De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether, for those who do all that is in them from the powers of nature alone, there are infallibly and by a certain law given by God helps of prevenient grace by which they carry it out as is required for salvation.

I. Some defend the affirmative part, which they explain through four statements. First statement. According to the ordinary law, God is not accustomed to give men helps of prevenient and exciting grace by which they may be disposed for salvation, except to those who use their free choice well, doing what is in them by the faculty of nature.

Second statement. For one who does all that is in him by the faculty of nature alone, helps of prevenient grace are infallibly given by a certain law which the Father established with the Son on account of the merits of his Passion. They add, however, that these helps are not given on account of prior merits of the man himself, but on account of Christ's merits.

Third statement, which explains this opinion more fully. Just as God is always at hand to free choice through his general concurrence, so that it may naturally will or refuse, as it pleases, so he is at hand to it through the help of sufficient grace, so that whenever it chooses, by its natural powers, to undertake some work among those that pertain to justification, it may carry it out as is required for salvation. They add that God, without any interruption, always stands ready at the door of the heart to help our efforts, and desires to enter. They do not, however, explain sufficiently whether that effort, proceeding from the powers of nature alone, is numerically the same act as the effort by which free choice elicits a disposition for grace—that is, whether the very same act, proceeding from the powers of nature, is perfected and elevated by prevenient grace to the supernatural order, so as to be of the kind required for salvation—although they seem to suggest this.

From these points they infer a fourth statement: namely, that the helps of prevenient and exciting grace are not absolutely necessary for man to elicit a disposition for grace as regards the substance of the act, but only for him to elicit it as is required, that is, so that the act be supernatural and suited to a supernatural end. But this is to be treated in disputation 65.

II. They prove the first statement: for, as will be clear in disputation 78, God's interior call to faith, the interior stirring of a believer to repentance through prevenient grace, and even the illuminations and helps by which those justified are aided by God both to receive greater increase of the Spirit and not to succumb to temptations, depend very greatly on the free choice of the one who is called and stirred. Therefore, according to the ordinary law, these helps are not given unless something first comes from the side of free choice. The antecedent is proved. First, because it is presupposed that a man approaches to hear the preaching of the Gospel; but he could approach intending to attend to what was being said, or intending to mock it, which was within his own power. Likewise, for him to be stirred to faith, it is presupposed that he first acquires intelligible species and cognitions, without which God would not stir him by the actual help of prevenient grace. Therefore the helps of prevenient grace depend on the free choice of the one who is called.

First confirmation. These helps often depend on ministers of the Church, without whose action God does not call men, as will be clear in disputation 77; yet this dependence detracts nothing from grace. Therefore, in the same way, the call can depend on the free choice of the one called without any injury being done to grace.

Second confirmation. The interior helps of prevenient grace consist in an illumination of the intellect and a stirring of the will, as is clear from the Council of Trent, session 6, On Justification, chapter 5, where it says: It further declares that the beginning of justification itself in adults must be taken from the prevenient grace of God through Jesus Christ, that is, from his call, by which they are called when none of their merits exist. But the call is made by God inwardly through an illumination of the intellect and a stirring of the will. Hence it adds below: So that, as God touches the heart of man through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, etc. By these words it is signified that the illumination of the intellect is prevenient grace. But this illumination of the intellect and stirring of the will, since they are formally vital actions, depend intrinsically on our vital powers, namely, on the intellect and will eliciting such operations. Therefore such helps depend in some way on the effort of our intellect and will; therefore, ordinarily speaking, without it God does not confer the helps of prevenient grace.

III. Second, an argument is made from the authority of St. Augustine, City of God, book 19, chapter 13, where he says: God gave human beings certain goods fitting for this life, that is, temporal peace in proportion to mortal life, in health, safety, and the fellowship of their kind; and whatever is necessary for preserving or recovering this peace, such as this visible light, breathable air, drinkable water, and so on. He did so by this most equitable arrangement: whoever among mortals has used such goods rightly will receive greater and better goods, namely the peace of immortality itself, and the fitting glory and honor in eternal life, to enjoy God and one's neighbor in God. But whoever uses them wrongly, that is, unjustly, will neither receive those nor lose these. By these words he seems plainly to establish the law asserted by the second statement of this opinion.

Third, an argument is made for the other statements, especially the second, and is drawn from various places in St. Thomas. For in Questions on Truth, question 14, article 11, reply to objection 1, he says: If someone brought up in the woods were to follow the guidance of natural reason in desiring good and fleeing evil, it must be held with complete certainty that God would either reveal to him through an inward inspiration what is necessary for believing, or send some preacher of the faith to him, just as he sent Peter to Cornelius in Acts 10. Here St. Thomas plainly teaches that if this person does what lies within him, following the dictate of natural reason in desiring good and fleeing evil, he will certainly be enlightened by God, which is the same as saying infallibly. But this infallibility can be grounded only in a law established by God, on account of Christ's merits, and in a decree to give the helps of prevenient grace to all who do all that lies within them. St. Thomas therefore holds that there is such a law. The same is gathered from his reply to objection 2 of the same article, where he says that although it is not in our power to know the things of faith from ourselves, nevertheless, if we do what lies within us, namely, follow the guidance of natural reason, God will not fail us in what is necessary for us. Likewise, in third contra Gentiles, chapter 159.¹ he says that God, for his part, is ready to give grace to all; only those are deprived of grace who themselves provide an impediment to grace. But one who does all that lies within him by the capacity of nature provides no impediment to grace, as is clear in itself. Therefore, according to St. Thomas's view, he will most certainly and infallibly receive the helps of prevenient grace. In Sentences, book 2, distinction 28, question 1, article 4, he says that someone can also prepare himself to have faith through what is in natural reason. Hence it is said that if someone born among barbarian nations does what lies within him, God will reveal to him what is necessary for salvation, either by inspiring him or by sending a teacher. And in Questions on Truth, question 24, article 1, reply to objection 2, he says: Although a person cannot acquire by free choice the grace that makes works meritorious, he can nevertheless prepare himself to have grace, which will not be denied him by God if he does what lies within him. And so it is not wholly outside the power of free choice to perform meritorious works, although the power of free choice by itself is not sufficient for this. Therefore.

Fourth, it is argued. In fact, God always grants sufficient help to one who does what lies within him. Therefore, he has decreed to confer it, for whatever God does, he has decreed to do. But God's decree is God's law, just as a ruler's law is the ruler's decree. Therefore, there truly is a law established by God to give the helps of prevenient grace to those who do all that lies within them. The antecedent is proved: God grants sufficient help to those who do not do what lies within them; otherwise he would fail to provide what is necessary for salvation. Therefore, all the more does he infallibly confer such help if they do all that lies within them. Otherwise, those who do not do what lies within them by the capacity of nature alone would have been provided for much better than those who do what lies within them. It would consequently follow that the admonitions by which sinners are urged to do good works are pointless, and likewise that good works done in mortal sin are pointless—something that must not be admitted.

IIII. Fifth, the aforesaid law is gathered from passages of Sacred Scripture, especially John 1: He was the true light, which enlightens every human being coming into this world; and 1 Timothy 2.² God wills all human beings to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. This would certainly be false if at some time God did not enlighten someone or give the helps of grace to one who does all that lies within him. For how does he will all human beings to be saved if he does not give the helps necessary for salvation, or even sufficient for it, to one who does all that lies within him? Therefore, there is a law concerning the giving of such helps to one who does what lies within him. Likewise, in Revelation 3 the Lord says in his own person: I stand at the door and knock; if anyone hears my voice and opens the door to me, I will enter to him, dine with him, and he with me. From these words it is gathered that God stands without interruption at the door of our heart, always ready to help our efforts and desiring to enter, if a person does what lies within him.

Sixth, the opposite opinion would entail one great absurdity: namely, that some adult would necessarily be damned. Yet this must in no way be admitted, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited Questions on Truth, question 14.

V. The consequence is proved as follows. If there is no law that those who do all that is in them receive the helps of prevenient grace, it will sometimes happen that a person does all that is in him, and yet God does not confer such helps on him. But, this being supposed, such a person will necessarily be damned, because he cannot be saved without the help of grace, which nevertheless he neither has nor can have, since God does not will to give it, whatever he may do. Another inconvenience would also follow, namely, that venial sin could exist in someone who has only original sin; but this is contrary to St. Thomas, Prima Secundae, question 89, article 6. The consequence is proved. If an unbaptized child who has reached the use of reason does all that is in him by nature's capacity in order to turn himself to God, he does not sin mortally against the precept by which, according to St. Thomas, he is bound at that moment to turn to God; for no one sins if he does all that he can, since otherwise he would be bound to do the impossible. Nor does he thereby obtain remission of original sin, because sin cannot be erased without the help of grace, which, however, we suppose God does not confer on that child. The argument is then this. After that time has passed, the child can sin venially before he sins mortally; therefore, if in fact he sins venially, venial sin will be found in him along with original sin alone.

Seventh. The salvation of an adult is placed in his power as long as he lives in this world. But it would not be in his power unless there were an infallible law that those who do all they can by nature's capacity receive the helps of prevenient grace, so that their action may be such as is required for salvation. Therefore. The major premise is clear from Eccles. 15: God from the beginning established man and left him in the hand of his own counsel. He set before you water and fire; stretch out your hand to whichever you wish. Before man are life and death, good and evil; whatever he chooses will be given to him. And Psalm 118 says: My soul is always in my hands, that is, in my power. The minor premise is proved as follows: if there were no law to give the helps of prevenient grace to someone who does all that is in him by nature's capacity alone, it would not be in that person's power to have those same helps, but only in God's power; and consequently salvation, which cannot be had without the helps of grace, would be in God's power alone and not in a person's power.

This is confirmed by John 1: He gave them the power to become children of God, to those who believe in his name, etc. By these words it is signified that people have been given the power to become children of God insofar as, if they strive as much as they can, God will be at hand to enable them to obtain faith and grace, and they will not be deprived of what they desire. Therefore, etc.

VI. The second opinion is opposed to the preceding one. All Thomists and the other Doctors in the places cited below defend it; and since this opinion is most certain and expresses the mind of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, let this be said for its explanation.³

First Conclusion. No law was ever established by God to give the helps of prevenient grace to those who do all that is in them by nature's capacity alone; nor did Christ our Lord merit or will that there be such a law.⁴ This is proved from St. Augustine in the passages cited in the preceding disputation, conclusions 2 and 3, and in Letter 107 to Vitalis. There he holds it certain that, when two people stand in an equal case, God enlightens one because he wills, and does not enlighten the other because it does not please him, which is shown without any contradiction in the case of little ones, as St. Augustine himself says in the same letter, arguing against the Pelagians; and the holy Doctor adds that no difference can be assigned on the parents' part. For he says: How can it be said that all people would have received that grace if those to whom it is not given did not reject it by their own will, because God wills all people to be saved, when it is not given to many little ones, and very many die without it who have no contrary will; and sometimes, although their parents desire it and hasten, and the ministers too are willing and ready, it is not given because God is unwilling, when the one for whom they were hastening to obtain it suddenly dies before it is given? Hence it is clear that those who resist this truth, so plainly manifest, do not at all understand the wording by which it is said that God wills all people to be saved, although so many are not saved—not because of their own unwillingness, but because God does not will it—which is shown without any obscurity in little ones. Moreover, in Book I of the Questions to Simplicianus, question 2, especially near the end, he teaches the same thing most clearly, as is clear from his words quoted above. There he affirms that God often leaves in unbelief people who apply themselves to morally good works by nature's capacity, and calls others to the faith who are corrupt in conduct, very wicked, and great sinners. Augustine therefore holds that no law was established by God for giving the helps of grace to those who do what is in them by nature's capacity. Likewise, in Book I Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 8, he says: For if the desire for good begins in us without God's grace, that very beginning will be a merit to which the help of grace will come as if owed; and thus God's grace will not be given freely, but what we have earned will be given. By these words he seems plainly to teach that operations preceding grace, proceeding from nature's capacity alone, upon which grace is given, are some beginning of that same grace and a kind of merit for it. He teaches this at greater length also in Book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 2. Therefore St. Augustine understood that there is no such law.

VII. It is confirmed by a clear argument from an effect: for St. Augustine often teaches that no reason can be assigned on man's part why God calls this one and not that one. He asserts this especially in the cited question 2, To Simplicianus, at the end, whose words are: Why, however, is it so for this one and not so for that one? Man, who are you? If you do not repay what is owed, you have something to be grateful for; if you repay it, you have nothing to complain about. From these words it is clear that, of two people who ask, knock equally, and desire by the mere faculty of nature, according to Augustine God calls one because he wills, and does not call the other because he does not will, so that he may be shown true who said: It is not of the one who wills, nor of the one who runs, but of God who shows mercy.⁵ And again: Therefore he has mercy on whom he wills, and whom he wills he hardens. St. Augustine therefore holds that the aforesaid law does not exist, and that God did not establish that, ordinarily speaking, one who has not first done what is in him by the faculty of nature is not called through grace, nor that help of grace is infallibly given to one who does all that is in him. Otherwise a reason could be assigned on man's part why God calls this one and not that one: namely, because this one first did all that was in him by the faculty of nature, whereas that one did not. We shall adduce other passages of Augustine that especially support this teaching in the following conclusion. Nor is it enough to answer that antecedent good works, done by the faculty of nature alone, are merely a condition without which God ordinarily does not give the help of prevenient grace, and not a reason on account of which grace is conferred. For, according to the teaching handed down by Augustine, to say that a condition sine qua non of predestination and grace is given on our part is the same as saying that a cause of predestination and grace, or a reason why a man is predestined and called to faith, is given, as was shown in disputation 37.

VIII. Second, it is proved from St. Prosper, Against the Collator, chapters 4, 5, and 6, where he attacks Cassian, who asserts: When he has seen in us some beginning of a good will, he at once illuminates, strengthens, and stirs it toward salvation, granting increase to the will that he himself either planted or saw spring up through our effort. Hence human reason cannot easily discern how the Lord grants to those who ask, is found by those who seek, and opens to those who knock, etc. By these words, as was shown in disputation 2, nos. 24 ff., Cassian asserted that if a man does what is in him by asking, knocking, seeking, etc., God will at once be present through exciting grace to illuminate the man and grant increase to the action he had seen spring up through our effort. Yet St. Prosper rebukes Cassian for placing by this assertion in nature the beginning of grace, although an imperfect one, and some merit of grace, even though Cassian did not explicitly assert that God had established a law that helps of grace be given to one who does what is in him by the faculty of nature, by asking, seeking, knocking, etc., or that they be given on account of works of nature as merit; he only said that all who by the faculty of nature do what is in them by seeking, knocking, etc., are said to receive, come, and enter, as Prosper himself reports in the same book, chapter 6. Faustus of Riez held the same as Cassian, as was said in disputation 2, nos. 13 ff. Against them, the same Prosper says in book 1 of On the Call of All Nations, chapter 9: It remains in force and is fulfilled daily, what the Lord promised Abraham without a condition and granted without a law:⁶ He therefore holds that God established no law for giving helps of grace to those who do all that is in them by the faculty of nature alone. Otherwise the promise of salvation made to the sons of Abraham would not have been absolute but conditional, namely, if they themselves had done what was in them; and the very gift of grace would not have been given without a law, if the contrary opinion were true.

IX. Third, it is proved by the authority of St. Thomas, first part of the second part, question 112, article 3, in the body, where he clearly teaches our opinion. For he says that preparation, if considered insofar as it is from free choice, has no necessity for the attainment of grace; but if considered insofar as it is from God moving, etc. He teaches the same in question 109, art. 6, ad 2, and on Romans 10, lecture 3, where he explains the maxim, For one who does what is in him, God does not deny grace, as referring to one who does what is in him insofar as he is moved by divine help. For he says: If any of them had nevertheless done what was in them, the Lord in his mercy would have provided for them by sending them a preacher of the faith, as Peter was sent to Cornelius, as told in Acts 10, and Paul to the Macedonians, as told in Acts 16. Yet this very fact, that some do what is in them by turning themselves to God, is from God, moving their hearts toward good. Lamentations 5: Turn us, O Lord, to you, and we shall be turned.

They answer that St. Thomas there speaks of habitual grace, for which not every human preparation is sufficient. But against this: the very same reasoning applies to actual helps of prevenient grace. For, since they are simply the first gifts of grace, they are given freely by God no less than habitual grace; indeed, the very character of gratuitous giving shines much more in the bestowal of the first help of grace than in the other gifts, which presuppose prior gratuitous helps, as will become clear from what we shall say in disputations 58 and 59. Moreover, the reason St. Thomas, in the cited place, says that no preparation, insofar as it comes from free choice, has necessity—that is, infallibility—for attaining grace is that the gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human power. But actual helps of prevenient grace likewise, since they are supernatural in their essence, exceed every preparation of human power and the whole order of nature. Therefore. Moreover, there is another place of St. Thomas where he expressly speaks of actual helps, namely third contra Gentiles, chapter 149, where he expressly proves by many arguments that a human being cannot merit the aforesaid help, nor even attain it by his own power. Among other things, in the first argument he says: Divine help is not given to us because we advance toward it by good works; rather, we make progress by good works because we are preceded by divine help. In the third argument he proves the same in these words: No particular agent can universally precede the action of the first and universal agent, since every action of a particular agent has its origin in a universal agent, just as among these lower things every motion is preceded by celestial motion. But the human soul is ordered under God as a particular agent under a universal one. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be any right motion in the soul that divine action does not precede.

X. Fourth, it is proved by an argument founded on Sacred Scripture. For whatever is given under a law and agreement to a person who works is given to him by a title of justice, at least imperfect justice; for a law and contract establish a claim of justice, as is clear from the parable in Matthew in which the laborers made an agreement with the master for a denarius. There the master said to one: Did you not agree with me for a day's wage of a denarius? Take what is yours, and go in peace.⁷ Therefore, if actual helps of prevenient grace are given by God under an agreement and contract to those who do all they can by the capacity of nature, they are given to them by a title of justice grounded in a divine contract and agreement. Consequently, those helps will not be gifts of grace but things owed for works; and so grace would not be grace. For Romans 11 says: But if it is by grace, then it is no longer from works; otherwise grace is no longer grace. It is confirmed by Romans 4: But to one who works, the reward is not reckoned according to grace but according to what is owed. Therefore, if there is a law that helps of grace be given to one who works by the capacity of nature and does all he can, such helps will be given to him as what is owed, not according to grace.

They answer that, although there is the aforesaid law, because it was established on account of Christ's merits and not on account of any condign worthiness, proportion, or piety found in works done by the capacity of nature, those helps are owed only in relation to Christ, who merited them for us and in view of whom, and on account of whose merits, the law was established; they are not owed in relation to those who use their free choice well by the capacity of nature alone.⁸ Just so, the justification of the ungodly, or habitual grace, which is given to those for whom Christ the Lord offered his passion in its efficacy, is owed in relation to Christ, but not in relation to those sinners themselves, since they are justified wholly freely.

But against this: for even when the Semi-Pelagians were challenged by Saints Augustine and Prosper because on their view grace was given according to our merits, they answered that goods of nature were in no way meritorious of grace, but only an occasion on which God was moved to confer the helps of prevenient grace; and so grace always remained gratuitous, as is clear from the words of Faustus and Cassian quoted in disputation 2, numbers 15, 26, and 28. Moreover, the same answer is refuted by a parallel case. If a king, at a prince's request, were to enact a law that he would give a certain city to whichever soldier in his army entered it first, surely the soldier who entered the city first would make it owed to him by a title of justice grounded in the law enacted at the prince's request; and, given the law, his deed would have some proportion to the value of that city, because the law gave it that proportion, although considered in itself and apart from the law it would have none. Therefore, the same applies in the present case, etc. Nor is the case the same as the example given about habitual grace. For when a law establishes that something will be given to someone who acts beforehand, there truly is an obligation in relation to the person who acts, so that what was promised by law is owed for that very act. But Christ did not merit that justification or habitual grace be given to a sinner as someone who acts beforehand by the capacity of nature alone; otherwise Christ would have merited that his grace not be grace. Hence the example is irrelevant.

XI. Fifth, this is proved from Romans 15: For I say that Christ Jesus was a minister of the circumcision for the truth of God, to confirm the promises made to the fathers; but that the Gentiles should honor God for his mercy. Explaining this passage, St. Thomas says in Lecture 1 that Christ in his own person presented himself only to the Jews, for the truth of God, namely, so that the truth of God who made the promise might be confirmed. Hence he adds, ‘To confirm the promises made to the fathers,’ that is, so that by this the promises made to the fathers might be fulfilled. Hence this does not apply to the Gentiles, but they were received on account of mercy.⁹ From this the argument is drawn. Christ came to the Gentiles out of sheer mercy, because he had not been promised to them; but he came to the Jews in order to keep the truth of his promises. Therefore, by reason of truthfulness, which is a potential part of justice,, the helps of prevenient grace are in some way owed to those who do what is in them, if they were promised those helps by an established law. Therefore, this law must not be admitted.

This is confirmed, first, because, as St. Thomas teaches in 2. 2. q. 80. art. 1., in the body of the article, a legal obligation is that which someone is bound by law to render. Therefore, if God bound himself by his own law to give the helps of prevenient grace to those who do what is in them, such helps are owed to them according to law.¹⁰

This is confirmed, second, because in the same place St. Thomas teaches that truthfulness is a potential part of justice, in which a moral obligation is found. Therefore, what is rendered in order to keep the truth of promises is rendered from imperfect justice when a promise has been made by law to someone who performs an action. Therefore, there is no such law.

Finally, this is proved from Canon 6 of the Council of Orange, where the person who says, Without the grace of God, mercy is conferred on us who believe, will, desire, and knock, etc., is condemned. By these words it teaches plainly and absolutely that mercy is not given to those who believe by nature's capacity alone, who will, who knock. The expression mercy is conferred should be noted, for the Semi-Pelagians, against whom the Council speaks, said that the helps of grace were given through mercy, and not through justice or as something owed, to all who believe, will, and desire, as is clear from what Prosper reports and what we said above concerning the opinion of Faustus and Cassian.¹¹ Therefore, all the more, one cannot say that mercy in the form of prevenient grace is given by a certain law to those who will, desire, and knock by nature's capacity alone. The Council therefore holds that no such law exists.

XII. Second Conclusion. It is false, as the first statement of the first opinion asserts, that according to the ordinary law or the common manner God follows, he does not give the helps of prevenient grace unless people do what is in them by nature's capacity.¹² This is proved from what was said in the first conclusion. Moreover, otherwise, according to the ordinary law and common manner God follows, the help of grace would follow upon human humility or obedience, which is contrary to Canon 6 of the Second Council of Orange. It would also follow that, according to that same law and manner, God would wait for our will in order to confer on us the prior helps of exciting grace and so that we might will to be cleansed; this seems contrary to Canon 4 of the same Council. This is proved as follows: if, generally speaking, God gives the helps of prevenient grace only to those believing as regards the substance of the act, willing, knocking, and doing what is in them by nature's capacity, then, generally speaking, prevenient grace follows upon the human will and obedience, and, speaking regularly, God waits for our will in order to grant us the first gifts of prevenient grace. This cannot be admitted, as will be clear in disputation 95.

Second, as was shown in disputation 2, no. 21, this first statement was asserted by Cassian in Conference 13, where he says: Thus God's grace always cooperates with our free choice toward the good, and helps, protects, and defends it in all things, so that sometimes it even requires or awaits certain efforts of a good will from it, lest he seem to confer his gifts on one wholly asleep or dissolved in idle sloth, etc.¹³ Yet St. Prosper reproves Cassian for this assertion in several chapters of Against the Collator, but especially chapter 39, definition 6, where he says: As if both positions should be accepted in such a way that in some people the will precedes grace, in others grace precedes the will, and not in such a way that in everyone the will follows grace. For, according to them, if free choice is removed when it is preceded by grace, grace is removed when it is preceded by free choice. Therefore he would have reproved Cassian all the more if he had said that, generally speaking, God does not give the help of prevenient grace unless a human will comes first by doing all that is in it.

XIII. Third, if the first statement were true, it would follow that prevenient grace, generally speaking, is not simply prevenient, and that God's first calling and excitation do not first precede us, but would be prevenient while themselves preceded by the created will. This is proved as follows: it would be preceded by free choice doing what is in it by nature's capacity; therefore grace would be preceded by nature, and would not precede it.

Fourth. God goes before with the helps of grace those who use their free choice badly, and calls them while they are caught in the very act of sin; as is clear from many passages of Scripture. For he says: I was found by those who were not seeking me; I appeared openly to those who did not ask me. And again: All day long I stretched out my hands to a people who did not believe but contradicted me. And in Isa. 50: Because I came, and there was no man; I called, and there was no one who would hear. In this the mercy of God shines forth especially, because he calls to himself the sluggish and negligent, and sinners who are unworthy and ungrateful. God observes this not merely ordinarily, but always, when he calls sinners: For all have sinned and lack the glory of God:¹⁴ therefore, etc.

This is confirmed by a notable testimony of St. Augustine, found in book 1 of On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, chapter 22, where, explaining the words, Not from works, but from him who calls it was said: The elder shall serve the younger, and O the depth of riches, he says: How does it happen that a man, from early childhood, is more modest, more intelligent, more temperate, victorious over lust to a great extent, hating greed, detesting wantonness, and growing more advanced and better suited to the other virtues, is nevertheless in a place where Christian grace cannot be preached to him? For how will they call upon one in whom they have not believed? Or how will they believe him whom they have not heard? But how will they hear without a preacher? Yet another, slow in intelligence, given over to lust, covered with shameful acts and crimes, is so directed that he hears, believes, is baptized, and is snatched away—or, if he is kept here, lives commendably? Where did these two acquire such different merits? I do not mean that this one believes and the other does not, which belongs to the will proper to each, but that this one hears and the other does not hear. For this is not in man's power. Where, I ask, did they acquire such different merits? He pursues many other points there in this way, showing that no merits or demerits preceded before the soul was infused into the body, on account of which one would be born slow in intelligence and given over to lust, or be called by God, while another would not. Augustine considered this argument so effective that, a little later, he says: I do not see at all what answer those can give to this who, wishing to defend God's justice by human conjectures and ignorant of the depth of grace, have woven implausible fables. He says the same in book 1, To Simplicianus, question 2, whose words we cited above:¹⁵ therefore, according to Augustine, no law was established by God to call to faith those who do what is in them by the faculty of nature or are endowed with good morals; nor does he require them first to do what is in them in order to confer on them the helps of prevenient grace.

XIV. Finally, this opinion is proved and explained by a twofold example that St. Fulgentius uses to confirm it. The first is found in On the Incarnation and Grace of Our Lord Jesus Christ, chapter 19, where he says: Just as, in carnal birth, the formation by the divine work precedes any act of will on the part of the person being born, so in spiritual birth, by which we begin to put off the old man, etc.¹⁶ He adds the second example in chapter 20 of the same book, where he says: A pattern was given beforehand in the flesh of Christ for us to recognize spiritually in our faith. For Christ, the Son of God, was conceived according to the flesh by the Holy Spirit and was born; but the Virgin could never have conceived or given birth to that flesh unless the Holy Spirit had brought about the beginning of that same flesh. So also, in the heart of man, faith can neither be conceived nor increased unless the Holy Spirit pours it out and nourishes it; for we have been reborn from the same Spirit from whom Christ was born. In confirmation of this he adduces the passage of Isa. 26: From before your face, O Lord, we have conceived and, as it were, been in labor, and have given birth to a spirit of salvation, to which the words in Galatians 4 correspond: My little children, for whom I am again in labor until Christ is formed in you. Behold, St. Fulgentius clearly teaches that nothing on our part precedes in the conferral of grace by which we are regenerated, just as nothing precedes in carnal generation. He therefore holds it false that, according to the ordinary law, God does not confer the helps of prevenient grace on men unless they themselves have first done what is in them.

XV. Third Conclusion. The effort by which a man elicits a supernatural disposition for grace is not the same as the effort by which he does what is in him from the powers of nature alone.¹⁷ The conclusion is most certain and is proved as follows: an effort proceeding as an elicited act from a power elevated by supernatural help is not the same in substance as a purely natural effort, as will be clear in disputation 65. But the effort that is a disposition for grace proceeds from a power elevated by supernatural help, especially if it is the ultimate disposition. Therefore it is not the same in substance as an effort proceeding from the faculty of nature alone.

Second, otherwise it would follow that a human being, from the powers of his own nature, supplies an imperfect beginning of his own salvation and a disposition for it in its substance, while only the perfection and completion of that disposition are supplied by God; thus the human being would take the first part for himself and leave the later parts to God. But this cannot be admitted, as St. Augustine shows in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapters 2 and 3, and St. Prosper in Against the Collator, chapter 3 and following. For Cassian used to say that, when God sees in us a certain beginning of good will, he immediately enlightens, strengthens, and stirs us toward salvation, as is clear from what was said at number 8.¹⁸ The answer is no good, namely, that the effort preceding grace contributes nothing to salvation because it is not supernatural or as it ought to be; for this answer was already excluded in disputation 55, number 9, and can also be refuted as follows: Cassian too asserted that this effort is not supernatural and contributes nothing to salvation unless God helps it by his grace. This is clear from St. Hilary's letter to Augustine, shortly after its beginning, where he says: For they do not think that a sick person’s wish to be healed, with fear of punishment aroused, is to be counted among any work of their cure. And below: Nor is grace denied if such a will is said to precede, a will that merely seeks a physician and is not yet itself able to do anything. For they want those testimonies, such as ‘according as he has apportioned to each the measure of faith,’ and similar ones, to mean that the one who has begun to will is helped, not that he is also given the gift of willing. Consider the phrase and is not yet itself able to do anything. It is the same as saying that the will to seek a physician has no power from itself, contributes nothing, and is not as it ought to be for salvation unless it is helped and perfected by God's grace. The same is gathered from Cassian's words reported by St. Prosper in Against the Collator, chapter 8. For, explaining Romans 9, It is not of the one who wills or runs, but of God who shows mercy, and Philippians 2, For it is God who works in us, Cassian says: In all these things both God's grace and the freedom of our free choice are declared: a human being can sometimes be moved by his own impulses to extend himself toward the desire for virtues, yet always needs the Lord's help. For no one, merely by willing, enjoys health or is freed from the disease of illness as his free choice desires. Cassian immediately adds these words: Even through the good of nature, bestowed by the Creator's gift, beginnings of good wills sometimes arise; yet, unless they are directed by God, they cannot reach the completion of the virtues. In chapters 15 and 16 of the same book, Prosper reports these words of Cassian: We infer, for reasons of piety, that we must accept both grace and free choice together, lest by taking either of them away from a human being we seem to depart from the rule of ecclesiastical faith. And explaining how God's grace relates to free choice, he adds: For when God sees that we are turning our will toward good, he meets us, directs us, and strengthens us, etc.¹⁹ Yet in the cited places St. Prosper convicts Cassian from these very statements of placing the beginning of grace in nature. The same is proved from Hilary's letter to Augustine, shortly after the beginning, where, speaking of the Massilians, he says: They want that testimony, ‘according as he has apportioned to each the measure of faith,’ and similar ones, to mean that the one who has begun to will is helped, not that he is also given the gift of willing.²⁰ See what was said above in disputation 2.

XVI. Finally, our conclusion is proved by a notable testimony of St. Augustine, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, book 1, chapter 18, where he reports these words of Julian: The human being, he says, we defend as God's work, and hold that no one is compelled against his will by God's power either toward evil or toward good, but that by his own will he does good or evil; in a good work he is always helped by God's grace, while toward evil he is incited by the devil's suggestions.²¹ Yet in chapter 19 Augustine attacks this assertion in the words cited in disputation 1, number 11, where he reproaches Julian for saying that our will is not moved by grace toward a good work. He says: Why did you not say that a human being is stirred by God's grace toward a good work, just as you said that he is incited toward evil by the devil's suggestions? But you said that in a good work a person is always helped by God's grace, as though after he had undertaken a good work by his own will, without any grace of God, he were then helped by divine aid in the work itself, in return, that is, for the merits of a good will, so that grace owed would be repaid, not grace unowed given, and thus grace would not be grace. He says the same in other places cited in disputation 1, numbers 3 and 9. There Julian held that the very work begun by nature was helped and completed by the grace of God following after it. In Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, book 2, chapter 8, he says: These people, that is, the Pelagians, want the desire for good to begin in a human being from the human being himself, so that the grace of completion may follow upon the merit of this beginning. And below: Perhaps, then, they preserve a place for grace at least in this way: they think that without grace a human being can have a desire for an imperfect good, whereas he can have a desire for a perfect good not merely more easily through grace, but cannot have it at all except through grace. Yet even so they say that God's grace is given according to our merits. In the course of that chapter and in chapter 9, St. Augustine proves against the Pelagians that an effort or good work begun by the powers of nature alone is not made supernatural by subsequent grace; rather, the help of grace precedes those very efforts. Otherwise, it would follow that grace is given according to our merits. Nor is it enough to answer that God does not give the helps of prevenient grace on account of preceding works of nature or some prior merit, but gives them freely, even though he ordinarily does not give grace without those works. For this answer has already been refuted above.

From these things it follows, first, that Christ our Lord did not merit that the above-mentioned law be established. This is proved as follows: Christ did not merit that a law derogating from his own grace be established; but the law of which we are speaking here seems to derogate from the grace conferred on us through Christ, as can be gathered from what was said above. Therefore, etc. Second, it follows that the third statement set out above is false, namely, that God is at hand to a human being with the sufficient help of grace, so that whenever he himself wishes by his natural powers to undertake some work among those pertaining to justification, he may carry it out as salvation requires. For the same inconveniences follow from this statement as from the other three.

XVII. To the first argument the antecedent is denied. For we say that, although the effect of the actual help of prevenient grace and of the inward calling—namely, an act of our will and intellect—depends in the genus of efficient cause on those same powers when moved and aroused by God, the help itself that first precedes, as will be clear in disputations 74 and 78, does not depend actively on our free choice, but on God alone, who alone calls us inwardly and moves us beforehand, in accord with the saying: You will call me, and I will answer you.²²²³ To the first proof it is answered that approaching to hear the Gospel, with the intention either of mocking it or of attending to what is said and receiving it, is indeed within our power, but in different ways. For approaching with the intention of mocking is in us from ourselves; but approaching with the intention of attending to what is said and receiving the Gospel is not from us or from ourselves, but from the help of prevenient and preoperating grace, as is clear from Acts 16.²⁴ A certain woman named Lydia, a seller of purple from the city of Thyatira, a worshiper of God, believed; the Lord opened her heart to attend to what was being said by Paul.²⁵ There the fact that Lydia attended to what the Apostle Paul preached is ascribed to the Holy Spirit moving her. Hence John 1 says: He was the true light, which enlightens every person coming into this world. As St. Augustine noted, in Book I On the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 25, this was said for this reason: no person is enlightened except by that light of truth which is God, lest anyone suppose that he is enlightened by the one from whom he hears something in order to learn. I do not mean if he happens to have some great human being as teacher, but not even if he happens to have an angel. For the word of truth is supplied from outside through the bodily ministry of the voice; nevertheless, neither he who plants nor he who waters is anything, but God who gives the increase. A person hears either a human being or an angel speaking, but, in order that he may perceive and know that what is said is true, his mind is sprinkled by that light within which remains eternal and shines even in darkness. By these words the holy Doctor teaches most plainly that perceiving and knowing the truth of what a preacher proposes does not proceed from nature's powers alone, but from the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, although hearing the word of God with the intention of mocking it is in us from ourselves. The reason for this is the one St. Thomas assigns.²⁶ For the first cause of the lack of grace is from us, but of the bestowal of grace, and of preparation for it, the first cause is from God, in accord with Hosea 13: Your destruction, Israel, is from you alone; your help is in me.

XVIII. To the other objection about intelligible species and cognitions, which is made in the same argument, it is answered that, just as nature itself is presupposed materially for grace, as a receptive subject perfected and elevated by grace, so, proportionally, intelligible species are presupposed in nature as it were materially; but by the help of grace they are elevated so that they may serve faith.²⁷ Hence the cognitions by which a person apprehends a believable object in order to assent to it do not have nature's capacity alone as their efficient cause, but are elicited by the intellect elevated through the special help of prevenient grace, in accord with what the Apostle says: We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as if from ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God.²⁸ From this testimony St. Augustine proves conclusively that a person can do none of the things pertaining to religion and piety without the help of grace, even if it is the smallest thought preceding consent and an act of faith.²⁹ But approaching to hear the Gospel with the intention of attending to what is said and receiving the truth pertains to religion and piety. Hence St. Thomas, speaking about the Pelagians' error in 2. 2. q. 6. ar. 1., in the body of the article, says: For this reason the Pelagians said that the beginning of faith is from us, insofar as it is from us that we are prepared to assent to the things of faith; but the completion of faith is from God. Certainly, if someone approached to hear the Gospel by nature's capacity alone, with the intention of receiving it, he would approach from himself, prepared to assent to the things of faith; for this is one of the most important preparations preceding an act of faith. Therefore, free choice cannot do this by nature's capacity alone.

XIX. To the first confirmation, it is answered that, as will be explained more fully in disputation 77, the external call depends on the ministers of the Church as its efficient causes,³⁰ whereas the interior call of God, which is through the inward motion of the intellect and will, although it ordinarily presupposes an external call, or the presentation of an object made through another's preaching or sacred reading, has God alone as its efficient cause, who alone can inwardly change another's will and act as its efficient mover, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. p. q. 106. ar. 2. et q. 111. art. 2.³¹ This answer is gathered from the same St. Tho. ad Heb. 13. lect. 3, on the words Now may the God of peace fit you. There he says: The human will, since it is a certain inclination of reason, is the principle of human acts, just as heaviness is the principle of the downward motion of heavy things. Hence it stands in relation to acts of reason as a natural inclination does to natural acts. A natural thing is said to be apt for that to which it has an inclination. In the same way, a man, when he has a will to do good, is said to be apt for it. God too, when he puts a good will into a man, makes him apt, that is, makes him fit. Therefore he says: May he fit you for every good thing, so that you do his will; that is, may he make you will every good thing. Prov. 11. The desire of the just is every good thing. For this is the will of God, namely, that God wills us to will; otherwise our will would not be good.³² And a little later: A man is fitted to do good in two ways. In one way, by acting outwardly; and thus one man fits another by persuasion or threats. In another way, by providing something inwardly; and thus only God fits the will, since only he can change it. Proverbior. 21. The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; he will incline it wherever he wills. Hence it is said, he who works in you. Phil. 2. God is the one who works in you both to will and to accomplish. What will he do? What is pleasing before him: that is, he makes you will what pleases him. These are faith, meekness, and fear of the Lord. Thus far St. Thomas.

XX. To the second confirmation, it is answered that the interior actual helps of prevenient grace, even sufficient grace, if they are absolutely the first helps, are not formally vital actions of our intellect or will, but are so causally. Hence, formally speaking, these helps do not depend on our intellect and will as their efficient causes, but are in us from God alone, as will be clear in disputations 74 and 78.

To the second argument from the authority of St. Augustine, it is answered that the passages cited above in support of the first conclusion make clear that he held that the helps of prevenient grace are not given by a law to those who do all that is in them by the powers of nature alone, but wholly gratuitously and without any dependence on those same works of nature. Nor does he teach the contrary in the passage cited from book 19 of The City of God. For when he says that temporal goods have been given to men by God on this most equitable condition, that any mortal who has used such goods rightly receive greater and better things, namely, the peace and glory of immortality, etc., he is speaking of a right use of temporal things, not one had from the powers of nature alone, but from the special help of grace. For a just man earns eternal life by the condign merit of his good works, which God promised to those who love him. For this reason the Apostle called eternal blessedness a crown of justice when he said: As for the rest, a crown of justice is laid up for me, which the Lord, the just Judge, will give me on that day:³³³⁴ namely, because, given the divine promise, it is owed in justice to the just on account of good works done from charity.

XXI. To the third. As regards the authority of St. Thomas, q. 14 de veritate, there is a first solution: the holy Doctor reduced to a better and clearer form what he taught in question 14 de veritate in 1. 2. q. 109, art. 6, ad 2, q. 112, art. 3, and book 3 against Gentiles, chapter 149. So say Driedo, Ruardus Tapper, and Cajetan, 1. 2. q. 109, art. 6, at the section beginning “Nec obstat”.³⁵

A second answer given by others is that a boy who does what lies within him in the first deliberation, by the powers of nature alone, will ordinarily be given, from God's pure mercy, a supernatural help by which he may dispose himself for grace; but this will not happen infallibly or under a law, such that, according to the common way God follows, a good effort of nature must necessarily precede grace.³⁶ Master Bañez seems to incline to this opinion in II–II, question 10, article 1, doubt 2, reply to objection 4. Many most learned Thomists give the same interpretation to St. Thomas's words. If an argument is made that “most certainly” means the same as “infallibly,” since what sometimes fails does not happen most certainly, they answer that in moral matters what happens ordinarily happens most certainly, even though it sometimes does not happen that way, just as we say that in winter there are most certainly rains. The word “most certainly” is used in this sense in 3 Kings, chapter 11, and Exodus 34, where it says: You shall not enter among them, that is, among the Moabite and Ammonite women, for they will certainly turn your hearts so that you follow their gods.³⁷ Hence St. Thomas teaches in I–II, question 105, article 4, reply to objection 6, that these words explain the moral danger of seduction. But this explanation does not seem to answer the argument made above. For let us suppose that this boy does all he can by the powers of nature alone, and God does not give him the help of grace. He will not sin mortally against the precept by which at that moment he is bound to turn himself toward God and the good of reason, because no one sins if he does all he can to fulfill a precept; otherwise he would be bound to do the impossible. Therefore, after that time has passed he may sin venially before he sins mortally. But to say that it belongs to divine providence not to permit him to sin venially before he either sins mortally or is justified by God seems arbitrary.

XXII. A third explanation is the one Master Medina develops at length in I–II, question 89, article 6: that St. Thomas there speaks of someone who does all that lies within him, not by the capacity of nature alone but by the help of prevenient grace.³⁸ Since this explanation is explicit in St. Thomas's commentary on Romans, chapter 10, lecture 3, whose words we quoted above, note, for understanding them, that the explicit knowledge of faith which is simply necessary for everyone and in every state for justification is the knowledge by which a human being believes that God exists and has providence over human affairs. St. Thomas gathers this in the same question, article 11.³⁹ body, from Hebrews 11: Whoever approaches God must believe that he exists and that he is the rewarder of those who seek him, in which the faith in the things necessary for salvation is contained implicitly. We say, therefore, that in that moral instant, and during the brief interval when the use of reason begins, together with natural enlightenment, God by a special help sufficiently moves the intellect and excites the will of the one coming to the use of reason, so that he may turn toward God as his ultimate end, known in the way that age permits. The reason is this: given that there is a precept by which at that instant the boy is bound to turn himself toward God as his ultimate end, resolving to please him in everything and to keep all the precepts of nature (for this is to follow the guidance of reason), it belongs to divine providence to give him sufficient help. For in fallen nature a human being cannot by the capacity of nature alone thus turn himself toward God or resolve with an absolute will to please him in everything, as was said in disputations 51 and 52. The Holy Doctor therefore wishes to teach that if the boy does what lies within him by the aforesaid supernatural help, God will enlighten him, either through some preacher or by an inward inspiration, so that he believes the other mysteries that it is necessary to believe explicitly in order to attain final salvation, such as the Incarnation of the Word and other things of this kind. For more is required on the part of faith to attain glory than to attain grace. This explanation is gathered from the same context, for there St. Thomas gives the example of Cornelius, to whom the Lord sent Peter in Acts 10 because he did what lay within him by giving alms, etc. Yet, as we were saying above, before he was enlightened by the Apostle Peter concerning the mysteries of the Gospel, Cornelius did not do what lay within him by the capacity of nature alone, but by a special help of prevenient grace.⁴⁰ St. Thomas acknowledges this in II–II, question 10, article 4, reply to objection 3, where he says: Concerning Cornelius, it must be known that he was not an unbeliever, for otherwise his action would not have been acceptable to God, since no one can please God without faith. He had implicit faith, however, although the truth of the Gospel had not yet been revealed. Therefore Peter was sent to him in order to instruct him more fully in the faith. From this it is clear how venial sin is not possible with original sin alone: for if the boy does what lies within him with that help, he will be justified; but if he does not, he will sin mortally.⁴¹ This explanation also agrees with St. Thomas's words in I–II, question 89, article 6, body, where he says that if that boy orders himself toward the due end at the instant when he comes to the use of reason through grace, he will obtain the remission of original sin. There he speaks of ordering oneself toward the due end through a special help; otherwise, without any help of prevenient grace, a human being would obtain habitual grace, which is most false, as Master Medina shows in the place cited above. What St. Thomas says in other places brought forward in the third argument must be interpreted and understood according to this teaching.

XXIII. But against this doctrine there is a difficult argument. For it follows that there is no adult who is negatively an unbeliever; the consequence is contrary to St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 10. ar. 1. Therefore. The consequence is proved: according to the doctrine set out above, everyone who reaches the use of reason has sufficient help to believe; therefore, he can believe. Since, then, he is bound to believe, if he does not believe, he will sin mortally by the sin of omission against the precept of faith; and consequently he will be an unbeliever by opposition. For, as the Thomists commonly teach in 1. 2. q. 6., to impute the omission of some act as culpable, it is sufficient and required that a person be able to perform that act, be bound to perform it, and not perform it. It is answered that, in the case supposed, God immediately gives that child sufficient supernatural help to fulfill the natural precept by which he is bound to turn himself to God as author of nature, who is ready to give him sufficient help by which he can turn himself through supernatural faith and charity to God as author of grace.⁴² Hence, if he does not fulfill that natural precept, he will sin mortally—not because he has not turned to God as author of grace, but because he has not turned to him as author of nature—and consequently he will remain negatively an unbeliever, but not an unbeliever by opposition. But if, by that supernatural help, he follows the guidance of reason and does what is in him by turning himself to God, the author of nature, he will immediately be enlightened by God himself and helped to have supernatural faith and obtain justifying grace. But then grace will infallibly be given to one who does all that is in him, not by nature's powers alone, but by the prevenient help of grace.

XXIIII. To the fourth it is answered that, both to those who do what is in them and to those who do not, God confers the helps of prevenient grace when it pleases him; and sometimes, also on account of preceding sins, he does not confer those same helps on them, as will be clear below. But when he gives these helps to those doing what is in them by the powers of nature, those natural works are neither the reason why the same helps are given nor a condition without which they would regularly not be given; rather, they are concomitant and accidental. Hence God did not make a law that, if a person first does all that is in him by nature's capacity alone, God will infallibly give him the helps of grace, and otherwise will not, according to the common manner he follows in conferring those same helps. Nor did he decree to confer such helps on account of merit, even merit of congruity, or as on account of a cause or reason, or as on account of a condition sine qua non. Nor did he establish that he would confer those gifts so that a subsequent help of grace might elevate that natural effort and make it such as is required for salvation. Nor does it follow from this that admonitions are in vain or that those good moral works are performed in vain by someone existing in mortal sin. For, although in no way are they dispositions for grace, not even remote ones, nevertheless they help to avoid a new mortal sin when those good moral works are commanded, and to generate some kind of habit of moral virtue, which is produced through repeated acts; and finally, so that a reprobate may be tormented less harshly in hell, as was said from Augustine in disputation 50, no. 11.⁴³ Hence they are not in vain, nor are sinners admonished in vain to exercise themselves in them.

XXV. To the fifth it is answered that from those passages of Scripture one can gather only that, on God's part, he gives all adults sufficient helps for salvation, but not that our good works or natural efforts must precede those helps, by which a person disposes and prepares himself in order to obtain those helps infallibly.⁴⁴ But specifically concerning the Apostle's passage, God wills all people to be saved,⁴⁵ it is answered that, among the explanations given by St. Thomas in First Part, q. 19, art. 6, which we discussed at length in disputation 33, is that this is to be understood of antecedent will, which is the will of sign, and not of consequent will, which is of good pleasure and is always fulfilled. To the other passage from Revelation it is answered that when it says, If anyone hears my voice, etc.,⁴⁶ it speaks of the one who hears, opens, and responds to the calling by the help of grace, which gives the very willing and the very opening; it does not speak of one who responds by nature's capacity alone or strives to do what is in him by natural powers. Indeed, from the same passage it is clearly gathered that God's calling precedes all our effort. For he says: I stand at the door and knock, as if to say, “I do not come when called, but precede the one called by knocking.”

XXVI. To the sixth argument it is denied that the first inconvenience follows from our opinion. For, as will be clear in disputations 112 and 113, God gives all people sufficient helps for salvation; but through his own fault a person does not will to use them well. Hence, if he is damned, let him blame himself. The other inconvenience, by which it was inferred that venial sin could exist in an adult with original sin alone, is already clear from what was said in the solution to the first and third arguments.

To the seventh it is answered that, as we were saying in response to the first, ruin and salvation are indeed placed in a person's power, but in different ways: for our ruin is from us, while salvation is from God.⁴⁷ Hence, as will be clear in disputations 98 and 117, our salvation is first in the power of God alone, as the absolutely first initiator, as St. Augustine expressly teaches in Book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 8, as does St. Ambrose, whose words Augustine adduces in the same place. Therefore, salvation is not in a person's power as in the one who first initiates or begins, but as in one who freely consents and cooperates, on the supposition of the help of prevenient grace, as was said. Hence, before such help, a person can perform nothing that has an order to his salvation, whether as a disposition or as a condition sine qua non.

XXVII. To the confirmation, it is answered that the explanation suggested in the argument is in no way to be admitted; St. Augustine rejects and attacks it in book 4 against Julian, chapter 8, and book 2 against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 3, and in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 8, as does St. Prosper in his letter to Augustine. The legitimate sense of that passage, then, is the one St. Augustine uses, as do the other holy Fathers in common: namely, that God gave those receiving him through faith and believing the power to become sons of God through habitual grace, for faith is the first beginning of justification. Nevertheless, men do not have it from themselves that they believe, but from God's gift, as was shown in disputation 49. Here it should be observed with Cajetan that he did not say, “He gave them the power to make themselves sons of God,” but said, He gave them the power to become sons of God:⁴⁸ to indicate that man has no power from the faculty of nature by which he makes himself a son of God, but receives that power from the gift of prevenient grace.⁴⁹ Hence St. Bernard, in his treatise On Grace and Free Choice, explaining how grace and free choice concur for justification, says: What was begun by grace alone is completed by both together, so that they work together, not separately; at the same time, not in turn, through each stage of progress. Not partly grace and partly free choice, but each accomplishes the whole by an undivided work. Free choice indeed does the whole, and the whole comes from grace; but just as the whole is in free choice, so the whole comes from grace.