De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Introduction

Disputatio LXX: Whether grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating, exciting and helping, and prevenient and subsequent grace.

Disputatio LXXI: Whether the help of grace is fittingly divided into sufficient help and efficacious help.

Disputatio LXXII: Whether, in the division of the help of grace into efficacious and inefficacious help, sufficient help is the immediate subject of division.

Whether, in the division of the help of grace into efficacious and inefficacious help, sufficient help is the immediate subject of division.

I. SOME have said that the immediate subject of division of this division is sufficient help: that is, whether that sufficient help is greater or lesser in itself, it is called efficacious when free choice, according to its freedom, is converted with it; but it is called inefficacious when free choice, by that same freedom, is not converted with it.

From this they infer that, besides the sufficient help of prevenient grace, no other prevenient help, distinct from sufficient help in its real power, is required for a sinner to be converted and act piously. Rather, the same help, which is merely sufficient when a person does not will to be converted, becomes efficacious if the person wills, according to his innate freedom, to use that help well and to turn freely to God by consenting to that help and cooperating with it. They also say that although efficacious help and sufficient help are not really distinguished according to their perfection and intrinsic power, they are nevertheless distinguished by reason, in the category of benefit and the category of gift, just as a sword given to someone in peacetime and in wartime is really the same sword; nevertheless, in the category of gift and benefit, the person to whom a sword is given in wartime, when he will use it to defend himself from enemies, receives a greater gift and benefit than if it were given in peacetime, when he would not need the sword for use.

Their first argument in support of their opinion is drawn from the Council of Trent, session 6, on justification, chapter 5 and canon 4, where it is stated that the human free choice, aroused and moved by God, freely consents to God who arouses and calls, and can dissent if it wills. Therefore, with any help of prevenient grace whatsoever in place, a person can consent to it or dissent from it. But if efficacious help is posited in a person, he cannot dissent from it, since otherwise it would not be efficacious. Therefore such help is not prevenient, nor is it included under the help of prevenient grace. Therefore only sufficient help is prevenient; and consequently, in the division by which the help of prevenient grace is divided into efficacious and inefficacious help, the immediate subject of division will be sufficient help, and not something abstracted from sufficient and efficacious help.

Second, they argue: the immediate subject of division of the division by which the help of grace is divided into efficacious and inefficacious is prevenient help; but only sufficient help is prevenient. For besides sufficient help no other prevenient help is given that is necessarily required for pious action. Therefore the immediate subject of division of that same division will be sufficient help, which will become efficacious if free choice consents to it, and inefficacious if it does not consent.

Third, they argue from the celebrated testimony of Matthew 11: Woe to you, Chorazin; woe to you, Bethsaida; for if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would long ago have repented in sackcloth and ashes. From these words the argument is drawn as follows. If the sufficient help given to the Jews, together with the miracles and signs done in Chorazin, were not sufficient for the people of Tyre and Sidon to be converted by that help alone, with every other prevenient help really distinct from it excluded, it would follow that the conditional spoken by the Lord Christ was not true. It would also follow that the Jews were rebuked without cause for not having been converted. The consequence cannot be accepted; therefore, so it is argued. The inference is proved as follows: for the conditional to be true, its consequence must be sound, such that if the antecedent is posited, the consequent is infallibly posited. But even if the people of Tyre and Sidon were given the helps given to the Jews, along with the miracles and mighty works performed among them, they would not have been converted unless God had given them another, greater help of prevenient grace—namely, efficacious help, really distinct from sufficient help—which was not given to the Jews. Therefore, if such help were necessary, that conditional would be false: If they had been done in Tyre and Sidon, etc. That the Jews would be rebuked in vain is proved as follows: they could reply that the efficacious help necessary for their conversion had not been given them, and that if God had given it to them, they too would have been converted.

Fourth, it is argued: No prevenient help is efficacious of itself, that is, according to its own nature, nor does it have of itself an infallible connection with the consent of free choice. Therefore it has this dependently on the free influx and cooperation of that same free choice. Therefore the same sufficient help is efficacious if a person consents, and inefficacious if he does not consent; and consequently sufficient help is called efficacious or inefficacious.

Fifth, it is argued that the contrary opinion would entail that conversion and every other pious operation are not within a person's free power. The proof is that, if efficacious help is prevenient, it must necessarily be effected in a person by God alone, since, as the contrary opinion affirms, it in no way depends on the influx of our free choice. Therefore such help is not within a person's free power. The consequence is clear: only that is within a person's power which is done by him and depends on him. Therefore neither will the free act, for which such help is said to be necessary, be within a person's free power, although this must in no way be asserted. The consequence is proved because such an act cannot be within a person's power unless those things also that are necessarily required for producing that act are within his power.

Sixth, they argue from all the reasons by which, as will be said below, they undertake to prove that efficacious help, insofar as it is efficacious, is not prevenient, but rather influences the pious operation together with free choice. For from this it is inferred that the aforesaid division of help is drawn only from its effect, and not from the real and intrinsic power of the help itself.

II. The contrary opinion is consistently defended by all proponents of grace that, as an efficient cause, predetermines free choice to consent. They affirm that it is in accord with the mind of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, as well as with sacred Scripture, Councils, and the Fathers; and it must therefore be held without doubt. Hence:

Efficacious help, insofar as it is efficacious, precedes the free cooperation of free choice.— First Conclusion. Not only is sufficient help prevenient, but efficacious help too, insofar as it is efficacious, precedes the cooperation of our will in the order of reason and causality. As regards sufficient help, this conclusion is accepted by all. Many, however, deny it of efficacious help, asserting that the physical efficacy of divine grace does not consist in anything antecedent to consent in the order of causality, but in the actual influx by which God, together with free choice, immediately influences supernatural operations. But our conclusion is that of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, as will become clear below. First, it is proved from the places cited above from the Council of Trent, where it is stated that through prevenient grace—which it divides into exciting and helping grace—a person is disposed to his justification by freely consenting to and cooperating with that same grace. The Council therefore holds that helping grace, which is efficacious grace, precedes our concurrence and cooperation in the order of reason and causality. Moreover, it is proved from the passages of St. Augustine and St. Thomas by which it was shown above, in disp. 18, that the actual influx of the first cause, by which it helps secondary causes to act, is an immediate influx into the secondary causes themselves. Therefore, in the order of nature and causality, it precedes the actual concurrence of every secondary cause and, consequently, the concurrence of our will as well. It is proved by reason: for sometimes God converts a sinner in a single instant without dispositions that precede in time, as happened in the conversion of St. Paul. Then the argument is this. The help by which God in such a case elevates the sinner's intellect and will to supernatural acts must be received in the faculty prior to the act, because without that help the intellect and will do not have sufficient power for such acts. Therefore, in that case, efficacious help precedes the consent of the will. The consequence is clear: for in similar cases there is no other sufficient help before efficacious help through which the intellect and will could produce supernatural acts; rather, by the same efficacious help God both grants the ability and brings about actual acting. But this conclusion will be treated expressly in disp. 82.

How sufficient help is distinguished from efficacious help.— Second conclusion. Sufficient and efficacious help are distinguished not only conceptually within the genus of gift, but by something intrinsic to them. Thus efficacious help, in itself and as it comes from God, has, at least in an intentional mode, some real intrinsic power of its own, which the help that is only sufficient does not have. This conclusion is opposed to certain theologians who hold that efficacious help has nothing real and intrinsic by which it is distinguished from sufficient help. They add that the same help of grace, remaining in itself unchanged, will be only sufficient if it is conferred in such circumstances, because free choice would not use that help; but if it is conferred on the same person at another time, when God foresaw that the person would use that same help, it will be efficacious.

But our conclusion is proved from 1 Cor. 4: For who distinguishes you? And what do you have that you did not receive? But if you received it, why do you boast as if you had not received it? From this an efficacious argument is drawn. If, with the same help, one person is converted because he wills it and another is not because he does not will it, it follows that the person who is converted distinguishes himself from the other by something proper to himself which he did not receive from the help of grace. The consequence is contrary to the authority of the Apostle. Therefore. The inference is proved as follows: those two people are not really distinguished by the grace they received antecedently to the free cooperation of choice, since, as is supposed, the helps were entirely equal in both. They are not distinguished by those things in which they agree, as Augustine teaches in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chap. 5. Therefore they are distinguished because this person willed to use that help from his innate freedom, while the other did not will to do so. Therefore the distinction and difference is ultimately reduced to the free cooperation of this or that person, in accordance with that person’s innate freedom. The force of this argument will become clearer from what will be said in the following disputation and from what was said in Disputations 36 and 37 on predestination, where we reported and refuted various answers by the authors of the opposing view.

III. What is the division of divine help into efficacious and inefficacious help?.— Third conclusion. The immediate subject of the division proposed above is prevenient help in its whole breadth, and not only sufficient help. This conclusion remains sufficiently proved from what has been said. For since efficacious help, insofar as it is efficacious, is prevenient, as is clear from the premises and will become clearer in Disputations 82 and 90, it follows that whatever prevenient help there may be is included in the immediate subject of that division which divides the help of prevenient grace into efficacious and inefficacious help; otherwise the division would not be sound. Therefore it is impossible for the immediate subject of division to be only sufficient help.

This is confirmed. Otherwise, the subject divided would coincide with one of the dividing members, which is impossible. The antecedent is proved: sufficient help and inefficacious help are precisely the same help. For it is called sufficient help because it grants only the ability to act, but not actually to act; and it is called inefficacious help because it does not make a person act. Therefore, if the immediate subject of division is only sufficient help, the division would coincide with one of its dividing members.

IV. Efficacious help brings it about that, although a person can dissent, he infallibly consents.— To the first argument the reply is that our free choice, aroused and moved by God, freely consents and consequently can dissent if it wills; nevertheless, when God's motion is efficacious, it will infallibly consent: for grace works this in free choice powerfully and gently: although it can dissent, it does not dissent. The reason is that given by Saint Thomas in I–II, question 112, article 3, in the body: For God's intention cannot fail. Hence, if it is God's intention in moving that the person whose heart he moves should consent and obtain grace, he infallibly obtains it—necessarily with the necessity of infallibility, but not with absolute necessity. He teaches the same in II–II, question 24, article 11, in the body. Therefore, to the argument in its form, we say that if a person consents, he does not make grace efficacious; rather, this is an a posteriori sign that he had efficacious grace. For the consent of free choice presupposes efficacious grace in the order of reason and causality. But if a person does not consent to God calling—as happened with those who, when called to the wedding, refused to come—he likewise does not make grace inefficacious, properly speaking; rather, this is an a posteriori sign that God's call, as it came from God, was not efficacious but only sufficient. And when it is argued that a call's being efficacious means producing consent, the antecedent is denied if we speak formally. It is true causally, however, for by efficacious grace God brings it about that free choice cooperates.

To the second argument the antecedent is denied. In proof, the reply is that besides sufficient help, which grants the ability, efficacious help distinct from sufficient help is necessarily presupposed for pious action, as will be clear below and is evident from what was said above.

V. To the third argument the reply is that the Gospel's conditional, “If the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented,” is most true. To understand this, it should be supposed from dialectic that for a conditional to be true, its antecedent need not be the cause of its consequent; it is enough that, if the antecedent is posited, the consequent is posited, whether the antecedent be the adequate cause of the consequent, its effect, or a condition presupposing another cause by whose power the consequent follows. For example, this conditional is true: “If it is day, the sun shines,” and yet the antecedent is not the cause of the consequent but its effect. This one is also true: “If fire is applied, it heats,” and yet the application is only a condition. So in the present case we say that to verify the conditional, “If the signs and wonders that the Lord performed in Chorazin and Bethsaida had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have been converted,” it is not necessary that the antecedent be the cause of the consequent, nor that anyone in fact be converted solely by the signs and sufficient helps granted to the Jews. It is enough that, if those signs were posited in Tyre and Sidon, many of them would in fact be converted—not by the signs alone, but by another cause that Christ presupposes, namely, the efficacious help that God had resolved to confer on them if the signs that the Lord performed in Chorazin and Bethsaida had been done among them, as was said in Disputation 7, no. 24. As for the objection in the same argument that the Jews would be rebuked without cause for not having turned to Christ, if God did not give them the efficacious help necessary for conversion, the reply is that the same argument can be made against the authors of the contrary opinion. For, as they themselves admit, a congruous call—that is, one conferred in circumstances in which God foresaw that the person would consent—is necessary for a person to be converted. Therefore, if God did not give the Jews such grace, or a congruous call, why did the Lord Christ rebuke the Jews for not having been converted? The reply, then, is that they are reasonably rebuked because by their own fault they provided an obstacle to efficacious grace being given to them, as was said in Disputation 7, no. 24, and Disputation 18, no. 20.

VI. In what sense help of grace is said to be efficacious in itself.— To the fourth objection it is answered that, as will become clear in the next disputation in the answer to the third argument, and in disp. 83, help of grace is called efficacious in itself, that is, according to the real power it has from God, insofar, namely, as it is an instrument of God, who by an absolute and efficacious will, with no presupposed middle knowledge, wills to convert to himself the person whose heart he moves. Hence help that is only sufficient in itself never becomes efficacious through the free cooperation of free choice.

The fifth objection was answered at length in disp. 18, no. 20; disp. 22, no. 32; and disp. 23, no. 29.

The answer to the sixth will become clear in disp. 82 and 90.

Disputatio LXXIII: Whether the division of the help of prevenient grace into efficacious and inefficacious help is taken solely from the effect, which also depends on the free cooperation of free choice, or also from the real power of the help itself.

Disputatio LXXIV: Whether exciting or prevenient grace is formally a vital act of free choice, or something preceding every vital act.

Disputatio LXXV: What is the proper effect of exciting grace insofar as it is formally exciting.

Disputatio LXXVI: Whether exciting grace is the same as sufficient grace.

Disputatio LXXVII: Whether exciting grace, conferred on human beings in the ordinary manner, depends on the ministers of the Church.

Disputatio LXXVIII: Whether exciting grace, ordinarily conferred on human beings, depends on the effort and diligence of the person who is roused.

Disputatio LXXIX: What help of grace is called truly sufficient.

Disputatio LXXX: Whether every sufficient help is efficacious in some respect.

Book Nine

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

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