De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Introduction
Disputatio LXX: Whether grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating, exciting and helping, and prevenient and subsequent grace.
Disputatio LXXI: Whether the help of grace is fittingly divided into sufficient help and efficacious help.
Disputatio LXXII: Whether, in the division of the help of grace into efficacious and inefficacious help, sufficient help is the immediate subject of division.
Disputatio LXXIII: Whether the division of the help of prevenient grace into efficacious and inefficacious help is taken solely from the effect, which also depends on the free cooperation of free choice, or also from the real power of the help itself.
Disputatio LXXIV: Whether exciting or prevenient grace is formally a vital act of free choice, or something preceding every vital act.
Disputatio LXXV: What is the proper effect of exciting grace insofar as it is formally exciting.
Disputatio LXXVI: Whether exciting grace is the same as sufficient grace.
Disputatio LXXVII: Whether exciting grace, conferred on human beings in the ordinary manner, depends on the ministers of the Church.
Disputatio LXXVIII: Whether exciting grace, ordinarily conferred on human beings, depends on the effort and diligence of the person who is roused.
Disputatio LXXIX: What help of grace is called truly sufficient.
What help of grace is truly called sufficient.
I. To this difficulty theologians commonly answer that help of grace is called sufficient for some act when a person can truly perform that act by it. Thus sufficient help for believing is that by which a person can believe; sufficient help for doing penance is that by which a person can do penance; and the same applies proportionally to other acts of the virtues. From this they infer that sufficient help for salvation is that by which a person can be saved. They gather this from St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, chs. 11 and 12, whose words we cited in disp. 71, no. 7. More recent theologians, however, inquire further into what is necessary on the part of divine help for a person to be said to be able by it to believe, love, or persevere. For some think that, for a help of grace to be truly called sufficient help by which a person can believe, love, or persevere, it must be so sufficient that, on the part of the active principle—that is, on the part of prevenient help—no other help is necessarily prerequired for him actually to believe, love, or persevere.1 They prove their opinion as follows.
First, from the very etymology of the name. For that is called sufficient beyond which nothing else is required. If something else were required as necessary, that help alone, which is called sufficient, would in fact not be sufficient. Therefore help is sufficient for believing when no other help antecedent to the cooperation of free choice in the act of believing is necessary beyond it, for a person actually to believe.
Second, it is argued by comparison. If twelve votes were absolutely necessary for some canonical election, and Peter, for example, had only eight votes, he would not be said to have sufficient votes for that election. Therefore, similarly, if beyond the help called sufficient for believing some other help is absolutely necessary, that first help will truly not be sufficient in relation to the act of believing, but would be called sufficient in name only.
Third. No other help2 mediates between sufficient help for believing and the act of believing itself. Therefore that is sufficient help for believing beyond which no other help is necessary for a person actually to believe. The consequence is proved as follows: otherwise there would already be a middle help between sufficient help and the act of believing itself. The antecedent is proved because it cannot be explained what that middle thing would be. For it is neither a habit nor a quality, since a habit is something permanent, while that middle thing cannot be permanent; nor is it an act, for otherwise another act of believing would mediate between sufficient help for believing and the act of believing itself, which is impossible. Therefore such a middle help is nothing.
This opinion can be confirmed by all the arguments with which in disp. 98 we shall undertake to prove that, besides sufficient help, no efficacious help really distinct from sufficient help is to be posited as necessary for believing. For from this it clearly follows that help is sufficient for some operation when no other prevenient help is necessary beyond it.
II. The contrary view is taught by all the doctors who think that besides sufficient help, which grants a person the ability to believe, to love, or to persevere, another help of efficacious prevenient grace is necessary, by which God effects that a person actually believes, loves, or perseveres. For these doctors preserve the true sufficiency of sufficient help alongside the necessity of such efficacious help, as we said in part in Disputation 18, no. 20, and Disputation 23, no. 32, from St. Thomas. To explain this, it must be assumed with Cajetan, the Ferrariense, and M. Medina3 that free choice is understood in two ways to be able to produce some act through some help. First, absolutely and simply, that is, without qualification, as when we assert that a person can see through the power of sight, because, insofar as the power by which he is constituted in first act for seeing is concerned, nothing else need be added to it in order for him truly to be said to be able to see—no other faculty or power granting him the ability to see in first act—even though, beyond the power of sight, many other things are required for a person actually to see. Hence from the power alone one cannot infer its use or operation in the exercise of the act. In this sense it must be asserted that through sufficient help a person truly can perform the act in relation to which the help is called sufficient, even if he will never act unless God, by efficacious help, effects that this ability is reduced to second act. In the second sense, this can be understood of a principle or help by which one can act completely, such that one not only has a principle through which one truly can act, but also has the complement—indicated in Disputation 18, no. 10, and Disputation 19, no. 5—by which one acts and wills in the exercise itself. We said something about this in Disputation 23, no. 32.
III. What help of grace is truly called sufficient.— Let the first conclusion, then, be this: help is called completely sufficient for some operation in this second sense when no other help is absolutely necessary beyond it for that operation to be actually produced. The authors of both views agree on this conclusion, and the arguments made at the beginning prove it effectively.
Second conclusion. Help is called truly sufficient in the first sense for some operation when it grants the ability in relation to that same operation, such that no other help is absolutely necessary for a person truly to be said to be able to produce that operation. For example, sufficient help for believing is that by which a person can believe; sufficient help for persevering is that by which a person can persevere, if he wills. There is also no disagreement among the doctors about this conclusion, for it is asserted in explicit words by Augustine in the places cited above, and the arguments made at the beginning also prove it effectively.
IIII. Third Conclusion. These two things are compossible: that besides sufficient help, which grants the ability, another help of efficacious prevenient grace, granting actual pious action, is absolutely necessary; and nevertheless that the help called sufficient is truly sufficient. Thus, for help of prevenient grace to be sufficient, it need not be so sufficient that no other help, prevenient in the order of causality to the action itself, is required without qualification for actual action. Cajetan, Ferrara, and Master Medina establish this conclusion in the cited places, and it is proved as follows. First, more things are necessary for someone actually to act than to be able to act, as is clear from the foregoing. Therefore it is quite possible that someone possess all the prerequisites by which he truly can act, without possessing all those necessarily required in order to act actually. Therefore help is truly preserved as sufficient, by which a person can believe, love, or persevere if he wills, even if it is asserted that for a person actually to believe, love, or persevere another help of prevenient grace is necessary without qualification, by which God brings it about that the person believes, loves, or perseveres. The authors of the contrary opinion reply that the things necessarily required for actual action,4 namely, God's actual general concurrence or the concurrence of helping grace, are not among the prerequisites antecedent to pious action, but among what accompanies and concurs at the same time with free choice toward that same action. But this solution remains sufficiently refuted by what was said in Disputations 18 and 23.5 For it was shown that God's general concurrence is God's immediate influx into secondary causes, and that it premoves and predetermines them to their actions, each according to the mode of its own nature. Therefore it must be counted among the prerequisites antecedent to pious action, not in the order of time, but in the order of reason and causality.
V. Second, this is proved as follows. The visual power is a sufficient principle for seeing, even if actual vision never occurs without light and a universal cause moving it. Therefore, similarly, sufficient help for believing is truly sufficient in its own kind, even though efficacious help, by which God brings it about that a person believes, is necessary without qualification in addition to it.
Third, the same can be proved: for, as will become clear in Disputation 86, by the help of efficacious grace God truly makes us cooperate as an efficient cause by freely consenting to that same grace. Therefore the aforesaid efficacious help is among the prerequisites antecedent to action, not in the order of time but in the order of reason and causality.
VI. To the first argument, the reply is that help is called sufficient when no other help granting the ability to act is required in addition to it; yet there is no inconsistency in another help granting actual action being necessary in addition to sufficient help.
To the second argument it is answered that, for a person to be able to be elected to some office, it is sufficient that he can receive the votes required for a canonical election under pontifical law. But for him actually to be elected in the case proposed, he must have twelve votes in his favor. In the same way, for a person to be able to believe, he must have sufficient help received in him that grants the ability; but for him actually to believe, he must have efficacious help by which he is made actually believing. To explain this more fully, it should be noted that, as St. Thomas teaches in De veritate, q. 6, art. 3, ad 7, something is said to be able to do something in two ways. First, by considering the power that is in it, as when we say that a stone can be moved downward. In another way, by considering what is on the part of something else, as when I say that a stone can be moved upward by the power of the one throwing it. Thus, therefore, someone who is actually moved by God to believe through sufficient help inhering in the intellect and will is said to be able to believe by a formal and proximate power that is in him. But if he is in no way moved by God to believe, as are negatively unbelieving people who have heard nothing of the Gospel, they are said to be able to believe both by a power that is in another, because they can be moved by God through sufficient help that grants the ability, and also by a radical power that is in created free choice, because, while the person is a wayfarer, it is flexible from evil to good. For this reason, St. Thomas teaches in 3. q. 8. art. 3. ad 1 that Christ is the head even of unbelievers, because although unbelievers are not actually of the Church, they are nevertheless of the Church potentially. This potentiality is founded on two things: first and principally on the power of Christ, which is sufficient for the salvation of the whole human race; secondarily on the freedom of free choice—namely, because every person, while he is a wayfarer, has free choice that can turn from evil to good, since no wayfarer is totally hardened in evil; for this belongs only to the damned, because they are at their end.
To the third argument it is answered that efficacious help, which predetermines free choice to the very act of believing, mediates between sufficient help for believing and the act of believing, as was shown above.6 And to the objection it must be said that this help is neither a habit nor a quality nor our act, but a powerful motion toward the act, as we explained at greater length in disp. 18 and 19.