De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Introduction

Disputatio LXX: Whether grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating, exciting and helping, and prevenient and subsequent grace.

Disputatio LXXI: Whether the help of grace is fittingly divided into sufficient help and efficacious help.

Disputatio LXXII: Whether, in the division of the help of grace into efficacious and inefficacious help, sufficient help is the immediate subject of division.

Disputatio LXXIII: Whether the division of the help of prevenient grace into efficacious and inefficacious help is taken solely from the effect, which also depends on the free cooperation of free choice, or also from the real power of the help itself.

Disputatio LXXIV: Whether exciting or prevenient grace is formally a vital act of free choice, or something preceding every vital act.

Disputatio LXXV: What is the proper effect of exciting grace insofar as it is formally exciting.

Disputatio LXXVI: Whether exciting grace is the same as sufficient grace.

Disputatio LXXVII: Whether exciting grace, conferred on human beings in the ordinary manner, depends on the ministers of the Church.

Disputatio LXXVIII: Whether exciting grace, ordinarily conferred on human beings, depends on the effort and diligence of the person who is roused.

Disputatio LXXIX: What help of grace is called truly sufficient.

Disputatio LXXX: Whether every sufficient help is efficacious in some respect.

Whether every sufficient help is efficacious in some respect.

I. The first reason for doubt is this: sufficient and efficacious help are essentially and specifically distinct from each other. Therefore they cannot also belong to the same help according to different respects or in relation to different things. The consequence is proved as follows: coordinate species that divide a genus cannot belong to the same thing at once. For it is impossible for the same animal to be both a human being and a horse, since human being and horse are mutually distinct species of animal.

Second. As was said above, sufficient help grants the ability to act, while efficacious help grants actually acting. But the ability to act and actually acting are not the same. Therefore sufficient help and efficacious help are not the same. Thus it is impossible for the same help to be efficacious and sufficient at once, even in relation to different things.

Third. A habit, since it is specified by acts, and an act by objects, cannot be a sufficient principle with respect to one act and an efficacious one with respect to another, unless that act belongs to the same species. This is clear in the habit of temperance, which can be an efficacious principle of an act of temperance concerning meat and a sufficient principle of an act of temperance concerning eggs. But it is impossible for it to be a sufficient principle in relation to an act of temperance and an efficacious principle in relation to an act of another virtue, such as fortitude or justice. But actual help is similarly specified by the acts to which it is ordered, and acts by their objects. Therefore it is impossible for the same help to be efficacious in relation to one act and sufficient in relation to another, unless those acts are of the same species. Consequently, help sufficient for perfect contrition cannot be efficacious in relation to fear of the punishments of hell or another act specifically distinct from an act of perfect contrition. If this is admitted, it would be the same to say that some help is sufficient in relation to one act and efficacious in relation to another as to say that some help is sufficient in relation to one act of faith and at the same time efficacious in relation to another act of the same virtue of faith, which is also impossible.

Fourth. Actual help is not something permanent in the soul, but something passing and flowing along with the operation itself. Therefore, if it is efficacious in relation to one act, it cannot be sufficient in relation to another. The consequence is proved as follows: when the operation in relation to which it is efficacious has passed, it has already had every effect it can have and has entirely ceased to exist; consequently, it can no longer be called sufficient help in relation to any operation. This is confirmed. Actual help is really identical with the operation for which it is given, just as motion is really identical with its terminus. But no actual help can be identical with two actions specifically distinct; otherwise those operations would be really identical with one another, since things that are really identical with a third are really identical with one another. Therefore it is impossible for the same actual help to be sufficient in relation to one act and efficacious in relation to another.

II. Sufficient help in relation to one act is always efficacious in relation to another.— Nevertheless, despite these arguments, it must be said that every sufficient help in relation to one act is always efficacious in relation to another, to produce which it is destined by an absolute decree of the divine will. For example, help sufficient for an act of faith efficaciously produces in a person pious thoughts and knowledge of things to be believed, or pious desires to have faith, and other imperfect acts of this kind, which, generally speaking, precede the assent of faith. Similarly, help sufficient for an act of contrition efficaciously produces in a person consideration of the punishments of hell, or of divine goodness, or of the shamefulness of sin, fear of hell, or attrition, or other imperfect acts of this kind, which generally speaking precede perfect contrition. This view is commonly taught by recent Thomists, especially M. Medina, 1. 2. q. 109. ar. 10, toward the end. And it is proved.

First, from Isaiah 55: As rain and snow come down from heaven and do not return there, but soak the earth, drench it, make it sprout, and give seed to the sower and bread to the eater, so shall my word be that goes forth from my mouth. It shall not return to me empty, but shall do whatever I willed, and shall prosper in the things for which I sent it. By these words it is signified that the interior call by which God addresses the soul is not empty or fruitless, but always has some effect in a person—namely, the effect that God efficaciously wills it to have—even though the same interior call, with respect to the perfect act to which it was ultimately ordered by God's antecedent will, is sufficient. Therefore the same help that is sufficient with respect to some perfect act is at the same time efficacious with respect to other imperfect acts, which ordinarily precede and are ordered to the perfect act.

III. Second, this is proved because actual help is never found in a person's intellect or will without an operation of that same intellect and will. For in this it differs from habitual help: a habit is something lasting in the soul even when it does nothing, whereas actual help is something flowing, just like an operation; hence it passes away together with the operation itself. Therefore actual sufficient help always has some operation joined to it, which it produces. Therefore, with respect to that same operation, such help will be efficacious, even though it is sufficient with respect to a further perfect act to which it was ultimately ordered.

The soul's arousal does not occur without its operation.— Third, this is proved because God arouses the soul by sufficient help, as was said above. But it entails a contradiction that the soul be formally aroused unless through a vital act elicited by itself, since such arousal is vital and cannot occur without a vital act. Therefore sufficient help always produces some vital act in a person, at least an indeliberate one. Therefore with respect to that act such help is always efficacious.

IV. Fourth. It is impossible that God actually move the soul and the soul not actually be moved, since mover and moved are correlatives. But by actual sufficient help God moves the soul; therefore the soul is actually moved, and hence by some act elicited by itself, for the soul is never actually moved except by eliciting some act. Therefore sufficient help will always be efficacious with respect to that act.

Fifth. Just as grace is divided into sufficient and efficacious grace, so too it is divided into prevenient and subsequent grace, as Saint Thomas teaches in I–II, question 111, article 3. But with respect to one effect grace can be prevenient and with respect to another subsequent, as Saint Thomas teaches in the body of that same article. Therefore, similarly, the same actual help can be efficacious with respect to one effect and sufficient with respect to another.

This is confirmed. The same habit is at once sufficient in the order to one effect and efficacious in the order to another: for the habit of grace efficaciously justifies and heals the soul, and at the same time is a sufficient root with respect to a meritorious work. Likewise, the habit of charity efficaciously makes a person a lover of God, and at the same time is a sufficient habitual principle with respect to an actual love of God. Therefore, similarly, the same actual help can at once be sufficient help with respect to one effect and efficacious with respect to another.

Sixth, it is proved as follows. White and black are more distant from one another than sufficient help and efficacious help, since those two are contraries, whereas these are not. But the same subject can be white without qualification and black in a qualified respect in relation to different things. Therefore, similarly, the same help can be sufficient without qualification and efficacious in a qualified respect in relation to different effects.

V. To the first argument it is answered, first, that just as grace is not diversified in essence by being prevenient and subsequent, operating and cooperating, but only according to different effects, so proportionally actual help is not always diversified in essence by being sufficient and efficacious, but is sometimes diversified only according to different effects. For it is called efficacious in relation to the effect, or imperfect act, that it produces, and sufficient in relation to the perfect act that it can produce and toward which it is ultimately ordered. A second answer is easier: that help which is absolutely efficacious without qualification is really and essentially distinct from help that is only sufficient; nevertheless, there is no difficulty in help efficacious in a qualified respect being really identical with help that is sufficient without qualification.

To the second argument it is answered that it proves only that the same help is not sufficient and efficacious in relation to the same thing, but only in relation to different things.

A habit is the principle of acts that differ in species in the order of nature.— To the third it is answered that imperfect acts do not specify a habit, but only perfect acts, because imperfect acts are ordered to perfect acts. Hence the same habit can be the principle of acts that differ in species in the order of nature, especially if one is ordered to the other, provided that in the moral genus they belong to the same species. Thus temperate eating of meat and temperate eating of fish differ in species in the order of nature, although it is certain that in the moral genus they belong to the same species of virtue. Similarly, collecting money in order to make restitution and willing to make restitution are acts distinct in species; nevertheless, because one is ordered to the other, the same virtue of justice can be the principle of both acts. Therefore, since the imperfect acts that sufficient help in fact produces in us are ordered as to an end toward a further perfect act, there is no difficulty in the same help being efficacious in relation to imperfect acts and at the same time sufficient in relation to the perfect act toward which it is ultimately directed. The case is not the same with a habit in relation to an act of temperance and one of fortitude or justice, for such acts are perfect, and one is not per se ordered to another. Therefore, the same habit cannot be a sufficient principle in relation to an act of temperance and an efficacious principle in relation to an act of justice or fortitude. A second answer is that a habit too is, in its own way, an efficacious principle in relation to one thing and a sufficient principle in relation to another. For, as was said above, a habit efficaciously establishes a faculty in first act, granting it operative power and qualifying it, and at the same time is a sufficient principle in relation to the operation it can produce.

VI. To the fourth argument it is answered that throughout the whole time in which sufficient help affects a power, it simultaneously and efficaciously produces those imperfect acts of which we spoke above, and is a principle sufficient in its own order in relation to the perfect act to which it is ordered. But if in fact a person's free choice does not produce a perfect act by that help, this proceeds from his fault, because he was unwilling to use the same help well; rather, by resisting it, he set an obstacle so that God would not proceed further by his grace in helping the person to produce a perfect act. For God, as St. Thomas teaches, is, as far as he is concerned, ready to give grace to all. For he wills all people to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, as is said in 1 Tim. 2. But only those are deprived of grace who themselves provide an obstacle to grace, just as, when the Sun illuminates the world, blame is imputed to the one who closes his eyes if some harm follows from this, although he cannot see unless he is first illumined by the Sun's light.

To the confirmation it is answered that actual help, both sufficient and efficacious, is really distinct from the operation toward which it is ordered, as was said in disp. 19, no. 8.

At the end of this treatise on exciting and sufficient grace, a serious difficulty presented itself for examination: whether sufficient help of divine grace is given to all people, even the reprobate and hardened. But this must be treated expressly below, in the discussion of reprobation. Let what has been said about exciting and sufficient grace suffice.

End of Book Eight.

Book Nine

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

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