De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Introduction
Disputatio LXX: Whether grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating, exciting and helping, and prevenient and subsequent grace.
Disputatio LXXI: Whether the help of grace is fittingly divided into sufficient help and efficacious help.
Disputatio LXXII: Whether, in the division of the help of grace into efficacious and inefficacious help, sufficient help is the immediate subject of division.
Disputatio LXXIII: Whether the division of the help of prevenient grace into efficacious and inefficacious help is taken solely from the effect, which also depends on the free cooperation of free choice, or also from the real power of the help itself.
Disputatio LXXIV: Whether exciting or prevenient grace is formally a vital act of free choice, or something preceding every vital act.
Disputatio LXXV: What is the proper effect of exciting grace insofar as it is formally exciting.
Disputatio LXXVI: Whether exciting grace is the same as sufficient grace.
Disputatio LXXVII: Whether exciting grace, conferred on human beings in the ordinary manner, depends on the ministers of the Church.
Disputatio LXXVIII: Whether exciting grace, ordinarily conferred on human beings, depends on the effort and diligence of the person who is roused.
Whether exciting grace, which is regularly conferred on people, depends on the effort and diligence of the one who is aroused.
I. Those doctors who think that God’s inward calling and arousal depend on the effort and diligence of the Church and its ministers as on a sine qua non condition, consequently teach that they also depend on the effort and diligence of the one who is aroused and called. The first and principal argument for this view is the one we touched on in the confirmation of the third argument of the preceding disputation. God does not regularly infuse new species or knowledge of things to be believed into those whom he calls to faith, but presupposes that they have acquired them elsewhere. Yet the one who is called must necessarily use his own effort and diligence to acquire them, so that he may come to hear the word of God with the intention of attending to what is said, and may read attentively the sacred books from which to acquire such species and knowledge. Therefore the conclusion follows.
Second, it is argued that God does not regularly confer prevenient and exciting grace on people unless they first do what lies within them by the powers of nature alone, as they tried to prove in Disputation 56, nos. 2 and 3. But to do what lies within one by the powers of nature requires one’s own effort and diligence. Therefore inward exciting grace regularly depends on the effort and diligence of the person who is called, at least as on a condition without which he would not regularly be called by God.
Third, the principal foundation of the opposing view is destroyed. For the opposing view argues that inward calling depends in no way, even as on a sine qua non condition, on the effort and diligence of the person called, because then inward calling would not be gratuitous but owed, which is contrary to the nature of grace. But this argument is invalid. The minor premise is proved: a sine qua non condition in no way destroys or diminishes the nature of grace, because such a condition has no value and does not imply merit to which grace corresponds as a debt. Otherwise the use of reason, which is presupposed in adults for the infusion of grace, would remove or diminish the nature of grace, because it too is a condition without which they would not be justified.
II. Inward calling does not depend on the natural diligence and effort of the person called.— The first prevenient grace does not depend on the effort of free choice, even as on a sine qua non condition.— The resolution of this difficulty is easy, once the things said in the preceding disputation and Disputation 56 are assumed. For if we speak of the effort and diligence of the person called proceeding from the powers of nature alone, it must be said that the inward arousal of the person called does not depend, even as on a sine qua non condition, on that person’s diligence; and this is on account of the arguments by which it was shown in Disputation 56 that the view is false of those who say that, according to the common manner God observes, he gives no one helps of prevenient grace unless the person first does what lies within him by the power of nature. For the same arguments effectively prove that inward calling does not depend, even as on a sine qua non condition, on the effort and diligence of the person called. But if we speak of effort and diligence proceeding from a prior help of exciting and prevenient grace, there is no incompatibility in admitting that just as one effect of grace depends on another, so one inward arousal depends on another and presupposes it according to the common manner God observes in arousing and calling people.1 For example, arousal to an act of penance depends on arousal to an act of fear of the punishments of hell, which regularly precedes perfect contrition; and the same is to be said proportionally of pious thoughts, desires, and petitions which precede an act of penance or charity. For a divine arousal and motion through special help to pious thoughts, desires, and prayers, by which the sinner knocks at the door of divine mercy, precedes arousal to these acts. All actions of this kind proceed from the special help of prevenient grace, as was shown above. Hence one must finally arrive at the first arousal, or the prevenient grace which is first without qualification, which does not depend on the effort and diligence of the person called, even as on a sine qua non condition, even according to the common manner God observes in calling people; so that the first beginning of salvation may thus be referred to God himself, the author of grace, and not to the natural power of our choice.
III. By this it is answered to the first argument that those items of knowledge which precede the act of believing proceed from a special impulse of the Holy Spirit, as Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas prove from 2 Corinthians 3.2 We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God. By these words the Apostle contends that the very thinking of the mysteries of faith so that they may be believed is from God and from his special motion.
To the second, the reply is that the antecedent is not to be admitted, as was shown in Disputation 56.
IV. In what sense use of reason is presupposed for grace in adults.— To the third, it is already clear from what was said in that same Disputation 56 how the character of grace seems to be harmed if someone asserts that the interior call depends on the diligence and effort of the one who is called. As for the proposed objection, the reply is that if we are speaking of the actual use of reason proceeding from the natural faculty alone, the same reasoning applies to the use of reason and to the diligence and effort of the one who is called. But if the discussion concerns the use of reason as though in habit, such use of reason belongs on the side of the subject. Therefore, if it is presupposed for justification in adults, it does not destroy the character of grace; for the character of grace is overturned only when it is given on account of some work of nature, according to what the Apostle says: If it is from works, then grace is no longer grace.3
After this, we must discuss sufficient grace. For the present, two things about it must be examined.
I. What help is said to be truly sufficient for salvation.
II. Whether every sufficient help is efficacious in some respect.