De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether an intellect that is naturally more perfect, with an equal light of glory¹, produces an act of beatific vision more intense than another.

I. Scotus holds the affirmative part in 4, dist. 49², question 6; Durandus in 3, dist. 14, q. 1, to the final argument; Richard in 4, dist. 49, art. 2, q. 8; John Major in the same distinction, q. 10, ad 2; Olchot in his Determinations, question 8, art. 1, to the fourth; and Cajetan is reported for the same opinion in 3 p. q. 10, art. 4. Some more recent theologians follow it and judge this opinion consonant with the principles of theology and with the truth. This opinion is proved.

First, by the authority of St. Thomas, 3 p., cited art. 4, ad 2, where he says that the degree of beatific vision is considered more according to the order of grace than according to the order of nature. He therefore holds that it is also considered according to the order of nature, although less chiefly; for the comparative more presupposes the positive.

Second, an argument is made. The intellect by its natural power truly concurs actively in beatific vision, as St. Thomas teaches in p. 2, q. 3, art. 2. Therefore it contributes something to that vision. Therefore, other things being equal, the more perfect the intellect, the more perfect will be beatific vision. If it is said that the intellect by its natural power has no proximate activity with respect to beatific vision, but participates in all of it from the light of glory, and that therefore beatific vision must be measured according to the quantity of the light of glory, the contrary is argued as follows.

Third, just as the light of glory is the whole power for seeing God, so the habit of faith is the whole proximate power for believing. For each act exceeds the faculty of nature both as to substance and as to manner, as will be clear below;³ but a better intellect, with an equal light of faith, penetrates the mysteries of faith better and sometimes produces an act more intense than the habit. Therefore, similarly, a more perfect intellect with an equal light of glory will produce a beatific vision more intense than an imperfect intellect.

Fourth. An intelligible species determines the possible intellect and its activity to a certain cognition, just as the light of glory determines the intellect to beatific vision. But a more perfect intellect understands the same object more perfectly with the same species than a less perfect intellect, just as, other things being equal, a stronger and more perfect power of sight sees better with the same visible species. Therefore.

II. Fifth. When two partial causes concur in the same numerically identical effect, the more perfect one of them flows into it more perfectly, and a more perfect effect is produced, as is clear if two luminous bodies are applied to a transparent medium: for they illuminate more perfectly the more perfect one of the luminous bodies is. But the natural power of the intellect and the light of glory concur as two partial causes in beatific vision, for it entails a contradiction that with respect to the same effect there be two particular causes and that each be total. Therefore.

Sixth. If a probable middle term concurs with a demonstrative middle term, an act of knowledge is produced more intensely in proportion to the greater efficacy of the middle term. Therefore an increase in one part of the whole cause contributes to a greater intensity of the effect, even when the effect is above the faculty of some part of such a cause. Therefore a better intellect with an equal light of glory produces a more perfect vision.

Seventh. The beatific vision, insofar as it is formally a vital act, does not proceed from the light of glory but from a natural power according to its natural power. For an act is called vital for this reason: it proceeds from a vital power. But the light of glory is not a vital power; the intellect itself is. Therefore, other things being equal, the more perfect the natural power, the more perfect an act it will produce.

St. Thomas holds the opposite opinion in part I, q. 12, art. 6, reply to objection 3, and Book 3 Against the Gentiles, chapter 58. Master Soto in book 4, distinction 49, question 3, article 2; Medina in I–II, question 3, article 2, doubt 3, reply to the fifth objection; Zumel in the cited disputation 1 of part I, conclusion 2; Master Bañez; and all Thomists hold it. It is so certain that the opposite has no probability at all. To explain it:

III. First, it should be noted that one action can be more perfect than another in two ways. First, intrinsically, because it is more perfect according to the intensity of the act itself or according to another perfection intrinsic to it, such as clarity or something of this kind.⁴ Second, extrinsically, because it is elicited by a more perfect suppositum having a nobler being. In this sense St. Thomas teaches in the Second Part, question 4, article 5, body, that after the resurrection, when the soul is united to the body, the beatific vision of any blessed person will be more perfect than it is now, when the soul is separated from the body. St. Thomas's reason is that, since operation depends on nature, the more perfect the soul is in its nature, the more perfectly it will have its proper operation, especially the operation in which happiness consists.

Second, it should be noted that in adults the quantity of the beatific vision must correspond to the quantity of merits.⁵ This foundation is of faith. For it is defined in the decree of faith of the Council of Florence, where it says: Souls that have been fully purified are immediately received into heaven and clearly behold God himself, three and one, just as he is; yet, according to the difference of merits, one more perfectly than another. This is also gathered from the Apostle, who says: He will repay each according to his works:⁶ the same is said very often in the Gospel. Let the following, then, be set down:

IIII. First conclusion: There is no absurdity in conceding that, by an extrinsic perfection derived from the greater perfection of the suppositum eliciting the beatific vision, a more perfect intellect, with equal light of glory, produces a more perfect act of beatific vision.⁷ This conclusion seems explicit in St. Thomas, the Second Part, cited above, and, as far as I can judge, this alone is what Cajetan intends to teach in the place cited above. Hence he never said that a more perfect intellect can produce a more intense act of beatific vision with equal light of glory, but rather a more perfect one, which can be explained as an extrinsic perfection.

The conclusion is proved by St. Thomas's argument. A soul united to a body has a more perfect being than a separated soul, and likewise one soul has a more perfect individual being than another. But operation follows upon being. Therefore, on the part of the suppositum eliciting it, the beatific vision of one person can be extrinsically more perfect than the beatific vision of another, even if the light of glory is equal. The same argument can be made about an Angel: for if the being of an Angel is nobler than the created being of any soul, then on this account the beatific vision of that Angel will be more perfect than the beatific vision of a human being, other things being equal on the part of the light of glory.

V. Second Conclusion. However perfect an intellect may be, even the intellect of the highest Angel, with equal light of glory it will not see God more perfectly by an intrinsic perfection of the act, derived from the intensity or clarity of the vision.⁸ It is proved.

First, let us suppose that an Angel and a human being have equal light of glory and equal merits, or that there are two human beings with equal merits, but one has the most perfect intellect in natural power while the other has a very imperfect intellect. Here is the argument. All of these, having equal merits, will be given equal light of glory in the heavenly homeland, since that light is given on account of merits. Therefore, if, with equal light, the more perfect intellect by nature sees God more intensely or clearly, it follows that this excess corresponds to nature and not to merits. Thus one would see God more perfectly than another not on account of a difference in merits, since, as we suppose, the merits were entirely equal, but on account of a difference in nature. This seems contrary to the Council of Florence cited above and contrary to the truth, for it would follow that this excess of glory was given neither by grace nor on account of Christ's merits, but proceeded from nature, contrary to Romans 6: But the grace of God is eternal life.

VI. To this argument, which greatly troubles the authors of the contrary opinion, they apply two solutions. The first solution is that, in the case supposed, an angel or human being having a more perfect natural intellect will be given less light of glory than another person of less perfect intellect, because less light of glory suffices for obtaining a reward equal to their merits. Thus, to the degree that one of them surpasses another in natural intellectual power, he will be surpassed by the other in the light of glory; and so an equal beatific vision in them will correspond to equal merits. This solution nevertheless does not seem to hold. First, the light of glory is also given to adults as a reward for merits, since it is the terminus of an operation proceeding from grace. Therefore, if unequal light of glory is given to those having equal merits, then some reward will not be given to adults according to the quantity of their merits, which is contrary to the Council of Florence cited above. Second, otherwise it would follow that, all else being equal, one who has an intellect less perfect than an angel or another person with the most perfect intellect would be in a better condition in the heavenly homeland, for he would have greater supernatural adornment there, since he would be suffused with a greater light of glory. Third, the habits and acts of charity are proportionate to the light of glory in the heavenly homeland. Therefore, if a person with a less perfect intellect is given greater light of glory, he must also be given greater charity, and thus he will love God more than another with a more perfect intellect and equal merits. For since a person with a more perfect intellect is given less light of glory, he must also be given lesser charity. Thus, among two people with equal merits, one would love God more intensely in the heavenly homeland than the other and consequently have greater beatitude, which cannot be admitted.

Having refuted this solution, they apply a second and say that, in the case supposed, equal light of glory will be given to people with equal merits, although one has the most perfect intellect, as an angel does, and the other an imperfect intellect; and their glory will likewise be equal. But this solution adds that it belongs to divine providence, precisely because God decided to lead to his beatitude human beings having unequal natural faculties of intellect and will, and to confer beatitude on them according to the quantity of each one's merits, to compensate for the inequality of their natural powers by his immediate influx, by which together with the light of glory and their powers he acts in their vision, love, and enjoyment. He will do this by acting so much more efficaciously through that influx as suffices for the effects to be equal. Thus, where merits are equal, not only will the essential rewards be equal, but also the light of glory and the habit of charity existing in the will. But this solution does not escape the proposed difficulty. For since the blessed use the light of glory according to the utmost of their power, God's actual assistance must be proportionate to the light of glory; otherwise it would be a miracle, just as it would be a miracle if, with fire having a heating power of eight, God acted only with actual help at six. Therefore, with people having equal light of glory, God acts in the beatific vision with equal actual help. Moreover, by this second solution they do not avoid the inconveniences for which they reject the first solution as insufficient, because according to it some perfection or intensity of beatitude would correspond to nature that did not proceed from grace or from Christ's merits, as is shown in this way. For a more perfect intellect, with equal light of glory, contributes more perfectly to the beatific vision than another less perfect intellect. Therefore, that greater perfection is attributed to the greater natural power of the intellect, since, as we suppose, the light of glory is equal. It also still follows that people with equal merits are given unequal rewards. For, since a just person merits eternal beatitude through good works, he consequently also merits that God act together with his intellect and the light of glory by actual help in the beatific vision. Therefore, if God acts with greater actual help together with a less perfect intellect than he does with a more perfect intellect, when the merits are equal, then one of them is given a greater influx of God as a reward than the other. Thus the rewards remain unequal, and the person with the less perfect intellect will be in the better condition.

Second, the conclusion is proved as follows. As was shown above, the light of glory is the entire proximate power for seeing God. Therefore, the beatific vision cannot be more intense than the light of glory, since otherwise the effect would exceed the power of its cause. Finally, it is proved by all the arguments with which we showed above that it cannot happen that, with equal help of assisting grace, one person acts more intensely and disposes himself for grace better than another.

VII. To the first argument it is answered, first, that it proves only the first conclusion. But insofar as it seems to proceed against the second, it is answered, second, that St. Thomas does not take the adverb more comparatively, but adversatively, as is gathered from his other passages cited above, where he teaches plainly that the quantity of the beatific vision is not considered according to the natural perfection of the intellect, but according to the light of glory. This manner of speaking is quite common, as when it is said that a virtuous life is to be pursued rather than a vicious one. Moreover, it is answered that St. Thomas only wished to signify that some extrinsic perfection of the beatific vision is taken from the greater perfection of the nature eliciting it, on the part of the acting suppositum, in the sense in which he taught in the cited I–II, question 4, article 5, body of the article, that the beatific vision will be more perfect in blessed Peter, for example, after the resurrection, when his soul is united with his body, than it is now when it is separated from his body, as was said in the first conclusion.

To the second it is answered that the intellect, insofar as it is elevated by the light of glory, contributes actively to the beatific vision; for in itself it has no proximate active power. Hence the perfection of the beatific vision must be taken from the perfection of the light of glory and not from the natural perfection of the intellect.

To the third, it is answered that a better intellect with an equal habit of faith does not penetrate what pertains per se to faith better than another with a less perfect intellect, if both use the habit to the utmost of their power.⁹ It is true that a more perfect intellect better penetrates those things that can be known by the light of nature, from knowledge of which obstacles to faith are removed. But when one with a more perfect intellect bursts forth into an act more intense than the habit itself, that greater intensity does not proceed from a greater effort of the power according to its natural power, but from an effort of that same power insofar as it is helped and moved by God through greater supernatural help. In the heavenly homeland, however, since God helps those with equal light of glory and equal merits with equal actual help, they therefore always produce an equal beatific vision.

VIII. To the fourth, the inference is denied, and the reason for the difference is this: a natural species is subordinated to the intellect, since it is as it were its instrumental form in relation to cognition.¹⁰ Therefore, a better intellect elevates the species in a more perfect way and consequently produces a more perfect cognition, just as with the same pen prepared in the same way, one writes better than another because he elevates that instrument better and more perfectly. But the divine essence in the aspect of an intelligible species, and the light of glory, are not properly subordinated to the intellect, because they do not receive their proximate power from it; rather, they communicate that power to it for seeing God clearly. Hence the cases are not alike.

To the fifth argument, it is answered that the intellect and the light of glory are not two partial causes of beatific vision, but total causes subordinated to one another.¹¹¹² For the intellect produces it as that which acts, and the light of glory as that by which it acts. Nor is it unreasonable for there to be two total causes with respect to the same effect when they are subordinated in the aforesaid way, as will be clear in disputation 85.

To the sixth, it is answered that a probable middle term does not make an act of knowledge intrinsically more intense and perfect;¹³ it only confirms that very knowledge as it were from outside and removes obstacles that could impede it, just as a natural argument brought forward for the things of faith confirms faith itself from outside. We say proportionately in the present case that the greater natural perfection of the intellect, other things being equal, does not contribute to making beatific vision intrinsically more perfect, but only extrinsically, as was said.

To the seventh, it is answered that the proximate vitality of beatific vision comes from the light of glory as the principle by which the intellect acts, as will be clear in the following disputation.

By these points the seventh argument made in the preceding disputation remains solved. For we say that, just as the entire intensity of a supernatural act is measured by the quantity of efficacious help, so likewise the entire intensity of beatific vision is measured according to the intensity of the light of glory. Nor does Cajetan or St. Thomas teach the opposite, as is clear from what was said above.

Second, it is answered that, with respect to grace, there are special passages of Scripture, authorities of Supreme Pontiffs, Councils, and holy Fathers that compel us to assert that in the work of his justification man has nothing from himself that he has not received as a gift from preoperating grace, from which he also has the fact that he consents with such or such intensity. But concerning the light of glory and beatific vision there are not so many testimonies as would prove that the perfection of beatific vision is in no way considered according to the natural perfection of the intellect. Hence it is much more false and more improbable to assert that, by reason of a greater effort of free choice, a man elicits a more intense disposition for grace, other things being equal on the part of divine help, than to assert that, with an equal light of glory, an intellect of a more perfect nature sees God more perfectly than another, less perfect intellect. There is an example of this difference in the rational soul and the angel. For although an angel is more perfect according to his nature than a rational soul, it is nevertheless more certain that the rational soul is immortal, or incorruptible, than it is certain that an angel is incorruptible.¹⁴ For there are particular definitions of the Church concerning the rational soul, which are nevertheless not about the angel. Hence one who denied the immortality of the rational soul would be a heretic, but not one who denied that an angel is immortal by its nature; he would err in philosophical principles and likewise err secondarily against the faith.