De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Introduction
Disputatio LXX: Whether grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating, exciting and helping, and prevenient and subsequent grace.
Disputatio LXXI: Whether the help of grace is fittingly divided into sufficient help and efficacious help.
Disputatio LXXII: Whether, in the division of the help of grace into efficacious and inefficacious help, sufficient help is the immediate subject of division.
Disputatio LXXIII: Whether the division of the help of prevenient grace into efficacious and inefficacious help is taken solely from the effect, which also depends on the free cooperation of free choice, or also from the real power of the help itself.
Disputatio LXXIV: Whether exciting or prevenient grace is formally a vital act of free choice, or something preceding every vital act.
Disputatio LXXV: What is the proper effect of exciting grace insofar as it is formally exciting.
Disputatio LXXVI: Whether exciting grace is the same as sufficient grace.
Whether exciting grace is the same as sufficient grace.
I. The first argument is on the negative side. Sufficient grace truly grants free choice sufficient powers by which it can be converted to God and act piously; for it is called sufficient for this reason, that it grants the ability to act. But exciting grace does not grant free choice sufficient powers by which it can be converted to God and act piously. Therefore exciting grace is not the same as sufficient grace. The minor premise is proved as follows: one who arouses a sick or lame person from sleep does not by such arousal grant that person the natural powers to run or to perform the activities of a healthy person, because by such arousal he does not in any way heal him, but only causes him to wake up and pay attention to the dangers threatening him. Therefore, by the same reasoning, when God arouses a stupefied person, he does not by exciting grace grant that person sufficient powers by which he can convert himself to God and perform the works of healthy free choice, especially supernatural works. For exciting grace likewise does not in any way heal free choice, but only causes it to wake up and pay attention to what is fitting for it.
Second. Since the will has been more injured by sin than the intellect, as was said above, it needs more to be strengthened and fortified by grace for performing the works of the virtues, especially those which exceed its natural end. But the will is not strengthened by exciting grace, nor is it elevated to perform the works of the virtues, especially those which exceed its natural end. For exciting grace is in the intellect and, consequently, posits nothing real and intrinsic in the will by which it is elevated to perform the aforesaid works of the virtues. Therefore the same conclusion follows as before.
If it is said that exciting grace posits in the will certain sudden affections, or first-first movements, and imperfect pious desires, which are something inhering in the same will, and consequently that through such movements, proceeding from the impulse of the Holy Spirit, the will is elevated and strengthened so that it truly can, if it wills, elicit the supernatural acts of faith, hope, and charity; against this there is the following:
Third argument. Indeliberate acts, however supernatural they may be, cannot be the formal principles of deliberate acts of faith, hope, and charity. For one act of a power is not the formal active principle of another, but rather the terminus of a formal principle. Since, then, indeliberate movements are produced by the intellect and will as efficient causes, it follows that they are not formal active principles, even sufficient ones, with respect to a deliberate supernatural act, but rather a terminus produced by a supernatural formal principle, namely, by the first prevenient grace.
This is confirmed. Deliberated supernatural acts are more perfect than indeliberate acts. Therefore indeliberate acts cannot be the formal active principle of a deliberate supernatural act. The consequence is proved: an effect cannot be more noble or perfect than its efficient cause, since every perfection of any effect must pre-exist in its efficient cause, because each thing acts insofar as it is in act.
Fourth, for conversion to God, besides exciting grace helping grace is necessary, as is clear from Trent;1 therefore exciting grace is not sufficient for conversion, since something is called sufficient for an effect when nothing else is required to produce that same effect.
II. The argument for the affirmative side2 is as follows: the Council of Trent3 sufficiently divided prevenient grace into exciting and helping grace. Therefore sufficient grace, since it truly is prevenient grace, must be assigned to one of these two members. But it is not assigned to helping grace, for helping grace is always efficacious: one who is helped does something, as Augustine says;4 therefore sufficient grace must be assigned to exciting grace. Otherwise that division would be insufficient, since its dividing members would not exhaust the whole of what is divided. It follows, then, that exciting grace is the same as sufficient grace.
To resolve this difficulty, it should be supposed that exciting grace is of two kinds, external and internal; the internal kind can be on the part of the intellect alone, or on the part of both intellect and will. Since we have already treated these members dividing exciting grace in Disputation 70 and following, there is no need to explain each one further with examples.
III. External exciting grace is not the same as sufficient grace.— Let this, then, be the first conclusion: external exciting grace is not the same as sufficient grace, speaking without qualification. All Catholics agree on this conclusion. It is proved as follows. Sufficient grace grants free choice sufficient powers by which it truly can turn to God or act piously; but external exciting grace does not grant free choice sufficient powers by which it can turn to God or act piously. Therefore the conclusion follows. The minor premise is proved: if external exciting grace is purely external, it places nothing real and intrinsic in free choice. Therefore it does not grant free choice sufficient powers for pious action. For, as was shown in Disputation 67, free choice cannot be raised to acts that exceed its natural powers, especially if they are supernatural, unless something supernatural inhering in free choice raises it to perform those acts. This is confirmed because, as was said in Disputation 1, in the second stage of his error Pelagius asserted that external preaching and arousal alone, through which God teaches what must be done and what must be avoided, without interior grace, suffice for a person by free choice to be able to fulfill all the commandments and attain eternal life. Therefore the opinion that external exciting grace alone is sufficient grace must not be admitted.
I said in the conclusion, “speaking without qualification,” for in a qualified sense it is not unreasonable to grant that external exciting grace is sufficient for salvation in its own kind, namely, as preaching or another form of external persuasion and arousal. The reason is that external arousal can be such that nothing more is required on its part for believing, acting piously, and attaining eternal life. Therefore such external arousal can be called sufficient in its own kind and in a qualified sense.
IIII. Second Conclusion. Even exciting grace by which the intellect alone is illumined or moved is not the same as sufficient grace, speaking without qualification, but only in a qualified sense, as was said in the preceding conclusion. This conclusion is proved from what has been said: not only the intellect but also the will needs divine motion and prevenient grace by which it is made capable of performing works of piety, since the will has been more corrupted by sin than the intellect, as was said above. Therefore exciting grace received in the intellect alone is not sufficient grace for salvation or for performing works of piety.
Second, it is proved as follows. For salvation, it is not only necessary that the intellect know what is to be done and what is to be avoided; the will must also will to embrace the good, flee evil, and love God above all things. But through exciting grace received in the intellect alone, the will cannot will anything conducive to salvation or love God above all things, because grace existing in the intellect is extrinsic to the will and consequently does not grant it a sufficient principle by which it can perform works of piety. Therefore exciting grace received in the intellect alone is not sufficient grace for salvation.
This is confirmed. A power existing in one faculty alone does not grant another faculty a sufficient principle for acting, since an operative power added to a faculty concurs with it in acting as the principle by which the operation occurs. Therefore exciting grace, which is received in the intellect alone, is not by itself sufficient for the will to perform through it works that exceed its natural powers.
Third, it is proved by comparison. If a lame or sick person, placed in some great danger, were asleep and another person awakened him so that he might see the dangers threatening him and flee, that awakening would not grant him a sufficient principle by which he could run and place himself in a safe spot, because, even once awakened, he would remain lame or sick. For that awakening in no way heals him or grants him the strength to run. Therefore, similarly, when a sinner is asleep, merely by his intellect being excited by God to attend and see how evil and bitter it is to have forsaken the Lord and how many dangers he is exposed to, this excitation alone does not grant him a sufficient principle by which he can flee from the Devil and run to God. Consequently, exciting grace received in the intellect alone, abstracting from every supernatural motion of the will, is not, speaking without qualification and absolutely, sufficient grace for salvation.
V. What exciting grace that is identified with sufficient grace must be like.— Third Conclusion. Exciting grace, insofar as it comprises not only the external and internal illumination of the intellect but also a supernatural motion received in the will, is really the same as sufficient grace, so that every grace that excites in the aforesaid manner is sufficient grace in relation to the effect to which it excites. Thus, if it excites someone to believe, it will be sufficient grace in relation to the act of faith; and if it excites someone to love God above all things, it will be sufficient grace in relation to the act of love of God. The same is to be said proportionally of other pious operations. The argument previously made for the contrary side effectively proves this conclusion. Moreover, it is proved as follows. A person who is excited by God in the aforesaid manner to believe at a time when the precept of faith is in force sins if he does not believe. Therefore that excitation was sufficient for believing. The consequence is proved because, if he did not have sufficient help for believing, he would not sin against faith by not believing, but would merely be negatively unbelieving, as was said above. Therefore this kind of exciting grace toward believing is sufficient grace, by which a person truly can believe if he wills. To the arguments made at the beginning it is answered that they prove only the first conclusion; but insofar as they proceed against the third, each must be addressed individually.
VI. To the first, the answer is that exciting grace, which is received not only in the intellect but also in the will, grants a person sufficient powers by which he can be converted to God or act piously, if he wills. For although this kind of exciting grace does not formally heal a person or free him from sin, it nevertheless heals him initially and dispositively, since it is a certain beginning and remote disposition for justifying and healing grace, or the beginning of that disposition. For this exciting grace toward perfect penance always has joined to it, on the part of the intellect and will, certain supernatural acts, such as fear of hell, attrition on account of the shamefulness of sin or the punishments of hell, or other acts of this kind, which do not attain to perfect conversion. Hence, just as sufficient grace is indeed sufficient in relation to perfect conversion, although it is always efficacious with respect to some effect, as will become clear in Disputation 80, so exciting grace, of which we spoke in our third conclusion, is sufficient in relation to that same perfect conversion; but with respect to the imperfect supernatural acts it produces in the intellect and will, it is efficacious, whether those acts are deliberate or indeliberate.
To the second, the answer is that the will is more injured by sin than the intellect, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2. q. 109. art. 2. ad 3. Hence it needs grace inhering in it more than the intellect does, in order to be converted. Therefore exciting grace, which is sufficient for conversion without qualification, includes a supernatural motion received not only in the intellect but also in the will itself, as was said.
To the third, the answer is that, as we said in Disputation 74, the first exciting grace does not consist formally and essentially in those indeliberate acts. For acts of this kind do not necessarily precede perfect conversion; but exciting grace always precedes perfect conversion, at least in the order of nature, as will become clear in Disputation 88. Rather, it consists in a certain divine motion produced in us by God alone, through which it efficaciously effects that our intellect and will produce some imperfect supernatural act, and sufficiently moves us toward perfect acts of charity, penance, or other supernatural acts of this kind. It must be noted, however, that some supernatural act can be called imperfect in relation to one thing and perfect in relation to another. For example, an unformed act of faith is imperfect in comparison with formed faith; but in comparison with other acts which ordinarily precede even unformed faith, such as going to church with the intention of hearing the word of God, listening attentively to what preachers say, and weighing the things to be believed, etc., it must be considered a perfect act; and the same is to be understood proportionally of other acts.
To the fourth, the answer is that exciting grace is not sufficient in every way for perfect conversion, but is sufficient in the genus of grace which grants a person the ability to act piously if he wills, as was said about sufficient grace in Disputation 23, no. 32, and will be discussed more fully in Disputation 79, no. 2.