De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether by the powers of nature alone man can assent to all the supernatural mysteries proposed and explained to him as revealed by God, with an assent that is certain and firm on the part of the believer.

I. Concerning this difficulty, before the time of Pelagius there was the heresy of Basilides, who, with the Valentinians, said that faith is natural to man.¹ So Clement of Alexandria reports in Stromata, book 4. Later, around the year 400, the heresy of Pelagius arose. As St. Augustine reports in Epistle 106 to Paulinus and Epistle 107 to Vitalis, and St. Thomas in II–II, q. 6, art. 1, Pelagius asserted that faith is not a gift of God, but is in us from ourselves; it depends on God only insofar as he reveals what must be believed through preachers, or through the law and teaching. Tyconius was in the same error before Pelagius, as St. Augustine reports in On Christian Doctrine, book 1, chapter 3. Indeed, before he had examined this question more carefully, St. Augustine himself adhered to the aforesaid opinion, as he admits in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 3, where he says he had erred before his episcopate when he thought that the faith by which one believes in God was not God’s gift but came from us and was in us, and that through it we obtained from God the gifts by which we live piously in this world. He reports the same in Retractions, book 1, chapter 23. Then, around the year 440, Faustus of Riez, a Gallic bishop, followed the same error, as John Maxentius reports in his reply to Pope Hormisdas’s letter and in the preface to the faith, as does Fulgentius in On the Incarnation and Grace of Christ. It is plainly gathered from Faustus’s own books On the Grace of God and the Free Choice of the Human Mind, whose words we cited in Disputation 2.²

Likewise Cassian and certain other Massilian Semi-Pelagians adhered to this error. For in Conference 13, chapter 17, he distinguishes two ways of calling to faith and to grace itself, and says that³ in some people God’s grace and help precede every human will, so that it comes beforehand to those who are not asking or knocking, but are asleep, that they may come to faith, according to Isaiah 65 and Romans 10: I was found by those who did not seek me; I appeared openly to those who did not ask me. Yet he asserted that they came to faith unwillingly. So St. Prosper reports in Against the Collator, chapter 4. At other times, however, man himself began by the powers of nature to believe, ask, knock, and desire faith, and by the watchfulness of his free will had certain imperfect beginnings, on account of which God at once conferred the help of grace so that he might believe more fully and perfectly; and then man believed freely. The same Prosper reports this in Against the Collator throughout, especially chapters 5, 6, 8, and 9, and in his letter to Augustine, section But some do good. We cited his words in Disputation 2, where we recounted the error of the Semi-Pelagians at length. Their arguments are these.

The first argument is drawn from Romans 10, If you believe, you will be saved, and Mark 16, He who believes and is baptized will be saved. There something is required of man, namely faith, and something is offered to him, namely salvation. Therefore, just as the salvation offered is within God’s power, so the faith required will be within man’s power. Hence man can believe by the powers of nature, for nothing is within anyone’s power except what he himself can do.

II. Secondly, an argument is made from Cassian, Conference cited above, chapter 9, from Romans 7: To will is present with me, but I do not find how to accomplish it; Isaiah I: If you are willing and listen to me, you will eat the good things of the land; Luke 12: Ask, and you will receive; seek, and you will find; knock, and it will be opened to you, and so forth; and Isaiah 30: At the sound of your cry, as soon as he hears it, he will answer you. Therefore from the good of nature there can arise certain beginnings of a good will, by which one seeks, asks for, and desires faith, and so on.

He confirms this in chapters 11 and 12 with many other testimonies of Scripture, from which he concludes that the beginning of a good will is not always to be attributed to grace, nor always to free choice, but sometimes to grace and sometimes to free choice. For sacred Scripture says in some places that grace itself takes the initiative, as in Romans 10 and Isaiah 65: I was found by those who did not seek me; I appeared openly to those who did not ask me, and so forth; and Isaiah: All day long I have spread out my hands to a people that does not believe but contradicts me.⁴ Psalm 48 says, My God, his mercy will come before me; Psalm 118, I waited for him who saved me, and so forth. In other passages it says that free choice takes the initiative before God’s grace, as Psalm 87: And in the morning his prayer will come before you; Psalm 118: I came before dawn and cried out; Isaiah 30: Therefore the Lord waits, that he may have mercy on you. He proves the same in chapter 13 from the Gospel: in Matthew 4 the Lord took the initiative by calling and drawing Peter and Andrew to himself, when they were thinking nothing about their salvation; finally, in Luke 18 Zacchaeus took the initiative before the Lord by his desire, for he climbed a sycamore tree in order to see him, and the Lord received his will, honored him, and turned him to himself.

Thirdly, an argument is made for the same opinion. According to the common philosophical maxim, a power is necessary for acting at all, but a habit, since it is a perfection of a power, is not necessary for acting at all, but only for acting better and more perfectly. But the gift of faith is a habit; likewise, prevenient actual help is reduced to a habit or is its complement, as was shown in Disputation 19. Therefore neither the habit of faith nor special help is necessary for believing at all, but only for believing more easily and better. If it is said that acquired habits are necessary for acting better and more perfectly, but infused habits are necessary for acting at all because they elevate the power to act above the whole capacity of nature, the counterargument is: every operative habit belongs essentially to a power as its perfection. Therefore it presupposes the active power of the faculty that it perfects. Therefore the intellect, even without special help, has the character of a power with respect to the act of believing. Therefore it can produce that act by its own natural power alone, at least as regards the substance of the act.

III. Fourthly, an argument is made from Matthew 11: If the mighty works that were done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would long ago have repented in sackcloth and ashes. Explaining this passage, St. Augustine says in On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14: The Tyrians and Sidonians could have believed if they had seen those miraculous signs of Christ. But since it had not been given to them to believe, even that by which they might believe was denied to them. From this it appears that some people naturally have, in their very native ability, a divine gift of understanding, by which they are moved to faith if they hear words or see signs suited to their minds. And yet, if by God’s higher judgment they have not been separated from the mass of perdition by the grace of predestination, neither divine words nor deeds are brought to bear on them, through which they could believe if they were to hear or see such things. And in To Simplicianus, book 1, question 2, explaining Matthew 20, Many are called, but few are chosen, he says: Those are chosen who are called suitably; those who were not suited and did not conform themselves to the call were not chosen, because they did not follow, although called. By these words he seems to indicate that it is from God that the Gospel is suitably proposed outwardly or even inwardly, through signs and words by which it is made credible, but that, once the Gospel has been proposed in this way, giving assent proceeds from man and from the natural faculty of free choice. The same seems to be gathered from Romans 10, How will they believe in him whom they have not heard? and so forth, and afterward he adds: Therefore faith is from hearing, and hearing through the word of Christ. Fulgentius seems to say the same in On the Grace of Christ, chapter 23, where he teaches that man can believe naturally.

IV. Among more recent theologians, some respond to the difficulty proposed with certain assertions. The first assertion is that man, with only the general concurrence of God, can by a purely natural act assent to all supernatural mysteries as revealed by God, and, because they have been revealed by God, with an assent that is certain and firm on the part of the believer. They add, however, that this assent is not as it must be for salvation.⁵ To explain their opinion more clearly, they affirm that, concerning the objects in which a Lutheran does not err, when he assents to them as revealed by God and because they have been revealed by God, we elicit a supernatural assent, while the Lutheran elicits a natural one from his own natural powers alone, without any mediated or immediate supernatural influx from God. Yet as regards infallibility concerning the objects, which follows from that first ground—that God truly revealed them to the Church through his servants and ministers—Lutherans are on a par with us, and no more falsity can underlie such an assent of the Lutheran than underlies ours.⁶ Secondly, they say that neither the habit of faith nor God’s special help is necessary for our intellect to assent easily and with discernment to the aforesaid mysteries, nor for the act of assent to be certain and firm with a certainty and firmness on the part of the believer; rather, such help is necessary for the act of believing to be supernatural and as it must be for salvation.⁷ Thirdly, they say that after a man has been taught that supernatural assent is necessary for salvation, he can desire to believe in this way and also try to assent by a supernatural gift and help of God. Finally, he can ask that this help be given to him and diligently prepare himself to receive it.⁸ Fourthly, they say that if a person does all that lies within him by the powers of nature in order to assent to the mysteries of faith proposed to him, God will infallibly, according to a certain law established by the Father with the Son on account of the merits of his Passion, give him the help of grace so that he believes as it must be for salvation. For this reason they teach that the supernatural act of believing is placed within the faculty of our free choice: if a man does all that lies within him in order to believe, God will give him special help so that the act of faith is supernatural and as it must be for salvation.⁹ But this law must be treated more fully in Disputation 65. Therefore, to prove the first three assertions, especially the first and the second, there is

V. The fifth argument. If the Gospel is proposed to someone with signs and miracles that make it appear most credible, a man sins against faith if he does not believe. Therefore, once the Gospel has been proposed in the aforesaid way, a man can believe as regards the substance of the act by the faculty of nature. The consequence is clear, because no one sins by failing to do what he truly cannot do; for no one is bound to do the impossible. If it is said that he can believe, but only with special help, and therefore sins if he does not believe, the counterargument is: let us suppose the case in which God has decided not to give him any special help, but only the general concurrence. The argument then stands. In the case supposed, that man sins if he does not believe or disbelieves. Therefore by the faculty of nature alone he could produce the act of believing as regards its substance, by which he would fulfill the precept of believing; otherwise in the case supposed that man would necessarily sin.

Sixthly, an argument is made. The act of faith is natural as regards its substance and supernatural only as regards its manner. Therefore, as regards its substance, it can be produced by the natural faculty of the intellect alone. The antecedent is clear: as regards its substance, the act of faith is intrinsically a vital act and therefore signifies an intrinsic order to a vital power, namely, the intellect, which is a natural power. Therefore in this respect the act of faith is natural as regards its substance; therefore it can be produced by the faculty of nature alone.

Seventhly, when the Council of Trent, Session 6, decree on justification, canon 3, and the Second Council of Orange, chapters 6 and 25, determine that special help from God is necessary for the act of believing, they always add the phrase as it must be, so that the grace of justification may be conferred on man. Therefore both Councils hold that man can by the faculty of nature alone believe supernatural mysteries as revealed by God with a purely natural assent, though not as it must be for salvation; otherwise the Councils would have added the phrase as it must be to no purpose.

Eighthly, an argument is made from John 15: If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin; and again: If I had not done among them the works that no one else did, they would not have sin. Therefore, at least those who heard Christ and saw his miracles could give assent to the doctrine of Christ the Lord with only the general concurrence of God.

VI. I affirm that St. Augustine and St. Thomas hold the contrary opinion. To make this clear, it should first be noted¹⁰ that, as St. Thomas teaches in II–II, q. 4, art. 2, in the body, believing supernatural mysteries is an act of the intellect insofar as it is moved by the will to assent. Hence St. Augustine says at the end of On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 5, that faith consists in the will of believers,¹¹ insofar, that is, as the intellect assents to things believable at the command of the will. Hence a devout affection is required on the part of the will. The reason is that, since the object of faith does not compel the intellect, the intellect itself must be moved by the will to assent to matters of faith. It should be noted, secondly,¹² that someone can assent to the mysteries of faith in two ways. First, with a certain opinionative and fallible assent as regards the formal reason for assenting: so that he believes the revealed mysteries only materially, but does not formally assent to them as revealed by God, or because of divine revelation, which is infallible, but on account of some human motive or probable reason, to which, speaking in itself, falsity may attach. Secondly, he can assent to the aforesaid mysteries with an assent that is certain, firm, and infallible on the part of the believer, as revealed by God, or because of divine revelation as the formal reason for believing. It should be noted, thirdly,¹³ that the present difficulty concerns not only faith formed by charity but also unformed faith, such as is found in a faithful sinner. For, as St. Thomas shows in II–II, q. 6, art. 2, such unformed faith is truly and properly Christian faith, of which the Councils, Supreme Pontiffs, and holy Doctors determine that it is a gift of God. Fourth,¹⁴ it must be assumed that everyone holds as most certain that for an act of faith God, on his part,¹⁵ must first, himself, propose inwardly and immediately the object to be believed, or explain externally, by the ministry of preachers, what is to be believed with sufficient clarity. This is plainly clear from Romans 10: How will they believe in him whom they have not heard? And how will they hear without a preacher? The Pelagians themselves did not deny this, as St. Augustine expressly reports in On the Grace of Christ against Pelagius and Celestius, book 1, chapter 7, where he cites these words of Pelagius: God helps us through his teaching and revelation, when he opens the eyes of our heart, when he shows us future things so that we are not occupied with present things, when he discloses the snares of the devil, and when he enlightens us with the manifold and ineffable gift of heavenly grace. From these words, as Augustine noted in the same book, chapter 8, it is plainly clear that Pelagius confesses a grace by which God shows and reveals what we ought to do and believe, but not one by which he gives and helps us to do and believe. He reports the same in chapter 33 and in other places cited in Disputation 1, no. 6 and following, which will be explained further below in Disputation 95. There I shall prove by the clearest testimonies of St. Augustine and the other Fathers that the chief question they had with Pelagius was not about exciting grace but about assisting grace. The whole controversy, then, concerns the inward assent by which man believes and assents, with an assent certain and infallible on the part of the believer, to the aforesaid mysteries proposed and explained to him as revealed by God: whether, to elicit such an assent, the special help of assisting grace is necessary without qualification on the part of both intellect and will. Therefore let this be.

VII. The first conclusion. No one can assent to the aforesaid mysteries as revealed by God with Christian assent by the faculty of nature alone, without special help from God.¹⁶ No Catholic Doctor denies this conclusion, for it was defined by the Church against the Pelagians at the Second Council of Orange, canons 5 and 7; at the Council of Milevis, canon 4; and at Trent, Session 6, decree on justification, canon 3. St. Augustine proves it at length in On the Gift of Perseverance, chapters 17 and 19, where in support of the same opinion he cites St. Cyprian, Ambrose, and Gregory Nazianzen. He proves the same in Epistle 105 and the two following letters, and in On the Spirit and the Letter, chapters 31 and 32. St. Prosper of Aquitaine proves it in On the Calling of All Nations, book 1, chapter 24; in Against the Collator, chapters 36 and 37; and in reply 8 to the Chapters of the Gauls.

Secondly, it is proved from Philippians I: It has been granted to you not only to believe in him, but also to suffer for him; Ephesians 2: You have been saved by grace through faith, and this is not from yourselves, for it is the gift of God; and 1 Corinthians 4: What do you have that you did not receive? By this testimony especially, together with the authority of Cyprian, Augustine admits in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 3, that he was convicted to retract the opinion he had asserted before his episcopate: Faith is not God’s gift, but is in us from ourselves. For the Apostle, in order to include faith itself, says absolutely: What do you have that you did not receive, and so on.¹⁷ For faith is something, and something conducive to salvation.

VIII. It is proved thirdly: if such an assent of faith comes from us without the special help of assisting grace, it follows that the first beginning of our justification comes from us, and hence that one man distinguishes himself from another by the faculty of his free choice, at least by taking the initiative. This is contrary to the Apostle’s words in 1 Corinthians 4: For who distinguishes you? The consequence is proved: the first beginning of justification is Christian faith, according to the Apostle’s words, He who comes to God must believe, and so forth.¹⁸ Therefore, if by the faculty of nature alone a man can believe with Christian assent, he can by the faculty of nature alone supply the first beginning of his justification.

It is proved fourthly by St. Thomas’s reasoning in II–II, q. 6, art. 1. The mysteries of faith exceed the whole capacity of nature. Therefore no one can assent to them with Christian assent by the powers of nature alone, unless the intellect and will are elevated by some special help of prevenient grace, so that they may assent to those same mysteries.

It is confirmed: water cannot heat unless it has been heated by fire, because heating exceeds the whole natural power of water itself. But believing the mysteries of faith with Christian assent exceeds the whole power of a created intellect much more. Therefore, unless it is elevated by a supernatural gift, it cannot assent to the mysteries of faith with Christian assent.

IX. The second conclusion. Even for the very first beginning of Christian faith, the special help of prevenient grace is necessary. Thus no beginning or commencement of Christian faith, however imperfect, can arise from the powers of nature alone or from the sole vigilance of free choice, whether it consists in asking for or desiring such faith, or anything else. This conclusion is against Cassian and the other Massilian Semi-Pelagians, but is asserted by the holy Father Augustine in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 2, and On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 20; and it is defined in the Second Council of Orange, canon 5, where it says: If anyone says that, just as the increase of faith, so also the beginning of faith itself and the very affection of belief by which we believe in him who justifies the impious and come to the regeneration of baptism, is naturally in us and not through the gift of grace—that is, through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit correcting our will from unbelief to faith, from impiety to piety—he is proved an adversary of the apostolic dogmas, since blessed Paul says: We trust,¹⁹²⁰ that he who began a good work in you will bring it to completion until the day of our Lord Jesus Christ. And that other passage: It has been granted to you for Christ not only to believe in him but also to suffer for him. And: You have been saved by grace through faith, not from yourselves: it is the gift of God. For those who say that the faith by which we believe in God is natural thereby declare all those who are alien to the Church of Christ to be in some way believers.²¹ By these words it teaches plainly enough that not only the act of believing but also the very affection of belief, or desire to believe in him who justifies the impious, is not naturally in us—that is, from the powers of nature—but comes from the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Let the words the beginning of faith, the very affection of belief be weighed. For they signify that the affection or desire to believe is the beginning of faith: although faith is an act of the intellect, it presupposes a devout affection of the will, as St. Thomas teaches in II–II, q. 2, art. 2. Let the passages of Scripture also be noted that the Council adduces to confirm the same teaching. Moreover, in canon 6 immediately following, it says: If anyone says that divine mercy is conferred on us when we believe, will, desire, strive, labor, watch, study, ask, seek, and knock, without the grace of God, but does not confess that it comes about through the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit within us that we believe, will, or are able to do all these things as we ought, and subordinates the help of grace to human humility or obedience, nor agrees that it is the gift of grace itself that we are obedient and humble, he resists the Apostle who says, What do you have that you did not receive? and, By the grace of God I am what I am.²² And in canon 7 it defines that by the vigor of nature man cannot consent to the preaching of the Gospel without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives sweetness to all in consenting and believing. If anyone maintains that by the vigor of nature he can think, as is expedient, of any good pertaining to the salvation of eternal life, or choose it, or consent to saving preaching—that is, the preaching of the Gospel—without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives all sweetness in consenting to and believing the truth, he is deceived by a heretical spirit, not understanding the voice of God in the Gospel, saying, Without me you can do nothing, and the Apostle’s words: Not that we are competent to think anything of ourselves, as if from ourselves, but our competence is from God.²³²⁴²⁵ From these words it follows that without the help of grace man cannot consent to the preaching of the Gospel proposed and explained to him. It is not enough to reply that the Council did not say absolutely that man cannot consent by the powers of nature alone to the Gospel sufficiently proposed, but added as is expedient or as we ought. For this is opposed by the fact that to assent to all the mysteries of faith proposed as revealed by God, or because of divine revelation as the formal reason for believing, is to assent to those same mysteries as is expedient for salvation. The same Council confirms this in canon 25 near the end, where it says: We also healthfully confess and believe that in every good work we do not begin first and are afterward helped by God’s mercy; rather, he himself first inspires in us, without any preceding good merits, both faith and love of himself. But if the assent of faith were from us, man would already begin to believe without the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Therefore.

This is confirmed by a notable testimony of St. Augustine in Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, book 2, chapter 8, where, reporting and attacking their opinion, These people, he says, want the desire for good to begin in man from man himself, so that the grace of completion may follow as a reward for this beginning. And below: Perhaps²⁶, then, they preserve a place for grace in this way at least: they think that without it man can have a desire for good, though imperfect, but that it can be perfected not merely more easily through grace, but only through grace. Yet even in this way they say that God’s grace is given according to our merits. He proves the same in chapters 9 and 10, where in confirmation of this teaching he adduces Psalm 76: And I said: Now I have begun; observing that it does not say: this is the change of my will, but: of the Most High’s right hand. For even the very beginning, however imperfect, of faith and of any pious action is not in us from ourselves, but from the help of prevenient grace. Since, then, to assent to all supernatural mysteries as revealed by God is some beginning of faith—indeed, it is perfect faith as regards its essence, since believing is nothing other than thinking with assent—it follows that this sort of assent cannot be had without the help of grace.

Secondly, it is proved from Philippians 2: We trust that he who began a good work in you will bring it to completion until the day of Christ. From these words the aforesaid Council, canon 5, proves that both the beginning and the completion of faith proceed from the gift of grace.

Thirdly, it is proved from Romans 11: For from him and through him and in him are all things. St. Augustine argues from these words against the Massilians in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 2, as follows: According to the Apostle’s decree, all things are from God; therefore the very beginning of faith is also from God. For, says Augustine, the other things are not from him with this one excepted; rather, from him and through him and in him are all things.

Fourth, it is proved by another argument of that same Augustine in the same chapter:²⁷ For if a human being begins to believe by the powers of nature, and to have some beginning of a good will by seeking, asking, and knocking, on account of which faith itself, or the help of grace, is granted, it follows that grace is given on account of merits, contrary to the Apostle's statement: But if it is by works, it is no longer grace. The inference is proved: for one who began to believe from himself merits from the one in whom he believes the gift of faith. St. Prosper develops this argument in the book against the Collator, c. 6., when he says: How, then, do you fail to see that you fall under that condemnation which, whether you wish it or not, you are convicted of asserting: that God's grace is given according to our merits, since you affirm that some good work must precede, coming from human beings themselves, on account of which they obtain grace? For the faith of one who asks, the devotion of one who seeks, and the persistence of one who knocks cannot be considered to have no merit—especially since all such people are said both to receive, to come, and to enter.²⁸ In this matter it is superfluous, indeed impious, to wish to make room for merits existing before grace in such a way that what the Lord says would not be wholly true: No one comes to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. This would be so if the conversion of anyone to belief were without God's illumination, or if in any way a human will could extend itself to God without God, who draws to the Son the one whom he has called—not by compelling one who resists and is unwilling, but by making a willing person out of an unwilling one, and by whatever means inclining the unbelief of one who resists, so that the heart of the hearer, as delight in obeying is generated within it, rises where it had been pressed down, learns where it had been ignorant, trusts from where it had distrusted, and wills from where it had been unwilling.²⁹ Here St. Prosper concludes that grace is given according to our merits if it is once granted that some good work can proceed from the powers of nature, whether asking, desiring, or something similar, upon the performance of which a person infallibly obtains the gifts of grace. Nor is it enough to answer that this work of nature is not meritorious of grace and is not of the same order as grace. For St. Prosper seems tacitly to reject this solution in those words just cited: Whether you wish it or not, you are convicted of saying that grace is given according to our merits, etc. St. Augustine uses the same kind of argument in letter 143 to Anastasius, against certain people who are excessively confident in the human will, which they think, once the law has been given, can suffice for them to fulfill it, without any grace of holy inspiration to assist it beyond the teaching of the law. Arguing against them, he speaks as follows: Through their discussion, wretched and needy human weakness is persuaded that we ought not even to pray, lest we enter into temptation. They do not dare to say this openly, but this is what their view necessarily implies, whether they wish it or not. For³⁰, why are we told, Watch and pray, that you may not enter into temptation? Why also, in keeping with this exhortation, when he taught us to pray, did he command us to say: Lead us not into temptation, if this is not accomplished through the help of divine grace, but lies wholly within the free choice of the human will?

Fifth, another argument of that same Augustine, in chapter 2 of the cited work On the Predestination of the Saints, proves the point from 2 Corinthians 3: We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as though from ourselves. Augustine argues from these words as follows: thinking is less than believing, and even less than beginning to believe; for believing is thinking with assent, and therefore includes both thinking and assenting. But thinking the mysteries of faith that are to be believed is not from us, but from God's gift, as the Apostle says. Therefore, all the more, the very beginning of faith will not be from us. Augustine proves the same conclusion in the passages cited before the preceding conclusion. Master Soto may be consulted on this in book 2 On Nature and Grace, chapter 8.

X. Third Conclusion. By the powers of nature alone, a human being can assent to supernatural mysteries proposed to him with a certain opinionative and fallible assent, insofar as concerns the believer; but not as to things revealed by God, in such a way that divine revelation, or the First Truth revealing, is the formal reason for assenting. Rather, the assent is given on account of some other motive or human reason.³¹ This is the conclusion of St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 5. art. 3. in the body of the article and ad 1; it is also maintained by Capreolus, in 3. d. 24. q. 1., in the replies to Scotus’s first and fourth arguments against the second conclusion; Cajetan, p. 2. q. 109. ar. 1. and 4.; Medina, in the same article, dub. ult.; Soto, in the place cited above; and Báñez, 2. 2. q. 6. art. 1. It is the common opinion.

It is proved first: a heretic who disbelieves one article assents to the others, because he wills to do so, as experience shows; yet that assent does not proceed from the help of grace. Therefore it proceeds from the powers of nature.

It is proved second. Such an act, by which someone assents materially to revealed mysteries, but not insofar as they are revealed by God, is not a true act of Christian faith, but so only equivocally. For it belongs to the essence of Christian faith to rest upon the First Truth revealing as the formal reason for believing, as St. Thomas proves, 2. 2. q. 5. art. 1. Therefore special help is not necessary for that act, and consequently it proceeds from the powers of nature alone. The second part, however, will be evident from the proofs of the following conclusion.

XI. Fourth Conclusion. By a merely natural act, with only God's general concurrence, a human being cannot assent to all supernatural mysteries as revealed by God, with certain and firm assent, or infallible assent on the believer's part; rather, the special help of prevenient grace is necessarily required to elicit such an act.³² This conclusion is manifestly established by the teaching of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and by the common opinion of the Thomists; it is so certain that the opposite view seems to have no probability at all. This is shown as follows.

First: as is clear from the first and second conclusions, and from the arguments brought forward for them, no one can elicit a true assent of Christian and divine faith without the special help of grace. But the assent of which we speak in this conclusion is a true assent of Christian faith. Therefore. The minor is proved: as follows from St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 1. art. 1 and q. 5. art. 3, in the body of the article and ad 1, Christian faith is distinguished from human faith in this respect: divine, or Christian, faith rests upon the First Truth as its formal reason, whereas human faith rests upon human testimony as the formal reason for believing, or upon some other human motive.³³ From this there follows in turn another difference: Christian faith is certain and infallible on the believer's part, because it rests upon an infallible and unfailing formal reason, namely, the First Truth revealing, which can neither be deceived nor deceive. Human faith, however, is fallible and liable to fail on the believer's part, because it rests upon a fallible foundation, namely, human testimony, although in another respect, on the part of its object, it is infallible. But the assent of which we speak rests upon divine revelation as its formal reason, for through it a human being assents to supernatural mysteries as revealed by God and because they have been revealed by God. Likewise, such assent is certain, firm, and infallible on the believer's part, with as great a certainty as Christian faith has, as is clear from the second statement of the opinion we are refuting. Therefore it is truly and properly an assent of Christian faith.

This is confirmed first. No assent is infallible unless it is assent to a thing known by the evident light of first principles or of science, or by a non-evident supernatural light, such as the light of faith or prophecy. But the aforesaid assent is infallible, and it is not assent to a thing known by the light of first principles or by scientific light. Therefore it must necessarily be assent to a thing known by the light of faith or prophecy. Therefore the special help of grace is required for it.³⁴

This is confirmed second: Christ the Lord praised Peter's faith when he declared, You are the Christ, the Son of the living God, because it rested upon divine revelation as its formal reason, as is clear from those words in Matthew: Blessed are you, Simon Bar-Jona, because flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in heaven. Therefore every assent by which someone assents to all the mysteries of faith as revealed by God is praiseworthy and must be regarded as a true assent of Christian faith.³⁵

It is proved second: St. Augustine and Prosper, in the cited passages, teach openly against Pelagius and the Massilians that no beginning or initial stage of faith, however imperfect, can proceed from the powers of nature alone. But a certain and firm assent by which someone assents to all supernatural mysteries as revealed by God is at least some imperfect inception and beginning of faith, and in some way leads toward attaining perfect faith, or toward obtaining the special help of grace. Therefore it cannot be had from the powers of nature alone. The minor is proved: according to the second opinion in the fourth statement, once that merely natural assent on the human being's part is posited, God immediately, by a certain law, bestows the help of grace, by which that work becomes supernatural and such as is necessary for salvation. Therefore it is some beginning of salvation and something that leads toward obtaining the help of grace.

It is proved third, and the fourth statement is refuted more fully: if a human being can have, by the powers of nature alone, an act of believing, upon the performance of which the help of grace is given by a certain law, it seems to follow that grace is given according to our merits. The inference is proved: as St. Augustine says in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 2: Who would say that one who has already begun to believe merits nothing from the one in whom he believes? But that person already begins to believe by the powers of nature. Therefore he merits from the one in whom he believes that perfect faith be bestowed upon him.

XII. If it is said that the assent preceding grace, being merely natural, has no value or merit for obtaining grace, nor any proportion to it, because they are of different orders, the reply is: Faustus and Cassian also affirmed that those good beginnings are merely natural.³⁶ They also said that a human being has no merit for obtaining grace, and that grace always remains gratuitous, as is clear from what was said in disputation 2, nos. 15, 26, and 28. Nevertheless, St. Prosper, on the basis of his statements, reproaches him for positing merit for grace. For he says: How do you fail to see that you fall into that condemned error which, whether you wish it or not, you are convicted of asserting: that God's grace is given according to our merits, since you affirm that some good work must precede, coming from human beings themselves, on account of which they obtain grace? For the faith of one who asks, the devotion of one who seeks, and the persistence of one who knocks cannot be considered to have no merit—especially since all such people are said both to receive, to come, and to enter.³⁷ Therefore, if all who have the aforesaid act of believing by the powers of nature receive the help of grace by a certain law, come, and enter, then by that act of believing they have already given some beginning to grace and in some way merit to enter.

It is proved fourth by the Apostle's authority, Romans 4: To one who works, however, the reward is not reckoned according to grace but according to debt. An argument is drawn from these words: as will be clear in disputation 56, if a king, out of his generosity or at a prince's request, were to establish this law—Whoever first enters such-and-such a city, I will give him that city—then in fact the person who first enters that city makes it due to himself, and, given the law, the king is bound by a kind of justice to give it to him. For that person performed the work to which the city was promised; but the reward is not reckoned to one who works according to grace, but according to debt. Yet that work, considered in itself, has no proportion to the city and no equal value; nevertheless, given the law, the city is owed to him. Therefore, correspondingly, if a law has been established, on account of Christ's merits, that the help of grace be given to one who believes by the mere capacity of nature, that help will be owed to the person who performs the work, given that law, even if the work in itself has no merit or value in relation to so great a reward.³⁸

XIII. Finally, it is proved: as is clear from what was said in disputation 1, among other reasons Pelagius erred because he thought that a human being could begin an act of faith and charity by himself, which God then perfected by subsequently giving grace. Although Pelagius denied that grace was necessary without qualification to perfect an act of faith and other good works, Julian nevertheless conceded this, as was said in disputation 1, no. 5. Therefore.

This is confirmed because the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians never said that the act of faith which they located in nature was supernatural on the part of the efficient cause, since it entails a contradiction that an act proceeding from the capacity of nature alone should be caused efficiently by a supernatural agent. Therefore the act of faith which the authors of the opposing opinion say proceeds from our free choice, with only general concurrence, seems in every respect to be like the act of faith which the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians located in nature.³⁹ The inference is clear: according to the opinion we are refuting, nothing at all is lacking to an act of faith produced from the powers of nature alone except that it becomes supernatural through a new inflow of grace together with free choice.

From these points it follows, against the second statement of that same opinion, that the special help of grace is necessary not only so that the act of believing may be supernatural and of the kind required for salvation, but also so that that assent may be certain and infallible on the believer's part. It is likewise necessary so that the act of believing may be directed toward a supernatural object, insofar as it is revealed by God; and, finally, so that it may simply be an assent of that kind of faith. It follows, second, against the third statement, that after a human being has been taught that supernatural assent is necessary for salvation, he cannot, without the help of grace, wish to believe in this way, or try by a supernatural gift and help of God to assent, or ask that this help be given to him, or endeavor to prepare himself to receive that same help. This is proved from what has been said: asking, wishing or desiring, and trying to have faith, etc., is some beginning of faith. Therefore such acts or efforts cannot be had from the powers of nature alone; rather, the special help of prevenient grace is necessarily required in order to elicit each one⁴⁰ of them.

XIV. In answer to the first argument made in support of the error of Pelagius and the Massilians, St. Augustine treats the matter expressly in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10. We say with him that both are in God's power: what he requires of us and what he offers us.⁴¹ The holy Doctor proves this from Rom. 8, where it is said: If by the Spirit you put to death the deeds of the flesh, you will live. There we are required to put the deeds of the flesh to death, while life is offered to us. Would it then please us, Augustine says, to say that putting the deeds of the flesh to death is not God's gift, and to refuse to acknowledge it as God's gift, because we have heard it required of us, with the reward of life offered if we do it? May this never please those who share in and defend grace. We therefore say that our very act of believing is in God's power, as in the one who gives help for believing and as the one who first begins the work; and, once the help of grace is given, it is also in the power of our free choice, as the proximate cause freely eliciting that same act. For, as Celestine says: So great is God's kindness toward us that he wishes what are his own gifts to be our merits.⁴² Hence 1 Chronicles, chapter 29,⁴³ says: All things are yours, and what we have received from your hand we give back to you.

XV. Regarding Cassian's second argument, which concerns the Apostle's authority in Rom. 7, St. Prosper replies in lib. contra Collat. c. 8. that the same Apostle who said, To will is present with me, also said in Phil. 2, For it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish, and in 2. ad Cor. 3, Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as though from ourselves. Hence that expression, To will is present with me, is the voice of a person called by God and placed under grace, who indeed delights in the law of God according to the inner person, but sees another law in his members, opposed to the law of his mind and taking him captive under the law of sin.

To the other two passages of Scripture, the reply is that we truly are the ones who will and ask, but God, by the special help of grace, brings it about that we will and ask,⁴⁴ according to the Apostle's statement: God sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father;⁴⁵ that is, making us cry out, as St. Augustine and St. Thomas often explain. And again he says: For we do not know what we ought to pray for, but the Spirit himself pleads for us with inexpressible groanings;⁴⁶ that is, he makes us plead, as the holy Fathers commonly explain. And Ezekiel 36 says: I will cause you to act, and to walk in my commandments, etc.

In answer to the confirmation, we reply from the teaching of the Council of Trent, decree on justification, chapter 5, that when Sacred Scripture says, Turn to me, and I will turn to you, we are reminded of our freedom. But when we answer, Turn us, O Lord, to you, and we shall be turned, we confess that we are preceded by God's grace.⁴⁷⁴⁸ We say the same here: in those passages of Scripture where it is asserted that our prayer precedes God, or that God waits in order to have mercy on us, we are reminded of our freedom, because we believe and love freely, not under compulsion.⁴⁹ In other passages, however, it is signified that before we will and believe, we are preceded by the help of divine grace. Or one may say that, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. 2. q. 111. art. 3, in the body of the article, the same effect of grace can be prevenient in relation to some things and subsequent in relation to others. Therefore, when Scripture says, My prayer will precede you, that prayer is a subsequent effect in relation to the first calling and first prevenient grace; but in relation to a further effect of grace, it can be called prevenient. This will be discussed more fully in Disputation 95, where it will be explained in what sense God is said to wait for us to will.

XVI. As for Cassian's statement that those who are preceded by God's grace do not come freely, Prosper replies in Against the Collator, chapter 39, definition 6, that if free choice is taken away when it is preceded by grace, then one must also say that grace is taken away when it is preceded by free choice.⁵⁰ Therefore, just as the proper manner of acting is not taken away from natural causes but rather perfected when they are moved by God, so free choice is not destroyed but perfected when it is preceded by grace. For grace moves in accordance with the way free choice is apt to be moved—that is, freely—as was said in Disputations 18, 21, and 22.

To the third, the major premise is denied: we say that this is not an essential difference between a habit and a power, but an accidental difference between a power and an acquired habit, which, insofar as it is acquired, presupposes a capacity in the power to produce an act with respect to its substance.⁵¹ This is proved as follows: the habit of first principles is necessary in order to act at all. We therefore say that a supernatural habit, or special help, because it raises a power to something above the entire capacity of nature, takes the place of a power and is required in order to act at all. For a supernatural habit, since it is the highest among all habits, in a certain way reaches the character of a power, according to the common saying: The highest of the lowest reaches the lowest of the highest. To the reply, it is answered that every operative habit presupposes a power which that habit perfects or raises above the capacity of its nature. Hence the intellect, without special help, does not have proximately and formally the character of a power in relation to the supernatural act of believing; it has it fundamentally and remotely, insofar as by its nature it is capable of being raised by the help of grace so as to elicit an act of believing. The other external powers do not have this, as St. Thomas teaches, 1. 2. q. 50. art. 1.

XVII. To the fourth, we reply that in that passage, Matth. 11, it is not asserted that the Tyrians and Sidonians would have believed through those outward signs alone, if indeed they had been performed in Tyre and Sidon; rather, it is simply affirmed that, if they had been performed, they would have believed.⁵² This must nevertheless be understood with the addition of God's efficacious inward motion through the special help of grace, which God in his mercy would have given the Tyrians and Sidonians if the signs performed in Chorazin and Bethsaida had been performed among them, as was explained in disput. 7. num. 23.

To St. Augustine's authority from chapter 14 of On the Gift of Perseverance, the reply is that he is speaking there of what is required for faith on the part of the presentation of things to be believed, and with respect to the motion that belongs to the object. For it is natural that some people be more affected by an object presented with such signs or words than if it were presented otherwise.⁵³ For some people are naturally more inclined to joy than to sorrow; hence the Gospel is presented to them more fittingly, when they are led to believe through motives proportioned, on the part of that same object, to their inclination. And since it had not been granted to the Tyrians and Sidonians that they believe, this too was denied them, namely, a fitting presentation of the Gospel. This explanation is gathered from the context itself, for Augustine is speaking of miracles and signs by which the things to be believed are presented and confirmed. Yet besides this fitting presentation of the credible object, another inward motion on the part of the power is necessarily required for faith, through special help, as the same Augustine expressly admits very often, especially in lib. 1. cont. duas epist. Pelag. cc. 34 et 35, and lib. 1. de gratia Christi contra Pelagium et Caelestium, c. 24, where he says: Let them read, then, and understand; let them consider and acknowledge that God works in human hearts not by the law and teaching sounding outwardly, but by an inward and hidden, wonderful and ineffable power—not only true revelations, but also good wills.⁵⁴ And on c. 6 of Ioan. he says: Even if they hear these things from human beings, nevertheless what they understand is given inwardly; it shines inwardly; it is revealed inwardly. And on Ps. 87, near the end, he says: How would I believe unless I heard? But in order that I might believe what I heard, he himself drew me. Hence Acts 16 says: And a certain woman named Lydia, a seller of purple, who worshiped God, heard; the Lord opened her heart to attend to the things that were being said by Paul. From these words, Prosper in lib. 1. de vocat. gent. c. 2, in epist. ad Ruffinum, and in lib. contra Collat. c. 30 proves that, beyond the presentation of the Gospel, however fitting, an inward motion of God on the part of the power through special help is necessarily required for faith. The authority of St. Augustine cited from q. 2. ad Simplicianum is to be understood in the same way, as is also clear from the context itself. For immediately after the words quoted, he adds: We see some people moved to believe in one way and others in another, when the same things are shown or signified. For example, Simeon believed in our Lord Jesus Christ while he was still a tiny infant, recognizing him because the Spirit had revealed him. Nathanael, upon hearing one statement from him—Before Philip called you, when you were under the fig tree, I saw you—answered: Rabbi, you are the Son of God; you are the King of Israel. Much later Peter confessed the same, and deserved to hear that he was blessed and that the keys of the kingdom of heaven would be given to him. When a miracle was performed at Cana of Galilee—the beginning of Jesus’ signs, as John the Evangelist records—with water changed into wine, his disciples believed in him. Since one person is moved to faith in one way and another in another, and the same thing often moves when said in one way but does not move when said in another, and moves one person but not another, who would dare to say that God lacked a way of calling by which Esau too could have applied his mind to that faith and joined his will to it, in which Jacob was justified?^55565758 See, Augustine speaks expressly of moral motion, which takes place through different words or deeds.

XVIII. To the passage of Fulgentius, we reply that when he says a human being can believe naturally, he is speaking of a remote power, or capacity, which naturally belongs to a human being because he is of an intellectual nature and has free choice, pliable in either⁵⁹ direction. In this sense Augustine said: The ability to have faith belongs to human nature; having it belongs only to the faithful. This explanation is gathered from the context itself, for Fulgentius adds that it is divinely granted to a human being to believe. Or the word naturally should be understood to mean through a nature healed by grace. St. Augustine also explains in this sense the passage, Rom. 2: The Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature the things of the law.⁶⁰

To the fifth, the reply is that, as St. Thomas teaches, 2. 2. q. 2. art. 5. ad 1: If something is said to be in a human being's power, with the help of grace set aside, then a human being is bound to many things that he cannot do without prevenient grace, such as loving God and neighbor and likewise believing the articles of faith. Nevertheless, he can do this with the help of grace; and that help, to whomever it is divinely given, is given mercifully, while to those to whom it is not given, it is justly not given as punishment for preceding sin, at least original sin, as Augustine says in lib. de corrept. et gratia, cc. 5 et 6. The same is taught in book III Against the Gentiles, c. CLIX and CLX. Therefore, in the case described in the argument, if that person scorns the faith and does not believe, he sins mortally against faith—not because, once the Gospel had been preached, he could elicit an act of believing by the powers of nature alone, as the argument claims, but because he could do so with the help of grace and did not wish to, but maliciously hindered that help from being given to him.⁶¹ But if a person who hears the Gospel is not aroused and moved by God to believe by any inward help, even sufficient help, he does not sin against faith by failing to elicit an act of believing, because in fact he cannot elicit it without special help. Hence he is only negatively, not contrarily, an unbeliever, as follows from St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 10. art. 1, where Master Báñez also expressly teaches this, dub. 3. concl. 5. I said: if he fails to elicit an act of faith, for if he positively resists the Gospel when it has been sufficiently presented and scorns it, he will sin against faith, as Master Báñez explains in the same place.⁶²

To the sixth, the antecedent is denied; it will be treated expressly in Disputation 65. In reply to the proof, we say that the proximate and formal vitality of an act of faith also comes from the habit of faith itself, as the principle by which, or from special help. For since that act is one and utterly simple, it is impossible for it to be composed of two entities, one natural and the other supernatural.⁶³ Moreover, this is clear from the authority of the Gospel: I give them eternal life,⁶⁴ where the very life possessed by the act of the beatific vision is attributed to the gift of grace. The reason is that since the vitality of that vision is unfailing by its nature, it cannot proceed from the natural power alone of a created intellect, which is in itself liable to fail; rather, it must proceed from an intellect raised by the unfailing light of glory, as will be clear in Disputation 64. The same must be said of other supernatural acts. In answer to the objection, we say that an act of faith, insofar as it is vital, expresses an intrinsic order to a vital power, but one raised by the habit of faith or by special help. For it is sufficient for the character of a vital act that it be produced by a vital power, either according to its natural power or by a power it receives from a superadded habit, as is clear in the beatific vision.

XIX. To the seventh, we reply that the phrase as is fitting was added in the Councils to distinguish this from an opinionative and fallible assent on the believer's part, by which someone assents to supernatural mysteries not insofar as they are revealed, but on account of some motive or human reason, as is found in a heretic.⁶⁵ For such assent is not as is fitting, and the process of justification does not begin from it; consequently the Councils are not speaking of it. But the assent by which someone firmly believes, on the believer's part, all the mysteries revealed, insofar as they are revealed, or on account of divine revelation as the formal reason, is truly an assent as is fitting. The first beginning of justification is taken from it, and thus it cannot be had without the special help of grace.

To the eighth, the inference is denied. For the Jews mentioned in those passages did not sin because they could, by the capacity of nature alone and with only general concurrence, assent to Christ's teaching as revealed by God. Rather, they sinned because, although they could believe through the help of grace, they resisted God as he called them and placed an obstacle in the way of that same grace, as was said.