De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Introduction
Disputatio LXX: Whether grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating, exciting and helping, and prevenient and subsequent grace.
Disputatio LXXI: Whether the help of grace is fittingly divided into sufficient help and efficacious help.
Disputatio LXXII: Whether, in the division of the help of grace into efficacious and inefficacious help, sufficient help is the immediate subject of division.
Disputatio LXXIII: Whether the division of the help of prevenient grace into efficacious and inefficacious help is taken solely from the effect, which also depends on the free cooperation of free choice, or also from the real power of the help itself.
Disputatio LXXIV: Whether exciting or prevenient grace is formally a vital act of free choice, or something preceding every vital act.
Whether exciting or prevenient grace is formally some vital act of free choice, or something antecedent to every vital act.
I. Some have said that prevenient and exciting grace is formally nothing other than certain vital acts which God works in us without us—that is, without our freely cooperating, though not without our concurring vitally and as efficient causes—and that it consists in the illustration and illumination of the intellect, and in the arousal and persuasion of the will. These proceed from the intellect and will as efficient causes, not as free, but as nature.
They prove this view first from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, on justification, chap. 5, where it says: It further declares that the beginning of justification itself in adults must be derived from the prevenient grace of God through Jesus Christ; that is, from his calling, by which they are called, with none of their merits existing, so that those who were turned away from God through sins may, through his exciting and helping grace, be disposed to turn themselves toward their own justification, freely assenting to and cooperating with that same grace; so that, when God touches a human heart through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, the person himself does not do nothing, receiving that inspiration—for he can also reject it—yet without the grace of God he cannot move himself toward justice before him by his own free will. From these words it is understood that prevenient and exciting grace formally consists in God's calling, in the touch by which God touches the human heart through the illumination of the intellect and the arousal of the will. But the illumination of the intellect and the arousal of the will are formally vital acts elicited by the created intellect and will as nature, since they are indeliberate acts. Therefore prevenient and exciting grace are formally vital acts. In chap. 6 of the same session and in canons 3 and 4, the Council now calls exciting and prevenient grace the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, now the divine touch through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, and now the divine call—all of which are plainly vital acts. Hence the Second Council of Orange says that through this illumination and inspiration God draws people to himself and works in us both to will and to accomplish according to good will. And Pope Celestine, in epist. 1 to the Bishops of Gaul, chap. 8, reporting a certain letter of the African bishops in which they praised and weighed the words of Pope Zosimus, “We, moreover, by the prompting of God,” etc., says: What did you do with such free choice as when you referred everything to the awareness of our humility? And yet you faithfully and wisely saw that it was done by God's prompting. This is certainly because the will is prepared by the Lord; and, so that they may do something good, he himself touches the hearts of his faithful with paternal inspirations.
This is confirmed. A pious thought which precedes the first act of faith pertains to prevenient grace, since it precedes the free consent of the will by which one wills to believe the mysteries of faith proposed and explained to him. Likewise, indeliberate movements of both intellect and will proceeding from the impulse and inspiration of the Holy Spirit pertain to prevenient grace. Since cognition itself and indeliberate acts are formally vital acts produced by intellect and will as efficient causes, without which they cannot be produced by God alone even by absolute power, it follows that prevenient and exciting grace are formally vital acts.
Second, an argument is made from Augustine’s authority. When speaking of this prevenient grace, he always calls it God’s inspiration, illumination, and calling, as may be seen in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chaps. 33 and 34; in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chaps. 16 and 19; in epist. 107; and in book 1, To Simplicianus, q. 2. Cyril of Alexandria speaks in the same way, in book 4 on John, chap. 7. And Prosper, in book 2 of The Calling of the Nations, chap. 26, says: The grace of God indeed takes precedence as the principal agent in all justifications: persuading by exhortations, moving by examples, terrifying by dangers, inciting by miracles, giving understanding, inspiring counsel, illuminating the heart itself, and imbuing it with the affections of faith.
II. Third, the opinion is argued for by reason. This exciting and prevenient grace is something inhering in the soul, because the soul is not aroused by things outside it except through some intermediary that inheres in the soul itself. Hence, although external causes or objects that arouse can be outside the soul, the formal arousal itself must necessarily inhere in the soul, because it must affect the soul formally, indeed vitally. But this arousal inhering in the soul is not its habit, for while the soul is only in a habit it is as though asleep, as Aristotle said. Through this arousal, however, it is made to be awake and attentive, as if it were told: Awake, you who sleep, and rise from the dead, and Christ will enlighten you;1 therefore this arousal occurs through a vital motion of the soul, which for that reason must be made by the soul itself and not by God alone.
Fourth, this opinion can be proved by all the arguments with which in Disputation 18 we contended that God's general concurrence is not an immediate influx into the secondary cause, nor anything prior to its operation, but an immediate influx with the cause into its effect. For from this principle it is plainly inferred that the special help of prevenient and exciting grace is not something prior to our vital acts, but stands for those same acts as proceeding from God, who supernaturally influences them and raises the vital acts to supernatural being, so that they may be of the kind required for salvation. The arguments adduced in Disputation 57 should also be considered, to prove that, on account of a greater effort of free choice, a person obtains more intense helps of prevenient and exciting grace.
III. We touched on this difficulty incidentally in Disputations 18 and 19 and in Disputation 57, nos. 4 and 9; it will have to be treated again in Disputation 120, no. 2. But now it must be examined more closely, so that the nature, or essence, of prevenient and exciting grace may be fully understood. To explain it, note that grace can be called prevenient and exciting in two senses. In one way, because it is prevenient in the first instance, before which no other grace inhering in the soul is understood. In another way, it is called prevenient and exciting not in the first instance, but relatively: although it is prevenient and exciting with respect to one act, it is not purely prevenient, but subsequent to another, prior grace or another prior act that it presupposes. Saint Thomas explains this in I–II, question 111, article 3, body and reply to objection 2; we cited his words in Disputation 70, no. 9.
IIII. Grace that first precedes is not formally a vital act.— Let this, then, be the First Conclusion. Purely prevenient grace, or grace that first precedes us, is not formally our vital act, but causes such an act. This conclusion is commonly taught by the Thomists and is very much in accord with the doctrine of the Councils; it is proved as follows. First, from the Second Council of Orange, canon 20, where it is said: Many good things are done in a person that the person does not do. The Council said this especially on account of prevenient grace, by which a person is first moved by God. Therefore grace that first precedes and excites is not formally a vital act of our intellect or will, even insofar as it is nature, but is something supernatural and prior to such acts. They answer that the things which the Council of Orange says are done in a person but not effected by that person are both infused supernatural habits, which God alone produces as an efficient cause,2 and also the movements of prevenient grace, which, as has been explained, are not from a person cooperating through intellect and will insofar as they take on the character of free choice. For a person is considered to do only those things that he effects through free choice precisely as free choice. The subject there is the goods pertaining to eternal life, against the Pelagians. For since they maintained that a person could, through his free choice without the help of grace, and indeed actually did, effect certain such goods by which he would merit helps of grace to be conferred on him thereafter, the Fathers of the Council define that God does indeed effect in a person, without that person cooperating through his free choice, certain goods belonging to that number; but that a person cannot effect any of them through his free choice unless God grants him by his grace that he effect it. Therefore the Fathers do not deny that either the intellect or the will3, insofar as it is nature, cooperates with the movements of prevenient grace. But there is an effective argument against this solution.4 For the Council intended not only to condemn the Pelagians because they said that a person could, through his free choice and the powers of nature, merit eternal life or the helps of grace by which he would attain beatitude, but also because they held that those same helps depended on nature, as is clear from what we said in disp. 1 and 2. Therefore, when the Council says, Many good things are done in a person that the person does not do, it also intends to indicate that the first help of prevenient grace is effected by God alone as an efficient cause, and that in its being it does not depend on free choice vitally influencing and causing that same help, even by an indeliberate influx. This is confirmed. If the first help of prevenient and exciting grace were formally a vital act, it would follow that it depended on both God and us as efficient causes; and thus the Prophet would not have said, My help is from the Lord,5 but would have said, “My help is from the Lord and from myself.” Consequently, the first beginning of our salvation would not be referred to God alone, but to God and nature, which no theologian will grant.
V. Second, this is proved from those words of Rev. 3: Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if anyone hears my voice and opens the door to me, I will enter to him and dine with him, and he with me. By these words it is signified that God stands like one knocking at a door when he anticipates sinners with his grace, calls them, and arouses them. But knocking proceeds, as from an efficient cause, only from the one who knocks and arouses, not from the one who is aroused or at whose door the knocking is done. Therefore the first prevenient and exciting grace is not formally a vital act proceeding from our intellect or will as efficient causes, even as nature, but something prior to those same vital acts. They answer this argument that there is a great difference between knocking at a door and knocking at the heart:6 although both, precisely insofar as they are knocking, proceed from the one who knocks as efficient cause, the motions of prevenient grace, insofar as they are from the intellect and will, are not knocks,7 nor by them do the intellect or will knock on themselves; rather, God alone knocks on the intellect and will through them. Nevertheless, in the action of knocking the door does not in any way concur as an efficient cause, but only the one who knocks, who by means of an action of this kind produces a sound, which is perceived by hearing if it reaches the ears of someone inside the house; yet it remains entirely up to that person to open or not open the door. But in the matter at hand, which is the knocking of the heart, the heart itself must concur as an efficient cause so that it may be perceived and so that, in consequence, a person can be moved in accordance with his freedom to open his heart to Christ the Lord. But from this answer an efficacious argument for our view is drawn.8 The vital act of the intellect and the pious affection elicited by the will through an indeliberate act are not simply the first prevenient grace. Rather, before acts of this kind it is necessary that some gratuitous gift, received in the intellect and will, precede, by which God elevates these powers to elicit those vital acts. For since they are supernatural acts and contribute substantially to salvation, they cannot be produced by nature alone; otherwise the first beginning of salvation would be from nature and not from grace, as the Pelagians said. Therefore it must necessarily be said that the first prevenient grace by which God effects that a person elicit such indeliberate vital acts is not formally our vital act, but something prior to it, namely, a certain actual and powerful motion of God, as we said at greater length in Disputation 19 while discussing God’s general concurrence. Many things have also been said about this argument in Disputation 57, nos. 3 and 4, where we also briefly touched on other arguments by which this conclusion of ours can be strengthened. Finally, it is proved by all the arguments by which it was shown in Disputation 67 that, without help of grace inhering in us and with only the extrinsic assistance of the Holy Spirit, free choice cannot elicit the supernatural acts of believing, hoping, and loving.
Second conclusion. It is not incompatible that the helps of exciting and prevenient grace—which are not simply first helps, but are prevenient in relation to one effect of grace and subsequent in relation to another—should be formally vital acts elicited by the intellect and will, not only as nature but also as will. This conclusion is gathered from St. Thomas in 1. 2. cited above, and the arguments made at the beginning prove it. Nevertheless, insofar as those arguments intend to attack our first conclusion, an answer must be given to them.
VI. What the Council of Trent understands by the name of calling.— To the first, the answer is that under the name of calling the Council of Trent also includes that prior motion of the Holy Spirit by which he effects that a person elicit pious thoughts, through which the intellect is enlightened, and pious affections, through which the will is drawn to consent to God who calls and arouses. Under the names of inspiration and touch of the Holy Spirit it likewise includes that prevenient gift which is prior to every vital act of ours. For God infuses that gift for this purpose: so that by its power a person may elicit vital acts of a supernatural order, by which his heart is touched, drawn, and invited freely to cooperate with God who calls. Hence it does not follow that the first prevenient or exciting grace is formally a vital act. And by this the confirmation is answered.
To the second, the reply is that a pious thought and supernatural illumination of the intellect, which formally occurs through an act produced by the same intellect, is indeed prevenient grace with respect to the free consent toward which the will is aroused; yet with respect to the supernatural motion by which God brings it about that the intellect elicits pious thoughts, it is called subsequent grace. For, as the Apostle says: We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.9
VII. To the third, the reply is that the first prevenient and exciting grace is something inhering in the intellect and will. Yet it is not a habit or a vital act, but a certain prior motion toward a vital act, as was said in Disputations 18 and 19. Although a person is formally aroused through a vital act, he can also be aroused causally, through efficient causation, by something prior in the order of nature to every vital act. Since, then, the name “prevenient and exciting grace” also includes the gift by which God brings it about that a person considers and apprehends things pertaining to salvation, as is clear from the foregoing, it follows that, formally speaking, exciting grace need not be a vital act.
To the fourth, an express reply was already given in Disputations 18 and 57, and it was shown that God's general concurrence is an immediate influx into secondary causes, and that the helps of prevenient grace are measured not by the amount of prior effort of free choice but by God's gratuitous will.