De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether through acts of charity equal to the preexisting habit, or even through less intense acts, a human being infallibly and under a certain law obtains an increase of habitual grace, charity, and essential glory.

I. Although this disputation is not very necessary for our purpose, because it will nevertheless bring some clarity to what was said in the preceding disputations, for the completion of the teaching and at the insistence of certain people, it seemed fitting to treat it here. The difficulty is this: suppose, for example, that Peter has a habit of grace and charity intensified to eight degrees, and breaks out into several acts of charity or another virtue equal to that habit or less intense than it, and never breaks out into a more intense act. Does he merit through such acts an increase of grace and charity and acceptance for a new degree of essential glory, such that, if he dies in grace, greater or more intense essential glory is infallibly given to him on account of those acts; and at what degree is such an increase conferred on him? To explain this, it should be noted that, as St. Thomas teaches in III, question 7, article 11, grace can be considered in two ways:¹ first, in the being of a habit and quality, according to the physical reality it has; second, in the being of grace, insofar as by it a righteous person is accepted for glory through meritorious good works. Likewise, charity can be considered in the being of a habit and quality, or according to the proper character of charity, that is, friendship with God himself.

II. The first opinion therefore teaches that through any act of charity, even a less intense one, the habit of grace and charity is immediately increased, not only in the being of grace and charity but also in the character of a habit. Consequently, when a meritorious act is more intense than the habit, the habit is increased according to the full extent of the act’s own intensity, and in the same proportion greater essential glory will afterward be given on account of that act. Gabriel, in book 1, distinction 17, question 4, and Major, distinction 22, single question, hold this. But this opinion has absolutely no probability, and Bañez sufficiently refutes it in II–II, question 24, article 6, doubt 2, at the section beginning “Praedicta opinio”.

The second opinion was that of the most learned Master Victoria in his Relection on the Increase of Charity. He teaches that grace is increased meritoriously through less intense acts and greater essential glory is afterward conferred on account of them, but charity is not increased. From this he infers that essential glory is not proportioned according to the quantity of the habit of charity but of grace, and that it is not necessary for grace and charity to have an equal² degree of intensity.

Yet this opinion does not seem to accord with St. Thomas's mind. For the Holy Doctor teaches repeatedly that glory is proportioned to charity and measured according to its quantity; but especially in part I, q. 12, art. 6, body, where he says that one who has more charity will see God more perfectly and be more blessed. In the same article he teaches that the light of glory by which the blessed person sees God is given according to the measure of charity; and in question 95, article 4, body, he says that the quantity of merit can be weighed in two ways: in one way, from the root of grace and charity, and such a quantity of merit corresponds to the essential reward, which consists in the vision of God. For one who acts from greater charity enjoys God more perfectly.

Moreover, this opinion is refuted. Charity is the proper and primary property of grace. Therefore, it is impossible for grace to increase while charity does not increase. The consequence is clear: the more perfect an essence is, the more perfect its property, as is clear in natural things. Further, it would follow that someone is loved more by God while he loves God less. The consequence seems contrary to Proverbs 8, I love those who love me, and John 14, If anyone loves me, he will be loved by my Father, and I will love him and manifest myself to him. By these words it is signified that those who love God more are loved more by God. For charity is mutual friendship, as St. Thomas teaches in II–II, question 23, article 1. The consequence is proved: by grace a human being is loved by God, for grace makes a human being an object of divine love; by charity a human being loves God, for charity makes a human being a lover of God. Therefore, if someone has greater grace than charity, he is loved by God more than he loves God.

III. The third opinion is that grace and charity, even according to their proper character as grace and charity, are increased only through more intense acts. Consequently, however much less intense acts, or even acts equal to the preexisting habit, are multiplied, the habit is in no way increased, nor will a righteous person later obtain more intense essential glory on account of those acts, but only accidental glory. This is Master Bañez's opinion in the cited article 6; in its favor he cites Capreolus, Paludanus, Alexander of Hales, Peter of Bergamo, and St. Vincent Ferrer in a certain sermon for Septuagesima, and he thinks this opinion is explicit in St. Thomas. Some Thomists now follow the same opinion, which Cajetan in I–II, question 114, article 8, and Conrad in the same place also seem to teach. It should be observed, however, that later, in a certain Relection on the Increase of Charity which he published at Salamanca on the eve of Pentecost in 1589, Master Bañez explains his opinion more fully. For he acknowledges that, for less intense acts of charity or even acts equal to the habit, a greater essential reward is given afterward, but not greater essential glory. For it can happen that glory, considered as a reward, is greater than itself considered as glory, as we in fact see in the glory of Christ's soul, which, considered as a reward, is infinite because it was given to him by the rigor of justice, but, considered as glory, is finite, since it is formally something created. The chief arguments for this opinion are the following.

IIII. First, an argument is made from St. Thomas's authority in 1. Sent. dist. 17. q. 2. art. 3., in the body and response to the second objection, where he says that charity is not increased by every act of charity, nor does an increase of reward correspond to every act. In the response to the fifth, he says that an increase of substantial reward does not necessarily follow from a multitude of acts. And in 2. Sent. dist. 27. q. 1. art. 5. ad 2., he says: It is not necessary that every meritorious act merit an increase of grace, because not in every meritorious act is found the condition by which an increase of the habit follows from the act. And in 3. Sent. d. 18. q. 1. art. 2. ad 4., he has these words: The one who merits need not make progress with respect to the reward he merits, so as to make it owed to himself either simply or in some way in which it was not owed to him before. By these words he seems to signify that, for someone to be said to merit essential glory through some act, it is not required that he make a new degree of glory owed to himself; rather, it suffices that he make the same degree of glory, otherwise owed, owed to himself under a new title. Likewise, in 1. Part, q. 12, art. 6, he says that whoever has more charity has more of the light of glory and sees God more. And in q. 95. art. 4., body of the article, he says the quantity of essential reward, which consists in the enjoyment of God, is considered from the root of grace and charity; for whoever does something from greater charity enjoys God more perfectly. But the quantity of accidental reward, which is joy over a created good, is considered from the quantity of the work. Consider the expression “whoever does something from greater charity.” For it signifies that the quantity of merit in relation to essential reward is considered from the intensity of charity itself. Finally, commenting on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 3, on the words Each will receive his reward according to his own labor, he says that one who labors from greater charity, although he undergoes less labor, will receive more of the essential reward.

V. Second, if the contrary opinion were to be held for some reason, it would be chiefly on account of the definition of the Council of Trent in the passages cited below at no. 13. But those passages prove nothing against this opinion. Therefore. The minor premise is proved as follows: the Council's intention in those passages is to define against the Lutherans, who asserted that a just person does not truly merit eternal life or an increase of grace and glory through good works, but that those works are only signs of justification obtained and its fruits. But to preserve that definition it suffices to assert that through some good works a just person merits a new degree of essential glory and an increase of grace and charity, namely through more intense acts, and likewise that through less intense acts he merits the same essential glory under a new title. Therefore, etc.

This is confirmed because Christ our Lord truly merited through subsequent acts; nevertheless, he merited nothing new except what he had merited before through the first act. For since his first act was infinitely meritorious, it had as much merit as all the acts that followed, since nothing greater than the infinite is given. Therefore, similarly, true merit can be preserved in all acts of charity, even less intense ones, although no new degree of essential glory corresponds to them, but the same degree corresponds under multiple titles.

Third, an act of grace and charity contributes not only meritoriously but also physically and dispositively to the increase of the habit. For just as God does not infuse the first grace without a disposition of free choice, so too he does not increase it without a disposition of free choice. But when God infuses first grace into an adult, he infuses it according to the quantity of the disposition. Therefore, similarly, when God increases grace, he increases it according to the quantity of the disposition. Therefore, it is increased only through acts more intense than the habit itself.

VI. Fourth, if grace and charity were increased by every act of charity, even a less intense one, and essential glory likewise, it would follow that they should be increased according to the entire breadth of the meritorious act. For there is no greater reason for an increase by one degree or by two or three than by all the degrees. Accordingly, if someone having grace and charity at ten were to burst into an act at eight, grace would increase up to an intensity of eighteen, and essential glory of an intensity of eighteen would correspond to him; proportionally, the same would have to be said about all subsequent acts of charity. But this seems absurd. Therefore. The minor premise is proved: if this were true, it would follow that one just person who lived in grace for thirty years and always acted with lesser intensity would be holier without qualification and have much greater essential glory than another who lived in grace for only one year, but during that year performed works of charity with great fervor and suffered martyrdom for Christ. This is manifestly proved, for all those less intense acts multiplied over thirty years exceed in quantity the acts that the martyr performed in one year, if the opinion is true that the habit and essential reward increase through less intense acts according to the entire breadth of the act. This is confirmed by comparison with the familiar calculation: if someone gives one grain of wheat on the first day of the year, two on the second, four on the third, eight on the fourth, and continues multiplying proportionally throughout the year, at the end of the year there will be such a multiplication of grains that it will incomparably exceed the number of all grains of wheat found in the whole world. Therefore, the same will hold for the increase of merit. Thus, if on the first day of the year a just person merits as one, on the second merits as two, either by a single act or by several, on the third as four, on the fourth as eight, and so on, at the end of the year he will have grace and charity intensified by so many degrees that they cannot be numbered by all the grains of wheat in the world. Therefore, to avoid this absurdity, it must be said that grace and charity are not increased by every act of charity, but only by acts more intense than the habit.

VII. Fifth. If grace and charity were increased through less intense acts, it would follow that grace, charity, and essential glory would also be increased on account of a longer continuation of an act; and thus greater glory would correspond to an act according to the longer time for which it is continued. The consequent is false. Therefore. The inference is proved: otherwise the man who continues an intense act of charity, one in intensity, for one whole hour would be in a worse condition than another who interrupts that same act and successively produces three acts of charity, each one in intensity, during that hour. For if grace and charity are not increased on account of continuation, only a reward of one would be given to the intense act of one continued for one hour; but a reward of three would be given to the other, who interrupts the act, because he produced three acts. The falsity of the consequent is proved: otherwise it would follow that there was no proportion between the merit of an act of charity that lasts only for one instant and the reward of an act that lasts for some time. It is proved as follows: there is no proportion between an instant and time, for any time exceeds one instant infinitely, since in any time and in any part of it there are infinitely many instants. Therefore, one who produces an act of charity and continues it for some time would obtain infinitely greater essential reward than another obtains on account of that same act if it lasted for only one instant.

First confirmation. To every instant some essential reward corresponds exactly, since the merit of charity can exist in an instant. But in any period of time there are infinitely many instants. Therefore an act of charity lasting for some period of time would have an infinitely intense reward corresponding to it. Second confirmation. If someone produced two meritorious acts in two discontinuous instants of one hour, he would double his merit and merit twice as much as in one instant. Therefore, if he continues an act of charity for a whole hour, he will obtain an infinitely greater reward, if it is true that the merit of an act is increased on account of its continuation.

VIII. Sixth. When someone rises from sin through penance, his prior grace and all the good meritorious works he had done before sin, when he was in grace, truly and properly revive through penance. And yet no new degree of grace or essential glory is given for them; rather, the same degree of glory corresponding to the penance by which he rises is given only under a new title. Therefore, similarly, through multiplied acts of charity that are equal or less intense, no new degree of essential glory will be given, but the same degree under a new title, although all those acts truly are meritorious of an increase of grace and glory. The inference holds by parity of reasoning, and the antecedent is proved from the Council of Trent, session 6, On Justification, chapter 7, where it says that when a sinner turns to God through penance he receives justice: Each his own, according to the measure that the Holy Spirit distributes to each as he wills, and according to each person's proper disposition and cooperation. Therefore the penitent who turns to God receives grace and charity only according to the measure of his present disposition and cooperation, not according to the measure of his prior merits. For prior merits are not dispositions by which the penitent cooperates in his justification, since they have already preceded. Therefore the same glory corresponds to them under a new title.

The same antecedent is confirmed by the explicit authority of St. Thomas, 3 p. q. 89, art. 5, ad 3, where he says that one who rises through penance in greater charity will indeed attain essential reward according to the measure of the charity in which he is found; nevertheless he will have greater joy over the works done in the first charity than over the works he did in the second, and this pertains to accidental reward. St. Thomas therefore holds that in such a case no new essential reward is given on account of prior works made alive again through penance, but only accidental reward; nevertheless, the same degree of essential glory is given under a new title.

The same is confirmed a second time: for if a new degree of grace and glory were given to the penitent on account of deadened works, it would follow that the penitent always rises again in greater grace than he had before sin. The consequent is contrary to St. Thomas in 3 Sent., distinction 35, question 1, article 4, subquestion 3, and 3 p. q. 89, art. 2, where he proves expressly that the penitent sometimes rises again in greater grace than he previously had, sometimes in equal grace, and sometimes even in lesser grace. Therefore. The inference is proved: if through penance all the grace and merits that a man had before sin are restored to him, and besides them a new degree of grace is given on account of his present contrition, by which he rises, according to the measure of that same contrition, it clearly follows that he has greater grace than before, for he has that grace and something more.

IX. The fourth opinion, which is common among more recent Thomists, asserts that although grace and charity are not increased in the being of the habit except when a man bursts forth in a more fervent act, they are nevertheless increased in the being of grace and charity even through equal acts and likewise through less intense acts, so that in the heavenly homeland a new essential glory corresponds to them. They prove this by arguments that will be brought forward below in support of this opinion.

To resolve this difficulty, it should first be assumed that, just as God alone is the efficient cause of grace and charity, so too God alone is the efficient cause of their increase; but through our acts they are increased meritoriously and dispositionally, because through them we merit that God increase grace and charity, and through those same acts we are also disposed and prepared for their increase. Second, the distinction of St. Thomas explained at number 1 should be assumed: grace in the being of grace and in the being of a quality or habit. Third, it should be assumed³, as St. Thomas teaches in book 4, distinction 12, question 2, article 1, second subquestion, and in Questions on Truth, question 26, article 6, reply to objection 8, and question 2 on Evil, article 2, that the reward corresponding in the heavenly homeland to good works is twofold: namely, an essential reward, consisting in the beatific vision of God and joy in God himself, and an accidental reward, which is joy in good works or in any other created good. Let the following, then, be set down:

First Conclusion. Grace and charity, if considered in the being of a habit and quality, are increased by God only when a righteous person breaks out into a more fervent act. The authors of the third and fourth opinions agree on this conclusion, which St. Thomas expressly intends to teach in the places cited above, and which the arguments given in favor of Master Bañez's opinion prove conclusively.

X. Second Conclusion. Grace and charity in the being of a habit are increased through more intense acts according to the excess of the act over the preexisting habit, but not according to the act's entire range of intensity.⁴ Thus, if someone who has charity at five degrees breaks out into a fervent act at ten degrees, the habit is increased to ten, but not to fifteen. The authors of both opinions also agree on this conclusion. Its chief reason is that God increases supernatural habits as their efficient cause while preserving the proportion found in natural things, as St. Thomas expressly teaches in I–II, question 114, article 8, reply to objection 3, and II–II, question 24, article 6. But in natural things a quality is increased only according to the excess of the act, as is clear: if a heating agent at four degrees is applied to water warm to two degrees, it increases the water's heat only according to the agent's excess over the patient, namely, to four degrees. Likewise, habits that have our acts as the efficient causes of their increase are increased only according to the act's excess over the habit, as Thomists commonly teach in I–II, question 52, article 2. Therefore.

XI. But there is a difficult argument against both conclusions. Charity cannot break out into an act more fervent than itself. Therefore, someone with a habitual charity at four degrees, for example, cannot break out into a fervent act at six degrees. Therefore, if grace and charity in the being of a habit are increased only when a human being breaks out into a more fervent act, they will never be able to increase. The antecedent is proved: an effect cannot exceed the power of its cause. Therefore, the habit of charity at four degrees cannot be the efficient principle of an intense act at six degrees. It is answered that, although the habit of charity at four degrees, considered in itself, cannot be the efficient principle of the intensity of an act of charity at six degrees,⁵ nevertheless, insofar as an intense actual help of God at six degrees is joined to it, it has proportionate power to produce an intense act at six degrees as an efficient cause. This will be discussed more fully in disputation 66, number 8.

XII. Third Conclusion. Grace in the character of grace, and likewise charity in the being of charity, are increased meritoriously through acts equal to the habit, and likewise through acts less intense than the habit itself, such that a new degree of essential glory corresponds to those acts in the heavenly homeland.⁶ The conclusion is against Master Bañez and the other Doctors cited above. Yet it is taught by the more common view among Thomists; Scotus also holds it in book 1, distinction 22, question 1, and it is gathered from St. Thomas, I–II, question 114, article 8, reply to objection 3. For when he had proposed an argument about less intense acts, he answers: Through every meritorious act a human being merits an increase of grace, just as he merits its completion, namely, glory. But just as glory is not conferred immediately, but at its proper time, so too an increase of grace is not conferred immediately, but at its proper time, namely, when someone has been disposed for an increase of grace. He says the same in II–II, question 24, article 6, reply to objection 1. Therefore, unless a person introduces the impediment of sin, on account of a less intense act a new degree of glory will be given to him.

The conclusion is proved, first, from Sacred Scripture. For Ecclesiastici 16 says: Every mercy will make a place for each person according to the merit of his works. And Rom. 2 says that the Lord will repay each according to his works. And 1. ad Corinth. 3: Each will receive his reward according to his own labor. In these passages reward is promised absolutely for good works, and the promise is not restricted to intense or less intense works. Therefore, a new essential glory will also be given for newly performed less intense works. The consequence is clear, because in Sacred Scripture “reward” means essential glory as the principal reward, although the accidental reward is also included under it. This is confirmed by 2. ad Corinth. 9: He who sows sparingly will also reap sparingly. According to the common explanation of the Doctors, the proper meaning of these words is that one who acts with lesser intensity will receive a less intense degree of glory, and for few works will obtain small degrees of glory. Hence St. Bernard, explaining this passage, says: A small withholding of seed means a great diminution of the harvest. Likewise, Psalm. 61: You will repay each according to his works. Christ our Lord confirmed these words in Matth. 16, saying: The Son of Man will come in the glory of his Father with his angels, and then he will repay each according to his works. And the Apostle repeats them in Rom. 2, saying: According to your hardness and impenitent heart, you store up wrath for yourself on the day of wrath and of the revelation of God's just judgment, who will repay each according to his works: eternal life to those who by perseverance in good work seek glory, honor, and incorruption. In these passages it is said absolutely that God will repay each with eternal life according to his works, that is, with a reward equal to his merits, in such a way that if the merits are great and intense, the eternal life corresponding to them, which consists in the clear vision of God, will also be intense; but if the merits are less intense, the corresponding eternal life and vision of God will also be less intense. Moreover, in Matth. 10 Christ our Lord says: All the hairs of your head are numbered. That is, all your good works and all your thoughts, however slight and like hairs, are nevertheless numbered before God so that he may grant them a reward worthy of them on the day of judgment, as Ambrose explains in Book II On the Holy Spirit. His explanation is very consonant with what Christ our Lord adds in the same passage: Whoever gives a drink of cold water to one of these least ones, only in the name of a disciple, amen I say to you, will not lose his reward. The expression in the name of a disciple, or, as Mark says, in my name, should be weighed, as if he were saying expressly: this alone is required for a just person not to lose the reward of a good work, that it be done in my name, that is, for God's sake. Therefore, a greater intensity of charity in the work is not required for a just person to obtain a new degree of essential glory through it.

In addition, the Apostle says in 2. ad Corinth. 4: What is momentary and light in our tribulation works in us, beyond measure, an eternal weight of glory in sublimity. From these words the argument is drawn: there is no work performed from charity, however momentary and light, or less intense, that does not produce from itself some weight and seed of eternal glory. For God grants the degrees of glory to the elect according to the measure and weight of merits, in accord with Luc. 6: They will give into your lap a good measure, shaken together and running over. Likewise, for the reprobate, according to the measure of the offense will be the measure of the blows, as Deuteronom. 25 says, in agreement with Apoc. 18: As much as she glorified herself and lived in luxury, give her as much torment and mourning. Therefore, some weight of essential glory corresponds to any work, however less intense, if it is done from charity.

XIII. It is proved second from passages of the Councils. For in the Second Council of Orange, chapter 18, it is defined as follows: A reward is owed to good works if they are done from grace. Here it is not required that a meritorious work be more intense than the habit itself for a reward to be owed to it; only that it be done from grace. And in the Council of Trent, session 6, On Justification, chapter 10, the holy Synod teaches: Those justified grow and are more justified through observance of the commandments of God and the Church, in that justice received through the grace of Christ, with faith cooperating through good works, as it is written: He who is just, let him be justified still.⁷ And again: Do not fear to be justified until death.⁸ The holy Church asks for this increase of justice when it prays: Grant us, O Lord, an increase of faith, hope, and charity. From these words I form the argument as follows: the Council teaches that the just grow in the grace by which they were justified through good works by which they observe the commandments of God and the Church. But for observing the commandments it is not necessary that they act from an act of charity more intense than the preexisting habit. Therefore, for them to grow in grace and charity, it is not required that the act meriting that same increase be more intense than the preexisting habit; and consequently grace is increased even through less intense acts, and on account of those same acts the just man will obtain a new degree of essential glory. Further, in chapter 16 of that same session it says: For since Christ Jesus himself, as the head into the members and as the vine into the branches, continually infuses into those justified a power that always precedes, accompanies, and follows their good works, and without which they could in no way be pleasing to God or meritorious, it must be believed that nothing more is lacking to those justified for them to be judged to have fully satisfied the divine law by those works done in God, according to the state of this life, and truly to have merited the attainment of eternal life in its own time, provided that they die in grace. By these words the Council requires nothing more for a just man to merit eternal life through good works than that he act from the influx of grace and the merits of Christ, namely, through faith and charity. Therefore, beyond this, it is not required that works be more intense than preexisting charity; and consequently, through less intense works he merits an increase of essential glory, and in its own time will infallibly obtain it, if he dies in grace. And in canon 24 of that same session it is defined as follows: If anyone says that the justice received is not preserved and also increased before God through good works, but that the works themselves are only the fruits and signs of justification attained, and not also a cause of its increase, let him be anathema. And in canon 26 one who says that the just ought not to expect and hope for an eternal reward from God for the good works done in God, through God's mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ, if by doing good and keeping the divine commandments they persevere to the end is anathematized. Finally, in canon 32⁹ it is defined: If anyone says that the justified person himself does not truly merit, by the good works done by him through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, of whom he is a living member, an increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of eternal life itself (provided that he dies in grace), and also an increase of glory, let him be anathema. Here the Council defines absolutely that through good works the just man truly merits an increase of grace, eternal life, and also an increase of glory and the attainment of that same glory. The Council does not distinguish between intense and less intense meritorious works. Therefore, it must not be said that through works done from charity, without its greater intensity, a just man does not obtain greater essential glory if he dies in grace.

XIV. Authors of the opposite opinion commonly give four answers to these arguments. The first answer is that the Council of Trent intended only to define against the Lutheran heretics, who said that grace is not increased through the good works of the righteous, but that those works are only signs of the justice attained and its fruits, as is clear from canon 24 cited above.¹⁰ The heretics' proposition was universal, namely: By no good work does a righteous person merit an increase of grace. Hence, to preserve the Council's definition, since it contradicts the heretics' assertion, it is not necessary that grace and preexisting charity be increased through every good work; it is enough that they be increased through some good work or works, namely, through more intense acts. They confirm this answer: otherwise the opinion that it is not enough for merit that a work be good and performed by someone in grace, but that it must also be referred to a supernatural end through an immediately preceding act of charity, would be contrary to that definition of the Council of Trent. For in the cited places the Council does not teach that any reference to a supernatural end through an immediately preceding act of charity is necessary for merit. But this consequence must not be admitted, since there are various opinions among the Doctors about the reference necessary for merit, as Medina shows in I–II, question 114, article 4.¹¹¹² Some, including Master Soto, book 3 of On Nature and Grace, chapter 4, and Vega on the Council of Trent, teach that habitual reference is sufficient, provided that the work is morally good and done by someone in grace. Others, following Durandus and Scotus, hold that merit requires the actual ordering of works to a supernatural end through an act of charity.¹³¹⁴ Others take a middle way and think that habitual reference is not sufficient, but neither is actual reference required; rather, virtual reference proceeding from an immediately preceding act of charity is required. Master Cano and some Thomists hold this. Finally, others, including Cajetan, I, question 63, article 6, and Capreolus, book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 40, single question, article 1, say that a remote virtual reference in the power of the act of charity by which someone was justified is sufficient. St. Thomas seems to adhere to this opinion in question 2 on Evil, article 5, replies to objections 7 and 11, and in book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 40, question 1, article 5, reply to the sixth argument. Therefore, just as the words of the Council of Trent cannot prove that habitual reference is sufficient for merit or that an actual or virtual reference to God made through an act of charity is unnecessary, because the Council left this to be debated among theologians, since it was not treating the matter expressly, so too the same Council does not conclusively prove that a new degree of essential glory corresponds to acts equal to or less intense than the preexisting habit of charity and grace, because the Council likewise was not treating this difficulty but left it for theologians to debate.

XV. Yet this answer, though it seems plausible and therefore excuses the opposite opinion from every censure, does not entirely remove the force of the argument. For although the Council primarily intends to exclude that heretical error, in consequence of excluding it the Council determines an absolute proposition equivalent to a universal one: namely, that a righteous person merits an increase of grace and glory through meritorious works. Therefore, the Council's words are not to be restricted to more intense acts but are to be understood universally of every meritorious act. Nor does the objection brought forward in confirmation of the answer prove anything, for the Council is speaking of meritorious acts. The question of whether merit requires a proximate reference of charity or whether a remote one suffices falls within the scope of opinion.

XVI. The second answer is that the Council defines only that a justified person merits an increase of grace and glory through good works. This is entirely true even if we speak of less intense good works. The authors of the opposite opinion do not deny this, but expressly acknowledge it with St. Thomas, I–II, question 114, article 8, reply to objection 3, where he says that through every meritorious act a human being merits an increase of grace, just as he merits the completion of grace, which is eternal life. But just as eternal life is not immediately repaid but at its proper time, so grace too is not increased immediately but at its proper time, namely, when someone has been sufficiently disposed for an increase of grace. Yet the Council does not determine that an increase of grace or essential glory is in fact always given for every less intense act, even if a righteous person perseveres in grace to the end.

There is nevertheless a strong argument against this answer: a reward is owed by justice for merit, as was said above. Therefore, if a righteous person merits an increase of grace through every act of charity, even a less intense one, he will eventually obtain that reward even if he does not break out into a more fervent act, provided that he does not introduce the impediment of sin. Otherwise merit would be given without the reward owed by justice, and so God would be unjust, contrary to Hebrews 6: For God is not unjust, so as to forget your work and labor, etc. Although the Apostle is speaking there about deadened merits that come back to life through repentance, his argument applies all the more to meritorious works that were never deadened. It is confirmed. It is impossible for God not to fulfill his promise. But he promised an increase of grace for every meritorious work of a justified person, and likewise an increase of glory. Therefore, in fact, he grants it if the person does not introduce the impediment of sin.

XVII. A third solution was hinted at above in the second argument proposed for the third opinion:¹⁵ namely, for each meritorious work the predestined will be given new glory in the heavenly homeland in the character of essential reward, because the same glory that was previously owed on account of other equal or more intense meritorious works will be given under a new title, just as was said of the reward corresponding to Christ's merits. However, greater glory will not be given in the character of glory, that is, with respect to the physical intensity of the beatific vision.¹⁶ Master Báñez pursues this solution in the Relection cited above. But it too does not seem sufficient, because it does not properly preserve the claim that an actual increase of grace and glory is given for less intense good works, even if the just person perseveres to the end. For a form is properly said to increase only when it grows in intensity. Therefore, since the Council teaches absolutely that a just person merits through good works an increase of grace and glory and the attainment of that increase if he perseveres to the end, the Council does not seem to be satisfied unless it is said that a just person merits an increase of grace and glory in intensity through good works, even less intense ones, and that such an increase will infallibly follow if he perseveres to the end, even if he never breaks out into an act more fervent than his pre-existing habit.

XVIII. A fourth solution asserts that, to preserve rigorously the doctrine of the Council of Trent and its definition, it suffices to admit that new accidental glory corresponds to less intense good works, provided that it is asserted that, when merits are more intense than the pre-existing grace and charity, more intense essential glory corresponds to them. This solution seems to have a basis in St. Thomas, Part I, question 95, article 4, in the body of the article, whose words we cited above. But it is easily refuted by what was said above: for the Council speaks without distinction of intense and less intense meritorious works. Therefore, just as more intense essential and accidental glory corresponds to more intense good works, so too a new degree of essential glory, and not merely accidental glory, corresponds to the less intense good acts of a just person if he perseveres in grace.

XIX. Third, the conclusion is proved from the holy Fathers, who teach universally that the reward of eternal glory must be measured according to the quantity and number of merits, so that the more numerous and greater the labors someone has endured in God's service, the greater and more intense the glory he obtains. For Gregory says in the Moralia: As one surpasses another here in merit, so there one will surpass another in retribution.¹⁷ He is speaking of the retribution of essential glory, as is clear from the preceding and following words. Jerome teaches the same in his commentary on Ezechiel, chapters 4 and 18, and in Book II Against Jovinian, where he says that among the blessed there will be unequal glory according to the inequality of merits. Likewise, St. Prosper says in book 2 of On the Calling of the Gentiles, chapter 36, near the end: Through the labor of works, the persistence of prayers, and the exercises of virtues, merits increase, and those who have done good are crowned according to their good works. St. Ambrose teaches the same in On Holy Virginity, chapters 26, 27, and 44, and in sermon 59 on the words of the Lord.

Fourth, the conclusion is proved by the authority of the Scholastics. For, besides St. Thomas in the places cited above, Capreolus, the most faithful interpreter and defender of the holy Doctor's teaching in all matters, teaches in book 4, distinction 14, question 2, article 3, reply to Scotus’s first objection against the second conclusion, in accord with St. Thomas's opinion, that for every act of charity, however less intense, a special degree of essential glory is to be conferred in heaven;¹⁸ and likewise through the multiplication of these acts, although none of them is an act more intense. Many very weighty Thomists understood St. Thomas in the same way.

XX. Fifth, this is proved by reason: condign merit intrinsically includes a debt founded on the divine promise and on the very perfection and dignity of the meritorious work insofar as it proceeds from grace and the motion of the Holy Spirit, as St. Thomas teaches in I–II, question 114, article 1, and as is gathered from 2. ad Timoth. 4: A crown of justice is laid up for me, and Heb. 6: For God is not unjust, that he should forget your work. But through every act of charity, even a less intense one, a person merits an increase of grace and essential glory condignly, as the authors of the contrary opinion admit, and as is clear from the Council of Trent and St. Thomas in the places cited above. Therefore, there intervenes a debt to render the reward if the just person does not place an impediment by sin and perseveres in grace to the end; consequently, a person will infallibly obtain such a reward. Otherwise, it would have to be said that God does not keep his promises and does not pay the reward owed for meritorious works, which is false and contrary to the Apostle's saying: He remains faithful, and cannot deny himself.¹⁹ This is confirmed. God is more inclined to reward good works than to punish sins. But for each sin God will repay the reprobate with a special punishment, as is clear from the Scripture passages cited above. Therefore, for each meritorious work he will repay the elect with a special degree of glory.

XXI. Sixth: for it would follow from the contrary opinion that if Peter, for example, with an act of charity intense to degree ten, distributed all his goods among the poor and professed the strictest religious life, in which he persevered in grace for 60 years, performing many works of virtue with intensity to degree ten, and finally suffered martyrdom for Christ with that same intensity of charity, he would not obtain greater essential glory, in the aspect of essential glory, than Martin, who persevered in grace for only one hour, performed one intense work of virtue to degree ten during that hour, and died. Although this consequence is conceded by the authors of the contrary opinion, it seems greatly to detract from the merits of the just and must in no way be conceded. For by this the faithful would be deterred from many good works and labors if they should once conceive that by a thousand good acts, or even a hundred thousand, they would obtain no greater essential glory than by one act of the same intensity. Likewise, it would also follow from the same opinion that through acts of faith, hope, religion, penance, mercy, and the other moral virtues, informed by grace and commanded by charity, the just obtain no special degree of grace or essential glory beyond the one corresponding to the act of charity, by which they are ordered to a supernatural end. But this consequence is contrary to the teaching of St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 114, art. 4, where he teaches that grace is the principle of meriting first and chiefly through charity, but secondarily through the other virtues, insofar as their acts are commanded by charity. And in the solution to the second objection he adds that labor and difficulty arising from the greatness of a work pertain to an increase of merit, indicating clearly enough that, other things being equal, an act is more meritorious the more laborious and difficult it is, with the difficulty arising from the greatness of the work. He teaches the same in 2. 2. q. 182, art. 2, ad 1, where he says that an increase of merit with respect to essential reward consists chiefly in charity. He therefore holds that it also consists in the acts of the other virtues, although less chiefly.

XXII. Second confirmation, which increases the difficulty of the preceding argument by an analogy: in natural things the perfection of a material fruit is judged not only from the root of the tree but also from its branches, through which the power of the root reaches the fruits; and for this reason, through a better branch, a better fruit is produced by the power of the root. Therefore, similarly, the fruit of merit or essential reward is to be assessed not only from the root of charity, but also by reason of the other virtues through which charity produces the fruit of a meritorious work;²⁰ and consequently, other things being equal, merit and the essential glory corresponding to it will be greater in proportion to the excellence of the virtue through which charity acts. Otherwise, essential reward of eternal life would have been promised to charity alone, and charity alone would receive a reward, contrary to explicit passages of Scripture. For it is said in Matt. 10: Everyone who confesses me before men, namely, through faith, I too will confess before my Father who is in heaven. And in Heb. 10: Do not lose your confidence, which has a great reward. And in Matt. 5: Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. There eternal life is also promised to many other virtues and their acts. And in Matt. 25: Come, blessed of my Father, possess the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. For I was hungry, and you gave me food; I was thirsty, and you gave me drink; I was a stranger, and you took me in; I was in prison, and you came to me. By these words Christ the Lord shows that essential glory is to be given not only on account of an act of charity but also on account of merits proceeding from the other virtues. Therefore it is increased through them.

Seventh, the same point is proved. If one who has charity at degree four performs an act intense to degree six, on account of it he will obtain greater essential glory. Therefore, if one who has charity intense to degree one hundred performs an act of charity intense to degree ninety, on account of it he will obtain new essential glory. The inference is clear, for otherwise the just man who acts less intensely would be in a better condition than one who acts intensely.

Some think that these arguments make our third conclusion so certain that the contrary opinion is very rash and erroneous in faith. Nevertheless, this censure does not seem reasonable, as is clear from what was said above.

XXIII. Fourth Conclusion. Grace in the being of grace, and likewise charity in the being of charity, are increased immediately, even through less intense acts, and are increased according to the whole range of the act above the habit.²¹ The first part is proved: as soon as a man performs a less intense meritorious act, he has a right to new essential glory. Therefore through it grace is immediately increased in the being of grace. The inference is clear, for grace's being increased in the being of grace is nothing other than the just man being accepted through it for greater glory. The second part is proved: there is no greater reason why grace should be increased in the being of grace through less intense acts by one degree rather than by two; therefore it is increased according to the whole range of the act. It is proved further: suppose a day's labor is worth three silver coins. If someone works for one day, he merits three silver coins; if he works another day, he merits another three. Therefore similarly, if someone with merit of degree four bursts forth into another meritorious act of degree four, he will remain with merit of degree eight and consequently will be accepted for essential glory of intensity eight, and so on for the other meritorious acts.

XXIV. Fifth Conclusion. The increase of grace and charity in the being of a habit that a human being merits through less intense acts will afterward be given at the first instant of glorification.²² This conclusion is gathered from St. Thomas, I–II, question 114, article 8, reply to objection 3, where he teaches that through less intense acts a human being merits an increase of grace and charity, to be conferred when, namely, he has been sufficiently disposed for an increase of grace, that is, when he has disposed himself through a more fervent act. From this the argument is drawn: in this life a righteous person never disposes himself through a more fervent act so that the increase he merited through less intense acts may be given to him. Therefore, in the other life he will be disposed by God through an act so intense that it equals the whole quantity of merit that preceded in this life, so that at last the proportion between grace and charity in the being of merit and in the being of a habit may be preserved. The consequence is clear, for otherwise meritorious less intense acts would remain without the reward they merited by justice. The antecedent is proved: when a righteous person in this life breaks out into a more fervent act, the increase of grace and charity in the being of a habit then conferred is given for that more fervent act, just as it would be given if no less intense acts had preceded. Therefore, no intensity is then added on account of the preceding less intense acts. It is confirmed: the other life is the time for receiving the adequate reward merited through preceding acts in this life. Therefore, a reward not conferred in this age must be conferred in the other. Nor does it follow from this that a human being merits in the other life. For just as then a righteous person will be disposed for the beatific vision through the light of glory without there being merit in the other life, so too through an intense act of charity the righteous person will be disposed for the intensity of the habit in the being of a habit that he merited through preceding less intense acts in this life, without there being any merit in the heavenly homeland.

XXV. But three arguments present themselves against these two conclusions. First, it would follow that in this life equality between grace and charity in the being of merit and in the being of a habit is never preserved after a righteous person has broken out into less intense acts. The consequence is proved: through less intense acts grace in the being of grace and charity in the being of merit are immediately increased, as was said above, and are increased according to the entire range of the act, but they are not immediately increased in the being of a habit. Therefore, grace in the being of grace will always be greater than grace in the being of a habit, and the same will hold for charity.

It is answered that there is no absurdity in equality and proportion between the quantity of grace in the being of a habit and in the being of grace, or merit, not always being preserved in this life;²³ it is enough that they be preserved in the heavenly homeland. There equality between the quantity of grace and the quantity of glory will also be preserved, for in the heavenly homeland all things will be complete and perfect.

XXVI. The second argument is that it belongs to the essence of grace and charity to be a habit. Therefore, if they are immediately increased in the being of grace and charity through less intense acts, they should also be immediately increased in the being of a habit. The consequence is clear, because a specific character cannot be increased without the generic character also being increased. For if whiteness is intensified, color consequently must also be intensified; but the character of a habit is generic with respect to the character of grace and charity. Therefore. It is answered that grace in the being of grace can be considered in two ways. First, in physical being, insofar as it is the ultimate physical difference contracting the habit to a given species.²⁴ Second, in the moral order, insofar as through meritorious works a person is accepted for glory by it. We therefore say that when grace is increased according to its proper specific character as grace in physical being, it must also be increased in the character of a habit; but it is not necessary that grace be increased in the being of a habit when it is increased in the being of grace in the moral order. An example is the habitual grace of Christ, which is finite in physical being, even according to the specific difference of grace, as Thomists commonly teach in III, question 7, article 11; yet according to moral dignity, insofar as it is the principle of infinite merit and infinite satisfaction, it is infinite in the being of grace on account of the suppositum acting, as St. Thomas teaches in that same article.

XXVII. The third argument is that, according to the opposite opinion, it would follow that through extrinsic acceptance alone a righteous person is accepted for the greater essential glory he merits through less intense acts.²⁵ The consequence seems contrary to the Council of Trent, session 6 on justification, chapter 7 and canon 11, where it says that sins are remitted and a human being is made worthy of eternal life through inherent righteousness²⁶, not through extrinsic favor alone or non-imputation. The consequence is proved: grace and charity are not intrinsically perfected in themselves as qualities when a righteous person breaks out into less intense acts. Therefore, if on account of those acts a human being is accepted for greater essential glory, that acceptance will be purely extrinsic in relation to that greater glory. It is answered by denying the consequence. As for the proof, it should be said that through preexisting habitual grace, insofar as it newly became the real cause of a new less intense act, a human being is accepted for the greater essential glory corresponding to that less intense act. Hence the acceptance is not purely extrinsic or through extrinsic favor alone, but through intrinsic justice, insofar as it expresses a new relation to a new meritorious act. From this the answer to the arguments made at the beginning in favor of the third opinion is clear. We say that they make that opinion probable; insofar as they are directed against our opinion, each is answered in turn.

XXVIII. To the first argument made at the beginning from St. Thomas, it is answered that the cited passages sufficiently persuade us that he held that opinion in the Sentences, although he retracted it in the Summa, in the places cited above. It should nevertheless be observed that the proposition St. Thomas grants in book 1 of the Sentences—namely, that a person does not merit an increase of charity through every act of charity—is not understood by St. Thomas absolutely, as meaning that, speaking absolutely, he does not merit that increase, but that he does not merit an increase of charity immediately to be conferred in the being of a habit, as is clear from what precedes and follows. For the holy Doctor intends to assign a difference between intense and less intense acts: through acts more intense than the habit, a person merits an increase of the habit so that it is conferred immediately;²⁷ but through acts less intense than the habit, he does not merit an increase of the habit so that it is conferred immediately. On this solution see Cajetan, I–II, response to the third objection of the same article, question 114, article 8 To the passage cited from the First Part, it is answered that St. Thomas is speaking of charity in the being of charity and merit, and his meaning is that one who has more charity in the being of charity has more of the light of glory and sees God more, as if he said more plainly: one who merited more on the way sees God more in the heavenly homeland. To the other passage from question 95, it is answered that when he says, One who does something from greater charity enjoys God more perfectly, this is understood with respect to any act. His meaning is that an act performed from greater charity is more meritorious of essential glory than an act performed from lesser charity. This is the same as saying that an act of charity more intense, whether elicited or commanded, is more meritorious than a less intense act. It does not follow from this, however, that through multiplication of acts of the same intensity, or through less intense acts, a person does not merit new essential glory. This also answers the other passage from the Epistle to the Corinthians. Finally, the response to the last argument will make St. Thomas's mind clearer.

XXIX. To the second: it is already clear from what was said in the second proof of the third conclusion how our opinion is more in conformity with the Council's doctrine and preserves its definition more properly.

To the confirmation it is answered that Christ our Lord merited through subsequent acts, under a new title, what he had already merited through the first act, because each of his acts was infinitely meritorious.²⁸ Hence he did not merit more through many acts than through one, because, insofar as the infinite is infinite, nothing can be added to it. But this reasoning does not apply to our merits, which are finite; hence the cases are not alike.

To the third it is answered that it only follows that charity and grace are not increased immediately in the being of a habit through less intense acts, but only when a person breaks out into a more fervent act, which we gladly admit with St. Thomas, as was said above. Nevertheless, they are immediately increased in the being of grace and in the moral order, because moral increase does not require an equal physical disposition; the multiplication of a meritorious act suffices.

XXX. To the fourth, we grant that grace is increased in the being of grace through less intense acts, and charity likewise in the being of charity, according to the entire breadth and intensity of the meritorious act.²⁹ To the objection it is answered that, morally speaking, the person who served God most devoutly and fervently for one year and at last suffered martyrdom is holier and will obtain greater essential glory than another who exercised himself in less intense acts of charity for twenty or forty years. First, morally speaking, the person most fervent in God's service more frequently multiplies acts of charity and performs more and more excellent good works, more intense than the other person who acts with lesser intensity. For, as Gregory says: Love accomplishes great things if it exists; but if it refuses to act, love does not exist.³⁰ And again he says: The proof of love is the manifestation of the work. Hence all the multiplication of acts performed over forty years by one who acts with lesser intensity will not equal the entire intensity of the merits of one year possessed by the person who lived most fervently. Second, although grace and charity in the being of grace and charity increase according to the entire breadth of the act, nevertheless, if one person has an intense act of charity at twenty, while another produces two intense acts of charity at ten, the first merits more through one intense act at twenty than the latter through two intense acts at ten; and perhaps it will be necessary to multiply four or six acts at ten to equal the entire merit of an intense act at twenty. The reason is that the intensity and fervor of the act are the chief and most excellent things considered here; and it is much more difficult and arduous to have one intense act at twenty than to attain merit at twenty through various intense acts at four or ten. This can be confirmed by a most manifest example. In human affairs, a prince reasonably values more and rewards more highly one most excellent act by a subject who once risked his life out of the most excellent love for the prince than many less intense and easy acts of another. Therefore, God likewise values more and rewards more highly one intense act at one hundred than ten intense acts at ten. And the wise man seems to suggest this when he said: Having been perfected in a short time, he fulfilled a long span.³¹ The meaning of these words is that a just person who serves God most fervently fulfills in a short time the number of merits of many years.

To the confirmation, it is answered that the authors of the contrary opinion are also bound to solve the argument made, for it proceeds in the same way concerning accidental reward, which they too admit is increased through less intense acts. Therefore, just as according to everyone's opinion a new accidental reward is given for each less intense act without that reward increasing by innumerable and incredible degrees, so in our opinion a new essential reward is given for each meritorious act without its increasing to some incredible and innumerable intensity. To the argument, therefore, it is answered that although an intensible and remissible form is infinitely divisible according to intensity, nevertheless it always remains of a determinate intensity, however much it is divided into more parts. This is like a span's quantity, which is determinate and yet is syncategorematically divisible to infinity, and parts can be multiplied on each day of a year according to the calculation made in the argument without any absurdity following. This is especially true in the case of grace and charity, which, since they are a certain participation in the divine nature, can be increased to infinity, as St. Thomas teaches in 2. 2. q. 24, art. 7. Hence, however much they are increased, they will never reach the greatest possible intensity by God's absolute power.

XXXI. To the fifth, it is answered that, other things being equal, the greater the continuation of an act, the greater essential glory corresponds to it.³² To the objection, it is answered that it has the same difficulty concerning accidental reward, which according to everyone's opinion is increased on account of the continuation of a meritorious act. It is therefore answered that it is impossible for an act of charity to last only for an instant, because the duration of an instant is not duration; but a thing produced in time through some action must be measured by some duration. Further, if an act of charity lasted only for an instant, it would follow that it both was and was not in the same instant.³³ For since an act of charity is a spiritual thing, it begins through its first being and ceases through its first not-being. Therefore, if it begins and ceases in the same instant, in that same instant it will be and not be. If it is said that it ceases through its ultimate being, the contrary is the case: for what ceases through its ultimate being ceases in time. For it is true to say: Now it is, and immediately after this it will not be. But what follows immediately after an instant must be time, because, as is shown in Physics 6 and 7, one instant cannot be immediately next to another. Therefore it must necessarily last for some time; and on this opinion the argument does not proceed, for there is a proportion between any part of time and time.

Second, according to the opinion of others, who admit that an act of charity can last only for an instant, the reward corresponding to the substance of the meritorious action, insofar as it is actually produced, is greater than the reward corresponding to the continuation of that same act. The reason is that continuation is a mode of the substance of a thing; but a greater reward must correspond to the substance of the thing than to its accident, unless the continuation is so great that it eventually equals or exceeds the merit corresponding to the production of the act. Hence, although other things being equal, one who continues an act of charity for some time merits more than one whose act lasts only for an instant, his merit is not twice as great unless the continuation is so great that it is equivalent to the instantaneous production of another act. For example, if that continuation lasts for a quarter of an hour, and someone produces an act of charity intense to degree ten at the first instant of that quarter and the act lasts only for an instant, he will merit glory of degree ten. But one who continues an act intense to degree ten for a quarter of an hour will merit degree twenty, for example, because the continuation for a quarter of an hour is equivalent to the production of another act; but if he continues the act for half a quarter-hour, he will merit degree fifteen, and so proportionately. For just as every part of a quarter-hour is infinitely divisible, so too every part of merit or of the reward corresponding to it is infinitely divisible, as was said. Hence, from our opinion there does not follow the absurdity intended by the argument. And by these points an answer is given to the first and second confirmations.

XXXII. To the sixth argument, it is answered that it touches on that celebrated difficulty which St. Thomas discusses in 3 p. q. 89, art. 5: how good works done in grace and charity, deadened by subsequent sin, later revive through penance, and in what measure. Since this difficulty requires a special discussion, it must be examined in the following disputation.

From what has been said in this disputation, the sixth argument made at the outset remains solved. For we say that through less intense acts of charity too, the just man infallibly obtains an increase of the habit, as was shown.