De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether, without the help of grace, a human being can dispose himself, at least remotely, to obtain grace by asking, seeking, knocking, etc.

I. It was the error of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians to assert that the first beginning of grace proceeds from the natural faculty of our free choice, as is clear from what was said in the first and second disputations. But there is no need to dispute against this error now: we have sufficiently refuted it in disputation 49, no. 12.

The first opinion, then, is that of Durandus, on Sentences I, q. 6 of the Prologue, art. 3, and II, dist. 28, q. 5, where he teaches that by the powers of free choice a human being can dispose himself for grace, with a disposition to which grace is given not by debt but by pact and divine ordination. Among more recent theologians there are some who assert that, just as one sin is usually permitted as punishment for another sin, so on account of alms and other morally good works performed by someone existing in mortal sin, God often customarily helps one person sooner and more than another, so that he may rise from sin; and for this reason such works have not undeservedly customarily been called remote dispositions for grace.

II. This opinion is proved, first, by Durandus's argument. For although the rational soul is created by God alone, a human being nevertheless has a natural power to dispose matter for the introduction of the rational soul. Therefore, proportionally, although grace comes from God alone as its efficient cause, free choice will nevertheless be able, by its natural power, to elicit a disposition to which grace corresponds by divine pact, and not by debt.

Second. When free choice is disposed to obtain habitual grace, it does something from itself; otherwise it would be wholly passive, like some lifeless thing, if it contributed nothing from itself. But to assert this is the heresy of Luther. Therefore, it effects something from itself by which it is disposed for grace.

Third. The final disposition for grace is consent, by which free choice assents to God calling. But, once divine calling is supposed, whether free choice consents or does not consent depends on nothing other than its own innate freedom. Therefore, the same conclusion follows as before.

Fourth, the same point is proved concerning a disposition that is at least remote. Someone existing in mortal sin can perform many morally good works by the powers of nature alone, such as giving alms from natural piety, offering certain prayers to God, visiting the sick, etc. But on account of such works God very often confers the helps of prevenient grace; and if a person uses those helps well (which lies within his power), he obtains habitual grace. Therefore, by the powers of nature he can dispose himself for grace, at least remotely.

This is confirmed. As is clear from Acts of the Apostles, chapter 10, Cornelius was called to the faith of Christ on account of his prayers and alms; and in Genesis 22, on account of that remarkable obedience, the Lord said to Abraham: Because you have done this thing, and have not spared your only-begotten son for my sake, I will bless you, etc. Therefore, on account of good works one person obtains the helps of prevenient grace rather than another; therefore, by those same good works a person in some way disposes himself to obtain grace.

III. Fifth, it is argued: for it is very consonant with reason that God should help by the special help of his grace, and draw to himself, rather, one who applies himself to the aforesaid morally good works than another who, abusing his free choice, commits very many sins without fear; therefore, by those good works he in some way disposes himself for grace.

This is confirmed from that parable of Matt. 25, in which, distributing talents, he gave five to one, but two to another, and one to another, to each according to his own ability. By these words God seems to be signified as distributing the gifts of his grace according to each one's ability; therefore such ability is some disposition, at least remote, for the attainment of grace.

A second confirmation. One who has good inclinations by nature, has received a good soul, and afterward exercises himself in good works, is less distant from grace than another stained by corrupt morals; therefore he has some disposition for it.

Sixth. The angels attained grace according to the measure of their natural endowments, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 62, art. 6. Therefore by natural virtue they in some way disposed themselves for grace; therefore man too will be able to dispose himself in the same way.

Seventh. There is greater distance and disproportion between humanity and the hypostatic union, or the being of the Word, than between good moral works and the gift of habitual grace. For between humanity and the Word there is infinite distance, which is not found between good moral works and grace; but on the part of human nature there is a congruity for the hypostatic union, as St. Thomas teaches, 3 p. q. 4, art. 1. Therefore, on the part of good moral works there is a congruity for grace; therefore they are dispositions, at least remote, to which grace corresponds as a matter of congruity, though not by debt or by merit from our free choice.

IIII. The second opinion is that of St. Augustine and St. Prosper, in the places cited below, which St. Thomas follows, 1. 2. q. 109, art. 6, and q. 24 de ver. art. 15, and 3. against Gentiles c. 149, and all Thomists: namely, that there is no disposition for grace from the faculty of nature alone. Since this opinion is most certain, for its explanation it should be noted that in this part we can speak either of habitual grace itself, or of the actual help by which free choice is moved by God to act piously. As regards habitual grace, then, let the following be stated:

First Conclusion. The ultimate disposition for grace cannot be had from the powers of nature alone; rather, the special help of God, who inwardly moves free choice and inspires good in it, is necessarily required for it.¹ So St. Thomas teaches in the cited places, and in 2 Sent. dist. 5, q. 2, art. 1, and dist. 28, art. 4, and de verit. q. 24, art. 15, quodl. 1, art. 7, and on Hebrews 12, lect. 3; Ferrariensis, 3 against Gentiles, cited chapter 149; and this is the common opinion of the ancients. It is proved by all the arguments by which, in disputation 54, conclusion 2, it was shown against the Pelagians that the special help of grace is absolutely necessary for salvation. Further, it is proved from that passage of Prov. 8, The will is prepared by the Lord: by this testimony the Council of Orange, canon 4, proves that the very desire to be cleansed from sin, by which man is prepared for grace, proceeds in us from the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit. St. Augustine proves the same from the same testimony, in book 1 against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 8, and book 4, chapter 6, and in On the Predestination of the Saints and On the Gift of Perseverance very often. In those places he maintains that preparation for grace comes from the special help of premoving grace. St. Prosper proves the same from the same testimony, in the book On Grace and Free Choice to Rufinus, where he says: Who would doubt that free choice obeys the exhortation of the one calling when the grace of God has generated in it the inclination to believe and obey? Otherwise, it would suffice for man to be admonished, with no new will also being made in him, as it is written: The will is prepared by the Lord.

V. Nor is there any obstacle in the fact that Solomon himself says in Proverbs, chapter 16: It is man's part to prepare the soul. For he understands that it is man's part because he freely produces the consent by which he is prepared for grace; yet he effects this while presupposing the special help of God, who inspires good and moves inwardly. St. Augustine explains this passage in this way, in the cited book 2 against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 8, and in On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 5. The words of Scripture, If anyone opens to me, I will enter in,² and that passage of Isaiah 30, God waits in order to have mercy on you, are to be explained in the same way. For he does not wait for our consent that proceeds from the faculty of nature alone, as though such natural consent were a disposition for grace; rather, he waits for the consent that he himself nevertheless causes in us and together with us by the special help of prevenient grace, as will become clear in disputation 95.

Second, it is proved from Hebrews 12: Now may the God of peace fit you in every good thing to do his will, doing in you what is pleasing before him through Jesus Christ. Explaining this passage, St. Thomas says in the same place, lecture 3: A human being is fitted to do good in two ways: in one way, by acting outwardly, and thus one human being fits another by persuading or threatening; in another way, by providing something inwardly, and thus God alone fits the will, for he alone can change it, according to Proverbs 21: ‘The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; wherever you will, you will turn it.’ Therefore, etc.³

Third, it is proved from the Council of Trent, session 6 on justification, chapter 5, where the holy Synod teaches that sinful human beings are disposed by God's exciting and helping grace to turn themselves toward their own justification, freely assenting to that same grace. Here it says plainly enough that the final disposition for grace comes from the help of grace. We explained this passage in disputations 51 and 52; the same is clear from canons 3 and 4 of the same session and from session 14, canon 4, on the sacrament of penance.

Fourth, it is proved. The final disposition for grace is the beginning of our justification. Therefore, if it proceeds, or can proceed, from the capacity of nature alone, the beginning of our justification and salvation will come from us; yet to assert this is Pelagian, as all Catholics acknowledge.

Fifth, as will be clear in disputation 68, the final disposition for any form comes from the form itself in the order of formal or efficient causality. Therefore, the final disposition for habitual grace comes from the help of that same grace; it cannot, then, proceed from the capacity of nature alone. See the other excellent arguments for this conclusion in St. Thomas 3. contra Gentes, cap. 149, cited above. This conclusion will become still clearer from what follows.

VI. Second Conclusion. No remote disposition for grace can be had from the capacity of nature alone, whether it be asking for grace, desiring grace itself, or anything else; rather, a special help of premoving grace is necessarily required for it.⁴

This conclusion is most certain, and is gathered from the teaching of St. Augustine, Prosper, and St. Thomas in the places cited above. It is proved by the arguments made for the preceding conclusion, which also prove this one. For not only the final disposition but also the remote disposition for grace is truly some beginning of our justification and salvation, although they differ in this: the proximate disposition is a perfect beginning, whereas the remote disposition is an imperfect beginning. But no beginning of our salvation, even an imperfect one, comes from us, as St. Augustine proves in On the Predestination of the Saints, especially chapters 3 and 4, and in Against Julian the Pelagian, book 4, chapter 6, where, among other things, he says: For there, as I see, you have already begun to place merits preceding grace: asking, seeking, knocking, so that grace may be repaid as a debt for these merits, and thus grace be named in vain, as though no grace had gone before and touched the heart, so that the beatifying good might be asked of God, God might be sought, and one might knock at God's door; and the words would be written in vain: ‘His mercy will go before me.’⁵ Prosper says the same in Against the Collator, chapter 4 and following. Therefore. It is confirmed: as we said in disputation 2, among the other errors of the Semi-Pelagians was the claim that imperfect desires precede grace, along with certain imperfect beginnings of it originating from the vigilance of free choice. But remote dispositions for grace are its imperfect beginnings. Therefore.⁶

Second, it is proved. In natural things, not only the final disposition but also the remote disposition comes from the same agent as its efficient cause by whom the form is produced. For not only heat of eight degrees, by which matter is proximally disposed to receive the form of fire, comes from the generating fire as its efficient cause, but also heat of one degree, of four degrees, and so on. But habitual grace comes from God as its efficient cause, according to the Psalmist: The Lord will give grace and glory. Therefore.⁷

VII. Third, it is proved by St. Thomas's argument in 3. cont. Gent. c. 149 and on Hebrews, chapter 5, lecture 1, at the words Nor does anyone take the honor for himself, etc. Nothing disposes itself to a state higher than its nature, or brings itself to it, unless it is brought there by another, higher agent, just as air does not make itself fire but is made so by a higher power. But habitual grace is above the whole created intellectual nature. Therefore, no created nature disposes itself by its own power, even remotely, to attain grace. It is confirmed. Every action proceeding from the capacity of nature alone belongs to an order lower than grace and is disproportionate to it. Therefore, it cannot be a disposition for grace, even a remote one, for every disposition must belong to the same order as its form.

Finally, this is proved from the Council of Trent, Session 14, on the sacrament of penance, chapter 4, where, as we showed in disputations 51 and 52, the holy Synod teaches: Imperfect contrition, etc., is a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, not yet indeed indwelling, but only moving, by which the penitent, helped, prepares a way for himself to justice. By these words the Council asserts that this remote disposition comes from God through the special help of premoving grace, and the same reasoning applies to any other remote disposition. But, in order to make clear what should be thought about the actual help of grace, let this be

VIII. Third Conclusion. The opinion that asserts that, on account of alms and other morally good works performed by someone existing in mortal sin, God confers the help of grace more on one person than another, according to the ordinary law, or helps one sooner, is contrary to St. Augustine, St. Prosper, and St. Thomas.⁸ That it is contrary to St. Augustine is clear from the passages cited for the preceding conclusion, but especially from Book II of the Questions to Simplicianus, question 2, near the end, where, explaining how hidden God's election to salvation is, he says: Certainly this election is so hidden that it cannot at all appear to us in the same lump; or, if it appears to some, I confess my weakness in this matter. For I have nothing to consider in people being chosen for saving grace, if I am allowed to examine this election by any thought, except either greater talent, or fewer sins, or both. Let us also add, if you please, honorable and useful studies. Does whoever is endowed with these things therefore seem to be chosen for grace? But when I have settled this, he who chooses the weak things of the world to confound the strong, and the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, will laugh at me; and, looking at him and blushing, I will laugh at many who are chaster than certain sinners and more eloquent than certain fishermen.⁹¹⁰¹¹ He immediately proves this with examples, saying: Have we not observed many of our faithful who walk in God's way and cannot compare in intellectual ability even with actors, let alone certain heretics? Likewise, do we not see certain men and women living blamelessly in conjugal chastity, and yet either heretics, or pagans, or even people in the true faith and the true Church so lukewarm that we are astonished to see them surpassed by harlots and actors suddenly converted, not only in wisdom and temperance but also in faith, hope, and charity? This is confirmed: for St. Augustine very often teaches that there is no reason on our part why God confers the helps of grace on this person rather than another. But especially, commenting on the words No one can come to me unless the Father has drawn him, he says: Why he draws this one and does not draw that one, do not wish to judge, if you do not wish to err.¹²¹³ He always reduces our calling to the gratuitous and sheer will of God, in accord with Matthew 11: I confess to you, Father, because you have hidden these things from the wise and prudent and revealed them to little ones; yes, Father, because this was pleasing before you. And Romans 9: It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy. But if the opinion we oppose were true, some reason or condition on our part could already be assigned on account of which God would confer the helps of grace more on one person than another; and thus calling would not be reduced to the sheer and gratuitous will of God, and consequently neither would election.

IX. Second, this is proved from St. Prosper, who in the book Against the Collator, chapter 6, attacks Cassian because he said that the helps of grace are given by God on account of certain imperfect desires preceding grace, which flowed from the vigilance of our free choice, and on account of certain imperfect works, such as asking, seeking, knocking, etc., as is clear from his words quoted above.

They reply that Cassian is rightly reproached for this reason: he said grace is given on account of those good works as if on account of merit, and on account of works of piety having a proportion with grace, so that they would in some way lay force upon the kingdom of God. Yet the opinion stated above does not assert this. But this solution seems contrary to the very context of St. Prosper, who says in the cited chapter 6: How do you fail to see that you fall into that condemned error, since, whether you will or not, you are convicted of saying that God's grace is given according to our merits, when you affirm that some good work from human beings themselves precedes grace, on account of which they obtain grace? For the faith of one who asks, the piety of one who seeks, and the persistence of one who knocks cannot be regarded as without merit, especially since all such persons are said both to receive and to enter. From these words, and from what we said in disputation 2, it is sufficiently clear that Cassian did not state in express terms that grace is merited; on the contrary, he denied it, affirming that he posited no merit for grace itself. Faustus also affirmed this, as is clear from Book I On Free Choice, which he wrote: there he reproaches Pelagius for asserting that grace is given according to our merits, but nevertheless Prosper, from what Cassian said, rebukes and convicts him of relapsing, whether he will or not, into Pelagius's condemned error of saying that grace is given according to our merits. Maxentius makes the same argument against Cassian in his response to Pope Hormisdas's letter. This is confirmed by the words of Prosper himself in chapter 37 of the same book, where he says: Whichever way you turn, you are both bound and defeated by yourself. For if merits do not precede grace, and faith cannot exist without merits, then faith does not precede grace; and in every way, whatever it is from which merit arises, which is not possessed before grace, is had from grace.

X. Third, it is proved from St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 112, art. 3, in the body, where he asks: Whether grace is necessarily given to one who prepares himself for it. He answers that preparation, if considered insofar as it is from free choice, has no necessity for the attainment of grace, because the gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human power; but if it is considered insofar as it is from God moving, it has the necessity of infallibility, for grace infallibly follows upon it. He therefore holds that no preparation for grace, not even a remote one, can be had from the faculty of nature alone. This conclusion will become clearer from what we shall set forth in disputation 56, first conclusion. On the occasion of this controversy many Thomists dispute against Scotus whether some preparation for habitual grace merits grace itself, at least by merit of congruity; but this difficulty has its proper place in that same 1. 2. q. 114, art. 5, which must be treated below.

XI. To the first, it is answered that the rational soul is of the same natural order as the dispositions posited by man through his own power, which are presupposed for its union with matter. Hence, although it is created by God alone, man can nevertheless, by his own power, dispose matter for its introduction. Grace, however, is of a higher order than every preparation of human power; therefore no preparation from the faculty of nature alone can be a disposition for it. There is also another difference: the rational soul, in itself, has incomplete being, independent of matter; but that it be united to the body through prior natural dispositions belongs to it insofar as it is the natural form of a composite. Grace, by contrast, since it is not properly created but educed from the obediential potency of an intellectual creature, does not have being subsisting in itself, nor is it the natural form of any creature; nor can it be such, as will be clear in disputation 69. Hence a disposition for it cannot proceed from the faculty of nature alone. This answer can be confirmed and explained further: for, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 70, art. 3, the sun and any heavenly body do not attain by their own power the union of soul with body, or the production of a living thing, because no effect exceeds the power and perfection of its cause. But a heavenly body, since it is not living, is absolutely surpassed by any living body; nevertheless, by the power of the intelligence by which it is moved, it can produce living things and dispose matter for the union of soul with body.¹⁴ We say proportionately in the present case that, since grace is of a higher order than every created substance and therefore exceeds its natural power, no preparation of a creature can in itself be a disposition for grace, except insofar as it proceeds from the motion of a higher agent through the special help of divine grace.

XII. To the second, it is answered that, as St. Thomas teaches, 1 p. q. 105, art. 4, ad 2 and 3, it can be understood in two ways that free choice does something from itself when it elicits consent. First, acting from itself can mean the same as moving from itself, that is, from an intrinsic active principle; and in this way, whenever the will acts freely, it acts from itself, that is, from an intrinsic principle, for it belongs to the nature of a free agent to act from itself in this way.¹⁵ In another way, acting from itself, or moving from itself, can be taken to exclude being moved by another extrinsic agent, or the motion of an extrinsic agent. In this sense created free choice does nothing from itself, as will be clear in disputations 96 and 97: for it does not have being from itself but from another, and it is not the absolutely first agent but only a proximate agent. And therefore it acts from its own intrinsic principle in such a way that it receives this very acting from the first agent absolutely, as from the first mover. For it does not belong to the nature of a free cause that the intrinsic principle from which the free action proceeds be its first principle, just as it does not belong to the nature of a cause that it be the first cause. St. Thomas pursues this doctrine in the same 1 p. q. 83, art. 1, ad 3, and in 2 Sentences, distinction 37, q. 2, art. 2, in the body; the subject will also return below. We therefore say in answer to the argument that, when free choice consents to God calling, it does indeed do something from itself in the first sense, that is, from an intrinsic principle; yet it does not do something from itself in the second meaning. Rather, it has consent itself from the efficacious help of prevenient grace, according to the words to the Philippians 2: For it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish, and 1 Cor. 4: What do you have that you did not receive? etc.

XIII. To the third, it is answered that, besides sufficient calling, which gives the will the ability to consent, efficacious calling is also required for it actually to consent, by which it is made consenting. For St. Augustine establishes these two callings as distinct in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 16, as we shall see in disputation 71. Therefore, whether free choice consents or does not consent to God calling is placed within its power and freedom, but this belongs to it in different ways. Its not consenting, but resisting the call, comes from nowhere but its innate freedom, which, since it is from nothing, can fail.¹⁶ But its consenting is indeed from the will's innate freedom, yet this freedom is elevated and moved by the efficacious help of prevenient grace. Hence innate freedom alone cannot dispose itself for justification. And to the proposition brought forward in the argument, it is answered that, given sufficient calling, man’s consent depends on something beyond innate freedom; for this proceeds from efficacious help that moves beforehand, which, as will be clear in disputations 71 and 72, is distinct from sufficient help. Nevertheless, given efficacious help, that the will consents is from no other source than innate freedom; yet innate freedom is not the first initiator, nor the absolutely first cause, of that consent, but the second, as will become clear in disputations 89 and 98.

To the fourth, it is answered that, as was said, God does not confer grace on account of morally good works done by the capacity of nature alone, because a person existing in mortal sin is owed nothing but eternal punishment. Hence, if habitual or actual grace is given to him, it will be by God's pure mercy. To the confirmation it is answered:

XIV. Cornelius, when Peter was sent to him, was not in mortal sin but in grace.¹⁷ For Acts, chapter 10, says that he was devout and feared God with all his household, giving many alms to the people and always praying to God. Hence his prayers and alms proceeded from a special motion of the Holy Spirit; and so, on account of such works, God could grant him explicit faith in Christ, since previously he had implicit faith. The same should be said proportionately about Abraham's obedience. Yet from this it is not rightly inferred that the case is the same for morally good works done by someone existing in mortal sin through the capacity of nature alone; the reason for the difference is clear from what has been said.

To the fifth argument it is answered that, if God in his mercy should wish to help by a special help of grace someone who uses his free choice well by the capacity of nature alone, this would be very consonant with reason according to the order of divine providence, because the divine will, which is the first rule of goodness and fittingness, has so willed.¹⁸ But if by a hidden yet just judgment he should wish to give that person the help of exciting grace, but not efficacious grace, and instead leave him in his sin and damnation, this too would be very consonant with reason according to the order of that same providence. For since grace is owed to no creature, it is not in itself more consonant with reason that it be given to this person than to that one; rather, this must be grounded in God's gratuitous giving, otherwise grace would not be grace. Just so, in itself and prior to God's free will, it is not more consonant with reason or more fitting that God create these rather than those from among all possible creatures; rather, all fittingness is drawn from the free will of God, who willed to give existence to the creatures he in fact produced, and not to others. On this, see St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, question 25, article 6.

XV. To the first confirmation it is answered with St. Thomas, Summa theologiae II–II, question 24, article 3, reply to objection 1: The power according to which God gives his gifts to each person is the disposition or preceding preparation, or the effort of the one receiving grace; but the Holy Spirit also goes before this disposition and effort, moving the human mind more or less according to his will. Hence the Apostle says to the Colossians 1: ‘Who made us worthy to share in the lot of the saints in light.’¹⁹ And to the Ephesians 4: Grace was given to each one of us according to the measure of Christ's gift; and 1 Corinthians 12: One and the same Spirit works all these things, distributing to each as he wills. Therefore, natural power or effort alone in no way disposes one for grace or for a greater increase of it, as will be made clear in disputations 57 and 62. St. Thomas develops the same answer in On Virtues in General, question 2, which is on Charity, article 7, reply to objection 9, where, explaining the same passage from Matthew, he says: What is said, ‘he gave to each according to his own power,’ is not to be referred only to the power of nature (for it is erroneous to say that the gifts of grace and glory are given according to the measure of natural endowments), but the power that is also through grace is to be understood, etc.²⁰ He teaches the same in his lecture on 1 Corinthians 12, lecture 2.

To the second confirmation it is answered that, although someone who has received a good soul, is well inclined, has fewer sins, and exercises himself in some morally good works by the capacity of nature alone is less distant from grace than another, very wicked person, nevertheless neither is positively disposed for grace, because every operation or power of nature belongs to an order lower than grace.²¹ Hence no disposition, even a negative one, is to be admitted from the powers of nature alone, such that grace infallibly follows it; for the same inconveniences follow from attributing such a negative disposition to nature rather than to grace. For this reason St. Augustine says: I attribute to your mercy the sins I have not committed. There is a parallel in natural things: it is certain that dry wood is less distant from fire, and less indisposed for the form of fire, than green wood, which has qualities more opposed to it. Yet neither is disposed for the form of fire, since every disposition comes through heat produced by fire, or by the power of fire or of some higher cause.

XVI. To the sixth it is answered that God, according to the order of his providence, mercifully and without any debt, willed to give the Angels more perfect in nature a more perfect efficacious help, so that they might turn more intensely to God and thereby obtain greater habitual grace, in order that there might be among the good Angels, according to the order of grace, a proportion like that found according to the order of nature. Thus, dispositionally, the quantity of habitual grace given to the Angels was according to the intensity of the motion of free choice, elevated by God through a special help of prevenient grace; for the Angels were justified through their own disposition.²² Yet the quantity of help was given to them freely, in keeping with the perfection of their nature, for the reasons St. Thomas assigns in the cited part I and in II–II, question 24, article 3, reply to objection 3. There, in this respect, he assigns a difference between Angels and human beings, to whom the quantity of help is not given according to the degree of perfection of their individual nature, as Augustine expressly teaches in question 2 to Simplicianus cited above.

XVII. To the seventh it is answered that the congruity by which human nature is more assumable by the Word than any other created nature is not considered according to some prior disposition in that nature, arising from its powers, by reason of which it would bear an order to the actual assumption; rather, it is considered according to an aptitude belonging to obediential potency. And this congruity, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited Third Part, question 4, article 1, is considered in two respects, namely according to its dignity and also according to its need.²³ According to its dignity, insofar as it is rational and intellectual, and consequently naturally apt to attain the divine Word himself through its own operation, by knowing and loving him; according to its need, because it needed restoration. But the disposition for habitual grace, of which we are speaking here, is not considered merely according to obediential potency, which naturally belongs to a human being, in accord with Augustine's saying: To be able to have faith belongs to human nature, where “to be able” means the natural capacity for faith, which a stone does not have. Rather, it is considered according to actual proximate or remote preparation, which, as was said, must be of the same order as grace itself.²⁴ Hence the cases are not alike.