De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice. This edition contains Book I: the prooemium and five preliminary disputations on Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian teaching, Manichaean and Reformation positions, Catholic theologians, and the authority of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
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Book One
Prooemium: division of the whole work
Disputatio I: Whether the Pelagians ever admitted that any inward grace, or any supernatural help from God, is divinely given for salvation or for fulfilling the precepts of the law
Disputatio II: What grace the Semi-Pelagians admitted as necessary for salvation, and where their view agrees with or departs from the error of the Pelagians
Disputatio III: What the Manichaeans formerly held, and the Lutherans and Calvinists hold in our time, about the necessity of grace and the natural powers of our free choice
Disputatio IV: What certain Catholic Doctors hold about the natural powers of free choice and its concord with divine foreknowledge, providence, predestination, and the efficacy of the helps of grace
Disputatio V: How much authority Saint Augustine’s teaching has concerning predestination and grace, and whether it is permissible to depart from it
Book Two
Introduction
Disputatio I: Whether the knowledge of God is suitably divided into the knowledge of simple understanding and the knowledge of vision.
Disputatio II: Whether the knowledge of God is sufficiently divided into knowledge that is merely natural and knowledge that is merely free; or whether, besides both, middle knowledge must be posited in God with respect to conditional future things that depend on the human will.
Disputatio III: Whether all future things are actually present in eternity according to the proper existences they will have in their own measure.
Disputatio IV: Whether God certainly knows future contingents because of their real presence in eternity before they come to be, and whether an existence of this kind contributes anything to the certainty and infallibility of the divine knowledge.
Disputatio V: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows all future contingents in the decree, or predetermination, of his divine will.
Disputatio VI: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows future sins in some decree of his divine will.
Disputatio VII: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows future contingents in the predetermination of secondary causes, especially when the secondary causes are free.
Disputatio VIII: Whether, setting aside every predetermination of the divine will and existence in eternity, another ground for the certainty of divine knowledge can be assigned, namely, on the part of the truth of the object.
Disputatio IX: Whether God certainly knows future contingents before the decree of his will, as future, in their ideas.
Disputatio X: Whether there is in God a conjectural knowledge of what, in particular, a created will will do if placed in such circumstances.
Disputatio XI: Whether this causal proposition is true: “Because this is future, it is foreknown by God”; or, conversely: “Because God foreknows something to be future, therefore it is future.”
Disputatio XII: Whether God produces things outside himself immediately through his knowledge, that is, through his intellect; or whether, besides intellect and will, a third executive power must be posited in him, through which things are produced immediately.
Book Three
Introduction
Disputatio I: Whether God’s actual motion, which all secondary causes need in order to produce their effect or operation, is an immediate influx into the secondary cause itself; or whether instead it is only an immediate influx, together with the secondary cause, into its effect.
Disputatio II: What that prior motion is by which God moves and applies secondary causes to act.
Disputatio III: Whether God’s general concurrence, by which he helps secondary causes constituted in first act through supernatural forms to produce supernatural acts, is supernatural; or whether it is of the same order as general concurrence with merely natural acts.
Disputatio IV: Whether God’s general concurrence, especially with respect to acts that depend on created free choice, is indifferent of itself.
Disputatio V: Whether, by an absolute and efficacious decree of his will, God truly predetermines as an efficient cause all secondary causes, both natural and free, to their operations after the manner of a physical cause, while preserving their nature and freedom.
Disputatio VI: Whether, by a prior motion inhering in the created will, God moves, applies, or predetermines it after the manner of a physical cause to all its good acts in particular, while preserving its freedom.
Disputatio VII: Whether, by a prior motion, God truly premoves as an efficient cause free choice after the manner of a physical cause to the act of sin, insofar as it is an act and insofar as it is a being.
Disputatio VIII: Whether all contingent and free acts predetermined by God necessarily occur with the necessity of infallibility, or with necessity on the supposition of the predetermination of the divine will.
Disputatio IX: Whether the first root of contingency is the efficacy, or omnipotence, of the divine will.
Disputatio X: Whether any effect can be called formally contingent in relation to God’s causality, especially when it is produced immediately by him.
Book Four
Introduction
Disputatio I: Whether God has providence not only over all genera and species, but also over all individuals in particular, according to all circumstances of place, time, etc.
Disputatio II: Whether the evils of punishment are willed by an absolute and efficacious will, and predetermined in particular, through divine providence, or are only permitted.
Disputatio III: Whether the nature of divine providence includes not only the ordering of means to an end, but also the attainment of the end intended by God.
Disputatio IV: Whether contingent and free secondary causes can withdraw themselves from, or depart from, the order assigned to them by divine providence.
Disputatio V: Whether created free choice can resist almighty God, or strive against the order of divine providence.
Book Five
Introduction
Disputatio I: Whether all the explanations that St. Augustine gives of those words of the Apostle, “God wills all human beings to be saved,” are legitimate.
Disputatio II: What God's antecedent will is, what his consequent will is, and whether antecedent will formally entails some conditional act or wish in God.
Disputatio III: What predestination is, and in which act it formally consists: an act of the will, or rather an act of the intellect.
Disputatio IV: Whether the good use of the aids of grace, insofar as it proceeds from free will, is an effect of predestination.
Disputatio V: Whether the good use of free will, proceeding from the aid of grace, is a cause, reason, or necessary condition of predestination in adults.
Disputatio VI: Whether the predestination of infants depended on, and presupposed, foreknowledge of the good use of the free will of their parents or of others through whom they came to the grace of baptism.
Disputatio VII: Whether the foreseen merits of Christ are the cause of our predestination with respect to its entire effect.
Disputatio VIII: Whether the grace of the state of innocence was conferred on Adam through the merits of Christ.
Disputatio IX: Whether predestination, with respect to the attainment of its effects, is certain and infallible with the certainty of the order and causality of the means.
Disputatio X: Whether anyone, apart from divine revelation, can know with infallible certainty that he or another is among the predestined, or infer this from certain signs.
Disputatio XI: Whether, at least among the faithful, there are more elect than reprobate.
Book Six
Introduction
Disputatio I: Whether the children of Adam contract original sin through seminal propagation, such that it truly and properly has the character of guilt in them.
Disputatio II: Whether through original sin man was only deprived of original justice and supernatural gifts, or also wounded in his natural powers.
Disputatio III: What wounds man incurs through original or actual sin.
Disputatio IV: Whether free will in fallen nature, apart from the aids of grace, has the same natural powers for good that it would have had if it had been created in a state of pure nature.
Whether free choice in fallen nature, when the helps of grace are set aside, has the same natural powers for the good that it would have had if it had been created in pure nature.
I. Those authors who say that through sin man was only stripped of gratuitous gifts, and was not wounded in his natural endowments, consequently teach that man’s free choice in fallen nature has precisely the same natural powers for the good that it would have had if it had been created in pure nature. They prove this by the same arguments with which, in the preceding Disputation, they claimed to prove that man was not wounded in his natural endowments through sin. For if the natural powers truly were not wounded by sin but remained wholly intact, it follows as an evident consequence that after sin they retain precisely the same natural powers that they would have had if man had been created in pure nature.
Moreover, the same opinion is proved as follows: A man created in pure nature would have precisely the same struggle of appetite against reason that he in fact now has in fallen nature; and consequently the same difficulty in doing the good proportionate to nature would exist in either state, and likewise the natural powers would be of the same kind, just as human nature itself is. Therefore the natural powers for carrying out the good of reason would be precisely the same in either state.
Secondly. There is no identifiable good work that a man could produce by the powers of nature in pure nature and not in fallen nature. Therefore in either state he would have the same natural powers for the good. The consequence is proved: for the whole perfection of natural powers is assessed, or at least known a posteriori, from the good works they can produce. The antecedent is proved as follows: good works are of two kinds. Some belong to the supernatural order, such as faith, hope, and charity; these man could not elicit by the powers of nature alone in pure nature, just as he could not in fallen nature. Others accord with and are proportionate to nature, such as an act of temperance, mercy, or liberality. These works can be produced indifferently by man after the Fall without the help of grace, and also in pure nature, if he had been created in that state. Therefore, and so on.
II. Thirdly. Man did not lose free choice through sin, as the Council of Trent defines against Luther and Calvin.1 Therefore by the powers of free choice he can perform in fallen nature any good work that he could have performed in pure nature; and consequently he has the same natural powers for the good in either state. The consequence is proved as follows: as will be clear in Disputation 115, free choice is the faculty of will and reason for either alternative, namely, to act or not to act, or to perform this or that act. If, then, man did not lose free choice through sin, it follows that he has a natural faculty for performing all those good works that he could have performed in pure nature; otherwise, with respect to those same works he would not have free choice after sin.
It is confirmed. No one is bound to do the impossible, since no one sins in what he cannot avoid. But in fallen nature man is bound by a natural precept to do the good proportionate to his nature and to avoid the evil opposed to it, just as he would be bound in pure nature. Therefore he has a natural faculty to do this, just as he would have had in pure nature. Thus the same conclusion as before follows.
III. Fourthly. In fallen man there is a natural light for knowing the evil and the good suited to the natural end, as is clear from Psalm 4. After the Prophet had said, Many say, Who will show us good things? he immediately adds, The light of your countenance, O Lord, is marked upon us, by which we know what is good and to be pursued, and what is evil and to be avoided. Therefore there are in him natural powers for embracing the good proportionate to himself and avoiding evil, just as he would have had them in pure nature. Therefore he would have the same powers in either state.
It is confirmed, first, from the passage in Romans 2: When the Gentiles, who do not have the law—that is, the written law—do by nature the things that are of the law, although they do not have the law, they are a law to themselves; they show the work of the law written in their hearts. Behold, Paul says that the Gentiles sometimes do by nature, that is, by the powers of nature alone, what belongs to the natural law, which plainly consists of moral goods suited to the natural end.
It is confirmed, secondly, by the authority of Augustine, Hypognosticon, book 3, who says: We confess that free choice exists in all men, having indeed the judgment of reason, not by which it is able without God to begin or certainly to complete what pertains to God, but only with respect to the works of this present life, both good and evil. Here he teaches plainly enough that free choice without grace can will whatever good pertains to the present life, and excludes only the good that pertains to God as the supernatural end. Therefore, according to Augustine, free choice has the same natural powers for the good that it would have had in pure nature.
Finally, all the arguments to be set forth in Disputation 54 may be brought forward for the same opinion. By these the same authors try to prove that a man in fallen nature, so long as the judgment of reason is not overwhelmed, has a natural faculty without the help of grace to resist, at each instant, any temptations whatsoever, even the gravest, that must be overcome in order to keep the natural law. For once this is admitted, it evidently follows that he has precisely the same natural powers for embracing the good proportionate to himself and avoiding evil that he would have had in pure nature.
This opinion, however, just like the one we refuted in the preceding Disputation, is not approved by very learned men, nor is it consonant with the teaching of Saints Augustine and Thomas; rather, it is wholly alien to it. Hence let this be
IV. The first conclusion. A man in fallen nature, without the help of grace, does not have the same powers for embracing natural good and avoiding evil that he would have had in pure nature.2 This conclusion follows manifestly from what has been said: through sin man was not only stripped of gratuitous gifts, but was also wounded, weakened, and changed for the worse in his natural powers. In pure nature, however, he would truly not be wounded in his natural endowments, weakened, or afflicted with wounds. But a wounded man, afflicted with wounds and weakened by infirmity, does not have the same powers for performing the works of nature that he would have if he had suffered no infirmity or weakness of his limbs. Therefore.
Secondly, through original or mortal sin man has been turned away from God not only as the supernatural end but also as the natural end. For it is impossible that a man ordered to eternal life be turned away through sin from the supernatural end without also being turned away, at least consequently, from the natural end; otherwise he could at once be turned away from God as the author of grace and turned toward him as the author of nature, which plainly involves a contradiction. But in pure nature he would in no way be turned away from God, even as the author of nature, for that state excludes grace and sin, and man in it is considered precisely according to what belongs to him from the principles of nature. Yet a man turned away from his ultimate end, even the natural end, does not have the same powers for the good proportionate to that end that he would have had if he had not been turned away from that same end. Therefore, and so on. The minor premise is proved: as Aristotle says, the ultimate end in practical matters stands as first principles do in speculative matters. But an intellect turned away from the first speculative principles does not have the same powers for inferring scientific conclusions that it would have if it were well instructed in those principles. Therefore, likewise, a man turned away through sin from the ultimate natural end does not have the same powers for embracing the good proportionate to that end and avoiding evil that he would have had if he had not been turned away from that same end through sin.
It is proved thirdly because, as will be clear in Disputation 51, a man in fallen nature cannot by the powers of nature alone love God above all things without qualification, even as the natural end; but in pure nature he could by his own powers elicit one or another act of love of God above all things insofar as he is the end of nature, as will be made clear in the same Disputation. Therefore, in fallen nature he does not have the same powers that he would have had in pure nature. And by this the objections are answered.
V. To the first argument, then, it is replied that a man in fallen nature is turned away from the ultimate end, even the natural end, from which he would not have been turned away if he had been created in pure nature. In this respect he has greater difficulty in doing the good proportionate to his nature than he would have had in pure nature.3 If, besides original sin, he also has actual sins, the sensitive appetite is made stronger in its struggle against reason, and through a habit of vice generated by multiplied acts the will is more and more inclined toward evil. In this respect he will have less power to carry out the good than he would have had in pure nature.
To the second argument it is replied that in pure nature a man could, by the faculty of nature alone, elicit one or another purely natural act of love of God above all things without qualification, which, however, he cannot elicit in fallen nature, as was said.
To the third argument it is replied that, although man’s free choice was not extinguished by sin, it was nevertheless bruised, wounded, and injured, as was said above in Disputations 45 and 46; these wounds, however, he would not have had in pure nature. Therefore, by his own powers in fallen nature he cannot perform every good work, even a natural one, that he could have performed in pure nature. Nor does it follow from this that man lost free choice with respect to those works that he cannot perform without the help of grace. For he can produce any act, at least with special help, which suffices for him to be considered to have free choice with respect to any good work; for what we can do through friends we are considered able to do ourselves, as Aristotle says in Ethics 3, chapter 3.
VI. To the confirmation it is replied with St. Thomas that, if something is said to be within man’s power with the help of grace excluded, then man is bound to many things that he cannot do without prevenient grace, such as loving God and neighbor, and likewise believing the articles of faith.4 Yet he can do this with the help of grace, which help is mercifully given by God to whomever it is given. To those to whom it is not given, it is withheld in justice as punishment for prior sin, and at least for original sin, as Augustine says in On Correction and Grace.5
To the fourth argument it is replied that, as St. Thomas teaches, human nature is more corrupted by sin with respect to appetite for the good than with respect to knowledge of the true. Hence it does not follow that the will can, without the help of grace, do all the good that the intellect can know by the light of nature.6
To the confirmation it is replied that this is not the sense of the Apostle touched upon in the argument; otherwise by the powers of nature alone a man in fallen nature could fulfill all the natural precepts of the law and love God above all things without qualification as the author of nature, which is false, as will be clear in Disputation 51. I add that this explanation of the Apostle had earlier been given by Julian, as Augustine reports when he says: Hence I do not see at all how those whom you wished to mention help you: those of whom the Apostle says, The Gentiles who do not have the law are a law to themselves, having the work of the law written in their hearts. For by means of them you have tried to prove that even those outside the faith of Christ can have true justice, because, according to the Apostle, they do by nature the things that belong to the law.78 St. Augustine explains the Apostle’s passage twice in the same chapter. The first explanation is that the Gentiles are said to do by nature the things of the law without the law, that is, through a nature corrected by grace.9 For he says: They are therefore said to do by nature the things of the law without the law because they came from the Gentiles to the Gospel, not from circumcision, to which the law was given; and they do so by nature because, in order that they might believe, their nature itself has been corrected by God’s grace. You cannot prove by them what you wish, namely, that even unbelievers can have true virtues; for they are believers. He gives the same explanation in On the Spirit and the Letter, chapters 26 and 27, which St. Thomas follows in many places, especially I–II, q. 109, art. 4, reply to objection 1. For when he had cited the Apostle’s passage above in proof that man can fulfill the precepts of the law without grace by his natural endowments, he replies that, as Augustine says in On the Spirit and the Letter, we should not be troubled by the fact that he said they do by nature the things of the law; for the Spirit of grace does this, restoring in us the image of God in which we were made by nature. St. Augustine’s second explanation in the same place is that, if the Apostle’s cited passage is understood of Gentiles who do not have the faith of Christ, it should not be extended to all the precepts of the law, but to some easy ones, and to the fulfillment of a precept in some particular matter as regards the substance of the act, but not as regards the rectitude that arises from the ultimate end. For Augustine says: Or, if they do not have faith in Christ, then surely they are neither just nor pleasing to God, since without faith it is impossible to please him. But let their thoughts defend them on the day of judgment, so that they may be punished more tolerably, because they did to some extent by nature the things of the law, having the work of the law written in their hearts to this extent: that they would not do to others what they would not wish to suffer themselves. Yet they sin in this, that as men without faith they did not refer these works to the end to which they ought to have referred them. For Fabricius will be punished less than Catiline, not because the former was good but because the latter was worse; and Fabricius is less impious than Catiline, not because he had true virtues, but because he did not deviate so far from true virtues. This will be explained more fully in Disputation 50.
VII. To the second confirmation it is replied that St. Augustine explains in the same place what those moral good works are that man can do in fallen nature without the help of grace. For he immediately adds: By good works I mean those that arise from the good of nature: that is, wanting to work in the field, wanting to eat and drink, wanting to have a friend, wanting to have clothes, wanting to build a house, wanting to marry a wife, to raise livestock, to learn a craft of various good things, wanting whatever good pertains to this present life. All these things do not stand without divine governance; indeed, they are or began to be from him and through him.10
WITH these matters concerning original sin and the wounds inflicted by it on the whole of human nature established, it must consequently be explained what natural powers free choice has for knowing or performing the good proportionate to nature and for rejecting evil, especially in fallen nature. Seven questions arise concerning this.
I. Whether man’s free choice can know all truth pertaining to the order of nature by its own powers alone, without the help of grace.
II. Whether by the powers of nature alone it can assent to all supernatural mysteries proposed and explained to it as revealed by God, with a purely natural assent, certain and firm on the part of the believer.
III. Whether, without the help of grace, a person can perform some work of moral virtue that is good by its object and all its circumstances, and that, by comparison with the ultimate natural end, is truly good and a work of true virtue.
IV. Whether in fallen nature, by his own powers alone, with the general concurrence of God, a person can elicit an absolute, purely natural act of love of God above all things, with an absolute resolve to please him in all things.
Here it is explained whether a man, if he had been created in pure nature, could by his own powers elicit some natural act of love of God above all things.
V. Whether free choice, with only the general concurrence of God, can elicit attrition or contrition as regards only the substance of the act, together with an absolute resolve never again to sin mortally.
VI. Whether man can, through the natural powers of his free choice, prepare the good connatural to him that he lost through sin.
VII. Whether fallen man can, without the help of grace, keep all the commandments and resist at every moment of time all the temptations that confront him, even the gravest, which must be overcome in order to keep the natural law.