De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether in fallen nature a human being can, by the powers of nature alone with God's general concurrence, elicit an absolute, purely natural act of loving God above all, with an absolute resolve to please him in all things.

I. Some reply that in the state of fallen nature human nature cannot exercise its natural powers in this natural love of God so absolutely and efficaciously as it could in intact nature. But there is no controversy about this. They do not expressly determine whether, speaking absolutely, a human being in fallen nature can elicit one or another act of loving God above all without qualification, without the help of grace, although they seem to imply or assume this tacitly. Others, however, say outright that in fallen nature a human being can, without the special help of grace and from the capacity of his nature, elicit the aforesaid act of loving God above all, together with an absolute resolve not to sin thereafter, although he could have produced it much more easily and readily in intact nature. To explain this, they distinguish three acts of the will with respect to loving God above all.¹ The first is a certain velleity, by which someone, from an affect of love, would wish to keep all the commandments but does not will this simply and absolutely; and thus he does not have an absolute act of loving God above all. For one who loves God in this way ought to resolve to keep all his commandments, according to the saying: If anyone loves me, he will keep my word.² The second act is an absolute and efficacious act of loving God above all, by which, from that same love, one absolutely wills to keep all the commandments and afterward fulfills this in deed. They make the third act intermediate between velleity and absolute, efficacious love. They call it an absolute but ineffective love of God above all, because although, from an affect of love and love of God above all, a human being resolves with an absolute resolve to keep all God's commandments and please him in all things and in every way, he does not afterward fulfill this in deed. They say that a human being can have this love of God above all in fallen nature, by the powers of nature alone and without special help on the part of the will, especially if there is faith on the part of the intellect. They say the same concerning supernatural love of God, contrition, and any other act of infused virtue, as regards the substance of the act. For they affirm that a human being can elicit such an act by the capacity of nature alone. They cite in support of this opinion Master Soto, in 4. dist. 17. q. 1. art. 5 and lib. 2. de nat. et grat. cc. 14 et 22; Master Cano, in relect. de poenit.; Cajetan, q. 1. de contritio.; St. Bonaventure, in 4. dist. 17. art. 2. q. 3; and other doctors.

II. This opinion is proved from St. Thomas, in 4. dist. 17. q. 2. art. 1. quaestiunc. 1. ad 6, where he says that contrition comes from God alone as regards the form by which it is informed, but as regards the substance of the act it comes from free choice and from God, who works in all works of nature and of the will. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, with only general concurrence free choice can elicit an act of contrition and an absolute love of God above all, as regards the substance of the act. The inference is clear: God works through general concurrence in all works of nature and of the will. Likewise, in 2. 2. q. 171. art. 2. ad 3 he expressly teaches that an act can be above human nature in two ways: In one way, as regards the substance of the act, as in performing miracles and knowing hidden and uncertain things of divine Wisdom; no gift of habitual grace is given to a human being for these acts. In another way, something is above human nature as regards the manner of the act, but not as regards its substance, as in loving God and knowing him in the mirror of creatures; for this a gift of habitual grace is given.³ Therefore, according to St. Thomas, the act of loving God above all, for which habitual grace is given, does not exceed the capacity of nature as regards the substance of the act but only as regards its manner, insofar as that act is supernatural or meritorious of eternal life. Therefore, as regards its substance, it can be produced by the capacity of nature alone. He teaches the same doctrine in q. 24. de verit. art. 14, in the body of the article, where he says: There is a twofold good: one is proportionate to human nature, while the other exceeds the capacity of human nature. If we speak of acts, these two goods do not differ in the substance of the act but in the manner of acting. He teaches the same in the replies to the first and second objections of the same article, where he says that no precept is impossible for a human being to keep, because as regards the substance of the act he can do it by the capacity of free choice, and as regards its manner he can do it by the gift of grace. Finally, in 1. sent. dist. 17. q. 1. art. 4, in the body of the article, he says that through love proceeding from a habit one cannot discern whether the act proceeds from an infused or an acquired habit. He therefore holds that an act of loving God above all can be produced as regards its substance by the powers of nature alone. Otherwise, through the act of supernatural love which a just person experiences in himself, he could know with certainty that he has the habit of supernatural charity and consequently is in a state of grace. This, however, is contrary to the express passages of Scripture and the Councils, as is clear from what was established in disput. 42.

It is argued second. By the powers of nature a human being can know that God is supremely good and supremely lovable, and that sin is supremely detestable and the cause of many evils of the soul. Therefore, as regards the substance of the act, the will can by the powers of nature love God above all and detest sin more than anything else that is detestable. The inference is clear: for such knowledge of divine goodness can rouse and move the will beforehand, especially in a believer, so that with only God's general concurrence it elicits an act of loving God above all and detests sin more than anything else that is detestable, as regards the substance of the act. Therefore it can produce that act by itself.

This is confirmed: it is not difficult for a human being, even one who has fallen, to elicit an act of loving God above all, especially when the most serious difficulties and temptations and occasions of sinning are absent, because then no obstacle stands in the way of such an act of love. Therefore. The antecedent is proved: the whole difficulty of an act of loving God above all lies in afterward fulfilling the absolute resolve to please him in all things, which is required for that love to be efficacious. Therefore in an absolute but ineffective love of God there is no serious difficulty that a human being cannot overcome by the powers of nature alone.

III. Third. A human being can approach the sacrament of penance without the special help of grace, with an absolute resolve thereafter to avoid all mortal sins except one, for example, homicide. For a resolve of this kind does not proceed from the special help of grace, since the Holy Spirit does not move someone to detest one mortal sin without the others, given that it is impious to hope for half a pardon from God and one mortal sin cannot be remitted without the others, as St. Thomas teaches in 3. p. q. 86. art. 3. Therefore, by the powers of nature, he will be able to approach with a resolve to abstain from all mortal sins and also from that one sin of homicide, and thus will be able to have a resolve to abstain from all of them. The inference is clear: the resolve to abstain from that one sin of homicide, when compared with the resolve to abstain from all the others, has little or no difficulty. Therefore, for the same reason that a human being can resolve by the powers of nature to abstain from all the others except homicide, he can have an absolute resolve to abstain from all of them.

Fourth. Acts of infused temperance and acquired temperance are of the same species as regards the substance of the act. For temperate eating is always of the same species as regards its substance, whether it is elicited by infused or acquired temperance. Therefore, likewise, an act of infused love of God and an act of acquired love of God will be of the same species as regards the substance of the act. But an act of acquired love or acquired temperance does not exceed the capacity of nature as regards its substance. Therefore neither does an act of infused love or infused temperance exceed the capacity of nature as regards its substance. Therefore free choice can elicit such acts by the powers of nature.

Fifth. For from the opposite opinion it would follow that an angel knew by experience, through the capacity of his nature, that he had the habit of supernatural charity and grace. The consequence is impossible, since grace cannot be known evidently by the capacity of nature alone. Therefore. The inference is proved: an angel experienced in himself an act of loving God above all, which he had in the first instant of his creation. Therefore, if the substance of that act were supernatural, the angel would know by experience and evidently that the act proceeded from grace and charity. For since the angel knew all natural things evidently and did not see the substance of that act among natural beings, he necessarily knew by experience that the act was supernatural as regards its substance and consequently knew that it proceeded from a supernatural habit.

Sixth. When the Second Council of Orange, cap. 6. et 25, and likewise the Council of Trent, sess. 6. can. 3, determine that the special help of prevenient grace is necessary for an act of love, faith, and hope, they add the phrase to love, to believe, and to hope as is fitting, so that the grace of justification may be conferred on a person. They therefore hold that a human being can, without the special help of grace, love God above all, believe, and hope, but not as is fitting for salvation or for obtaining the grace of justification or glory, only as regards the substance of the act. This is confirmed:⁴ for, by an argument from the contrary sense, the Council seems to have indicated that the opinion which asserts that the aforesaid acts can be elicited without the help of grace as regards their substance, but not as is fitting for salvation, is true. Otherwise the Council would have added to its definition in vain the phrase as is fitting for salvation.

IV. The second opinion is that of St. Augustine in the passages to be cited below, and of St. Thomas, p. 2. q. 109. art. 4 and in many other places. The Thomists commonly follow it. To explain it, we must note first that, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. 2. q. 100. art. 10, and as Cajetan and all the Thomists teach there, although the manner of charity does not fall under the precept of the other virtues, nor is it necessarily included in their acts, as in the precept of the virtue of temperance or fortitude, nevertheless it falls under the precept of the virtue of charity itself and is included in it.⁵ Hence, if there is a precept to fast or a precept to honor one's parents, that precept is fulfilled by the act of fasting performed in mortal sin and by an act of filial piety toward one's parents, even if performed in mortal sin, because the manner does not fall under the precept. But if there is a natural precept by which a human being is bound to elicit an interior act of loving God above all, then by force of this precept he is bound to love God also as regards the manner of loving, so as to love him with his whole heart, according to Matth. 22: You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and with your whole soul, and with your whole mind.⁶ But to love with one's whole heart, as St. Thomas teaches in the same art. 10. ad 2 and 2. 2. q. 44. art. 4 et 5, is to love God in such a way that one refers oneself and all things to God as the ultimate end and admits nothing in one's heart contrary to divine love.

Second, we must note that an absolute love of God includes virtually the observance of all the commandments, at least in readiness of mind.⁷ So Medina teaches, 1. 2. q. 109. art. 3. dub. 1, § deinde advertendum; this is clear from Ioan. 14: If anyone loves me, he will keep my word; and 1. Ioan. 5:⁸ This is love, that we keep his commandments. Hence throughout the time that this love above all, or its power, lasts, the observance of all the precepts remains joined to it, at least the natural precepts if the love is only natural, and also the supernatural precepts if the love is supernatural. But because in the present state the act of charity and its power can be interrupted by a contrary act, it follows that even if someone has a true and efficacious absolute act of loving God above all, even a supernatural act, and an absolute resolve to please him in all things and keep all the commandments, it nevertheless happens afterward in fact that he does not keep them, and the power of the preceding act of charity is interrupted by mortal sin.

V. Third, we must note that for an act of loving God above all and an absolute resolve to keep all the commandments to be considered efficacious, it is not necessary for a human being to keep all the commandments throughout his whole life. It suffices that he keep them throughout the time that the act of love, or its power, lasts.⁹ This is a foundation against the authors of the opinion cited above. It is proved as follows: otherwise no love, even a supernatural love, however intense, would be efficacious except that alone which has joined to it the gift of perseverance to the end, which nevertheless seems absurd. This is confirmed: if someone once loved God above all and by virtue of this love kept all the commandments for an entire month, then his love was efficacious throughout that month in which its power lasted. Therefore even if, after the month had passed, he breaks one precept, the preceding love was still efficacious during the time its power lasted. From this it follows that every absolute love of God above all and every absolute resolve to keep all the commandments is efficacious at least for the instant in which it is elicited. For it is impossible for a human being, in the same instant in which he elicits such love, to break some precept binding under mortal sin, because, as the Apostle says, Love is the fullness of the law.¹⁰ Therefore for some instant or brief time it always has joined to it the observance of all the commandments, and so it will be efficacious for that time. Finally, we must assume the distinction between natural and supernatural love.¹¹ Natural love of God above all is that which is directed toward God as the author of nature, as the ultimate end, preferring him to all things. Supernatural love, however, is the love by which we love God as the author of grace and as the supernatural ultimate end. Therefore:

VI. First Conclusion. A human being in fallen nature who is in mortal sin can, without the special help of grace, have a conditional act of loving God above all, or a certain velleity, expressed in these words: I would wish to love God above all and to please him in all things. This conclusion is common among theologians. Master Medina proves it, p. 2. q. 109. art. 3. dub. 1. concl. 3. The reason is that this act of love is not the most perfect act of a sound nature, nor true love of God above all; nor is a human being turned away from mortal sin by it, nor is he in fact turned toward God as the ultimate end. Therefore it can be had by the powers of nature.

Second Conclusion. A human being in fallen nature, especially if he is in mortal sin, cannot, without the special help of prevenient grace, love God above all with an absolute natural love, nor have an absolute resolve to please him in all things.¹² This conclusion is opposed to the opinion cited above, but it is expressly stated by St. Thomas, in the cited art. 3 and 1. 2. q. 100. art. 10. ad 3, where he says that the precept of charity is not fulfilled without grace. He is also speaking of the precept of charity to which a human being is bound by the law of nature. Some reply¹³ that St. Thomas means that a human being in fallen nature cannot love God above all with an efficacious love that lasts throughout his whole life without any failure, though he could do this in intact nature. This solution, however, is contrary to St. Thomas's mind:¹⁴ for he teaches that a human being in fallen nature cannot fulfill the precept of charity without grace, and the precept of charity is fulfilled through an absolute act of love of God above all, even if afterward one in fact breaks some precept. Otherwise only those who have the gift of perseverance would fulfill the precept of charity. Therefore. The same opinion is expressly held by St. Augustine in epist. 107. ad Vitalem, where he says: By the magnitude of the first sin we lost free choice for loving God, that is, we lost the power to love God through the capacity of nature alone. He teaches the same in lib. de gratia et lib. arb. c. 18, where, among other things, he says: If the love of God and neighbor comes not from God but from human beings, the Pelagians have won; but if it comes from God, we have defeated the Pelagians. St. Prosper establishes the same conclusion against Cassian in lib. contra Collat. cc. 30 et 31, and St. Gregory in 33. moral. c. 20, where he says: If our love precedes God, where is what the Apostle John said: Not because we loved God, but because he first loved us?¹⁵

VII. It is further proved from the passages of Scripture cited by Prosper in the cited places. For Sacred Scripture asserts that charity, or love of God above all, is a gift of God,¹⁶ as in Rom. 5: The charity of God has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us. And 1. Io. 4: Charity is from God. Likewise, the Council of Milevis, can. 4, defines that both are God's gifts: knowing what we ought to do, and loving so that we may do it. And the Second Council of Orange, can. 25, says: It is wholly a gift of God to love God. Therefore. If it is said that Sacred Scripture and the Councils speak of supernatural love insofar as it is supernatural, and of love that proceeds from an infused habit, the reply is: Pelagius never taught that the love which he located in nature was supernatural or proceeded from an infused habit. Rather, he said absolutely that love of God above all and an absolute resolve never to sin can simply be had by the powers of nature alone.¹⁷ For it entails a contradiction for love to be supernatural and to proceed from the powers of nature alone; otherwise it would be supernatural and not supernatural at the same time. Yet St. Augustine and Prosper refute this assertion of his. Therefore. This is confirmed: if Pelagius asserted that love of God above all can be had by the powers of nature alone, then he was speaking of merely natural love. The inference is clear: love proceeding from the powers of nature alone is merely natural. Therefore the saints, when they determine against Pelagius that a human being cannot love God above all by the powers of nature alone, are also speaking of natural love by which God is loved absolutely above all. Some theologians reply that Scripture and the Councils speak of efficacious love, not absolute but ineffective love. But the reply is: as we showed in the second and third foundations, every absolute act of loving God above all is efficacious at least for the instant and time that it lasts, since it essentially includes the observance of all the commandments for that same instant or time. Therefore.

VIII. It is proved second. An absolute act of loving God above all is incompatible with mortal sin. Therefore, if a human being can elicit an act of loving God above all by the powers of nature alone, he will be able by those same powers to rise from mortal sin. This, however, cannot be admitted, as St. Thomas shows, p. 2. q. 109. art. 7.¹⁸ The antecedent is proved: it is impossible for a human being to be turned away from God as the ultimate end and at the same time turned toward God as the ultimate end; otherwise he would at the same time be turned away from God and turned toward him, which entails a contradiction. But one who is in mortal sin is turned away from God and turned toward a creature as the ultimate end, whereas one who loves God above all is turned toward him as the ultimate end. Therefore it is impossible for an act of loving God above all to be compatible with mortal sin. This argument is confirmed: as St. Thomas teaches, p. 2. q. 1. art. 5, it is impossible for anyone to have two ultimate ends at the same time. But if a human being remaining in mortal sin could elicit an absolute act of loving God above all, he would have two ultimate ends at the same time. Therefore it is impossible for him, while remaining in mortal sin, to elicit such an act of loving God above all. The minor is proved: one who is in mortal sin has a creature as his ultimate end. But the person in question remains in mortal sin, as is assumed. Therefore he has a creature as his ultimate end. Again, one who loves God above all with an absolute love loves him as the ultimate end. Therefore, if a person in mortal sin can love God above all by the powers of nature, he can at the same time love him as the ultimate end. Therefore, if he does in fact love him, he will have God as the ultimate end and likewise a creature, which nevertheless seems expressly contrary to the Apostle's saying: What fellowship has light with darkness? etc.¹⁹ This conclusion will become clearer from the arguments to be brought forward for the following conclusion.

IX. Third Conclusion. A human being in fallen nature cannot love God above all as the supernatural end by the powers of nature alone, even if what is meant is an act of love as regards its substance and the person is a believer. Thus, however much God is proposed by the intellect to the will as the supreme supernatural good and as supremely lovable, the will cannot love him above all with an absolute act, even as regards the substance of the act, nor have an absolute resolve to please him in all things, without the special help of grace. This conclusion follows all the more from the preceding conclusion and its arguments. It is proved first: a fallen human being in mortal sin cannot, without the special help of grace, have imperfect desires or imperfect beginnings of virtues or seeds, as Prosper shows against Cassian throughout lib. contra Collat., especially cc. 27 et 28. We recounted Cassian's error in disput. 2. Therefore, much less can he have a most perfect act, such as loving God above all as the supernatural end, especially since, according to the opposing opinion, once that merely natural act of love is posited, God by a certain law confers the help of grace so that the act may be as is fitting for salvation, as we will demonstrate in disput. 56 et seq.

X. It is proved second: from the opposing opinion it follows that a human being can suffer martyrdom out of love for God as the author of the supernatural order, without the help of grace. This conclusion must not be admitted. For if he could suffer martyrdom without God's help, he could attain final salvation without the help of grace. For it is said in Matth. 10: He who loses his life for my sake will find it, and Augustine says: He does an injustice to a martyr who prays for him. Therefore. The inference is proved: if he can love God above all absolutely by the powers of nature, then he can love him more than himself and more than his own life. Therefore he can expose his life for love of God. Therefore he can suffer martyrdom for love of God by the powers of nature. In reply to this argument, they deny the inference:²⁰ for it is not enough for the character of martyrdom to expose one's life for some act of virtue; it is necessarily required that one expose it out of supernatural love of God, as is clear from the Apostle, 1. ad Cor. 13: If I hand over my body so that I burn, but do not have charity, I am nothing.²¹ But an argument against this solution is:²² as the authors of the opposing opinion admit, God has established a law that whoever does all that lies within him by loving God above all, etc., will obtain the help of grace, by which that act becomes supernatural and as is fitting for salvation. Therefore, one who loves God above all by the capacity of nature and exposes his own life by the capacity of nature obtains the help of grace so that the act may be as is fitting for true martyrdom. Therefore, by the powers of nature he becomes a martyr. This is confirmed: at least it follows that the beginning of martyrdom, or imperfect martyrdom, is by the powers of nature, and that the help of grace is necessary only for martyrdom and the act of love to be perfect. But this cannot be admitted, as is clear from the foregoing. Therefore.

XI. It is proved third from the Council of Trent, sess. 14. cap. 4. de sac. poeni., where it says: As for that imperfect contrition called attrition, since it is commonly conceived either from consideration of the shamefulness of sin or from fear of hell and punishments, if it excludes the will to sin and is joined with hope of pardon, the Council declares that it not only does not make a person a hypocrite and more of a sinner, but is also a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit, who does not yet dwell in the penitent but only moves him; helped by this, the penitent prepares the way for himself to righteousness.²³ Therefore, the Council holds that the will and absolute resolve never to sin again is a gift of God and proceeds from the motion of the Holy Spirit, and thus cannot be had by the powers of nature alone. They reply that the Council neither intended to determine nor determines that attrition is a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit insofar as it includes an absolute resolve not to sin, as regards the substance of the act, but only insofar as it is a disposition for salvation and is made supernatural and, in a believer, proceeds from hope of pardon and fear of hell.²⁴ This explanation, however, does not seem sufficient or in keeping with the mind of the Council.²⁵ First, because the same difficulty applies to hope of pardon, fear, and the other supernatural acts, since, as the authors with whom we dispute assert, a human being can elicit them by the powers of nature as regards the substance of the act. Second, because the Council absolutely determines that attrition having all those conditions is a gift of God. To restrict the Council to supernatural attrition, so that the sense is that supernatural attrition is a gift of God and proceeds from the motion of the Holy Spirit, is to restrict that decree too severely. For other decrees of the Councils could be restricted in the same way, and so we would have no firm decree against Pelagius. For, as we said above, Pelagius never asserted that supernatural love proceeding from an infused habit is caused efficiently by the powers of nature alone, since that plainly entails a contradiction. Moreover, to say that supernatural attrition comes from a supernatural motion of the Holy Spirit is to say virtually that supernatural attrition is supernatural. Therefore the Council intended to define something more; therefore that attrition is a gift of God.

Moreover, the Council of Trent had already defined, concerning the act of faith and hope, in sess. 6. de Iustificatione can. 3, that the help of grace is necessary for such acts. Therefore, when it later teaches in sess. 14 that attrition on account of the punishments of hell, which excludes the will to sin and is joined with hope of pardon, is a gift of God, it means that it is a gift of God not only by reason of faith or hope of pardon or fear of the punishments of hell, which acts usually precede attrition itself, but also by reason of attrition itself, or sorrow for sins, together with an absolute resolve not to sin thereafter.

XII. Finally, our conclusion is proved by the argument Prosper uses against Cassian: otherwise free choice would not have been harmed or wounded by sin, since it could elicit by the capacity of nature alone the most perfect act of a sound nature, such as natural love of God above all. But this consequence is false, as was shown in disput. 45. Therefore.

XIII. In reply to the first argument from the authority of St. Thomas in 4. Sent., we say that the passage is rather on our side. For the form of contrition is grace and charity, by whose command contrition arises; for contrition is a sorrow for sins undertaken²⁶ on account of God, supremely loved. Therefore, when St. Thomas says that contrition comes from God alone as regards its form, he teaches plainly enough that habitual charity, by whose command contrition proceeds, comes from God alone. But when St. Thomas says that contrition, as regards the substance of the act, comes from free choice and from God, he does not mean that it comes from God through general concurrence but through special help. Nor do these words pose an obstacle: who works in all works of nature and of the will. For St. Thomas does not say that it comes from God as he works in all works of nature, etc.; rather, he says that it comes from God, who works in all works of nature, etc. This is quite true, for the same God works in all supernatural works and in the works of nature. But in the works of nature he works formally as the author of nature, whereas in supernatural works he works as the author of grace. Hence, although contrition as regards the substance of the act comes from free choice and from God through special help, it still remains true and is verified that the substance of that act comes from free choice and from God, who works in the works of nature and of the will. St. Thomas adds these words to explain the universal dependence of every act of the will on God himself as the first agent. This solution and explanation of St. Thomas is gathered from the very argument to which he replies, which is as follows: contrition is given to us by God, but what is given is not undertaken. Therefore contrition is not a sorrow undertaken. In summary, St. Thomas replies that even if it is given by God in the aforesaid way, nevertheless that sorrow is undertaken by us because we elicit it voluntarily, on the supposition of divine action.²⁷ From this, however, it does not follow that this action is through general concurrence. For to resolve this argument, it was not necessary to assert that contrition, as regards the substance of the act, does not proceed from special help. Otherwise an act of supernatural charity, insofar as it is supernatural, would not be free or freely undertaken, for even on the opposing opinion it proceeds from special help insofar as it is supernatural. This solution is also certain: as Medina proves, 1. 2. q. 62. art. 2, from the Councils of Milevis, Orange, and Africa, supernatural help is entirely necessary for any act of a theological virtue, not only as regards the manner of the work but also as regards the substance of the act. Cajetan teaches the same, 3. p. q. 76. art. 7, after the middle of the commentary, where he shows that an elicited act of the theological virtues differs in species from acts of natural virtues concerning the same matter, not only in the moral order, or as regards manner, but also in its natural being and as regards its substance. This is also clearly gathered from St. Thomas, in the cited q. 62, and will be proved expressly by us in disput. 65. St. Thomas therefore never understood that an act of charity or contrition proceeds, as regards the substance of the act, from the capacity of nature alone with only God's general concurrence.

XIV. To the other passage from 2. 2, Medina replies in the cited q. 62, in the reply to the first objection, that St. Thomas speaks there of love of God in general, abstracting from natural and supernatural love. This does not exceed the capacity of nature as regards its substance. Medina understands this to mean love absolutely, or imperfect love, but not love of God above all without qualification. Although this explanation contains truth, it does not seem to reflect St. Thomas's mind in that passage. For in the reply to the third objection he speaks expressly of an act of charity for which the gift of habitual grace is given. But no gift of habitual grace is given for love of God in general, abstracting from the natural and the supernatural. Therefore St. Thomas is not speaking of that.

A better reply, then, is that St. Thomas speaks there of an act of supernatural charity, not an act elicited immediately by supernatural charity itself. For such an act, as will be clear in the cited disput. 65, exceeds the powers of nature even as regards its substance, just like the act of the beatific vision. Rather, he speaks of a commanded act of charity, such as an act of fortitude or of the other virtues, which, insofar as it is referred by charity to the supernatural end, is called an act of supernatural charity, though it is commanded.²⁸ He also speaks of an exterior act. For acts of this kind do not exceed the capacity of nature as regards the substance of the act, but only as regards the manner, namely, insofar as they are done from charity. This also answers the passage cited from q. 24. de verit., for there he explains himself just as we explain him. For after the cited words he adds: For example, the act of giving alms is a good proportionate to human powers insofar as a person is moved to this by a certain natural love or kindness; but it exceeds the capacity of human nature insofar as a person is moved to this by charity, which unites the human mind to God.

To the other passage from the First of the Sentences, the same reply is given; or one may say that the only conclusion to be drawn from that authority is that a human being can have, without an infused habit or without the help of grace, some imperfect love of God, which is a velleity, or even a certain natural love by which God is loved, not simply above all nor for his own sake, but only insofar as he is the common good on which all things depend for their existence. For St. Thomas himself admits that this imperfect love is in demons, to whom it is clear that God gives no special help, 1. p. q. 60. art. 5. ad 5. He confirms the same doctrine in 1. 2. q. 109. art. 3, in the body of the article, showing that every²⁹ creature loves God more by natural love, as the universal good on which every particular good depends, than it loves itself.

XV. To the second argument, the inference is denied. For, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. 2. q. 109. art. 2. ad 3,³⁰ human nature is more corrupted by sin with respect to its appetite for the good than with respect to its cognition of truth.³¹ The reason is that sin is consummated in the consent of the will. In reply to the proof, the antecedent is denied if what is meant is physical motion, which gives the human will the power to elicit an act of loving God above all. For such cognition, since it is external to the will and only represents the object and its suitability to it, does not give the weakened will the power to elicit an act so perfect, which belongs to a sound nature.

In reply to the confirmation, the antecedent is denied. We say that the difficulty of that act does not consist only in this: that a human being afterward fulfill what he resolved and in fact keep all the commandments throughout his whole life. It also consists in this: that it is difficult, indeed impossible, for weakened nature to elicit an act so perfect as loving God above all without qualification, unless it is helped and healed by grace. For, as was said, throughout the time that the power of such an act lasts, observance of all the commandments is joined to it.

To the third argument, the inference is denied. For a resolve to abstain from all other sins except one, homicide, is an absolutely bad resolve insofar as it includes a resolve not to abstain from one sin, because evil arises from any defect, and so that resolve can come from us. But a resolve to abstain absolutely from all sins is a good and perfect resolve. Hence from the fact that a human being can have the first resolve without the help of grace, it is wrongly inferred that he can also have the second.

XVI. In reply to the fourth argument, we say that an exterior act of infused and acquired temperance is of the same species as regards the substance of the act, but not an interior elicited act, as was said above. St. Thomas himself gives the reason for this in the cited 1. 2. q. 62: the interior acts of infused and acquired temperance or charity have formally different objects. Therefore they formally differ in species, for acts are specified by their objects.

XVI. To the fifth argument, the inference is denied. For, as St. Thomas teaches, p. 2. q. 62. art. 1, at the end of the body of the article, the habits of the theological virtues are known with certainty and infallibly only through divine revelation.³² Indeed, Master Báñez adds in the passages to be cited below, disputations 118 and 119, that they cannot be known evidently according to their ultimate difference through any created species, but only through the beatific vision, which is elicited through an uncreated species. In reply to the objection, we say that because the acts of infused and acquired charity are similar, without divine revelation a person cannot know infallibly that the act of charity he has in this life is supernatural, nor can he discern with certainty whether it proceeds efficiently from an infused habit, an acquired habit, or bare power. This is the solution of St. Thomas, in 1. sent. d. 17. q. 1. art. 4, and of Master Soto, lib. 1. de natura et grat. c. 22. coroll. 3, which Cajetan develops at greater length, 2. 2. q. 6. art. 1, with Master Báñez there; and art. 2. dub. 2, and q. 5. art. 1. ad 1, against St. Thomas's first conclusion; and ad 3, in support of Cajetan's opinion; and 1. p. q. 32. art. 1. dub. 2. ad 1 et 3. The reason why experience of acts, however supernatural they may be, does not entail infallible experience of the supernatural habits from which they proceed, but only probable experience, is that the formal reason under which supernatural acts are elicited cannot be known infallibly by experience, but only through divine revelation. Master Báñez gives this reason in the place cited above. When it is argued, An angel evidently knew that the substance of that act was not natural; therefore he evidently knew it was supernatural, the antecedent is denied. For although an angel left to his nature, apart from a special miracle, knows all natural things, whether substances or accidents, God by his absolute power can nevertheless conceal some natural thing from him, and the angel knows this evidently by his nature, because he knows that God is omnipotent and infinite.³³ Since the angel did not know evidently and could not know by the capacity of his nature whether God would or would not use this absolute power, he therefore did not have evident knowledge that the substance of that act was not natural. Most Thomists commonly give a similar solution to the question whether an angel can know infallibly by the capacity of his nature that Christ's humanity can subsist through an uncreated subsistence. See Medina, in the introduction to 3. p. q. 2, in the reply to the sixth of the objections in the second place. The same solution is applied to the argument made in 3. p. q. 76. art. 7.³⁴ concerning the question whether an angel knows by the powers of nature the sacramental conversion of bread into the body of Christ. See Soto, in 4. d. 10. q. 1. art. 7. Also see what we shall note in Disputations 118 and 119, where this same difficulty in the argument will be treated.

XVII. In reply to the sixth argument, we say first that the Council of Milevis and the Second Council of Orange in the cited places, in support of the second conclusion, determine absolutely that loving God is a gift of God, and they understand this of an absolute love of God above all. The holy Fathers, especially Augustine, likewise say this absolutely, and the phrase “as is fitting” is not added there. Second, one who loves God absolutely above all and prefers him to everything without exception loves him as is fitting, just as we said in disput. 50, in reply to the seventh argument: one who assents to supernatural mysteries with certainty and infallibly as revealed by God assents as is fitting for salvation. But the Council of Trent and the Second Council of Orange, in the cited places in the argument, added the phrase “as is fitting” to exclude an imperfect love of God, which is not simply above all and is not directed absolutely toward God, but loves him only insofar as he is the common and universal good on which every particular good depends intrinsically.³⁵ For, as we said above from St. Thomas, demons have this love by nature; indeed, every natural thing is more inclined to preserve the whole than to preserve itself. These points also answer the confirmation.

As for the authors cited in support of the first opinion, we say that they do not support it in any way. In particular, Master Soto expressly refutes the first opinion in lib. 1. de natura et gratia, c. 22. concl. 3, and in the section beginning “Ad dilectionem Dei.” He affirms that a fallen human being cannot have, by the powers of nature, a love of God above all, even a natural one, nor an absolute resolve to please him in all things, even if what is meant is a love and resolve that are not afterward fulfilled in execution. He asserts that this is Augustine's opinion and cites many passages of his. And in the section beginning “Igitur ad propositam quaestionem,” he teaches that a human being in fallen nature cannot fulfill the natural precept of inwardly loving God above all without the special help of grace. Cajetan too, p. 2. q. 109. art. 3, in the passage beginning “Ad evidentiam,” teaches most clearly that a fallen human being cannot love God absolutely above all by natural powers alone. In art. 4 he teaches that a human being cannot fulfill the precept of love of God and hope without the special help of grace, even as regards the substance of the act. If perhaps Cajetan or another Doctor cited in support of the first opinion said some obscure word somewhere that seems to support it, he explained himself in a sound sense in other places.

One argument nevertheless remains to be resolved at the end of this disputation, by which some theologians attack our opinion. It is drawn from a certain bull of Pius V, confirmed by Gregory XIII in 1579, on the fourth day before the Kalends of February, in the eighth year of his pontificate, against Michael Baius, a Doctor, as they say, of Louvain. Among the propositions of this author condemned there is listed proposition 34, namely: That distinction between two kinds of love, natural love, by which God is loved as the author of nature, and gratuitous love, by which God is loved as the beatifier, is empty and fabricated, and devised in order to make a mockery of Sacred Scripture and many testimonies of the ancients. Therefore, according to the decree of the Apostolic See, it must be asserted that there is a natural charity by which God is loved above all as the author of nature through the proper powers of free choice, without the help of grace. Otherwise that distinction between two kinds of love would be empty and fabricated.

To resolve this argument and the others that can be drawn from the same bull, we must note that the propositions of Michael Baius contained in that bull were condemned in the sense intended by their author. This is clear from the wording of the bull, where, after listing seventy-nine propositions, it says: These opinions, weighed in a strict examination before us, although some of them could in some way be defended, in the strict and proper sense of the words intended by their author, we condemn, circumscribe, and abolish, by the authority of these presents, as, respectively, heretical, erroneous, suspect, rash, scandalous, and offensive to pious ears, together with anything spoken or written concerning them. We also forbid the freedom to speak, write, or dispute in any way henceforth about these and similar matters. Given this, we reply that this distinction between two kinds of love should indeed be admitted; but it is not rightly inferred from it that a human being in fallen nature can, without the help of grace, love God above all without qualification, insofar as he is the author of nature. The Supreme Pontiff does not teach this in any way. Nor is it necessary that the love of God, or an act of charity natural on account of the object loved, also be natural on account of the principle eliciting that same act. For many acts whose object does not exceed the capacity of free choice are nevertheless given special help of grace by God, either because of the weakness of rational nature, which cannot of itself proceed to perfect acts, even acts proportionate to it, unless it is helped by the assistance of medicine, or also so that an act which otherwise could have been produced as regards its substance by the powers of nature alone may enter the supernatural order, as a disposition for grace or as a merit of glory. This is clear in many acts of the moral virtues elicited by a sinner at the special impulse of the Holy Spirit, who does not yet dwell in him but moves him, and likewise when they are elicited by a just person and are ordered through charity to the supernatural end, in which case such acts are meritorious of glory. Yet it is certain that acts of this kind are not supernatural on account of their proximate object, by which they are specified, but on account of the principle eliciting them and the ultimate end to which they are ordered. Second, we reply that to preserve this distinction between two kinds of love even in practice, it suffices that in the state of innocence our first parents could have loved God above all by the powers of nature alone, insofar as he is the author of nature. It may also be added that a created will is naturally more inclined to love God insofar as he is the universal good on which all other particular goods depend for their existence than it is inclined to love itself. Nevertheless, for this reason the demons too love God more than themselves, as St. Thomas teaches in the passages cited in no. 14 of this disputation.

We can confirm our opinion from the same bull. Among the propositions of the aforesaid Michael Baius, this proposition, which is no. 33, is condemned: That charity which is the fullness of the law is not always joined with the remission of sins.³⁶ From this an argument is drawn. An act of charity by which God is loved above all without qualification, insofar as he is the author of nature, virtually includes the observance of all the commandments, at least as regards their substance for the instant or time in which that act of charity is elicited or its power lasts, since transgression of one or another precept is incompatible with that act of charity. Therefore such love is always joined with the remission of sins, and consequently cannot proceed from the powers of nature alone. Therefore it must proceed from the help of divine grace. Otherwise, through that act of charity a human being would by the powers of nature alone dispose himself to obtain the remission of all sins and would in fact obtain it. This, however, cannot be admitted.

A small doubt is an appendix to the preceding question: whether, if a human being were created in pure nature, he could elicit by the powers of nature one or another natural act of loving God above all without qualification. Master Medina holds that a human being in pure nature cannot love God above all by the capacity of nature alone, just as neither can he in the state of fallen nature, and he proves this.³⁷ First: a human being in pure nature differs from a human being in fallen nature as a naked person differs from one who has been stripped. Therefore a human being in pure nature does not have greater natural powers than in fallen nature. But a human being in fallen nature cannot love God above all without the special help of grace, as was shown above. Therefore neither can he in pure nature.³⁸ Second: otherwise a human being in pure nature could by the capacity of nature alone keep all the precepts of the law, persevere in the good to the end of his life, and fail in nothing. Yet no one admits this.³⁹ The inference is proved: love of God above all virtually includes the observance of all the commandments, as was said above. Therefore if a human being in pure nature could love God above all by the capacity of nature, he could also keep all the commandments.

XIX. Nevertheless, the opinion of other Thomists seems true to me: they assert that a human being in pure nature can produce by the capacity of nature, for some short time, an act of loving God above all.⁴⁰ The chief reason for this is that in that state a human being would have a natural precept to love God above all as the author of nature, for this precept accompanies nature itself. Therefore he could fulfill that precept. The inference is clear: precepts are not given concerning impossibilities, as Jerome teaches in his exposition of the Catholic faith to Damasus. But in that state a human being would not have any help of grace by which he could fulfill that precept. For if he had help of grace, he would no longer be in pure nature, since this state excludes grace and sin and includes only those things that belong to a human being by his nature. Therefore by the capacity of nature he could fulfill it in one or another act.

XX. In reply to the first, we say that a human being in pure nature differs from one in fallen nature as a naked person differs from one who has been stripped, with respect to being deprived of grace and original justice, because in neither state would he have grace or original justice. Just as a person who has been stripped is without clothing, so is a naked person.⁴¹ Yet on another side, as we showed in disput. 45, there is a difference in this: the state of a human being in pure nature includes no guilt by which he is turned away from the ultimate end and wounded in his natural powers, whereas the state of fallen nature includes guilt, at least original guilt, by which he is turned away from the supernatural ultimate end and wounded in his natural powers, as St. Thomas explains, p. 2. q. 85, especially art. 3, where from Bede he enumerates the four wounds a human being incurs through sin, which were discussed in disput. 46. Hence a fallen human being cannot love God above all with natural love by the powers of nature. Otherwise he would at the same time be turned away from God as the supernatural end and turned toward him as the author of nature, which entails a contradiction. This argument does not apply to a human being in pure nature, because in that state he would not be turned away from the supernatural end or wounded by sin. Therefore the cases are not alike.

XXI. In reply to the second argument, we say that in pure nature a human being could love God above all for a short time. Hence he could keep all the commandments that would morally arise for him during that same time, but he could not keep all the precepts collectively throughout his life or for a long time. For because of the conflict of the sensitive appetite against reason that would exist in that state, a human being would eventually fail.⁴²⁴³ For Augustine says: If, in the great weakness of this life, a weakness in which virtue had nevertheless to be perfected so as to restrain pride, their will had been left to them so that they could, if they wished, remain in God's help, without which they could not persevere, and God did not work in them to make them will, then amid so many and such great temptations their will would succumb to their weakness. And so they could not persevere, because, weakened by their frailty, they would not will, or would not will strongly enough through the weakness of their will, to be able to persevere.⁴⁴