De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice, written for the de auxiliis controversy. The first eight books treat God’s knowledge of future contingents, his motion of secondary causes, providence and predestination, the powers of fallen nature, the preparation for grace and the division of grace; books nine to twelve treat the help of efficacious grace, the gift of perseverance, reprobation, and the reconciliation of created free choice with the grace that infallibly moves it, and close with an epilogue of twenty propositions. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.


Book One

Book Two

Book Three

Book Four

Book Five

Book Six

Book Seven

Book Eight

Introduction

IN WHICH THE DIVISION OF Helps of Grace, and of Exciting and Sufficient Grace, is treated.

THE weakness of free choice after the Fall having been recognized, we must proceed to the intrinsic helps by which it is strengthened and assisted by God, so that it may turn away from evil and do good. First, we must treat the division of the helps of divine grace in general; then, in particular, each of the members dividing it must be discussed. Regarding the first, four questions must be examined.

I. Whether grace is suitably divided into operating and cooperating grace; where the division of grace into exciting and helping grace, and into prevenient and subsequent grace, is also treated.

II. Whether the help of grace is suitably divided into sufficient, or inefficacious, help and efficacious help.

III. Whether, when the help of grace is divided into efficacious and inefficacious help, the immediate subject divided by this division is prevenient help in its whole breadth, or only sufficient help.

IIII. Whether the division of help into efficacious and inefficacious help is drawn only from the effect, which also depends on the cooperation of free choice, or also from the intrinsic power of the help itself.

Disputatio LXX: Whether grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating, exciting and helping, and prevenient and subsequent grace.

Whether grace is suitably divided into operating and cooperating; into exciting and helping; into prevenient and subsequent.

I. Saint Thomas and his disciples treat this difficulty expressly, in the Second Part, question 111, articles 2 and 3, and therefore it must be resolved briefly by us. Among heretics, however, certain Pelagians said that no helping grace prevenient to our free choice should be posited; rather, the opposite: that the works of our choice precede grace itself. That is, God confers on a person the special help of helping grace because the person wills to act well. The Pelagians held this error, as is most plainly evident from what was said in Disputations 1 and 2. Consequently, these heretics denied true prevenient helping grace, asserting that it is an attendant of the human will and is given according to our merits. Hence they also do not admit the divisions of grace with which our discussion is concerned.

Their chief argument was this: if helping grace, prevenient in the order of causality to the human will and its efforts, is established as necessary for salvation and pious action, no freedom of choice remains in us. For a person could not act when he himself wills, but only when God wills to precede and help him by his grace. Pelagius suggests this argument in Augustine, On the Grace of Christ against Pelagius and Caelestius, book 1, chapter 7, whose words were cited in Disputation 1, no. 6. Julian had the same argument, as Augustine attests in book 1 of Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, to Boniface, chapter 18, as can be gathered from what was said in Disputation 1, nos. 11 and 13.

II. From these points it is clear that Julian denied the necessity of prevenient helping grace for this reason, and admitted only helping grace subsequent to the created will: he thought that if helping grace preceded our wills and made willing people out of unwilling ones, it would utterly destroy human freedom of choice. The remnants of the Pelagians in Gaul held the same view, especially Faustus and Cassian, as was shown in Disputation 2, no. 16, and Disputation 49, no. 1. Certain more recent theologians, to preserve human freedom, said that God ordinarily confers the helps of prevenient and exciting grace only on those who first do what lies within them by the powers of nature; but that those who do what lies within them by nature's power infallibly receive these helps, in accordance with a fixed law. In this way, while we were on the way, our salvation would always be placed in the hands of our free choice, and our failure to turn to God would be due to ourselves. But we have dealt expressly against this doctrine in Disputations 56 and 58.

III. What is meant by the name “grace”?.— To explain the divisions of grace in accordance with the commonly received teaching of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas, it should be noted that here we are not speaking of grace in its most general sense, in which it signifies or includes even nature freely created by God: For in this sense Pelagius very often used the name “grace” to deceive the simple minds of the faithful, as Saint Augustine observes. Rather, we are speaking of grace in a more particular sense, as distinguished from nature freely created, and signifying a supernatural gift, whether it be a habitual gift, as justifying grace is, or an actual help of God moving us toward good. For Saint Thomas often teaches that both are signified by the name “grace.”

Grace is divided into sanctifying grace and freely given grace.— The first conclusion, then, is this: Grace, in its first division, is divided into sanctifying grace and freely given grace. This is the conclusion of St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 111, art. 1, in the body, where he proves it as follows: As the Apostle says in Rom. 13, the things that are from God are ordered. The order of things consists in this: some are led back to God through others, as Dionysius says in the book On the Celestial Hierarchy. Since, then, grace is ordered to this, that man be led back to God, this is carried out according to a certain order, namely, that some are led back to God through others. Accordingly, grace is twofold. One is that by which the man himself is joined to God, and is called sanctifying grace. The other is that by which one man cooperates with another so that he may be led back to God. Such a gift is called freely given grace because it is granted to man above the faculty of nature and above the merit of the person. But since it is not given so that the man himself may be justified through it, but rather so that he may cooperate in another's justification, it is therefore not called sanctifying. And concerning this the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 12: To each is given the manifestation of the Spirit for the benefit, namely, of others.

IIII. How sanctifying grace and freely given grace differ.— From this it is clear that there is a fourfold difference between sanctifying grace and freely given grace. The first and most important is the one St. Thomas assigns in the words cited: for sanctifying grace, by its nature and in itself, is ordered to the benefit of the one to whom it is given, namely, that he be a son of God and heir of the heavenly kingdom. For it is said in 2 Pet. 1: He has given us great and precious promises, so that we may become partakers of the divine nature. And in Titus 3: So that, justified by his grace, we may be heirs according to the hope of eternal life. But freely given grace is ordered per se, primarily and immediately, only to the benefit of others, as is gathered from 1 Cor. 12: To each is given the manifestation of the Spirit for the benefit, namely, of others, as St. Thomas explains in the cited 1. 2. And in Eph. 4 it is said: He gave some as Apostles, some as Prophets, others as Evangelists, others as pastors and teachers, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of ministry, for the building up of the body of Christ. And in 1 Pet. 4: As each has received grace, minister it to one another, that is, for the benefit of one's neighbors.

The second difference is that sanctifying grace cannot coexist with mortal sin, whereas freely given grace can. St. Thomas assigns this difference in 2. 2. q. 172, art. 4. Clement of Alexandria does so in book 8 of the Apostolic Constitutions, chapter 1, where, to confirm this teaching, he adduces the passage in Numbers 24, where Balaam is reported to have been a prophet, and what is said of Caiaphas in John 11: Since he was high priest that year, he prophesied. Yet it is certain that he was a great sinner. Finally, St. Gregory in homily 17 on Ezekiel gathers the same teaching from Matt. 7: Lord, did we not prophesy in your name? Yet the Lord answered them: I do not know you; depart from me, workers of iniquity.

The third difference is that sanctifying grace is always of the same formal character in everyone, although it is found more intense in some and less intense in others; but freely given grace is not the same in everyone according to species, according to the words: There are divisions of graces, but the same Spirit; there are divisions of ministries, but the same Lord; and there are divisions of operations, but the same God who works all things in all. And after enumerating all the freely given graces, he concludes as follows: But all these things the one and same Spirit works, distributing to each as he wills. Only Christ the Lord, who is the source of all graces, had all the freely given graces at once, as St. Thomas teaches in 3 p. q. 7, art. 7, and Augustine in epistle 57 to Dardanus.

The fourth difference is that sanctifying grace is a quality inhering in the soul after the manner of a habit, as St. Thomas says in 1. 2. q. 110. art. 1. But freely given grace is not always given after the manner of a habit; sometimes it is given after the manner of an act or motion, as prophecy, as St. Thomas teaches in 2. 2. q. 171. art. 2. In Christ’s most holy soul, on account of its union with the Word, there were freely given graces after the manner of what is permanent, as we showed in our commentaries on Is. chap. 3, no. 26. Let what the holy Doctor teaches about freely given graces in 2. 2. q. 176. and following be consulted, together with 3. cont. Gent. cap. 154.

V. Second conclusion. Grace, whether it is taken for a habitual gift or for actual help, is suitably divided into exciting and helping grace. The conclusion is drawn from Sacred Scripture and the Councils. For Revelation 3 says of exciting grace: Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if anyone opens to me, I will enter and dine with him, and he with me. And the Apostle says: Awake, you who sleep, and arise from the dead, and Christ will enlighten you. Of helping grace, the Psalmist says: Help us, O God our savior. And Psalm 118: Help me, and I shall be saved. And the Apostle in Rom. 8: The Spirit helps our weakness. And many other similar passages are found in Scripture. On their account, the sacred Council of Trent, sess. 6, on justification, chap. 5, divided grace into exciting and helping grace, saying: It further declares that the beginning of justification itself in adults must be derived from the prevenient grace of God through Jesus Christ; that is, from his calling, by which they are called, with none of their merits existing, so that those who were turned away from God through sins may, through his exciting and helping grace, be disposed to turn themselves toward their own justification, freely assenting to and cooperating with that same grace. And chap. 6: They are disposed to that very justice when, aroused and helped by divine grace, conceiving faith through hearing, they are freely moved toward God. St. Augustine teaches the same division, both in book 2, On the Merit and Remission of Sins, chap. 18, saying, That we turn away from God, is ours, and this is an evil will; but that we turn ourselves toward God we cannot do unless he himself arouses, and helps us, and this is a good will; and also in other places to be cited in disp. 88, where it will become clear that even one who has infused habits needs a special help to elicit a supernatural act, not only of exciting grace but also of helping grace. There we will bring forward many passages of the Saints for the same division.

VI. And if an argument is made: St. Thomas, who in 1. 2. divided grace into its members more carefully than all the Scholastic Doctors, never mentions this division; the answer is that, just as operating grace and cooperating grace are the same as prevenient and subsequent grace, as St. Thomas teaches in de ver. q. 27. art. 5. ad 6, where he says, according to these modes, prevenient and subsequent grace seem to be the same as operating and cooperating grace, and says the same in 2. sent. dist. 26. art. 5. in corp., so exciting and helping grace do not differ from prevenient and subsequent grace. Hence St. Thomas, when in 1. 2. q. 111. art. 3. he divided grace into prevenient and subsequent grace, included under this division that by which the Council of Trent divided grace into exciting and helping grace.

VII. Third Conclusion. Grace is suitably divided into operating grace and cooperating grace. Saint Thomas also establishes this division in the cited 1. 2., in 2 Corinthians 6, in 2. sent. dist. 26. ar. 5., and in On Truth, question 27, article 5, reply to objection 1 and 2. It is plainly gathered from Sacred Scripture and the Councils. For it is said of operating grace in Philippians 2: For it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish. And in Isaiah 26: You have worked all our works for us, O Lord. Hence Saint Augustine says in On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 17: And who had begun to give this love, even if small, unless he who prepares the will and, by cooperating, brings to completion what he began by operating? For he operates so that we may will, beginning the work; he cooperates with those who will, bringing it to completion. Therefore the Apostle says: I am confident that he who has begun a good work in you will bring it to completion until the day of Christ Jesus. Therefore, so that we may will, he operates without us; but when we will, and will in such a way that we act, he cooperates with us. Yet without him, whether operating so that we may will or cooperating when we will, we are entirely powerless for good works of piety. Of him operating so that we may will it is said: For it is God who works in you both to will. Of him cooperating when we already will and by willing act, it is said: We know, he says, that all things work together for good for those who love God.

What is called operating and cooperating grace.— Saint Thomas assigns the reason and sufficiency of this division: the operation of an effect is attributed not to what is moved but to what moves. Therefore, in that effect in which our mind is moved and does not move, while God alone moves, the operation is attributed to God; and in this respect it is called operating grace. But in that effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is attributed not only to God but also to the soul; and in this respect it is called cooperating grace. Now there are two acts in us. The first is the interior act of the will; with respect to this act, the will is as what is moved, while God is as what moves, especially when the will begins to will the good, having previously willed evil. And therefore, insofar as God moves the human mind to this act, it is called operating grace. The other act is exterior; since it is commanded by the will, it follows that with respect to this act the operation is attributed to the will. And because God also helps us toward this act, both by strengthening the will inwardly so that it may reach the act, and by providing outwardly the power to act, with respect to this sort of act it is called cooperating grace. Hence after the words just quoted Augustine adds: He operates so that we may will; but when we will, he cooperates with us so that we may accomplish. If, then, grace is taken for God's gratuitous motion by which he moves us to meritorious good, grace is suitably divided into operating and cooperating. But if grace is taken for a habitual gift, then grace has two effects, as does any other form: the first is being; the second is operation, just as heat's operation is to make something hot and to heat something else. Thus habitual grace, insofar as it heals or justifies the soul, or makes it pleasing to God, is called operating grace; but insofar as it is the principle of a meritorious work that proceeds from free choice, it is called cooperating grace. What operating grace and cooperating grace are will be explained expressly in Disputation 81.

VIII. Fourth Conclusion. Grace is likewise rightly divided into prevenient and subsequent grace. This is Saint Thomas's conclusion in 1. 2. q. 111. art. 3., and Augustine's in On Nature and Grace, chapter 32, where he says: It precedes so that we may be healed; it follows so that, once healed, we may be strengthened. It precedes so that we may be called; it follows so that we may be glorified. This is gathered from Sacred Scripture. For it is said of prevenient grace in Psalm 58: His mercy will precede me, and in Psalm 20: For you preceded him with blessings of sweetness. Saint Augustine proves prevenient grace by these testimonies in book 2 of Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 9, saying: May God turn away this madness, that in his gifts we should put ourselves first and God afterward; for “His mercy will precede me”; and it is he to whom this is truly and faithfully sung: “For you preceded him with blessings of sweetness.”

Concerning the same prevenient grace, Celestine I says: Let us not doubt that all the merits of man are preceded by his grace, through whom it comes about that we begin both to will and to do something good. And St. Prosper, in his book Against the Collator, chapter 38, attacking Cassian, who asserted that not all but only some are preceded by God's grace, says: With this distinction laid down, then, there would be in the one Church, as you define it, the following diversity: that our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom it was said, “And you shall call his name Jesus,” for he himself will save his people from their sins, and of whom it was said, “For there is no other name under heaven given to men by which it is necessary for them to be saved,” would be the Savior not of all Christians but of some, while he would be the receiver of others: so that only those would be saved whom God has compelled, when they were turned away and resisting, to receive grace; but those would be received who have anticipated the call by the fervor of their spontaneous course. To the former, a gratuitous gift would be conferred; to the latter, a reward that is owed would be repaid. Those who have no good except what they have received would be without any praise or merit; but those who, devoted by their own power, offered what they had not received would abound in glory and grow rich in reward. And thus Jesus Christ would have found some free and have liberated others. And what he says, “You did not choose me, but I chose you,” would not pertain to all, if there are some by whom he was chosen although he had not chosen them; what he says, “No one comes to me unless it has been given to him by my Father,” would not pertain to all, if there are some who were able to come to the Son without the Father giving it; what the Evangelist says, “He was the true light that enlightens every man coming into this world,” would not pertain to all, if there are some who either came into this world without being darkness or began to be light in such a way that they did not need to be enlightened by the true light. Nor would what the Apostle says be understood of all the adopted: “He delivered us from the power of darkness and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love,” if they themselves break their chains and, shaking off the yoke of their former captivity, cross over from the dominion of the Devil into the kingdom of God with free eagerness. From these words it is gathered that the teaching which asserts that God by his grace does not go before all but only some, while others go before grace itself by their good efforts, by asking, seeking, knocking, and doing all that is in them from the faculty of nature alone, is in no way to be admitted, as is clear from what was said in disputation 55.

IX. The same grace is called prevenient and subsequent with respect to different effects.— Concerning subsequent grace, Psalm 22 says: And his mercy shall follow me. The Council of Trent explained both in these words: Christ Jesus himself, as the head into the members and as the vine into the branches, continually pours power into those who have been justified. This power always precedes their good works, accompanies and follows them, and without it they could in no way be pleasing to God and meritorious. Here, by the name of preceding power, he understands prevenient grace, of which he had spoken in chapters 5 and 6; by the name of accompanying and subsequent power, he understood subsequent grace. For a fuller explanation of this, we must note with St. Thomas that just as grace is divided into operating and cooperating grace according to its different effects, so too it is divided into prevenient and subsequent grace, however grace may be understood. There are five effects of grace in us. The first is that the soul be healed; the second, that it will the good; the third, that it efficaciously perform the good it wills; the fourth, that it persevere in the good; the fifth, that it attain glory. And therefore grace, insofar as it causes the first effect in us, is called prevenient with respect to the second effect; and insofar as it causes the second in us, it is called subsequent with respect to the first effect. And just as one effect is subsequent to one effect and prior to another, so grace can be called prevenient and subsequent according to the same effect, with respect to different effects. This is what Augustine says in the book On Nature and Grace: “It precedes, that we may be healed; it follows, that we who have been healed may be invigorated; it precedes, that we may be called; it follows, that we may be glorified.”

X. From this the holy Doctor infers that grace is not diversified in essence by being prevenient and subsequent, but only according to its effect, as was said of operating and cooperating grace.

Why grace is called subsequent.— From the same doctrine we gather that grace is not called subsequent because it follows the works of nature, as the Pelagians held; nor because it presupposes certain natural efforts in some people, as Cassian thought; nor because, as a rule, God does not confer this grace on people unless they have first done all that lies within them by the power of nature alone, as some have supposed. Rather, it is because it follows another, prior effect of grace, so that in this way the first beginning of grace and of our salvation may be from God and not from us. Otherwise, as St. Augustine argues against the Pelagians, it would follow that grace is given according to our merits, and consequently that grace is not grace, as the Apostle concludes, saying: But to one who works, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt. And again: But if by grace, then it is no longer from works; otherwise grace is no longer grace. All these matters will become clearer from what will be said below concerning the nature of exciting and helping grace, operating and cooperating grace, and prevenient and subsequent grace.

XI. To the argument made at the beginning, then, the reply is that, as Saint Prosper observed, it can be said much more truly that the name of grace is destroyed if free choice precedes it than that free choice is destroyed if grace precedes it. For Christ's grace does not endanger free choice but saves it—unless someone wishes to say that nature is destroyed when it is healed. Hence Pope Celestine, after teaching that all human merits are preceded by God's grace, adds: By this help and gift of God, free choice is not taken away but set free, so that what was dark may become bright, what was crooked straight, what was weak healthy, and what was imprudent prudent. For God's goodness toward all people is so great that he wills that his gifts should be our merits, and for these things that he has bestowed he will grant eternal rewards. How, with this helping grace that precedes and operates beforehand, the freedom of our choice always remains entire and unharmed has already been explained amply by us above, and will be further clarified below, especially in the discussion of the legitimate and ancient agreement of our choice with the help of divine grace.

Disputatio LXXI: Whether the help of grace is fittingly divided into sufficient help and efficacious help.

Whether the help of grace is suitably divided into sufficient help and efficacious help.

I. There have not been lacking those who assert that the distinction of grace into sufficient and efficacious is plainly insufficient, useless, and alien to the sacred Scriptures, Councils, Fathers, and reason. They cite in support of themselves Jerome Osorius, book 9 of On Justice, pp. 2 and 3, and John Anthony Delphius in the book On Justification, while explaining the divisions of grace. They prove their opinion.

First: for the division of help into sufficient help and efficacious help under these terms is not found in the sacred Scriptures, Councils, Fathers, or ancient Scholastic Doctors. Indeed, the Council of Trent, which among other things treated grace and free choice more carefully against ancient and modern heretics, made no mention of sufficient or efficacious grace, but divided grace exhaustively into exciting and helping grace. Therefore the division of grace into sufficient and efficacious is to be rejected as new.

Second. The aforesaid division has very many stumbling blocks, since more recent theologians disagree so greatly about the notion and explanation of sufficient and efficacious grace. Therefore, to avoid such stumbling blocks, it will be better to reject this new division and retain the old division into exciting and helping grace.

Third. Everything that sacred Scripture, the Councils, and the Fathers have handed down about divine grace or special help can be explained and understood in a Catholic and suitable way by using the single division into exciting and helping grace. For what Scripture says, Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if anyone opens to me, I will enter to him, I called, and you refused, and similar things are understood of exciting grace. But what it says, Without me you can do nothing, God is the one who works in us both to will and to accomplish, and, all our works he has worked in us, and other such things are sufficiently understood of helping grace. Therefore the distinction of divine help into efficacious and sufficient is multiplied superfluously.

Fourth. Reprobates, while they are in grace, perform many works of charity by virtue of divine help, and yet they do not perform those works by virtue of sufficient help, for sufficient help is that which grants the ability, but not actual acting; nor do they perform them by virtue of efficacious help, for this help is proper to the predestined, since according to Augustine it is help according to the purpose of God who shows mercy, and the most important among those benefits by which all who are liberated are most certainly liberated. Therefore this distinction is insufficient and consequently unsuitable for resolving the doubts that arise about God's help.

It is confirmed. Those who elicit an act of attrition, which is required beforehand for receiving the sacrament of penance, are helped by some supernatural help from God. For, according to the Council of Trent, this attrition is a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not yet indeed dwelling within, but moving, by which impulse the penitent, being helped, prepares a way for himself to justice. Yet that help is not sufficient, since otherwise the person would reject that help and would not do anything else with it; nor is it efficacious help, since otherwise by its power the sinner would be converted infallibly and would obtain justifying grace. Therefore the same conclusion follows as before.

Fifth. Efficacious help, however its proponents explain it, destroys true sufficient help; therefore the help of grace is not correctly divided into sufficient help and efficacious help. The consequence is proved because one member of a division ought not to destroy the nature of the other. The antecedent is proved as follows: if, with the Thomists, efficacious help is said to be one of the things antecedently and necessarily required for acting, it is clear that sufficient help is sufficient in name alone. For how can that help be called sufficient for some operation beyond which another help is necessarily required for that operation actually to be produced? But if, according to the view of other theologians, sufficient help is that which God confers at an unsuitable time and in other unaccommodating circumstances, in which God foresees that a person will not consent if such grace is conferred on him, even on this view the help said to be sufficient for believing is not truly sufficient. For if a physician gives a potion to a patient whose phlegm is excessive and who suffers from a fever on account of that excess—a leading remedy, indeed, but one quite unsuitable for curing the phlegm—he must be said not to have given sufficient medicine, or even medicine at all. The same would occur if he applied to the disease not a bad remedy, but one at an unsuitable and unseasonable time, for example, while the humor has not yet been concocted but is resisting through its crudity. Therefore, in like manner, God is not considered to grant sufficient help for healing a person from sin if that help is not suitable and adapted to the person to whom it is applied, or if it is conferred at an inopportune time, namely, when God foresees that the person will not consent.

Sixth, there is an argument that the authors of the opposing view call the touchstone. Let us suppose that one and the same preacher speaks to many sinners about the punishments of hell or the glory of paradise, while the Holy Spirit meanwhile arouses and inwardly moves their hearts with equal grace. It may happen that some of them are converted, while others are not, as is clear from Matt. chap. 11, where the wisdom of the incarnate Word revealed to us that, if the signs and wonders he performed among the Jews had been done among the Tyrians and Sidonians, they would long ago have repented. He plainly showed that the Jews resisted the same wonders by which the Tyrians and Sidonians would have been converted. Therefore that grace was not merely sufficient, since otherwise no one would be converted by it; nor was it efficacious, since otherwise all would be converted. Therefore another kind of grace must be posited, namely, an indifferent one, which one may resist or consent to by the freedom of choice, as is found in the Council of Trent. Therefore that distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace is not to be admitted.

Seventh. One member of a division ought not to be included in another, since a division must be made into opposites. But sufficient grace is included in efficacious grace, for all efficacious grace is, a fortiori, sufficient. For if a person actually acts through it, he can undoubtedly act through it. Therefore grace is not correctly divided into sufficient and efficacious grace.

Eighth. The term “efficacious grace” was invented by Calvin, as is clear from book 2 of the Institutes, chap. 3, no. 11, where he says: Nor can Christ’s saying be understood otherwise, “Everyone who has heard from my Father comes to me,” than that he teaches God’s grace to be efficacious of itself. Therefore, at least so that we may not agree with heretics in terminology, that division of grace into sufficient and efficacious is not to be used in the schools of theologians.

II. The Doctors commonly teach the contrary opinion. Hence it must be said that the help of grace is suitably and sufficiently divided into sufficient help and efficacious help. This division is not useless, nor foreign to Sacred Scripture, the Councils, the Fathers, or reason; rather, it is entirely consonant with them all, and consequently useful and necessary for explaining everything the Catholic Church has always taught about grace and free choice. Indeed, if we speak of the reality itself, no Catholic can doubt this division, since sufficient grace is the same as exciting grace, and efficacious grace is not really distinct from helping grace, as was said above. It is clear, moreover, that the division of grace into exciting and helping is found in Sacred Scripture and the Councils, especially Trent, and in the holy Fathers. Therefore, as regards the reality itself, the division of grace into sufficient and efficacious cannot be rejected. But it is proved that this division must necessarily be admitted, and that it is found even under its proper names in Sacred Scripture, Councils, Fathers, and scholastic Doctors, especially Saint Thomas.

III. First, this division is proved from Sacred Scripture. For the Apostle says of sufficient help: I can do all things in him who strengthens me, and again: We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God. In these words he expressly establishes sufficient grace, by which we can act piously, and teaches that it is not in us from ourselves but from God. Hence the Council of Orange, canon 7, and Saint Thomas infer the sufficiency of grace from these words, saying: Although we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as though from ourselves, nevertheless we have some sufficiency, namely, that we can will the good and begin to believe; and this is from God, What have you that you did not receive? in 1 Corinthians 4. Moreover, the same Apostle says: Lest the greatness of the revelations should exalt me, a thorn in my flesh was given to me, an angel of Satan to buffet me; for this I besought the Lord three times that it might depart from me, and he said to me: My grace is sufficient for you, for power is made perfect in weakness. If, according to the Lord's word, grace suffices to overcome all temptations, then true sufficient grace is given, by which a person can overcome temptations and perform works of piety. Therefore sufficient grace is found under this very name in Sacred Scripture. It is stated explicitly in other places under equivalent names. For Proverbs 1 says: Wisdom cries aloud outside, raises her voice in the streets, and cries out at the head of the crowds. And in Acts 7, where Saint Stephen said to the Jews, You have always resisted the Holy Spirit, he plainly signified that good desires are inspired in some so that they can be converted, but that they resist these through their own malice. For if they could not be converted through that call of the Holy Spirit, Stephen would not have reproached the Jews for resisting. Likewise, in Isaiah 5 the Lord speaks thus: Inhabitants of Jerusalem and men of Judah, judge between me and my vineyard. What more should I have done for my vineyard that I did not do? Did I perhaps expect it to yield grapes, and did it yield wild grapes? From this it is clear that the Jews whom the Lord reproaches did not have efficacious grace, since otherwise they would certainly have borne good fruit. But they had truly sufficient grace, by which they could have been converted and could have produced fruits worthy of repentance. For otherwise the Lord would not have reproached them for bearing wild grapes instead of grapes. Therefore Sacred Scripture attests sufficient grace, distinct from efficacious grace.

IIII. The same is proved concerning efficacious grace from Ezekiel 36: And I will put my Spirit within you, and I will cause you to walk in my commandments, and to keep my judgments, and to do them. Saint Augustine very often uses this testimony against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians to prove that efficacious grace must be admitted, which grants the will most efficacious powers, as will be clear below.

The same efficacious help is understood in the passage of John 6: Everyone who hears from the Father and has learned comes to me. Here the efficacy of the divine call is declared, by which the one called infallibly comes. And in John 10: No one will snatch them from my hand, and they will never perish. This was said because he goes before his predestined ones with efficacious help so that they may be infallibly saved. Likewise, in Rom. 8: Those whom he called, these he also justified. And in chapter 9: It was said not from works but from him who calls: “Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated.” Here efficacious calling is signified, of which the same Apostle elsewhere says: To those who are called saints according to the purpose. And in Phil. 2: For it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish according to his good will.

V. First, they answer that these and similar passages of Scripture proceed against Pelagius, who, content with general divine help, denied special help and exciting and helping grace, but that they prove nothing against those who acknowledge the necessity of exciting and helping grace. Nevertheless, this answer does not remove the force of the argument, both because Pelagius admitted exciting grace, as was seen in disputation 1 and will become clearer in disputation 95, and likewise Julian admitted helping grace attendant upon and subsequent to the determination of the created will, as was shown in the same disputation 1, no. 11; and also because the argument proves not only that exciting and helping grace must be admitted, but also concludes that there is grace that is truly sufficient for salvation and grace that is not only sufficient but also efficacious. Second, they answer that the cited words of Scripture and similar passages indicate the gift of perseverance. Hence efficacious help cannot be proved from them, for the gift of perseverance is proper to the predestined, whereas efficacious grace is common to those who finally persevere and to those who do good but do not persevere to the end. From this they infer that an intermediate kind of grace must be granted, which serves those who do good works but nevertheless do not persevere finally; and consequently, that the aforesaid division is insufficient, since grace is divided into sufficient and efficacious.

This answer too has no appearance of validity whatever. First, although some passages of Scripture are understood of the predestined who persevere to the end, some nevertheless speak without distinction of the predestined and those who perform works of piety, even if they do not persevere to the end, as in Phil. 2: It is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish. And Ezek. 36: I will make you walk in my commandments. And the passage of John 6: No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. For one who believes in Christ and loves him is said to come to Christ, even if he finally falls from grace and is condemned. Second, although the help of grace is divided immediately into sufficient help and efficacious help, efficacious help is afterward subdivided in turn into efficacious help for believing and efficacious help for loving, etc., and into efficacious help for persevering, as will be clear in disputation 84. Hence, from the fact that there is some efficacious help proper to the predestined, namely, the gift of perseverance, and some efficacious help common to the predestined and non-predestined, namely, that by which someone believes in God and loves him above all things, it does not follow that the division of grace into sufficient and efficacious grace is not exhaustive.

VI. Second, this is proved from the definitions of the Councils. For the Second Council of Orange says in chap. 19: Since without the grace of God a person cannot preserve the salvation he has received, how can he, without the grace of God, restore what he has lost? Therefore grace grants the ability to persevere and the ability, through penance, to repair the losses incurred through sin; therefore grace sufficient for persevering and doing penance is given. The same is proved of efficacious grace from canon 9 of that Council, where it says: It is a gift of God when we think rightly and keep our feet from falsehood and injustice; for whenever we do good, God works in us and with us so that we may work. And canon 20: Many good things are done in a person that the person does not do; but no good things does a person do that God does not grant the person to do. In these words it expressed efficacious grace, which makes us do, and works so that we may work. And canon 25: We also believe, in accordance with the Catholic faith, that all the baptized, having received grace through baptism, with Christ helping and cooperating, can and ought to fulfill the things that pertain to salvation, if they are willing to labor faithfully. In these words it plainly teaches that all who are in a state of grace can persevere through God's help, if they will, and can fulfill the things that pertain to salvation.

The same division of grace is gathered from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, on justification, chap. 11, where it says: God does not command impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes you both to do what you can and to ask for what you cannot; and he helps you to be able. And immediately it adds that with divine help they can perform what God commands. Therefore, according to the Council of Trent, grace sufficient for a person to keep all the divine commandments is given. In canons 1 and 2 it defines that without grace a person cannot be justified or merit eternal life, clearly showing that grace grants a person the ability to be justified and the ability to merit eternal life; but the grace that grants the ability is sufficient grace, as was said above. And in canon 4 efficacious grace is taught unmistakably, when it defines that the free choice of a human being, moved and aroused by God, in some way cooperates, assenting to God who arouses and calls, whereby it disposes and prepares itself to obtain the grace of justification. The subject there is efficacious grace, which makes a person cooperate with God who arouses and calls.

VII. There is a notable testimony to prove the same efficacious grace, from Pope Benedict VII in a certain prayer of the following tenor: Be present to us, we beseech you, O Lord, Holy Spirit: we are indeed held by the enormity of sin, but gathered especially in your name. Come to us and deign to enter our hearts. Teach us what we should do; show us where we should go; work what we should accomplish. Be our salvation, and the adviser and cause of our judgments, you who alone with God the Father and his Son possess a glorious name. Do not allow us to be disturbers of justice; you who love the equity of supreme truth, so that ignorance may not draw us to the left, favor may not bend us, nor the acceptance of a gift or partiality toward a person corrupt us. But join us to yourself efficaciously, by the gift of your grace alone, so that we may be one in you and deviate from the truth in nothing; so that, gathered in your name, we may thus maintain justice in all things with the moderation of piety, that our judgment disagree with yours in nothing, and that in the future we may obtain eternal rewards for what we have done well. Let the phrase efficaciously, by the gift of your grace alone be considered: therefore efficacious grace cannot be denied, even as to the very name.

Third, this is proved by the authority of the holy Fathers, especially Saint Augustine, who explicitly distinguishes grace into sufficient grace, without which we cannot act piously, and efficacious grace, by which we actually act well, as is clear from the passages cited above. Moreover, he says in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 16: For God calls his many predestined sons, in order to make them members of his one predestined Son—not with that calling by which those who refused to come to the wedding were called; for by that calling the Jews too were called, to whom Christ crucified is a stumbling block, and the Gentiles, to whom Christ crucified is foolishness; but he calls the predestined with that calling which the Apostle distinguished when he said that to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, he preaches Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God. For he says, “To those who are called,” so as to show that the others were not called; for he knew there is a certain calling of those who are called according to purpose, whom he foreknew and predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son. Signifying this calling, he says: “Not from works, but from him who calls, it was said to her: The elder shall serve the younger.” Did he say, “not from works, but from one who believes”? He wholly removed this even from man, so that he might give everything to God. He therefore said, “but from him who calls”—not by just any calling, but by that calling through which one becomes a believer. Saint Augustine calls a calling “according to purpose” one that proceeds from the purpose, or absolute and efficacious decree, of the divine will to convert a person, draw him to himself through pious action, justify him, or even save and glorify him. He calls a calling “not according to purpose” one that proceeds from God's antecedent will, by which he wills all people to be saved and to come to knowledge of the truth. Likewise, in On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 11, he says: For that was such a help that one would leave it if he willed and remain in it if he willed; it was not a help that would make him will. This is the first grace, given to the first Adam; but the grace of the second Adam is more powerful. The first is that by which a person has righteousness if he wills; the second, then, has greater power, by which he is also brought to will, and to will so strongly and to love with such ardor that he overcomes by the pleasure of the spirit the pleasure of the flesh that lusts against it. And below: Through Jesus Christ our Lord, a greater measure of this is given to those to whom God has been pleased to give it, so that there may be present not only the help without which we cannot persevere even if we will, but also a help of such great measure and kind that we will. Through this grace of God we have, in receiving the good and holding it fast with perseverance, not only the ability to do what we will, but also the willing to do what we are able to do. In these words he distinguishes two helps of divine grace: one granting the ability, which is sufficient help; the other granting us the willing, which is efficacious help. Moreover, in chapter 12 of the same book he says: These helps themselves must be distinguished. One kind is a help without which something does not happen; another is a help by which something happens. And below: Therefore, to the first man, who in the good in which he had been made upright had received the ability not to sin, not to die, and not to abandon the good itself, the help of perseverance was given—not a help that would make him persevere, but one without which he could not persevere by free choice. But now the saints predestined through God's grace for the Kingdom of God are given not merely such a help of perseverance, but one by which perseverance itself is granted them: not only so that without this gift they cannot persevere, but also so that through this gift they unfailingly persevere. In these words he plainly distinguishes the help, or assistance, of grace into a help that merely grants the ability to act or the ability to persevere—as was the help granted to our first parents in the state of innocence—and a help that grants not only the ability but also actual pious action or perseverance to the end. Grace that grants the ability is sufficient; grace that confers actual action is efficacious. Therefore.

VIII. There are more compelling testimonies concerning efficacious help in the same St. Augustine, some of which we cited above; especially in book 1 against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 20; in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 20; and in the book On Grace and Free Choice, chapters 14, 16, and 17. In these passages he cites and considers the words of Ezekiel 36, I will make you do: to prove that efficacious help is given by God, by which he makes us act and works so that we may act. And in On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 5, he says: That Paul should be called from heaven and converted by such a great and most efficacious call was solely the grace of God, because Paul's merits were great, but evil.

IX. They answer that such most efficacious grace was granted to the Apostle Paul by a special privilege. Hence it should not be made a rule for proving that efficacious grace is given to all who act piously, much less can it prove that grace is divided into sufficient and efficacious. For otherwise grace should with equal or greater right be divided into most hidden and most manifest grace, since St. Augustine also uses the name “most hidden grace,” as is clear in book 1 of On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, chapter 9, and On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 8.

But an argument is urged against this answer: even if that most efficacious grace was granted to the Apostle by a special prerogative, nevertheless it truly was efficacious grace and distinct from the grace given to those who are not converted but can nevertheless be converted, which without doubt is sufficient grace. Therefore the division of grace into sufficient and efficacious must be admitted. Nor does it follow from this that, according to St. Augustine, grace must be divided into most hidden and most manifest grace. For the supernatural grace of God about which we are now speaking is always hidden and cannot be known evidently through experience or natural reason, as was said above and will be clear below. But not all grace is efficacious or most efficacious; some is only sufficient. Hence the cases are not alike.

Moreover, St. Augustine establishes in many other places efficacious grace as common to all who act piously or merit eternal life, and especially in On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 16, where he says: It is certain that we act when we act; but he makes us act, by furnishing the will with most efficacious powers, who said: I will make you walk in my justifications, and observe my judgments, and do them. Behold, he distinguishes most efficacious powers from sufficient powers and defines that the former are given to all who act piously, whereas the latter are granted to those who can act well but, through their own fault, do not wish to act. And in book 1 against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 20, speaking of the divine power by which God, in response to Queen Esther's prayer, turned the heart of King Ahasuerus and changed his indignation into mildness, he says: He who turned the king's heart, before the king had heard the words of the woman making a request, and changed it from indignation to mildness by a most hidden and most efficacious power—that is, from a will to harm to a will to favor—according to the Apostle's words: It is God who works in you both to will.

X. There is an outstanding testimony of St. Cyril to prove the same division in the book On Adoration and Worship in Spirit and Truth. There, while narrating the history of Gen. 19, how Lot received the angels as guests and afterward they took hold of his hand and the hands of his wife and sons, and while mystically explaining their taking hold of the hands, he says: Let this be a very clear sign to you, Palladius: he does not only spur and exhort us with words and with admonitions put into the mind so that we may depart from sin, but God, the Savior of all, also shows us such great kindness that he helps us with efficacious aid, according to what is written: You have taken hold of my right hand, and in your counsel you have led me. For since human nature is not very noble nor sufficiently able to flee evil, God in a certain way fights alongside us and seems to grant a twofold benefit: persuading us through admonitions so that we may find help, and providing that help more powerfully, so that present and violent evil cannot prevail. By these words he most clearly distinguishes a twofold support or help of God: one that is sufficient, granting the ability to act well, which he signified by admonitions put into the mind; and another stronger help, namely, efficacious help, which brings about a person's pious action and escape from imminent evil.

XI. The Passion of Christ made satisfaction for all as regards sufficiency, and for some as regards efficacy.— Fourth, this is proved by the authority of the Scholastics, who posited the division into sufficient and efficacious grace. Among them, St. Thomas holds the first place. For in 3. sent. dist. 13. q. 2. art. 2. quaestiunc. 2. ad 5, he says that Christ made satisfaction sufficiently for the whole human nature, but not efficiently, because not all become partakers of that satisfaction; this is due to their obstinacy, not to any insufficiency in the satisfaction itself. And in dist. 19. q. 1. art. 1. quaestiunc. 2. ad 3, he uses the same distinction, comparing Christ’s Passion to medicine, which before being applied to the sick person is sufficient to heal, but has no efficiency—that is, efficacy—unless it is applied to the sick person. And in 3. p. q. 79. art. 7. ad 2, he says that just as the Passion of Christ is indeed profitable to all with respect to sufficiency, for the remission of guilt and the attainment of grace and glory, but does not have its effect except in those who are joined to Christ’s Passion through faith and charity; so too the sacrifice of the Mass, which is the memorial of the Lord’s Passion, has its effect only in those who are joined to this sacrament through faith and charity. And in his exposition of Matt. chap. 26, on the words This is my blood of the new testament, which will be shed for many for the remission of sins, he says: For many and for all, if sufficiency is considered; for he is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world. But if we consider the effect, it does not have its effect except in those who are saved, and this is due to the fault of human beings. From these passages an argument is drawn. Christ’s Passion made satisfaction for all human beings as regards sufficiency, and for some as regards efficacy; therefore grace, which he merited for us through his Passion, can and ought similarly to be distinguished into sufficient grace, through which a person can act piously or be saved, and efficacious grace, through which a person actually acts piously or is saved.

But they say that in all the places cited above St. Thomas made absolutely no mention of the efficacy of Christ’s Passion, but only taught that Christ’s Passion is sufficient for all, while it is efficient in some and has its effect in them. Therefore, according to the mind of St. Thomas, Christ’s Passion or grace should not be distinguished into sufficient and efficacious, but into sufficient and efficient. Yet this objection is of no force, for efficient grace in St. Thomas designates efficacious grace: it signifies the grace that makes us act and works so that we may act. It is clear that this is efficacious grace, or that which, as Augustine says, grants the will most efficacious powers. Besides, St. Thomas also makes explicit mention of efficacious grace in other places, as distinguished from sufficient grace, especially in his commentary on John, chap. 6. Explaining the words Everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me, he says: The Father’s drawing is most efficacious, because everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to Christ. Let the other passages of St. Augustine and St. Thomas be consulted which we brought forward in Disputation 23, no. 9 and following, in support of efficacious grace, which predetermines created will to good.

XII. Fifth, the same division and its sufficiency are proved by reason. For if truly sufficient grace were not given, it would follow that all those who are not converted or saved could not in reality be converted or saved—something that cannot be admitted. The antecedent is proved as follows: they do not have efficacious grace, for otherwise they would be converted or saved, since this grace grants actual good action or perseverance to the end. Therefore, if they do not have truly sufficient grace, which grants the ability, all of them would be unable to be converted, act piously, or be saved. Thus it would not be imputed to them as blame that they were not converted or did not fulfill the divine commandments, and consequently God would complain of them irrationally and rebuke them without cause. Yet this seems contrary to the testimonies of Sacred Scripture. For Proverbs 1 says: Because I called and you refused; I stretched out my hand and no one paid attention, etc.; I too will laugh at your destruction, etc. And Psalm 4 says: Sons of men, how long will you be heavy of heart? Why do you love vanity and seek a lie? And the Lord Christ, seated as judge on the day of judgment, will say to those on his left: Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the Devil and his angels; for I was hungry and you did not give me food, etc. It therefore remains that they had sufficient help by which they could fulfill all these things. Therefore grace must necessarily be divided into sufficient and efficacious.

Finally, it is specifically proved that efficacious help must be posited as distinct from sufficient help. For otherwise the certainty and infallibility of predestination would be removed, since it is founded on the efficacy of the helps of divine grace, through which all who are saved are most certainly saved, as Augustine says in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 14. These matters will become clearer from what will be said below in the discussion of the efficacy of the helps of prevenient grace.

XIII. To the first argument, it is already clear from what has been said how consonant the division of grace into sufficient and efficacious is with Sacred Scripture, the Councils, and the Fathers. As for the objection from the Council of Trent, the reply is that by the names “exciting” and “helping” grace it included sufficient and efficacious grace, as is plainly clear from the other passages of that same Council cited above.

To the second, the reply is that nearly the same difficulties which theologians discuss concerning sufficient and efficacious grace can be raised about exciting and helping grace. Hence, if because of those difficulties the division of grace into sufficient and efficacious were not to be admitted, then for the same reason the division of grace into exciting and helping would have to be rejected—something that cannot be granted. The second reply is that all the difficulties that arise concerning the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace are readily resolved from theological principles, namely, from Scripture, the Councils, and the Fathers, as is clear from what was said above and from what is to be said below. Even if, once this same distinction is posited, many matters present themselves that we cannot fully understand or explain, they should not for that reason be denied or rejected. Hence Augustine asks: Are we going to say that what we see to be so is not so, because we cannot discover why it is so? Should what is manifest be denied because what is hidden cannot be grasped? And in another place he says: Even if I cannot refute their arguments, nevertheless I see that we must hold fast to what is most clearly stated in the Scriptures, so that from these the obscure things may be revealed; or, if the mind is not yet capable of seeing them when demonstrated or investigating them when hidden, they must be believed without any doubt; more will be said on this in Disputations 118 and 119.

To the third, the reply is this: since sufficient and efficacious grace are not really distinct from exciting and helping grace, the passages of Scripture that speak of grace and free choice, just as they are rightly explained of exciting or helping grace, can also be interpreted most rightly of sufficient or efficacious grace.

To the fourth objection it is answered that the reprobate, while they are in grace, perform good works meritorious of eternal life by the power of efficacious grace. But that grace is indeed efficacious for believing in or loving God; it is not, however, efficacious for persevering. For efficacious grace is divided into different members, as was said above. Hence, from the fact that the grace conferred on the reprobate is not efficacious for persevering, it does not follow that it is not efficacious, or that a middle kind of grace, distinct from sufficient and efficacious grace, must be posited. Efficacious grace is called grace according to God's purpose, whether that purpose is to effect in us and with us pious acts of faith, hope, and charity—as happens in the reprobate who are in grace—or is also a purpose of saving or glorifying, which is the purpose he has concerning the elect. Therefore, when St. Augustine says that predestination is foreknowledge and the preparation of God's benefits, by which all who are delivered are most certainly delivered, by “God's benefits” he comprehends not only efficacious grace, by which a person believes in, hopes in, and loves God, or performs other works of piety, but also that grace by which God makes that person persevere to the end.

To the confirmation it is answered that the actual help by which the act of attrition is elicited is indeed sufficient help in relation to perfect conversion, and at the same time efficacious in relation to attrition or other imperfect acts that regularly precede perfect contrition. For, as will be said in disp. 80, the same help that is sufficient in relation to one effect is at the same time efficacious in relation to another.

To the fifth objection it is answered that efficacious help is one of the things antecedently required for a person actually to act well, as was said above. Nor does it follow from this that no grace other than efficacious grace is sufficient, as was shown in disp. 18, no. 20, and disp. 23, no. 29.

XIV. To the sixth objection it is answered that, when all the helps of prevenient grace, both external and internal, are altogether equal in two people, it never happens that one is converted and the other is not; rather, the one who is converted always receives some stronger help of prevenient grace that the one who is not converted does not receive, as will become clear in disp. 108. There it will also be necessary to answer the objection drawn from Matt. 11.

To the seventh objection it is answered that sufficient grace is included eminently in efficacious grace, but not formally. For, formally speaking, sufficient grace, as distinguished from efficacious grace, is that which grants only the ability to perform the act in relation to which it is called sufficient. Efficacious grace, however, although it grants the ability to act, does not confer only the ability, but also actual acting, as was said.

Second, it is answered that even when the conversion of a sinner takes place in a single instant, God both moves free choice by helping grace, which is efficacious, and likewise, through exciting or sufficient grace, illuminates the intellect and excites the sinner's will to convert freely. Although this excitation occurs in the same instant of time, it is nevertheless presupposed, at a prior conceptual stage, to efficacious grace.

The answer to the eighth argument is that, as we said in Disputation 3 and as will also become clear below, Calvin did not err when he asserted that Christ’s grace is efficacious; rather, his error was that he imagined it to be efficacious of itself in such a way that our free choice does not cooperate freely with it, but only by a spontaneous motion.

Disputatio LXXII: Whether, in the division of the help of grace into efficacious and inefficacious help, sufficient help is the immediate subject of division.

Whether, in the division of the help of grace into efficacious and inefficacious help, sufficient help is the immediate subject of division.

I. SOME have said that the immediate subject of division of this division is sufficient help: that is, whether that sufficient help is greater or lesser in itself, it is called efficacious when free choice, according to its freedom, is converted with it; but it is called inefficacious when free choice, by that same freedom, is not converted with it.

From this they infer that, besides the sufficient help of prevenient grace, no other prevenient help, distinct from sufficient help in its real power, is required for a sinner to be converted and act piously. Rather, the same help, which is merely sufficient when a person does not will to be converted, becomes efficacious if the person wills, according to his innate freedom, to use that help well and to turn freely to God by consenting to that help and cooperating with it. They also say that although efficacious help and sufficient help are not really distinguished according to their perfection and intrinsic power, they are nevertheless distinguished by reason, in the category of benefit and the category of gift, just as a sword given to someone in peacetime and in wartime is really the same sword; nevertheless, in the category of gift and benefit, the person to whom a sword is given in wartime, when he will use it to defend himself from enemies, receives a greater gift and benefit than if it were given in peacetime, when he would not need the sword for use.

Their first argument in support of their opinion is drawn from the Council of Trent, session 6, on justification, chapter 5 and canon 4, where it is stated that the human free choice, aroused and moved by God, freely consents to God who arouses and calls, and can dissent if it wills. Therefore, with any help of prevenient grace whatsoever in place, a person can consent to it or dissent from it. But if efficacious help is posited in a person, he cannot dissent from it, since otherwise it would not be efficacious. Therefore such help is not prevenient, nor is it included under the help of prevenient grace. Therefore only sufficient help is prevenient; and consequently, in the division by which the help of prevenient grace is divided into efficacious and inefficacious help, the immediate subject of division will be sufficient help, and not something abstracted from sufficient and efficacious help.

Second, they argue: the immediate subject of division of the division by which the help of grace is divided into efficacious and inefficacious is prevenient help; but only sufficient help is prevenient. For besides sufficient help no other prevenient help is given that is necessarily required for pious action. Therefore the immediate subject of division of that same division will be sufficient help, which will become efficacious if free choice consents to it, and inefficacious if it does not consent.

Third, they argue from the celebrated testimony of Matthew 11: Woe to you, Chorazin; woe to you, Bethsaida; for if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would long ago have repented in sackcloth and ashes. From these words the argument is drawn as follows. If the sufficient help given to the Jews, together with the miracles and signs done in Chorazin, were not sufficient for the people of Tyre and Sidon to be converted by that help alone, with every other prevenient help really distinct from it excluded, it would follow that the conditional spoken by the Lord Christ was not true. It would also follow that the Jews were rebuked without cause for not having been converted. The consequence cannot be accepted; therefore, so it is argued. The inference is proved as follows: for the conditional to be true, its consequence must be sound, such that if the antecedent is posited, the consequent is infallibly posited. But even if the people of Tyre and Sidon were given the helps given to the Jews, along with the miracles and mighty works performed among them, they would not have been converted unless God had given them another, greater help of prevenient grace—namely, efficacious help, really distinct from sufficient help—which was not given to the Jews. Therefore, if such help were necessary, that conditional would be false: If they had been done in Tyre and Sidon, etc. That the Jews would be rebuked in vain is proved as follows: they could reply that the efficacious help necessary for their conversion had not been given them, and that if God had given it to them, they too would have been converted.

Fourth, it is argued: No prevenient help is efficacious of itself, that is, according to its own nature, nor does it have of itself an infallible connection with the consent of free choice. Therefore it has this dependently on the free influx and cooperation of that same free choice. Therefore the same sufficient help is efficacious if a person consents, and inefficacious if he does not consent; and consequently sufficient help is called efficacious or inefficacious.

Fifth, it is argued that the contrary opinion would entail that conversion and every other pious operation are not within a person's free power. The proof is that, if efficacious help is prevenient, it must necessarily be effected in a person by God alone, since, as the contrary opinion affirms, it in no way depends on the influx of our free choice. Therefore such help is not within a person's free power. The consequence is clear: only that is within a person's power which is done by him and depends on him. Therefore neither will the free act, for which such help is said to be necessary, be within a person's free power, although this must in no way be asserted. The consequence is proved because such an act cannot be within a person's power unless those things also that are necessarily required for producing that act are within his power.

Sixth, they argue from all the reasons by which, as will be said below, they undertake to prove that efficacious help, insofar as it is efficacious, is not prevenient, but rather influences the pious operation together with free choice. For from this it is inferred that the aforesaid division of help is drawn only from its effect, and not from the real and intrinsic power of the help itself.

II. The contrary opinion is consistently defended by all proponents of grace that, as an efficient cause, predetermines free choice to consent. They affirm that it is in accord with the mind of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, as well as with sacred Scripture, Councils, and the Fathers; and it must therefore be held without doubt. Hence:

Efficacious help, insofar as it is efficacious, precedes the free cooperation of free choice.— First Conclusion. Not only is sufficient help prevenient, but efficacious help too, insofar as it is efficacious, precedes the cooperation of our will in the order of reason and causality. As regards sufficient help, this conclusion is accepted by all. Many, however, deny it of efficacious help, asserting that the physical efficacy of divine grace does not consist in anything antecedent to consent in the order of causality, but in the actual influx by which God, together with free choice, immediately influences supernatural operations. But our conclusion is that of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, as will become clear below. First, it is proved from the places cited above from the Council of Trent, where it is stated that through prevenient grace—which it divides into exciting and helping grace—a person is disposed to his justification by freely consenting to and cooperating with that same grace. The Council therefore holds that helping grace, which is efficacious grace, precedes our concurrence and cooperation in the order of reason and causality. Moreover, it is proved from the passages of St. Augustine and St. Thomas by which it was shown above, in disp. 18, that the actual influx of the first cause, by which it helps secondary causes to act, is an immediate influx into the secondary causes themselves. Therefore, in the order of nature and causality, it precedes the actual concurrence of every secondary cause and, consequently, the concurrence of our will as well. It is proved by reason: for sometimes God converts a sinner in a single instant without dispositions that precede in time, as happened in the conversion of St. Paul. Then the argument is this. The help by which God in such a case elevates the sinner's intellect and will to supernatural acts must be received in the faculty prior to the act, because without that help the intellect and will do not have sufficient power for such acts. Therefore, in that case, efficacious help precedes the consent of the will. The consequence is clear: for in similar cases there is no other sufficient help before efficacious help through which the intellect and will could produce supernatural acts; rather, by the same efficacious help God both grants the ability and brings about actual acting. But this conclusion will be treated expressly in disp. 82.

How sufficient help is distinguished from efficacious help.— Second conclusion. Sufficient and efficacious help are distinguished not only conceptually within the genus of gift, but by something intrinsic to them. Thus efficacious help, in itself and as it comes from God, has, at least in an intentional mode, some real intrinsic power of its own, which the help that is only sufficient does not have. This conclusion is opposed to certain theologians who hold that efficacious help has nothing real and intrinsic by which it is distinguished from sufficient help. They add that the same help of grace, remaining in itself unchanged, will be only sufficient if it is conferred in such circumstances, because free choice would not use that help; but if it is conferred on the same person at another time, when God foresaw that the person would use that same help, it will be efficacious.

But our conclusion is proved from 1 Cor. 4: For who distinguishes you? And what do you have that you did not receive? But if you received it, why do you boast as if you had not received it? From this an efficacious argument is drawn. If, with the same help, one person is converted because he wills it and another is not because he does not will it, it follows that the person who is converted distinguishes himself from the other by something proper to himself which he did not receive from the help of grace. The consequence is contrary to the authority of the Apostle. Therefore. The inference is proved as follows: those two people are not really distinguished by the grace they received antecedently to the free cooperation of choice, since, as is supposed, the helps were entirely equal in both. They are not distinguished by those things in which they agree, as Augustine teaches in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chap. 5. Therefore they are distinguished because this person willed to use that help from his innate freedom, while the other did not will to do so. Therefore the distinction and difference is ultimately reduced to the free cooperation of this or that person, in accordance with that person’s innate freedom. The force of this argument will become clearer from what will be said in the following disputation and from what was said in Disputations 36 and 37 on predestination, where we reported and refuted various answers by the authors of the opposing view.

III. What is the division of divine help into efficacious and inefficacious help?.— Third conclusion. The immediate subject of the division proposed above is prevenient help in its whole breadth, and not only sufficient help. This conclusion remains sufficiently proved from what has been said. For since efficacious help, insofar as it is efficacious, is prevenient, as is clear from the premises and will become clearer in Disputations 82 and 90, it follows that whatever prevenient help there may be is included in the immediate subject of that division which divides the help of prevenient grace into efficacious and inefficacious help; otherwise the division would not be sound. Therefore it is impossible for the immediate subject of division to be only sufficient help.

This is confirmed. Otherwise, the subject divided would coincide with one of the dividing members, which is impossible. The antecedent is proved: sufficient help and inefficacious help are precisely the same help. For it is called sufficient help because it grants only the ability to act, but not actually to act; and it is called inefficacious help because it does not make a person act. Therefore, if the immediate subject of division is only sufficient help, the division would coincide with one of its dividing members.

IV. Efficacious help brings it about that, although a person can dissent, he infallibly consents.— To the first argument the reply is that our free choice, aroused and moved by God, freely consents and consequently can dissent if it wills; nevertheless, when God's motion is efficacious, it will infallibly consent: for grace works this in free choice powerfully and gently: although it can dissent, it does not dissent. The reason is that given by Saint Thomas in I–II, question 112, article 3, in the body: For God's intention cannot fail. Hence, if it is God's intention in moving that the person whose heart he moves should consent and obtain grace, he infallibly obtains it—necessarily with the necessity of infallibility, but not with absolute necessity. He teaches the same in II–II, question 24, article 11, in the body. Therefore, to the argument in its form, we say that if a person consents, he does not make grace efficacious; rather, this is an a posteriori sign that he had efficacious grace. For the consent of free choice presupposes efficacious grace in the order of reason and causality. But if a person does not consent to God calling—as happened with those who, when called to the wedding, refused to come—he likewise does not make grace inefficacious, properly speaking; rather, this is an a posteriori sign that God's call, as it came from God, was not efficacious but only sufficient. And when it is argued that a call's being efficacious means producing consent, the antecedent is denied if we speak formally. It is true causally, however, for by efficacious grace God brings it about that free choice cooperates.

To the second argument the antecedent is denied. In proof, the reply is that besides sufficient help, which grants the ability, efficacious help distinct from sufficient help is necessarily presupposed for pious action, as will be clear below and is evident from what was said above.

V. To the third argument the reply is that the Gospel's conditional, “If the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented,” is most true. To understand this, it should be supposed from dialectic that for a conditional to be true, its antecedent need not be the cause of its consequent; it is enough that, if the antecedent is posited, the consequent is posited, whether the antecedent be the adequate cause of the consequent, its effect, or a condition presupposing another cause by whose power the consequent follows. For example, this conditional is true: “If it is day, the sun shines,” and yet the antecedent is not the cause of the consequent but its effect. This one is also true: “If fire is applied, it heats,” and yet the application is only a condition. So in the present case we say that to verify the conditional, “If the signs and wonders that the Lord performed in Chorazin and Bethsaida had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have been converted,” it is not necessary that the antecedent be the cause of the consequent, nor that anyone in fact be converted solely by the signs and sufficient helps granted to the Jews. It is enough that, if those signs were posited in Tyre and Sidon, many of them would in fact be converted—not by the signs alone, but by another cause that Christ presupposes, namely, the efficacious help that God had resolved to confer on them if the signs that the Lord performed in Chorazin and Bethsaida had been done among them, as was said in Disputation 7, no. 24. As for the objection in the same argument that the Jews would be rebuked without cause for not having turned to Christ, if God did not give them the efficacious help necessary for conversion, the reply is that the same argument can be made against the authors of the contrary opinion. For, as they themselves admit, a congruous call—that is, one conferred in circumstances in which God foresaw that the person would consent—is necessary for a person to be converted. Therefore, if God did not give the Jews such grace, or a congruous call, why did the Lord Christ rebuke the Jews for not having been converted? The reply, then, is that they are reasonably rebuked because by their own fault they provided an obstacle to efficacious grace being given to them, as was said in Disputation 7, no. 24, and Disputation 18, no. 20.

VI. In what sense help of grace is said to be efficacious in itself.— To the fourth objection it is answered that, as will become clear in the next disputation in the answer to the third argument, and in disp. 83, help of grace is called efficacious in itself, that is, according to the real power it has from God, insofar, namely, as it is an instrument of God, who by an absolute and efficacious will, with no presupposed middle knowledge, wills to convert to himself the person whose heart he moves. Hence help that is only sufficient in itself never becomes efficacious through the free cooperation of free choice.

The fifth objection was answered at length in disp. 18, no. 20; disp. 22, no. 32; and disp. 23, no. 29.

The answer to the sixth will become clear in disp. 82 and 90.

Disputatio LXXIII: Whether the division of the help of prevenient grace into efficacious and inefficacious help is taken solely from the effect, which also depends on the free cooperation of free choice, or also from the real power of the help itself.

Whether the division of the help of prevenient grace into efficacious and inefficacious help is drawn only from the effect, which also depends on the free cooperation of free choice, or also from the real power of the help itself.

I. The whole difficulty of this question consists in this: whether efficacious help adds, at least in an intentional mode, some real power antecedent to a pious act over and above sufficient help; or whether it adds nothing real, but the very same help is called efficacious by an extrinsic denomination only when a person wills to cooperate with it, and is likewise called inefficacious when the person does not will to cooperate.

Some have said that the division of the help of prevenient grace into efficacious help and inefficacious help is drawn from the effect, which also depends on the freedom of choice, and accordingly that whether it is efficacious or inefficacious for conversion or justification depends on the free consent and cooperation of free choice with it.

They prove their view. First, efficacious help, insofar as it is efficacious, formally speaking, does not precede the free consent of our free choice, but only accompanies it and works together with it in the pious act. For it is called efficacious because it effects the same act together with us. Therefore it is called efficacious only from the effect, namely, because it cooperates with us; and for the same reason it is called inefficacious because it does not cooperate with us.

Second, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2. q. 111. art. 3. ad 2: Grace is not diversified in essence by being prevenient and subsequent, but only according to its effect, as was also said of operating and cooperating grace; for even when subsequent grace pertains to glory, it is not numerically different from prevenient grace, through which we are now justified. Therefore grace is likewise not diversified in essence or according to a real and intrinsic power by being efficacious or sufficient, but only according to its effect. Therefore grace is called efficacious only from the effect, because free choice cooperates with it; and likewise it is called inefficacious because, from its innate freedom, free choice did not will to cooperate with it.

Third. No help of prevenient grace is inefficacious by its nature. Therefore likewise no help of prevenient grace will be efficacious intrinsically and by its nature. The consequence is proved as follows: in a per se division, when one member belongs by its nature to some subject, the other member must also belong per se to another, as in the division by which animal is divided into human being, horse, and so on; some animal to which being a horse belongs per se and by its nature must necessarily be assigned, just as an animal to which being a human belongs per se is assigned. The antecedent is proved: if there were some help of prevenient grace which per se and by its nature were inefficacious, it would follow that it was incompatible with that same help to have an effect, and consequently free choice truly could not act through that help; thus no sufficient help would remain, since, as will become clear below, sufficient help is that with which free choice can act. It therefore remains that the division of grace into sufficient and efficacious is to be drawn only from the effect, which also depends on the cooperation of free choice.

Fourth, the very same help, remaining unchanged in itself, can be sufficient and efficacious. Therefore this division is not drawn from the nature or intrinsic power of the help itself, but from something extrinsic, namely, from the effect that it has or does not have. The antecedent is proved: for, if something possible is posited as actual, no absurdity follows. But if this possibility—that a person can act piously by sufficient help—is posited as actual, and he in fact acts piously, in that case the same help that was called sufficient will truly be efficacious, with no real change made on the part of that help. Therefore precisely the same help, without any change in itself, will be sufficient and efficacious, and thus help will be called sufficient or efficacious solely extrinsically. The same argument can be made concerning efficacious help: for given any help whatsoever, however efficacious, free choice can still act or not act with it, consent or dissent, as the Council of Trent defines. Therefore suppose that it does not act but dissents. Then the same help of prevenient grace that was called efficacious will be inefficacious, since it would not have its effect. Therefore the same point follows as before.

I consider the contrary opinion true, and entirely in keeping with the mind of Saints Augustine and Thomas and consonant with Sacred Scripture and the Councils. To explain it, let the following be stated.

II. The division of help into sufficient and efficacious help is not taken only from the effect.— First Conclusion. The division of the help of prevenient grace into sufficient or inefficacious help and efficacious help is not to be drawn only from the effect, which also depends on the cooperation of free choice, but also from the real and intrinsic power of that same help, which it has as it comes from God, insofar, namely, as it is an instrument of the divine will. Accordingly, the efficacious help of grace that operates beforehand always has, in an intentional mode, some real power to bring it about that free choice cooperates; sufficient help does not have this in itself. First, this opinion is proved by the authority of Saint Augustine, in Letter 107 to Vitalis. There, reporting Vitalis's opinion concerning sufficient grace, which gives the ability, and that grace which works in us both to will and to accomplish—which is efficacious grace—Augustine says: How can you say what I hear you say: that rightly believing in God and assenting to the Gospel is not God's gift, but is from ourselves, that is, from our own will, which he himself has not worked in our heart? And when, in reply to this, you hear, “What, then, is it that the Apostle says: God works in us both to will and to accomplish?” you answer that God works through his law and his Scriptures, which we either read or hear, so that we may will; but that to consent or not to consent to them is so much our own that it happens if we will, and if we do not will, we make God's operation have no effect in us. For, you say, he operates, so far as it depends on him, so that we may will, when his utterances become known to us; but if we do not wish to yield to them, we bring it about that his operation profits us nothing. In these words Vitalis of Carthage seems to have established a division between inefficacious and efficacious grace based solely on the effect, which also depends on the cooperation of free choice. This is indicated by his words: But to consent or not to consent to them is so much our own that it happens if we will, and if we do not will, we make God's operation have no effect in us. This is the same as if he said: Prevenient grace, which becomes efficacious when our consent is added, is rendered inefficacious if, in keeping with our freedom, we withhold our consent. Saint Augustine, refuting this opinion, adds: If you say this, you contradict our prayers. Below he confirms this with many testimonies from Scripture. If it is said that Vitalis admitted no interior prevenient grace, but only external law and teaching, the reply is that not only the Massilians but Pelagius too, in the third stage of his heresy, finally admitted illumination through interior teaching and persuasion, or the arousing of a sluggish will, as was shown in Disputation 1, no. 6, and will become clearer in Disputation 95. He nevertheless always denied the help of efficacious grace by which God makes willing people out of unwilling ones, as is plainly clear from Disputation 1, nos. 13 and 14.

Second, it is proved as follows. For, as was said above, sufficient help is that by which someone can act if he wills, whereas efficacious help is that by which someone actually acts. But a principle that grants actual acting is of greater power than a principle that grants only the ability, since second act is nobler than first act, as will become clear below: therefore efficacious help has some real power to effect that a person act piously, which sufficient help does not have. Therefore the division of the prevenient help of grace into efficacious and sufficient is drawn not only from the effect, which also depends on the cooperation of free choice, but also from the real power of the help itself.

III. Efficacious help contains, in an intentional mode, the power of the divine will.— Third. As St. Thomas teaches, in efficacious help there is, in an intentional mode, the power of God, who by an absolute will wills that the person whose heart he moves be converted or act piously, as we also showed at greater length in disp. 22 and 23. But this intentional power is not in sufficient or inefficacious help. Therefore there is some real power in efficacious help that sufficient help does not have. Therefore the aforesaid division is not taken only from the effect, which also depends on the cooperation of our free choice, but also from the real and intrinsic power of the help itself. This is confirmed. When an agent, especially if it has infinite power, uses an instrument to effect something, it grants that instrument, in the very act of using it, an intentional power to produce that effect, as is clear in the sacraments of the New Law, which by divine power effect the grace they signify. But God uses efficacious help as an instrument to effect that our free choice actually cooperate with God as he excites and calls us. Therefore he grants it an intentional power to infallibly produce this effect, which he does not grant to sufficient help, by which God, through an efficacious will, intends only to grant free choice the ability to act, but not actual acting. Consequently, the aforesaid division is made according to the real power of the prevenient help of grace itself; therefore it is not to be drawn only from the effect.

If it is said that the same sufficient help, under subordination and in relation to God, who efficaciously wills to convert a person through it, becomes efficacious without any real power, even an intentional one, being granted to it by which it is distinguished from merely sufficient help, the answer is this. For St. Thomas, in 4. sent. dist. 1. q. 1. ar. 4. quaestiunc. 1. in corp., proves from this that when God uses the sacraments of the New Law to cause grace, he grants them, in an intentional mode, a certain real power that causes grace. Otherwise the sacraments themselves would not truly cause grace; rather, God alone would produce grace in their presence. Therefore, if God, when he uses created help to convert a person, does not grant it, in an intentional mode, some real power by which it makes a person consent, a power not present in sufficient help, it follows that God alone would convert a person in the presence of efficacious help, and consequently that the help of grace itself would truly do or effect nothing toward the conversion of a person. And thus the conversion itself would not be referred to God's grace. This is confirmed because a relation alone, since it is not active, cannot grant any power to effect something. But the relation of sufficient help to God's efficacious decree, by which he wills to convert a person to himself, is a relation. Therefore this relation alone does not grant help the power to convert a person. Therefore, besides this relation, efficacious help must have, in an intentional mode, some real power communicated to it by that same decree, by which it infallibly converts a person.

Fourth, this view can be proved by all the arguments with which it was shown above, and will be established below, that efficacious help of prevenient grace not only morally but also physically predetermines our free choice to consent to and cooperate with God who arouses and calls. For since sufficient, or inefficacious, help has no power by which it thus predetermines free choice to act piously, it follows that there is some real power in efficacious help which sufficient help truly does not have. The same view can be confirmed by the arguments through which in Disputation 90 it will become clear that the help of prevenient grace is efficacious independently of the cooperation of our choice and precedes it in the order of nature. For from this it is deduced as an evident consequence that the same help is not called efficacious only from its effect; otherwise, insofar as it is efficacious, it would not be prevenient but subsequent to the free determination of that same choice, and would depend on it for its efficacy.

Second conclusion. The aforesaid division is drawn from the real and intrinsic power that help has as it comes from God. This conclusion will be proved expressly in Disputations 83 and 90, where we will show that efficacious help does not depend in its efficacy on the causal contribution of free choice acting with it, but has its efficacy from God alone. Since help which is only sufficient does not have this real efficacy, it follows that there is in efficacious help some real power to move free choice, which is not in sufficient help; and consequently, the division or distinction of help into sufficient help and efficacious help must be drawn from the real and intrinsic power which is present in an intentional mode in one help and not in the other. The same is clear from what was said in the preceding conclusion.

IIII. Efficacious help has some real power which is not in sufficient help.— To the first, then, the answer is that efficacious help, insofar as it is efficacious, is prevenient, as is clear from the premises; for it is not called efficacious only because it effects a pious act together with us, but also because it effects that free choice cooperate with it, predetermining free choice to consent freely.

Efficacious help eminently contains every perfection of sufficient help.— To the second, the consequence is denied, and the reason for the difference is this: cooperating grace has in itself that it also cooperates together with us. Sufficient grace, however, does not have in itself that it actually grants performance of the act with respect to which it is called sufficient; hence the cases are not similar. And if an argument is made: when a sinner is suddenly converted perfectly to God, without dispositions preceding in time the infusion of grace, the same help that grants actually acting also grants the ability to act, since two different helps are not posited in him, one granting the ability and another granting the act; therefore in that case sufficient and efficacious help are distinguished only according to different effects, like operating and cooperating grace; and consequently the help of grace is called sufficient or efficacious only from its effect, not because of a real distinction in the help itself. The answer is that efficacious help eminently contains every perfection of sufficient help, just as anything perfect in a genus eminently contains whatever perfection is in every imperfect thing of that same genus. Hence it is not necessary that help which is formally efficacious and eminently sufficient be really distinguished from itself. But when help is formally sufficient in such a way that it grants only the ability to act and not actually to perform the act with respect to which it is called sufficient, then it must be really distinguished from efficacious help, that is, by some real power existing in an intentional mode in efficacious help as it comes from God and as it is an instrument of God, who absolutely wills to convert to himself the person whose heart he moves—a power which sufficient help nevertheless does not have in itself.

V. In what sense help of grace is called efficacious by its nature.— To the third, the reply is that help of grace can be called efficacious by its nature in two ways. First, “by its nature” can signify only the physical entity it has in the order of being, by which it truly determines free choice by its nature—that is, naturally—to act. In this sense no help of grace is called efficacious by its nature. In another way, help of grace can be called efficacious by its nature as an instrument of the divine will, so that “by its nature” is understood in contrast with help that is called efficacious solely from an effect that also depends on the free cooperation of our choice. In this sense help that is efficacious by its nature is given: that is, it is efficacious of itself, by the real intentional power it has from God independently of the free cooperation of our choice. In this same sense sufficient help is given by its nature, because, as an instrument of the divine will, it grants only the ability, not actual performance of the act with respect to which it is called sufficient. As for the refutation, the reply is that help of grace is not called inefficacious because it cannot have the effect with respect to which it is called inefficacious, but because in fact it will not have that effect through the fault of the one to whom it is conferred. Since he truly can turn to God or act piously by that help, it is through his own fault that he does not act, as is clear from what was said above.

VI. When something possible is posited as actual, absolutely speaking, no absurdity follows.— To the fourth, the antecedent is denied. To the proof, the reply is that when something is possible not only in the divided sense but also in the composite sense, no absurdity follows from its being posited as actual. But when it is possible only in the divided sense, and not in the composite sense, then a great absurdity follows if it is in fact posited as actual, given something with which such a positing is incompatible. This is clear in the case of any predestined person, who while on the way can absolutely, in the divided sense, be damned. Yet because this is impossible in the composite sense, a great absurdity would follow if it were posited as actual while positing, as one does, that he is predestined. For it would follow that predestination is not certain as regards attaining its effect, which is impossible, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore, since free choice moved by God with efficacious help cannot dissent from it in the composite sense, though it can in the divided sense, as will become clear below, a great absurdity would follow if this possibility were posited as actual. For it would follow that God's will is inefficacious and can be obstructed by the human will, which, as Augustine says and we showed above, is impossible.

Consequently, we must now treat in particular the help of exciting and sufficient grace, from which the justification of the predestined first begins, according to the Apostle's words: Those whom he predestined, he also called. This agrees with the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 5, which says: The beginning of this justification in adults must be derived from the prevenient grace of God through Jesus Christ, that is, from his call, by which they are called, with none of their merits existing. Five questions arise for discussion here.

I. Whether exciting grace is formally some vital act of free choice, or rather something antecedent to every vital act.

II. What is the proper effect of exciting grace insofar as it is formally exciting.

III. Whether exciting grace is the same as sufficient grace.

IIII. Whether exciting grace, which is conferred on people according to the common manner, depends on the ministers of the Church.

V. Whether it depends on the personal diligence and effort of the one who is excited.

Disputatio LXXIV: Whether exciting or prevenient grace is formally a vital act of free choice, or something preceding every vital act.

Whether exciting or prevenient grace is formally some vital act of free choice, or something antecedent to every vital act.

I. Some have said that prevenient and exciting grace is formally nothing other than certain vital acts which God works in us without us—that is, without our freely cooperating, though not without our concurring vitally and as efficient causes—and that it consists in the illustration and illumination of the intellect, and in the arousal and persuasion of the will. These proceed from the intellect and will as efficient causes, not as free, but as nature.

They prove this view first from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, on justification, chap. 5, where it says: It further declares that the beginning of justification itself in adults must be derived from the prevenient grace of God through Jesus Christ; that is, from his calling, by which they are called, with none of their merits existing, so that those who were turned away from God through sins may, through his exciting and helping grace, be disposed to turn themselves toward their own justification, freely assenting to and cooperating with that same grace; so that, when God touches a human heart through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, the person himself does not do nothing, receiving that inspiration—for he can also reject it—yet without the grace of God he cannot move himself toward justice before him by his own free will. From these words it is understood that prevenient and exciting grace formally consists in God's calling, in the touch by which God touches the human heart through the illumination of the intellect and the arousal of the will. But the illumination of the intellect and the arousal of the will are formally vital acts elicited by the created intellect and will as nature, since they are indeliberate acts. Therefore prevenient and exciting grace are formally vital acts. In chap. 6 of the same session and in canons 3 and 4, the Council now calls exciting and prevenient grace the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, now the divine touch through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, and now the divine call—all of which are plainly vital acts. Hence the Second Council of Orange says that through this illumination and inspiration God draws people to himself and works in us both to will and to accomplish according to good will. And Pope Celestine, in epist. 1 to the Bishops of Gaul, chap. 8, reporting a certain letter of the African bishops in which they praised and weighed the words of Pope Zosimus, “We, moreover, by the prompting of God,” etc., says: What did you do with such free choice as when you referred everything to the awareness of our humility? And yet you faithfully and wisely saw that it was done by God's prompting. This is certainly because the will is prepared by the Lord; and, so that they may do something good, he himself touches the hearts of his faithful with paternal inspirations.

This is confirmed. A pious thought which precedes the first act of faith pertains to prevenient grace, since it precedes the free consent of the will by which one wills to believe the mysteries of faith proposed and explained to him. Likewise, indeliberate movements of both intellect and will proceeding from the impulse and inspiration of the Holy Spirit pertain to prevenient grace. Since cognition itself and indeliberate acts are formally vital acts produced by intellect and will as efficient causes, without which they cannot be produced by God alone even by absolute power, it follows that prevenient and exciting grace are formally vital acts.

Second, an argument is made from Augustine’s authority. When speaking of this prevenient grace, he always calls it God’s inspiration, illumination, and calling, as may be seen in the book On the Spirit and the Letter, chaps. 33 and 34; in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chaps. 16 and 19; in epist. 107; and in book 1, To Simplicianus, q. 2. Cyril of Alexandria speaks in the same way, in book 4 on John, chap. 7. And Prosper, in book 2 of The Calling of the Nations, chap. 26, says: The grace of God indeed takes precedence as the principal agent in all justifications: persuading by exhortations, moving by examples, terrifying by dangers, inciting by miracles, giving understanding, inspiring counsel, illuminating the heart itself, and imbuing it with the affections of faith.

II. Third, the opinion is argued for by reason. This exciting and prevenient grace is something inhering in the soul, because the soul is not aroused by things outside it except through some intermediary that inheres in the soul itself. Hence, although external causes or objects that arouse can be outside the soul, the formal arousal itself must necessarily inhere in the soul, because it must affect the soul formally, indeed vitally. But this arousal inhering in the soul is not its habit, for while the soul is only in a habit it is as though asleep, as Aristotle said. Through this arousal, however, it is made to be awake and attentive, as if it were told: Awake, you who sleep, and rise from the dead, and Christ will enlighten you; therefore this arousal occurs through a vital motion of the soul, which for that reason must be made by the soul itself and not by God alone.

Fourth, this opinion can be proved by all the arguments with which in Disputation 18 we contended that God's general concurrence is not an immediate influx into the secondary cause, nor anything prior to its operation, but an immediate influx with the cause into its effect. For from this principle it is plainly inferred that the special help of prevenient and exciting grace is not something prior to our vital acts, but stands for those same acts as proceeding from God, who supernaturally influences them and raises the vital acts to supernatural being, so that they may be of the kind required for salvation. The arguments adduced in Disputation 57 should also be considered, to prove that, on account of a greater effort of free choice, a person obtains more intense helps of prevenient and exciting grace.

III. We touched on this difficulty incidentally in Disputations 18 and 19 and in Disputation 57, nos. 4 and 9; it will have to be treated again in Disputation 120, no. 2. But now it must be examined more closely, so that the nature, or essence, of prevenient and exciting grace may be fully understood. To explain it, note that grace can be called prevenient and exciting in two senses. In one way, because it is prevenient in the first instance, before which no other grace inhering in the soul is understood. In another way, it is called prevenient and exciting not in the first instance, but relatively: although it is prevenient and exciting with respect to one act, it is not purely prevenient, but subsequent to another, prior grace or another prior act that it presupposes. Saint Thomas explains this in I–II, question 111, article 3, body and reply to objection 2; we cited his words in Disputation 70, no. 9.

IIII. Grace that first precedes is not formally a vital act.— Let this, then, be the First Conclusion. Purely prevenient grace, or grace that first precedes us, is not formally our vital act, but causes such an act. This conclusion is commonly taught by the Thomists and is very much in accord with the doctrine of the Councils; it is proved as follows. First, from the Second Council of Orange, canon 20, where it is said: Many good things are done in a person that the person does not do. The Council said this especially on account of prevenient grace, by which a person is first moved by God. Therefore grace that first precedes and excites is not formally a vital act of our intellect or will, even insofar as it is nature, but is something supernatural and prior to such acts. They answer that the things which the Council of Orange says are done in a person but not effected by that person are both infused supernatural habits, which God alone produces as an efficient cause, and also the movements of prevenient grace, which, as has been explained, are not from a person cooperating through intellect and will insofar as they take on the character of free choice. For a person is considered to do only those things that he effects through free choice precisely as free choice. The subject there is the goods pertaining to eternal life, against the Pelagians. For since they maintained that a person could, through his free choice without the help of grace, and indeed actually did, effect certain such goods by which he would merit helps of grace to be conferred on him thereafter, the Fathers of the Council define that God does indeed effect in a person, without that person cooperating through his free choice, certain goods belonging to that number; but that a person cannot effect any of them through his free choice unless God grants him by his grace that he effect it. Therefore the Fathers do not deny that either the intellect or the will, insofar as it is nature, cooperates with the movements of prevenient grace. But there is an effective argument against this solution. For the Council intended not only to condemn the Pelagians because they said that a person could, through his free choice and the powers of nature, merit eternal life or the helps of grace by which he would attain beatitude, but also because they held that those same helps depended on nature, as is clear from what we said in disp. 1 and 2. Therefore, when the Council says, Many good things are done in a person that the person does not do, it also intends to indicate that the first help of prevenient grace is effected by God alone as an efficient cause, and that in its being it does not depend on free choice vitally influencing and causing that same help, even by an indeliberate influx. This is confirmed. If the first help of prevenient and exciting grace were formally a vital act, it would follow that it depended on both God and us as efficient causes; and thus the Prophet would not have said, My help is from the Lord, but would have said, “My help is from the Lord and from myself.” Consequently, the first beginning of our salvation would not be referred to God alone, but to God and nature, which no theologian will grant.

V. Second, this is proved from those words of Rev. 3: Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if anyone hears my voice and opens the door to me, I will enter to him and dine with him, and he with me. By these words it is signified that God stands like one knocking at a door when he anticipates sinners with his grace, calls them, and arouses them. But knocking proceeds, as from an efficient cause, only from the one who knocks and arouses, not from the one who is aroused or at whose door the knocking is done. Therefore the first prevenient and exciting grace is not formally a vital act proceeding from our intellect or will as efficient causes, even as nature, but something prior to those same vital acts. They answer this argument that there is a great difference between knocking at a door and knocking at the heart: although both, precisely insofar as they are knocking, proceed from the one who knocks as efficient cause, the motions of prevenient grace, insofar as they are from the intellect and will, are not knocks, nor by them do the intellect or will knock on themselves; rather, God alone knocks on the intellect and will through them. Nevertheless, in the action of knocking the door does not in any way concur as an efficient cause, but only the one who knocks, who by means of an action of this kind produces a sound, which is perceived by hearing if it reaches the ears of someone inside the house; yet it remains entirely up to that person to open or not open the door. But in the matter at hand, which is the knocking of the heart, the heart itself must concur as an efficient cause so that it may be perceived and so that, in consequence, a person can be moved in accordance with his freedom to open his heart to Christ the Lord. But from this answer an efficacious argument for our view is drawn. The vital act of the intellect and the pious affection elicited by the will through an indeliberate act are not simply the first prevenient grace. Rather, before acts of this kind it is necessary that some gratuitous gift, received in the intellect and will, precede, by which God elevates these powers to elicit those vital acts. For since they are supernatural acts and contribute substantially to salvation, they cannot be produced by nature alone; otherwise the first beginning of salvation would be from nature and not from grace, as the Pelagians said. Therefore it must necessarily be said that the first prevenient grace by which God effects that a person elicit such indeliberate vital acts is not formally our vital act, but something prior to it, namely, a certain actual and powerful motion of God, as we said at greater length in Disputation 19 while discussing God’s general concurrence. Many things have also been said about this argument in Disputation 57, nos. 3 and 4, where we also briefly touched on other arguments by which this conclusion of ours can be strengthened. Finally, it is proved by all the arguments by which it was shown in Disputation 67 that, without help of grace inhering in us and with only the extrinsic assistance of the Holy Spirit, free choice cannot elicit the supernatural acts of believing, hoping, and loving.

Second conclusion. It is not incompatible that the helps of exciting and prevenient grace—which are not simply first helps, but are prevenient in relation to one effect of grace and subsequent in relation to another—should be formally vital acts elicited by the intellect and will, not only as nature but also as will. This conclusion is gathered from St. Thomas in 1. 2. cited above, and the arguments made at the beginning prove it. Nevertheless, insofar as those arguments intend to attack our first conclusion, an answer must be given to them.

VI. What the Council of Trent understands by the name of calling.— To the first, the answer is that under the name of calling the Council of Trent also includes that prior motion of the Holy Spirit by which he effects that a person elicit pious thoughts, through which the intellect is enlightened, and pious affections, through which the will is drawn to consent to God who calls and arouses. Under the names of inspiration and touch of the Holy Spirit it likewise includes that prevenient gift which is prior to every vital act of ours. For God infuses that gift for this purpose: so that by its power a person may elicit vital acts of a supernatural order, by which his heart is touched, drawn, and invited freely to cooperate with God who calls. Hence it does not follow that the first prevenient or exciting grace is formally a vital act. And by this the confirmation is answered.

To the second, the reply is that a pious thought and supernatural illumination of the intellect, which formally occurs through an act produced by the same intellect, is indeed prevenient grace with respect to the free consent toward which the will is aroused; yet with respect to the supernatural motion by which God brings it about that the intellect elicits pious thoughts, it is called subsequent grace. For, as the Apostle says: We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.

VII. To the third, the reply is that the first prevenient and exciting grace is something inhering in the intellect and will. Yet it is not a habit or a vital act, but a certain prior motion toward a vital act, as was said in Disputations 18 and 19. Although a person is formally aroused through a vital act, he can also be aroused causally, through efficient causation, by something prior in the order of nature to every vital act. Since, then, the name “prevenient and exciting grace” also includes the gift by which God brings it about that a person considers and apprehends things pertaining to salvation, as is clear from the foregoing, it follows that, formally speaking, exciting grace need not be a vital act.

To the fourth, an express reply was already given in Disputations 18 and 57, and it was shown that God's general concurrence is an immediate influx into secondary causes, and that the helps of prevenient grace are measured not by the amount of prior effort of free choice but by God's gratuitous will.

Disputatio LXXV: What is the proper effect of exciting grace insofar as it is formally exciting.

What is the proper effect of exciting grace, insofar as it is formally exciting.

I. One kind of exciting grace is internal, another external.— This difficulty will also be touched on below, when we have taken up the question whether exciting grace is the same as sufficient grace. From what was said in the preceding disputation, however, it will be very easy to answer the present difficulty. To explain it, it should be noted that exciting grace includes both an external excitation, which takes place through creatures and sensible signs, and also an internal one, which takes place immediately from God, when he instills pious thoughts and proposes things that can move free choice to an act of faith and charity and to other supernatural operations, as can be inferred from what was said in disp. 70. St. Augustine mentions this twofold exciting grace in De spiritu et littera, ch. 34, when he says: By persuasions from things seen (or, as other more correct codices have it, by twofold persuasions) God acts so that we may will and believe, either externally through evangelical exhortations—where the commandments of the Law also do something, if they thereby admonish a person of his weakness so that by believing he may flee to justifying grace—or internally, where no one has control over what comes into his mind. He has similar words in Book 83 Questions, q. 68: For no one can will unless he is admonished and called, either internally, where no human being sees, or externally through a spoken word or some visible signs; and thus it comes about that God himself also works the very act of willing in us. In these words he distinguishes a twofold excitation, namely external excitation and calling, which can take place and often does take place through the ministry of human beings, and internal calling, which takes place by God alone. Through the latter he not only illuminates the intellect, but also excites and moves the will to carry out the good itself proposed through the intellect. St. Prosper gathered both kinds of exciting grace, external and internal, into a brief and elegant discourse. For, explaining the words of John 6, No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him, he says: If, then, no one comes unless drawn, all who come, however they come, are drawn. The contemplation of the elements draws to God, as does the most orderly beauty of all the things in them. For his invisible attributes are perceived and understood from the creation of the world through the things that have been made. Knowledge of past events draws, and the report of divine works inflames the mind of the hearer, as people recount the praises of the Lord, his powers, and his wonders that he has done: fear draws, for the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom: joy draws, for “I rejoiced in the things that were said to me: We shall go into the house of the Lord”: desire draws, for “My soul longs and faints for the courts of the Lord”: the delight of reading draws: “How sweet are your words to my palate, more than honey and the honeycomb to my mouth.” Who could perceive or recount through how many affections God's visitation leads the human mind, so that it follows what it fled, loves what it hated, and hungers for what it found distasteful; and so that, through a wondrous change, what had been closed to it suddenly lies open; what was burdensome becomes light; what was bitter becomes sweet; and what was dark becomes bright? All these things are worked by one and the same Spirit, distributing to each as he wills.

II. Exciting grace includes several acts.— Second, it must be noted that exciting grace for the perfect act of conversion to God or for an act of charity includes various pious acts elicited by the intellect, by the will, and also by the sensitive appetite. This is gathered quite clearly from the words of Prosper that we have just introduced. On the part of the intellect, it includes cognition of creatures, contemplation of divine works, apprehension of things to be believed, and of any other good proposed to the will as suitable. On the part of the will, it includes delight in sacred reading, pious desires, and other affections of this kind. On the part of the sensitive appetite, it includes sensible devotion, fear, and other sensible affections of this kind, through which God is accustomed to draw free choice to believe, to love, and to elicit other pious acts. Miracles and other external deeds by which God mercifully leads people to good are also included. Hence St. Augustine says: We see, he says, that different people are moved to believe in different ways when the same things are shown or signified, as, for example, Simeon believed in our Lord Jesus Christ while he was still a tiny infant, recognizing him because the Spirit revealed him to Simeon. At one saying he heard from him, “Before Philip called you, when you were under the fig tree, I saw you,” Nathanael replied, “Rabbi, you are the Son of God; you are the King of Israel.” For confessing this same thing much later, Peter, he deserved to hear that he was blessed and that the keys of the kingdom of heaven would be given to him. When a miracle was performed at Cana of Galilee, which the Evangelist John records as the beginning of Jesus’ signs, water having been turned into wine, his disciples believed in him. By speaking he invited many to faith; many did not believe even when the dead had been raised. Terrified by his cross and death, even the disciples wavered, and yet the thief believed at the time when he saw him no greater in his works, but equal in his fellowship in the Cross. One of the disciples also believed after his resurrection, not so much through his living limbs as through his recent scars. Many among those who had crucified him, who had despised him while seeing him work miracles, believed when the disciples preached him and did such things in his name. By these words Augustine distinguishes external deeds and various signs by which God is accustomed to move people to good in different ways according to their different qualities, moving some in one way and others in another, as he arranged in his gratuitous predestination. Hence, in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chap. 14, explaining Matt. 11: For if the mighty works which were done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, he says: Their eyes, then, were not so blinded, nor were the hearts of the Tyrians and Sidonians so hardened, for they would have believed if they had seen the signs these people saw. But it did not profit them that they could believe, because they were not predestined by him whose judgments are inscrutable and whose ways are unsearchable; nor would it have harmed these people that they could not believe, if they had been predestined, so that God might illuminate their blind eyes and might wish to take away their hearts of stone from the hardened.

Third, note that exciting grace includes not only illuminations of the intellect, by which God shows a person what he ought to believe, hope for, love, embrace, and reject, but also pious affections of the will, by which he draws and inclines free choice to fulfill in action what it has learned must be done. The reason is that not only the intellect, when it does not know or consider what it was bound to know or consider, but also the will, when it is sluggish and as if stunned, is like a sleeping person. For it is written of the intellect: You will be like one sleeping in the midst of the sea, and like a drowsy helmsman who has lost his rudder; and you will say: They struck me, and I was not hurt; they dragged me, and I did not feel it. Because of the sleep suffered by the will, the Prophet cries: My soul has slumbered from weariness; strengthen me by your words. And Proverbs 6 says: How long will you sleep, sluggard? When will you rise from your sleep? You will sleep a little, doze a little, fold your hands a little to sleep; and poverty will come upon you like a traveler, and want like an armed man. Hence Saint Augustine, describing the state of the sinner who, weighed down by deep sleep, does not hear the Lord arousing him, says: But I, still bound to the earth, refused to serve you, and feared to be freed from all hindrances as much as one ought to fear being hindered. The burden of the world pressed sweetly upon me, as sleep usually does, and the thoughts by which I meditated on you were like the efforts of those who want to wake up but, overcome by deep sleep, sink back again. And just as no one wishes always to sleep, and everyone in sound judgment prefers to be awake, yet a person often delays shaking off sleep when a heavy stupor is in his limbs, and he takes pleasure in what already displeases him, though the time to rise has come, so I was certain that it was better to surrender myself to your love than to yield to my desire; but the one pleased me and overcame me, the other delighted me and bound me. I had nothing to answer you when you said to me, “Awake, you who sleep, and rise from the dead, and Christ will enlighten you,” and showed me everywhere that you spoke the truth. Convicted by the truth, I had absolutely nothing to answer but slow and sleepy words: “Just now, look, just now; leave me a little.” But “just now” and “just now” had no limit, and “leave me a little” went on for a long time. Since, then, both the human intellect and the will, when they do nothing, seem as though asleep, each power must be aroused by divine grace to carry out supernatural actions.

III. The effect of exciting grace.— These points being supposed, it will be easy to explain what effect exciting grace has in a person insofar as it is formally exciting. For it must be said that through exciting grace God brings it about that a person wakes up and attends to those things that can help him embrace good and reject evil. For example, when a person has turned away from God through sin, by exciting grace God illumines his intellect so that he may see how evil and bitter it is to have abandoned the Lord, how great a danger to soul and body confronts one bound by the cords of his sins, how many losses mortal sin brings upon the sinner, and the like. Thus the Lord opened the heart of the purple-seller of Thyatira so that she attended to what Paul was saying. By the same exciting grace God also causes certain supernatural acts, though imperfect ones, by which he remotely disposes a person to obtain the grace of justification; or, if he is already justified, by these same imperfect acts he inclines his free choice to consent and cooperate with God arousing and calling him. Such are sudden movements by which a person fears the punishments of hell or hopes for eternal blessedness, pious desires, and other such affections of the heart that precede free consent.

Some deliberate acts pertain to exciting grace.— From this it follows that, although deliberate acts of faith and hope, insofar as they attract a person to an act of charity or to other pious operations, are included under the name of exciting grace, nevertheless, considered in themselves and absolutely, they are effects of helping grace. The reason is that through such acts we are not called by God or excited to believe or hope; rather, by consenting and cooperating in those same acts, we respond to him who calls and excites us. Therefore, speaking without qualification, they are effects of helping grace. For we have already said above that the same act can pertain to prevenient and subsequent grace, or to exciting and helping grace, according to different considerations.

IIII. And if an objection is made as follows: if through free and deliberate acts we respond to God as he calls us, then no deliberate act pertains to exciting grace, even in relation to other subsequent acts; for grace, insofar as it is exciting, does not proceed from free choice but from God alone, since God alone excites and calls, while free choice neither excites nor calls itself. The answer is that, just as the final disposition for grace, insofar as it is a disposition, is not attributed to a person, although it is elicited by him through free choice, but only to God who infuses grace, because a disposition, insofar as it is a disposition, is attributed to the agent inducing the form—so too deliberate acts of faith and hope, insofar as they excite a person and attract him to the observance of the commandments, are not attributed to the person who is excited, but to God who calls and excites. Hence, under this aspect, they are not included under the name of helping grace, but are referred to exciting grace.

Disputatio LXXVI: Whether exciting grace is the same as sufficient grace.

Whether exciting grace is the same as sufficient grace.

I. The first argument is on the negative side. Sufficient grace truly grants free choice sufficient powers by which it can be converted to God and act piously; for it is called sufficient for this reason, that it grants the ability to act. But exciting grace does not grant free choice sufficient powers by which it can be converted to God and act piously. Therefore exciting grace is not the same as sufficient grace. The minor premise is proved as follows: one who arouses a sick or lame person from sleep does not by such arousal grant that person the natural powers to run or to perform the activities of a healthy person, because by such arousal he does not in any way heal him, but only causes him to wake up and pay attention to the dangers threatening him. Therefore, by the same reasoning, when God arouses a stupefied person, he does not by exciting grace grant that person sufficient powers by which he can convert himself to God and perform the works of healthy free choice, especially supernatural works. For exciting grace likewise does not in any way heal free choice, but only causes it to wake up and pay attention to what is fitting for it.

Second. Since the will has been more injured by sin than the intellect, as was said above, it needs more to be strengthened and fortified by grace for performing the works of the virtues, especially those which exceed its natural end. But the will is not strengthened by exciting grace, nor is it elevated to perform the works of the virtues, especially those which exceed its natural end. For exciting grace is in the intellect and, consequently, posits nothing real and intrinsic in the will by which it is elevated to perform the aforesaid works of the virtues. Therefore the same conclusion follows as before.

If it is said that exciting grace posits in the will certain sudden affections, or first-first movements, and imperfect pious desires, which are something inhering in the same will, and consequently that through such movements, proceeding from the impulse of the Holy Spirit, the will is elevated and strengthened so that it truly can, if it wills, elicit the supernatural acts of faith, hope, and charity; against this there is the following:

Third argument. Indeliberate acts, however supernatural they may be, cannot be the formal principles of deliberate acts of faith, hope, and charity. For one act of a power is not the formal active principle of another, but rather the terminus of a formal principle. Since, then, indeliberate movements are produced by the intellect and will as efficient causes, it follows that they are not formal active principles, even sufficient ones, with respect to a deliberate supernatural act, but rather a terminus produced by a supernatural formal principle, namely, by the first prevenient grace.

This is confirmed. Deliberated supernatural acts are more perfect than indeliberate acts. Therefore indeliberate acts cannot be the formal active principle of a deliberate supernatural act. The consequence is proved: an effect cannot be more noble or perfect than its efficient cause, since every perfection of any effect must pre-exist in its efficient cause, because each thing acts insofar as it is in act.

Fourth, for conversion to God, besides exciting grace helping grace is necessary, as is clear from Trent; therefore exciting grace is not sufficient for conversion, since something is called sufficient for an effect when nothing else is required to produce that same effect.

II. The argument for the affirmative side is as follows: the Council of Trent sufficiently divided prevenient grace into exciting and helping grace. Therefore sufficient grace, since it truly is prevenient grace, must be assigned to one of these two members. But it is not assigned to helping grace, for helping grace is always efficacious: one who is helped does something, as Augustine says; therefore sufficient grace must be assigned to exciting grace. Otherwise that division would be insufficient, since its dividing members would not exhaust the whole of what is divided. It follows, then, that exciting grace is the same as sufficient grace.

To resolve this difficulty, it should be supposed that exciting grace is of two kinds, external and internal; the internal kind can be on the part of the intellect alone, or on the part of both intellect and will. Since we have already treated these members dividing exciting grace in Disputation 70 and following, there is no need to explain each one further with examples.

III. External exciting grace is not the same as sufficient grace.— Let this, then, be the first conclusion: external exciting grace is not the same as sufficient grace, speaking without qualification. All Catholics agree on this conclusion. It is proved as follows. Sufficient grace grants free choice sufficient powers by which it truly can turn to God or act piously; but external exciting grace does not grant free choice sufficient powers by which it can turn to God or act piously. Therefore the conclusion follows. The minor premise is proved: if external exciting grace is purely external, it places nothing real and intrinsic in free choice. Therefore it does not grant free choice sufficient powers for pious action. For, as was shown in Disputation 67, free choice cannot be raised to acts that exceed its natural powers, especially if they are supernatural, unless something supernatural inhering in free choice raises it to perform those acts. This is confirmed because, as was said in Disputation 1, in the second stage of his error Pelagius asserted that external preaching and arousal alone, through which God teaches what must be done and what must be avoided, without interior grace, suffice for a person by free choice to be able to fulfill all the commandments and attain eternal life. Therefore the opinion that external exciting grace alone is sufficient grace must not be admitted.

I said in the conclusion, “speaking without qualification,” for in a qualified sense it is not unreasonable to grant that external exciting grace is sufficient for salvation in its own kind, namely, as preaching or another form of external persuasion and arousal. The reason is that external arousal can be such that nothing more is required on its part for believing, acting piously, and attaining eternal life. Therefore such external arousal can be called sufficient in its own kind and in a qualified sense.

IIII. Second Conclusion. Even exciting grace by which the intellect alone is illumined or moved is not the same as sufficient grace, speaking without qualification, but only in a qualified sense, as was said in the preceding conclusion. This conclusion is proved from what has been said: not only the intellect but also the will needs divine motion and prevenient grace by which it is made capable of performing works of piety, since the will has been more corrupted by sin than the intellect, as was said above. Therefore exciting grace received in the intellect alone is not sufficient grace for salvation or for performing works of piety.

Second, it is proved as follows. For salvation, it is not only necessary that the intellect know what is to be done and what is to be avoided; the will must also will to embrace the good, flee evil, and love God above all things. But through exciting grace received in the intellect alone, the will cannot will anything conducive to salvation or love God above all things, because grace existing in the intellect is extrinsic to the will and consequently does not grant it a sufficient principle by which it can perform works of piety. Therefore exciting grace received in the intellect alone is not sufficient grace for salvation.

This is confirmed. A power existing in one faculty alone does not grant another faculty a sufficient principle for acting, since an operative power added to a faculty concurs with it in acting as the principle by which the operation occurs. Therefore exciting grace, which is received in the intellect alone, is not by itself sufficient for the will to perform through it works that exceed its natural powers.

Third, it is proved by comparison. If a lame or sick person, placed in some great danger, were asleep and another person awakened him so that he might see the dangers threatening him and flee, that awakening would not grant him a sufficient principle by which he could run and place himself in a safe spot, because, even once awakened, he would remain lame or sick. For that awakening in no way heals him or grants him the strength to run. Therefore, similarly, when a sinner is asleep, merely by his intellect being excited by God to attend and see how evil and bitter it is to have forsaken the Lord and how many dangers he is exposed to, this excitation alone does not grant him a sufficient principle by which he can flee from the Devil and run to God. Consequently, exciting grace received in the intellect alone, abstracting from every supernatural motion of the will, is not, speaking without qualification and absolutely, sufficient grace for salvation.

V. What exciting grace that is identified with sufficient grace must be like.— Third Conclusion. Exciting grace, insofar as it comprises not only the external and internal illumination of the intellect but also a supernatural motion received in the will, is really the same as sufficient grace, so that every grace that excites in the aforesaid manner is sufficient grace in relation to the effect to which it excites. Thus, if it excites someone to believe, it will be sufficient grace in relation to the act of faith; and if it excites someone to love God above all things, it will be sufficient grace in relation to the act of love of God. The same is to be said proportionally of other pious operations. The argument previously made for the contrary side effectively proves this conclusion. Moreover, it is proved as follows. A person who is excited by God in the aforesaid manner to believe at a time when the precept of faith is in force sins if he does not believe. Therefore that excitation was sufficient for believing. The consequence is proved because, if he did not have sufficient help for believing, he would not sin against faith by not believing, but would merely be negatively unbelieving, as was said above. Therefore this kind of exciting grace toward believing is sufficient grace, by which a person truly can believe if he wills. To the arguments made at the beginning it is answered that they prove only the first conclusion; but insofar as they proceed against the third, each must be addressed individually.

VI. To the first, the answer is that exciting grace, which is received not only in the intellect but also in the will, grants a person sufficient powers by which he can be converted to God or act piously, if he wills. For although this kind of exciting grace does not formally heal a person or free him from sin, it nevertheless heals him initially and dispositively, since it is a certain beginning and remote disposition for justifying and healing grace, or the beginning of that disposition. For this exciting grace toward perfect penance always has joined to it, on the part of the intellect and will, certain supernatural acts, such as fear of hell, attrition on account of the shamefulness of sin or the punishments of hell, or other acts of this kind, which do not attain to perfect conversion. Hence, just as sufficient grace is indeed sufficient in relation to perfect conversion, although it is always efficacious with respect to some effect, as will become clear in Disputation 80, so exciting grace, of which we spoke in our third conclusion, is sufficient in relation to that same perfect conversion; but with respect to the imperfect supernatural acts it produces in the intellect and will, it is efficacious, whether those acts are deliberate or indeliberate.

To the second, the answer is that the will is more injured by sin than the intellect, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2. q. 109. art. 2. ad 3. Hence it needs grace inhering in it more than the intellect does, in order to be converted. Therefore exciting grace, which is sufficient for conversion without qualification, includes a supernatural motion received not only in the intellect but also in the will itself, as was said.

To the third, the answer is that, as we said in Disputation 74, the first exciting grace does not consist formally and essentially in those indeliberate acts. For acts of this kind do not necessarily precede perfect conversion; but exciting grace always precedes perfect conversion, at least in the order of nature, as will become clear in Disputation 88. Rather, it consists in a certain divine motion produced in us by God alone, through which it efficaciously effects that our intellect and will produce some imperfect supernatural act, and sufficiently moves us toward perfect acts of charity, penance, or other supernatural acts of this kind. It must be noted, however, that some supernatural act can be called imperfect in relation to one thing and perfect in relation to another. For example, an unformed act of faith is imperfect in comparison with formed faith; but in comparison with other acts which ordinarily precede even unformed faith, such as going to church with the intention of hearing the word of God, listening attentively to what preachers say, and weighing the things to be believed, etc., it must be considered a perfect act; and the same is to be understood proportionally of other acts.

To the fourth, the answer is that exciting grace is not sufficient in every way for perfect conversion, but is sufficient in the genus of grace which grants a person the ability to act piously if he wills, as was said about sufficient grace in Disputation 23, no. 32, and will be discussed more fully in Disputation 79, no. 2.

Disputatio LXXVII: Whether exciting grace, conferred on human beings in the ordinary manner, depends on the ministers of the Church.

Whether exciting grace, which is conferred on people in the ordinary way, depends on the ministers of the Church.

I. Some theologians defend the affirmative part. For they say that God's interior call to faith, although it is God's gift, nevertheless depends greatly on the ministers and effort of the Church. They add, however, that this dependence on the Church's effort is only as on a condition without which we would not be illumined and called by God in the ordinary course of divine providence. They prove their opinion.

First, from that vision shown to Paul at Troas: A certain Macedonian man was standing and beseeching him, saying: “Cross over into Macedonia and help us.” By these words he signified that their call to faith and salvation depended on Paul's preaching and diligence. Likewise, when Christ sent the seventy-two disciples two by two ahead of him, he said in Luke 10: The harvest is indeed plentiful, but the laborers are few. Therefore ask the Lord of the harvest to send laborers into his harvest. He clearly indicated that the faith and salvation of people, signified by the harvest, depended greatly on the Church's laborers.

Second, God is not accustomed to call people to faith by himself implanting intelligible species in each person, or knowledge of things pertaining to faith, but after external preaching has taken place. For the Apostle says: How will they believe in him whom they have not heard? And how will they hear without a preacher? And how will they preach unless they are sent? Therefore faith is from hearing, and hearing through the word of Christ. Therefore prevenient grace, or the interior call to faith, depends on the ministers of the Church and their effort, at least as on a condition without which people ordinarily would not be called to faith.

This is confirmed. The interior call to faith depends on intelligible species and knowledge of the things to be believed; but, in the ordinary course, such species and knowledge depend on the ministers and effort of the Church. For, owing to the corruption, weakness, and misery of human nature after sin, ordinarily speaking, no one does all that lies within him by the powers of nature alone—knowing, worshiping, and obeying God—so as to be supernaturally illumined immediately by him beyond the ordinary course or outside the ordinary laws. Therefore, from first to last, prevenient grace, or the interior call to faith, depends on the effort and ministers of the Church.

II. Third. No prejudice is done to God's prevenient grace, nor is the character of the gratuitous interior call diminished in any way, by asserting that it depends on the ministers and effort of the Church as on a condition without which it would not occur. Therefore it truly depends on them. The antecedent is proved: God always calls people to himself altogether gratuitously, whether the interior call itself depends on the ministers of the Church or not, because the ministers' effort is not a merit for the interior grace of calling, which is conferred by God, but only a condition without which people ordinarily would not be called by God.

This is confirmed. For no prejudice is done to calling grace by asserting that it depends greatly on the effort and diligence of the one who is called. Indeed, it truly depends on intelligible species and knowledge acquired through one's own diligence or through another's ministry, since God does not always infuse new species or knowledge of what is to be believed into those whom he calls to faith, but presupposes that they have acquired them from elsewhere. Therefore much less does prejudice follow to exciting and calling grace from asserting that it depends on the effort and diligence of the ministers of the Church.

III. How exciting grace depends on the ministers of the Church.— To resolve this difficulty, it should be noted that prevenient grace, or internal calling, can be understood to depend on the ministers and effort of the Church in two ways. First, so that the efforts of the ministers of the Church themselves—such as external preaching, the working of miracles, and similar things, by which unbelievers are usually persuaded to faith and the faithful to works of piety—are included under the name of prevenient or exciting grace. For, as was said above, God moves and excites unbelievers to faith and faithful sinners to penance not only inwardly but also outwardly. Second, God's internal calling can depend on the ministers and effort of the Church as on a condition without which it does not occur, so that the effort and diligence of the ministers of the Church are not included under the name of prevenient grace, but are presupposed for it on the part of nature as a condition without which it does not occur. The authors cited above seem to understand their opinion in this second sense, for they speak in the same way of the effort and diligence of the ministers of the Church as of the effort and diligence of the person called by God. But it is clear from what was noted above and will be said below that, in their opinion, the efforts of the one who is called, antecedent to internal exciting grace, are not included under the name of prevenient and exciting grace, but are presupposed for it by nature itself as a condition without which people would not ordinarily be called or excited inwardly by God. Hence they also affirm that to a person who does all that lies within him by the powers of nature alone, God confers prevenient grace by which he may carry it out as is necessary for salvation, as was seen in disp. 56.

Let this, then, be the First Conclusion. If the efforts of the Church and its ministers, by which God usually calls people to faith, are included under the name of prevenient and exciting grace, it can and must be conceded that, ordinarily speaking, internal calling, or exciting grace, depends on the ministers and effort of the Church as on a condition without which God would not ordinarily call them inwardly. This conclusion seems certain to us, and we do not think that Catholic Doctors deny or attack it. The arguments made at the beginning prove it, if they prove anything.

Moreover, it is proved as follows. God often determines to call unbelievers inwardly to faith and sinners to penance by means of the effort and diligence of the Church, and not otherwise. This is clearly inferred from the passages of Scripture cited above. Therefore, according to the common order of divine providence, the interior calling of a person depends in some way on the diligence and effort of the Church. This is confirmed. For, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2. q. 112. ar. 2. ad 2., ordinarily speaking, justification depends on dispositions that precede the infusion of grace in time, since in the common course God does not justify a sinner without the aforesaid dispositions, although at times, without them, he perfectly converts to himself in a single instant someone in the course of sin, as he converted Paul. Therefore the internal calling of a person also depends on the effort and diligence of the Church, or its ministers. The consequence is proved because, ordinarily speaking, God does not call people inwardly to faith or sinners to penance except by means of the effort and diligence of the Church and its ministers.

IV. Second conclusion. This dependence of a person’s inward calling on the effort and diligence of the Church and its ministers is not merely dependence on them as a sine qua non condition, accompanying it or occurring accidentally, but as on an external cause proposing and persuading, which moves morally by outwardly inviting and drawing the will to pursue the good proposed to it. To make this clear, we must consider that, as is gathered from St. Thomas, 4. sent. dist. 1. q. 1. art. 4. quaestiunc. 1. c. and 5. metaph. lect. 6. at the beginning, a sine qua non cause is of two kinds. One kind is that which does absolutely nothing to bring about the effect, either by disposing or improving anything with respect to its being a cause; it has no place with respect to the effect beyond accidental causes, as white is a cause of a house if the builder is white. In the second sense, something is called a sine qua non condition which, although it is not the principal cause of a thing, is nevertheless a co-cause and cooperates in some way in producing the effect, as breathing is a sine qua non condition for the life of a breathing animal, because without breathing it cannot live; for although breathing is not the cause of life, it is a co-cause insofar as it cooperates in tempering the heat, without which there is no life. And the same is true of food, without which an animal cannot live, insofar as food cooperates in restoring what has been lost and prevents the complete consumption of the radical moisture, which is the cause of life. Therefore the effort and diligence of the ministers of the Church can be called a condition without which people, generally speaking, would not be inwardly called by God in this second sense, but not in the first. This is proved as follows: a sine qua non condition taken in the first sense is an accidental cause and absolutely does not cooperate in the effect of the principal agent; consequently, it does not fall under the consideration of a science, for what is accidental is omitted by art. But the effort and diligence of the ministers of the Church do cooperate in some way in the inward calling, by disposing the subject, persuading, or removing impediments. Therefore it is not a sine qua non condition in the first sense, but in the second. The minor premise is proved: one of the ministers of the Church, indeed the founder of the Church after Christ, says: As helpers, he says, we exhort you not to receive the grace of God in vain. Here the word “helpers” signifies that the ministers of the Church by their preaching and diligence somehow help God toward the intended end, not by supplying him with power to do anything, but by carrying out his commands. St. Thomas explains it in this sense in 1. ad Cor. 3: We are God’s helpers. This is confirmed by the Psalm: The Lord will give the word to those who preach with great power. And again it says: He will give power to his voice. This plainly signifies that God grants a certain power to the words of preachers so that they may soften the hearts of their hearers and incline them to do good. This agrees with the Apostle’s saying: I am not ashamed of the Gospel, for it is the power of God for salvation to everyone who believes. Hence Chrysostom says: For those who treat human bodies, he says, different remedies are available, as well as various instruments and foods suitable for the sick; but often the very nature of the air alone will be sufficient to restore a suffering person to health; at other times sleep, when it comes at the right time, relieves the physician himself of all labor and frees him. But here one may devise nothing of this kind; rather, after the example of deeds has been provided, one way of treating and healing must be held to and followed, namely, instruction through the Gospel’s message. For this is the instrument, this the food, this the best tempering of the air, this serves as medicine, this takes the place of fire, this serves as a knife. If it is necessary either to burn or to cut, it is necessary to use this very means; and if it has been of no use, all the other things must perish in vain. By this we raise up the soul when it lies low and restrain it when it swells; by this we cut away what is superfluous, supply what is lacking, and accomplish all the other things which contribute to the soul’s well-being. Indeed, so that you may establish your life as well as possible, the life of another person can draw you to the same example and equal emulation. But when the human soul suffers from the illnesses of wholly false doctrines and opinions opposed to the faith, the use of the Gospel’s message is then especially necessary, not only so that you may strengthen and confirm those who are your own, but also so that you may wage war and engage with outsiders. And he continues in this manner with other things. Hence St. Augustine, exhorting his children to listen attentively and reverently to the word of God, says: I ask you, brothers or sisters: what seems greater to you, the word of God or the body of Christ? If you wish to answer truthfully, you must surely say that the word of God is not less than the body of Christ. And therefore, with as much care as we observe when the body of Christ is ministered to us, so that none of it fall to the ground from our hands, let us observe with equal care that the word of God which is dispensed to us should not perish from our heart while we think or speak of something else. For he who listens negligently to the word of God will be no less guilty than the one who through negligence allows the body of Christ to fall to the ground. Therefore, in comparison with inward calling, preachers of the word of God are not a sine qua non condition in the first sense, where that condition is accidental and contributes nothing to the production of the effect.

V. It is of God's grace that someone should have preachers.— Third Conclusion. The effort and diligence of the Church and its ministers, by which unbelievers are led to faith and the faithful to perform works of piety, are included under the name of prevenient grace. Thus it is a gift of God's grace and of a certain special providence that someone should have preachers and exhorters to good. This conclusion is explicitly Saint Augustine's opinion in book 1 of On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, chapter 22, whose words we have already cited and examined in Disputation 56, no. 13. He teaches the same in his mystical exposition of Psalm 134, where, explaining He raises clouds from the end of the earth; he made lightning into rain. What clouds? he asks, and replies: The preachers of the word of his truth. Concerning these clouds, in another place, being angry at his vineyard, he says: “I will command my clouds not to rain down rain upon it,” etc. And what does he do with these clouds? He made lightning into rain: he turned threats to mercy, and watered them with terrors. When God threatens you through the Prophet and the Apostle, and you are afraid, did not the lightning flash terrify you? But when you are corrected through repentance and recognize that this happens by mercy, the terror of the lightning is turned into rain. He says the same on Psalm 87: God's grace is exceedingly hidden, by which the minds of people are in a certain way brought back to life so that they can hear the precepts of holiness from any of his ministers, etc. And shortly afterward he says: Therefore I said to you: “No one can come to me unless it has been granted him by my Father,” so as to show that the very faith by which a soul believes and comes back to life from the death of its heart is given to us by God. Therefore, however excellent the preachers of the Word and of truth may be, and however powerful they are in their miracles, acting with people like great physicians, if people are dead and have not revived by his grace, “Will you work wonders for the dead? Or will physicians raise them up, and will those whom they raise up confess you?” In Homily 23 he says: Your God says this to you: “I was guiding you for myself, preserving you for myself, so that you would not commit adultery; the tempter was lacking, and I caused him to be lacking. Place and time were lacking, and I caused them to be lacking. The tempter was present, place and time were not lacking; so that you would not consent, I struck fear into you. Acknowledge, then, the grace of him to whom you owe even what you did not commit. For there is no sin committed by one person that another person could not commit, if he lacked the ruler by whom he was made.” He says nearly the same in the same words in Soliloquies, chapters 15 and 16. Saint Gregory supports this: The same word is often granted to the teacher as a grace for the hearer, and often, because of the hearer's fault, speech is withheld from the Doctor. For a good word is given even to wicked teachers as a grace for the hearer, as the words of preaching could be supplied to the Pharisees of whom it is written: “Observe and do everything they tell you, but do not act according to their works.” But because of the hearers' rejection, speech is withheld even from good Doctors, as it is said to Ezekiel concerning Israel: “I will make your tongue cling to your palate, and you will be mute, not as a man reproving, because the house is provoking.” Sometimes the preaching word is given for the sake of both, sometimes it is withheld for the sake of both. It is given for both, as the divine voice says to Paul at Corinth: “Do not be afraid, but speak.” And a little later: “For I have many people in this city.” It is withheld for both, as when Eli the priest both knew of his sons' wicked conduct and did not raise his voice in a fitting rebuke, although it was surely to happen that the penalty of death would punish them for the guilt of their crime and him for his silence. In these words he explicitly teaches that grace is given to hearers when preachers are sent to them by God. Therefore the effort of the ministers of the Church and their preaching must be included under the name of prevenient grace. This conclusion can be confirmed from what we noted in the preface to this work: there we showed that external helps, or helps extrinsic to free choice, by which a person is led to the love of God, are included under the name of exciting grace.

VI. Something pertains to prevenient grace in two ways.— Fourth Conclusion. The internal calling and excitation of a person does not depend on the diligence and effort of the ministers of the Church as though such diligence were presupposed by nature and in no way included under the name of prevenient grace. This conclusion is inferred from the preceding one. To explain it more fully, it should be noted that something can pertain to grace in two ways. First, because according to its essence and entity it is something supernatural, as are the habit of grace and charity and the special internal help by which God moves free choice as an efficient cause toward a pious operation. For these are God's gratuitous supernatural gifts according to their entity. Second, something can pertain to grace or a gratuitous gift because, although according to its physical entity it is not something supernatural, it is nevertheless ordered by God to salvation and a supernatural end, and he takes it up as a means for exciting a person inwardly or moving free choice to tend toward the supernatural end. Of this kind is the excitation by which, through sensible creatures or an external preacher or exhorter, God moves and inclines an unbeliever to faith and a sinner to penance. For that external preaching according to its entity is not intrinsically something supernatural, especially if it is done for vainglory or for some end that is a mortal sin. Nevertheless, insofar as it is ordered by God to convert sinners to himself, it enters the supernatural order and is included under the name of exciting grace by which God precedes their free choice. Consequently, when exciting grace is taken in its full breadth, external preaching is not presupposed to it, even as a condition without which God is not accustomed to call people to himself.

VII. An external act, as depending on the will, pertains to the moral genus.— This is proved as follows. External acts, although according to their essence and entity they are not intrinsically moral acts, nevertheless in their exercise, insofar as they proceed from the command of the will and are ordered to its end, truly pertain to the moral genus, as the Thomists commonly teach in 1. 2. q. 20. ar. 1. et 2. Therefore, in the same way, although the external preaching and diligence of the ministers of the Church are not according to their entity supernatural actions, insofar as they are ordered by God to the salvation of the person who is called they are truly included under divine calling and under the aspect of prevenient grace.

The first and second arguments made at the beginning are easily answered from what has been said: for they prove only that internal calling ordinarily depends on external calling, which is also included under the name of prevenient grace. This is clearly inferred from the passages of Scripture cited in those same arguments. For they expressly assert that God himself, who justifies sinners, sends preachers so that all who are ordained to eternal life may attain salvation. For he says that the Lord of the harvest sends workers into his harvest, and, How shall they preach unless they are sent? Therefore God, in his mercy, is the one who sends preachers. Therefore the diligence of preachers and ministers of the Church is not presupposed by nature to God's prevenient grace, even as a condition without which people would not be called inwardly.

I will answer the third argument, together with its confirmation, in the following disputation.

Disputatio LXXVIII: Whether exciting grace, ordinarily conferred on human beings, depends on the effort and diligence of the person who is roused.

Whether exciting grace, which is regularly conferred on people, depends on the effort and diligence of the one who is aroused.

I. Those doctors who think that God’s inward calling and arousal depend on the effort and diligence of the Church and its ministers as on a sine qua non condition, consequently teach that they also depend on the effort and diligence of the one who is aroused and called. The first and principal argument for this view is the one we touched on in the confirmation of the third argument of the preceding disputation. God does not regularly infuse new species or knowledge of things to be believed into those whom he calls to faith, but presupposes that they have acquired them elsewhere. Yet the one who is called must necessarily use his own effort and diligence to acquire them, so that he may come to hear the word of God with the intention of attending to what is said, and may read attentively the sacred books from which to acquire such species and knowledge. Therefore the conclusion follows.

Second, it is argued that God does not regularly confer prevenient and exciting grace on people unless they first do what lies within them by the powers of nature alone, as they tried to prove in Disputation 56, nos. 2 and 3. But to do what lies within one by the powers of nature requires one’s own effort and diligence. Therefore inward exciting grace regularly depends on the effort and diligence of the person who is called, at least as on a condition without which he would not regularly be called by God.

Third, the principal foundation of the opposing view is destroyed. For the opposing view argues that inward calling depends in no way, even as on a sine qua non condition, on the effort and diligence of the person called, because then inward calling would not be gratuitous but owed, which is contrary to the nature of grace. But this argument is invalid. The minor premise is proved: a sine qua non condition in no way destroys or diminishes the nature of grace, because such a condition has no value and does not imply merit to which grace corresponds as a debt. Otherwise the use of reason, which is presupposed in adults for the infusion of grace, would remove or diminish the nature of grace, because it too is a condition without which they would not be justified.

II. Inward calling does not depend on the natural diligence and effort of the person called.— The first prevenient grace does not depend on the effort of free choice, even as on a sine qua non condition.— The resolution of this difficulty is easy, once the things said in the preceding disputation and Disputation 56 are assumed. For if we speak of the effort and diligence of the person called proceeding from the powers of nature alone, it must be said that the inward arousal of the person called does not depend, even as on a sine qua non condition, on that person’s diligence; and this is on account of the arguments by which it was shown in Disputation 56 that the view is false of those who say that, according to the common manner God observes, he gives no one helps of prevenient grace unless the person first does what lies within him by the power of nature. For the same arguments effectively prove that inward calling does not depend, even as on a sine qua non condition, on the effort and diligence of the person called. But if we speak of effort and diligence proceeding from a prior help of exciting and prevenient grace, there is no incompatibility in admitting that just as one effect of grace depends on another, so one inward arousal depends on another and presupposes it according to the common manner God observes in arousing and calling people. For example, arousal to an act of penance depends on arousal to an act of fear of the punishments of hell, which regularly precedes perfect contrition; and the same is to be said proportionally of pious thoughts, desires, and petitions which precede an act of penance or charity. For a divine arousal and motion through special help to pious thoughts, desires, and prayers, by which the sinner knocks at the door of divine mercy, precedes arousal to these acts. All actions of this kind proceed from the special help of prevenient grace, as was shown above. Hence one must finally arrive at the first arousal, or the prevenient grace which is first without qualification, which does not depend on the effort and diligence of the person called, even as on a sine qua non condition, even according to the common manner God observes in calling people; so that the first beginning of salvation may thus be referred to God himself, the author of grace, and not to the natural power of our choice.

III. By this it is answered to the first argument that those items of knowledge which precede the act of believing proceed from a special impulse of the Holy Spirit, as Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas prove from 2 Corinthians 3. We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God. By these words the Apostle contends that the very thinking of the mysteries of faith so that they may be believed is from God and from his special motion.

To the second, the reply is that the antecedent is not to be admitted, as was shown in Disputation 56.

IV. In what sense use of reason is presupposed for grace in adults.— To the third, it is already clear from what was said in that same Disputation 56 how the character of grace seems to be harmed if someone asserts that the interior call depends on the diligence and effort of the one who is called. As for the proposed objection, the reply is that if we are speaking of the actual use of reason proceeding from the natural faculty alone, the same reasoning applies to the use of reason and to the diligence and effort of the one who is called. But if the discussion concerns the use of reason as though in habit, such use of reason belongs on the side of the subject. Therefore, if it is presupposed for justification in adults, it does not destroy the character of grace; for the character of grace is overturned only when it is given on account of some work of nature, according to what the Apostle says: If it is from works, then grace is no longer grace.

After this, we must discuss sufficient grace. For the present, two things about it must be examined.

I. What help is said to be truly sufficient for salvation.

II. Whether every sufficient help is efficacious in some respect.

Disputatio LXXIX: What help of grace is called truly sufficient.

What help of grace is truly called sufficient.

I. To this difficulty theologians commonly answer that help of grace is called sufficient for some act when a person can truly perform that act by it. Thus sufficient help for believing is that by which a person can believe; sufficient help for doing penance is that by which a person can do penance; and the same applies proportionally to other acts of the virtues. From this they infer that sufficient help for salvation is that by which a person can be saved. They gather this from St. Augustine, De correptione et gratia, chs. 11 and 12, whose words we cited in disp. 71, no. 7. More recent theologians, however, inquire further into what is necessary on the part of divine help for a person to be said to be able by it to believe, love, or persevere. For some think that, for a help of grace to be truly called sufficient help by which a person can believe, love, or persevere, it must be so sufficient that, on the part of the active principle—that is, on the part of prevenient help—no other help is necessarily prerequired for him actually to believe, love, or persevere. They prove their opinion as follows.

First, from the very etymology of the name. For that is called sufficient beyond which nothing else is required. If something else were required as necessary, that help alone, which is called sufficient, would in fact not be sufficient. Therefore help is sufficient for believing when no other help antecedent to the cooperation of free choice in the act of believing is necessary beyond it, for a person actually to believe.

Second, it is argued by comparison. If twelve votes were absolutely necessary for some canonical election, and Peter, for example, had only eight votes, he would not be said to have sufficient votes for that election. Therefore, similarly, if beyond the help called sufficient for believing some other help is absolutely necessary, that first help will truly not be sufficient in relation to the act of believing, but would be called sufficient in name only.

Third. No other help mediates between sufficient help for believing and the act of believing itself. Therefore that is sufficient help for believing beyond which no other help is necessary for a person actually to believe. The consequence is proved as follows: otherwise there would already be a middle help between sufficient help and the act of believing itself. The antecedent is proved because it cannot be explained what that middle thing would be. For it is neither a habit nor a quality, since a habit is something permanent, while that middle thing cannot be permanent; nor is it an act, for otherwise another act of believing would mediate between sufficient help for believing and the act of believing itself, which is impossible. Therefore such a middle help is nothing.

This opinion can be confirmed by all the arguments with which in disp. 98 we shall undertake to prove that, besides sufficient help, no efficacious help really distinct from sufficient help is to be posited as necessary for believing. For from this it clearly follows that help is sufficient for some operation when no other prevenient help is necessary beyond it.

II. The contrary view is taught by all the doctors who think that besides sufficient help, which grants a person the ability to believe, to love, or to persevere, another help of efficacious prevenient grace is necessary, by which God effects that a person actually believes, loves, or perseveres. For these doctors preserve the true sufficiency of sufficient help alongside the necessity of such efficacious help, as we said in part in Disputation 18, no. 20, and Disputation 23, no. 32, from St. Thomas. To explain this, it must be assumed with Cajetan, the Ferrariense, and M. Medina that free choice is understood in two ways to be able to produce some act through some help. First, absolutely and simply, that is, without qualification, as when we assert that a person can see through the power of sight, because, insofar as the power by which he is constituted in first act for seeing is concerned, nothing else need be added to it in order for him truly to be said to be able to see—no other faculty or power granting him the ability to see in first act—even though, beyond the power of sight, many other things are required for a person actually to see. Hence from the power alone one cannot infer its use or operation in the exercise of the act. In this sense it must be asserted that through sufficient help a person truly can perform the act in relation to which the help is called sufficient, even if he will never act unless God, by efficacious help, effects that this ability is reduced to second act. In the second sense, this can be understood of a principle or help by which one can act completely, such that one not only has a principle through which one truly can act, but also has the complement—indicated in Disputation 18, no. 10, and Disputation 19, no. 5—by which one acts and wills in the exercise itself. We said something about this in Disputation 23, no. 32.

III. What help of grace is truly called sufficient.— Let the first conclusion, then, be this: help is called completely sufficient for some operation in this second sense when no other help is absolutely necessary beyond it for that operation to be actually produced. The authors of both views agree on this conclusion, and the arguments made at the beginning prove it effectively.

Second conclusion. Help is called truly sufficient in the first sense for some operation when it grants the ability in relation to that same operation, such that no other help is absolutely necessary for a person truly to be said to be able to produce that operation. For example, sufficient help for believing is that by which a person can believe; sufficient help for persevering is that by which a person can persevere, if he wills. There is also no disagreement among the doctors about this conclusion, for it is asserted in explicit words by Augustine in the places cited above, and the arguments made at the beginning also prove it effectively.

IIII. Third Conclusion. These two things are compossible: that besides sufficient help, which grants the ability, another help of efficacious prevenient grace, granting actual pious action, is absolutely necessary; and nevertheless that the help called sufficient is truly sufficient. Thus, for help of prevenient grace to be sufficient, it need not be so sufficient that no other help, prevenient in the order of causality to the action itself, is required without qualification for actual action. Cajetan, Ferrara, and Master Medina establish this conclusion in the cited places, and it is proved as follows. First, more things are necessary for someone actually to act than to be able to act, as is clear from the foregoing. Therefore it is quite possible that someone possess all the prerequisites by which he truly can act, without possessing all those necessarily required in order to act actually. Therefore help is truly preserved as sufficient, by which a person can believe, love, or persevere if he wills, even if it is asserted that for a person actually to believe, love, or persevere another help of prevenient grace is necessary without qualification, by which God brings it about that the person believes, loves, or perseveres. The authors of the contrary opinion reply that the things necessarily required for actual action, namely, God's actual general concurrence or the concurrence of helping grace, are not among the prerequisites antecedent to pious action, but among what accompanies and concurs at the same time with free choice toward that same action. But this solution remains sufficiently refuted by what was said in Disputations 18 and 23. For it was shown that God's general concurrence is God's immediate influx into secondary causes, and that it premoves and predetermines them to their actions, each according to the mode of its own nature. Therefore it must be counted among the prerequisites antecedent to pious action, not in the order of time, but in the order of reason and causality.

V. Second, this is proved as follows. The visual power is a sufficient principle for seeing, even if actual vision never occurs without light and a universal cause moving it. Therefore, similarly, sufficient help for believing is truly sufficient in its own kind, even though efficacious help, by which God brings it about that a person believes, is necessary without qualification in addition to it.

Third, the same can be proved: for, as will become clear in Disputation 86, by the help of efficacious grace God truly makes us cooperate as an efficient cause by freely consenting to that same grace. Therefore the aforesaid efficacious help is among the prerequisites antecedent to action, not in the order of time but in the order of reason and causality.

VI. To the first argument, the reply is that help is called sufficient when no other help granting the ability to act is required in addition to it; yet there is no inconsistency in another help granting actual action being necessary in addition to sufficient help.

To the second argument it is answered that, for a person to be able to be elected to some office, it is sufficient that he can receive the votes required for a canonical election under pontifical law. But for him actually to be elected in the case proposed, he must have twelve votes in his favor. In the same way, for a person to be able to believe, he must have sufficient help received in him that grants the ability; but for him actually to believe, he must have efficacious help by which he is made actually believing. To explain this more fully, it should be noted that, as St. Thomas teaches in De veritate, q. 6, art. 3, ad 7, something is said to be able to do something in two ways. First, by considering the power that is in it, as when we say that a stone can be moved downward. In another way, by considering what is on the part of something else, as when I say that a stone can be moved upward by the power of the one throwing it. Thus, therefore, someone who is actually moved by God to believe through sufficient help inhering in the intellect and will is said to be able to believe by a formal and proximate power that is in him. But if he is in no way moved by God to believe, as are negatively unbelieving people who have heard nothing of the Gospel, they are said to be able to believe both by a power that is in another, because they can be moved by God through sufficient help that grants the ability, and also by a radical power that is in created free choice, because, while the person is a wayfarer, it is flexible from evil to good. For this reason, St. Thomas teaches in 3. q. 8. art. 3. ad 1 that Christ is the head even of unbelievers, because although unbelievers are not actually of the Church, they are nevertheless of the Church potentially. This potentiality is founded on two things: first and principally on the power of Christ, which is sufficient for the salvation of the whole human race; secondarily on the freedom of free choice—namely, because every person, while he is a wayfarer, has free choice that can turn from evil to good, since no wayfarer is totally hardened in evil; for this belongs only to the damned, because they are at their end.

To the third argument it is answered that efficacious help, which predetermines free choice to the very act of believing, mediates between sufficient help for believing and the act of believing, as was shown above. And to the objection it must be said that this help is neither a habit nor a quality nor our act, but a powerful motion toward the act, as we explained at greater length in disp. 18 and 19.

Disputatio LXXX: Whether every sufficient help is efficacious in some respect.

Book Nine

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