De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether a human being in supernatural acts performed through grace is a principal cause in its own order, or only an instrument of God.

I. The first opinion is that a person, or the human will, does not contribute to supernatural acts as a second cause that is principal in its own order, but only as an instrument of God. Certain more recent theologians teach this opinion, and prove it as follows.

First, because, since the act is supernatural in substance and in its entire entity, the will, which is a power of an inferior order, cannot have any connatural power which by its nature produces such an act, either as a total or as a partial cause. Therefore, it does not contribute to supernatural acts as a principal second cause, but only as an instrument of God who elevates it.

Second. The will does not have from itself any natural power for supernatural acts, but only an obediential potency. For if it had some natural power, at least an incomplete one, for those same acts, it would also have a connection with the order of grace that was in some way connatural to it or owed to it by reason of its nature; and consequently supernatural concurrence from God would be owed to it, because every natural active power, even if it is only incipient¹, demands from the author of nature concurrence and a proportionate complement so that it can operate. But the consequence cannot be admitted, for then grace would not be grace if it were owed in any way. Therefore.

Third. The will in these acts operates only insofar as it is elevated to a higher order of operations and effects, which are in no way owed to it by its nature. But whenever a creature operates in this way, it does not act as a principal cause but as an instrument of the cause that elevates it, since it does not act by its own power but by another's, just as the created intellect is elevated to see God. For, according to St. Thomas, a principal cause differs from an instrumental cause in this: the principal cause acts through its own form proportionate to the effect, whereas an instrument acts through another's power and insofar as it is moved by the principal agent. Therefore.

This is confirmed. Water heated by fire contributes only as an instrument of fire to heating another body, because it does not produce this effect through its own connatural form, but through a form communicated from outside by an agent and exceeding the whole natural power of the water itself. But a supernatural form, namely, grace and special help, exceeds the whole natural power of created free choice much more than heat exceeds the natural power of water. Therefore, etc.

II. Fourth, an argument is made in favor of this opinion. A created principal cause, whether it acts naturally or freely, has a limited terminus beyond which it cannot tend, both as regards species and intensity, as is clear of every created agent with respect to acts connatural to it. But the intellect and will, and consequently a human being, have no limited terminus of intensity in supernatural actions, but can elicit acts more and more perfect without limit. Therefore.

Fifth. The holy Fathers usually call free choice an instrument of divine grace, and simply deny that it is the principal agent in the work of salvation, when they assert that God is the one who principally disposes a person for grace. For it is not a person who principally disposes himself for justification. Therefore.

This is confirmed. For if man is a principal cause eliciting the ultimate disposition for grace, it would follow that he is a principal cause of grace. The consequent is contrary to St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 112, art. 1, and to all theologians. Therefore. The inference is proved: whoever is the principal cause of the ultimate disposition is also the principal cause of the form that follows upon it. Therefore, if man's free choice is a second principal cause eliciting the ultimate disposition for grace, it follows that it is a second principal efficient cause of grace.

III. The second opinion distinguishes between free choice elevated by a supernatural habit and free choice elevated by special help alone. It says that when it is elevated by a habit, it truly is a second principal cause of supernatural vital operations; but if it is elevated by special help alone, it will not be the principal cause of those acts, but only their instrumental cause. Master Bañez seems to adhere to this opinion in 2. 2. q. 24, art. 6, doubt 2, to the seventh argument. In support of it there is the following.

Sixth argument, by which this author is persuaded. For when free choice is elevated only by special help, it does not have in itself a formal principle by which it is established in first act so that it is a proportionate cause for producing a greater intensity of the act. Nor does it suffice to answer that God creates this proportion through his help, since divine help alone, by which he concurs with second causes, does not effect a proportion between effect and second cause unless that cause itself has a proportionate principle in itself, as is clear inductively in all causes with which God concurs for their effects. But when we find an effect more excellent than the formal principle of the second cause, we attribute that excellence to the higher agent and regard the lower as an instrument. For example, when an artisan, by moving a paintbrush, succeeds in shaping an image, the paintbrush is said to be only an instrument of the artisan. Therefore, if free choice is elevated by divine motion alone to supernatural acts, they cannot be attributed to man as a principal cause, but only as an instrument.

This is confirmed. If someone having a habit of charity at degree five produces an act at degree six, that greater intensity of the act is not efficiently produced by the habit of charity at degree five elevated by divine motion, but by the power elevated by the habit of charity at degree six, which is increased at the same instant. For otherwise the preexisting habit would be only an instrumental cause of an act of charity at degree six with respect to that greater intensity of the act above the habit. Therefore, for free choice not to be a pure instrument but a second principal cause of supernatural acts, it is necessary that it be elevated by a supernatural habit in order to produce those acts; it is not enough for it to be elevated by divine motion.

IIII. The third opinion belongs to others who think that this question is only about a manner of speaking and that the authors on both sides agree in reality. For, they say, they acknowledge that man's rational powers do not attain supernatural acts by their own power, do not have any innate activity or proportion for them, and are elevated by grace or by infused habits and other such things. They differ because some say that the nature of a principal cause requires its own proper and proportionate power, or a power of a higher order than the effect; others deny this to be necessary if there are other conditions proper to a principal agent, such as that it acts rather than is acted upon, that it determines itself to act, and the like. Hence they judge the first opinion probable, although they say the contrary opinion is more to be approved as a manner of speaking.

V. But the first opinion has always seemed improbable to us, and we think the difference is not merely one of terminology or manner of speaking, but concerns the thing itself. For clarity it should be considered that every second cause, even a principal one, has in a certain general respect the character of an instrument in relation to God with respect to the effect it produces,² insofar as it produces in the effect the very being that it attains only insofar as it is an instrument of God, since the most universal effect, such as being, must be attributed to the most universal cause, as Bañez shows in 1 p. q. 8, art. 1, ad 6. St. Thomas also shows this in Book 2 Against the Gentiles, chapter 21. Moreover, no second cause produces a particular effect unless it is moved by God, as is clear from what was said above.³ Therefore, in the present case we are not speaking of an instrumental cause in this general sense; for everyone acknowledges that man's free choice is in some way an instrument of God not only in relation to supernatural acts but also in relation to natural acts, although it is a free instrument. For St. Thomas speaks this way in q. 24 de veritate, art. 1, ad 5, where he says⁴ that an instrument is said in two ways. In one way, properly, when something is moved by another in such a way that the mover does not confer on it a principle of that kind of motion, as a saw is moved by a carpenter; and an instrument of this kind is devoid of freedom. In another way, whatever is moved by another is called an instrument more commonly, whether it has in itself a principle of its own motion or not. In this way the character of freedom need not be wholly excluded from an instrument, because something can be moved by another and yet move itself; and so it is with the human mind. And in Book 3 Against the Gentiles, chapter 100, in the second argument, he says: Since God is the first agent, all things that are after him are as it were certain instruments of his. He says the same in his commentary on the tenth chapter of Isaiah, on the words Assyria is the rod of my fury, and the staff itself is. And in Opusc. 20, On the Governance of Princes, book 3, chapter 8. Therefore, the difficulty concerns an instrument taken properly and strictly, namely, something moved by another in such a way that the mover does not confer on it a principle of that kind of motion, as a saw is moved by a carpenter and a staff by a man's hand.

VI. Second, it should be noted that a principal secondary cause differs from a purely instrumental cause in this way: a principal secondary cause contributes something through its own form to the production of an effect, for it produces the effect from an intrinsic active principle, whether that principle is connatural to it or produced by a supernatural agent. For through a supernatural form inherent in it and proportionate to the effect, it attains that effect. An instrumental cause, however, contributes nothing to the production of an effect through its own form, not even at the root; it is related to the effect only as a bearer of the power of the principal agent. Hence it produces an effect only insofar as it is moved by that same principal agent. Thus heated water attains only instrumentally the heat that it produces in another subject, because it is related only as a subject bearing the power of fire, which is the principal cause of that same heat, and it attains the heat only insofar as it is moved by fire. Hence St. Thomas says in question 4 on Evil, article 3, body, that an effect is in the principal cause according to the likeness of its form or, if the cause is univocal, according to a form of the same species, as when a human being generates a human being or fire generates fire; or according to some more excellent form, if the agent is not univocal, as when the sun generates a human being. But in an instrumental cause the effect is present according to the power that the instrument receives from the principal cause insofar as it is moved by that cause. The Holy Doctor explains this in article 4 of the same question, reply to objection 15.

VII. Let the first conclusion, then, be this. The will, or created free choice, elevated through a supernatural habit, produces supernatural acts as an efficient cause, as a true principal secondary cause, and not as a mere instrument of God.⁵ This is the conclusion of St. Thomas, question 24 on Truth, article 1, reply to objection 5, and of all Thomists. I regard it as so certain that I think the opposite improbable. It is proved:

First, by an argument drawn from St. Thomas in the cited question 24 on Truth. An instrument that truly and properly is an instrument is not free to act, since it acts only insofar as someone uses it. Therefore, if created free choice with respect to supernatural acts is a mere instrument and not a principal secondary cause, it follows that it does not freely perform those same acts. But this consequence must not be admitted, for it is against the definition of the Council of Trent.⁶ Therefore. It is confirmed: an instrument attains the effect of the principal agent only by bearing its power, just as a saw attains the artifact by bearing the power of the art, or the artisan, which exists intentionally in its instrument, as St. Thomas teaches in question 3 on Power, article 7, reply to objection 7. Therefore, if free choice attains supernatural acts only as a mere instrument and not as a principal secondary cause, it seems to follow that it concurs in producing those same acts only by bearing the power of the principal agent, namely, God. Thus it would be purely passive, like some inanimate thing; but this would be to fall into the error of the heretics of our time, as is clear from what was said above.

Second. In any action some principal cause must be assigned, which the action itself names and to which the effect is principally attributed, just as God is named Creator from creation and an artisan is named a builder from the real construction of the house that he effects through the instruments of his art. But when free choice elevated by a supernatural form produces acts of supernatural faith, hope, and charity, and through them merits eternal life, there is no other principal cause named by these acts than the human being himself or his free choice. Therefore, it truly concurs in those same acts as a principal secondary cause. The minor premise is proved: if another principal cause were assigned, which those actions named, it would be God himself elevating free choice by grace to supernatural acts. But God is not named or called formally a meritorious agent, understanding, or willing on account of such actions. For meriting is incompatible with God according to the divine nature, since it is impossible for him to have a superior from whom he merits; moreover, all goods are proper to him and owed to him by the title of creation. Likewise, he is not said to understand or will from the act of understanding or willing that is in us, but from what is in God himself, which is also really and formally identified with the divine essence. Therefore.

VIII. Third. It belongs to the character of a vital act that it proceed from an intrinsic, living, and conjoined principle. Hence generation, because it is a vital action, is defined by St. Thomas as the origin of a living thing from a conjoined living principle, in the likeness of its nature.⁷ But a person's understanding and willing, even when supernatural, are truly vital actions. Therefore, they must proceed from an intrinsic, living, and conjoined principle; consequently, a person contributes as an efficient cause to supernatural acts through some intrinsic principle, namely, through the vitality of a power elevated by a supernatural form in the manner explained above. Consequently, he will be a principal second cause. They reply⁸ that acting in the manner of an instrument is not incompatible with a vital act, because God can elevate each faculty in a manner suited to it; thus he elevates a vital power to effect an act immanent in it and as its intrinsic principle, which suffices for the character of a vital act, whether such a power contributes by its natural power or by an obediential potency, and as an instrument. This solution nevertheless seems insufficient. For, although God can elevate each faculty in a manner suited to it, as he elevates the free action of a priest speaking the words of consecration over the required matter so that, purely instrumentally, they effect the conversion of bread and wine into Christ's body and blood, it is nevertheless impossible for him to elevate a vital power so that it purely instrumentally produces a vital act immanent in it. This is shown as follows: an effect does not have a formal and intrinsic dependence on a purely instrumental cause, since it does not contribute to the principal agent's effect through a form or power proper to itself and proportionate to the effect, but through the motion and elevation of the principal agent. Hence, when the agent has infinite power, as God does, he can by absolute power use any instrument indifferently for any effect, and cause the same effect immediately by himself without any instrument. But it is clear that a vital act, even one of the supernatural order, cannot be produced by God except through a vital power elevated by the help of grace. Therefore, it is impossible for a vital power to be a purely instrumental cause in relation to that same act. Therefore, it must be said that it is a principal cause. Moreover, the same solution is attacked because its statements seem to entail a contradiction. On the one hand, it admits that God elevates a vital power through grace to effect an act immanent in it, as its intrinsic principle; on the other hand, it denies that the vital power is a principal second cause of that same act. These two positions cannot cohere, as was shown.

IX. Fourth. As St. Thomas teaches in the passages cited above, but especially in On Truth, question 24, article 1, reply to objection 5, a purely instrumental cause is properly one that is moved by another external agent but does not move itself from an intrinsic principle. But the free choice of a human being is not moved by God to produce supernatural acts in such a way that it does not move itself from an intrinsic principle. Therefore, either one must assert that a person's free choice is not the free cause of supernatural acts, which cannot be admitted, or one must say that it is a principal second cause and not properly an instrument with respect to those same acts. This is confirmed: as St. Thomas says in Part I, question 105, article 4, reply to objection 2, and as we will show expressly in disputation 96, to be moved voluntarily is to be moved from oneself,⁹ that is, from an intrinsic principle. But that intrinsic principle can be from another external principle, and thus being moved from oneself is not incompatible with being moved by another. And in the response to the third objection he adds: If the will were moved by another in such a way that it were not moved from itself in any respect, the works of the will would not be imputed to merit or demerit. But because being moved by another does not exclude its being moved from itself, as was said, the character of merit or demerit is not removed. By these words he teaches plainly that the will is not free, and consequently its works cannot be imputed to it as merit or demerit, unless it is moved from itself, that is, from an intrinsic principle. Therefore, if it is moved by God to supernatural acts in such a way that it is not moved from itself, that is, from an intrinsic principle, it follows that it is not free with respect to supernatural acts, and consequently merits nothing through those same acts. Therefore, it must be said that a will aroused and moved by God moves itself from an intrinsic active principle and consequently is a principal second cause of those same acts in its own order.

They reply to this argument that it is no obstacle to a free act for the will to contribute to it properly as an instrument when it is supernatural. They give this reason: only two things are necessary for a free act. The first is an intrinsic power to act; the second is a power not to act. The latter belongs to the will from itself even with respect to supernatural acts, and as regards this part it can be said that the act's freedom comes from the will as its principal cause, because the power not to act, from which the act is denominated free in this respect, belongs to the will through its own power. Thus, if it lacks the act, this lack is attributed principally to it. But as regards the other part, namely, the power to act, it suffices for freedom that the will have a power sufficient to elicit its act vitally, whether it can do so from itself or through friends, that is, as a free instrument of divine grace. From this they infer that, although the will operates as an instrument of God in these supernatural acts, it is nevertheless a free instrument and a true free cause of those same acts.

But there is a conclusive argument against this answer. For according to the Catholic faith, the will is free not only in not performing supernatural acts but also in performing those same acts, as is clear from the Council of Trent cited above and from the definition of a free power, which, as will be clear below, necessarily requires the power or faculty for either course, namely, to act or not to act.¹⁰ Therefore the will must be moved from itself, that is, from an intrinsic principle, not only when it does not act, or wills not to perform a supernatural act, but also when it performs that act. Further, if for the power to act it sufficed for freedom that the will itself have a power sufficient to elicit its act vitally, it would follow that it is no freer to produce the acts of charity it elicits on the way than it is to love God clearly seen in the heavenly homeland. Thus it would not now have sufficient freedom to merit through an act of charity, for in beatific love there is not sufficient freedom to merit, since that act is absolutely necessary, as was said above. The inference is proved: in the heavenly homeland the will truly has the power to elicit an act of beatific love vitally. Therefore, if this power suffices for the freedom of an act of love, the act of love of God in the heavenly homeland and on the way will be free with the same freedom. Further, an act can be vital and yet not free, as is clear in the first spontaneous acts of the intellect and will and in the cognition and love by which God knows and loves himself. For more is required for a free act than for a vital act. Therefore the power to elicit its act vitally is not sufficient for it to produce it freely with the freedom necessary for merit or demerit.

X. Fifth, the same point is proved by destroying the chief foundation of the contrary opinion. For from this it proves that the will is not a second principal cause of supernatural acts but only an instrumental cause: in itself it has no active power with respect to those acts, but only an obediential potency, according to what Augustine says: The ability to have faith belongs to human nature.¹¹ But this reasoning presupposes what is false. Therefore. The minor premise is proved: although the intellect and will in themselves have no natural proximate active power in relation to supernatural acts, nevertheless they have a radical activity with respect to those same acts insofar as they are vital. For the vitality of supernatural actions, although formally it comes from a supernatural principle as that by which it is produced,¹² nevertheless depends radically on natural life, which proceeds from the soul, as was shown in disputation 64. This dependence is sufficient for vital powers elevated by a supernatural form to be second principal causes of supernatural actions, as was said above and will become clearer in the answers to the arguments. Therefore.

This is confirmed. If the intellect and will in themselves had no radical and remote activity in relation to supernatural vital actions, but only a certain obediential potency, such as is found in all things, so that in them and from them whatever God wills may be made, it would follow that just as God uses the intellect and will to produce supernatural acts, he could indifferently use any other creature or created power to produce the same acts. Thus, by means of a stone, the power of sight, or any other natural thing, he could produce an act of supernatural charity and faith, which is absurd. The inference is proved: just as God uses baptismal water to cause habitual grace, by his absolute power he can indifferently use any other creature and created action to produce the same effect, since water concurs only instrumentally in producing grace. Therefore, if the will concurs only instrumentally in producing a supernatural act, it follows that God can produce the same act through any other creature or power. It would also follow that free choice elevated by the habit of charity reaches an act of charity in no other way or genus of cause than the sacraments of the New Law effect justifying grace, for the sacraments too reach grace instrumentally. But this consequence is absurd, for otherwise in justification free choice would be altogether as if lifeless, which is nevertheless contrary to the Council of Trent. Therefore.

XI. Sixth. An instrumental cause must, by reason of its own form, have some prior action through which it operates dispositionally toward the effect of the principal agent, as St. Thomas teaches in the first part, question 45, article 5. But in man there can be no prior action, nor can one be imagined, through which he operates dispositionally toward producing supernatural acts. Therefore, with respect to those same acts, he is not an instrumental cause. Since he truly is an efficient cause of such acts, it remains that he is their second principal cause.

Seventh. A natural power concurs as a second principal cause in natural operations proportionate to it, as the power of sight does in seeing. Therefore, a supernatural power too will concur as a second principal cause in supernatural operations proportionate to that power. But through the habit of charity the will becomes a supernatural power of the same order as grace. For, as was said above, supernatural habits, since they are the highest among all habits, attain the character of a power, because the highest of the lowest attains the lowest of the highest. Hence habits of this kind are necessary not only for acting more easily but for acting at all. Therefore the will elevated by the habit of charity will be a second principal cause of supernatural acts of charity, with which it is proportionate.

XII. Second Conclusion. Even if free choice is not elevated through supernatural habits to produce supernatural acts, but through special help and a transient supernatural motion, it will nevertheless be the principal secondary cause of such acts and not a mere instrument.¹³ The conclusion is proved by the arguments we made for the preceding conclusion, which also prove this one conclusively. Moreover, whether the supernatural form by which free choice is actualized and elevated to produce supernatural acts inheres in it permanently or transiently is irrelevant and entirely accidental to whether free choice concurs instrumentally. For, in either way, it is always perfected to produce a supernatural act within the range of its adequate object, as was explained above. Moreover, the supernatural act itself, insofar as it is vital and free, always proceeds at its root from the vitality and freedom of the natural power, namely, free choice, which even by God's absolute power could not be elevated to produce a free act of charity and other similar acts unless by its nature it were a vital and free power. But when it is elevated through a supernatural habit, it truly is the principal secondary cause of those actions. Therefore, it is likewise a principal cause when it is elevated through a premotion or special help.

It is confirmed. Otherwise it would follow that all supernatural dispositions preceding the infusion of a habit in time, such as attrition, fear of hell, pious desires, and other such vital and free acts that truly are supernatural, would not be produced by a human being as a principal secondary cause but only as an instrumental cause. For free choice is not elevated through a supernatural habit to produce these acts, but through special help. Therefore, if a habit is necessary for it to be the principal cause of supernatural acts, it follows that it is not the principal but the instrumental cause of these acts.

XIII. To the first argument it is answered that the created will does not have any connatural power that by its nature is a proximate and formal efficient cause producing a supernatural act, either as a total or as a partial cause. Nevertheless, it must be said that it has a connatural, radical, and remote power by which, given its elevation through an active supernatural form, it effects supernatural acts as a principal secondary cause, total within its own order. Therefore, when elevated, it does not concur only as an instrument of God who elevates it but as a proximate principal cause.

To the second it is answered that in the created will there is a twofold potentiality in relation to God as author of grace.¹⁴ One is in relation to the supernatural habits that God can produce in the will. This is a passive and not an active obediential potency; for under this aspect the will is only a power to receive a habit from God, not to produce it. Therefore, God's supernatural concurrence cannot be owed to it, since such concurrence, being ordered to acting, is conferred only on an active power. The other is a power to perform a supernatural act. This power is either remote, as is found in rational nature itself when considered in itself, and supernatural concurrence from God is not owed to such an active power, because it is not ordered immediately to acting. Rather, a supernatural habit or a special actual help mediates between it and the supernatural act, by which it immediately and proximately becomes powerful to produce such an act. Or the power to perform a supernatural act is proximate; even then, however, God's concurrence, by which it is moved and predetermined to act actually, is not owed to it, since this motion and predetermination are conferred freely by God and cannot be preceded or merited by a human being, even a righteous one, as was said above. But if God in his mercy wishes to premove a righteous person, predetermine him to act piously, and bring it about that he acts, then the supernatural concurrence by which God concurs with free choice in a supernatural act will be proportionate to him according to the order of grace. Hence it does not follow that grace is owed to nature.

To the third it is answered that, although the active supernatural form by which the will is elevated to elicit supernatural acts does not come from nature but from the author of grace, it nevertheless formally actualizes the created will and perfects it in conformity with its nature and in the order of something contained within the range of its adequate object. Thus, when elevated in this way, it performs supernatural acts as a principal cause. The same should be said of the intellect elevated by the light of glory to the beatific vision.

XIV. Second, it is answered that a creature can operate as elevated and moved by a superior agent in two ways. First, the motion and elevation may be the entire formal and proximate as well as radical and remote reason for attaining an effect, as when water heated, moved, and elevated by fire heats a hand.¹⁵ For, in itself, water has no activity, even radical and remote, with respect to heating; rather, by its nature, it is a principle of cooling. Then it contributes only instrumentally. Second, the elevation may indeed be the entire proximate and formal reason for operating, but still presupposes in the power being elevated a radical and remote active power, which through the elevation is constituted as a proximate power in comparison with an object that, although it exceeds the power's nature, is contained within the breadth of its adequate object. Then the power that operates as elevated contributes to the act as a principal second cause and not as a mere instrument. In this way the intellect elevated by the light of glory performs the beatific vision, and the will performs an act of charity when elevated by the habit of charity or by special help. When it is argued that, according to St. Thomas, a principal cause is one that acts through its own form proportionate to the effect, it is answered that by its own form he does not mean only the form belonging to a thing from the proper principles of its nature,¹⁶ but also one which, although it is above its nature and inheres in it from an external agent, nevertheless perfects the power in the manner of its own nature and in relation to its own adequate object and operation. For the motion of an instrument does not perfect it in relation to its own operation, but to the proper operation of another agent, namely, to produce the work proper to the craftsman. Likewise, water heated by fire is not moved through the fire's motion toward its own operation, but toward the proper effect of another agent, namely, the fire that elevates it to heat; therefore, it is not the principal cause of this effect, but purely instrumental. Since, then, the habit of charity perfects the will in relation to its own operation, which is willing and loving, and such an act cannot be produced by any power other than the will, when the will operates through such a habit it is judged to operate through its own form proportionate to the effect. Consequently, it produces that act as a principal second cause and not as a mere instrument. This makes clear the response to the confirmation.

To the fourth it is answered that every created principal agent indeed has an act determinate as to the genus or species of action, but its act need not be determinate as to intensity. Otherwise, a natural act of love for God would not be from a human being as a principal second cause. For, as St. Thomas teaches in II–II, question 24, article 7, charity can always be increased infinitely; the same must be said of other acts of virtue, which can grow infinitely as regards intensity.

XV. To the fifth it is answered that, as St. Thomas says in On Truth, question 24, article 1, reply to objection 4,¹⁷ the first cause is said to be principal simply speaking because it contributes more to the effect; but the second cause is principal in a certain respect insofar as the effects are more conformed to it. In this way the holy Fathers who say that free choice is an instrument of divine grace speak of an instrument in a certain general sense, as was said above. Likewise, when they deny that free choice is a principal agent in the work of our salvation, they speak of an agent that is principal simply and in every way, insofar as free choice is distinguished from a principal agent that acts without itself being acted upon or moved by another. For in this way God alone is the principal agent, even with respect to supernatural acts by which a person is disposed for grace; for free choice is in some way an instrumental agent with respect to those same acts, as was said above. Or the Fathers are to be explained as speaking of a principal agent with respect to justifying grace and supernatural habits, of which God alone is the principal efficient cause; for free choice contributes only dispositively to producing those habits, or at most instrumentally, as happens when contrition is elevated by the sacrament of penance to cause grace in the soul.

To the confirmation it is answered that, although a person's free choice, moved and aroused by God, is a principal second cause of the final disposition for grace, it is nevertheless not a principal second cause of grace, for the reason assigned in disputation 66, no. 12, and moreover because God's help, like a habit, does not perfect a power for producing another habit, such as grace, but for producing an act.

To the sixth, the antecedent is denied. To its proof, it is answered through what was said in the second conclusion. And if the argument proved anything, it would conclude that free choice is not even an instrumental cause of supernatural actions. For divine help too, by which God concurs with second causes, does not formally constitute the cause itself under the aspect of an instrument, since this general concurrence is common to second causes, both principal and instrumental. It is therefore answered that when divine help, by which God concurs with second causes, is general, it does not effect a proportion between effect and second cause unless the cause itself has a proportionate principle in itself. But when the help is special and is given to a vital power for acts contained under the universal aspect of its own adequate object, as happens in the case of our disputation, then divine help effects a proportion between effect and second cause, namely, the vital power, which through that help is first elevated to supernatural being and established proximately under the aspect of a power in relation to supernatural acts, when the help finds that power not already elevated by a habit. For then special help supplies the role of the habit in this respect. The case is not the same as that of the paintbrush moved by an artisan to shape an image, as is clear from what was said in the second conclusion and in the answer to the third argument.

XVI. To the confirmation, the antecedent is denied. For it was already shown above that the greater intensity of an act of charity above the preexisting habit cannot be efficiently produced by the habit that is increased at that instant, namely, by the habit at degree six, but by the preexisting habit at degree five, elevated by actual help from God intense to degree six. Nor does it follow from this that, with respect to that greater intensity, free choice informed by the preexisting habit is an instrumental cause, as is clear from what was said above. But an argument is urged against this:¹⁸ if God by his special concurrence were to elevate fire that has heat only at degree eight so that through it he produced something hot at degree ten, then fire would be only an instrumental agent with respect to that greater intensity, because it would not operate through its own form proportionate to the effect, but through the motion of another agent. Therefore, similarly, when free choice produces a supernatural act or its greater intensity through the motion of special help alone, it will be an instrumental and not a principal cause in relation to that same act or its intensity. The inference is denied in the answer.¹⁹ For fire, since it is a natural agent, is by its nature determined to one thing both as to the species of its action and as to its intensity, and it is not a vital power. Therefore, if it is elevated to an effect more intense than its own natural form, it will concur in it only as a pure instrument, if the effect is considered according to the greater intensity in which it exceeds the natural form of fire. But free choice is a free agent and a vital power. Hence, however God elevates it through something inhering in it so that it produces a free act, it will always be a second principal cause with respect to that same act, as was said.