De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether acts of believing, hoping, and loving God insofar as he is the author of grace are supernatural in substance and in the being of nature, or only as to their manner and in the moral order.

I. A similar difficulty is usually disputed under other terms in I–II, question 62, namely, whether acts of an infused virtue and an acquired virtue concerning the same matter differ substantially in the being of nature. And since from resolving this difficulty it will become clear that the special help of divine grace is absolutely necessary for free choice to elicit such acts, even as regards their substance, I judged it necessary to insert the present disputation among the preceding ones.

The first opinion, then, asserts that acts of believing, hoping, loving, and repenting are supernatural only as to the manner they have in the moral order, but not as to the substance of the act in the being of nature. The theologians who, as I said above,¹ suppose that a person can elicit the aforesaid acts as regards their substance by the powers of nature alone, with God's general concurrence, consequently follow this opinion; and consequently, they hold that the help of grace is necessary only to make those acts supernatural and such as salvation requires. For this plainly entails that the substance of those same acts is not supernatural. The chief foundations of this opinion are these.

First, an argument is made from many passages of St. Thomas in which he seems plainly to teach this opinion. For in On Truth, question 24, article 14, body of the article, he says: There is a certain good proportionate to human nature, and another that exceeds the capacity of human nature; and these two goods, if we speak of acts, do not differ according to the substance of the act, but according to the manner of acting. He teaches the same in the responses to the first and second objections of the same article, where he says that no precept is impossible for a human being to keep, because a person can perform the substance of the act by the power of free choice, and its manner by the gift of grace. And in II–II, question 171, article 2, reply to objection 3, he says that loving God exceeds human nature as to the manner of the act, but not as to its substance. And in book 1 of the Sentences, distinction 17, question 1, article 4, body of the article, he says that through love proceeding from a habit, it is not distinguished whether the act is from an infused habit or an acquired habit. Therefore, St. Thomas holds that acts of infused and acquired charity do not differ according to the substance of the act, but only according to its manner.

Second, it is argued as follows. An act of infused charity is not purely supernatural. Therefore, it is natural with respect to the substratum or substance of the act. The antecedent is proved: if it were purely supernatural, it could not be produced by any creature as a principal cause. For St. Thomas, I–II, question 112, article 1, body, proves from this that it entails a contradiction for any creature to be the principal cause of grace, because the gift of grace exceeds every capacity of created nature.

This is confirmed: if the act of charity is purely supernatural, then its principle is purely supernatural. Therefore, the natural power is in no way its principle. The first consequence is proved: as St. Thomas teaches in the single question On the Union of the Word, article 5, body of the article, actions are specified by their principles. Therefore, a purely supernatural action must have a purely supernatural principle.

II. Third. The certainty of infused faith is of the same character as natural certainty. Therefore, the acts will also be of the same character as regards substance. The consequence is proved: the certainty of a habit or act must be of the same order and character as the habit or act itself, just as the certainty of science is scientific and the certainty of opinion is opinion-based. The antecedent is proved because no form is intensified by another of a different species, for intensification occurs when the same form is more deeply rooted in the subject, as St. Thomas teaches in I–II, question 52, article 2, body of the article. But the certainty of natural science is intensified by the certainty of infused faith: for a Christian philosopher is more certain of the proposition “God is one” than a pagan philosopher, because faith and science mutually help one another in matters where they do not conflict, namely, in certainty. Therefore.

Fourth. Things that differ substantially in the being of nature cannot be continuous. But acts of infused and acquired faith are continuous. For example, if a Jew shortly before the instant of the Lord's birth had the assent “Christ will be born” and continued in it without interruption for some time after Christ had been born, that act was from infused faith at first, but after Christ's birth it was from human faith, because infused faith cannot incline toward what is false. Therefore, acts of infused and human faith are not distinguished as to substance in the being of nature.

Fifth. Acts of acquired and infused fortitude or temperance are of the same species as to substance in the being of nature. Therefore acts of acquired and infused faith are too. The inference is proved: for just as an act of infused charity is absolutely supernatural, so is an act of infused fortitude. The antecedent is proved: eating temperately is always of the same species as to substance, whether it proceeds from infused or acquired temperance. Likewise, to face death bravely is of the same species as to substance, whether this act proceeds from infused or acquired fortitude.

Sixth: for it would follow from the contrary opinion that an angel, while he was a wayfarer, infallibly knew by experience that he had the supernatural habit of faith or charity. The consequent is false, for such acts cannot be known with certainty except by divine revelation; otherwise a wayfarer could know with certainty that he is in grace, which is false, as was said above. Therefore. The inference is proved: an angel experienced acts of faith and charity in himself. Therefore, if those acts were not natural as to substance, it was evident to the angel through experience that those same acts were supernatural as to substance, and consequently proceeded from a supernatural principle, namely, from the infused habit of faith and charity.

Seventh. The vitality of a supernatural act of faith and charity is natural. Therefore such acts are natural as to substance. The antecedent is proved: these acts are not vital insofar as they proceed from a supernatural habit, but insofar as they proceed from a natural power joined to the intellectual creature's life, since a habit is not a vital power or intrinsically joined to a principle of life. Therefore.

III. The second opinion is that the elicited acts of the theological virtues are distinguished in species from acts of an acquired virtue concerning the same matter not only in the moral order, or as to their manner, but also in the being of nature and as to substance. Cajetan holds this opinion in 3 p. q. 76, art. 7, after the middle of the commentary, in the section beginning Ad evidentiam, where he says that the natural and the supernatural are both differences of being and differences of the manner of making. For eyes given to a person born blind and wine made at a wedding differed from other eyes and wines as natural and supernatural only as to the manner of coming to be. But charity, the Incarnation of Christ, Christ's being under the Sacrament, the light of glory, and the like differ from natural virtues and other things that we call natural beings under the aspect of supernatural and natural as to the beings themselves. For these are supernatural beings by their own genus, since they can neither be nor become connatural to any being. By these words he seems to have corrected the opinion he held in 2. 2. q. 171, on the solution to St. Thomas's third objection. Master Medina defends the same conclusion in 1. 2. q. 62, art. 2, conclusion 4, where he says: It seems more probable and more consonant with divine theology that these acts differ also in the genus of nature, according to substance. Therefore, for the resolution of the difficulty, let the following be stated.

IIII. First conclusion. An act of any theological virtue differs as to substance and in the being of nature from an act of an acquired virtue concerning the same matter, which can be had from the powers of nature alone.² This conclusion is proved. The substance of an act is taken from its formal object. But acts of infused and acquired charity have different formal objects, for, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2. q. 62, art. 2, in the body, the object of the theological virtues is God himself, who is the ultimate end of things, insofar as he exceeds the cognition of our reason; but the object of an acquired virtue is something that can be comprehended by human reason. Therefore. It is confirmed: the formal aspect of a theological virtue is supernatural and divine, whereas the formal aspect of an acquired virtue is purely natural. Therefore, they are distinguished by their formal objects and consequently specifically, even in the being of nature. This conclusion can be proved second by all the arguments by which it was shown above that man cannot elicit an act of faith, hope, charity, or contrition without the help of grace.³ But if such acts were not supernatural as to substance but natural, they could be produced from the powers of nature without the help of grace. Therefore.

V. It is proved third: for, as Master Medina proves in the first conclusion from the Councils of Milevis, Orange, and Africa, and from the common opinion of the holy Fathers, supernatural help from God is absolutely necessary for believing, hoping, and loving, and in general for every act of a theological virtue, so that it is not required only as to the manner of the work.⁴ We also proved this above in disputations 49 and 51. Therefore it must not be said that the substance of those same acts is purely natural. The inference is proved: if the substance of those acts were purely natural, special help would certainly not be absolutely necessary for believing, hoping, and loving God as to the substance of the act.

It is proved second: the supernatural manner is included intrinsically in the substance and essence of an act of a theological virtue, since virtues of this kind are per se infused by God and supernatural. But according to the definition of the Councils, an act of every theological virtue is supernatural as to the aforesaid manner. Therefore it is also supernatural as to the substance of the act.

VI. To the first argument it is answered that St. Thomas expressly teaches our opinion, as was shown above, and nowhere suggested the opposite. To the passage cited from question 24 on Truth it is answered that he is speaking of an exterior act, as is gathered from his replies to objections 1 and 2 of the same article, for precepts are given concerning exterior acts. Such acts, like an exterior confession of faith, although they come under the direction of the theological virtue of faith, nevertheless do not exceed the capacity of nature as regards the substance of the act. For the entitative nature of an exterior confession of faith is the same in physical species whether it is made by a Christian from a supernatural motive or by a heretic for some human motive. The other passage cited from II–II has already been answered fully above, in disputation 51, number 14.

VII. To the final passage from book 1 of the Sentences it is answered that, although an act of a theological virtue and an act of a human virtue concerning the same matter differ according to the substance of the act, nevertheless, because of the similarity between them, a human being cannot, apart from divine revelation, know infallibly that the act of charity he produces is supernatural, or discern whether it proceeds from an infused or acquired habit, as St. Thomas teaches in the same article 4.⁵ Master Soto teaches the same in book 1 of On Nature and Grace, chapter 22, corollary 3. Indeed, as some serious authors teach, the habits of faith and other per se infused habits cannot be known evidently according to their ultimate difference except through the beatific vision,⁶ because the light of faith, like the habits of grace and charity, is in a way a seed of glory. Hence, just as the power of a seed cannot be known distinctly and evidently unless its fruit is known distinctly and evidently, so God's grace, charity, or faith cannot be known distinctly and evidently unless eternal life is known evidently.

To the second it is answered that one can concede in this sense that an act of infused charity is purely supernatural: namely, because the natural power cannot attain it, even as regards the substance of the act, unless it is elevated by help or by a supernatural habit.⁷ Certainly, if a natural power had in itself some activity with respect to the substance of a supernatural act of faith or charity, it could happen that, other things being equal on the part of the supernatural habit and divine help, a person with a more perfect natural power would produce a more intense supernatural act of faith, charity, or beatific vision. Yet this must not be admitted, as was shown in disputation 63. To the argument brought forward against this from St. Thomas it is answered that it applies to habits, but not to acts. The reason for the difference is that before a habit, which exceeds the whole capacity of nature, no supernatural principle can be understood to exist by reason of which a human being is in act so as to produce a supernatural habit as a principal cause. But before a supernatural act, special help or a supernatural habit is understood to exist in the power, through which a human being acts as the principal cause of supernatural acts of faith, hope, and charity. Hence the cases are not alike.

Someone might say that, although a person who has the habit of grace and charity cannot produce a supernatural habit in himself⁸, there nevertheless seems to be no incompatibility that would prevent him from producing it in another as a principal cause, for he already has a supernatural principle by which he is in act. It is answered that grace is not immediately an operative habit. Charity and the other infused habits do indeed have the character of an operative principle and a producer of acts, but not of habits.⁹ Hence, if God were to use the habit or act of charity existing in Peter to produce a habit of charity in Paul, Peter would be only the instrumental cause of such a habit, not its principal efficient cause.

To the confirmation it is answered that it proves only that a natural power does not concur in any way in a supernatural act except as elevated by some supernatural active principle. Yet, thus elevated, it truly concurs actively in the same act as the proximate principal cause, as will become clear below, in disputation 68.

VIII. To the third it is answered that the certainty of knowledge is not properly and formally intensified through the certainty of faith, but only on the part of the subject, just as things belonging to a lower order are perfected through conjunction with things belonging to a higher order. To the objection it should be said that, other things being equal, a Christian philosopher is not more certain in intensity, with natural certainty, of this truth, “God exists,” than a pagan philosopher; he is certain only more extensively,¹⁰ namely, in more ways about that truth. For when natural demonstration is lacking, the light of faith remains in the Christian, by which he remains fixed in that truth, but this does not apply to a pagan philosopher.

To the fourth it is answered with Medina that many things seem to be continuous to the senses that are not truly continuous, as is clear in a rod whose one half is dry and the other green, and in the motion of a dog falling from a high tower, which motion, if the dog dies on the way, is interrupted, as philosophers commonly say in Physics 4.¹¹ The same should therefore be said in the proposed case: that the act of faith is not continuous, but is interrupted by a change in the object believed. Until the instant of the Lord's birth it is elicited by infused faith; afterward it is produced by human faith. Nevertheless, both acts can be meritorious, as would be the case if that person were in grace and had invincible ignorance of the Lord's birth, which had already in fact taken place.

IX. To the fifth it is answered that, if we speak of the interior act, acts of infused and acquired temperance are of different species, even as regards substance and the being of nature, because they have different formal aspects of the object.¹² But if we speak of the exterior act, they are of the same species in the being of nature, as was said above, although they are distinguished in the moral order. The same occurs with an act of faith and charity, as was said.

To the sixth the consequence is denied. For, as was said above, because natural and supernatural acts of charity are similar, it cannot be known with certainty, without divine revelation, whether that act was elicited by an infused or acquired virtue.¹³ Hence, as Cajetan says, experience of acts, however supernatural they may be, does not infallibly infer experience of the supernatural habits from which they proceed, but only probabilistically.¹⁴ The reason for this is the one Master Báñez assigns: the formal aspect under which supernatural acts are elicited cannot be known infallibly through experience, but only through divine revelation.¹⁵ For that aspect is entirely supernatural and consequently exceeds the whole order of natural cognitive power.

But the argument made presses further. For an angel evidently knows all natural things by its own power. Therefore, since it would not see within the whole order of nature that assent by which it believed God to be three and one, it would evidently know a posteriori that the assent was supernatural as regards substance, and consequently would evidently know that it had some supernatural active principle by whose power it produced that act.

X. To this argument Cajetan responds that species of all things were not implanted in angels, but only species of those things that pertain to the natural order; and therefore they did not know faith and charity through natural cognition unless they had them in themselves, as belonging to them.¹⁶ By these words he seems to grant that each angel knew its own habit of faith, hope, and charity by natural cognition from the beginning, insofar as that habit was an accident belonging to it. St. Thomas teaches the opposite opinion in I–II, question 62, article 1, at the end of the body of the article, where he says that the habits of the theological virtues are imparted only by divine revelation.¹⁷ Therefore, the argument is answered as follows: as will be clear below, an angel did not evidently know that the substance of those acts was not supernatural¹⁸. For although angels evidently know all natural things by the powers of nature when left to their own nature, nevertheless, by his absolute power God could conceal some natural object from them, and the angel did not know whether God in fact used his absolute power with respect to those acts. For this reason it did not evidently know a posteriori that those acts were supernatural as regards substance. For the same reason it did not know evidently by the faculty of nature alone that Christ's humanity subsisted through the substance of the Word, even if it did not see the created substance of that humanity, since in fact it did not have it.¹⁹ But this matter must be discussed more fully below. In the meantime, see Master Medina, introductory question 2 to Part III, in the response to the sixth argument among the objections listed second.

To the seventh argument it is answered that the proximate and formal vitality of the act of faith and every other supernatural act has a supernatural habit or divine motion as the efficient principle by which it is produced, as was shown above.