De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
Book One
Book Two
Book Three
Book Four
Book Five
Book Six
Book Seven
Book Eight
Introduction
Disputatio LXX: Whether grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating, exciting and helping, and prevenient and subsequent grace.
Disputatio LXXI: Whether the help of grace is fittingly divided into sufficient help and efficacious help.
Disputatio LXXII: Whether, in the division of the help of grace into efficacious and inefficacious help, sufficient help is the immediate subject of division.
Disputatio LXXIII: Whether the division of the help of prevenient grace into efficacious and inefficacious help is taken solely from the effect, which also depends on the free cooperation of free choice, or also from the real power of the help itself.
Whether the division of the help of prevenient grace into efficacious and inefficacious help is drawn only from the effect, which also depends on the free cooperation of free choice, or also from the real power of the help itself.
I. The whole difficulty of this question consists in this: whether efficacious help adds, at least in an intentional mode, some real power antecedent to a pious act over and above sufficient help; or whether it adds nothing real, but the very same help is called efficacious by an extrinsic denomination only when a person wills to cooperate with it, and is likewise called inefficacious when the person does not will to cooperate.
Some have said that the division of the help of prevenient grace into efficacious help and inefficacious help is drawn from the effect, which also depends on the freedom of choice, and accordingly that whether it is efficacious or inefficacious for conversion or justification depends on the free consent and cooperation of free choice with it.
They prove their view. First, efficacious help, insofar as it is efficacious, formally speaking, does not precede the free consent of our free choice, but only accompanies it and works together with it in the pious act. For it is called efficacious because it effects the same act together with us. Therefore it is called efficacious only from the effect, namely, because it cooperates with us; and for the same reason it is called inefficacious because it does not cooperate with us.
Second, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2. q. 111. art. 3. ad 2: Grace is not diversified in essence by being prevenient and subsequent, but only according to its effect, as was also said of operating and cooperating grace; for even when subsequent grace pertains to glory, it is not numerically different from prevenient grace, through which we are now justified. Therefore grace is likewise not diversified in essence or according to a real and intrinsic power by being efficacious or sufficient, but only according to its effect. Therefore grace is called efficacious only from the effect, because free choice cooperates with it; and likewise it is called inefficacious because, from its innate freedom, free choice did not will to cooperate with it.
Third. No help of prevenient grace is inefficacious by its nature. Therefore likewise no help of prevenient grace will be efficacious intrinsically and by its nature. The consequence is proved as follows: in a per se division, when one member belongs by its nature to some subject, the other member must also belong per se to another, as in the division by which animal is divided into human being, horse, and so on; some animal to which being a horse belongs per se and by its nature must necessarily be assigned, just as an animal to which being a human belongs per se is assigned. The antecedent is proved: if there were some help of prevenient grace which per se and by its nature were inefficacious, it would follow that it was incompatible with that same help to have an effect, and consequently free choice truly could not act through that help; thus no sufficient help would remain, since, as will become clear below, sufficient help is that with which free choice can act. It therefore remains that the division of grace into sufficient and efficacious is to be drawn only from the effect, which also depends on the cooperation of free choice.
Fourth, the very same help, remaining unchanged in itself, can be sufficient and efficacious. Therefore this division is not drawn from the nature or intrinsic power of the help itself, but from something extrinsic, namely, from the effect that it has or does not have. The antecedent is proved: for, if something possible is posited as actual, no absurdity follows. But if this possibility—that a person can act piously by sufficient help—is posited as actual, and he in fact acts piously, in that case the same help that was called sufficient will truly be efficacious, with no real change made on the part of that help. Therefore precisely the same help, without any change in itself, will be sufficient and efficacious, and thus help will be called sufficient or efficacious solely extrinsically. The same argument can be made concerning efficacious help: for given any help whatsoever, however efficacious, free choice can still act or not act with it, consent or dissent, as the Council of Trent defines.1 Therefore suppose that it does not act but dissents. Then the same help of prevenient grace that was called efficacious will be inefficacious, since it would not have its effect. Therefore the same point follows as before.
I consider the contrary opinion true, and entirely in keeping with the mind of Saints Augustine and Thomas and consonant with Sacred Scripture and the Councils. To explain it, let the following be stated.
II. The division of help into sufficient and efficacious help is not taken only from the effect.— First Conclusion. The division of the help of prevenient grace into sufficient or inefficacious help and efficacious help is not to be drawn only from the effect, which also depends on the cooperation of free choice, but also from the real and intrinsic power of that same help, which it has as it comes from God, insofar, namely, as it is an instrument of the divine will. Accordingly, the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand always has, in an intentional mode, some real power to bring it about that free choice cooperates; sufficient help does not have this in itself. First, this opinion is proved by the authority of Saint Augustine, in Letter 107 to Vitalis. There, reporting Vitalis's opinion concerning sufficient grace, which gives the ability, and that grace which works in us both to will and to accomplish—which is efficacious grace—Augustine says: How can you say what I hear you say: that rightly believing in God and assenting to the Gospel is not God's gift, but is from ourselves, that is, from our own will, which he himself has not worked in our heart? And when, in reply to this, you hear, “What, then, is it that the Apostle says: God works in us both to will and to accomplish?” you answer that God works through his law and his Scriptures, which we either read or hear, so that we may will; but that to consent or not to consent to them is so much our own that it happens if we will, and if we do not will, we make God's operation have no effect in us. For, you say, he operates, so far as it depends on him, so that we may will, when his utterances become known to us; but if we do not wish to yield to them, we bring it about that his operation profits us nothing. In these words Vitalis of Carthage seems to have established a division between inefficacious and efficacious grace based solely on the effect, which also depends on the cooperation of free choice. This is indicated by his words: But to consent or not to consent to them is so much our own that it happens if we will, and if we do not will, we make God's operation have no effect in us. This is the same as if he said: Prevenient grace, which becomes efficacious when our consent is added, is rendered inefficacious if, in keeping with our freedom, we withhold our consent. Saint Augustine, refuting this opinion, adds: If you say this, you contradict our prayers. Below he confirms this with many testimonies from Scripture. If it is said that Vitalis admitted no interior prevenient grace, but only external law and teaching, the reply is that not only the Massilians but Pelagius too, in the third stage of his heresy, finally admitted illumination through interior teaching and persuasion, or the arousing of a sluggish will, as was shown in Disputation 1, no. 6, and will become clearer in Disputation 95. He nevertheless always denied the help of efficacious grace by which God makes willing people out of unwilling ones, as is plainly clear from Disputation 1, nos. 13 and 14.
Second, it is proved as follows. For, as was said above, sufficient help is that by which someone can act if he wills, whereas efficacious help is that by which someone actually acts. But a principle that grants actual acting is of greater power than a principle that grants only the ability, since second act is nobler than first act, as will become clear below:23 therefore efficacious help has some real power to effect that a person act piously, which sufficient help does not have. Therefore the division of the prevenient help of grace into efficacious and sufficient is drawn not only from the effect, which also depends on the cooperation of free choice, but also from the real power of the help itself.
III. Efficacious help contains, in an intentional mode, the power of the divine will.— Third. As St. Thomas teaches, in efficacious help there is, in an intentional mode, the power of God, who by an absolute will wills that the person whose heart he moves be converted or act piously,4 as we also showed at greater length in disp. 22 and 23. But this intentional power is not in sufficient or inefficacious help. Therefore there is some real power in efficacious help that sufficient help does not have. Therefore the aforesaid division is not taken only from the effect, which also depends on the cooperation of our free choice, but also from the real and intrinsic power of the help itself. This is confirmed. When an agent, especially if it has infinite power, uses an instrument to effect something, it grants that instrument, in the very act of using it, an intentional power to produce that effect, as is clear in the sacraments of the New Law, which by divine power effect the grace they signify. But God uses efficacious help as an instrument to effect that our free choice actually cooperate with God as he excites and calls us. Therefore he grants it an intentional power to infallibly produce this effect, which he does not grant to sufficient help, by which God, through an efficacious will, intends only to grant free choice the ability to act, but not actual acting. Consequently, the aforesaid division is made according to the real power of the prevenient help of grace itself; therefore it is not to be drawn only from the effect.
If it is said that the same sufficient help, under subordination and in relation to God, who efficaciously wills to convert a person through it, becomes efficacious without any real power, even an intentional one, being granted to it by which it is distinguished from merely sufficient help, the answer is this. For St. Thomas, in 4. sent. dist. 1. q. 1. ar. 4. quaestiunc. 1. in corp., proves from this that when God uses the sacraments of the New Law to cause grace, he grants them, in an intentional mode, a certain real power that causes grace. Otherwise the sacraments themselves would not truly cause grace; rather, God alone would produce grace in their presence. Therefore, if God, when he uses created help to convert a person, does not grant it, in an intentional mode, some real power by which it makes a person consent, a power not present in sufficient help, it follows that God alone would convert a person in the presence of efficacious help, and consequently that the help of grace itself would truly do or effect nothing toward the conversion5 of a person. And thus the conversion itself would not be referred to God's grace. This is confirmed because a relation alone, since it is not active, cannot grant any power to effect something. But the relation of sufficient help to God's efficacious decree, by which he wills to convert a person to himself, is a relation. Therefore this relation alone does not grant help the power to convert a person. Therefore, besides this relation, efficacious help must have, in an intentional mode, some real power communicated to it by that same decree, by which it infallibly converts a person.
Fourth, this view can be proved by all the arguments with which it was shown above, and will be established below,6 that efficacious help of prevenient grace not only morally but also physically predetermines our free choice to consent to and cooperate with God who arouses and calls. For since sufficient, or inefficacious, help has no power by which it thus predetermines free choice to act piously, it follows that there is some real power in efficacious help which sufficient help truly does not have. The same view can be confirmed by the arguments through which in Disputation 90 it will become clear that the help of prevenient grace is efficacious independently of the cooperation of our choice and precedes it in the order of nature. For from this it is deduced as an evident consequence that the same help is not called efficacious only from its effect; otherwise, insofar as it is efficacious, it would not be prevenient but subsequent to the free determination of that same choice, and would depend on it for its efficacy.
Second conclusion. The aforesaid division is drawn from the real and intrinsic power that help has as it comes from God. This conclusion will be proved expressly in Disputations 83 and 90, where we will show that efficacious help does not depend in its efficacy on the causal contribution of free choice acting with it, but has its efficacy from God alone. Since help which is only sufficient does not have this real efficacy, it follows that there is in efficacious help some real power to move free choice, which is not in sufficient help; and consequently, the division or distinction of help into sufficient help and efficacious help must be drawn from the real and intrinsic power which is present in an intentional mode in one help and not in the other. The same is clear from what was said in the preceding conclusion.
IIII. Efficacious help has some real power which is not in sufficient help.— To the first, then, the answer is that efficacious help, insofar as it is efficacious, is prevenient, as is clear from the premises; for it is not called efficacious only because it effects a pious act together with us, but also because it effects that free choice cooperate with it, predetermining free choice to consent freely.
Efficacious help eminently contains every perfection of sufficient help.— To the second, the consequence is denied, and the reason for the difference is this: cooperating grace has in itself that it also cooperates together with us. Sufficient grace, however, does not have in itself that it actually grants performance of the act with respect to which it is called sufficient; hence the cases are not similar. And if an argument is made: when a sinner is suddenly converted perfectly to God, without dispositions preceding in time the infusion of grace,7 the same help that grants actually acting also grants the ability to act, since two different helps are not posited in him, one granting the ability and another granting the act; therefore in that case sufficient and efficacious help are distinguished only according to different effects, like operating and cooperating grace; and consequently the help of grace is called sufficient or efficacious only from its effect, not because of a real distinction in the help itself. The answer is that efficacious help eminently contains every perfection of sufficient help, just as anything perfect in a genus eminently contains whatever perfection is in every imperfect thing of that same genus. Hence it is not necessary that help which is formally efficacious and eminently sufficient be really distinguished from itself. But when help is formally sufficient in such a way that it grants only the ability to act and not actually to perform the act with respect to which it is called sufficient, then it must be really distinguished from efficacious help, that is, by some real power existing in an intentional mode in efficacious help as it comes from God and as it is an instrument of God, who absolutely wills to convert to himself the person whose heart he moves—a power which sufficient help nevertheless does not have in itself.
V. In what sense help of grace is called efficacious by its nature.— To the third, the reply is that help of grace can be called efficacious by its nature in two ways. First, “by its nature” can signify only the physical entity it has in the order of being, by which it truly determines free choice by its nature—that is, naturally—to act. In this sense no help of grace is called efficacious by its nature. In another way, help of grace can be called efficacious by its nature as an instrument of the divine will, so that “by its nature” is understood in contrast with help that is called efficacious solely from an effect that also depends on the free cooperation of our choice. In this sense help that is efficacious by its nature is given: that is, it is efficacious of itself, by the real intentional power it has from God independently of the free cooperation of our choice. In this same sense sufficient help is given by its nature, because, as an instrument of the divine will, it grants only the ability, not actual performance of the act with respect to which it is called sufficient. As for the refutation, the reply is that help of grace is not called inefficacious because it cannot have the effect with respect to which it is called inefficacious, but because in fact it will not have that effect through the fault of the one to whom it is conferred. Since he truly can turn to God or act piously by that help, it is through his own fault that he does not act, as is clear from what was said above.
VI. When something possible is posited as actual, absolutely speaking, no absurdity follows.— To the fourth, the antecedent is denied. To the proof, the reply is that when something is possible not only in the divided sense but also in the composite sense, no absurdity follows from its being posited as actual. But when it is possible only in the divided sense, and not in the composite sense, then a great absurdity follows if it is in fact posited as actual, given something with which such a positing is incompatible. This is clear in the case of any predestined person, who while on the way can absolutely, in the divided sense, be damned. Yet because this is impossible in the composite sense, a great absurdity would follow if it were posited as actual while positing, as one does, that he is predestined. For it would follow that predestination is not certain as regards attaining its effect, which is impossible8, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore, since free choice moved by God with efficacious help cannot dissent from it in the composite sense, though it can in the divided sense, as will become clear below,9 a great absurdity would follow if this possibility were posited as actual. For it would follow that God's will is inefficacious and can be obstructed by the human will, which, as Augustine says and we showed above, is impossible.
Consequently, we must now treat in particular the help of exciting and sufficient grace, from which the justification of the predestined first begins, according to the Apostle's words: Those whom he predestined, he also called. This agrees with the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 5, which says: The beginning of this justification in adults must be derived from the prevenient grace of God through Jesus Christ, that is, from his call, by which they are called, with none of their merits existing. Five questions arise for discussion here.
I. Whether exciting grace is formally some vital act of free choice, or rather something antecedent to every vital act.
II. What is the proper effect of exciting grace insofar as it is formally exciting.
III. Whether exciting grace is the same as sufficient grace.
IIII. Whether exciting grace, which is conferred on people according to the common manner, depends on the ministers of the Church.
V. Whether it depends on the personal diligence and effort of the one who is excited.