearts so that we believe, is there any fear that he cannot do the whole? And so man claims for himself the first parts of it, in order to merit receiving the last parts from him. See whether anything else is being done in this way than that God's grace is given according to our merits, in whatever manner, and thus grace is not grace.

St. Chrysostom teaches the same doctrine. St. Augustine records that Julian the Pelagian himself honorably recalled him, praised him as holy and learned, and said that Chrysostom had received testimony and glory from fellowship with the truth. For, explaining those words in the second epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 3, Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as if from ourselves, he says: As if Paul were saying more plainly: When I said, “We have confidence,” I did not mean that it is partly ours and partly God's, but I attribute the whole to him and acknowledge it as received from him. And in homily 4 on the second epistle to the Thessalonians, chapter 2, I, he says, certainly said this: the whole, however, is God's. And in homily 15 on the Acts of the Apostles, Let this alone be our concern, he says, how we may conquer the devil; indeed, it is not our work, but the whole is of divine grace. In the same way St. Jerome speaks against the Pelagians, on chapter 18 of Jeremiah. Explaining the words Behold, as clay in the hand of the potter, after teaching that grace and free choice are preserved in pious actions, he adds: Nor will what comes to pass therefore belong wholly to man, but to the grace of him who has bestowed all things. For freedom of choice must be preserved in such a way that the grace of the giver excels in all things, in accordance with the prophetic saying: “Unless the Lord builds the house, those who build it have labored in vain. Unless the Lord guards the city, the one who guards it will keep watch in vain.” For it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy. St. Basil too, in homily 22 on humility, says: Nothing has been left to you, O man, about which you can boast. And St. Ambrose says in book 2 of On Abraham, chapter 7, it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, so that you might not justify yourself, but might attribute all things to God, who called you—namely, by an efficacious call, through which he brings it about that we act. Paul Orosius agrees at the end of his Apology for the Freedom of Choice, which he wrote against Pelagius while the latter was still alive. Explaining the words in John 15, I am the vine, you are the branches, he says: Whatever the branch has, it has, of course, from the vine. For the Apostle says: “You do not carry the root, but the root carries you.” Why, then, does it boast of the fruits seen in it, when everything belongs to the vine—not only that it may be able, but also that it may exist? Otherwise it will be cut off and thrown into the fire. For it is not the branch but the vine that can; and what the vine can do, the branch shows. So it is enough for each one to have. But let him humbly acknowledge where and from whom he has it, and wait patiently, lest, while he does not have it and believes that he has it, the very thing he has be taken away from him. St. Cyprian says in his sermon on fasting and temptation, We owe everything to God: that we live, that we move, that we are. And St. Anselm says in his book On the Concord of Predestination and Free Choice, shortly after the beginning: The whole, he says, must be ascribed to grace, because one’s willing does not come from the one who wills, nor one’s running from the one who runs, but from God who shows mercy. And on chapter 2 of the epistle to the Ephesians, on the words By grace you have been saved through faith, and this is not from yourselves, etc., he says: Faith itself, or your calling, is God's gift, and not partly, but purely God's gift; because it is not from your works—that is, there is no mingling of works there—so that no one may boast. By these words he clearly teaches that God and free choice are not partial causes of the act of faith and of other supernatural acts, as two men hauling a ship are. This is shown by the words not partly, but purely, and there is no mingling of works: they signify that the influx, or cooperation, of free choice must ultimately be referred back to God himself as to an efficient cause, so that faith may be God's gift not partly, but purely. He therefore holds that God and free choice are not partial causes of a pious operation, as two men hauling a ship are. Gregory Nazianzen, Cyprian, and Bernard teach the same; we cited their testimonies in Disputation 62, number 6. Moreover, St. John of Damascus holds the same in his History of the Illustrious Men Balaam and Josaphat, saying: The one who had more virtue ascribed the whole to the grace of God.

Finally, St. Thomas embraces the same doctrine in 1. 2. q. 111. art. 2. ad 2: for he says, God does not justify us without us, because, through the motion of free choice, while we are being justified, we consent to God's justice. Yet that motion is not the cause of grace, but its effect; hence the whole operation belongs to grace. He teaches the same point more clearly at the end of 3. Against the Gentiles, ch. 70, in these words: The same effect is not attributed to a natural cause and to divine power as though it were made partly by God and partly by a natural agent; rather, it is wholly from each, in different ways, just as the same effect is attributed wholly to an instrument and wholly also to the principal agent. But the principal agent and the instrument are not two partial causes of the effect, since the instrument is subordinated in its influx to the principal agent. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, God, or efficacious grace, and free choice are not partial causes of supernatural consent, as two men hauling a ship are.

IIII. This opinion can be confirmed by those words of James: Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights. Since, then, the cooperation of free choice, consenting to God who calls, is something excellent and perfect, it follows that it must be attributed to God. Consequently, God is not a partial cause, but a total one, to whom the cooperation of free choice must be referred as to a prior efficient cause. For this reason the Catholic Church says in a certain prayer: God, to whom belongs everything that is best, etc. These words signify that God is not a partial cause, but in his own order is the total cause of every supernatural act of our free choice, or of any other effect produced, even through the intervention of a secondary cause.

They answer all these arguments by saying that God is indeed a total cause in the totality of the effect, since the whole effect is produced by God, just as it is also produced whole by the secondary cause; yet he is not a total cause in the totality of the cause, because it is not God alone who produces the free act in us by efficient causality: free choice also cooperates at the same time, and flows jointly with him into the pious operation itself. It is as when two men haul a ship: each produces the whole effect, and no part of the ship's motion can be assigned as produced by one and not the other. Yet neither is the total cause of the ship's motion, but each is a partial cause, because neither produces that motion unless aided by the other, who at the same time flows into it and produces that same motion.

V. There is, however, a forceful argument against this solution. For, as St. Thomas teaches in book 4 of Against the Gentiles, when many agents partially haul a ship, since the power of each is imperfect and insufficient for this effect, one power belonging to all is gathered from their various powers, and this suffices to haul the ship. But God's power is not imperfect; it is infinite, as St. Thomas himself shows in 1. Against the Gentiles, ch. 43. Therefore God and free choice are not partial causes of a supernatural act, as two men hauling a ship are. Otherwise God's power would be insufficient and imperfect, and would need the power of another to produce some effect.

Second, it is proved by refuting the chief foundation of the opposing opinion. For if, for some reason, God and free choice were partial causes of the supernatural action of believing, hoping, and loving, etc., this would be so especially because not God alone, but man's free choice too, produces such acts at the same time. But this reason is groundless. For it would follow from it that the Father and the Son partially produce the Holy Spirit, as two men hauling a ship do. Indeed, it is not the Father alone who produces the Holy Spirit, nor the Son alone; rather, the Father and the Son produce him together. But the consequence is inadmissible, as St. Thomas shows in the passage from 4. Against the Gentiles cited above. Therefore, even if God and free choice produce a supernatural act together, it does not follow that they are partial causes of that same act, as two men hauling a ship are.

Third, it is proved as follows. As shown above, the very cooperation and influx of free choice into a pious operation proceed by efficient causality from God, or from the help of efficacious grace. For this reason, as we shall say below, God, or the imparting of efficacious help, is the adequate cause that brings it about that a person is converted or acts piously. Therefore God and free choice are not partial causes of the same operation, as two men hauling a ship are. The consequence is proved: in partial causes of this kind, each has an influx and effort so proper to itself that neither receives it from the other as from a proper efficient cause, as was said above.

Fourth, this is proved by all the arguments in which it will become clear in Disputations 96 and 97 that, when free choice consents to God as he excites and moves it, it does nothing from itself that it has not received from God as a prior cause that exercises efficient causality in its own right. Consequently, its cooperation with grace does not proceed from its own innate freedom alone. From this it is clearly concluded that God and free choice are not partial causes of supernatural consent, as two men hauling a ship are partial causes of the ship's motion. This argument can also be confirmed: the acts of believing, hoping, and loving God as the author of grace are supernatural in their substance and in all their being, as was shown in Disputation 65. Therefore the will, considered in itself and in its natural power, since it is a power of a lower order, cannot have any power connatural to it by which it could produce such acts even as a partial cause. Otherwise, from itself and by its own nature it would have a connection and proportion connatural to it with the order of grace; consequently the order of grace would not be above the entire order of nature, which cannot be admitted.

VI. The same is proved by the arguments in Disputations 18 and 23, which showed that God's general concurrence, in both the natural and supernatural orders, is God's immediate influx into secondary causes, including free causes, and premoves them by efficient causality toward their own operations, each according to the mode of its nature. But this does not belong to partial causes, or to causes that concur partially in producing the same effect, as is clear from what was said above.

VII. In reply to the first argument, it is said that although it is not grace alone that produces man's supernatural operation, but free choice too concurs in it by efficient causality at the same time, cooperating with God's grace, nevertheless God alone, and grace alone, brings it about that free choice cooperates, as was shown above. Therefore it is not a partial cause, but a total cause in its own order of every supernatural act. For, to be a partial cause in the sense of causal partiality, as they say, it is not enough to have the partnership of another cause simultaneously exercising causal influx into the effect. Beyond this, it is required that each cause, taken by itself and separately, be imperfect and have imperfect power in cooperating toward the same effect, as was said. It is further required that the influx and effort of one cause not proceed by efficient causality from the other, which is not the case here.

How the influx of free choice is proper to it.— In reply to the second argument, it is said that human free choice does indeed have its own influx into a supernatural act, an influx that proceeds from an intrinsic principle elevated by grace; but it receives this same actual influx from God, as from a truly efficient cause, as was shown. For Jerome says: Willing and running are mine; but that very thing that is mine will not be mine without God's continual help. Hence, although through its own form free choice produces supernatural acts—not as a mere instrument, but as a principal cause, in keeping with what was said in Disputation 68—nevertheless God and free choice are each a total cause in their own order of those same acts, not a partial cause in the sense of causal partiality, as was said. For confirmation of this solution, see what was said in Disputation 62, number 8.

In reply to the third argument, it is said that Catholic doctors who teach that God is a partial cause of the effects he produces through secondary causes should be understood as using “partial cause” in its general sense: a cause that has the partnership of another cause concurring by efficient causality in producing the same effect, as can be gathered clearly enough from the words quoted from them. If perhaps one or another spoke less properly in this respect, asserting that God and free choice are two partial causes making one total cause, we should not for that reason depart from the opinion and manner of speaking of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and the other Fathers. As was shown above, they affirm that God is not a partial cause but a total cause, on whom not only our very willing, but also the cooperation and influx of our free choice, depend as on a prior efficient cause. This was shown above and will be made clearer in the following disputation.

As for the matters touched on in the fourth argument, they have already been amply answered in Disputations 22, 23, and 24. The answer to the confirmation will be clear in Disputation 97.

Disputatio LXXXVI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, truly makes us act as an efficient cause, or only by persuading, inviting and drawing us, or otherwise attracting us morally even inwardly.

Whether God, through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, truly brings it about by efficient causality that we act; or only by persuading, inviting, and alluring, or otherwise also drawing us inwardly in a moral way.

I. Since not only St. Augustine but also the sacred Scriptures and the Councils expressly teach that God makes us act and works so that we may work—as the passages to be cited below prove more clearly than light—there is no Catholic who denies in words that God, through the help of grace, makes us act and works so that we may cooperate. There is, however, disagreement among theologians about the way in which God does this.

For some, although they acknowledge that God, through the efficacious help of grace, truly effects a supernatural act by efficient causality and physically, together with free choice, nevertheless deny that God himself, through the efficacious help of prevenient grace, truly and by efficient causality brings it about that our free choice exercises causal influx and cooperates with God as he calls and moves it. Hence they explain all the passages of Scripture, the Councils, and the holy Fathers that assert that God, through his prevenient grace, makes us act—inasmuch as this is attributed in some way to God alone and to prevenient grace—as referring only to a moral or metaphorical causality. This occurs only by persuading, alluring, inviting, and inwardly presenting an object suitably and opportunely, in the way God foreknows that the created will will give its consent. Their chief foundation is this: for otherwise they think the freedom of our choice cannot be preserved unharmed. For if, before the created will elicits its act or cooperates with God as he moves it, God must first, in the order of reason and causality, bring it about that the will itself wills, then it will not be within that same will's power to will or refuse at its pleasure. It will be only in God's power, since he brings it about that we will or refuse whenever it pleases him. Thus freedom will be in God alone, not in the created will.

Moreover, this opinion can be proved as follows. God makes us act by working in us, without us, the beginning of a good will, which is not perfected without us. For Augustine says in book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 17: He works without us when beginning, he who cooperates with those who will when perfecting. But God does not work in us, without us, the beginning of a good will except by morally persuading, alluring, and inviting. For he cannot physically effect the beginning of an act of the will without us, because, being a vital act, it cannot be produced by God alone without the concurrence and cooperation of the created will. Therefore God makes us act only morally, not truly by efficient causality or physically.

This is confirmed. For the physical beginning of an act of good will is free to man; otherwise the whole act would not be free for man. Since an act of the will is instantaneous, if its beginning were not free with respect to man, the whole act would not be free for that same man, but would be free for God alone. But it is impossible for a free act, or any physical beginning of it, to be produced without the free consent and cooperation of our will. Therefore it is impossible for God, through operating or prevenient grace, insofar as it is prevenient, to make us act physically or truly by efficient causality. Therefore he effects this only morally.

Second. The whole causality of prevenient grace, through which God makes us act, is reduced to the motion exerted by the end. For through this grace God makes the object proposed for love appear more honorable and more worthy of love, the object to be feared more dreadful, and the object to be hated more shameful, and so on. But the causality of the end is only moral, not truly and properly efficient. Otherwise the efficient and final causes would be confused and coincide. Therefore God, through prevenient grace, makes us act only morally, not truly by efficient causality.

This is confirmed: for through prevenient grace, by which God makes us act, God moves a man, insofar as he is a man, to act and consequently moves him to act freely, in accordance with the mode of his nature. But man, insofar as he is man, is moved to act by an end conceived beforehand, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2. q. 1. art. 1. Hence human actions take their species from the end, as he shows in the same question, article 3. Therefore through prevenient grace God makes us act only morally.

II. Third. To work so that we will, or to bring it about that we will, is nothing other than to work something in us by which we are disposed or inclined to will, and to do so with the purpose and intention that we will. But all this belongs to the order of moral causality and does not intrinsically include true efficient causality with respect to the act of willing. Therefore, from the fact that, according to Sacred Scripture, the Councils, and the Fathers, God works in us so that we will and makes us act, it does not follow that he truly brings it about by efficient causality that we will. Rather, all those expressions, insofar as they are attributed to God alone, can and must be understood as referring to moral or metaphorical causality. The minor premise is proved: one who excites and premoves a person inwardly to love does something by which he disposes and inclines the will to love. For he works an illumination of the intellect and an inspiration through which the will is prepared and moved to love. For the devil too prepares the will and moves it by persuasion to sin, by proposing to it the attractiveness of the object. Likewise, one person can by persuasion prepare and incline another person's will to do something; yet the devil does not truly bring it about by efficient causality that a person sins, but does so only morally, just as one person makes another will only morally. Therefore.

This is confirmed. It is one thing to produce willing in us, and another to bring it about that we will. For one who asks or commands another to will brings it about that the other wills, but does not work in that person the act of willing. Therefore, similarly, through prevenient grace, insofar as it is prevenient, God, by persuading, brings it about that we will, without, through that same grace insofar as it precedes the free cooperation of our choice, effecting the very act of willing in us.

Fourth. There is no action upon an action; otherwise another action would be necessary for that prior action, and another for that one, and so there would be an infinite regress among actions and efficient causes. Therefore, before the action and cooperation of free choice, no divine action is understood as prior, by which God physically, or truly by efficient causality, brings it about that free choice cooperates. Consequently, through the efficacious help of prevenient grace, he makes us act only morally.

Fifth. The same can be proved by all the preceding arguments, by which the authors of this opinion try to persuade us that God, by his efficacious help, does not predetermine free choice to act, but that the actual determination of that same choice proceeds from its own innate freedom alone. For from this principle, if it were true, it clearly follows that God, through the efficacious help of prevenient grace, makes us act only morally, not physically or truly by efficient causality.

III. God, through the efficacious help of pre-operating grace, makes us cooperate both morally and by efficient causality.— Nevertheless, despite these arguments, it must be held with absolute certainty that God, through the efficacious help of prevenient grace, makes us act and works so that we may work, not only by persuading, alluring, inviting, or otherwise also drawing us inwardly in a moral way, but also by truly bringing it about through efficient causality, and doing so efficaciously, that free choice itself, moved and roused by God, freely determines itself to act well and does so. This is the express opinion of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, as is clear from the passages cited above and from those to be cited below.

This is proved, first, by the clearest testimonies of Sacred Scripture. Among them, the foremost is Ezekiel 36: I will give you a new heart, and I will place a new spirit within you; I will take the stony heart from your flesh and give you a heart of flesh, and I will place my spirit within you; and I will bring it about that you walk in my precepts, keep my judgments, and act. St. Augustine often pressed this testimony against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, concluding against them that God makes us act and works so that we may work, and does so not only by persuading, alluring, inviting, or otherwise also drawing us inwardly in a moral way, but also by truly bringing it about through efficient causality, and efficaciously, that our free choice cooperates. But especially in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 11, For this reason, he says, these things are both commanded to us and shown to be gifts of God, so that it may be understood that we do them too, and God brings it about that we do them; just as he says most clearly through the prophet Ezekiel. For what could be clearer than where he says, “I will bring it about that you do them”? Attend, dearest brothers, to the very passage of Scripture, and you will see that God promises that he himself will bring it about that they do what he commands to be done. And in On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 16: It is certain that we keep the commandments if we will; but because the will is prepared by the Lord, we must ask him that we will as much as suffices for us to act by willing. It is certain that we will when we will, but he brings it about that we will the good—he of whom it was said, as I quoted a little earlier, that the will is prepared by the Lord, and of whom it was said: “The steps of a man will be directed by the Lord, and the man shall will the Lord’s way.” Of him it was said: “It is God who works in you both to will and to act.” It is certain that we act when we act; but he brings it about that we act, by supplying the will with the most efficacious powers—he who said: “I will bring it about that you walk in my statutes, observe my judgments, and act.” When he says, “I will bring it about that you act,” what else does he say but, “I will take from you the stony heart, by which you did not act, and give you a heart of flesh, by which you may act”? And what is this but, “I will take away the hard heart, by which you did not act, and give you an obedient heart, by which you may act”? He brings it about that we act, to whom a man says: “Set a guard, Lord, over my mouth”; for this is to say, “Bring it about that I set a guard over my mouth”—a benefit already obtained from God by the one who said: “I set a guard over my mouth.” St. Prosper in Against the Collator and St. Fulgentius explain the same passage from Ezekiel in the same sense, the latter concluding from the prophet's words as follows: God therefore gives a new heart so that we may walk in his statutes, which pertains to the beginning of a good will. He also grants that we observe his judgments and act, which pertains to the effect of a good operation. From this we know that it belongs to God that we will to do good, and that we be able to do good. A little further below, explaining the words In God we shall do valiantly, he adds: But what we do in God is what, through God’s acting in us, we are given to do. This is shown clearly in the epistle to the Hebrews: after it had been said of God, “May he equip you in every good thing to do his will,” there immediately follows, “Doing in you what is pleasing before him through Jesus Christ.” Therefore every work that is done in God, God does in us. For all things are from him, and through him, and in him. Therefore both the good will and the good operation are from him. The Doctor of the Gentiles affirms this in these words: “For it is God who works in you both to will and to bring to completion, for a good will.” St. Thomas taught the same opinion in the passages cited above; especially in 3. Against the Gentiles, ch. 88, where, from the passage quoted from Philippians 2, It is God who works in you both to will and to bring to completion, for a good will, and Proverbs 21, The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; he will turn it wherever he wills, he proves that God alone can move the will by way of an agent—that is, truly by efficient causality, as distinguished from merely moral motion. This is gathered from the fifth argument, where, explaining what it is to be moved by way of an agent, he says: I mean being moved by an extrinsic principle that moves by way of an agent and not by way of an end. And in ch. 89, recounting and refuting the interpretation of those who wrongly interpreted the cited passages of Scripture, he says: But some, not understanding how God can cause the movement of the will in us without prejudice to the freedom of the will, tried to explain these authorities wrongly, saying that God causes willing and bringing to completion in us insofar as he gives us the power to will, but not in such a way that he makes us will this or that—just as Origen explains it in the third book of On First Principles, defending free choice against the authorities just mentioned. From this there seems to have arisen the opinion of certain people who said that providence does not concern those things subject to free choice, namely choices, but that providence relates to external outcomes. For one who chooses to attain or accomplish something, such as building or becoming wealthy, will not always be able to reach it. Thus the outcomes of our actions are not subject to free choice, but are arranged by providence. These authorities of Sacred Scripture plainly resist that view. For it is said in Isaiah 26: “You, Lord, have wrought all our works in us.” Hence we have from God not only the power to will, but also the operation. Moreover, what Solomon himself says, “He will incline it wherever he wills,” shows that divine causality extends not only to the power of the will, but also to its act. Again, God not only gives things their power, but no thing can act by its own power unless it acts by his power, as was shown above. Therefore a person cannot use the power of the will given to him except insofar as he acts by God's power. But that by whose power an agent acts is the cause not only of the power, but also of the act. This is clear in the case of a craftsman, by whose power an instrument acts—even an instrument that does not receive its own form from that craftsman, but is merely applied by him to its act. Therefore God is the cause for us not only of the will, but also of willing. In this testimony, let the Reader consider those words of St. Thomas, but not in such a way that he makes us will this or that. With these words he refutes those who assert that God does not make us will this or that, because they did not understand how he could do this without prejudice to freedom. He therefore holds that God truly brings it about by efficient causality that we will this particular thing or that. For if this were understood only as moral or metaphorical causality, there could be no reason, not even the slightest, to move Origen and others to think that our freedom of choice was prejudiced by such divine causality. St. Thomas is therefore speaking of true efficient causality, commonly called physical causality, by which God effects not only the act of willing together with the willing person, but also brings it about that the person wills. This is indicated by those words of St. Thomas: Therefore God is the cause for us not only of the will, but also of willing.

Second, this is proved from the Council of Orange, canon 9, where it says: Whenever we do good, God works in us and with us so that we may act. By these words it teaches clearly enough that God not only works with us through efficient causality in doing good works, but also works in us by bringing it about that we cooperate with God. For if God worked with us in doing good works only by a simultaneous influx, but did not bring it about that we cooperate, it would have said only: Whenever we do good, God works with us. It would not have been necessary to add the words, he works so that we may act. And canon 20 adds: Many good things are done in a person that the person does not do; but a person does no good things unless God grants that the person does them.

IIII. The authors of the opposing opinion answer all these arguments in two ways. Their first answer is that God makes us act and works so that we may work, not physically, or truly by efficient causality, by predetermining the will to act well, but by inwardly persuading and alluring that same will, and drawing it morally in the way in which he foreknows that the will will consent. In this sense, they say, the passages of Scripture, the Councils, and the holy Fathers cited above are to be understood.

This answer, however, does not seem to satisfy the cited testimonies. First, they teach without qualification that God works so that we may work. But to work only by morally persuading is not properly to work, but only to work metaphorically, as St. Thomas teaches in question 3, On Evil, article 3, in the body. Second, St. Augustine speaks expressly of physical efficient causality, as distinguished from causality that is only moral, as is clear from On Rebuke and Grace, chapters 11 and 12, whose words we cited in Disputation 71, number 7. For he assigns a difference between the grace given to Adam and the grace given to us through Christ. The grace of the first state only made it so that a person would have justice if he willed, and would do good and persevere in it if he willed. But the grace of Christ is more powerful, for through it God brings it about that a person wills. And to exclude the false interpretation of mere moral causality set out above, St. Augustine used the verb “to effect,” which signifies true efficient causality. Third, as was shown above, the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians admitted an interior prevenient grace consisting in an illumination of the intellect, persuasion, and an excitation of the sluggish will, through which God makes us will only morally or metaphorically; but they denied the grace that truly brings this about by efficient causality, as is clear from what was said in Disputations 1 and 2. Therefore, when St. Augustine and the Councils teach against the Pelagians that God, through efficacious grace, makes us act and works so that we may work, they speak of physical efficient causality, not of causality that is only moral or metaphorical.

V. Their second answer is that Augustine and the Councils also speak of physical efficient causality. For when God grants efficacious help, he infuses something physical and truly causes it by efficient causality in the intellect and will themselves, namely an interior illumination, which is something real and physical, and an excitation and pious affection of the will, which likewise is something real and physical, received in that same will. And if our will, through the freedom innate to it, wills to determine itself to perform a pious act toward which it is moved by exciting grace, God too, through that same grace by a simultaneous concurrence, truly produces the pious operation with us by efficient causality. In this sense they acknowledge that God physically, or truly by efficient causality, makes us act and works so that we may work.

This explanation, however, is easily refuted. For the Councils and Fathers do not merely intend to establish against Pelagius and the Semi-Pelagians that God works something physical through efficient causality in our intellect and will when he makes us act; as was said, the Pelagians did not deny this. Nor do they intend merely to teach that God simultaneously cooperates physically with our will in producing a pious act if our will itself wills to determine itself to act; for the Pelagians did not deny this either, as was said above. Therefore they intended to define something more: namely, that by his grace God truly brings it about by efficient causality that the will itself freely determines itself and cooperates with God as he calls it, so that the cooperation and determination, or influx, of the created will is an effect of the divine operation in the order of true efficient causality. For by his grace God brings it about that we cooperate, freely assenting to that same grace. It should also be added that, although God causes something in the intellect and will as an efficient cause when he rouses free choice to act—namely, interior illuminations and excitations—nevertheless, through these he makes the will determine itself only by moral persuasion, not by true efficient causality. Similarly, one person, when he persuades another that something is good, produces something by true efficient and physical causality, for the persuasion is something real whose efficient cause is the one persuading. But through it he brings it about only morally that the other consents; he does not make him willing from unwilling, or consenting from resisting. God, however, brings this about in us through prevenient grace, as Augustine often teaches.

VI. What they add in the same answer about God's simultaneous influx or concurrence does not satisfy the argument either. Through it God works with us if we will; yet he does not bring it about that we will. But in the passages cited, St. Augustine contends that God not only cooperates with us when we will, but also works in us so that we will. Hence, in book On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 17, he says: It was said of him who works so that we may will: “For it is God who works in you both to will.” Of him who cooperates when we already will and act by willing, it was said: “We know”, he says, “that all things work together for good for those who love God.” And in Question 2 to Simplicianus he says: For it is God who works in you both to will and to act for a good will. Here he shows clearly enough that the good will itself is also brought about in us by God working. For if the statement, “It is not of the one who wills, nor of the one who runs, but of God who shows mercy,” was made only because man's will alone does not suffice for us to live justly and rightly unless we are helped by God's mercy, “It is therefore not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills” could also be said in this way, because God's mercy alone does not suffice unless the consent of our will is added. But this is clear: we will in vain unless God shows mercy. Yet I do not know how it can be said that God shows mercy in vain unless we will. For if God shows mercy, we also will; for it pertains to that same mercy of God that we will. For it is God who works in us both to will and to act for a good will. Therefore, according to Augustine, our very acting is an effect of the divine operation in the same kind of causality, and just as properly, as it is an effect of our free choice. And in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 8: Why, he says, does he not teach all? If we say that those whom he does not teach are unwilling to learn, we shall be answered: “Where, then, is what is said to him: ‘Lord, when you turn us, you will revive us’?” Or if God does not make the unwilling willing, what does the Church pray for her persecutors in accordance with the Lord's command? It is therefore so plainly Augustine's opinion that God, by the help of pre-operating grace, truly brings it about by efficient causality that we act and works so that we may work that there is no need to dwell on it further. See the same Augustine in On Grace and Free Choice, chapters 20 and 21, where, among other things relevant to our purpose, The Almighty brings about, he says, in the hearts of people, even the movement of their will, so that through them he may do what he himself has willed to do through them, since he does not know how to will anything unjustly.

VII. Third, this is proved by reason. Interior illuminations of the intellect, excitations of the will, and persuasions, however perfect they may be and however much they may be multiplied, can exist in one who is unwilling. Therefore, by moral motion alone, God does not efficaciously bring it about that we will. Therefore, beyond such excitations and persuasions, an efficacious help must be posited, through which God truly brings it about by efficient causality that we act and works so that we may work.

Fourth. Through prevenient grace God works good works in us, not only permissively, but properly and per se; as the Council of Trent defines, anathematizing those who say that God works evil works just as he works good ones, not only permissively, but also properly and per se, so that the destruction of Judas is no less his own work than the calling of Paul. By these words it establishes a difference between evil works and good ones, because, as St. Thomas teaches: God is said to be the cause of good actions not only with respect to the essence of the act, but also with respect to the perfection according to which they are called good: for his causal influx upon the agent brings about both its acting and its acting well; but in evil actions, although he is their cause with respect to their essence, he is not their cause with respect to their defect. And therefore he must be called absolutely the cause of good works, but not of sins. Therefore, according to the Council’s definition, God is properly and per se the efficient cause, exercising causal influx upon the agent so that it acts well. Therefore he makes us act not only morally but also truly by efficient causality. For a moral cause is not a cause per se, but is called a cause metaphorically, as St. Thomas teaches, since the effect does not follow from it, motion does not begin from it, nor does it impart to the agent the very act of acting.

Fifth. The same point can be confirmed by all the arguments through which it will be made clear in Disputations 96 and 97 that the determination and cooperation of free choice do not have its innate freedom alone as their efficient cause; rather, they must be reduced to the absolute and efficacious decree of the divine will, as to a prior per se efficient cause, although God does not effect them without us freely consenting and cooperating.

Finally, to prove the same point, the passage of the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 4 can be brought forward: For who distinguishes you? And what do you have that you did not receive? But if you received it, why do you boast as though you had not received it? For if God, through his efficacious grace, does not truly cause us to act by efficient causality, but a man, given exciting grace, were to determine himself to a devout action by his own innate freedom alone, he could glory in himself against another in that determination, and by means of it distinguish himself from the one who persists in sin or does not cooperate with God calling and rousing him. This is how St. Augustine argues in the passage cited, Disputation 62, no. 6.

TO the foundation of the contrary opinion, the reply is that it concludes only that willing itself is not primarily and per se in the power of the created will, but in the power of God, who alone has first and absolute dominion over every created action, as will be clear in Disputation 117. For freedom by essence is found only in God; in intellectual creatures, however, freedom and dominion are found by participation from the first free being and the first Lord, on whom they depend as on an efficient cause, even in the exercise of that same dominion.

VIII. In reply to the first argument made in confirmation of this opinion, it is answered that God brings about in us the beginning of a good will not only morally but through efficient causality, prior in the order of nature, though not prior in time, but with that same will simultaneously exercising causal influx and freely cooperating, as was said above. And by this the reply to the confirmation is clear.

In reply to the second, although the whole moral causality of prevenient grace is reduced to the motion exerted by the end, the causality of efficacious help, by which God effects man’s conversion, is not reduced to the motion exerted by the end alone, but truly belongs to the genus of efficient cause, as was said. Hence, through prevenient grace, God makes us act not only morally, that is, by a motion from the object or the end, but also truly through efficient causality.

In reply to the confirmation, it is answered that man, as man, is moved to acting both morally by the object, or by the end previously conceived, and also through efficient causality by God as the first mover, as St. Thomas teaches in 1.2, q. 9, art. 1 and 4; and he needs both motions in order to act, as will be clear in Disputation 91.

What it is for God to work so that we will.— In answer to the third argument, it is said that to work so that we will is to work something in us by which we are disposed, efficaciously inclined, and determined to will. But this does not belong only to the genus of moral causality, since persuasion alone does not transform the will from one thing to another, as was said above from St. Augustine and Thomas. Hence, besides an inward illumination of the intellect and the rousing of the sluggish will, it is required that God truly bring it about through efficient causality that we act; otherwise he will not incline free choice efficaciously to will, but only sufficiently, just as the devil does not make a man sin efficaciously, as St. Thomas teaches in the body of q. 3, de malo, art. 3; and he gives the reason: because he prepares and inclines the man’s will to sin only by persuading it.

In answer to the confirmation, it is said that it is one thing to make us will, and another to produce the willing itself; nevertheless, we say that God truly does both through efficient causality by his grace. He brings about the first, namely, without our bringing it about that we will; the second, however, he works together with us as we consent and cooperate simultaneously in time, as was said. The case is not the same with a man or an angel who asks or commands another to will; for he makes the other will not properly but metaphorically, as is clear from what was established above.

In answer to the fourth, efficacious help, by which God makes us act and works so that we act, does not belong directly to the category of quality, because it is a motion by which free choice is applied to acting; it will be called a motion endowed with causal power, as was shown in Disputation 19. Hence it does not follow that there is an infinite regress in actions or in efficient causes.

The fifth argument is answered by what was said in Disputation 22 and the two following disputations.

Disputatio LXXXVII: Whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, as habits are, which we use when we will.

Whether efficacious actual help is subject to the power of our free choice, as regards its use, in the way that habits are subject to it, which we use when we will.

I. THE affirmative position is consistently defended by all the authors who deny that efficacious help physically predetermines free choice to consent; they prove it by all the arguments set out above, by which they oppose this kind of predetermination.

Moreover, it is proved by the authority of St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 83. ar. 1. ad 5. where, after proposing the fifth argument to prove that man does not have free choice, in this form: The Philosopher says 3. Ethic. cap. 5.: As each person is, so the end appears to him. But it is not in our power to be of one kind or another; this is from nature. Therefore it is natural to us to pursue some end; therefore, it is not from free choice—he replies that inclinations or dispositions arising from any impression of bodily causes do not prejudice the freedom of choice, because they are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys. A little earlier he had stated that man naturally desires the ultimate end, namely happiness, and does not do so freely, because natural appetite is not subject to free choice. St. Thomas therefore holds that, for an inclination or disposition not to prejudice freedom of choice, it must, as regards its use, be subject to the judgment of reason and to the power of free choice. Therefore, if efficacious help is not subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use, it will destroy its freedom.

Second, it is argued as follows: although the supernatural habits of faith, hope, and charity incline the faculties in one direction, namely, toward producing acts of the virtues proportioned to them, as regards their actual use they are nevertheless subject to the power of free choice, for we use habits when we will. Therefore, divine grace’s efficacious helps, although they incline the faculties toward producing similar acts, must also, as regards their actual use, be subject to the power of our free choice and subordinate to it. The inference is proved as follows: the very same rationale applies to help as to habit, since help is reduced to the species of habit.

Third. The efficacious help of divine grace has no effect in us without the free cooperation of our free choice; otherwise, it would produce a pious action in us without our freely consenting and cooperating, which is contrary to the decrees of the Council of Trent: therefore, as regards the actual production of that same effect and, consequently, as regards its actual use, it is subject to the power of our free choice. For the use of help consists in the actual production of the act for which it is given.

Fourth. The created will does not use the efficacious help of prevenient grace necessarily; otherwise, it would act necessarily and not freely, since it uses the help only by acting. Therefore, it uses this help freely and, consequently, can use it or not use it. Therefore, as regards its use, it is subject to the power of our free choice.

Fifth. Help that free choice can resist does not subject free choice to itself; rather, as regards its use, it is subject to that choice. But free choice can resist efficacious help, for the Council of Sens says: Nor is the help of God who draws such that it cannot be resisted: therefore, this kind of help is subject to the power of free choice as regards its use.

II. The contrary position is also consistently defended by all the Thomists and other authors who hold that God, by his efficacious grace, physically predetermines man’s will to consent and to act piously. And since this position is certain and highly consonant with the sacred Councils and the holy Fathers;

To explain this, to make the title of the question clear, and to understand the point on which the authors with whom we are disputing disagree with us, we must first state that all Catholics agree against Luther and Calvin that man concurs freely with efficacious help, cooperating and assenting to God who rouses and moves him; and consequently, speaking absolutely, he can fail to act and dissent if he wills. This is defined under anathema in the Council of Trent, sess. 6. can. 4., and the Holy Synod teaches in cap. 5. of that same session that man can reject through free choice the inspiration he receives from God. Hence, if in the present disputation “use of efficacious help” means the cooperation of free choice with it, or the term toward which that same help moves free choice, namely, the operation, there is no doubt that such use, as we are moved by God, is subject to the power of our free choice. This follows from the argument drawn from Trent: even when free choice is moved by efficacious help to act piously, it can truly, speaking absolutely and in the divided sense, reject that inspiration and dissent if it wills, although it cannot be the case both that efficacious help is present and that it in fact rejects it or dissents. But since, strictly and properly speaking, to use something is to apply and determine it to an operation or to the effect for which it is ordered, as we shall say shortly, the difficulty is this: whether actual efficacious help is subject to the power of our free choice as regards its use in such a way that our will, according to its freedom, applies and determines efficacious help to cooperate with it; and consequently, whether these two coexist, or can coexist: that this help, considered according to all the real power it has from God, is in a man, while the man does not cooperate in the act toward which it moves him, because he does not will to use this same help—as happens with habits, which we use when we will; and because we do not always will to use a habit, it is possible at once to have the habit and to do nothing with it.

What the use of a thing is.— Note, therefore, secondly, that, as St. Thomas says, 1. 2. q. 16. art. 1., Use of a thing imports the application of that thing to some operation. Hence the operation to which we apply a thing is also called its use: for example, riding is the use of a horse, and striking is the use of a staff. Since the will uses the other faculties, both internal and external, using is consequently an act of the will as the first mover, and of reason as that which directs; but it is an act of the other faculties as those which execute, and which stand to the will, by which they are applied to acting, as instruments stand to the principal agent. It follows that the efficacious help of divine grace cannot be subject or subordinate to the power of free choice as regards its use unless it is applied and determined by free choice to acting in actuality.

Efficacious help of grace is not subject to free choice but subjects it to itself.— Therefore, it must be said that the efficacious help of pre-operating grace is not subject to the power of our free choice in this second sense, as regards its use, in the way that habits are subject to it, which we use when we will. Rather, the help itself subjects the human will to itself powerfully and sweetly, and makes it obedient. Consequently, these two things are incompatible: that efficacious help, considered according to all the real power it has as it comes from God, is in a man, and that the man does not cooperate with it, although he can, if he wills, fail to cooperate.

It is proved first as follows: if free choice uses efficacious help in such a way that, according to its freedom, it determines that help to concur with it, it would follow that the help, or assistance, of grace is subordinated to human humility or obedience. This is shown as follows. If, whenever the will wills to obey and cooperate, efficacious help concurs with it, and does so only then; if it is the will of the one obeying that applies the help itself to concur with it; and if, when the will does not will to obey, the help itself produces no pious action in us or with us, then the assistance of grace is subordinated to human humility or obedience. But this conclusion is contrary to the Council of Orange, can. 6., where it is said: If anyone subordinates the help of grace to human humility or obedience, and does not agree that it is a gift of grace itself that we are obedient and humble, he resists the Apostle, who says: What do you have that you did not receive? And, by the grace of God I am what I am. By these words the Council defines that the help of grace is not subordinated to human humility or obedience. If it is said that the Council means that the help of grace is not subordinated to human humility or obedience arising from the powers of nature alone, as the Semipelagians said about the first call, asserting that God gives his prevenient grace to those who seek, knock, and strive by the powers of nature, but that the Council defines nothing against those who say that, after God has roused free choice by his grace and mercifully gone before it, that same grace is made subject or subordinate to free choice, all the arguments by which we shall show in disp. 95. that even after grace’s first rousing God does not wait for our willing to be cleansed militate against this. Let Augustine be consulted, lib. de corrept. et gratia cap. 1. 2. et 8., where he says: The human will does not obtain grace by freedom, but rather freedom by grace, etc.; that is, helping grace makes free cooperation of free choice follow.

Second, it is proved as follows: for St. Augustine, as was seen in disputation 73. nu. 2., teaches in epist. 107. ad Vitalem that those contradict our prayers who say, with regard to God’s call, that consenting or not consenting is so much our own affair that, if we will, it comes to pass, but if we refuse, we make God’s work of no effect in us. St. Augustine therefore holds that those contradict the prayers of the Church who say that the help of grace is subject, as regards its use, to the power of our free choice in such a way that, if we will, we cooperate with it, but if we refuse, we make that help of no effect in us.

This is confirmed. As Augustine often teaches, God by the help of efficacious grace makes the unwilling willing and the resisting consenting. Therefore, by that same help he subjects human wills to himself; therefore, the help itself is not subject to human wills as regards its use.

Third, it is proved. For St. Prosper, reporting the position of the Massilians, says that they thought the human will procures for itself the aid of divine grace; grace does not subject the human will to itself. Attacking this position in lib. 1. de vocat. gentium, cap. 25., he says: Could the power of grace, which subjected to itself those whom it willed, not convert those who remained unconvertible? By these words he teaches plainly that the efficacious help of divine grace submits and subjects human wills to itself. Therefore, it must be said that grace itself subjects free choice to itself as regards right use; the contrary must not be asserted, namely, that efficacious grace is subjected, as regards its exercise, to the power of created free choice.

Fourth, it is proved as follows. What is more powerful and stronger in acting overcomes and subjects to itself what is less powerful in acting or resisting; for it is said in Lucae 11.: When a strong man, fully armed, guards his own courtyard, his possessions are all in peace. But when one stronger than he comes upon him and conquers him, he takes away all his armor in which he trusted and distributes his spoils. But the efficacious will of God is much more powerful in acting than human free choice is in resisting. For Augustine says: No human free choice resists him when he wills to save; for willing and refusing are so within the power of the unwilling or willing person that they do not impede the divine will or overcome divine power. For he himself does what he wills with those who do what he does not will. And a little later: It is therefore not to be doubted that human wills cannot resist the will of God, who in heaven and on earth has done all things whatsoever he willed, and who also made those things that are to come, so as to prevent him from doing what he wills; since indeed, he does what he wills, when he wills, even with the very wills of men. And below: God, he says, has the wills of men more in his power than they themselves have their own. And in Enchirid. ad Laurentium cap. 95. Our God, he says, is above in heaven; in heaven and on earth he has done all things whatsoever he willed. This is plainly not true if he willed anything and did not do it. And, what is more unworthy, he did not do it because a human will prevented what the Almighty willed from being done. And below: If we do not believe this, the very beginning of the confession of our faith is imperiled, by which we profess to believe in God the Father almighty. For he is truly called almighty for no other reason than that he can do whatever he wills, and the effect of the Almighty’s will is not hindered by the will of any creature. Therefore, efficacious grace subjects free choice to itself as regards its use; therefore, it is not subject to that same free choice.

This is confirmed. Efficacious grace softens the free choice of man, removes its hardness, and overcomes its resistance; for Augustine says: This grace, therefore, which is bestowed on human hearts by divine generosity in a hidden way, is received by no hardened heart *. For it is given precisely so that hardness of heart may first be removed. And the Lord says through the Prophet: And I will give them a new heart, and I will place a new spirit within them, and I will take the heart of stone from their flesh and give them a heart of flesh, so that they may walk in my commandments, keep my judgments, and do them. And in cap. 36.: And I will put my spirit in your midst, and I will make you walk in my commandments, keep my judgments, and carry them out. Therefore, efficacious grace subjects free choice to itself as regards its use, and not the reverse.

Fifth, it is proved as follows: otherwise it would follow that efficacious grace does not apply free choice to acting, but, on the contrary, free choice applies efficacious grace so that it may cooperate with it. This conclusion is contrary to what was said above: therefore. The inference is proved as follows: as St. Thomas teaches in the cited 1. 2. q. 16., to use something is to apply it to acting. Therefore, if efficacious grace is subject to free choice as regards its use, it follows that free choice itself applies efficacious grace to acting. This argument is confirmed by all the arguments by which it was shown in disput. 23. that God, through efficacious help, premoves, applies, and predetermines human wills to act. The arguments by which we showed in disp. 21. that God’s general concurrence is not indifferent in itself reach the same conclusion.

III. IN answer to the first argument, it is said that St. Thomas rightly infers that qualities or dispositions arising from the impression of a bodily cause do not impair the freedom of choice, even though they incline the will in some way toward one side, because such qualities and inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, insofar as it is within our power to acquire such qualities, either causally or dispositionally, or to exclude them from ourselves. Yet it does not follow from this that, if it is not in our power to acquire efficacious grace causally or dispositionally, or if this same efficacious grace is not subject to the power of our free choice as regards its actual use, the freedom of that choice is lost. For a man’s freedom to act or not to act to remain, it suffices that he can, speaking absolutely and in the divided sense, reject efficacious grace and dissent if he wills, even though in the composite sense he cannot reject it or dissent, as was said above and will become clearer below.

In answer to the second, the inference is denied, and the reason for the distinction is this: a habit gives only the ability, or perfects it, whereas efficacious help grants the faculty its actual operation. Hence a habit does not subject free choice to itself as regards actual use, but is subject to free choice, insofar as free choice is moved by God through an actual motion. Efficacious help, however, subjects the created will to itself and makes it obedient, as was said.

IIII. What effects efficacious help causes in us.— In answer to the third, it is said that efficacious help has a twofold effect in us, or a twofold mode of causing, one of which follows upon the other. The first is to exercise an immediate causal influx upon free choice as upon a cause, moving it, applying it, predetermining it, and effecting that it cooperate and consent. It produces this effect in us prior to the cooperation of our free choice, not by priority of time, but of reason and causality, as was said above. In this respect it is in no way subject to the power of our free choice, but only to the power of God; for God alone moves us and makes us act, as was shown above. The second effect is to produce free consent together with the will that it moves. In this respect it is subject to the power of our free choice on the side of the term, namely, on the side of the free act for which it is given, because that act itself is under the power of our free choice as moved and roused by God. But the help itself, even as it exercises causal influx upon free consent, is not strictly within our power; for although the help itself does not exercise causal influx upon consent without our freely concurring, our free choice does not cause the help to exercise causal influx upon consent. On the contrary, God through that same help causes our free choice to concur.

In answer to the fourth, our will freely uses itself insofar as, moved and applied by God, or by helping grace, it freely moves and applies itself as the proximate cause for acting, and acts. Properly speaking, however, the will does not use the help, since it does not apply or determine it to acting. Hence it does not follow that the will uses it necessarily or freely, except in the sense explained in the first foundation. But you will say: If help applies the will to acting, then the will does not apply itself and, consequently, does not act freely but necessarily. It is answered that this conclusion does not follow; it follows only that the created will is not absolutely the first to move itself, the first to apply itself, or the first to determine itself, as was said above.

In answer to the fifth, if efficacious help is considered according to its physical entity, setting aside the efficacious decree of the divine will, whose power it contains in an intentional mode, the will can resist it. But if it is considered as an instrument of God who wills to convert a man to himself, the will cannot resist it, properly speaking of resistance, just as it cannot resist the will of God’s good pleasure, as was said above and will be clear below. If, however, we speak of resistance in a broad sense, so that it includes the power to dissent and not to act, free choice can indeed resist efficacious help absolutely and in the divided sense—that is, dissent from it—but not in the composite sense, because efficacious help cannot coexist with actual dissent by free choice, although it can coexist with the power to dissent, as was said in disput. 18. num. 23. and disput. 25.

Disputatio LXXXVIII: Whether, in someone who has infused habits, special help of exciting and also helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.

Whether, in one who has infused habits, special help not only of exciting but also of helping grace, really distinct from the help of the infused habit, is necessary for each supernatural act.

I. The first opinion asserts that the habit of faith suffices to produce supernatural acts of faith, and that no special help of exciting or helping grace is necessary. This opinion says the same of other supernatural acts. Some theologians hold this view and speak of the matter as follows: Once the habit has been infused, it, together with God’s general concurrence, suffices to elicit supernatural acts of believing suited to a supernatural end. Yet one must not deny that the habit of faith, and of the other supernatural virtues, is greatly helped by illuminations and particular helps conferred through the gifts of the Holy Spirit—wisdom, understanding, counsel, piety, and fear, and so on—so that it may elicit its acts with greater fervor and excellence.

This opinion is proved first by the authority of Saint Thomas, I–II, q. 113, art. 8, in the body, where he says that, when the wicked person is justified, the very motion of God moving him is the infusion of grace. From this he concludes that, in the order of nature, the first thing in the justification of the wicked is the infusion of grace; the second, a movement of free choice toward God; the third, a movement of free choice toward sin; and the fourth, the remission of guilt, to which the whole transformation is ordered as to its end. In art. 6 of the same question, in the body, he says that four things are enumerated as required for the justification of the wicked: the infusion of grace, a movement of free choice toward God through faith, a movement of free choice toward sin, and the remission of guilt. A little later he says: Therefore, the infusion of grace is understood on the side of the divine motion. By these words Saint Thomas requires no other special help, really distinct from those same habits, as necessary in addition to the infusion of grace and supernatural habits, in order that free choice elicit supernatural acts of faith, charity, and contrition.

This is confirmed: for in art. 7 of the same question, in the body, he says that the whole justification of the wicked consists originally in the infusion of grace, for through it both free choice is moved and guilt is remitted. By these words he plainly teaches that through the infusion of grace, or through infused grace, God moves free choice to supernatural acts by which a person is prepared for justification. He therefore holds that, in one who has infused habits, some special help of helping or exciting grace is not absolutely necessary. For the habit itself has the character of divine help, as may be gathered from the words of the Council of Milevis, canon 3: Whoever says that the grace of God, by which we are justified through Jesus Christ our Lord, is effective only for the remission of sins and not also as help so that they may not be committed, let him be anathema.

II. Second, special help of exciting and helping grace is necessary for this reason: acts of believing, hoping, and loving, and other acts of this kind, which as regards their substance can be produced by free choice through the powers of nature alone, must become supernatural and such as salvation requires. But through infused habits, or through the concurrence of those same supernatural habits, these acts are sufficiently elevated so as to be supernatural. For God infuses such habits into the operative powers so that the operative powers may have within themselves a formal active principle of the supernatural order, proportionate to acts of this kind. Therefore, in those who have infused habits, no other special help, really distinct from those same habits, is absolutely necessary for the powers elevated by the habits to elicit supernatural acts.

Thirdly, special help of exciting and helping grace is not absolutely necessary for one who has infused habits in order physically to predetermine a power established in first act to operate. For such predetermination, since it removes indifference to operating or not operating, in which the freedom of choice essentially consists, cannot be compatible with that freedom. Also, we use habits when we will; consequently, for someone to use the habit of faith or charity infused in him by God to elicit one or another act of faith or charity, no special help of exciting or helping grace will be necessary in addition to the innate freedom of choice. Nor is such special help absolutely necessary for God to cooperate simultaneously with the power and supernatural habit in supernatural acts: general concurrence suffices for this, by which God concurs simultaneously with all other secondary causes established in first act through forms proportionate to their effects, since God’s concurrences should not be multiplied without necessity. Therefore, special help of exciting or helping grace is posited superfluously as necessary for producing supernatural acts in one whose power has already been perfected by supernatural habits.

III. The second opinion is that of other theologians, who hold that for supernatural acts elicited by infused habits, exciting grace proportionate to those acts and a simultaneous concurrence of the order of grace are indeed absolutely necessary: but that, in addition to these, no other helping grace is absolutely necessary for eliciting a supernatural act. For the most part, however, it is useful, so that the act may be performed more easily, sweetly, and perseveringly, if God wills to confer it, because it increases the powers for operating. This opinion nevertheless adds that, although a new helping grace is not necessary for a justified person to perform each supernatural act, it is necessary for a person in the state of fallen nature to persevere in grace for a long time. For perseverance in grace requires special help, as the councils define, namely, the gift of perseverance, which includes both exciting and helping grace. These authors are convinced by the following arguments.

Fourth, for from the teaching of Saint Thomas in the First Part of the Second Part, q. 109, arts. 1, 2, and 3, it is plainly gathered that no other helping grace besides concurrence of the order of grace is absolutely necessary for one who has infused habits to elicit supernatural acts.

Fifth, through the habit the faculty has sufficient power as a proximate cause, and through supernatural concurrence that proximate cause has sufficient help from the first cause in that order. What else, then, could be necessary? Perhaps it will be said that an actual complement is required, as they call it, which is not sufficiently given by the habit alone, because second act is more perfect and more actual than first act. But the power with the habit is established only in first act, and therefore does not yet have complete power for eliciting an act until it receives another, flowing actual grace, as it were, by which it is perfectly completed.

Against this is the sixth argument. If this reasoning had any force, it would prove not only for acts of grace but also for natural acts that a faculty with a habit does not have sufficient power for its connatural act, although all philosophers say that it has not merely sufficient but superabundant power, and therefore can not only exercise its act but do so easily and pleasantly. Moreover, the same would have to be said of every natural active power, however perfect, which is plainly false for the reasons given in Disputation XVIII to prove that God’s general concurrence is not an immediate influx into secondary causes. Finally, the same would have to be said of that flowing quality which others invent. For, as they themselves also admit, that quality is not an act of life elicited by the soul, but is pre-infused by God alone, in the order of nature, for eliciting an act. Therefore, it too stands in relation to action as first act to second act, and is less perfect in this respect: it does not formally constitute the power in its ultimate act, as the action itself, or second act, does. It too will therefore be an incomplete power and will need another complement. And so the process would go on to infinity, since that complement is always only first act. If a distinction is established between a habit and that flowing quality on the ground that a habit can be separated from second act, whereas that flowing quality cannot, the following argument is made against this.

IIII. Seventh, this is of no help in the first place, because inseparability does not remove the distinction between first and second act. The light of glory, for example, also has an inseparable vision, and charity joined to it has an inseparable love; nevertheless, they are first acts, so much so that the authors of the opposing opinion also require the aforesaid flowing quality beforehand in those cases. Accordingly, that distinction entails only that the quality is a naturally acting first act with such necessity that it carries the will along with it, and consequently also removes the free exercise of action.

Eighth, first act, especially supernatural first act, is absolutely more perfect than second act, because it not only makes operating easier but also grants the very ability to operate. Second act, by contrast, is called more perfect only in a qualified respect, because it is ultimate and leaves no further potency. Yet there is nothing to prevent what is absolutely more perfect from producing something that is absolutely lower and less perfect, even if that thing seems to surpass it in a qualified respect. Therefore, the foundation of the opposing opinion collapses: from the fact that second act is absolutely more perfect than a habit, it infers that a power elevated by a habit needs the special help of helping grace to be premoved to operate. Without such help, therefore, it will be able to elicit supernatural acts with the habit alone.

They confirm this opinion with all the arguments brought above, by which they try to prove that God’s general concurrence, and likewise helping grace insofar as it helps, is not God’s immediate influx into free choice as into a cause, nor does it premove or predetermine free choice to operate; rather, it is an immediate influx together with the secondary cause into that cause’s effect.

V. Nevertheless, the third opinion is that of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas, and it is beyond doubt to us. The Thomists commonly defend it, asserting that, in one who has infused habits, special help of grace, both exciting and helping, really distinct from those habits, is absolutely necessary for each supernatural act, in addition to the habits themselves and the simultaneous concurrence of the same order as grace. By this help free choice, established in first act through the infused habits, is completed in its active power, and is premoved and determined to operate. Hence, to resolve this difficulty, three conclusions must be stated and proved.

Special help of exciting and helping grace is necessary for each supernatural act.— First conclusion. Even in one who has infused habits, special help of exciting or helping grace is absolutely necessary for each supernatural act. Thus, by the habit alone, he will never produce a supernatural act unless he is roused or helped by God through special help. In the present conclusion we speak disjunctively of the special help of exciting or helping grace, for the following conclusions will explain whether both kinds of help are necessary for each act. The conclusion is against the first opinion, but it can be proved by all the arguments with which it was shown in Disputation XX that the general concurrence by which God concurs with free choice, elevated through supernatural habits, in acts of faith, hope, and charity is a concurrence of the supernatural order, different in kind from that by which he concurs with natural secondary causes in merely natural effects.

It is also proved from the words spoken to the Apostles, who were certainly just: Without me you can do nothing (John XV). And in the person of the just, Psalm XXVI says: Be my helper; do not forsake me. From these testimonies Saint Augustine, in his book On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 1, concludes that even when someone has been freed from the condemnation of sin, he still needs the help of his Liberator in order to do good. Augustine cannot be explained as speaking of God’s general concurrence, for he speaks of the help of the Savior, which is conferred on us through Christ. This is plainly special help: general concurrence is not the help of God the Redeemer, but of God the Creator, common to all creatures, including irrational and insensible ones, which are not capable of the redemption of Jesus Christ. Therefore, in addition to the infused habit, actual help of exciting or helping grace is necessary for each supernatural act. Likewise, Psalm CXXVI says of justified people: Unless the Lord guards the city, the guard keeps watch in vain. Saint Ambrose and Hilary interpret these words of the soul of the just person, which cannot resist temptations by doing good without God’s protection and help.

It is proved secondly from Pope Celestine’s letter to the bishops of Gaul, ch. 8, where he teaches that the just perform good works at God’s prompting: For this very reason, because the will is prepared, he says, by the Lord, and he himself touches the hearts of his faithful with paternal inspirations so that they may do some good. For all who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God —so that we may recognize that our own free choice is not absent, and yet in each movement of the human will toward any good we may not doubt that his help has greater force. In ch. 10: On the fruits, he says, of the commandments the Lord was speaking, when he did not say, “Without me you can do nothing more difficult,” but said, “Without me you can do nothing”; and he is speaking of actual help. He therefore holds that, in addition to justifying grace, special help is necessary for every good and meritorious work, not merely to make it easier, as Pelagius said, but for it to be accomplished at all.

Thirdly, this is proved from the definition of the councils, especially the Second Council of Orange, canon 10, which says: The help of God must always be implored, even by those reborn and holy, so that they may reach a good end or persevere in a good work. Here it teaches that the help of grace is necessary not only for persevering to the end but also for carrying out a good work with perseverance. It states this more clearly in canon 25: We also believe this, it says, according to the Catholic faith, that all the baptized, having received grace through baptism, can and ought, with Christ helping and cooperating, to fulfill the things that pertain to salvation, if they are willing to labor faithfully. By these words it teaches that, in addition to habitual grace, special help is necessary for the good works by which the commandments are fulfilled. And at the Council of Trent, Session VI, On Justification, ch. 16, the holy Synod teaches that Christ Jesus himself, as the head to the members and as the vine to the branches, continually pours his power into the justified —a power that always precedes, accompanies, and follows their good works, and without which those works could in no way be pleasing to God and meritorious. By these words it teaches that for each meritorious work, in addition to justifying grace and infused habits, special help—which it explains by the name “power”—is absolutely necessary.

Fourthly, it is proved as follows. As Augustine admits, several ancient councils defined, against Pelagius, that God’s grace is given for each act. That is, special help from God is absolutely necessary for each pious act, for this is what the Fathers were discussing when they pressed Pelagius, as is clear from what was said above. Hence Pelagius himself, as Augustine reports in epistle 106, at the Council of Palestine, so as not to be condemned himself, anathematized what he had asserted: that God’s grace—that is, actual help or the help of grace—is not necessary for each pious act. Saint Augustine himself, in epistle 107: This is, he says, that evil opinion of the Pelagians, of evil repute, deservedly rejected, and condemned at the judgment of the Eastern bishops by Pelagius himself, too, who feared being condemned: the opinion in which they say that God’s grace is given not for each act, but is found in free choice or in the law and teaching. A little later, from many passages of Scripture, he proves our conclusion, concluding as follows: Therefore, God’s grace is not in the nature of free choice, or in the law and teaching, as the Pelagian perversity foolishly supposes. Rather, it is given by his will for each act, so that we may believe in God and live piously. He proves the same in Book I of On the Grace of Christ against Pelagius, chs. 2 and 3. Saint Prosper agrees in Book of Responses to the Chapters of the Gauls, response 8, where he teaches that this very doctrine was sanctioned by the judgment of 214 priests. Saint Jerome treats the same subject at great length against the Pelagians in his letter to Ctesiphon, saying: They posit God’s grace in such a way that we do not rely on and are not governed by his help in each work, etc.; and those who say this do not understand that the devil hisses through their mouths an intolerable blasphemy. He proves this there as well with many scriptural testimonies, in Book III of his Dialogue against the Pelagians, and in his commentary on Galatians, ch. 3, on the words He, therefore, who supplies the Spirit to you; and on Ephesians, ch. 2, explaining For we are his workmanship; and on Jeremiah, ch. 25, and ch. 31, on the words Turn me, O Lord, and I shall be turned. Finally, Vincent of Lérins, in Book Against the Profane Novelties of Heresies, p. 22 in the Leuven edition, says: Who before that profane Pelagius ever presumed so much on the power of free choice that he did not think God’s grace necessary to help it in good things through each individual act? This conclusion will become clearer from the arguments brought forward for the following two conclusions.

VI. Second conclusion. In addition to infused habits, a just person needs new exciting grace in order to perform good works, both internal and external. This conclusion is against some theologians who assert that a just person can exercise both internal and external righteousness whenever he wills—that is, perform good works and keep the divine precepts—and ordinarily does not need new exciting grace, but only helping grace. Nevertheless, our conclusion is proved from what was said in the preceding conclusion.

Exciting grace is necessary for each meritorious act even in a just person.— It is proved further. First, from the Council of Trent, Session VI, On Justification, ch. 5, where it declares that the beginning of justification in adults must be traced to the prevenient grace of God through Jesus Christ—that is, to his calling, by which they are called despite having no merits of their own—so that those who had turned away from God through sins may, through his exciting and helping grace, be prepared to turn toward their own justification by freely assenting and cooperating with that same grace. In ch. 6 it adds that people are prepared for righteousness itself when, roused and helped by divine grace, they conceive faith from hearing and are freely moved toward God. Therefore, just as exciting grace is necessary for supernatural acts elicited before justification, in accord with the teaching of the Council of Trent, so the same grace will also be necessary for supernatural acts elicited after justification. The inference is proved as follows: just as the will is prepared and moved by the Lord to elicit supernatural acts of faith, hope, and charity, by which a person is prepared for justification, so too is it prepared by the Lord to produce similar acts after justification. Since this preparation is made through the special help of exciting and helping grace, it follows that this grace is necessary for eliciting supernatural acts even in one who has infused habits. The same is proved from the Council of Orange, canon 25, where the council fathers declare: This, they say, we salutarily profess and believe: in every good work, we do not begin on our own and then receive help through God’s mercy; rather, with no preceding merits, he first inspires in us faith and love for himself, so that afterward, with his help, we may be able to fulfill what is pleasing to him. Here the council teaches that, in addition to the help of helping grace required to fulfill the supernatural commandments—namely, to have faith in and love for God—exciting grace is necessary, which the council signified by divine inspiration.

This is confirmed. As will be clear in Disputation XC, no. 6, free choice, even when established in first act, needs a moral motion from the side of the end in order to operate. But in supernatural acts this moral motion is made by God through exciting grace, just as physical motion comes from him through helping grace. Therefore, in each free supernatural act God rouses the will to elicit an act of this kind.

Secondly, it is proved by the authority of Augustine, whose words seem to express our conclusion. In Book II of On the Merits and Remission of Sins, ch. 18, he says: That we turn away from God is our doing, and this is an evil will; but that we turn toward God we cannot do unless he rouses and helps us, and this is a good will. Here he speaks without distinction of turning toward God through a good act, whether it occurs before or after the infusion of a habit, and teaches that it cannot take place unless God rouses us. He therefore holds that, in addition to infused habits, exciting grace is given for each supernatural act. He teaches the same in On the Spirit and the Letter, ch. 34, in these words: God acts through persuasive presentations to the mind so that we may will and believe, whether outwardly through the Gospel exhortations—where the commandments of the law also do something if they remind us of our weakness, so that by believing we may flee to justifying grace—or inwardly, where no one has it in his power to determine what comes into his mind; but whether to assent or dissent belongs to one’s own will. And in Book of Eighty-Three Questions, q. 68, he says generally of all good acts: No one can will unless admonished and called. Finally, in Question II to Simplician: Who, he says, can believe unless touched by some call, that is, by some testimony of things? Who has it in his power to be touched in mind by such a presentation that his will is moved toward faith? Saint Prosper teaches the same in Book II of The Call of All Nations, ch. 26, saying: God’s grace, he says, has the chief place, persuading by exhortations, moving by examples, frightening through dangers, stirring through miracles, giving understanding, inspiring counsel, and illuminating the heart itself and imbuing it with the affections of faith. But the human will is also subject to it and joined with it; the will has been roused by the aforesaid helps for this purpose, that it may cooperate in the divine work within itself.

Third, it is proved by reasoning. The will never performs any good work unless it has been proposed to it through the intellect, since nothing is willed unless it is first known, as Augustine says. But that presentation, by which the intellect proposes to the will a supernatural good as something to pursue and love, as suitable to it, pertains to exciting grace, since through it the will is persuaded, attracted, and invited to pursue that good. Therefore, however just a person may be and whatever infused habits he may have, he still needs exciting grace for each supernatural act.

This is confirmed. In a just person, the illumination of the intellect by which a supernatural good is proposed to the will as something to pursue and love—even if it occurs through some recollection or memory of a preceding divine excitation—does not proceed from the powers of nature alone; otherwise, the first beginning of a good work in us would come from us. Therefore it proceeds from the help of exciting grace. Consequently, in addition to infused habits, special help of exciting grace is absolutely necessary for each supernatural act. They reply to these arguments that the habit of grace and charity, and the other infused habits in a just person, have the character of exciting grace because they incline free choice to supernatural acts. Hence, just as someone not yet justified can produce the fruit of conversion and works of penance from the seed of a good inspiration, much more can he produce the fruit of righteousness and good works from the seed of grace that makes one pleasing to God, without any new exciting grace.

Refutation.— But an argument can be made against this solution: although grace and the other infused habits habitually incline a person’s free choice to elicit supernatural acts, they do not incline it actually unless it is actually moved by exciting and helping grace to elicit those same operations. Therefore, an infused habit alone does not take the place of the special help of exciting grace.

VII. Special help of helping grace is necessary for each act even in a just person.— Third conclusion. In a just person, in addition to exciting grace and supernatural simultaneous concurrence, by which God produces supernatural acts together with free choice and infused habits, special help of helping grace is necessarily required for each act. The conclusion is against the authors of the second opinion, but it is expressly stated by Saint Augustine in On Nature and Grace, ch. 26, where he says: Just as the bodily eye, even when completely healthy, cannot see unless helped by the brightness of light, so a person, even when most perfectly justified, cannot live rightly unless divinely helped by the eternal light of righteousness. God therefore heals not only to erase what we have sinned, but also to grant that we do not sin. In On Grace and Free Choice, ch. 6, he confirms the same with many scriptural testimonies, especially from Song of Songs VIII: Who is this who comes up, made white, leaning on her beloved? Having been made white, he says, she walks well, but only if she perseveringly leans on him by whom she was made white. For this reason Jesus himself, on whom the one made white leans, said to his disciples: “Without me you can do nothing.” This is also the opinion of Saint Thomas, I–II, q. 109, art. 1, in the body, where he says that however perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature may be held to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it is moved by God. He teaches the same in art. 9. Saint Thomas cannot be explained as speaking only of exciting grace, for through it God does not physically move free choice to pious operations but only morally; still less can he be interpreted as speaking only of simultaneous concurrence, as was shown above. Rather, he must necessarily be understood as speaking of helping grace, through which free choice is premoved and predetermined to operate. Saint Thomas teaches the same opinion in the places cited above. It can first be proved by the arguments made for the preceding conclusion.

It is also proved from the definition of the Second Council of Orange, canon 9: Whenever we do good, God works in us and with us so that we may act. Here it speaks universally of all good works, including those of a person already justified, and teaches that special help of helping grace is necessary for works of this kind. Through it God not only works the good work simultaneously with us, but also works in us, namely by means of that same help causing us to cooperate freely with God, as is clear from what was said above, where we interpreted the council’s words in this same sense. Otherwise it would have said, “Whenever we do good, God works with us”; there would have been no need to add the words “God works in us and with us.” This is confirmed by Innocent I in his reply to the Council of Carthage, where he says: All the saints testify that they can do nothing without God’s help. And in his reply to the Council of Milevis: It is necessary, he says, that, once the freedom of our former state has been restored to us through grace, we seek that grace, since we cannot avoid the devil’s temptations and devices in any other way than through helping grace. Celestine I, in his letter to all the bishops of Gaul, chs. 8 and 9, also decrees that grace is necessary for each act. He reports Pope Zosimus asserting in his letter to the bishops of the whole world that in each movement of the human will toward any good we should not doubt that his help has greater force, and that every holy thought and every movement of a good will comes from God, because through him we can do something good, without whom we can do nothing. He is speaking of the special help of helping grace, by which God acts in us so that we both will and do what he wills, as the same Celestine says in ch. 12 of that letter. Because of these testimonies, Master Medina, I–II, q. 109, art. 9, conclusion 3, considers our opinion so true and certain that he considers teaching the contrary untenable.

Secondly, God alone is the one who first initiates, physically—that is, by true efficient causality—every good work, even in justified people, as was shown above. But God makes this beginning through the special help of helping grace, insofar as through such help he premoves free choice and causes it to cooperate with him. Therefore, in addition to infused habits, special help of helping grace is necessary for each act in just people, not merely simultaneous help but also help prior to the cooperation of free choice, preceding it in the order of causality.

Thirdly, no action follows from something that is indifferent between alternatives unless something else determines it to one of them, as the Commentator says in Physics II, text 48. But human free choice, even when perfected by a supernatural habit, remains indifferent between alternatives, namely, operating and not operating, since a habit does not determine the faculty with respect to the exercise of an act, but only with respect to its specification. Therefore, it will never break forth into a particular act unless it is determined by God to produce this supernatural act here and now. But God makes this determination through the special help of helping grace, as was shown above. Therefore, even just people need special help of helping grace for every supernatural act.

Fourthly, general concurrence, whether of the order of nature or of the order of grace, by which God concurs with secondary causes established in first act through forms proportionate to their effects, is an immediate influx into secondary causes, completing and perfecting them so that they actually operate, as was shown in Disputations XVIII, XIX, and XXIII. Therefore, the special help of helping grace necessary for each supernatural act does not consist only in simultaneous concurrence, by which God, together with free choice elevated by a habit, flows into a supernatural act; it also consists in a prior motion by which God causes free choice to concur with him. Therefore, in addition to infused habits, just people need special help of helping grace for each supernatural act.

VIII. To the first argument the reply is that Saint Thomas explicitly teaches our opinion in many places, especially in the First Part of the Second Part, q. 109, art. 9, where he says that even one who has already attained grace, beyond the habitual gift by which corrupt human nature is healed and elevated to perform meritorious works of eternal life, needs the help of grace in another way, namely, to be moved by God to act rightly. By this help Saint Thomas means the special help of helping grace, not only simultaneous help but also prior help. Nor does he teach the contrary in the passages cited, because by “infusion of grace” he includes both habitual grace, through which a person is formally made just, and also the special or actual help by which free choice is moved to elicit the acts through which one is prepared for justification. In adults this help inseparably accompanies the first infusion of habitual grace. Hence, when in the cited article 6 he says that the infusion of grace is understood on the side of the divine motion—words by which he seems to mean that in justification itself God moves free choice to supernatural acts through the infusion of grace—he does not mean that he accomplishes this through habitual grace alone, but also through special actual help: through grace, radically or habitually; through special help, actually and formally. This also makes clear the answer to the confirmation and likewise to the Council of Milevis: the passage is understood of habitual help, without excluding actual motion. For justifying grace not only remits sins; it also gives strength through other infused habits or virtues, by which a person can thereafter avoid sin and persevere in the good, if he wills. But that, beyond this habitual help, special actual help is necessary for operating well or persevering in the exercise of the act is taught by the Supreme Pontiffs and the councils cited above.

IX. Special help of grace is not necessary only for an act to be supernatural.— To the second argument, the reply is that special help is necessary not only for an act of believing, hoping, and loving God to be supernatural, but also for it simply to exist and to be produced by free choice in its exercise, as is gathered from what was said above. Nor should it be admitted that these same acts can be produced in their substance by the powers of nature alone, as is clear from what was said in Disputation LXV. And although free choice is sufficiently elevated in first act through infused habits to elicit supernatural acts, nevertheless, in order actually to elicit acts of this kind in the exercise of its power, special help of exciting and helping grace is necessary, for the reasons assigned above.

To the third argument, the reply is that special help of helping grace is necessary both to predetermine a faculty established in first act through a supernatural habit to operate—it does not follow from this that freedom of choice is destroyed, as was shown in Disputations XVIII and XXIII and will be made clearer below—and also so that God, together with the faculty elevated through a habit, may produce the supernatural operation. For when the secondary cause is supernatural, God’s general concurrence must also be supernatural, as was shown in Disputation XX.

To the fourth argument on behalf of the second opinion, the reply is that, according to the teaching of Saint Thomas, the supernatural concurrence required on God’s side for supernatural acts is not only simultaneous, that is, flowing into those same acts jointly with free choice; it is also prior and immediate in its influx into free choice itself, as is clear from what was said above in Disputations XVIII and XXIII.

X. To the fifth argument, the reply is that a faculty does indeed have, through a supernatural habit, sufficient power as an efficient cause by which it truly can elicit supernatural acts if it wills to do so. But the habit alone does not grant it that it actually wills; otherwise, as long as it had the habit, it would always be operating in act. Therefore, in order for it to operate in act through the habit, special help of helping grace is necessarily required, by which it is moved and predetermined to operate, as was said above. For simultaneous concurrence does not predetermine free choice to operate and concur with God; rather, it presupposes that through its innate freedom it wills to use the supernatural habit and to operate with it.

To the sixth argument, the reply is that this is not the sole or even the chief reason why we say that special help of helping grace is necessary for each supernatural act even in just people. There are other more compelling reasons drawn from passages of Scripture, the Supreme Pontiffs, and the councils, by which we have proved this more effectively. We nevertheless admit that this argument too has great force. In answer to the attack on it, one should say that a faculty with a habit does indeed have sufficient and superabundant power by which it can operate if it wills, but it does not have the efficacious power by which it actually operates. Hence, for that it is necessary that it be moved and predetermined to operate through God’s actual concurrence of the supernatural order, as was shown more fully above. The same should be said proportionately of any permanent natural active power, however perfect, as may be gathered from Saint Thomas, I–II, q. 109, arts. 2 and 9, and from what was said in Disputations XVIII and XXIII.

To the confirmation, the reply is that this special help, or motion in the manner of a transient motion, does not need another motion from God by which it would be moved or predetermined to operate, as do faculties perfected or elevated by habits. Saint Thomas assigns the reason for this distinction: for although through grace and the other infused habits a person is healed with respect to the mind and perfected in first act for operating, corruption and infection with respect to the flesh still remain in him, through which he is a slave to the law of sin, as is said in Romans VII. A certain obscurity of ignorance also remains in the intellect, according to which, as is also said in Romans VIII, we do not know what we should pray for as we ought. Consequently, through habitual grace alone a person does not adhere immovably to the good, nor is he predetermined actually to pursue and love it. Therefore, he still needs the special help of helping grace, by which he is moved undeclinably and insuperably to do good. But this reason does not apply to one who has the special help of helping grace or the gift of perseverance. Hence it does not follow that he still needs another help or that the process goes on to infinity. When it is argued that even that special help of helping grace, or flowing motion, stands in relation to a supernatural act as first act to second, the reply is that this help, or prior motion, is formally neither first act nor second act, but a complement of first act and a certain mean between that first act and second act, as was said in Disputations XVIII and XIX.

XI. To the seventh argument, the reply is that the distinction assigned between a habit and the special help of helping grace does not entail that the same help acts naturally with such necessity that it drags the will along with it. For the will is not moved through grace by being forcibly carried along, as Luther claimed it was. Rather, it entails only that the habit does not cause the will to cooperate freely and infallibly with it. God does cause this through the special help of helping grace, because he moves the will in conformity with its own nature, as was said above. Hence special help not only does not destroy freedom of choice but perfects it in a wondrous way, for it grants it the actual use of that same freedom, as is clear from what has been established.

XII. An act is absolutely nobler than a faculty or habit.— To the eighth argument, the reply is that second act, speaking absolutely, is more perfect than a habit, although in a qualified respect a habit is superior. This is what Saint Thomas teaches in I–II, q. 71, art. 3, in the body and in replies to objections 1 and 3, and I p. q. 25. art. 1, ad 2. Richard of Middleton, IV Sentences, dist. 49, art. 1, q. 4; Soto, the same distinction, q. 1, art. 2, concerning the first conclusion; and Giles, quodlibet 4, q. 19, agree. Cajetan supports this in I, q. 27, art. 1, near the end, where he says that an act is superior to a habit in its character as actual. The reason is that second act participates more in actuality and, consequently, one acting through it is more like God than one acting through a habit, which includes a certain potentiality and imperfection. Moreover, a habit is ordered to an act as to its end, for the sake of which the habit itself is necessary. Hence, according to the common opinion of theologians, beatitude consists essentially in an act and not in a habit, as is clear from I–II, q. 3, art. 2, and IV Sentences, dist. 49. Therefore, since operation is the ultimate act, it is simply more perfect than a habit. For formal beatitude, since it is a person’s ultimate act, must consist in what is more perfect and more actual. Nor is it an obstacle that a habit is the efficient cause of an act, for this does not entail that it is simply more perfect than the act, but only more perfect in a qualified respect. For a habit is not the principal cause of the act itself but an instrumental cause; an instrumental cause need not be simply more perfect than its effect, especially when the effect is the end to which the cause itself is ordered. Since, therefore, second act is simply more perfect than a habit, the faculty elevated through a habit must be moved by God through the special or actual help of helping grace, so that it may elicit an act proportionate to itself.

I think the reply to the confirmation was already given in Disputation XVIII. For there, as I believe, a full enough answer was given to all the arguments that try to prove that God’s general concurrence is not an immediate influx into a secondary cause.

Disputatio LXXXIX: Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.

Whether created free choice is the first cause or first root of its own determination.

I. A similar question will have to be discussed below, in Disputation XCVIII, where it will be asked whether, given exciting grace, the consent or cooperation of free choice is first begun by the created will or instead by the divine will, that is, by the efficacious help of pre-operating grace. But because some recent theologians use various ways of speaking on this point, I have thought it necessary to treat the proposed question expressly. Some have said that the created will is in a certain way the first root of its determination with respect to the determination of an action. They also admit that every free will can in its own order be called the first root of its determination. Nevertheless, they say that God concurs simultaneously with that same determination of the will through his concurrence.

Other theologians, however, distinguish between the conversion of the will and its determination. They assert that although the conversion and consent of the will come from the will itself and from God acting together with the will to produce that same conversion and consent, the determination of the will—which occurs in both cases—comes from the will itself, as it freely applies and determines itself to consent or dissent through its innate freedom, and does not come from God determining it by his omnipotence. They add that one should not grant that God determines the will together with the will determining itself, just as one grants that God produces an effect together with the will simultaneously in the order of nature. This opinion is proved as follows.

First. Before it determines itself, the created will is wholly undetermined in the order of nature and has no necessity to exercise an influx, either absolutely or on the supposition of another act of its own. Rather, by its freedom’s own indifference alone, it begins an act whenever and of whatever kind it wills. Therefore, this determination must be referred to that same will as its first root and cause.

This argument can be confirmed: although the created will in its existence depends on another prior cause that efficiently produces it per se, namely God, and for that reason cannot be called simply the first cause, nevertheless, in comparison with the determination of its act, it has no other prior cause that efficiently produces it per se. For this determination proceeds from its own innate freedom alone, as will be proved in Disputations XCVI, XCVII, and XCVIII. Therefore, in this order, or in comparison with this kind of determination, it can be called the first cause. The inference is proved as follows: in this sense, the first cause of a determination is said to be that which has no other prior cause of that same determination.

II. Secondly, it is argued that created free choice has absolute dominion over its act, as Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas seem to teach in the places to be cited in Disputation CXVII, nos. 1 and 2. Several arguments will be brought forward there to confirm this. Therefore, the determination of an action must be referred to free choice itself as its first per se efficient cause. The inference is proved as follows: a person is not properly said to have dominion over something whose use depends on another’s will, since dominion is the proper power to use a thing for all uses permitted by law.

Thirdly, it is wholly incompatible with freedom for the determination of one’s act to be in oneself from another, as is clear from Saint Thomas in Book II of the Sentences, dist. 25, q. 1, art. 1, reply to the first objection. There he says that free choice is preserved in God insofar as the determination of his act is not from another but from himself; and from this he infers that God is truly the Lord of his work. Since, then, the will has true freedom, as is clear from the Council of Trent, it follows that the determination of our will to this or that act is not from another but from itself. Consequently, in its own order, it can be called the first cause or first root of its determination.

Fourthly, it is proved that God does not determine the will, even together with that same will determining itself, and does not concur as an efficient cause in such a determination. For if God’s influx were to be applied to determining the will, it would have to be immediate in the will, so that the will would be applied and moved to consent, or to determine itself to consent. But it is impossible for there to be such an immediate influx into the will to produce a free action or determination, as is clear from the arguments proposed at the beginning of Disputation XVIII. Therefore, God, neither by general concurrence nor by any other concurrence, even simultaneous concurrence, is the cause of the will’s determination. Consequently, the created will must be called the first and sole cause of that same determination.

Fifthly, the determination of the will is not an action of the will under every aspect of its consideration; rather, it is the very action insofar as it has the character of an influx belonging to the will alone. This is called the will’s determination insofar as the will thus exercises an influx, cooperates, and consents, while it is within the will’s power not to exercise that influx, not to cooperate, and not to consent. Therefore, nothing else should be posited as God’s cooperation in determining the will in this way, together with the will itself. Therefore, by its innate freedom alone the will determines itself and, consequently, will be the first and sole cause of its determination.

They confirm this with all the arguments by which, as will be clear in Disputations XCVI and XCVII, they try to prove that the good use of the helps of grace, insofar as it proceeds from free choice, proceeds from its own innate freedom alone. For since the will’s determination to supernatural acts is nothing other than the aforesaid good use insofar as it proceeds from free choice, it follows that the will’s determination must be referred to its innate freedom alone and, consequently, that the created will is the first and sole cause of its determination.

Sixthly, once any action or cooperation of God to determine the will to consent is posited, the will can still fail to determine itself and fail to consent. Therefore, by that action or cooperation it is not determined; rather, it still remains for the will to determine or not determine itself, and to consent or not consent. Therefore, no action or cooperation of God is the will’s determination. Consequently, the will is the first and sole cause of its determination.

III. The created will is not the sole or first cause of its determination.— The second opinion teaches that the will’s determination must be referred to God as to a prior per se efficient cause, as was seen in Disputations LXXV and LXXXVI and will be discussed more fully in Disputation XCVI. God does not, however, produce that same determination of free choice in us without our freely concurring and cooperating at the same time, but later in the order of reason, as the holy Council of Trent teaches. Consequently, the created will cannot be, or be called, the first root or first efficient cause of its determination. This opinion is followed by all defenders of efficacious grace, which physically predetermines free choice to consent; their testimonies were cited in Disputations XXII and XXIII. I consider this opinion so certain that its opposite has no probability. But, in order to examine the different ways of speaking used by some theologians and to explain what should be thought about them, we must first state and assume those points on which the authors of both opinions agree and about which no theologian has ever had any doubt. First, they agree that the created will, or free choice moved and excited by God, is the proximate cause not only of a pious operation but also of its own determination, by which it determines itself to act piously. Otherwise, it would be purely passive, receiving an operation produced by God alone, which is incompatible with the Council of Trent. Its actions would also not be free and, consequently, would not be meritorious or demeritorious. Secondly, they agree that created free choice truly moves and determines itself when it produces a free action. For it belongs to the nature of a free operation that it proceed as from a proximate cause, from an intrinsic principle that moves and determines itself, as will be made clear in Disputation CXVII and has been partly shown above in Disputations XVIII and XIX. Thirdly, with a qualification and in a certain respect, they agree that free choice can be said to be the first and sole cause of its determination or pious operation—namely, in the genus of the proximate secondary cause that elicits that same operation. For in this order it has no partnership with another proximate or secondary cause that would produce the same determination or pious operation together with the will itself. The difficulty, then, is whether the created will should be called the first root or first efficient cause of its determination, in such a way that it has no other cause that produces that same determination prior to it in causality or simultaneously with the created will.

IIII. A first cause of an effect is spoken of in two ways.— To explain this, it should be noted that something can be called the first cause of an effect in two ways. First, positively: because through a power not received from another, higher cause, it produces that effect. In this sense, God alone is the first cause of every created effect, whether he produces it immediately through himself or through another, secondary cause. In another way, something can be called the first cause negatively: because it has no prior per se efficient cause on which the concurrence of that same cause, by which it produces the effect, depends.

Let the first conclusion, then, be this: the created will cannot be called the first root or first cause of its determination in this latter sense that we have explained. This is the conclusion of Saint Thomas in Book II of the Sentences, dist. 37, q. 2, art. 2, in the body, and it is proved by his argument, which we brought forward in Disputation XVIII, no. 14, and Disputation XXIV, no. 19. For otherwise, with respect to its determination, the created will would have the character of a first principle, and thus two first principles would have to be admitted, which must not be said.

They reply that the created will does not simply have the character of a first principle in comparison with its own determination, because, although it can determine itself and does so without the influx of a prior agent predetermining it, nevertheless it does not have existence from itself and cannot operate without the first agent’s general simultaneous concurrence, whereas existence from itself and the ability to operate without that concurrence would be necessary for it to have the character of a first principle. But Saint Thomas expressly refutes this solution in the cited place, and it remains sufficiently ruled out by what was said in Disputations XVIII and XXIV above.

Secondly, it is proved as follows. The determination by which the will determines itself is nothing other than the very free volition, insofar as it proceeds from that same will as its proximate efficient cause. But under this aspect such a determination is not ultimately reduced to the created will, but to God as to a prior per se efficient cause, as was shown in Disputation XXXVI and will be discussed more fully in Disputation XCVI and the two following disputations. Therefore, the created will is not the first cause, even in the negative sense, of its determination. The inference is proved as follows: that is called the first cause negatively, in comparison with some effect, which has no other prior cause to which that effect is reduced. Since, then, the will’s determination, or free act, even insofar as it proceeds from the will, is reduced to God as to a prior per se efficient cause, it follows that the created will cannot be called the first cause or first root of its determination.

Thirdly, it is proved as follows. Just as the created will is not simply the first mover of itself, so it is not simply the first determiner of itself, as is clear from what was said in Disputations XXII and XXIII. Otherwise, it would be simply the first deliberating and the first free being, if its determination were not reduced to another prior efficient cause. Therefore, it is not the first cause of its determination. V. They reply that there is a great difference between God’s freedom and the freedom of the created will. For God is not only free, but is free per se and essentially; he possesses the use of freedom not only without dependence on another, but also without any potentiality, composition, or imperfection. For this reason, that mode of freedom requires infinite perfection and therefore cannot be communicated to any creature in that mode. Yet a participation in that freedom and indifference, with true dominion over one’s act, can be communicated to a creature without infinite perfection. Thus, for a power that is indifferent in itself to produce one act determinately rather than another, not through the determination of another but spontaneously and by an intrinsic power (although not without the concurrence of another), infinite perfection is not required. Hence it does not follow that a free will operating in this way, or first determining itself, is the first free being, unless the term “first free” is highly equivocal. For what is properly called the first free being is either what is free by essence or what has freedom wholly independent of another. Neither applies to the created will, since it has freedom only by participation in God’s freedom and depends on that same freedom in its determinations. But if “first free” is said of the agent from which a free determination first proceeds in its own order, then it is true that every free will can in its own order be called the first root of its determination: for, without that will, the determination cannot occur, and it occurs in no other way than through the will’s intrinsic and free application. They add that this is a highly improper meaning of the term and therefore one should not use it or attribute it to the created will. But against this there is an argument: as Saint Thomas argues in Book II of the Sentences, dist. 37, q. 2, art. 2, although this reply might establish that our will was not the absolutely first being, it could not avoid saying that it is the first agent if its action and determination were not reduced to some prior agent as to an efficient cause.

Moreover, the same reply supplies a powerful argument against the authors of the opposing opinion. For by the same reasoning that the created will is called “the first free being” most improperly, it must also be called “the first cause of its determination” most improperly. Consequently, one should not use this term or attribute it to the created will. But they say that this term should not be attributed to the created will absolutely except in evil acts. In good acts, and especially supernatural ones, we cannot speak this way absolutely, because although the will has its part in such a free determination, its first beginning is not from the will itself but from God, who prepares and helps it to determine itself. But against this there is the following argument. If the authors of this reply mean that the first beginning of a free determination does not have the will itself, but God, as its efficient cause, they are consequently bound to admit with us that such a determination is not to be reduced to the created will as to its first efficient cause, but to God alone, who, as an efficient cause, truly and efficaciously brings it about through the help of helping grace that the will determines itself. But if they mean that the first beginning of its determination comes from God only morally, insofar as through exciting grace he moves the will to consent by attracting, inviting, and persuading it, it seems to follow that the created will must properly be called the first physical efficient cause of its determination. Nor should the qualification “in its own order” or “in a certain way” be added to that same expression. Rather, it would be permissible to admit absolutely that although the created will does not have the character of a first principle, it truly is the first cause of its determination—something that even the authors of the reply we are refuting do not admit.

VI. Second conclusion. It cannot be denied that God concurs as an efficient cause in the determination by which the created will determines itself. The arguments made in favor of the preceding conclusion prove this all the more strongly. For otherwise it would follow that this determination must be attributed to the created will alone and not to God, and, consequently, that God would not be the first author and cause of all beings that belong to the order of nature or grace. VII. They reply that the will’s determination to good acts can in some way be attributed to the author of nature insofar as it proceeds from the faculty of free choice, which that same author of nature has conferred so that it may freely determine itself in this way; this is because it is not an abuse of free choice, as determination to a sinful act is, and insofar as the same author often helps and invites free choice to that determination through his particular gifts and helps. Nevertheless, they say that the determination itself must be attributed simply to free choice. But this reply needs no refutation: for according to it the will’s determination to good acts would be reduced to God only as to a cause without which it would not occur: that is, unless God had created free choice, its determination to this or that action would not have existed in the world. Or it would be reduced to God only as to a moral cause, not as to a physical efficient cause. How false this is is plainly clear from what was said in Disputations XXXVI and LXXXVI.

Moreover, the free power by which our will can freely determine itself is attributed to God as to its first efficient cause. Therefore, the actual determination of that same will must also be attributed to God as to its first per se efficient cause. Otherwise, as Saint Augustine argues, we would attribute what is less perfect to God, but what is more perfect not to God but to free choice. Yet this conflicts with the words of the Apostle James, who says: Every excellent gift and every perfect gift is from above, from the Father of lights. For it is clear that the actual determination to good is something more perfect than the power of determining oneself, just as an act is simply more perfect than a habit, as Saint Thomas says in the First Part of the Second Part, q. 71, art. 3, replies to objections 1 and 3, and First Part, q. 25, art. 1, reply to objection 2. Aristotle also teaches this in Metaphysics IX, text 19, saying: The act of any power is better than the power itself. We proved the same in the preceding disputation, no. 12.

VIII. How the will’s determination is free.— The conclusion is also proved by demolishing the chief foundation of the opposing opinion. For from this foundation it argues that God does not produce the will’s determination even together with the will: otherwise, the freedom of choice with respect to that same determination would be destroyed, and it would not be free if God produced it together with the will. But this reasoning assumes something false. Therefore, and so forth. The minor premise is proved as follows: an act of willing by the will and every other pious operation of it is truly free, even if God produces that operation together with the same will. Therefore, the will’s determination will likewise be free even if God produces its determination together with the will. The inference is proved because it is no more incompatible with freedom for God to produce the will’s operation together with it than for him to produce its determination together with the will determining itself. They reply by denying the inference and give the reason for the distinction: God’s influx into an action is immediate in the action itself, not in the will and then into the action through the will moved by him. But if God’s influx were to be applied to determining the will, it would have to be immediate in the will, so that the will would be applied and moved to consent, or to determine itself to consent. Therefore, one should not grant that God concurs as an efficient cause together with the will in its determination in the same way as he concurs in the action itself. Nevertheless, this reply remains sufficiently refuted by what was said in Disputations XVIII, XXII, and XXIII: for it was shown that God’s general concurrence, both for acts of the natural order and for those of the supernatural order, is God’s immediate influx into the cause, by which he moves, applies, and predetermines it to operate. Through such an influx, the freedom of created free choice is not only unharmed but perfected in a wondrous way.

IX. How the will is understood to be undetermined in the order of nature before it determines itself.— In answer to the first argument, it is said that, in that priority of nature before it determines itself, the created will is indeed undetermined in second act, or in the determination formally effected by an act of the will itself. Yet it is not undetermined with respect to prior determination, or with respect to the completion of first act, which is effected by God’s efficacious help, as was shown in Disputation XXIII. And although, in that priority, the will has no absolute necessity to exercise its influence, nor any necessity on the supposition of another act produced by that same will, it nevertheless has a conditional necessity to exercise its influence, or on the supposition of the divine will and efficacious help, as was shown in Disputation XXV. This necessity is a qualified necessity and therefore is not opposed to freedom, as is clear from what was said in that same disputation.

In answer to the confirmation, it is said that the created will depends on God not only in its being but also in its cooperation and influx, as on a prior per se efficient cause, as was said; this will be further evident in Disputations XCVI, XCVII, and XCVIII, where the arguments customarily brought forward to the contrary will be resolved. Hence, with respect to its own determination, the will cannot be called the first efficient cause, but only a proximate and secondary cause.

In answer to the second argument, it is said that created free choice does indeed have dominion over its act, but not first and absolute dominion, as will become clear in Disputation CXVII, where the testimonies of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas hinted at in the argument will be answered.

X. What a free power requires.— In answer to the third argument, it is said that it is indeed incompatible with a free power for the determination of its act to be in it from another while that power itself remains purely passive. But it is not incompatible with a free power for the determination of its act to be from another, provided that the power itself concurs from within itself in determining its act—that is, from an intrinsic active principle that is not determined in the manner of nature, or naturally to one outcome, but retains a true capacity for either alternative. Free choice retains this capacity even when predetermined by God, as was said in Disputation XVIII, no. 23. This answers the authority of Saint Thomas adduced; it will be explained at greater length in Disputation CXVII.

In answer to the fourth, the minor premise is denied. For God’s concurrence is an immediate influx into the will, as was shown in Disputations XVIII and XIX.

In answer to the fifth, it is said that the determination of the will of which we speak is the action itself insofar as it has the character of an influx—not of the will alone, but of the will as moved and predetermined by God’s influx to determine itself to act freely and to cooperate—as is plainly clear from what was said in Disputations XVIII and XXIII.

In answer to the confirmation, I shall respond expressly in Disputations XCVI and XCVII.

In answer to the seventh, it should be said that, once God’s action predetermining the will to consent is posited, the will cannot fail to determine itself in the composite sense, although it can do so absolutely and in the divided sense, as was said in Disputation XXV and will be said at greater length in Disputations XCII, XCIII, and XCIV.

Disputatio XC: Whether the help of grace, as efficacious help, depends on the free causal contribution of created free choice acting with it, or is efficacious in itself and as it comes from God before the free cooperation of that same choice.

Whether the help of grace, insofar as it is efficacious help, depends on the free influx of created free choice together with it, or whether it is efficacious in itself, as it comes from God prior to the free cooperation of that same free choice.

I. We touched on this difficulty incidentally in Disputations LXXII and LXXIII, while discussing the nature of the division of gratuitous help into sufficient help and efficacious help. Now, however, it must be discussed at greater length.

Some recent theologians teach that the help of grace is not efficacious of itself, that is, by the sole force and intrinsic power of the help itself, but in dependence on the free cooperation of created free choice with it. From this they infer that our free choice, by its innate freedom, can cause the same help, while remaining unchanged in itself, to become efficacious or inefficacious. They prove their opinion by the arguments set out in the aforementioned Disputation LXXIII.

They also prove the same point as follows. Human beings, placed in the arena of this life, have been put in the hand of their own counsel, so that they may reach out their hand toward whatever they wish, as is clear from Ecclesiasticus 15: God created man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel, etc. But in truth a person would not have been placed in the hand of his own counsel unless, by his innate freedom, he could cause help that is efficacious for premoving him to become inefficacious by not consenting to it, and cause help that is inefficacious to become efficacious by consenting to it and cooperating vigorously with it. Therefore, by his freedom he can bring this about; consequently, no help is given that is efficacious by its own nature, prior to or independently of the free cooperation of our free choice. The inference is proved: for if help were efficacious by its own nature, our free choice could not make it inefficacious. Indeed, not even God could do so, since it is not in his power to change the nature or essence of a thing, just as no power can make something be a human being and not be a rational animal, since a rational animal is the very essence of a human being.

II. Second. Efficacious help is nothing other than help that actually produces a pious act of willing or a pious operation, as is clear from the very meaning of the name. But no help produces an act of willing or pious operation by its own nature prior to the free influx and cooperation of our free choice with it; otherwise, free choice would be purely passive, receiving a pious operation produced by God alone. Yet this openly conflicts with the definition of the Council of Trent: therefore, no help is efficacious by its own nature, or independently of the free cooperation of free choice. Consequently, it will be efficacious only from the event or effect, which likewise depends on the cooperation of free choice.

Third, they argue as follows. No help of grace is efficacious naturally; otherwise, it would make a person cooperate naturally and not freely. Therefore, neither is it efficacious by its own nature. For what is such by its own nature is deemed to be so naturally. Therefore, it will be efficacious accidentally and from an extrinsic source, namely, from the free cooperation of free choice.

Fourth. The help of grace is efficacious only insofar as it is subject to the foreknowledge and will of God, who wills by such help, bestowed on such a person in such circumstances, to convert that person to himself. Therefore, it will be efficacious only by an extrinsic denomination. The inference is proved: for God’s foreknowledge and will are something extrinsic to the help itself. Therefore, it is not efficacious through some real and intrinsic power existing in efficacious help, which is absent from sufficient help.

Fifth. If the help of grace is established as efficacious by its own nature, or by a real and intrinsic power of the help itself, all freedom of choice is entirely taken away. Therefore, it must not be so established. The antecedent is proved: for if it is efficacious by its own nature and intrinsically, free choice will not be able to refrain from acting with it. Therefore, through such help the faculty of free choice to act or not to act is destroyed; consequently, its freedom perishes, since freedom consists in the faculty for either alternative.

III. They confirm their opinion by all the arguments set out in Disputation XXIII, with which they try to prove that, through efficacious help, God does not predetermine the created will to consent in the manner of a physical cause, but leaves it entirely indifferent and undetermined, so that it acts if it wishes and does not act if it does not wish. For this principle entails that no help of grace is efficacious of itself and intrinsically, but only from its effect. For help that is efficacious of itself and intrinsically has the power physically to predetermine free choice to consent. The arguments set out in Disputations XVIII and LXXXV tend in this direction as well. With them they try to prove that God’s general concurrence, both in the natural and in the supernatural order, is not an immediate influx into the secondary cause but into its effect; and, consequently, that God and free choice are two partial causes of a pious operation, just as two people pulling a ship are partial causes of the ship’s motion. For this entails, by an evident inference, that the help of grace is not intrinsically efficacious, or efficacious by its own nature.

IIII. This opinion, however, does not seem admissible. Hence all Thomists and other Doctors who hold that the efficacy of the help of pre-operating grace is not only moral but also physical, and that it predetermines our free choice to consent freely in the manner of a physical cause, defend the contrary view. They do not all agree, however, in how to express it. Some say that it is efficacious of itself; others assert that it is efficacious by its own nature; others object to this way of speaking because it seems somewhat harsh, and want it to be said that it is efficacious prior to and independently of the free cooperation of free choice. Still others approve none of the foregoing ways of speaking. They think instead that the help of grace should be called efficacious not in itself, of itself, or by its own nature, but as an instrument of the absolute and efficacious decree of the will of God—excluding middle knowledge—who wills free choice to cooperate with God as he moves it, and to consent.

How the help of grace is efficacious of itself or by its own nature.— To set forth my opinion on the matter itself and on the ways of speaking just mentioned, one must observe that when it is said that the help of grace is efficacious of itself, as it comes from God, the phrase of itself can be understood in two ways. First, it can be taken as abstracting from God’s absolute and efficacious decree that a person be converted or act piously here and now. In this sense no Catholic has said that the help of grace is efficacious in itself or of itself. For it is self-evident by the light of nature that nothing comes to be in the world unless God wills or permits it, since through his intellect and will he is the cause of everything that has being in any way, as was shown in Disputation XXVI. In a second way, the help of grace can be said to be efficacious of itself such that the phrase of itself, or in itself, signifies independence from the free cooperation of our free choice. Thus, to say that the help of grace is efficacious in itself or of itself is the same as saying that it is efficacious prior to and independently of the free cooperation of our free choice. The proponents of the foregoing proposition understand it in this sense, and in this sense it is entirely true, as will be clear below. Likewise, when it is asserted that the help of grace is efficacious by its own nature, the phrase by its own nature can be understood in two ways. First, it can signify the same as naturally, as if one were saying that, through efficacious help, God makes a person act naturally. In this sense the proposition is false and was not intended by Catholic authors, who explicitly teach against the Lutherans and Calvinists that a person cooperates with God as he rouses and moves him, not naturally but freely. Some nevertheless want to defend the foregoing proposition when rightly and piously understood, insofar as it signifies that it belongs naturally, or by its own nature, to efficacious help to be the means by which God causes a person to act freely and infallibly. For just as it naturally belongs to efficacious motion, by which God applies natural secondary causes to act, to be the means by which God himself causes natural secondary causes to act naturally and without the use of freedom, so they do not consider it unfitting to grant that it belongs to efficacious help of divine grace by its own nature, or naturally, to be the means by which God causes a person freely to cooperate and consent to the divine call. For efficacious help of grace intrinsically and essentially makes free causes act freely, just as God’s general concurrence makes natural causes act naturally. The reason for this is the one we gave above: God’s concurrence causes secondary causes to act, each according to its own nature, as Saint Thomas teaches: I p. q. 19. art. 8. This way of speaking could indeed be tolerated in this sense. But because it is very ambiguous, and it is unclear whether the phrase by its own nature, or naturally, in that proposition modifies the verb belongs—expressed or understood in the previously cited way of speaking—so that the sense is that it naturally belongs to efficacious help to make a person act, and act freely; or instead modifies the verb act, as if one were saying that God, through efficacious help, makes a person act naturally; lest anyone through ignorance or inattention understand or take that proposition in this second, heretical sense, one should not use it, especially since there are other words that can explain and defend the efficacy of the help of pre-operating grace with the greatest clarity and precision, and without any danger of offense, as will be clear from what is said below. Second, the phrase by its own nature can be taken to signify the same as through a real and intrinsic power that it has from God alone, prior to the free cooperation of free choice, even when that cooperation is foreknown by the knowledge they call middle knowledge. In this sense, Catholics who use the proposition understand it, and this sense is Catholic. But, as was said, this way of speaking is not free from equivocation. Therefore, it will be better to explain the efficacy of the help of divine grace by other expressions to be set out below.

V. What the term “efficacious grace” signifies.— Second, one must observe that in the present disputation the term efficacy is not taken for actual efficient causation by which the help of grace, together with the will, produces a pious operation, but for the real and intrinsic power that the help itself has from God to move free choice and cause it freely to cooperate and consent. Saint Augustine spoke of the efficacy of grace in this sense when he said: It is certain that we act when we act; but he makes us act, by furnishing the will with most efficacious powers, he who said: I will cause you to walk in my commandments, and to keep my judgments and do them. By “most efficacious powers” he wished to be understood to mean the real and intrinsic power that efficacious help has from God to cause free choice to cooperate with God and consent. He means the same thing by help that is more powerful and stronger: Saint Cyril also used this expression to explain the efficacy of grace, as is clear from his words cited in Disputation LXXI, no. 10. Since some recent theologians also take efficacy to mean actual efficient causation, it will be useful, for completeness of doctrine, to discuss efficacy in both senses.

Third. One must note that efficacious help, being God’s immediate influx into free choice as a cause, and together with free choice into its operation, as is clear from what was said in Disputations XVIII, XXII, and XXIII, produces a twofold effect, one of which is subordinated to and follows the other. First, it premoves and causes free choice to cooperate and consent, as was shown in Disputation LXXXVI. This belongs to the help insofar as it is God’s immediate influx into free choice as a cause. Second, it produces a pious operation together with free choice itself as moved by God, simultaneously in time. This effect is attributed to the same efficacious help insofar as it is an influx with free choice into the operation, which depends on both.

Fourth. One must note that, as the authors of the opposing opinion acknowledge, dependence, properly speaking, in efficient causes implies a certain subordination and inferiority of that which depends on another to that on which it depends. Hence, although the first cause, acting outwardly through secondary causes, does not produce their effects without the influx and cooperation of secondary causes, nevertheless the divine operation in producing such effects does not, properly speaking, depend on the cooperation and influx of secondary causes. Rather, the converse is true: the cooperation and influx of each secondary cause depends on God’s operation, as was said in Disputation LXXXVI and will be clearer still in Disputations XCVI and XCVII. Therefore, all dependence is to be attributed to the secondary cause in comparison with the first, on which it depends for its being, influx, and cooperation; and the same is true of a pious operation, which depends on free choice as its proximate cause and on God as its first, per se efficient cause.

VI. The efficacy of grace does not depend on the free cooperation of free choice.— Let the first conclusion, then, be this. If we speak of the efficacy of the help of divine grace in its first and proper meaning, insofar as it signifies the real and intrinsic power of the help through which God causes free choice to cooperate and consent, it must be said that this efficacy does not depend on the free cooperation of free choice, but precedes it in the order of reason and causality. This conclusion can easily be proved from what was said in the preceding disputations. For efficacious help is God’s immediate influx into free choice as a cause, as was shown in Disputation XVIII; and through the same help God applies and physically predetermines free choice itself to cooperate and consent, as is clear from Disputations XXII and XXIII and will be clearer still in Disputation XCI. Therefore, its efficacy does not depend on the influx and cooperation of free choice.

Second. What is prior does not depend on what is posterior. But the efficacy of grace is prior to the cooperation of free choice, since efficacious grace, or helping grace insofar as it helps and cooperates, is prevenient, as was shown in Disputation LXXXII. The influx and free cooperation of free choice, however, are posterior, since they are the effect of the same efficacious help, as is clear from what was said in Disputation LXVI and from what will be said in Disputations XCVI and XCVII. Therefore, the efficacy of the help of prevenient grace does not depend on the free cooperation of free choice.

Third. The bestowal of efficacious help is the adequate cause that makes free choice cooperate, as will be clear in Disputation CII. Therefore, the efficacy of the same help does not depend on the free influx and cooperation of free choice itself. The inference is proved: for the efficacy of a cause does not depend on its effect; rather, the effect depends on the power and efficacy of its cause. For example, the efficacy that fire has to heat does not depend on the heating or heat produced; on the contrary, the heating itself and the heat produced depend on the intrinsic power and efficacy of fire.

Fourth. Help whose efficacy depends on the free influx and cooperation of free choice with it is efficacious only from its effect. But the help of helping grace is not efficacious only from its effect; rather, it is efficacious through the real power it has as it comes from God, prior to the same cooperation of free choice, as was shown in Disputation LXXIII. Therefore, efficacious help, insofar as it is efficacious, does not depend on the free influx and cooperation of created free choice with it.

VII. Let the second conclusion be this. If the efficacy of the help of divine grace is taken for its efficient causation, by which it causes free choice to exercise its influx together with grace and cooperate, this efficacy, or efficient causation, does not depend on the free influx and cooperation of that same free choice. This conclusion is proved by the arguments made for the preceding conclusion. It is also proved because grace alone causes this effect in us. For although a person wills freely, only God gives the will most efficacious powers and through the help of grace causes it to cooperate and will, as was shown in Disputation LXXXVI and will be clearer still in Disputation C. Therefore, this efficient causation of grace is understood as prior to the free cooperation of free choice and, consequently, does not depend on it.

The actual efficient causation of grace is not without the free cooperation of free choice, yet it does not depend on it.— Let the third conclusion be this. If the efficacy of gratuitous help is taken for its actual efficient causation, by which it produces with us the very act of willing, or a pious operation, that efficacy, or efficient causation, does not exist without the free cooperation of free choice; yet, properly speaking, it does not depend on it. The authors of both opinions undoubtedly accept the first part of this conclusion, and the reason is evident: otherwise, free choice would be purely passive, receiving a pious operation produced by grace alone, which conflicts with the definition of the Council of Trent. The authors of the first opinion do not accept the second part. But it is proved by the arguments made for the first conclusion and by what was said in the fourth foundation. For dependence in efficient causes implies a certain subordination and inferiority of that which depends on another to that on which it depends. But the efficacy of grace, even if taken for the efficient causation of grace itself, is not inferior to the cooperation of free choice, nor subject to it. Rather, efficacious grace subjects the human will and makes it obedient to itself, as was shown in Disputation LXXXVII. Therefore, the efficacy of grace and its efficient causation do not depend on the free cooperation of free choice.

VIII. Free choice does not make the helps of divine grace efficacious.— It is also proved as follows. Otherwise, it would be in the power of our free choice to make the helps of grace efficacious by cooperating with them, or inefficacious by withholding consent. Yet this is impossible, as was shown in Disputation LXXIII and will be shown at greater length in Disputation CVIII. This is confirmed: for the opposing opinion would entail that efficacious helps have from God only the power by which they can produce an effect actually, while they would beg their actual efficient causation from free choice actually acting as an efficient cause—if through the influx and cooperation of free choice the help of grace that was not efficacious in itself is made efficacious. Consequently, our free choice would confer on the helps of grace the efficacy they have.

Solution:— They reply that when it is asserted that our consent makes the helps of grace efficacious, this should not be understood as though our free choice imparted some power or efficacy to the helps themselves. Rather, the helps impart to free choice the power and inclination to elicit consent by inviting, attracting, and assisting free choice itself toward that end. But they say we mean it in this sense: for help to be efficacious is nothing other than for it, through its impulse and invitation, which it has by a necessity of nature insofar as it is prevenient grace, to move free choice to consent or to cooperate with it toward contrition or another act to which prevenient grace invites it. But moving free choice to consent or cooperate with prevenient grace toward contrition depends on the innate freedom of free choice, by which it wills or does not will to elicit such consent and cooperation. Thus, that the help of prevenient grace is efficacious—that is, that it has the effect to which it invites free choice—depends on free choice itself consenting and cooperating with it as a part of the cause that must produce such an effect together with it. In comparison with that effect, if it is produced, the help is called efficacious; if it is not produced because free choice does not will to consent and cooperate, the help is called inefficacious. From this they infer that for free choice, first moved and roused in the order of nature by the help of prevenient grace, freely to consent and cooperate with that same help is not to attribute efficacy to it. Rather, it is to supply the condition without which that help would not have the character of being efficacious in comparison with such an effect, nor would it have the character of helping free choice toward contrition through a new influx of that same help into contrition, by which it cooperates with free choice to produce contrition. For the free cooperation of free choice, concurring with it to produce that same contrition, would be lacking. Thus, according to this reply, although all supernatural efficacy and efficient causation come from the help of grace, nevertheless that efficacy or efficient causation depends on the free cooperation of free choice as on a condition without which it would not have the character of being efficacious in comparison with such an effect.

IX. Refutation.— Many things are involved in this reply that have been sufficiently refuted above and will be refuted again in what follows. First, what it asserts is false: that the help is efficacious means nothing other than that it has the effect to which it attracts and invites free choice. For it has already been shown above that the help of pre-operating grace is efficacious principally, and is called efficacious, because of its real and intrinsic power, through which God, in the manner of a physical cause, causes free choice to cooperate by predetermining it to such cooperation. It is also false that they say the efficacy of help depends on the free cooperation of free choice as on a condition without which it would not be efficacious. For a condition without which something would not be the case precedes, at least in the order of reason, the effect that depends on it. But the free cooperation of free choice does not precede the efficacy of grace, even in the order of reason; rather, the reverse is true: in the order of nature and causality the efficacy of grace precedes the free cooperation of free choice, since efficacious help, insofar as it is efficacious and helping, is prevenient, as was shown in Disputations LXXXII and LXXXVI. Therefore, it is impossible for the efficacy of grace to depend, even as on a condition without which it would not be efficacious, on the free cooperation of free choice. This is confirmed first as follows. If the cooperation of free choice is a condition without which actual grace would not be efficacious, then that cooperation, or influx of free choice, precedes the efficacy of grace in the order of nature, just as the application of fire precedes the action by which fire burns wood. Therefore, the cooperation or consent of free choice does not need the efficacy of grace, since it is understood as prior to it. From this it follows again that efficacious grace, insofar as it is efficacious, follows upon the influx and cooperation of free choice. Yet this cannot be admitted.

X. Predestination does not depend on the free cooperation of free choice.— This is confirmed a second time. For otherwise it would follow that divine predestination, by which people are efficaciously ordered to eternal life through these and those helps, depends on their free cooperation as on a condition without which it would not have the character of predestination in comparison with those people, but would retain only the character of a common supernatural providence. But this consequence is explicitly contrary to the teaching of Saint Augustine, as was shown in Disputation XXXVII. Therefore. The inference is proved: predestination includes efficacious helps, since predestination, as we said above from Augustine, is the preparation of God’s benefits, by which all who are delivered are most certainly delivered. Therefore, if the efficacy of those same helps depends on the free cooperation of free choice with them as on a condition without which they would not be efficacious, it follows that divine predestination itself depends on that same free cooperation as on a condition without which it would not be predestination.

XI. How a person is said to have been placed in the hand of his own counsel.— In answer to the first argument, it is said that a person is not said to have been placed in the hand of his own counsel because he can make help that would otherwise be inefficacious become efficacious, but because he has the choice of his own act and can act or not act. For although, on the supposition that a person is moved efficaciously by God to consent, he cannot fail to consent in the composite sense, as was proved in Disputation XXV, nevertheless he can always absolutely and in the divided sense dissent, if he so wills. This will be discussed at greater length in Disputations XCII, XCIII, and XCIV. Let what was said about this same authority in Disputation XXI, no. 11, and Disputation XXIII, no. 44, be consulted.

In answer to the second, it is said that the help of grace being efficacious does not mean only that it produces a pious operation, but that it physically predetermines free choice to cooperate and consent, causing it actually to concur with grace itself; and it does this first in the order of reason, before free choice cooperates, as was said. Second, even if efficacy is taken for the actual efficient causation of help, it still does not depend on the free cooperation of free choice. For although it is in the same moment of time as that cooperation, it precedes it in the order of reason and causality—not by producing consent without the free cooperation of free choice, but by applying free choice itself so that it may cooperate freely and have an influx into consent.

The solution to the third argument is clear from what was said above.

XII. Efficacious help, as subject to God’s decree to convert a person, adds a new power over sufficient help.— In answer to the fourth, it is said that the help of grace is indeed efficacious as subject to God’s absolute and efficacious decree to convert to himself the person whose heart he moves, prior to all foreknowledge of our free choice’s future cooperation. And although that decree, insofar as it formally signifies an act of the divine will, is something extrinsic to efficacious help, insofar as it signifies the effect of that decree, it is not extrinsic to the same help. For, as is clear from the premises in Disputations XIX, XXXI, XXXII, and LXXIII, it places in the help a certain intentional power of God, just as the power of an art is in the instrument of the artisan while it is moved by him. This power cannot fail, nor can the human will impede it, so that the effect God intends to produce through that help will follow—not only as to its substance but also as to the mode of freedom fitting to the created will.

In answer to the fifth, the antecedent is denied. To the proof, it is said that, as was shown in Disputation XXV and will be discussed more fully in Disputations XCII and XCIII, the person moved by God through efficacious help can, absolutely speaking and in the divided sense, dissent and not act, although in a qualified way and in the composite sense that person cannot dissent or fail to act. For the freedom of our free choice it is enough that, absolutely speaking and in the divided sense, it can refrain from acting; it is not required that it be able to refrain from acting in the composite sense. More will be said on this in Disputations CXV, CXVI, and CXXI.

In answer to the confirmation, I think sufficient satisfaction has already been given in the disputations cited there.

Disputatio XCI: Whether God, through the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand, predetermines free choice to consent in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly as an efficient cause.

Disputatio XCII: Whether free choice moved by God through efficacious help can, in the composite sense, dissent from that same help and fail to be converted.

Disputatio XCIII: Whether created free choice can resist efficacious help, speaking properly of resistance.

Disputatio XCIV: How the composite and divided senses are to be explained and understood when it is asserted that human free choice moved by God through efficacious help cannot dissent or fail to be converted in the composite sense, but only in the divided sense.

Disputatio XCV: Whether, after God has mercifully aroused created free choice, he awaits its free consent to be purified or justified.

Disputatio XCVI: Whether free choice does anything of itself when it consents to God who arouses and calls it.

Disputatio XCVII: Whether the good use or cooperation of free choice, by which it consents to God who arouses and calls it, proceeds from its innate freedom alone.

Disputatio XCVIII: Whether, exciting grace being presupposed, the consent or cooperation of free choice must first be begun by the created will, or by the divine will or the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand.

Disputatio XCIX: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person, preceded by exciting grace, wills to be converted, he is therefore helped by God and converted; or, conversely, he is converted because he is helped by God.

Disputatio C: Whether the bestowal of efficacious help is the adequate cause of the conversion of free choice.

Disputatio CI: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person is not helped by God, he is therefore not converted.

Disputatio CII: Whether this causal statement is true: because a person aroused by God does not will to use sufficient grace, he is therefore not helped by God or converted.

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

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