Book One

Prooemium: division of the whole work

Disputatio I: Whether the Pelagians ever admitted that any inward grace, or any supernatural help from God, is divinely given for salvation or for fulfilling the precepts of the law

Disputatio XV: Whether God’s absolute power can create an intellectual substance capable, by the powers of nature alone, of loving God above all things as the author of grace and eliciting other supernatural acts.

Whether, by the absolute power of God, an intellectual substance can be created to which, by the powers of nature alone, it belongs to love God above all things as author of grace and to elicit other supernatural acts.

I. St. Thomas treats a similar difficulty specifically concerning the beatific vision in part I, q. 12, art. 4 and 5, and his interpreters do so there. But since an understanding of this question will make clearer what was said above about the natural powers of created free choice and what will be said below about the necessity and essence of grace, it seemed fitting here to inquire generally about all supernatural acts.

The first opinion is held by those who assert that God can create an intellectual substance to which it is connatural, through its own powers, to see God through his essence and to elicit other supernatural acts. They add that no argument occurs to them that evidently demonstrates this to be impossible.

This opinion is proved first. God can create some supernatural substance from which the light of glory and other supernatural habits of faith, charity, etc., flow by way of a property. Therefore, he can create a substance to which it is connatural to see God through his essence and to love him above all things as author of grace. The consequence is proved: since the light of glory and the habit of charity are active powers for seeing God and loving him as author of grace, if such habits were connatural to something, it would also be connatural to that thing to see God through his essence and to love him as author of grace. The antecedent is proved: God in fact produces supernatural accidents, such as the habits of grace and charity. Therefore, it entails no contradiction for him to produce a supernatural substance from which the light of glory and other infused habits flow. For no sufficient reason can be assigned why created accidents of the supernatural order can be given, but it entails a contradiction to give a created substance of the same order.

It is confirmed. An accident is a certain participation in substance. Therefore, if a supernatural accident is given, God will be able to create a supernatural substance from which supernatural accidents flow by way of a natural property.

Second, it is argued. What is a common accident with respect to one thing is, or can be, a proper property with respect to another, as is clear in the case of heat, which with respect to water is a common and separable accident, but with respect to fire is a proper property naturally flowing from its essence. But habitual grace and the other infused habits are common and separable accidents with respect to a human being. Therefore, God can create a substance from which such habits flow by way of a property.

Third. Habitual grace and charity are connatural to the soul of Christ, as St. Thomas seems to teach in part III, question 2, article 12, and St. Augustine in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, chapter 40. But Christ's soul is a created substance. Therefore, grace and charity are, or can be, connatural to some created substance. Therefore, it will also be connatural to that substance to love God above all things as author of grace. The consequence is proved: to whatever a habit is connatural, the act proceeding from that same habit is also connatural.

II. Fourth. If for some reason it could not be communicated to a created or creatable substance to see God through his essence by the powers of nature alone and to love him through an act connatural to it insofar as he is author of grace, this would be especially because this is a proper and connatural perfection of God alone. But this reason proves nothing. Therefore. The minor premise is proved: it is also God's proper and connatural perfection to have being and to exist. For it is said in God's person in Exodus 3: He who is has sent me to you. And again: I am who I am. Yet in fact God communicates to creatures that they have being and exist from their own principles. For it is connatural to a human being to be, and connatural to Angels to be incorruptible, as St. Thomas teaches in part I. Therefore, although it is connatural to God himself to see God through his essence and to love him above all things insofar as he is author of grace, this can be communicated to a pure creature so that it sees God clearly from the principles of its nature, etc.

This is confirmed. The only thing incommunicable to a creature is to have being and operation from itself. But it is not incommunicable to it to have being dependent on God as the first efficient cause from the principles of nature, and likewise to operate in this way. Therefore, it can also be communicated to a creature that, dependently on God as the first efficient cause, it be supernatural in substance, just as it is communicated to it that it have natural being in substance. Therefore, it is not incompatible for there to be a supernatural substance from which supernatural habits flow as properties. Therefore, that created substance will be able, from its own principles of nature, to see God clearly, love him above all things, and elicit other supernatural acts.

Fifth, an argument is made by destroying St. Thomas's reasoning. From this he proves that it is impossible for a created intellect to see the divine essence by its natural powers, because God, since he is his own being, exceeds the mode of being and knowing of every created intellect and thus cannot be known evidently by it through its own powers. For the known thing is in the knower according to the knower's nature. But this reasoning is invalid. Therefore. The minor premise is proved: from St. Thomas's principle that the known thing is in the knower according to the knower's mode, it does not follow that the knower's nature must be equal to the known object; it only follows that the cognition must be proportionate to the knower. Otherwise, an inferior angel could not know a superior angel quidditatively by the powers of nature, since the mode of being of a superior angel exceeds the mode of being of an inferior angel. Therefore, although a created intellect cannot be made equal by its natural powers to the divine essence as regards its mode of being, it can nevertheless by God's absolute power know the divine essence through the powers of nature.

This is confirmed: it would follow from St. Thomas's reasoning that a created intellect could not see the divine essence clearly even when illuminated by the light of glory. But the consequence is erroneous. Therefore. The consequence is proved: a created intellect, even with the light of glory, is not equal to the mode of being of the divine essence itself.¹ For even with the light of glory it is not pure act or its own being, but always has potentiality mixed in. Therefore.

III. The second opinion is St. Thomas's in 1. p. q. 12. art. 4 and 5, and in On Evil, question 4, article 1, reply to objection 14, On Truth, question 8, article 3, book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 49, question 2, article 6, and 12, question 5, article 5, where he teaches plainly that no created intellect can see God through his essence by the powers of nature alone. He says the same of other supernatural acts in I–II, question 109, articles 5 and 6, and St. Thomas's reasons conclude that this is impossible even by God's absolute power. The Thomists commonly follow this same opinion. Cajetan expressly teaches it in Part III, question 76, article 7, section Ad evidentiam, where he says that beings supernatural by their genus cannot be or become connatural to any being. He says the same in Part I, question 12, article 5, reply to Durandus’s third objection To explain this, first note that the mode of knowing follows the mode of being.² Hence, just as four grades of things and powers are distinguished in their mode of being, so they must be distinguished in their mode of knowing. The first grade is that of corporeal things or a corporeal power, which uses a bodily organ; it is connatural to powers of this kind to know things insofar as they are in individual matter. Hence sense can know only singulars, in accord with Aristotle's saying: Sense is of singulars, but intellect is of universals. The second is a power that in itself does not depend on matter or use a bodily organ³, but nevertheless, by reason of its state, depends in its cognition on material individuals, from which it abstracts the universal nature it knows, as the human intellect does. It is connatural to this intellect to know a nature abstracted from material individuals. Hence by the powers of nature alone it cannot know separately existing substances quidditatively, as St. Thomas teaches in Part I, question 88, articles 1 and 2 The third grade is a power that is neither material nor in matter, but has some potentiality and a certain imperfection mixed in, because it is neither its own understanding nor its own being, as the angelic intellect is. It is connatural to this power to know natures existing in themselves without matter, which are not their own being or pure actuality. The fourth and highest mode or grade of power is one that is neither material nor in matter, has no potentiality, but is its own being through its essence, as the divine intellect is. It alone has it as connatural to see clearly subsistent being itself, which is the divine essence.

IIII. Second, note that the proposition assumed by St. Thomas, that the known thing is in the knower according to the knower's mode, is to be understood in this way: there must be a proportion between the known object and the cognitive power of the knower, such that the known object and the knower's power are of the same order.⁴ Since it entails a contradiction for any created intellect by its natural powers to be of the divine order, it evidently follows that it cannot see God through his essence by the powers of nature. That no created or creatable intellect can by its natural powers be of the divine order is clear from this: otherwise it would be God by essence, which entails a contradiction. For no substance has by its natural powers the character of the divine order except God alone. Therefore, the character of being of the divine order through its essence cannot belong to a created intellect either.

V. From these foundations an evident argument is derived for St. Thomas's conclusion. Nothing of an inferior nature, with respect to the aforesaid four degrees of being, can by its natural powers know quidditatively what is of a superior nature. For the rational soul, as long as it has a mode of being in a body, cannot by its natural powers know quidditatively an angel, who has a mode of being outside every body;⁵ but the divine essence has a mode of being of a higher order than every created and creatable intellect, because the divine essence is its own being and pure act, whereas no created or creatable intellect is, or can be, its own being or pure act. Therefore no created or creatable intellect can by its natural powers see God through his essence.

It is proved second. The Catholic faith teaches that beatific vision is above the whole nature of the created intellect, as is clear from the Council of Vienne under Clement V, and is found in the Clementine Ad nostrum, On Heretics, where, among the errors of the Beghards and Beguines, the fifth is condemned: namely, that every intellectual nature is naturally blessed in itself and that the soul does not need the light of glory by which it is elevated to see God. This is proved from 1 Tim. 6: He dwells in inaccessible light, whom no man sees, nor can see, namely, by the powers of nature. And in Isa. 64: Eye has not seen, O God, apart from you, what you have prepared for those who wait for you. And in Rom. 6: The grace of God is eternal life. Therefore no created intellect can by its natural powers see God through his essence; otherwise beatific vision would not be above the whole order of nature.

VI. He answers that from the aforesaid passages of Scripture and the Council it is only established that beatific vision is above the whole nature of the created intellect; they do not, however, define that it is above the nature of any intellect that can be created by God's absolute power, because they speak only of an intellect created by God or to be created. Nevertheless, this answer does not seem to accord with the words of Scripture and the Council, for they teach absolutely that beatific vision is supernatural. Therefore they hold that it is above every faculty of created and creatable nature. The inference is proved: that which is above the faculty of this created nature but not of another is not called supernatural absolutely, but only in a certain respect, just as setting something on fire is not supernatural absolutely, because although it is above the nature of water, it is not above the nature of fire.

It is proved third. No one can see God clearly unless the divine essence is united to his intellect under the aspect of an intelligible species. For, as St. Thomas teaches, God cannot be known quidditatively through any created species.⁶ But it entails a contradiction for any created or creatable intellect to have the divine essence united to it by the faculty of nature under the aspect of an intelligible species. Therefore. This is confirmed. The light of glory by its nature is a disposition for the divine essence to be received in a created intellect by way of an intelligible species. Therefore, it cannot be connatural to any intellect unless it is connatural to that intellect to have the divine essence united to it, just as heat at degree eight cannot be connatural to anything unless the form of fire is connatural to it, since heat is by its nature the ultimate disposition for fire. But it is not connatural to any created intellect to have the divine essence united to it. Therefore it cannot be connatural to it to have the light of glory. Therefore beatific vision cannot be connatural to it either. The inference is proved because, as will be clear below, the light of glory is absolutely necessary for seeing God quidditatively.

VII. Fourth. It is impossible for God to create an intellectual substance to which it belongs by its nature to be impeccable, because by the very fact that free choice is produced from nothing, it is by nature liable to defect and to sin.⁷ So teach St. Augustine, book 12 of The City of God, chapter 1, and book 2 of On Vices and Concupiscences, chapter 28; St. Gregory, Moralia 25, chapter 5; Gregory of Nyssa, book 1 of On Free Choice, final chapter; Damascene, book 2 of the Orthodox Faith, chapter 27; Cyril, book 11 on John, chapter 25; Rupert, book 1 on Genesis, chapter 15; and St. Thomas, 2 Sent., distinction 34, question 1, article 3, ad 4. Therefore it is also impossible for there to be a created intellectual substance to which, from the principles of its nature, it belongs to see God through his essence. The inference is proved: impeccability necessarily follows upon a clear vision of the divine essence, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2. q. 5, art. 4.

Fifth, the same point is proved generally about all supernatural habits and acts of faith, hope, and charity. For, as was said in disputation 64, acts of this kind are supernatural as to substance, just like beatific vision. Therefore they cannot be connatural to any created or creatable substance, or be produced by it from the powers of nature alone.

Sixth, an argument is made. Things that by their formal concept imply infinite perfection cannot be communicated to a pure creature even by God's absolute power, such as being pure act, having being from oneself, and the like. But producing supernatural acts from the proper principles of nature formally implies infinite perfection, because for this the suppositum that elicits those acts must in itself be of the divine order and consequently God through his essence. Therefore.

VIII. Seventh. It is impossible for habitual grace to be connatural to any created or creatable substance. Therefore, it is also impossible for charity or its act to be connatural to such a substance or to proceed from the powers of nature alone.⁸ The consequence is proved: if an essence is not connatural to something, neither can its proper property be connatural to it. But charity follows habitual grace as its proper property, as St. Thomas teaches in I–II. The antecedent is proved, because it is contrary to the character of grace that it be owed to nature; for this is why grace is called grace, because it is given freely and not as what is owed, according to the Apostle: Not from works, otherwise grace is no longer grace.⁹

To the first argument the antecedent is denied. To its proof it is answered that the case of accidents is not the same as that of substance. For accidents do not subsist in themselves and do not have being as that which is, but only as that by which something is accidentally such. Hence it entails no contradiction for God to produce accidents of the supernatural order through which an intellectual nature is elevated accidentally to supernatural being and supernatural operations. Created substance, however, subsists in itself as that which is. Likewise, a created intellect, although it does not subsist in itself, follows by way of a property from the principles of created nature, which does subsist in itself. Hence, if there were a created substance or intellect that by its nature belonged to the divine order, it would follow that it was God by nature and not through a gratuitous and accidental participation, which is impossible.

To the confirmation it is answered¹⁰ that accidents of the natural order are a certain participation in created substance in the order of material, formal, or even efficient causality, because they either flow from the created substance itself by simple resultance, as proper properties do, or depend on it as on an efficient or material cause. Accidents of the supernatural order, however, are not a participation in created substance but in the divine substance. For created charity is a participation in the infinite charity of the Holy Spirit, as St. Thomas teaches in II–II, question 24, article 7, body; and grace likewise is a participation in the divine nature, according to the words: He has given us great and precious promises, that we may become partakers of the divine nature.¹¹ Hence the cases are not alike.

IX. To the second it is answered that it is not necessary for every common accident to be a proper property with respect to some subject. For blackness, properly speaking, is not a property of a raven or another suppositum, but an accident following from matter. A proper property follows upon a nature by reason of its form. Hence it is not necessary that habitual grace and the other infused habits be proper properties with respect to some creatable substance.

To the third it is answered that habitual grace and charity are said to be connatural in relation to Christ the Lord, not as though they were caused in Christ by the principles of human nature, but because he had them from birth and because they proceeded from the divine nature, which was united to human nature in the same suppositum of the Word, as St. Thomas explains in part III, question 2, article 12.¹²

To the fourth it is answered that God's perfections are of two kinds. Some do not include infinity in their formal conception but abstract from it, such as being, living, and understanding; perfections of this kind can be communicated to creatures.¹³¹⁴ Other perfections include infinity in their formal conception, such as being pure act and creating; these perfections are so proper to God that they cannot be communicated to a pure creature. This also makes the answer to the confirmation clear.

X. To the fifth it is answered that St. Thomas's argument is demonstrative, as is clear from its foundations explained above. To the objection it is answered that the mode of being of a higher Angel exceeds the mode of being of a lower Angel in specific degree, but not in generic degree, according to the four degrees of being and knowing explained above.¹⁵ Hence a lower Angel can naturally know a higher Angel quidditatively.

To the confirmation the consequence is denied. To the proof it is answered with¹⁶ Ferrariensis, Book 3 Against the Gentiles, chapter 54, around the sixth doubt, that although the intellect with the light of glory is not its own being or pure act, nevertheless the light¹⁷ of glory is a disposition for receiving the divine essence as an intelligible species, which is its own being and pure act. Consequently, the light of glory is of the same order as God;¹⁸ for the ultimate disposition, as such, is of the same order as the form. Hence St. Thomas, explaining in book 4, distinction 49, question 2, article 6, body of the article, how a created intellect without the light of glory lacks proportion to the beatific vision, and through that light becomes proportioned to the same vision, says: The ultimate disposition for a form and the form itself are received in the thing to be perfected under the same aspect, so that if one is natural, so is the other, because through its ultimate disposition for the form the thing to be perfected attains the form itself. But the form, which is the divine essence, exceeds every natural faculty and capacity. For a power and its proper act are always considered in the same genus. Hence power and act divide every genus of being, as is clear in Physics 3.¹⁹²⁰ And therefore the faculty or power of a creature extends only to a form of its own genus. Thus the divine essence, which is outside every genus, exceeds the natural faculty of every created intellect. Therefore the ultimate disposition for the union of the intellect with such an essence exceeds every capacity of nature. Hence it cannot be natural, but is above nature. This disposition is the light of glory, of which it is said in Psalm 35: In your light we shall see light. He says the same in On Truth, question 8, article 3, body of the article. There, from the principle that the ultimate disposition for a form and the form are of one order, so that if one is natural, so is the other, he infers that it cannot happen that a created intellect sees God through his essence from its own natural principles, because it is impossible for the light of glory, which is the disposition by which the divine essence is united with the created intellect in intelligible being, to be connatural to any created substance. He understands this to be impossible even by absolute power, as can be gathered from the argument of the article and from the other passages cited above. Therefore, because through the light of glory the intellect is made Godlike, in accord with 1. Io. 3: We know that when he appears, we shall be like him, since this is a form pertaining to the divine order, a created intellect illuminated by the light of glory can attain the clear vision of God. Second, it is answered that, for the intellect to know an object quidditatively by its natural powers, it must have the same mode of being as that object. This is not necessary, however, when it is elevated to such cognition through a higher form. For a rational soul still existing in the body can know an angel quidditatively by supernatural means, although it has an inferior mode of being. For St. Thomas's reasoning applies only to connatural cognition, as is gathered plainly from the context of the article.

End of Book Seven.

Book One

Prooemium: division of the whole work

Disputatio I: Whether the Pelagians ever admitted that any inward grace, or any supernatural help from God, is divinely given for salvation or for fulfilling the precepts of the law

Disputatio II: What grace the Semi-Pelagians admitted as necessary for salvation, and where their view agrees with or departs from the error of the Pelagians

Disputatio III: What the Manichaeans formerly held, and the Lutherans and Calvinists hold in our time, about the necessity of grace and the natural powers of our free choice

Disputatio IV: What certain Catholic Doctors hold about the natural powers of free choice and its concord with divine foreknowledge, providence, predestination, and the efficacy of the helps of grace

Disputatio V: How much authority Saint Augustine’s teaching has concerning predestination and grace, and whether it is permissible to depart from it

Book Two

Introduction

Disputatio I: Whether the knowledge of God is suitably divided into the knowledge of simple understanding and the knowledge of vision.

Disputatio II: Whether the knowledge of God is sufficiently divided into knowledge that is merely natural and knowledge that is merely free; or whether, besides both, middle knowledge must be posited in God with respect to conditional future things that depend on the human will.

Disputatio III: Whether all future things are actually present in eternity according to the proper existences they will have in their own measure.

Disputatio IV: Whether God certainly knows future contingents because of their real presence in eternity before they come to be, and whether an existence of this kind contributes anything to the certainty and infallibility of the divine knowledge.

Disputatio V: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows all future contingents in the decree, or predetermination, of his divine will.

Disputatio VI: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows future sins in some decree of his divine will.

Disputatio VII: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows future contingents in the predetermination of secondary causes, especially when the secondary causes are free.

Disputatio VIII: Whether, setting aside every predetermination of the divine will and existence in eternity, another ground for the certainty of divine knowledge can be assigned, namely, on the part of the truth of the object.

Disputatio IX: Whether God certainly knows future contingents before the decree of his will, as future, in their ideas.

Disputatio X: Whether there is in God a conjectural knowledge of what, in particular, a created will will do if placed in such circumstances.

Disputatio XI: Whether this causal proposition is true: “Because this is future, it is foreknown by God”; or, conversely: “Because God foreknows something to be future, therefore it is future.”

Disputatio XII: Whether God produces things outside himself immediately through his knowledge, that is, through his intellect; or whether, besides intellect and will, a third executive power must be posited in him, through which things are produced immediately.

Book Three

Introduction

Disputatio I: Whether God’s actual motion, which all secondary causes need in order to produce their effect or operation, is an immediate influx into the secondary cause itself; or whether instead it is only an immediate influx, together with the secondary cause, into its effect.

Disputatio II: What that prior motion is by which God moves and applies secondary causes to act.

Disputatio III: Whether God’s general concurrence, by which he helps secondary causes constituted in first act through supernatural forms to produce supernatural acts, is supernatural; or whether it is of the same order as general concurrence with merely natural acts.

Disputatio IV: Whether God’s general concurrence, especially with respect to acts that depend on created free choice, is indifferent of itself.

Disputatio V: Whether, by an absolute and efficacious decree of his will, God truly predetermines as an efficient cause all secondary causes, both natural and free, to their operations after the manner of a physical cause, while preserving their nature and freedom.

Disputatio VI: Whether, by a prior motion inhering in the created will, God moves, applies, or predetermines it after the manner of a physical cause to all its good acts in particular, while preserving its freedom.

Disputatio VII: Whether, by a prior motion, God truly premoves as an efficient cause free choice after the manner of a physical cause to the act of sin, insofar as it is an act and insofar as it is a being.

Disputatio VIII: Whether all contingent and free acts predetermined by God necessarily occur with the necessity of infallibility, or with necessity on the supposition of the predetermination of the divine will.

Disputatio IX: Whether the first root of contingency is the efficacy, or omnipotence, of the divine will.

Disputatio X: Whether any effect can be called formally contingent in relation to God’s causality, especially when it is produced immediately by him.

Book Four

Introduction

Disputatio I: Whether God has providence not only over all genera and species, but also over all individuals in particular, according to all circumstances of place, time, etc.

Disputatio II: Whether the evils of punishment are willed by an absolute and efficacious will, and predetermined in particular, through divine providence, or are only permitted.

Disputatio III: Whether the nature of divine providence includes not only the ordering of means to an end, but also the attainment of the end intended by God.

Disputatio IV: Whether contingent and free secondary causes can withdraw themselves from, or depart from, the order assigned to them by divine providence.

Disputatio V: Whether created free choice can resist almighty God, or strive against the order of divine providence.

Book Five

Introduction

Disputatio I: Whether all the explanations that St. Augustine gives of those words of the Apostle, “God wills all human beings to be saved,” are legitimate.

Disputatio II: What God's antecedent will is, what his consequent will is, and whether antecedent will formally entails some conditional act or wish in God.

Disputatio III: What predestination is, and in which act it formally consists: an act of the will, or rather an act of the intellect.

Disputatio IV: Whether the good use of the aids of grace, insofar as it proceeds from free will, is an effect of predestination.

Disputatio V: Whether the good use of free will, proceeding from the aid of grace, is a cause, reason, or necessary condition of predestination in adults.

Disputatio VI: Whether the predestination of infants depended on, and presupposed, foreknowledge of the good use of the free will of their parents or of others through whom they came to the grace of baptism.

Disputatio VII: Whether the foreseen merits of Christ are the cause of our predestination with respect to its entire effect.

Disputatio VIII: Whether the grace of the state of innocence was conferred on Adam through the merits of Christ.

Disputatio IX: Whether predestination, with respect to the attainment of its effects, is certain and infallible with the certainty of the order and causality of the means.

Disputatio X: Whether anyone, apart from divine revelation, can know with infallible certainty that he or another is among the predestined, or infer this from certain signs.

Disputatio XI: Whether, at least among the faithful, there are more elect than reprobate.

Book Six

Introduction

Disputatio I: Whether the children of Adam contract original sin through seminal propagation, such that it truly and properly has the character of guilt in them.

Disputatio II: Whether through original sin man was only deprived of original justice and supernatural gifts, or also wounded in his natural powers.

Disputatio III: What wounds man incurs through original or actual sin.

Disputatio IV: Whether free will in fallen nature, apart from the aids of grace, has the same natural powers for good that it would have had if it had been created in a state of pure nature.

Disputatio V: Whether man can, by the powers of nature alone and without the aid of grace, know every truth pertaining to the natural order.

Disputatio VI: Whether man can, by the powers of nature alone, assent to all the supernatural mysteries proposed and explained to him as revealed by God, with assent that is certain and firm on the believer’s part.

Disputatio VII: Whether, without the aid of grace, man in fallen nature can perform a moral act that is truly good in relation to the ultimate natural end and is an act of true virtue.

Disputatio VIII: Whether man in fallen nature can, by the powers of nature alone together with God’s general concurrence, elicit an absolute, purely natural act of loving God above all things, with an absolute resolve to please him in everything.

Disputatio IX: Whether free will, with general concurrence alone, can elicit attrition or contrition with respect to the substance of the act alone.

Disputatio X: Whether man can, by the natural powers of free will, restore the good connatural to him that he lost through sin.

Disputatio XI: Whether fallen man can, without the aid of grace, keep all the commandments and resist, at every moment, all the temptations he encounters, even the gravest, which must be overcome to keep the natural law.

Book Seven

Introduction

Disputatio I: Whether man can, without the aid of grace, dispose himself at least remotely to obtain grace by asking, seeking, knocking, and so forth.

Disputatio II: Whether those who do all that lies in their power by nature alone receive from God, infallibly and according to a fixed law, the aids of prevenient grace by which they carry it out as required for salvation.

Disputatio III: Whether greater effort of free choice obtains greater or more intense aids of rousing and prevenient grace.

Disputatio IV: Whether someone who does all that lies in his power with the earlier aids of prevenient grace receives subsequent aids infallibly and according to a fixed law.

Disputatio V: Whether someone who does all that lies in his power with efficacious aid, that is, who elicits an act of charity and contrition, receives justifying grace infallibly and according to a fixed law.

Disputatio VI: Whether acts of charity equal to the preexisting habit, or even less intense acts, obtain an increase of habitual grace, charity, and essential glory infallibly and according to a fixed law.

Disputatio VII: Whether deadened merits obtain for the penitent, infallibly and according to an established law, greater habitual grace and a right to more intense essential glory.

Disputatio VIII: Whether greater effort or influence of free choice, with equal aid of assisting grace, obtains for one person greater justifying grace than for another.

Disputatio IX: Whether a naturally more perfect intellect, with equal light of glory, produces a more intense act of beatific vision than another.

Disputatio X: Whether the beatific vision, insofar as it is formally a vital act, is efficiently caused by the light of glory as the principle by which it is produced, or by the intellect alone according to its innate power.

Disputatio XI: Whether acts of believing, hoping, and loving God as the author of grace are supernatural in substance and in the being of nature, or only in their manner and in the moral order.

Disputatio XII: Whether the final disposition to habitual grace proceeds by way of efficient causation from grace itself, or from actual aid alone, that is, from the will elevated by that aid.