De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether a fallen human being can, without the help of grace, keep all the commandments and resist, at every moment of time, all the temptations that befall him, even the gravest ones, which must be overcome in order to keep the natural law.

I. In this part we have a twofold controversy: one with heretics, the other with Catholics. Among the heretics there were two extreme errors. The first was that of Pelagius, who, as we noted in disputation 1, asserted that the help of divine grace is necessary only so that a human being may more easily accomplish through grace what he could do by nature, and that free choice need not first be healed by grace. This opinion can be proved. First, otherwise it would follow that without habitual grace a human being could not keep all the natural commandments, even if he were helped by God with special assistance. The consequence is false; therefore, the inference is proved as follows: special assistance, without habitual grace, does not heal free choice, since it is found very often in people who are in mortal sin, as is clear from the Council of Trent, Session 14, chapter 4, On the Sacrament of Penance, where it says that attrition arising from considering the ugliness of sin or from fear of hell and punishments not only does not make a human being a hypocrite and a greater sinner, but is also a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, who does not yet dwell within him but only moves him; helped by this, the penitent prepares a way for himself to justice. Therefore, special assistance alone does not heal the soul. The minor premise is proved as follows: a human being can see God through his essence without the light of glory as a habit, provided that the light of glory is given to him as an actual motion. Therefore, in the same way, he will be able to keep all the commandments, especially the natural ones, without the gift of grace as a habit, provided it is given to him as a motion.

Second, an argument is made. In a state of pure nature a human being could keep all the natural commandments without the help of grace; therefore, he will be able to do the same in fallen nature, since in a state of pure nature he would not have had greater powers than he has after sin.

Third, after the Fall human free choice can, by the capacity of nature, keep any precept that presents itself, for some instant or for a short time; and by keeping one precept or another a human being becomes more capable and ready to keep the rest. Therefore, he will be able to keep them all without the help of grace.

Fourth, a human being can keep this commandment or that one without the help of grace, and so of each in turn; therefore, he will be able to keep them all. If it is said that he can keep them all distributively but not collectively, the reply is that there is no special precept by which a human being is bound to keep all the commandments collectively; rather, he is bound to all collectively because he was bound to observe each distributively. Therefore, if by the capacity of nature he can keep all the commandments distributively, he will also be able to keep them collectively.

II. The second error is that of the Lutherans, who assert the opposite extreme: God's precepts are impossible, and not even a just person can observe them by grace; consequently, a just person sins in every work of his. Luther, Calvin, and the other heretics cited in disputation 3, no. 13, hold this view. Jodocus Coccius, Canon of Jülich, writes against this error in his Catholic Treasury, vol. 2, On the Justification of Man, article 21. The Council of Trent also condemned the same error in Session 6, On Justification, chapter 11 and canons 7 and 25, as will be shown below.

Among Catholics, too, there are contrary opinions. The first is that of Dionysius the Cistercian in 1, dist. 17, q. 1, and Gregory in 2, dist. 26, q. 1, arts. 2 and 3. They said that a human being in fallen nature cannot keep any natural precept without the help of grace, even as regards the substance of the act. The chief argument for this opinion is drawn from John 15: Without me you can do nothing,¹ and 2 Cor. 3: We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as though from ourselves.

III. The second opinion is held by others who assert the opposite extreme: a human being in mortal sin, with only God's general concurrence, can, so long as the judgment of reason is not overwhelmed, keep at any moment any precept that binds under pain of sin, as regards the substance of the act, even if the precept is supernatural. Consequently, they add that a fallen human being has sufficient powers, without God's special help, not to consent at any moment to any grave and more intense temptation, and to overcome any great difficulty that must be overcome in that instant alone in order to keep the natural law—even if death must be endured for that reason. They say, however, that without the help of grace a person cannot keep the whole law throughout his life or for a long time without failing in anything, nor perform any work of piety meritorious of eternal life, as the Pelagians held. The arguments for this opinion are these.

Fifth, an argument is made from St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 10, arts. 2 and 3, where he teaches that, so long as it is in this life, the will cannot be necessitated by any object whatsoever as regards the exercise of its act, but always remains free to elicit or not elicit the act; and specifically in article 3 he teaches that the human will cannot be necessitated by any passion, however vehement. Therefore, the will is forced to consent to sin in no temptation; therefore, by the capacity of nature, with only general concurrence, it can avoid any sin for the instant in which the precept binds, and thus it will be able to fulfill that precept by the powers of nature. They prove the same from Anselm, book On Free Choice, chapters 6, 7, 9, and 10, and in book On the Harmony of Foreknowledge, Predestination, and Grace with Free Choice, chapter 1. In these places he teaches that, so long as the judgment of reason is not overwhelmed, no passion, however vehement, and no difficulty can take away the will's freedom not to consent; and thus, whenever it consents at any moment, it sins by transgressing the precept.

They confirm this by the authority of St. Augustine, book On Predestination and Grace, chapter 9, and book Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 5, where he says: Free choice avails for sinning in human beings subject to the Devil. From this they infer that by the capacity of free choice, with only general concurrence, one can fulfill any precept for the instant in which it binds and avoid any sin; otherwise a human being could not refrain from sinning. They prove the same from Jerome, book 3 of the Dialogues Against the Pelagians, where, speaking as Atticus, he says to Christobulus, who plays the role of Pelagius: This is what I said to you from the beginning: it is within our power either to sin or not to sin, and to stretch out our hand toward good or toward evil, so that free choice may be preserved, but this is according to the measure, time, and condition of human frailty. Perpetual sinlessness, however, is reserved to God alone. A little later he adds: Since, as we said, I can do it, will you force me to be able to do it continuously? By these words Jerome seems plainly to teach that for a short time, in any circumstance, we can avoid any sin and fulfill any precept without God's special help, though not continuously—that is, throughout life or for a long time.

IV. Sixth, an argument is made. Otherwise it would have to be admitted that secondary causes, which stir up vehement temptations or notable difficulties, and the temptations themselves take from the will its inborn freedom and necessitate it, as regards the exercise of its act, to consent to sin unless it is fortified by supernatural assistance. But this must not be said.

Seventh, free choice has precisely the same powers in fallen nature as it would have had in a state of pure nature, in which state God would not have bestowed any supernatural help on a human being. But in a state of pure nature, so long as the judgment of reason was not overwhelmed, a person could by the capacity of nature, with only the general concurrence of the natural order, fulfill any precept for the instant in which it binds, overcome any temptation for that same instant, and not consent to sin. Otherwise God would then command a human being to do something truly impossible: in such a case he could not fulfill that precept even by the help of grace, because no such help would be possible, nor could he do so by the capacity of nature alone, as is assumed; and consequently fulfillment of that precept would be altogether impossible. Therefore, in fallen nature too, so long as the judgment of reason is not overwhelmed, a human being will be able to fulfill any precept that presents itself by the capacity of nature alone, at every moment of time.

This is confirmed as follows: restraining consent in such events, one by one, or eliciting the contrary dissent are in themselves purely natural and proper to free choice. For the natural capacity was given to it for this purpose, no less than sight was given for seeing and intellect for understanding. Therefore, by the capacity of nature it will be able freely to restrain consent to sin or elicit the contrary dissent at every moment of time.

V. Eighth, otherwise it would follow that the higher part of the human being does not rule the lower except when the lower part's movements are slight; rather, the lower part would rule the higher when vehement temptations arise. This consequence seems contrary to what the Lord said to Cain in Genesis 4: Its desire shall be under you, and you shall rule over it; therefore, the claim follows.

Ninth, another great inconvenience would follow from the contrary opinion: namely, that whenever notable or vehement temptations arise, a human being would never sin, even if he committed every sort of crime, and consequently would not deserve punishment, since no one sins in what he cannot avoid.

Tenth, the human will in certain most holy persons, especially Our Lady and Christ as a wayfarer, was moved to good no less powerfully than another person's will is moved to evil when some vehement temptation arises. But that vehement motion to good left Our Lady's and Christ's wills free not to elicit an act concerning that object—unless you wish to take merit away from Our Lady and Christ as a wayfarer, contrary to the Catholic faith. Therefore, when any vehement temptation has arisen, the will of others, left to itself, remains free at every instant not to consent to evil. These authors prove their opinion by four other arguments, but none raises a difficulty not touched on in the preceding arguments.

VI. The third opinion is that of the Thomists, who, following the mind of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, assert that a human being in fallen nature cannot fulfill all the precepts by the capacity of nature alone, even as regards the substance of the act, nor overcome any great difficulty that must be overcome at every moment in order to keep the natural law. In this controversy we must first argue against Luther and Calvin; second, against the Pelagians; third, examine the statements of the second opinion; and finally set forth, explain, and defend the true opinion of St. Augustine and St. Thomas.

VII. FIRST CONCLUSION, against Luther and his followers: God commands nothing impossible to a human being through his law, whether it is the natural law, the written law, or the law of grace; rather, a human being can fulfill any commandment either by the capacity of nature or by the help of grace.² This conclusion is of faith and is held by all Catholics. It is proved first from sacred Scripture, especially Deuteronomy 30, where it says: This commandment that I enjoin upon you today is not above you nor far off, nor is it set in heaven, so that you could say, “Which of us can ascend to heaven to bring it down to us, so that we may hear it and put it into practice?” Nor is it beyond the sea, so that you could make excuses and say, “Which of us can cross the sea and bring it to us, so that we may hear and do what has been commanded?” Rather, the word is very near you, in your mouth and in your heart, so that you may do it. St. Augustine uses this testimony in book On Nature and Grace, chapter 69, and Procopius of Gaza in his commentary on Deuteronomy 30 to confirm our conclusion. This testimony has special force against the statement of Melanchthon cited in disputation 3, no. 13. Likewise, 1 John 1 says: This is the love of God, that we keep his commandments; and his commandments are not burdensome. And Matthew 11 says: Take my yoke upon you and learn from me, for I am meek and humble of heart, and you shall find rest for your souls; for my yoke is sweet and my burden light. Augustine and Procopius, in the passages cited above, prove the same truth from these testimonies, as do Bede on chapter 5 of the first letter of John and St. Gregory, homily 17 on Ezekiel. There he also adduces in confirmation of the same doctrine Psalm 118: Your commandment is exceedingly broad, and Psalm 16: Because of the words of your lips I have kept to hard ways. Likewise John 14 says: If anyone loves me, he will keep my word; and Acts 13 says: I have found David, son of Jesse, a man after my own heart, who will do all my wishes. Job 1 says that Job was a simple and upright man, fearing God and turning away from evil, and still holding fast to his innocence, and again: In all these things Job did not sin with his lips. If Job did not sin in all these things, how then does Luther say, A just person sins in every work of his? The Apostle says in Philippians 4: I can do all things in him who strengthens me. The same is clear from the Lord's words in Ezekiel, chapter 36: I will give you a new heart and put a new spirit within you; I will take the heart of stone from your flesh and give you a heart of flesh, and I will put my spirit within you and cause you to walk in my precepts, keep my judgments, and do them. From these words the argument is drawn: God is able to do what he has promised, as Romans 4 says; but God has promised that through his Spirit he will cause the just to keep the divine commandments, as is clear from the cited words of Ezekiel. Therefore, he does so; therefore, the just fulfill God's commandments; therefore, they can fulfill them, at least by the help of grace. God has not, then, commanded a human being to do anything impossible. An important passage for proving the same is Romans 8, where it says: For the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus has freed me from the law of sin and death. For what was impossible for the law, in that it was weakened through the flesh, God, sending his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, on account of sin condemned sin in the flesh, so that the justification of the law might be fulfilled in us, who do not walk according to the flesh but according to the spirit. From this testimony Cyril of Alexandria, book 3 against Julian, proves that the precepts which were impossible through the law are possible for us through grace.

VIII. Second, this is proved by the authority of the Supreme Pontiffs. For Leo the First teaches the same truth in his sermon for the solemnity of Epiphany, chapter 3, and sermon 5 for Lent, chapter 1; and Sixtus III, in his treatise On Evil Teachers and Works of Faith, says: You may indeed prove that God commanded something impossible, if it is also fitting for a human being. For if the human condition considers it unjust to command anyone to do something beyond his ability, what perversity it is to think this of God, when even mortal nature would not tolerate it!

Third, this is proved from the definitions of Councils. For the Second Council of Orange says in canon 25: We also believe, in accordance with the Catholic faith, that all the baptized, having received grace through baptism, can and ought, with Christ helping and cooperating, fulfill the things that pertain to salvation, if they are willing to labor faithfully. And the Council of Trent, Session 6, decree On Justification, chapter 11, says: No one ought to use that rash expression, forbidden by the Fathers under anathema, that the commandments of God are impossible for a justified person to observe. For God does not command impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes you both to do what you can and to ask for what you cannot, and he helps you so that you can; his commandments are not burdensome, his yoke is sweet, and his burden is light. And canon 6 of that same decree anathematizes anyone who says that all works performed before justification, however they were performed, are truly sins or merit the hatred of God; and canon 25 defines: If anyone says that a just person sins at least venially in every good work, or, what is more intolerable, mortally, let him be anathema. Therefore, etc.

IX. Fourth, this is proved from the common consensus of the holy Fathers. Among the Greeks, Clement of Alexandria teaches our conclusion in book 4 of the Stromata, chapter 8, where he says: The commandments are indeed of such a kind that they can be done or left undone by us; this is fitting, so that praise and blame may follow. Athanasius says in his book On the Preservation of Virginity: For those who fear the Lord, the Lord's commandments are not difficult. If they are not difficult, then much less are they impossible. Basil the Great, in the Shorter Rules, response 176, explaining the Apostle's words, Be imitators of God, as most beloved children, and walk in love, says: Without doubt, he who is good and just would not have commanded this unless he had also bestowed³ the capacity by which we might do it. And in his homily on Moses' words, Take heed to yourself, he says: It is impious to assert that the precepts of the Holy Spirit are impossible to observe. Chrysostom speaks thus on Psalm 101: God's precepts ought to be received with great delight, and nothing in them should be considered difficult; for it is usually not the nature of the precepts but the negligence of many that causes difficulty.⁴ And in homily 18 on Matthew: Let us not, then, think the precepts impossible, since they are certainly useful to us and very easy. And in homily 8 on penance: Do not accuse the Lord of giving impossible commandments; for many exceed the commandments themselves. Anastasius of Nicaea, question 5, explaining Matthew 11, My yoke is sweet and my burden light, says: It is clear that even one who is old and weak can keep his law. After adducing several other passages of Scripture in confirmation, he concludes: You see that nothing has been ordained that is burdensome and that cannot be done by us.⁵ Among the Latin Fathers, St. Jerome teaches the same on Matthew 5. Explaining Love your enemies, he says: Many, judging God's precepts by their own weakness rather than by the strength of the saints, think the commandments impossible and say that it is enough for virtue not to hate one's enemies, while loving them is commanded beyond what human nature can bear.⁶ We must know, then, that Christ commands not impossibilities but perfections, as David did toward Saul and Absalom. And in book 3 against the Pelagians, chapter 1, he says: No one doubts that God commanded things possible. St. Augustine says in book On Nature and Grace, chapter 43: Therefore God does not command impossibilities, but by commanding admonishes us both to do what we can and to ask for what we cannot.⁷ The Council of Trent took these words from Augustine in the cited chapter 11. Moreover, in sermon 191 On Time, he says: We also abhor the blasphemy of those who say that God commanded something impossible for a human being and that God's commandments can be kept not by each person but only by all collectively.

Fifth, this is proved by reason. Precepts are given concerning acts that are within a human being's power; otherwise a human being would deserve neither a reward from God if he fulfilled them nor a punishment if he transgressed them. For a human being neither merits nor demerits by natural things, because they are not within his power. Therefore, it entails a contradiction that something be commanded to a human being and yet not be within his power; consequently, it must be possible for him, at least by the help of grace.

X. SECOND CONCLUSION, against the Pelagians: A human being in fallen nature cannot fulfill all the precepts without qualification of the law by the capacity of nature alone, but necessarily needs the help of supernatural grace for this.⁸ As it stands, this conclusion is of faith, defined against Pelagius at the Council of Milevis, chapter 5, and recorded in the Decretum, consecration, distinction 4, chapter Placuit. These are the Council's words: It was also resolved that whoever says that the grace of justification is given to us for this purpose: that what we are commanded to do by free choice we may more easily fulfill through grace, as though even without grace we could—not indeed easily, but still could—fulfill the divine commandments, let him be anathema. The same is defined in the African Council, chapter 80, and in several chapters of the Second Council of Orange, especially canons 10, 18, 23, and 24. Likewise, the Council of Carthage, in its letter to Innocent I concerning Pelagius and Celestius, preserved among Augustine's letters as Letter 90, defines the same truth, which it proves there from Romans 8, The Spirit helps our weakness, etc., and Romans 9, It is not of one who wills, nor of one who runs, but of God who shows mercy. The same is also defined in the Council of Valence, chapter 6, in these words: Concerning grace, by which believers are saved and without which a rational creature has never lived blessedly, and concerning free choice, weakened by sin in the first man but restored and healed in his faithful ones by God's grace, we most firmly and plainly profess the same thing that the most holy Fathers, on the authority of sacred Scripture, left us to hold, which the African and Arausican Synods professed, and which the most blessed Supreme Pontiffs of the Apostolic See held with Catholic faith.

XI. Second, it is proved from the definitions of the Supreme Pontiffs. For Gelasius I, in epistle 5, after many things he teaches against Pelagius, says as follows:⁹ Who, then, would dare to say, as a Christian, that he has any good apart from grace, when the Teacher of the Gentiles cries out in 1. ad Corin. 15: “By the grace of God I am what I am”; and again: “I labored more than all, yet not I, but the grace of God with me”? Likewise, Innocent I, in epistle 31, which is to the Council of Carthage, defines the same truth against Pelagius, concluding in these words:¹⁰ Whoever, then, assenting to this, seems to hold the opinion that we do not need divine help, declares himself an enemy of the Catholic faith and ungrateful for the gifts of God; nor are they worthy of our communion, which they have wholly defiled by their preaching. And in epistle 32, which is to the Council of Milevis, he says:¹¹ The Psalmist spoke rightly of such men: “Behold, the men who have not made God their helper.” Finally, Celestine I, in epistle 8 to the bishops of Gaul, defines the same truth in the most elegant words. For in chapter 10 he speaks thus:¹² We also embrace as proper to the Apostolic See that which was established among the decrees of the Synod of Carthage, namely, what was defined in its third canon: whoever says that the grace of God, by which we are justified through Jesus Christ our Lord, avails only for the remission of sins already committed, and not also as help so that they may not be committed, let him be anathema. And again, in chapter 4:¹³ Likewise, whoever says that the grace of God through Jesus Christ helps us not to sin only because through it the understanding of the commandments is revealed and opened to us, so that we know what we ought to desire and what we ought to avoid, but that through it we are not enabled to love and be able to do what we have recognized must be done, let him be anathema. For since the Apostle says, “Knowledge puffs up, but charity builds up,” it is most impious to believe that we have the grace of Christ for that which puffs up, but not for that which builds up, since both are gifts of God: to know what we ought to do, and to love so as to do it, so that, when charity builds up, knowledge cannot puff up. And just as it is written of God, “He who teaches man knowledge,” so too it is written, “Charity is from God.”¹⁴¹⁵ And in chapter 5 he adds: Likewise, whoever says that the grace of justification is given to us for this reason, that we may more easily fulfill through grace what we are commanded to do by free choice—as though, even if grace were not given, we could indeed fulfill the divine commandments, though not easily—let him be anathema. For the Lord was speaking of the fruit of the commandments when he did not say, “Without me you can do nothing with greater difficulty,” but said, “Without me you can do nothing.”¹⁶

XII. Third, it is proved from the common consensus of the holy Fathers, who drew this truth against Pelagius from the sources of Scripture. Among the Greek Fathers, Gregory Nazianzen teaches it in his homily on the passage of Matthew's Gospel, When Jesus had finished his sayings;¹⁷ there he proves it from Romans 9, It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, etc., and from Psalm 126, Unless the Lord guards the city, he watches in vain who guards it. Chrysostom teaches the same in his homily on Adam and Eve, near the end, volume 1. Cyril of Alexandria, book 5 on Isaiah, chapter 60, cites in his support John 6: No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. St. Augustine teaches the same in On Correction and Grace, chapter 12, whose words we cited at the end of Disputation 51. Maxentius teaches the same in his response to Hormisdas's letter, where he says: If human nature could make progress among its adversaries by its own goods and not by God's help, the Prophet, filled with the Spirit of God, would never pray, saying in Psalm 16, “Make my steps firm in your paths, so that my footsteps may not be moved.” He also proves it in his Confession of Faith from Philippians 2: For it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish. St. Maximus too proves it in On Charity, century 2, chapter 28, from the words of the Lord, Without me you can do nothing.¹⁸ Damascene says in book 3 of The Orthodox Faith, chapter 30, that God himself is the source and author of every good, and that without his help we cannot will or do good.

XIII. Among the Latin Fathers, Cyprian holds the same view in book 3 to Quirinus, chapter 4, where he proves it from the Apostle in 1. ad Cor. 4: What do you have that you did not receive? Jerome too cites this passage for this truth in book 1 to Ctesiphon, chapter 3. Augustine is constant in this opinion: for, speaking against Pelagius in On the Grace of Christ against Pelagius and Caelestius, Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, and On the Spirit and the Letter, but especially in epistle 79, which is the second to Hilary, he strengthens the same truth with many scriptural testimonies. Likewise, in epistle 90 he expressly attacks Pelagius's error. Gennadius of Marseilles teaches the same in book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, chapter 22; Fulgentius in On the Faith to Peter, chapter 72, where he says: Hold most firmly, and doubt in no way, that no one can obey the divine commandments unless God first comes to him with his grace. St. Isidore of Seville says in book 2 of On the Highest Good, chapter 5: Let the defenders of free choice know that man can accomplish nothing by his own power toward good unless he is sustained by the help of divine grace. St. Bernard, in sermon 2 on Pentecost: The Spirit, he says, will give strength for life, and what is impossible for you by nature will through his grace become not only possible but easy. All these points are confirmed by Psalm 118: Give me life, and I will keep your words. On this passage St. Ambrose, sermon 11, observes that the Psalmist first said, Give me life—that is, through your grace—and afterward added, so that I may keep them, to show that unless man is given life through grace, he cannot keep all the commandments. The Psalmist repeats this many times in the same Psalm, especially in these words:¹⁹ Would that my ways were directed toward keeping your statutes, etc. On this passage Augustine, sermon 4, also observes that he first said, May they be directed, and then added, toward keeping them, because unless man's free choice is directed and helped by God through his grace, he cannot keep God's statutes, that is, his commandments.

Finally, it is proved by reason: among the divine commandments, some are supernatural, such as the precepts of believing, hoping, and loving; among the natural commandments too is the precept to love God, as author of nature, above all things. But without the help of grace man cannot fulfill those supernatural commandments, as we showed at length in Disputation 49. Likewise, a man in fallen nature cannot fulfill the natural precept of loving God above all things without the help of grace, as we left proved in Disputation 51. Therefore, speaking absolutely, man cannot fulfill all the commandments without the help of grace. But to deal with the Catholics, let the following conclusion be stated:

XIV. THIRD CONCLUSION: A human being in fallen nature can, without special help from grace, fulfill one or another precept of the natural law as regards the substance of the act—for example, the precept to honor one's parents, preserve one's own life, and similar precepts, in which there is no grave difficulty—and can resist lighter temptations that must be overcome in order to keep those same precepts. This conclusion remains sufficiently proved by what was said in disputation 50: free choice was not extinguished by sin but only wounded; therefore, by its own powers it can perform some morally good works proportionate to its nature. Therefore, if a precept concerning such works presents itself, it will be able to fulfill it by eliciting those same good works and resisting lighter temptations. This opinion can be confirmed from the bull of Pius V cited in disputation 51, no. 17, where among the propositions of Michael Baius, proposition 37 is condemned: He agrees with Pelagius who recognizes anything naturally good, that is, anything arising from the powers of nature alone. Proposition 35 is likewise condemned there, namely: Everything that a sinner or a slave of sin does is sin. Therefore, etc.

FOURTH CONCLUSION: A human being in fallen nature cannot, without special help from grace, keep all the precepts of the law, even as regards the substance of the act, nor resist the more serious temptations that must be overcome in order to keep those same commandments.²⁰ This conclusion can be understood in two senses. The first is that the distribution all is taken collectively or comprehensively, for all the precepts that present themselves to a person throughout his life or over a long time; in this sense no Catholic denies it. The second sense is that all is taken distributively, for any precept that presents itself at any single moment or for a short time. We understand our conclusion in this sense. Thus explained, this opinion is gathered from St. Augustine and St. Thomas in the passages cited in disputations 49 and 51 to prove that a human being in fallen nature cannot fulfill the supernatural precepts of Faith, Hope, and Charity, even as regards the substance of the act, without the help of grace, nor the precept of natural love by which we are bound to love God above all things insofar as he is the author of nature. Master Soto teaches this in book 1, On Nature and Grace, chapter 22, conclusion 3.

The conclusion is proved by the authority of Augustine's Letter 106 to Paulinus. Among the charges made against Pelagius at the Council of Palestine—which Pelagius himself anathematized at that same Council so that he would not be anathematized—Augustine recalls the assertion that God's grace and help are not given for each individual act. He also reports that Pelagius held that our victory comes not from God's help but from free choice. Among other matters to be examined, Augustine says: Every believer must confess that when we fight against temptations and illicit desires, although we also have free choice there, our victory proceeds not from it but from God's help. Therefore, it is contrary to Augustine's opinion to assert that by the capacity of free choice alone a human being can fulfill each precept at any moment and overcome every temptation in order to keep them, as regards the substance of the act. Therefore, this must not be admitted.

Moreover, Innocent I confirms the same in his letter to the Council of Carthage, for he says: Not free choice but God's help alone can make us equal to resisting. And Celestine I, in Letter 1, chapter 6, defines that no one, even if renewed by the grace of baptism, is fit to overcome the snares of the Devil and conquer the desires of the flesh unless he has received perseverance in good conduct through God's daily assistance.

XV. They offer two replies to all these authorities. The first is that the passages cited speak of victory over temptations that is accompanied by merit of eternal life and the praise of true virtue, not of a victory that occurs without any merit of eternal life or praise of true virtue, with respect to any particular act and at any moment whatsoever. But this interpretation does not seem to follow the mind of the Council, the Supreme Pontiffs, or St. Augustine. For it is argued against it as follows. First, the Supreme Pontiffs, Councils, and holy Fathers condemned both of these assertions against Pelagius: the claim that a human being can merit eternal life without supernatural grace, and the claim that by the capacity of nature alone a human being can fulfill all the precepts. They do not restrict their definitions to the fulfillment of all precepts with or without merit. Therefore, their decrees must not be so narrowed. Otherwise someone could say that a human being can keep all the precepts collectively throughout his whole life without the help of grace, by restricting this claim to observing all the precepts without merit of eternal life; yet this cannot be conceded. Second, the same interpretation is refuted because the Councils and Fathers assign this difference between intact and fallen nature: a human being in intact nature could keep all the natural precepts without the help of grace, whereas in fallen nature he cannot unless he is healed and helped by grace. Therefore, they speak of observing all the precepts as regards the substance of the act, and do not restrict their teaching to observance with merit of eternal life. The inference is clear because, even in intact nature, according to the opinion of all Catholics, a human being could not keep all the natural precepts with merit of eternal life without the help of grace, as St. Thomas shows in 1, 2, q. 109, art. 4, and q. 114, art. 2. Third, the same reply is challenged because, according to this interpretation, one could concede that a human being in fallen nature has sufficient powers to dispose himself for grace, at least remotely, through an act of attrition. But that consequence seems contrary to the Council of Trent, Session 14, On the Sacrament of Penance, chapter 4; therefore, it is not allowed. The inference is proved because such attrition is not accompanied by merit of eternal life. Indeed, one would have to concede that contrition, insofar as it precedes the infusion of grace in the order of nature, can be elicited by the capacity of free choice alone, because as it precedes justifying grace it is not meritorious; otherwise a person would merit the infusion of grace through it. Rather, it is meritorious of eternal life only insofar as it follows that same justifying grace in the order of nature, as St. Thomas teaches in 1, 2, q. 112, art. 2, reply to objection 1. Finally, a person could elicit an act of unformed Christian faith without the special actual help of prevenient grace, because it is not meritorious of eternal life.

XVI. Second, they reply to the other cited passages that it was not determined against Pelagius that a human being cannot, by the powers of nature alone, obtain victory over one or another temptation or desire, however grave and troublesome, provided it does not last a long time. They say the powers of free choice suffice for that, although such victory is obtained much more easily and better if we are helped by some special assistance from God; rather, they say the passages speak of victory over all temptations collectively, which is victory without qualification. This interpretation is refuted by the same arguments as the preceding one.

Moreover, it is to attribute too much to the free choice of a fallen and weak human being to say that it can overcome any very great temptation in a short time. For if this were true, it would follow that the faithful need not ask God for daily help to overcome the gravest temptations without qualification that arise at any particular instant, distributively, or for a short time—even if they arise at the point of death—but need only ask for help to overcome them more easily. How objectionable it is to concede this is clear from St. Augustine, cited Letter 107 and book On the Grace of Christ against Pelagius and Celestius, chapters 27 and 28, and from the petition in the Lord's Prayer: ²¹ And lead us not into temptation. According to the common explanation of the saints, in this we ask God not to allow us to succumb to temptations but to give us help to overcome them not only more easily but without qualification, when they are grave. Moreover, Innocent I teaches in the cited letter to the Council of Carthage that God's daily help is necessary for overcoming the Devil's snares and conquering the Devil's desires. Therefore, he holds that a human being in fallen nature cannot resist graver temptations without the help of grace, not only throughout his whole life or for a long time but even for a short time, such as the span of a single day.

Furthermore, the same interpretation is refuted from St. Prosper, book Against the Collator, chapter 33 and following, where he sharply reproves Cassian because he said that Job overcame the Devil's temptations by his own powers, not by God's grace, and that grace merely prevented the most violent enemy from making Job's soul insane and senseless and from overwhelming him with an unequal and unjust weight of combat. In particular, Prosper, speaking against Cassian in chapter 35, says: When you say that God's grace is understood not to have wholly departed from Job because God gave his tempter as much power as he knew Job had strength to resist, would you not speak more truly and sincerely if, where you said “as much strength as he knew Job had to resist,” you instead said “as much strength as he knew he had given Job to resist”? For the correction of a single word would have tempered with some restraint all the glory you wished to assign to human powers, so that the marvelous patience amid such affliction would be attributed both to God's help and to the human being's free choice. But you feared to diminish human nature's praise if you admitted that its strength was given by God. Thus you do not wish God to be a cooperator in that struggle and victory, but only a spectator. And in definition 10 he says: If God merely knew that Job could do it but did not grant him the ability, he was a witness to his patience, not its helper. And in what would the help of grace be necessary if that great victory had been won by human powers alone?

XVII. From these things it follows that when St. Augustine and the other Fathers determine against Pelagius that God's grace is necessary for each act, if they are speaking of acts of the natural order, they are to be understood as referring to each act that has notable difficulty, which a fallen human being cannot overcome by his own powers because of the weakness of nature. ²² This interpretation is gathered from those same Fathers, especially Augustine, who, as was shown above, teaches that a human being in fallen nature can perform without special assistance some good acts proportionate to his nature that do not involve grave difficulties—for example, planting vines, preserving one's own life, eating, having a friend, traveling, and other such things. St. Thomas teaches the same in 1, 2, q. 109, art. 3. ²³

XVIII. To the first of the arguments made at the beginning in support of the Pelagian error, it is answered that it touches on another difficulty attached to the preceding one: namely, whether habitual grace is necessary for keeping all the natural commandments, or whether special help—an actual supernatural motion—is sufficient. Abulensis, question 178 on Matthew 19, holds that a supernatural motion without habitual grace is sufficient; Richard in 2, dist. 28, art. 1, question 6, holds the same. Other theologians, among whom is Vega, question 13, On Justification, teach that without justifying grace a human being cannot, even with actual supernatural assistance, keep all the natural commandments according to the ordinary law. Many Thomists follow this opinion, and it seems more probable to me. ²⁴ The chief reason for this opinion is that canon 5 of the Council of Milevis says that the grace of justification is given to us because without it we cannot fulfill the divine commandments. Moreover, one of the natural precepts is to love God above all things; but as regards the interior act, a person in mortal sin cannot fulfill this precept unless he is first justified in the order of nature and grace is infused into him. Otherwise he would be converted to God as the author of nature and turned away from him as the author of the supernatural order, which, as we said above, is impossible. Therefore, etc. According to this opinion, the first reply to the argument is that the grace required to keep all the natural commandments over a long period heals the soul formally; for, as was said above, justifying grace, through which a human being is healed, is required.

It is answered, second, according to the other opinion, that actual supernatural help heals the soul initially, because the first beginning of salvation is taken from this kind of prevenient grace, as is stated in the Council of Trent, Session 6, On Justification. And if actual help is efficacious for justification, that is, for converting a human being to God, such help will heal the soul effectively at its beginning. ²⁵ Hence, when St. Thomas says that healing grace is required, he is to be understood as referring either to grace that heals formally, such as habitual grace, or to grace that heals initially, such as special actual supernatural help.

XIX. To the second argument it is answered that in a state of pure nature a human being could, without the help of grace, keep all the natural commandments for some short time, just as he could love God above all things for that same period. But the case is not the same for a human being in fallen nature, for the reasons given in disputations 51 and 52. See St. Thomas, 3. con. Gen. c. 160.

To the third argument it is answered that a human being in fallen nature cannot, without special help from grace, keep the precept of loving God above all things, as was shown in disputation 51, nor the supernatural precept of Faith, Hope, and Charity, even as regards the substance of the act. Hence he cannot keep all the commandments, even the natural ones, that present themselves or can present themselves at any single instant, although he can keep one or another natural precept. See another solution to this argument in Master Medina's reply to the fourth objection, against the second conclusion in 1, 2, q. 109, art. 4.

XX. To the fourth it is answered that in fallen nature a human being cannot keep all the precepts, even the natural ones, without the help of grace, either distributively or collectively, as was said. Second, it is answered that, even if one granted without conceding that he can keep each one distributively, it still would not follow that he can keep them all collectively; for the argument proceeds from the divided sense to the composite. To the objection against this it is answered that, although there is no special precept to keep all the commandments collectively, there is a special difficulty in observing them all that is not found in observing each one distributively, just as it is more difficult to avoid all venial sins collectively than each one distributively. ²⁶

The answer to the foundation of Luther and the other heretics, who assert that God's precepts are impossible, is clear from what was said in the first conclusion. What is asserted in support of the first opinion among Catholics was answered at length in disputation 50.

To the fifth argument made in support of the second opinion from the authority of St. Thomas, we gladly concede that no object in this life and no passion, however vehement, compels the will or necessitates it, as regards the exercise of its act, to consent to sin; this alone is what St. Thomas teaches there. ²⁷ Yet it is wrongly inferred from this that by the capacity of nature alone the will can avoid any sin amid whatever temptations threaten. For a created will to be free as regards the exercise of its act at any moment, it is sufficient that it can act or not act, consent or not consent, either of itself or by the help of grace. A created will has of itself the ability to consent to sin and to consent freely through an indifferent judgment of reason. It also has of itself the ability to place an obstacle so that the help of grace is not given to it; this belongs to a created will because it was made from nothing. For this reason it is in itself capable of sin and of failing, as St. Thomas teaches from St. Augustine in passages to be cited in disputation 101, no. 8. Likewise, in any circumstances it can refrain from consenting to sin, but resist at least by the help of grace. For to say absolutely that someone is bound to an act does not require that he be able to produce it by the capacity of nature alone; it is sufficient that he can do so either by himself or by the help of grace. This solution is clearly gathered from St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 109, art. 4, reply to objection 2, and art. 8, replies to objections 1 and 2; 2, 2, q. 2, art. 5, reply to objection 1; and 3. cont. Gent. c. 159. Nevertheless, it must be said that, on the supposition that the will freely prevented the necessary help of grace from being given to it in order to avoid some sin, whether in a case where vehement temptations threaten or in another case, it will necessarily fall into that sin—not by absolute necessity, for this is incompatible with freedom, but by a necessity of infallibility or of consequence, that is, a necessity on a supposition, which is a qualified necessity and does not hinder freedom, as was shown in disputation 25. ²⁸ The same answer is given to the authority of Anselm cited in the argument.

To the confirmation from the cited authority of St. Augustine it is answered that it rather supports us: it confirms what we said, namely, that created free choice, especially when subjected to the Devil through sin, can of itself consent to sin and consent freely, even though on the aforesaid supposition it consents necessarily by a necessity of infallibility, as St. Thomas teaches at length in 3. cont. Gent. cap. 160. But Augustine never taught that the will has of itself, without the help of grace, the ability to resist valiantly and fight against graver temptations; rather, he teaches the opposite. For in book On the Grace of Christ against Pelagius and Celestius, chapter 27, he argues against Pelagius because he said that by the powers of nature alone a human being can resist the evil spirit. Augustine's words are: You wish people to believe that the powers of nature, which you exalt and thereby ruin, are so great that even without the help of the Holy Spirit one can resist the evil spirit somehow, although less easily. Therefore, etc.

XXI. To the authority of St. Jerome it is answered that his words conclude only that a human being can, without the help of grace, perform some good proportionate to his nature, which we gladly admit; yet by the capacity of nature alone he cannot persevere in that good to the end. Likewise, he cannot overcome the gravest temptations, even for a short time, without the help of grace; nor does St. Jerome teach the contrary there or anywhere else.

To the sixth argument we deny that our opinion entails that natural causes stirring up vehement passions impose necessity on the will or take away its inborn freedom. For, as was said, the will can elicit consent to sin and sin of itself, and likewise it can resist any temptations, but then by the help of prevenient and cooperating grace, as was said. ²⁹

To the seventh it is answered that, as was shown in disputation 47, human free choice would have had greater powers to carry out the good in a state of pure nature than it now has in fallen nature without the help of grace. Hence, from the fact that in pure nature it could fulfill by the capacity of nature any connatural precept at any moment, it does not follow that it can do so in fallen nature without the help of grace.

XXII. To the confirmation it is answered that restraining consent to sin, fighting valiantly in individual cases where notable difficulty is present, or eliciting the contrary dissent is not proper to weak and wounded free choice unless it is first healed and helped by grace, as St. Thomas says in 1, 2, q. 109, art. 4, concerning natural love of God above all things. This belongs to a human being in intact nature, who in that state had sufficient powers for it, but not in fallen nature—just as it is proper to a human being to be able to run, though this is not proper to a sick person.

To the eighth the inference is denied: for even when the disordered movements of the sensitive appetite are vehement, free choice can resist them by the help of grace and subject them to reason. Hence it always remains master of its acts, and the appetite remains subject to it, unless by his own fault a human being chooses to subject himself to those movements by placing an obstacle to the bestowal of the help of grace, through which he could and would restrain them.

To the ninth the consequence is denied. To the proof, it is answered that no one sins in what he cannot avoid either by his own natural powers or by the help of grace. The same answer is given to the proposition, “No one is bound to do the impossible”—namely, what is impossible even by grace. For what we can do through friends we can do ourselves, as Aristotle says. This is the solution of St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 109, art. 4, reply to objection 2, and 2, 2, q. 2, art. 5, reply to the first.

To the tenth it is answered that the vehement inclination to good found in certain most holy persons, especially the Blessed Virgin, did not proceed from nature alone: For the sense and thought of the human heart are prone to evil from youth, ³⁰ but proceeded from the help of grace. That help moved their wills to act freely for the good according to the mode of those same wills. It therefore moved them infallibly to perform such good, yet in such a way that they could refrain from performing it if they wished; although, given that efficacious motion, it was impossible in the composite sense that they would not perform that good, as is clear from what was said in disputation 25. Thus the human will of any saint, however perfect, while this vehement inclination to good remained, was free to perform that good by the help of grace and to refrain from performing it by itself, since not acting is a negation and requires no prior help of grace, for negation is said both of what is and of what is not. In proportionate fashion, then, the wills of other people, when any vehement temptation arises, remain free at every instant and able both not to consent and to consent to evil, but in different ways. The latter—that is, consenting to evil—they can do of themselves, because by their nature they are capable of failing, since they were created from nothing. The former—that is, not consenting to evil, which is done by pursuing the opposite good—they can do by the help of grace and not otherwise, given the weakness of nature and the arising of a vehement temptation. The reason is the one St. Thomas gives in 1, 2, q. 112, art. 3, reply to objection 2: the first cause of defect is from us, but the first cause of good is from God, in accordance with the saying: ³¹ Your destruction is from yourself, Israel; only in me is your help. For the freedom of free choice does not require that a human being, left to his own nature, be able to consent or not consent to any object presented to him. It is sufficient that he be able to do so either by himself or by the help of grace. Otherwise no just person, however perfect, would have free choice to love God as the author of the supernatural order: left to his own nature, without any help of grace, he cannot elicit such an act or consent to it, however much he tries of himself to produce supernatural love, although by his own powers he can elicit an act contrary to charity.

End of Book Six.