De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether to one who does all that is in him by efficacious help, that is, elicits an act of charity and contrition, justifying grace is infallibly given by a certain law.

I. The reason for doubt is this: the first justifying grace is given entirely freely; therefore, there is no law that it will be infallibly given to one who, through efficacious help, performs an act of charity or contrition by which he is disposed for that same justifying grace. The consequence is proved: for, as the Apostle says, To one who works, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt,¹ and again he says, Not from works, otherwise grace is no longer grace.²

This is confirmed because St. Prosper infers against the Collator that, according to his opinion, grace is given according to our merits, since he asserted that some good work precedes in people, on account of which they obtain grace.³ Therefore, if some good work of ours precedes the infusion of justifying grace, on account of which we infallibly and by a certain law obtain justifying grace, it follows that such grace is given according to our merits.

Second, it is argued as follows. Through an act of charity and contrition, which is the final disposition for grace, a sinner does not merit justifying grace, even by merit of congruity; for otherwise he would not be justified entirely freely, but from works, which is contrary to the Apostle who says: Justified freely by his grace.⁴ Therefore, no law was established by God to infallibly give justifying grace to a sinner who elicits an act of charity and contrition through efficacious help. The consequence is proved: if such a law and divine promise existed, a sinner would merit the infusion of justifying grace at least by merit of congruity through an act of contrition; indeed, he would merit it through imperfect justice, or by condign merit, since a divine promise to give something on account of a preceding supernatural work establishes condign merit.

II. Third, it is argued as follows. The gift of perseverance is not infallibly given by a certain law to someone who does all that is in him by means of the preceding helps of grace, because that gift is the efficient principle of merit. But habitual grace too is the efficient principle of merit, for every meritorious work proceeds from habitual grace through charity, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2. q. 114. ar. 4. Therefore, the same conclusion follows as before.

Fourth, it is argued that, if God had established some law to give habitual grace to a person disposing himself for it through an act of contrition, that law would be gathered from Sacred Scripture, through which alone those things depending on God's simple will are made known to us. But there is no passage in Sacred Scripture from which the aforesaid law could be gathered or proved. Therefore.

Fifth, the meritorious acts produced by a just person after receiving justifying grace are more acceptable to God than acts preceding the infusion of first justifying grace. But restoration after a fall is not infallibly given by a certain law to just people who elicit those meritorious acts after receiving grace; otherwise a just person could merit his own restoration after a fall, which is contrary to St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 114. ar. 7. Therefore, similarly, justifying grace will not be infallibly given by a certain law to one who elicits an act of contrition.

Sixth, just as a person disposes himself to obtain habitual grace and charity through an act of charity and contrition, so too he disposes himself to an increase of that same grace and charity through subsequent acts of charity or contrition. And, as the Council of Trent says, by those same acts a just person merits an increase of the habit of grace.⁵ But no law was established by God to give an increase of the habit to one who disposes himself to such an increase through his own acts. Therefore, similarly, there will be no law established by God to confer habitual grace on one who, through the help of grace, elicits an act of contrition or charity by which he disposes himself to obtain justifying grace. The minor premise is proved as follows: it often happens that a just person elicits acts of charity less intense than his pre-existing habit, never afterward produces a more fervent act, and dies; then he will not obtain an increase of the habit. Therefore.

IV. Four difficulties are involved in these arguments. First: Whether justifying grace is given infallibly by the nature of the thing to one eliciting an act of contrition and charity. Second: Whether by that same act a man merits justifying grace by merit of congruity. Third: Whether a just man can by good works merit restoration for himself after a fall. Fourth: Whether by acts less intense than the preexisting habit of grace and charity a man merits an increase of the habit, and when this increase is conferred on him. The first three difficulties are resolved here; the fourth will be reserved for the following disputation.

For the resolution of the first difficulty, let the first conclusion be stated. The habit of justifying grace and charity, and the other infused habits that accompany justifying grace, are infallibly and by a certain law infused by God into a man who elicits an act of contrition and charity from the help of grace.⁶ The conclusion is explicit in St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 112, art. 3, in the body. It is proved. First, according to the ordinary law, forms are infallibly introduced into matter once the ultimate disposition is posited; otherwise the disposition would not be ultimate. But an act of contrition and charity is the ultimate disposition for justifying grace, as St. Thomas often teaches. Therefore, according to the ordinary law, grace is infallibly introduced into the soul as soon as it first elicits an act of contrition and charity. It is proved second: as was shown above, the same contrition that is the ultimate disposition for grace and precedes it in the genus of material cause is nevertheless an effect of that same grace in the genus of formal and efficient cause. And for this reason, although it is not meritorious of grace, it is meritorious of eternal life, as St. Thomas says in 1. 2. q. 112, art. 2, ad 1. Therefore there can be no contrition that is the ultimate disposition for grace without justifying grace being infused into the man at that same instant of time. Therefore it is infallibly given to one who prepares himself through an act of contrition proceeding from the help of grace.

V. It is proved third by the reasoning of St. Thomas in the cited 1. 2. When preparation for grace is from God moving, it has necessity for that to which it is ordered by God—not necessity of coercion, but of infallibility—because God's intention cannot fail, according to what Augustine says in On the Predestination of the Saints: all who are liberated are most certainly liberated through God's benefits. Therefore, if it is God's intention in moving that the man whose heart he moves attain justifying grace, he attains it infallibly. But through an act of contrition God moves the sinner from the state of sin to justice and justification, as St. Thomas says in 1. 2. q. 113, art. 5, in the body, and he does this with an efficacious intention that the man attain the grace of justification. Therefore he attains it infallibly. All these points are confirmed from the Council of Trent, session 6, On Justification, chapter 7, where, after explaining in the preceding chapter the manner of preparation for grace, which is through an act of contrition and charity, it adds these words: Justification itself follows this disposition or preparation; it is not only the remission of sins, but also the sanctification and renewal of the inner man through the voluntary reception of grace and gifts. Hence a person passes from being unjust to being just, and from being an enemy to being a friend, so that he may be an heir according to the hope of eternal life. The Council therefore holds that justifying grace is infallibly given to those who elicit an act of contrition and charity from the help of grace.

VI. Whether justifying grace has an infallible connection by the nature of the thing, or by divine ordination and disposition, with the act of contrition and charity that is the ultimate disposition is disputed in 1. 2. q. 112, arts. 1 and 3, and q. 113, where the justification of the ungodly is treated expressly. Master Medina answers the first objection in 1. 2. q. 112, cited art. 1, doubt 2, that an act of contrition is not by the nature of the thing a disposition for grace in the way that heat of degree eight is the ultimate disposition for the form of fire. For he says that this preparation, which a man places after being preceded by divine grace, has nothing from itself or from its merits that makes it the ultimate disposition for grace, such that grace would follow it by necessary connection; rather, it has this from divine acceptance. He gathers this from St. Paul, who says: To one who does not work, but believes in him who justifies the ungodly, faith is reckoned as justice according to the purpose of the grace of God;⁷ where the subject is formed faith. And he says that by God's mercy it is reckoned and accepted as justice before God. Nevertheless, let it be

VII. Second Conclusion. The act of contrition and charity, which is the final disposition for grace, has a connection with habitual grace by its own nature, and not only by divine acceptance.⁸ This conclusion is defended by other most learned Thomists and seems closer to St. Thomas's mind in I–II, question 112, article 2, body and reply to objection 1, where he teaches without qualification that the final preparation for grace is simultaneous with the infusion of grace. He holds the same more clearly in question 113, article 8, reply to objection 2. His words are: The disposition of a subject precedes the reception of a form in the order of nature; yet it follows the action of the agent, through which the subject itself is also disposed. Therefore, the motion of free choice precedes the attainment of grace in the order of nature, but follows the infusion of grace. St. Thomas therefore holds that contrition is an effect of grace. Therefore, by its own nature it is connected with habitual grace and depends on it. Therefore, it is not connected with that same grace solely by divine acceptance. It is confirmed. Contrition, by which a penitent is ultimately disposed for the infusion of habitual grace, is meritorious of eternal life, as St. Thomas teaches in I–II, question 112, article 2, reply to objection 1. Therefore, it is an effect of habitual grace, for no human operation is meritorious of eternal life unless it proceeds from habitual grace and is posterior to it at least in the order of nature. Therefore, this sort of contrition is connected with habitual grace by the nature of the thing. Otherwise, the works of a righteous person would be meritorious of eternal life only through God's extrinsic acceptance, and consequently, properly speaking, would not be meritorious by condign merit. Yet this is against the common opinion of theologians and against St. Thomas, I–II, question 114, article 3.

VIII. Hence, to the argument by which Master Medina is refuted, it is answered that from that authority of the Apostle one can gather only that a human being is justified freely, that is, without his own merits preceding the very grace of justification⁹; the Apostle does not intend to exclude a preceding disposition proceeding from free choice, excited and moved by the help of prevenient grace. Grace is owed to that disposition, not as a reward for merit, but only as a form is owed to its final disposition. Hence the Council of Trent says: Freely, we are said to be justified for this reason: because none of the things that precede justification, whether faith or works, merits the grace of justification itself. For if it is by grace, it is no longer from works; otherwise, as the same Apostle says, grace is no longer grace.¹⁰¹¹ But more must be said about this below.

Concerning the second difficulty, which is touched on in the second argument proposed at the beginning of this disputation, it should be noted that Durandus, question 6 of the prologue to book 1 of the Sentences, article 3, and in book 2 of the Sentences, distinction 28, question 1, and Scotus at the same distinction, in the single question, and in book 4 of the Sentences, distinction 14, question 2, held that a human being can dispose himself for grace through the powers of free choice with a disposition to which grace is infallibly given—not as what is owed, but under a divine agreement and ordinance. Durandus adds in Book I, distinction 17, question 2, that this disposition merits grace by merit of congruity. Other theologians of no small authority, however, although they acknowledge that a human being cannot dispose himself for grace, whether proximately or remotely, by the powers of nature alone, and that a special help of grace is necessary for this, by which free choice is moved by God, nevertheless say that a disposition of free choice elicited from that special help merits justifying grace by merit of congruity. Many serious ancient doctors follow this opinion, among them Ferrariensis, at the end of third contra Gentiles, chapter 149. The chief arguments by which they are persuaded will be brought forward and answered below, although some were touched on above in part in disputation 55. The opposite opinion is defended by very weighty Thomists and, in my judgment, is explicit in St. Thomas in the places to be cited below. To make this clear, it must be assumed from what was said in disputation 55 that a human being cannot elicit through the powers of nature alone any disposition, not only a proximate one but even a remote one, by which he prepares or disposes himself to receive the infusion of justifying grace; rather, all such dispositions proceed from the help of grace. Let the following, then, be set down as part of this disputation:

IX. Third Conclusion. Good moral works produced by the powers¹² of nature alone do not merit grace itself in any way, not even by merit of congruity.¹³ It is proved by all the arguments with which it was shown in disputations 55 and 56 that no beginning of grace, however imperfect, can proceed from the powers of nature alone. But merit of congruity by which someone merits grace is some beginning, at least an imperfect one, of that same grace. Therefore, through good moral works proceeding from the powers of nature alone, a human being does not merit grace itself even by merit of congruity. It is further proved: when councils, Supreme Pontiffs, and the holy Fathers condemned Pelagius for asserting that grace is given according to our merits, they intended to exclude from works of nature not only perfect merit, such as condign merit, but also every other imperfect merit, or merit of congruity. This is clear from what St. Augustine and St. Prosper taught against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians in the places cited above. This conclusion will become clearer from what is to be said in the next conclusion. But against this conclusion,¹⁴ some object with St. Thomas, I–II, question 114, article 3, where, asking whether a human being established in grace can merit eternal life by condign merit, he answers that if a human being’s meritorious work is considered according to the substance of the work and insofar as it proceeds from free choice, there can be no condignity in it, because of the great inequality, but there is congruity on account of a certain equality of proportion. For it seems fitting that God reward a person who works according to his own power according to the excellence of God’s power. He says the same in the body of article 6 of the same question. Therefore, etc.

It is answered that St. Thomas is to be understood as speaking of congruity on God's part, not on the part of the work or the person working, because someone existing in mortal sin cannot by nature's powers alone produce any good act that merits grace even by congruity, as was shown above. Thus St. Thomas is to be explained in the sense in which he taught in the Third Part that human nature, by a certain congruity, is more assumable by the divine Word than any other created nature whatever.¹⁵ As was already said above. Second, it is answered that St. Thomas is not speaking there about a sinner's merit with respect to first justifying grace, but about the merit of a just person in comparison with eternal life. St. Thomas's meaning is that, if the meritorious works of a just person are considered insofar as they proceed from free choice, they do not have condignity with eternal life according to their substance, and thus do not merit it condignly, in accord with the Apostle's words in Rom. 8: The sufferings of this present time are not worthy of the future glory that will be revealed in us. Nevertheless, they are meritorious by a certain congruity; for sinners too, through good works according to their object, although performed by them with an evil intention, merit the temporal goods conferred on them by God, as St. Thomas teaches in art. 10 of the same question. But if those same good works of the just are considered insofar as they proceed from justifying grace, by this account they merit eternal life condignly, for they receive value and condignity from grace itself, on the supposition of the divine promise. This is all that St. Thomas wished to teach there. Hence the argument proves nothing against our conclusion.

X. Fourth Conclusion. Even dispositions proceeding from the help of grace, whether they are remote or proximate dispositions, do not merit first justifying grace even by congruity, speaking properly of merit of congruity. This conclusion is against Henry and the other authors cited above, although Capreolus defends it in 4. dist. 14. q. 2., in response to Henry's argument.¹⁶ Nevertheless, it seems to be St. Thomas's express position in 1. 2. q. 114. art. 5., body of the article. When asking whether a person can merit first grace for himself, he answers that the gift of grace can be considered in two ways. In one way, according to the character of a gratuitous gift, and thus it is clear that every merit is incompatible with grace; for, as the Apostle says in Rom. 11, ‘If by grace, then no longer from works.’ In another way, it can be considered according to the nature of the thing itself that is given; and thus too it cannot fall under the merit of one who does not have grace, both because it exceeds the proportion of nature and because, before grace, in the state of sin, a person has an impediment to meriting grace, namely, sin itself.¹⁷ But once someone already has grace, he cannot merit the grace he already has, because a reward is the terminus of a work, whereas grace is the principle of every good work in us, as was said above. If someone merits another gratuitous gift by the power of preceding grace, then it will not be first grace. Hence it is clear that no one can merit first grace for himself. By these words he teaches plainly that no one can merit first grace for himself, not only by condign merit but even by merit of congruity, for he absolutely denies every merit of first grace. But if the holy Doctor had understood that first grace is merited by congruity through good works or dispositions preceding that same grace, he would certainly have explained this, just as he did in art. 6 of the same question. There, when asking whether one person can merit first grace for another, he answers that no one can merit first grace for another by condign merit, except Christ alone, though one can do so by merit of congruity. Furthermore, in art. 7 of the same question, in the body of the article, he says no one can merit for himself restoration after a future fall, neither by condign merit nor by merit of congruity, and gives the reason: because the character of this merit, namely, condign merit, depends on the motion of divine grace, and this motion is interrupted by a subsequent sin. He proves the same regarding merit of congruity because the efficacy of merit of congruity is impeded by a subsequent sin. In the response to the second objection he teaches clearly enough that, for merit of congruity by which someone merits some supernatural good, it is necessary that the meritorious operation proceed from justifying grace, in which all merit is founded. But dispositions preceding justifying grace in time do not proceed from that same grace, since mortal sin is compatible with them. Likewise, the final dispositions, although mortal sin is not compatible with them and they are in the same instant of time in which justifying grace is infused, nevertheless precede that grace in the order of nature. Therefore, such dispositions do not merit justifying grace even by congruity. Finally, in the same 1. 2. q. 112. art. 2. ad 1., he says the person's preparation for grace, which is simultaneous with the infusion of grace, is indeed meritorious, but not of the grace already possessed; rather, it merits glory, which is not yet possessed. There he expressly denies that the final disposition for grace that makes one pleasing to God is meritorious of that same grace. And immediately, speaking of a preparation that precedes justifying grace in time, he says: There is another imperfect preparation for grace, which sometimes precedes the gift of grace that makes one pleasing to God; this, however, comes from God moving the person. But this does not suffice for merit when the person has not yet been justified by grace, because there can be no merit except from grace, as will be said below. He refers to art. 2. q. 114., where he teaches that no created nature has a sufficient principle for an act meritorious of some good exceeding that same nature's proportion; and he gives the reason: For the act of anything is not divinely ordered to something exceeding the proportion of the power that is the principle of the act; this comes from the divine institution of providence, that nothing act beyond its power.

XI. Further, it is proved by an argument. For all merit with respect to a supernatural reward is founded on friendship and the dignity of the meriting person, according to Genesis 4: The Lord looked upon Abel and his gifts, but upon Cain and his gifts he did not look.¹⁸ By these words it is signified that Abel's gifts were acceptable to God because the person offering them was pleasing to God, but Cain's gifts were not acceptable to God because the person offering them was not pleasing to him. And in Isa. 1 it is said: Incense is an abomination to me. New moon and sabbath and other festivals I will not endure, etc., for your hands are full of blood. Here, on account of the sins by which the Jews were stained, it is shown that their oblations, solemnities, sacrifices, and prayers were not pleasing and acceptable to God, but rather troublesome. Since, therefore, the dispositions preceding sanctifying grace, insofar as they are dispositions, do not proceed from habitual grace or from a subject pleasing to God, because under this aspect they precede justifying grace in the order of nature, it remains that they are in no way meritorious of that same grace, not only by merit of condignity but not even by merit of congruity.

As for the third difficulty, which is suggested in the fifth argument, we must consider what St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2. q. 114, art. 7, where he disputes whether a man can merit restoration for himself after a fall. It should be noted that St. Bonaventure, in 2 Sent., dist. 28, around the text of the Master; Gabriel, dist. 26, q. un., art. 3, doubt 3; Vega, q. 6 On Justification, to the sixth argument; and some more recent theologians have said that through good works proceeding from justifying grace a man can merit restoration for himself after a fall by merit of congruity. St. Thomas teaches the contrary opinion in the cited article 7, as do Albert the Great in 2, dist. 28, art. 2; Alexander of Hales, 3 p. q. 69, memb. 5, art. 2; and all Thomists, especially Master Medina in the cited 1. 2. And since this opinion is very consonant with the sacred Scriptures, I set forth the following conclusion.

XII. Fifth Conclusion. A just man can merit restoration for himself after a fall neither by merit of condignity nor by merit of congruity.¹⁹ And indeed, if we speak of merit of condignity, the conclusion is most certain and commonly accepted by all theologians. The arguments we shall immediately adduce to prove that no one can merit restoration for himself after a fall even by merit of congruity prove it all the more strongly. Our conclusion is therefore proved universally from Ezekiel 18: If the just man turns away from his justice and commits iniquity, none of the just deeds that he did will be remembered. This would certainly not be true if through the works of justice that he did the just man merited restoration after a fall, at least by merit of congruity. For even after committing mortal sin, God would remember the good works he had done earlier, in order to restore him to his former grace on account of them as merits of congruity. If it is said that those words, will not be remembered, must be restricted in comparison with eternal life, because God does not remember the good works done in the first charity in order to confer eternal life for them unless they revive through penance, there is an objection to this: the same reasoning applies even more strongly to merit in comparison with restoration after a fall, because, also in comparison with that, all the merits done in the first charity have been deadened by subsequent sin. Therefore, on whatever day a just man sins mortally, God does not remember his prior merits in order to restore the sinner after a fall on account of them.

It is proved second. It is of faith that the sinner is justified freely, as is clear from the Council of Trent cited above and from the Apostle's words: Being justified freely through his grace.²⁰ And in Rom. 11: Not from works, otherwise grace is no longer grace. Therefore the sinner himself is not justified on account of any prior merit. Since, then, good works done in the first charity precede restoration after a fall, it remains that through them a just man cannot merit that same restoration.

It is proved third. It would follow from the contrary opinion that in fact there would be in a just man some merit that would not truly be deadened by subsequent mortal sin. This consequence must not be admitted, for according to the common opinion of theologians mortal sin deadens all prior merits. Therefore. The consequence is proved: if a just man by good works merits that grace be given to him by which he is restored when he falls into mortal sin, then, while he still remains in mortal sin, the prior merit remains alive and acceptable to God, so that grace is given to the sinner on account of it. Therefore that merit was not deadened.

XIII. The authors of the contrary opinion answer that mortal sin deadens every prior merit with respect to a reward to be conferred by merit of condignity, but that it is not unreasonable for it not to be deadened with respect to a reward conferred by merit of congruity. But there is an argument against this: good works do not have the power to merit that which cannot be given to the meriting person unless he is in mortal sin. For it belongs to the nature of a reward that it be given to those who are worthy, since such a giving is an act of justice, according to the Apostle's words: As for the rest, a crown of justice is laid up for me, which the Lord, the just judge, will give me on that day.²¹ But one who is in mortal sin is worthy of no reward, but of eternal punishment. Since, then, restoration after a fall cannot be given to the meriting person unless he is in mortal sin, it remains that no man, however just, can merit restoration after a fall for himself, even by merit of condignity.

XIV. There are arguments against this conclusion by which the authors of the contrary opinion are persuaded. The first argument is this: Aristotle says in Ethics 9, chapter 3, that something is to be granted on account of an old friendship. Therefore, at least by merit of congruity, one who was in grace merits restoration after a fall.

It is answered that something should be attributed to old friendship, not as a reward for merit, even merit of congruity, but from the pure mercy and goodness of the giver.²² Hence God often, from his own mercy and generosity alone, grants grace after a fall to old friends; yet he does not always do so, because there is no law or justice that requires it.

XV. The second argument is drawn from those words of the Apostle to the Hebrews 6: For God is not unjust, so as to forget the work and labor. St. Thomas explains this passage in lecture 3 as concerning restoration after a fall and merit of congruity. For when this argument had been raised: Justice regards merit. If, then, the Lord's justice requires God not to forget if someone repents, as the gloss says, it follows that a human being's rising from sin falls under merit, and so he would merit grace, which is impossible, he answers: There are two kinds of merit: one that rests on justice, and this is condign merit; the other rests on mercy alone, and is called merit of congruity. Of this latter he says that it is just, that is, fitting, that a person who does many good things should merit. By these words he teaches plainly enough that a righteous person merits restoration after a fall for himself by merit of congruity.

It is answered that St. Thomas, in the cited place in I–II, expressly teaches that a righteous person does not merit restoration after a fall for himself through good works, even by merit of congruity. Hence we must either say that St. Thomas changed his opinion in I–II, or explain that he is speaking not of merit of congruity coming from works done in grace and deadened by a subsequent sin, but of merit proceeding from contrition itself, by which a person is proximally prepared for the infusion of grace. For such contrition can in some way be called meritorious of grace itself by merit of congruity, not properly and strictly, but in a broad sense, as was said above.²³ This explanation seems to fit the context: for in the immediately preceding words he had said that a person who falls after grace can be situated in two ways. In one way, he perseveres in evil, and then God forgets all his acts of justice; in another way, he repents, and then God remembers his preceding good works, because they are counted toward his merit. Hence the gloss says that deadened works come back to life. St. Thomas therefore wishes to say two things. One is that if a person repents after sin and afterward perseveres, through the good works done in his first charity he obtains eternal life by justice, for through repentance they come back to life. The other is that through an act of repentance and charity, by which he is disposed for grace, a person merits the infusion of grace by merit of congruity, taken in a broad sense, insofar as it implies an obligation by which a form is owed to its final disposition; but not insofar as it implies a relation to justification as a wage and reward. To the cited passage of the Apostle it is answered that it is to be understood of condign merit with respect to glory, but not of merit with respect to restoration after a fall. Its sense is that, however much God may permit righteous people to fall into mortal sin, by which their preceding merits are deadened, if they afterward rise through true repentance, he does not on that account forget those same merits; for an eternal reward is left to them, according to the Apostle's words in 2 Timothy 4: From now on a crown of righteousness is laid up for me. The Council of Trent explains the Apostle's passage in this way, session 6 on justification, chapter 16: For this reason, to people who have been justified, whether they have preserved the grace they received continually or recovered grace they lost, the Apostle's words are to be proposed: Be abundant in every good work, knowing that your labor is not in vain in the Lord.²⁴ For God is not unjust, so as to forget your work and the love you showed in his name.²⁵ And: Do not lose your confidence,²⁶ which has a great reward. And therefore eternal life is to be proposed to those who do good works to the end and hope in God, both as grace mercifully promised to the children of God through Jesus Christ and as a reward faithfully to be repaid, according to God's own promise, for good works and merits. For this is the crown of righteousness that the Apostle said was laid up for him after his contest and course, to be repaid to him by the just judge—not only to him, but also to all who love his coming.²⁷²⁸ St. Chrysostom gives the same explanation in homily 10 on the Epistle to the Hebrews, and Cajetan follows it in I–II, question 114, article 7, as does Andreas de Vega, book 13 of On Justification, chapter 10. It is common and very much in keeping with the Apostle's context.

XVI. The third argument is this. The prayer of Psalm 70, When my strength fails, do not abandon me, is acceptable to God. Therefore, it merits what it asks, at least by merit of congruity. But in it the Prophet, speaking in the name of all the righteous, asks that after falling into sin he be restored by God through grace. Therefore, by that prayer a righteous person merits restoration after a fall for himself by merit of congruity.

It is answered that in that prayer the Prophet, in the name of the righteous, asks for divine help by which they may be preserved from sin in a time of tribulation. The righteous can merit this help for themselves by merit of congruity through good works proceeding from grace. St. Augustine follows this explanation on the same psalm, as does Lyra's gloss, and it is fairly common among the Doctors. Yet it does not follow from this that a righteous person can merit restoration after a fall for himself by merit of congruity.

XVII. Second, it is answered that, if in that prayer a just person asks for restoration after a fall, as the other Doctors hold, with whom St. Thomas seems to agree in 1. 2. q. 114. art. 7. ad 1., such a prayer can be called an impetration of that same restoration after a fall, but not meritorious, even by congruity.²⁹ The reason for the distinction is what St. Thomas hints at in the same response to the first objection, and states more expressly in 2. 2. q. 83. art. 16. ad 2. For merit rests on justice and the divine promise; hence reward corresponds to it infallibly and by a certain law, unless it is deadened by a subsequent sin. But impetration does not rest on justice, but on divine mercy and liberality; hence even sinners obtain many good things from God by praying, as the same holy Doctor proves in 2. 2. q. 83. art. 16. ad 2. For this reason St. Augustine says in his commentary on John: If God did not hear sinners, the tax collector would have said in vain: ‘Lord, be merciful³⁰ to me, a sinner.’³¹³² And Chrysostom says in his commentary on Matthew: Everyone who asks receives, that is, whether he is just or a sinner.³³

The fourth argument is this. A just person merits restoration after a fall for another by congruity, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2. q. 114. ar. 6. Therefore, he can merit it for himself too. The consequence is proved: a person's merit is more ordered to what is to be conferred on himself than to what is to be conferred on someone else.

It is answered by denying the consequence. In the case of the antecedent, it is not necessary that the other person, for whom the just person merits restoration, fall into a new mortal sin in order to be restored and for the one meriting to receive the reward he merits by congruity.³⁴ But for a just person to merit restoration after a fall for himself, it is necessary that he fall into a new mortal sin in order for such a reward to be conferred on him. Hence the cases are not alike.

But there is an argument against this. It follows from this response that one just person cannot merit restoration after a fall for another just person, even by congruity. The consequence is proved: in this case it is impossible for such a reward to be given unless the other person, for whom he merited restoration, falls into a new mortal sin. For one who is in grace cannot be restored after a fall unless he sins mortally. It is answered, with St. Thomas in the cited art. 6, by denying the consequence. The reason is that, in the case of the consequence, for that reward to be given, it is not necessary that the one meriting fall into a new mortal sin, by reason of which the preceding merit would be interrupted and deadened. Hence that merit always remains acceptable to God, even if a mortal sin occurs on the other person's part, which is presupposed for restoration. Nevertheless, when someone merits restoration for himself, it is necessary that the one meriting himself fall into mortal sin in order for that reward to be given. Hence the cases are not alike.

XVIII. But the argument presses further. What should be said if Peter, existing in grace, merits restoration after a fall for Paul, and, before Paul is restored, Peter loses grace by sinning mortally? Will Paul afterward be restored on account of Peter's merit, at least by congruity? Certain Thomists answer that, even if Peter sins mortally before Paul is restored, that merit still remains before God. They give this reason: by Peter, the one meriting, sinning mortally, Paul does not lose the right already acquired by congruity that he has from Peter's merit already applied to him, because Peter's sin occurs accidentally. But this reason does not work when someone merits restoration for himself, since then the sin of the one meriting is presupposed per se in order for him to be restored. Many other Thomists do not like this solution, and rightly so; for it would follow from it that Peter's mortal sin does not in fact deaden all his preceding merits, since that merit of congruity by which the same Peter merited Paul's restoration after a fall would still remain. Therefore, it must be said with Medina, 1. 2. q. 114. art. 1. ad 2., that if Peter, who merited Paul's restoration by congruity, sins mortally before Paul is restored, Paul will not afterward be restored through Peter's merit, because it was interrupted and deadened by a subsequent sin. Hence, if Paul is in fact restored after a fall, his restoration will occur from God's mere mercy, without any merit of Peter, just as if Peter had never merited Paul's restoration by congruity.

XIX. The fifth argument is this. A subsequent mortal sin does not destroy the merit with respect to glory that was in good works performed in grace; otherwise the reprobate would merit nothing through good works performed when they were in grace. Therefore, neither does it destroy merit with respect to restoration after a fall. Therefore, just as the reprobate truly merit eternal life condignly through good works performed in grace, although in fact it is not afterward conferred on them because of the impediment of sin, so too a just person merits restoration after a fall, at least by congruity, through good works, although this reward is often not conferred on him because of the impediment of sin.

It is answered that, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited 1. 2. q. 114. art. 7., the reprobate, as long as they are in grace, truly merit eternal life through good works, although a subsequent sin places an impediment to their obtaining that reward.³⁵ The reason is that, from the nature of the thing, it was not necessary that the one meriting sin mortally in order to obtain that reward, because by divine help he could persevere to the end. But for a just person to obtain restoration after a fall, it is necessary that a new mortal sin occur. Hence it entails a contradiction for him to merit restoration after a fall for himself, as was said.

As for the fourth difficulty, which is suggested in the sixth argument from the outset, nothing need now be said, lest the course of this disputation be drawn out longer than is fitting; therefore we reserve its resolution for the following disputation. From what has been said, it is easy to answer all the arguments made at the outset.

XX. To the first argument, we have already said around the second conclusion that a man is justified freely, that is, without his own works meriting the grace of justification itself; but not without a prior disposition on his part, if he is an adult, a disposition to which grace is infallibly given, not as a reward for merit but as a form to its ultimate disposition.

To the confirmation, it is answered that the Semipelagians posited an infallible connection between works of nature and the attainment of grace, as was said above, and for this reason St. Prosper rightly reproved them. We, however, establish an infallible connection only between justifying grace and its ultimate disposition, proceeding from the gratuitous motion of God. Hence the whole operation is reduced to grace; and consequently it does not follow that grace is given according to our merits.

To the second argument, it is already clear from what was said in the third and fourth conclusions how dispositions, even ultimate ones, are not meritorious of justification itself either by merit of condignity or by merit of congruity, although sanctifying grace is infallibly given, and by a certain law, to one who elicits an act of contrition from special help.

XXI. To the third, it is answered that grace is the radical and habitual principle of merit, whereas the gift of perseverance in adults is the actual and proximate principle,³⁶ which is conferred on adults by way of a transient motion. Therefore, before the infusion of grace, there precedes a preparation of free choice moved by the special help of God, to which grace infallibly corresponds as a form to its ultimate disposition. But before divine motion, no preparation of free choice is presupposed, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2. q. 109, art. 6, ad 3, assigning two reasons for this in the same place. The first is that God is the first mover; hence, in order to move free choice, he does not need first to dispose it by another motion. The second is that there would be a process to infinity, because another motion would be necessary for that prior motion, and another would be required for that one, and so on to infinity. This is unreasonable, because no action would follow, since the infinite cannot be traversed.

To the fourth argument, it is answered that it can be gathered from the sacred Scriptures that God infallibly and by a certain law infuses justifying grace into all sinners who, by God's special help, elicit an act of charity and contrition by which they are prepared for the infusion of grace. For it is said in Zechariah 1: Turn to me, and I will turn³⁷ to you. And in Ezekiel 18: But if the wicked man does penance for all his sins that he has committed, and keeps all my precepts, and practices judgment and justice, he will live and not die. I will remember none of all the iniquities he has committed; he will live in the justice he has practiced, namely, the spiritual life that is through justifying grace. Since, then, God promises life to those doing penance in these words, it remains that the sacred Scriptures show that grace is infallibly given to those who elicit an act of contrition from the special help of God.

To the fifth argument, it is answered that the meritorious acts produced by a just man after receiving justifying grace are not dispositions for restoration after a fall. But contrition, which precedes grace in the order of nature, is the ultimate disposition for its infusion; hence the cases are not alike.

To the sixth argument, the solution will be clear from what must be said in the following disputation.