De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether, without the help of grace, a human being in fallen nature can perform some moral work that, in comparison with the ultimate natural end, is truly good and a work of true virtue.

I. To explain the title of the question and make known the point under dispute, we must observe that, as St. Thomas teaches in 2. 2. q. 23. art. 7, in the body of the article, something may be called, or be, a true virtue in two ways. First, in relation to a particular good and to the proximate end of that same virtue, or to its object: namely, because the particular object that the virtue immediately regards is not an apparent good but a truly good one, since it can, considered in itself, be ordered to the principal good, which is the ultimate end. An example is someone who, while in mortal sin, gives a small alms to a poor friend out of natural piety, without adding a bad circumstance; and the same holds for other good works of this kind. The present difficulty does not concern this sense. For it is most certain in St. Thomas's teaching—and indeed in accordance with the decree of the bull of Pius V, which we will cite at the end of the following disputation—that without the help of grace a human being can elicit some morally good act that is truly good and a work of true, though imperfect, virtue in comparison with its object, or particular good, as in the case just given. For the aforesaid act can, considered in itself, be ordered to the principal good, which is the ultimate end. In this respect it differs from a feigned act of virtue that is not true virtue, which concerns a particular apparent good, as in the temperance of the avaricious, who restrain their appetite for costly lust, and the fortitude of the avaricious, who expose themselves to many dangers in order to become rich. For virtue of this kind is not true virtue, even imperfect virtue, but a false likeness of virtue. St. Thomas expressly teaches this in the cited art. 7, for he says: If virtue is taken insofar as it is ordered to some particular end, then some virtue can be said to exist without charity, insofar as it is ordered to some particular good. But if that particular good is not a true good but an apparent one, the virtue ordered to that good will also not be true virtue, but a false likeness of virtue. Thus the prudence of the avaricious is not true virtue, by which they devise different sorts of profit; nor the justice of the avaricious, by which, for fear of serious losses, they refrain from taking what belongs to others; nor the temperance of the avaricious, by which they restrain their appetite for costly lust; nor the fortitude of the avaricious, who, as Horace says, flee poverty by sea, over rocks, through fires, as Augustine says in book 4 Against Julian. But if that particular good is a true good, for example, the preservation of a city or something of the kind, it will indeed be true virtue, but imperfect, unless it is referred to the final and perfect good. Accordingly, absolutely speaking, true virtue cannot exist without charity. He teaches the same thing in many other places, from which it follows that in comparison with a particular good there can be true moral virtue without charity, although imperfect. For in relation to its proper object, by which it is specified, it has the true essence of virtue, although the act, on the part of the one acting, is not referred to God, supremely loved, as the ultimate end.

In the second way, something may be called true virtue, and its act truly good and a work of true virtue, not only in comparison with its object, or particular good, but also in comparison with the ultimate end, or universal good. This means that not only is that act, considered in itself, capable of being ordered to the principal good, which is the ultimate end, but also that on the part of the one acting it is actually or virtually referred to God as the ultimate end, loved above all with natural or supernatural love. The present difficulty concerns this sense, not the former.

There is, then, a first opinion of certain theologians who assert that, with only God's general concurrence and without any other gift or help of grace, a human being can perform a morally good work suited to the natural end of a human being and truly good, and a work of virtue, in comparison with that end. They add that free choice, by its own natural powers and with only God's general concurrence, can refer such morally good acts to God, known by the natural light, as the ultimate end. If they speak consistently, they understand this as a formal or virtual reference made through an act of charity, by which God is loved above all absolutely by the powers of free choice alone, insofar as he is the author of nature. For, as will be clear in the following disputation, they hold that a human being in fallen nature can elicit such an act of natural charity without the help of grace. They prove their opinion by the following arguments.

First. In a human being there is a natural light for knowing moral good and evil, as is clear from Ps. 4, where, after the Prophet had said, Many say, Who will show us good things? he adds, The light of your countenance, O Lord, has been marked upon us. This signifies that the natural light impressed upon us by God shows the moral good to be pursued and the evil to be avoided. Since there is no serious difficulty in many good acts, such as showing honor to parents, giving alms to a poor person, and other things of this kind, it follows that by the powers of nature alone a human being can not only will these things but also perform them.

This is confirmed: a human being was created to act honorably as toward a natural end. Therefore, by the powers of nature alone, even after sin, he can perform some moral good that is truly good and a work of true virtue. Otherwise, after sin free choice would not merely be wounded but extinguished.

It is argued second from Rom. 2: When the Gentiles, who do not have the law—that is, the written law—do by nature the things of the law, although they do not have the law, they are a law to themselves. They show the work of the law written in their hearts. Behold, Paul says that the Gentiles sometimes do by nature, that is, by the powers of nature alone, what belongs to the natural law; these are plainly moral goods suited to the natural end.

II. It is argued third from the authority of St. Augustine, lib. de spiritu et littera, c. 29, where he clearly teaches that sinners can perform some morally good works. His words are: Just as certain venial sins, without which this life is not lived, do not prevent a just person from attaining eternal life, so certain good works are of no benefit toward eternal salvation for an ungodly person, without which the life of any very wicked person is found only with great difficulty. And in lib. 3. Hypogn. he says: We confess that free choice exists in all human beings, having indeed the judgment of reason, not such that it is capable, without God, of beginning or certainly completing things that pertain to God, but only in the works of this present life, both good and evil.

Fourth: for the Council of Trent, sess. 6. can. 1, defines: If anyone says that a human being can be justified before God by his own works, whether performed by the powers of human nature or through the teaching of the law, without divine grace through Jesus Christ, let him be anathema. These words sufficiently imply that moral good works can be performed by the powers of human nature alone or through the teaching of the law, since it defines that they are not sufficient for justification without divine grace through Jesus Christ.

Fifth. For a moral act to be truly good and a work of true virtue, it is not necessary that it be ordered to the supernatural ultimate end; it is enough that, by its object and circumstances, it be good and be ordered to the ultimate natural end, namely, to God as known by the natural light. But an unbeliever, or a believing sinner, can without the help of grace perform some moral work good in its object, without adding a bad circumstance, and order it to the true God as known by the light of nature. Therefore, by the powers of nature, he can perform some moral work that is truly good and a work of true virtue.

III. St. Augustine seems manifestly to teach the opposite opinion in lib. 1. retract. c. 3 and at greater length in lib. 4. cont. Iulianum c. 3, where from many testimonies of Scripture he shows that no one has any true virtue, even moral virtue, unless he is just. But it is impossible for anyone to be or become just without the help of grace; otherwise, as the Apostle argues: If righteousness is through the law, then Christ died for nothing.¹ Therefore, without the help of grace there can be no true virtue or act of true virtue.

St. Thomas discusses this difficulty in 2. 2. q. 23. art. 7, where he asks whether there can be any true virtue without charity; and in 1. 2. q. 65. art. 2 he discusses whether the moral virtues can exist without charity; in art. 4 he inquires the same about faith and hope; and also in q. 14. de verit. art. 6. All Thomists treat the same difficulty in those places, especially Master Báñez, who addresses it in the cited 2. 2. Since it is therefore for us to resolve this briefly, we will touch only on those points where the opinion of the Thomists differs from that of the other theologians. First, then, we must assume, in accordance with the common opinion of theologians, that a human being, whether believer or unbeliever, can by the powers of nature alone perform some moral work that in the particular instance is not a sin, even a venial sin, but is good in the moral order. St. Thomas proves this expressly in 2. 2. q. 10. art. 4; Cajetan and all the Thomists do so there, showing that not all the works of unbelievers are sins. Second, we must also assume, according to the common opinion, which the authors with whom we dispute share, that free choice, not only in fallen nature but even in intact nature, cannot without the help of grace perform any act of virtue that is truly good or a work of true virtue in relation to the supernatural end. St. Thomas also proves this in the cited 2. 2. q. 23 from the authority of the Apostle, 1. Cor. 13: If I distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I hand over my body so that I burn, but do not have charity, it profits me nothing. Moreover, the supernatural end, which consists in the clear vision of God, exceeds every capacity of created nature. Therefore, unless it is raised by the help of grace, it cannot perform any act of virtue ordered to such an end.

IV. The whole difficulty, then, consists in this: whether free choice in fallen nature can, without the special help of grace, perform some moral work that, in comparison with the ultimate natural end, is truly good and a work of true virtue, as I noted in explaining the title of the question. And although some theologians contend that the difference is merely in the name, when the matter is examined and explained in full, it will become clear that the controversy concerns not only the name but the thing itself.

For a brief resolution of this difficulty, we must consider that by sin a human being's free choice was not only stripped of original justice and supernatural gifts, but was also wounded and harmed in natural goods, and so weakened and inclined that, unless it is healed and helped by grace, it cannot perform perfect and more difficult works, even in the natural order, as was shown in disput. 45.

V. Second, we must note that just as by mortal sin a human being's free choice remains turned away from God, not only as the supernatural end but also as the natural end of an intellectual nature, so by an act of charity it is turned toward and ordered to God insofar as he is the universal good and ultimate end of rational nature. If the act of charity is natural, such as Adam could elicit by the powers of nature alone in intact nature, by that act a human being is ordered to God as the end of nature. But if the act of charity is supernatural, such as that which proceeds from the help of grace in the justified, by that act he will be ordered to God as the author of grace and the supernatural end, and will attain him under that same aspect. Since a virtue that attains some end orders the acts of the other virtues to that same end, it follows that acts of temperance and every other moral virtue are ordered to God as the ultimate end through an act of charity, as St. Thomas teaches, 2. 2. q. 23. art. 8. Hence it is impossible for such acts of virtue to be ordered formally or virtually, on the part of the one acting, to God as the ultimate end unless they are referred to him through an act of charity.

VI. We must therefore say that no moral act elicited by a human being in fallen nature without the help of grace is truly good and a work of true virtue in the sense explained above, even in comparison with the ultimate natural end.² This is the constant teaching of St. Augustine, especially in that chapter 3 of book 4 against Julian, where he speaks as follows: Since chastity is a virtue, to which unchastity is the contrary vice, and all the virtues, even those that act through the body, dwell in the soul, how can a body rightly be called chaste when the soul itself commits fornication against the true God? And a little later: In the very matter in which you wish a human being, as you say, to be stirred by the impulses of a noble heart toward something praiseworthy, when you do not wish him to glory in the Lord but in free choice, and to put himself first so that a reward may be paid to him, and in this way grace may not be grace because it is not gratuitous. And below: How much more tolerable would it be to attribute those virtues which you say are in the ungodly to a divine gift rather than merely to their will? They themselves may not know this until, if they are among the number of the predestined, they receive the Spirit who is from God, so that they may know the things given to them by God. But far be it that there be true virtue in anyone unless he is just; and far be it that anyone be truly just unless he lives by faith, for the just person lives by faith.³ Indeed, that St. Augustine attacks the first opinion set out above in the same sense in which its authors asserted it is clear from this: they say that a morally good work performed by the powers of nature alone is truly good and a work of virtue suited to the natural end, though not to the supernatural end. But Julian too, whom St. Augustine refutes, asserted this very thing, namely, that the morally good works of the ungodly are not suited to the supernatural end but are sterile fruits unless they are helped by grace, as is clear from these words of Augustine a little after the beginning of the same chapter: When, then, a human being is helped by God, he is helped not only to attain perfection, which is what you yourself proposed, plainly wishing it to be understood that he begins by himself, without grace, what grace perfects; but also in the way the Apostle speaks, so that he who began a good work in you may perfect it to the end.⁴ And near the end of the same chapter he reports Julian as saying that the good works of unbelievers are sterile and do not lead them to eternal salvation and the kingdom. For Augustine says: But what will you answer, Julian? What but empty words? I said, you reply, that people who do good things not for God's sake are sterile in their goodness, and do not obtain eternal life from him. And below, after St. Augustine had refuted this opinion, he adds: Or certainly, since you at least concede that the works of unbelievers which seem good to you do not nevertheless lead them to eternal salvation and the kingdom, know that we call that good in human beings—the good will, the good work—which, without the grace of God given through the one mediator between God and human beings, cannot be conferred on anyone, and through which alone a human being can be led to God's eternal gift and kingdom. Accordingly, let all the other things that seem to have some praise among human beings seem to you to be true virtues, seem to be good works, and to have been done without any sin. As far as I am concerned, I know that a good will does not do them. For an unbelieving and ungodly will is not good. Here St. Augustine requires, for an act to be a true virtue in comparison with the ultimate end, that the will necessarily be upright, or made upright, and through charity refer that act of virtue to God, loved above all, as the ultimate end. It is not enough to answer that St. Augustine speaks only of the supernatural ultimate end, in comparison with which there is no true virtue simply without charity. For this is contrary to the fact that St. Augustine, both in that cited chapter 3 and in other passages to be cited in the following disputation, teaches clearly that without the help of grace a human being in fallen nature cannot love God above all absolutely, even as the author of nature. This is also the opinion of St. Thomas, as will be said in the same disputation. For the will cannot be good, upright, and ordered to God as the natural ultimate end while turned away from God insofar as he is the ultimate end of the supernatural order, as will be said below.

St. Cyprian holds the same opinion in lib. de bono patientiae, in princ., where he proves that unbelievers do not have the true virtue of patience. Among other things, he says: Philosophers too profess to pursue this, but their patience is as false as their wisdom. For how can someone be wise or patient who does not know the wisdom or power of God, when God warns and says of those who seem wise to themselves in the world: I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and reject the prudence of the prudent?⁵ St. Cyprian is speaking of true virtue in comparison with the ultimate end, in the sense we explained above. St. Thomas speaks in the same way in the cited 2. 2. q. 23. art. 7, when he says that absolutely speaking, true virtue cannot exist without charity. This is proved as follows.

First. Although every morally good act is, in itself, capable of being ordered to God as the ultimate end, loved above all with natural or supernatural love, in fact and in its exercise it is ordered in that way only through an act of charity, as was said. But in fallen nature a human being cannot, without the help of grace, elicit an act of charity by which God is loved above all absolutely, even as the natural end. For such an act is the most excellent act of a sound nature, and consequently the free choice of a weakened human being cannot perform it, as will be shown in disput. 51. Therefore, without the help of grace, no morally good act can be referred by the one acting, formally or virtually, to God as the ultimate end. Since, then, for an act of true virtue, even in comparison with the natural end, it is necessary that it be referred to God as the ultimate end in the aforesaid way, it follows that no moral act elicited by a human being in fallen nature without the help of grace is truly good and a work of true virtue, even in comparison with the natural end.

This is confirmed. Without charity there is no true virtue. Therefore neither is there any act of true virtue, even in comparison with the ultimate natural end. The inference is proved: since a habit exists for the sake of acts and is specified by them, what is necessary for a habit to be a true virtue is all the more required for an act elicited by that habit to be a work of true virtue. So an act of faith without grace and charity is unformed, not formed, because the habit of faith without grace and charity is unformed. The antecedent is St. Thomas's, 2. 2. q. 23. art. 7. It is proved by the argument he gives in the reply to the second objection: the end in matters of action is like the principle in matters of speculation. But there cannot be absolutely true science if a right judgment about the first and indemonstrable principle is lacking. Therefore there cannot be absolutely true justice or true chastity if the due ordering through charity to God, loved above all as the ultimate end, is lacking, however rightly someone may be disposed in other respects.

VII. It is proved second. Virtue, as Aristotle teaches, is that which makes its possessor good. But no moral habit without grace makes its possessor good, because no one is good, even in comparison with the ultimate natural end, without grace and charity. Therefore without charity there is no true virtue, even moral virtue; and consequently there is no act of true virtue.

It is proved third by an argument drawn from St. Augustine against Julian: just as the Apostle says most truly of the law, If righteousness is through the law, then Christ died for nothing,⁶ so it is most truly said: if righteousness is through nature and the will, then Christ died for nothing. But Christ did not die for nothing and without cause; rather, as the same Apostle says, Christ died so that we might live for righteousness. Therefore true righteousness cannot be acquired or possessed through nature or the will without the help of grace.

The same holy Doctor confirms this in the same place: through that by which there is true righteousness, there is also the kingdom of God. For God himself would be unjust—far be it—if a truly just person were not admitted to his kingdom, since his kingdom itself is righteousness, as it is written: The kingdom of God is not food and drink, but righteousness, and peace, and joy.⁷ Moreover, if the ungodly do not have true righteousness, they will certainly not have the other virtues that accompany and belong with it.

It is proved fourth by another argument of that same Augustine. For a moral act to be a work of true virtue, it is required that it be performed prudently, courageously, temperately, and justly. For it is not enough for an act of true virtue that one do what is just unless one does it justly and with the other required circumstances, according to the saying: You shall pursue what is just justly.⁸ But in fallen nature a human being cannot, without the help of grace, perform any moral work prudently, courageously, temperately, and justly. For in order to act courageously, one must act with such firmness of spirit that no dangers or temptations, even fear of death, turn one away from that good or draw one toward the contrary evil. It is clear, however, from what was said above, that without the help of grace a fallen human being cannot overcome all the temptations that must be overcome in order to keep the natural law, even with respect to this or that particular matter. Therefore the same conclusion follows as before.⁹

VIII. Fifth. According to the Catholic faith, after the day of judgment there will be no intermediate state between the supreme happiness enjoyed by the elect and the supreme misery endured by the reprobate. But all who do not enjoy eternal glory with Christ the Lord will be consigned to the eternal punishments of loss, or even of sense if they are adults, as is clear from Matth. 25: These will go into eternal punishment, but the just into eternal life. But if anyone had true virtue or true righteousness by the powers of nature alone, without the help of grace, then after the day of judgment an intermediate state between those two would necessarily have to be assigned, where he would receive eternal recompense for those good works. Therefore.¹⁰ The minor is proved: one who practices righteousness by the powers of nature alone will not attain the kingdom of heaven, for such people did not please God, since they did not have faith, without which, as the Apostle says, It is impossible to please God;¹¹ those who do not please God do not attain the kingdom of heaven. Nor will they be engulfed in eternal fires, since otherwise they would be in everlasting damnation while possessing true righteousness, which God's equity does not permit. Therefore an intermediate place must be appointed between damnation and the kingdom of heaven, where these people will not be in misery but in everlasting blessedness.

All these points are confirmed from Matth. 7: A bad tree cannot bear good fruit;¹² there the created will is compared to a tree, while its good works are compared to the tree's fruits. If, then, a tree cannot bear good fruit so long as it is bad, it follows that an evil will, unless it is healed by grace and changed into a good will, cannot perform good acts that are truly good and works of virtue. Augustine urges this argument against Julian in these words: Do not rush to a conclusion; consider carefully what answer it is fitting for you to give. Do you say that an unbelieving person is a good tree? Then he pleases God, for what is good cannot fail to please the good. Where, then, will we find what is written, Without faith it is impossible to please God? Will you answer that he is a good tree not insofar as he is an unbeliever, but insofar as he is a human being? Of whom, then, does the Lord say, A bad tree cannot bear good fruit, since whoever he may be, he will be either a human being or an angel? But if a human being, insofar as he is a human being, is a good tree, then surely an angel, insofar as he is an angel, is a good tree. For these are God's works, since he is the creator of good natures. And so there will be no bad tree of which it was said that it cannot bear good fruit. Who could be so unbelieving as to think this unbelievingly? Therefore, insofar as a person is a human being, which is God's work, he is not a bad tree; rather, insofar as he has an evil will, each person is a bad tree and cannot bear good fruit. Consider, then, whether you would dare to call an unbelieving will a good will. But¹³¹⁴ perhaps you will say: A merciful will is good. That would rightly be said if mercy were always good, just as the faith of Christ—that is, the faith that works through love—is always good.

IX. Sixth. The soul's right ordering toward God as the end of nature and toward God as the supernatural end are in fact so closely connected in a human being ordered to eternal life that one cannot exist without the other. Therefore it is impossible for the soul to be set right in relation to God as the ultimate natural end without being right in relation to God as the supernatural end. But according to the Catholic faith no one can be set right in relation to the supernatural end without the help of grace. Therefore in fallen nature no one can be set right in relation to the ultimate natural end without the help of grace, and consequently neither can he elicit any work that is truly good and a work of true virtue, even in comparison with the ultimate natural end. For through true virtue a human being is made right, at least in relation to that same end, as is clear from its definition, which St. Thomas gives from St. Augustine: Virtue is a good quality of the mind by which one lives rightly and which no one uses badly.¹⁵¹⁶

X. In reply to the first argument, we say that a human being can indeed give a small alms by the powers of nature, and honor his parents out of natural piety without adding a bad circumstance, so that he does not sin in the particular instance of such an act. Nevertheless, unless such acts are referred formally or virtually to God as the ultimate end through an act of charity, they are not to be regarded as works of true virtue.

In answer to the confirmation, we reply that in intact nature a human being could, by the powers of nature alone, perform every good work proportionate to the natural end. But in fallen nature he cannot do this without the help of grace, nor can he even have a natural act of loving God above all, through which moral works are referred to God himself as the ultimate end. Nevertheless, from the good of nature he can perform some morally good works, though imperfect and involving no serious difficulty; and this suffices to show that his free choice was not extinguished by sin.

To the second, we reply that the same argument was once put to St. Augustine. In answer, St. Augustine says: Hence I do not see at all how those people too, whom you wanted to mention, help you, those of whom the Apostle says: The Gentiles, who do not have the law, are a law to themselves, having the work of the law written in their hearts. Through them you have tried to prove that even those who are strangers to the faith of Christ can have true righteousness, because, as the Apostle testifies, they do by nature the things of the law. Here you have expressed more clearly your doctrine, by which you are enemies of the grace of God given through Jesus Christ our Lord, who takes away the sins of the world, by introducing a class of human beings who can please God without faith in Christ, by the law of nature. This is what the Christian Church most detests in you.¹⁷¹⁸ A little later he replies by explaining the Apostle's words in two senses, as was seen in Disputation 47, nos. 6 and 7.

XI. If anyone asks what use those imperfect good works were to the Gentiles, the reply is that they served to avoid a new sin and to be punished with a milder penalty in hell.¹⁹ Hence in the same context St. Augustine adds: But to this end their thoughts will defend them on the day of judgment²⁰, so that they may be punished more tolerably, because to some extent they did by nature the things of the law, having the work of the law written in their hearts to the extent that they would not do to others what they would not wish to suffer themselves. Yet they sinned in this: being human beings without faith, they did not refer these works to the end to which they ought to have referred them. For Fabricius will be punished less than Catiline, not because the former is good, but because the latter is worse; and Fabricius is less impious than Catiline, not because he possessed true virtues but because he deviated less from true virtues.

To the third, we reply that the good works which Augustine teaches sinners can perform by the capacity of nature are not acts of true virtue, in the sense in which we now speak of true virtue, as Augustine himself teaches very often in the other passages cited above. The same must be said in reply to the fourth argument.

To the fifth, we reply that for an act to be an act of true virtue, it is required that it be ordered through charity to God, at least as the natural end. A human being in fallen nature cannot do this without the help of grace, as is clear from the foregoing and will become clearer from what will be said about the act of charity in the following disputation.