De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Introduction

Disputatio LXX: Whether grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating, exciting and helping, and prevenient and subsequent grace.

Disputatio LXXI: Whether the help of grace is fittingly divided into sufficient help and efficacious help.

Whether the help of grace is suitably divided into sufficient help and efficacious help.

I. There have not been lacking those who assert that the distinction of grace into sufficient and efficacious is plainly insufficient, useless, and alien to the sacred Scriptures, Councils, Fathers, and reason. They cite in support of themselves Jerome Osorius, book 9 of On Justice, pp. 2 and 3, and John Anthony Delphius in the book On Justification, while explaining the divisions of grace. They prove their opinion.

First: for the division of help into sufficient help and efficacious help under these terms is not found in the sacred Scriptures, Councils, Fathers, or ancient Scholastic Doctors. Indeed, the Council of Trent, which among other things treated grace and free choice more carefully against ancient and modern heretics, made no mention of sufficient or efficacious grace, but divided grace exhaustively into exciting and helping grace. Therefore the division of grace into sufficient and efficacious is to be rejected as new.

Second. The aforesaid division has very many stumbling blocks, since more recent theologians disagree so greatly about the notion and explanation of sufficient and efficacious grace. Therefore, to avoid such stumbling blocks, it will be better to reject this new division and retain the old division into exciting and helping grace.

Third. Everything that sacred Scripture, the Councils, and the Fathers have handed down about divine grace or special help can be explained and understood in a Catholic and suitable way by using the single division into exciting and helping grace. For what Scripture says, Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if anyone opens to me, I will enter to him, I called, and you refused, and similar things are understood of exciting grace. But what it says, Without me you can do nothing, God is the one who works in us both to will and to accomplish, and, all our works he has worked in us, and other such things are sufficiently understood of helping grace. Therefore the distinction of divine help into efficacious and sufficient is multiplied superfluously.

Fourth. Reprobates, while they are in grace, perform many works of charity by virtue of divine help, and yet they do not perform those works by virtue of sufficient help, for sufficient help is that which grants the ability, but not actual acting; nor do they perform them by virtue of efficacious help, for this help is proper to the predestined, since according to Augustine it is help according to the purpose of God who shows mercy, and the most important among those benefits by which all who are liberated are most certainly liberated. Therefore this distinction is insufficient and consequently unsuitable for resolving the doubts that arise about God's help.

It is confirmed. Those who elicit an act of attrition, which is required beforehand for receiving the sacrament of penance, are helped by some supernatural help from God. For, according to the Council of Trent, this attrition is a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not yet indeed dwelling within, but moving, by which impulse the penitent, being helped, prepares a way for himself to justice. Yet that help is not sufficient, since otherwise the person would reject that help and would not do anything else with it; nor is it efficacious help, since otherwise by its power the sinner would be converted infallibly and would obtain justifying grace. Therefore the same conclusion follows as before.

Fifth. Efficacious help, however its proponents explain it, destroys true sufficient help; therefore the help of grace is not correctly divided into sufficient help and efficacious help. The consequence is proved because one member of a division ought not to destroy the nature of the other. The antecedent is proved as follows: if, with the Thomists, efficacious help is said to be one of the things antecedently and necessarily required for acting, it is clear that sufficient help is sufficient in name alone. For how can that help be called sufficient for some operation beyond which another help is necessarily required for that operation actually to be produced? But if, according to the view of other theologians, sufficient help is that which God confers at an unsuitable time and in other unaccommodating circumstances, in which God foresees that a person will not consent if such grace is conferred on him, even on this view the help said to be sufficient for believing is not truly sufficient. For if a physician gives a potion to a patient whose phlegm is excessive and who suffers from a fever on account of that excess—a leading remedy, indeed, but one quite unsuitable for curing the phlegm—he must be said not to have given sufficient medicine, or even medicine at all. The same would occur if he applied to the disease not a bad remedy, but one at an unsuitable and unseasonable time, for example, while the humor has not yet been concocted but is resisting through its crudity. Therefore, in like manner, God is not considered to grant sufficient help for healing a person from sin if that help is not suitable and adapted to the person to whom it is applied, or if it is conferred at an inopportune time, namely, when God foresees that the person will not consent.

Sixth, there is an argument that the authors of the opposing view call the touchstone. Let us suppose that one and the same preacher speaks to many sinners about the punishments of hell or the glory of paradise, while the Holy Spirit meanwhile arouses and inwardly moves their hearts with equal grace. It may happen that some of them are converted, while others are not, as is clear from Matt. chap. 11, where the wisdom of the incarnate Word revealed to us that, if the signs and wonders he performed among the Jews had been done among the Tyrians and Sidonians, they would long ago have repented. He plainly showed that the Jews resisted the same wonders by which the Tyrians and Sidonians would have been converted. Therefore that grace was not merely sufficient, since otherwise no one would be converted by it; nor was it efficacious, since otherwise all would be converted. Therefore another kind of grace must be posited, namely, an indifferent one, which one may resist or consent to by the freedom of choice, as is found in the Council of Trent. Therefore that distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace is not to be admitted.

Seventh. One member of a division ought not to be included in another, since a division must be made into opposites. But sufficient grace is included in efficacious grace, for all efficacious grace is, a fortiori, sufficient. For if a person actually acts through it, he can undoubtedly act through it. Therefore grace is not correctly divided into sufficient and efficacious grace.

Eighth. The term “efficacious grace” was invented by Calvin, as is clear from book 2 of the Institutes, chap. 3, no. 11, where he says: Nor can Christ’s saying be understood otherwise, “Everyone who has heard from my Father comes to me,” than that he teaches God’s grace to be efficacious of itself. Therefore, at least so that we may not agree with heretics in terminology, that division of grace into sufficient and efficacious is not to be used in the schools of theologians.

II. The Doctors commonly teach the contrary opinion. Hence it must be said that the help of grace is suitably and sufficiently divided into sufficient help and efficacious help. This division is not useless, nor foreign to Sacred Scripture, the Councils, the Fathers, or reason; rather, it is entirely consonant with them all, and consequently useful and necessary for explaining everything the Catholic Church has always taught about grace and free choice. Indeed, if we speak of the reality itself, no Catholic can doubt this division, since sufficient grace is the same as exciting grace, and efficacious grace is not really distinct from helping grace, as was said above. It is clear, moreover, that the division of grace into exciting and helping is found in Sacred Scripture and the Councils, especially Trent, and in the holy Fathers. Therefore, as regards the reality itself, the division of grace into sufficient and efficacious cannot be rejected. But it is proved that this division must necessarily be admitted, and that it is found even under its proper names in Sacred Scripture, Councils, Fathers, and scholastic Doctors, especially Saint Thomas.

III. First, this division is proved from Sacred Scripture. For the Apostle says of sufficient help: I can do all things in him who strengthens me, and again: We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God. In these words he expressly establishes sufficient grace, by which we can act piously, and teaches that it is not in us from ourselves but from God. Hence the Council of Orange, canon 7, and Saint Thomas infer the sufficiency of grace from these words, saying: Although we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as though from ourselves, nevertheless we have some sufficiency, namely, that we can will the good and begin to believe; and this is from God, What have you that you did not receive? in 1 Corinthians 4. Moreover, the same Apostle says: Lest the greatness of the revelations should exalt me, a thorn in my flesh was given to me, an angel of Satan to buffet me; for this I besought the Lord three times that it might depart from me, and he said to me: My grace is sufficient for you, for power is made perfect in weakness. If, according to the Lord's word, grace suffices to overcome all temptations, then true sufficient grace is given, by which a person can overcome temptations and perform works of piety. Therefore sufficient grace is found under this very name in Sacred Scripture. It is stated explicitly in other places under equivalent names. For Proverbs 1 says: Wisdom cries aloud outside, raises her voice in the streets, and cries out at the head of the crowds. And in Acts 7, where Saint Stephen said to the Jews, You have always resisted the Holy Spirit, he plainly signified that good desires are inspired in some so that they can be converted, but that they resist these through their own malice. For if they could not be converted through that call of the Holy Spirit, Stephen would not have reproached the Jews for resisting. Likewise, in Isaiah 5 the Lord speaks thus: Inhabitants of Jerusalem and men of Judah, judge between me and my vineyard. What more should I have done for my vineyard that I did not do? Did I perhaps expect it to yield grapes, and did it yield wild grapes? From this it is clear that the Jews whom the Lord reproaches did not have efficacious grace, since otherwise they would certainly have borne good fruit. But they had truly sufficient grace, by which they could have been converted and could have produced fruits worthy of repentance. For otherwise the Lord would not have reproached them for bearing wild grapes instead of grapes. Therefore Sacred Scripture attests sufficient grace, distinct from efficacious grace.

IIII. The same is proved concerning efficacious grace from Ezekiel 36: And I will put my Spirit within you, and I will cause you to walk in my commandments, and to keep my judgments, and to do them. Saint Augustine very often uses this testimony against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians to prove that efficacious grace must be admitted, which grants the will most efficacious powers, as will be clear below.

The same efficacious help is understood in the passage of John 6: Everyone who hears from the Father and has learned comes to me. Here the efficacy of the divine call is declared, by which the one called infallibly comes. And in John 10: No one will snatch them from my hand, and they will never perish. This was said because he goes before his predestined ones with efficacious help so that they may be infallibly saved. Likewise, in Rom. 8: Those whom he called, these he also justified. And in chapter 9: It was said not from works but from him who calls: “Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated.” Here efficacious calling is signified, of which the same Apostle elsewhere says: To those who are called saints according to the purpose. And in Phil. 2: For it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish according to his good will.

V. First, they answer that these and similar passages of Scripture proceed against Pelagius, who, content with general divine help, denied special help and exciting and helping grace, but that they prove nothing against those who acknowledge the necessity of exciting and helping grace. Nevertheless, this answer does not remove the force of the argument, both because Pelagius admitted exciting grace, as was seen in disputation 1 and will become clearer in disputation 95, and likewise Julian admitted helping grace attendant upon and subsequent to the determination of the created will, as was shown in the same disputation 1, no. 11; and also because the argument proves not only that exciting and helping grace must be admitted, but also concludes that there is grace that is truly sufficient for salvation and grace that is not only sufficient but also efficacious. Second, they answer that the cited words of Scripture and similar passages indicate the gift of perseverance. Hence efficacious help cannot be proved from them, for the gift of perseverance is proper to the predestined, whereas efficacious grace is common to those who finally persevere and to those who do good but do not persevere to the end. From this they infer that an intermediate kind of grace must be granted, which serves those who do good works but nevertheless do not persevere finally; and consequently, that the aforesaid division is insufficient, since grace is divided into sufficient and efficacious.

This answer too has no appearance of validity whatever. First, although some passages of Scripture are understood of the predestined who persevere to the end, some nevertheless speak without distinction of the predestined and those who perform works of piety, even if they do not persevere to the end, as in Phil. 2: It is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish. And Ezek. 36: I will make you walk in my commandments. And the passage of John 6: No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. For one who believes in Christ and loves him is said to come to Christ, even if he finally falls from grace and is condemned. Second, although the help of grace is divided immediately into sufficient help and efficacious help, efficacious help is afterward subdivided in turn into efficacious help for believing and efficacious help for loving, etc., and into efficacious help for persevering, as will be clear in disputation 84. Hence, from the fact that there is some efficacious help proper to the predestined, namely, the gift of perseverance, and some efficacious help common to the predestined and non-predestined, namely, that by which someone believes in God and loves him above all things, it does not follow that the division of grace into sufficient and efficacious grace is not exhaustive.

VI. Second, this is proved from the definitions of the Councils. For the Second Council of Orange says in chap. 19: Since without the grace of God a person cannot preserve the salvation he has received, how can he, without the grace of God, restore what he has lost? Therefore grace grants the ability to persevere and the ability, through penance, to repair the losses incurred through sin; therefore grace sufficient for persevering and doing penance is given. The same is proved of efficacious grace from canon 9 of that Council, where it says: It is a gift of God when we think rightly and keep our feet from falsehood and injustice; for whenever we do good, God works in us and with us so that we may work. And canon 20: Many good things are done in a person that the person does not do; but no good things does a person do that God does not grant the person to do. In these words it expressed efficacious grace, which makes us do, and works so that we may work. And canon 25: We also believe, in accordance with the Catholic faith, that all the baptized, having received grace through baptism, with Christ helping and cooperating, can and ought to fulfill the things that pertain to salvation, if they are willing to labor faithfully. In these words it plainly teaches that all who are in a state of grace can persevere through God's help, if they will, and can fulfill the things that pertain to salvation.

The same division of grace is gathered from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, on justification, chap. 11, where it says: God does not command impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes you both to do what you can and to ask for what you cannot; and he helps you to be able. And immediately it adds that with divine help they can perform what God commands. Therefore, according to the Council of Trent, grace sufficient for a person to keep all the divine commandments is given. In canons 1 and 2 it defines that without grace a person cannot be justified or merit eternal life, clearly showing that grace grants a person the ability to be justified and the ability to merit eternal life; but the grace that grants the ability is sufficient grace, as was said above. And in canon 4 efficacious grace is taught unmistakably, when it defines that the free choice of a human being, moved and aroused by God, in some way cooperates, assenting to God who arouses and calls, whereby it disposes and prepares itself to obtain the grace of justification. The subject there is efficacious grace, which makes a person cooperate with God who arouses and calls.

VII. There is a notable testimony to prove the same efficacious grace, from Pope Benedict VII in a certain prayer of the following tenor: Be present to us, we beseech you, O Lord, Holy Spirit: we are indeed held by the enormity of sin, but gathered especially in your name. Come to us and deign to enter our hearts. Teach us what we should do; show us where we should go; work what we should accomplish. Be our salvation, and the adviser and cause of our judgments, you who alone with God the Father and his Son possess a glorious name. Do not allow us to be disturbers of justice; you who love the equity of supreme truth, so that ignorance may not draw us to the left, favor may not bend us, nor the acceptance of a gift or partiality toward a person corrupt us. But join us to yourself efficaciously, by the gift of your grace alone, so that we may be one in you and deviate from the truth in nothing; so that, gathered in your name, we may thus maintain justice in all things with the moderation of piety, that our judgment disagree with yours in nothing, and that in the future we may obtain eternal rewards for what we have done well. Let the phrase efficaciously, by the gift of your grace alone be considered: therefore efficacious grace cannot be denied, even as to the very name.

Third, this is proved by the authority of the holy Fathers, especially Saint Augustine, who explicitly distinguishes grace into sufficient grace, without which we cannot act piously, and efficacious grace, by which we actually act well, as is clear from the passages cited above. Moreover, he says in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 16: For God calls his many predestined sons, in order to make them members of his one predestined Son—not with that calling by which those who refused to come to the wedding were called; for by that calling the Jews too were called, to whom Christ crucified is a stumbling block, and the Gentiles, to whom Christ crucified is foolishness; but he calls the predestined with that calling which the Apostle distinguished when he said that to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, he preaches Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God. For he says, “To those who are called,” so as to show that the others were not called; for he knew there is a certain calling of those who are called according to purpose, whom he foreknew and predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son. Signifying this calling, he says: “Not from works, but from him who calls, it was said to her: The elder shall serve the younger.” Did he say, “not from works, but from one who believes”? He wholly removed this even from man, so that he might give everything to God. He therefore said, “but from him who calls”—not by just any calling, but by that calling through which one becomes a believer. Saint Augustine calls a calling “according to purpose” one that proceeds from the purpose, or absolute and efficacious decree, of the divine will to convert a person, draw him to himself through pious action, justify him, or even save and glorify him. He calls a calling “not according to purpose” one that proceeds from God's antecedent will, by which he wills all people to be saved and to come to knowledge of the truth. Likewise, in On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 11, he says: For that was such a help that one would leave it if he willed and remain in it if he willed; it was not a help that would make him will. This is the first grace, given to the first Adam; but the grace of the second Adam is more powerful. The first is that by which a person has righteousness if he wills; the second, then, has greater power, by which he is also brought to will, and to will so strongly and to love with such ardor that he overcomes by the pleasure of the spirit the pleasure of the flesh that lusts against it. And below: Through Jesus Christ our Lord, a greater measure of this is given to those to whom God has been pleased to give it, so that there may be present not only the help without which we cannot persevere even if we will, but also a help of such great measure and kind that we will. Through this grace of God we have, in receiving the good and holding it fast with perseverance, not only the ability to do what we will, but also the willing to do what we are able to do. In these words he distinguishes two helps of divine grace: one granting the ability, which is sufficient help; the other granting us the willing, which is efficacious help. Moreover, in chapter 12 of the same book he says: These helps themselves must be distinguished. One kind is a help without which something does not happen; another is a help by which something happens. And below: Therefore, to the first man, who in the good in which he had been made upright had received the ability not to sin, not to die, and not to abandon the good itself, the help of perseverance was given—not a help that would make him persevere, but one without which he could not persevere by free choice. But now the saints predestined through God's grace for the Kingdom of God are given not merely such a help of perseverance, but one by which perseverance itself is granted them: not only so that without this gift they cannot persevere, but also so that through this gift they unfailingly persevere. In these words he plainly distinguishes the help, or assistance, of grace into a help that merely grants the ability to act or the ability to persevere—as was the help granted to our first parents in the state of innocence—and a help that grants not only the ability but also actual pious action or perseverance to the end. Grace that grants the ability is sufficient; grace that confers actual action is efficacious. Therefore.

VIII. There are more compelling testimonies concerning efficacious help in the same St. Augustine, some of which we cited above; especially in book 1 against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 20; in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 20; and in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapters 14, 16, and 17. In these passages he cites and considers the words of Ezekiel 36, I will make you do: to prove that efficacious help is given by God, by which he makes us act and works so that we may act. And in On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 5, he says: That Paul should be called from heaven and converted by such a great and most efficacious call was solely the grace of God, because Paul's merits were great, but evil.

IX. They answer that such most efficacious grace was granted to the Apostle Paul by a special privilege. Hence it should not be made a rule for proving that efficacious grace is given to all who act piously, much less can it prove that grace is divided into sufficient and efficacious. For otherwise grace should with equal or greater right be divided into most hidden and most manifest grace, since St. Augustine also uses the name “most hidden grace,” as is clear in book 1 of On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, chapter 9, and On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 8.

But an argument is urged against this answer: even if that most efficacious grace was granted to the Apostle by a special prerogative, nevertheless it truly was efficacious grace and distinct from the grace given to those who are not converted but can nevertheless be converted, which without doubt is sufficient grace. Therefore the division of grace into sufficient and efficacious must be admitted. Nor does it follow from this that, according to St. Augustine, grace must be divided into most hidden and most manifest grace. For the supernatural grace of God about which we are now speaking is always hidden and cannot be known evidently through experience or natural reason, as was said above and will be clear below. But not all grace is efficacious or most efficacious; some is only sufficient. Hence the cases are not alike.

Moreover, St. Augustine establishes in many other places efficacious grace as common to all who act piously or merit eternal life, and especially in On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 16, where he says: It is certain that we act when we act; but he makes us act, by furnishing the will with most efficacious powers, who said: I will make you walk in my justifications, and observe my judgments, and do them. Behold, he distinguishes most efficacious powers from sufficient powers and defines that the former are given to all who act piously, whereas the latter are granted to those who can act well but, through their own fault, do not wish to act. And in book 1 against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 20, speaking of the divine power by which God, in response to Queen Esther's prayer, turned the heart of King Ahasuerus and changed his indignation into mildness, he says: He who turned the king's heart, before the king had heard the words of the woman making a request, and changed it from indignation to mildness by a most hidden and most efficacious power—that is, from a will to harm to a will to favor—according to the Apostle's words: It is God who works in you both to will.

X. There is an outstanding testimony of St. Cyril to prove the same division in the book On Adoration and Worship in Spirit and Truth. There, while narrating the history of Gen. 19, how Lot received the angels as guests and afterward they took hold of his hand and the hands of his wife and sons, and while mystically explaining their taking hold of the hands, he says: Let this be a very clear sign to you, Palladius: he does not only spur and exhort us with words and with admonitions put into the mind so that we may depart from sin, but God, the Savior of all, also shows us such great kindness that he helps us with efficacious aid, according to what is written: You have taken hold of my right hand, and in your counsel you have led me. For since human nature is not very noble nor sufficiently able to flee evil, God in a certain way fights alongside us and seems to grant a twofold benefit: persuading us through admonitions so that we may find help, and providing that help more powerfully, so that present and violent evil cannot prevail. By these words he most clearly distinguishes a twofold support or help of God: one that is sufficient, granting the ability to act well, which he signified by admonitions put into the mind; and another stronger help, namely, efficacious help, which brings about a person's pious action and escape from imminent evil.

XI. The Passion of Christ made satisfaction for all as regards sufficiency, and for some as regards efficacy.— Fourth, this is proved by the authority of the Scholastics, who posited the division into sufficient and efficacious grace. Among them, St. Thomas holds the first place. For in 3. sent. dist. 13. q. 2. art. 2. quaestiunc. 2. ad 5, he says that Christ made satisfaction sufficiently for the whole human nature, but not efficiently, because not all become partakers of that satisfaction; this is due to their obstinacy, not to any insufficiency in the satisfaction itself. And in dist. 19. q. 1. art. 1. quaestiunc. 2. ad 3, he uses the same distinction, comparing Christ’s Passion to medicine, which before being applied to the sick person is sufficient to heal, but has no efficiency—that is, efficacy—unless it is applied to the sick person. And in 3. p. q. 79. art. 7. ad 2, he says that just as the Passion of Christ is indeed profitable to all with respect to sufficiency, for the remission of guilt and the attainment of grace and glory, but does not have its effect except in those who are joined to Christ’s Passion through faith and charity; so too the sacrifice of the Mass, which is the memorial of the Lord’s Passion, has its effect only in those who are joined to this sacrament through faith and charity. And in his exposition of Matt. chap. 26, on the words This is my blood of the new testament, which will be shed for many for the remission of sins, he says: For many and for all, if sufficiency is considered; for he is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world. But if we consider the effect, it does not have its effect except in those who are saved, and this is due to the fault of human beings. From these passages an argument is drawn. Christ’s Passion made satisfaction for all human beings as regards sufficiency, and for some as regards efficacy; therefore grace, which he merited for us through his Passion, can and ought similarly to be distinguished into sufficient grace, through which a person can act piously or be saved, and efficacious grace, through which a person actually acts piously or is saved.

But they say that in all the places cited above St. Thomas made absolutely no mention of the efficacy of Christ’s Passion, but only taught that Christ’s Passion is sufficient for all, while it is efficient in some and has its effect in them. Therefore, according to the mind of St. Thomas, Christ’s Passion or grace should not be distinguished into sufficient and efficacious, but into sufficient and efficient. Yet this objection is of no force, for efficient grace in St. Thomas designates efficacious grace: it signifies the grace that makes us act and works so that we may act. It is clear that this is efficacious grace, or that which, as Augustine says, grants the will most efficacious powers. Besides, St. Thomas also makes explicit mention of efficacious grace in other places, as distinguished from sufficient grace, especially in his commentary on John, chap. 6. Explaining the words Everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me, he says: The Father’s drawing is most efficacious, because everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to Christ. Let the other passages of St. Augustine and St. Thomas be consulted which we brought forward in Disputation 23, no. 9 and following, in support of efficacious grace, which predetermines created will to good.

XII. Fifth, the same division and its sufficiency are proved by reason. For if truly sufficient grace were not given, it would follow that all those who are not converted or saved could not in reality be converted or saved—something that cannot be admitted. The antecedent is proved as follows: they do not have efficacious grace, for otherwise they would be converted or saved, since this grace grants actual good action or perseverance to the end. Therefore, if they do not have truly sufficient grace, which grants the ability, all of them would be unable to be converted, act piously, or be saved. Thus it would not be imputed to them as blame that they were not converted or did not fulfill the divine commandments, and consequently God would complain of them irrationally and rebuke them without cause. Yet this seems contrary to the testimonies of Sacred Scripture. For Proverbs 1 says: Because I called and you refused; I stretched out my hand and no one paid attention, etc.; I too will laugh at your destruction, etc. And Psalm 4 says: Sons of men, how long will you be heavy of heart? Why do you love vanity and seek a lie? And the Lord Christ, seated as judge on the day of judgment, will say to those on his left: Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the Devil and his angels; for I was hungry and you did not give me food, etc. It therefore remains that they had sufficient help by which they could fulfill all these things. Therefore grace must necessarily be divided into sufficient and efficacious.

Finally, it is specifically proved that efficacious help must be posited as distinct from sufficient help. For otherwise the certainty and infallibility of predestination would be removed, since it is founded on the efficacy of the helps of divine grace, through which all who are saved are most certainly saved, as Augustine says in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 14. These matters will become clearer from what will be said below in the discussion of the efficacy of the helps of prevenient grace.

XIII. To the first argument, it is already clear from what has been said how consonant the division of grace into sufficient and efficacious is with Sacred Scripture, the Councils, and the Fathers. As for the objection from the Council of Trent, the reply is that by the names “exciting” and “helping” grace it included sufficient and efficacious grace, as is plainly clear from the other passages of that same Council cited above.

To the second, the reply is that nearly the same difficulties which theologians discuss concerning sufficient and efficacious grace can be raised about exciting and helping grace. Hence, if because of those difficulties the division of grace into sufficient and efficacious were not to be admitted, then for the same reason the division of grace into exciting and helping would have to be rejected—something that cannot be granted. The second reply is that all the difficulties that arise concerning the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace are readily resolved from theological principles, namely, from Scripture, the Councils, and the Fathers, as is clear from what was said above and from what is to be said below. Even if, once this same distinction is posited, many matters present themselves that we cannot fully understand or explain, they should not for that reason be denied or rejected. Hence Augustine asks: Are we going to say that what we see to be so is not so, because we cannot discover why it is so? Should what is manifest be denied because what is hidden cannot be grasped? And in another place he says: Even if I cannot refute their arguments, nevertheless I see that we must hold fast to what is most clearly stated in the Scriptures, so that from these the obscure things may be revealed; or, if the mind is not yet capable of seeing them when demonstrated or investigating them when hidden, they must be believed without any doubt; more will be said on this in Disputations 118 and 119.

To the third, the reply is this: since sufficient and efficacious grace are not really distinct from exciting and helping grace, the passages of Scripture that speak of grace and free choice, just as they are rightly explained of exciting or helping grace, can also be interpreted most rightly of sufficient or efficacious grace.

To the fourth objection it is answered that the reprobate, while they are in grace, perform good works meritorious of eternal life by the power of efficacious grace. But that grace is indeed efficacious for believing in or loving God; it is not, however, efficacious for persevering. For efficacious grace is divided into different members, as was said above. Hence, from the fact that the grace conferred on the reprobate is not efficacious for persevering, it does not follow that it is not efficacious, or that a middle kind of grace, distinct from sufficient and efficacious grace, must be posited. Efficacious grace is called grace according to God's purpose, whether that purpose is to effect in us and with us pious acts of faith, hope, and charity—as happens in the reprobate who are in grace—or is also a purpose of saving or glorifying, which is the purpose he has concerning the elect. Therefore, when St. Augustine says that predestination is foreknowledge and the preparation of God's benefits, by which all who are delivered are most certainly delivered, by “God's benefits” he comprehends not only efficacious grace, by which a person believes in, hopes in, and loves God, or performs other works of piety, but also that grace by which God makes that person persevere to the end.

To the confirmation it is answered that the actual help by which the act of attrition is elicited is indeed sufficient help in relation to perfect conversion, and at the same time efficacious in relation to attrition or other imperfect acts that regularly precede perfect contrition. For, as will be said in disp. 80, the same help that is sufficient in relation to one effect is at the same time efficacious in relation to another.

To the fifth objection it is answered that efficacious help is one of the things antecedently required for a person actually to act well, as was said above. Nor does it follow from this that no grace other than efficacious grace is sufficient, as was shown in disp. 18, no. 20, and disp. 23, no. 29.

XIV. To the sixth objection it is answered that, when all the helps of prevenient grace, both external and internal, are altogether equal in two people, it never happens that one is converted and the other is not; rather, the one who is converted always receives some stronger help of prevenient grace that the one who is not converted does not receive, as will become clear in disp. 108. There it will also be necessary to answer the objection drawn from Matt. 11.

To the seventh objection it is answered that sufficient grace is included eminently in efficacious grace, but not formally. For, formally speaking, sufficient grace, as distinguished from efficacious grace, is that which grants only the ability to perform the act in relation to which it is called sufficient. Efficacious grace, however, although it grants the ability to act, does not confer only the ability, but also actual acting, as was said.

Second, it is answered that even when the conversion of a sinner takes place in a single instant, God both moves free choice by helping grace, which is efficacious, and likewise, through exciting or sufficient grace, illuminates the intellect and excites the sinner's will to convert freely. Although this excitation occurs in the same instant of time, it is nevertheless presupposed, at a prior conceptual stage, to efficacious grace.

The answer to the eighth argument is that, as we said in Disputation 3 and as will also become clear below, Calvin did not err when he asserted that Christ’s grace is efficacious; rather, his error was that he imagined it to be efficacious of itself in such a way that our free choice does not cooperate freely with it, but only by a spontaneous motion.

Disputatio LXXII: Whether, in the division of the help of grace into efficacious and inefficacious help, sufficient help is the immediate subject of division.

Disputatio LXXIII: Whether the division of the help of prevenient grace into efficacious and inefficacious help is taken solely from the effect, which also depends on the free cooperation of free choice, or also from the real power of the help itself.

Disputatio LXXIV: Whether exciting or prevenient grace is formally a vital act of free choice, or something preceding every vital act.

Disputatio LXXV: What is the proper effect of exciting grace insofar as it is formally exciting.

Disputatio LXXVI: Whether exciting grace is the same as sufficient grace.

Disputatio LXXVII: Whether exciting grace, conferred on human beings in the ordinary manner, depends on the ministers of the Church.

Disputatio LXXVIII: Whether exciting grace, ordinarily conferred on human beings, depends on the effort and diligence of the person who is roused.

Disputatio LXXIX: What help of grace is called truly sufficient.

Disputatio LXXX: Whether every sufficient help is efficacious in some respect.

Book Nine

Book Ten

Book Eleven

Book Twelve

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