De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether through original sin man was stripped only of original justice and supernatural gifts, or was also wounded in natural things.

I. In this part we have a twofold controversy: one with heretics who expressly denied original sin, the other with Catholics who, while admitting with the Church of Christ that Adam's children contract original sin, say that natural things remained intact after sin. For Pelagius, as Augustine reports in lib. de nat. et gratia, c. 19, just as he denied original sin, so consequently he also said that man's nature was not weakened or changed through Adam's sin. His chief reason was this: sin is either some substance or is wholly without substance. If the first is granted, it follows that sin is from God, since every created substance is from God. But if the second is granted, how could sin have weakened or changed human nature? For what is without substance, and is no thing, no existing entity, no body, certainly cannot corrupt or weaken nature.

Other heretics, by contrast, asserted the opposite extreme: that man's natural freedom was not only injured or weakened by sin, but wholly extinguished. This was the view of Luther and the other heretics of our time cited in Disputation 3, but especially Calvin in lib. 1. inst. c. 15. § 8, where he says that the corruption of nature consists in this: through sin man lost the free choice he had possessed before sin. The arguments of these heretics will be brought forward and resolved below, in the discussion of the agreement of free choice with the efficacy of the helps of divine grace.

Among Catholics who admit both original sin and man's free choice even after the fall, some have said that the first parent's sin harmed us only in gratuitous gifts, and that for this reason natural things remained intact in us after sin, as they would be by their nature if they had not been endowed with any supernatural gift. This opinion is proved as follows.

First, by the authority of St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 95. art. 1., in the body, where he says: It is clear that the subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason was not natural; otherwise it would have remained after sin, since the natural gifts bestowed on demons also remained after sin, as Dionysius says in c. 4. de divin. nomin. In these words he clearly teaches that in the first parent, just as in demons, natural things remained intact after sin. He therefore holds that through sin man was stripped only of supernatural gifts and not wounded in natural things. Hence Master Medina, 1. 2. q. 85. ar. 3., § “Second, it follows,” defends the same opinion on the authority of St. Thomas: This is, he says, the true opinion of divine theology, taught by all theologians, namely, Cajetan, 1. 2. q. 85. ar. 3., and q. 109. ar. 2.; Mars. in 2. q. 18. ar. 1.; and the most learned Father Soto lib. 1. de nat. et grat. c. 13.

This is confirmed: St. Thomas compares man after sin to demons with respect to the evils that followed from sin itself. But demons through sin were stripped only of supernatural gifts and were not wounded in natural things; therefore the same holds of men.

Second, it is argued that the sole difference between human nature after sin and before the gifts of grace, and the same nature if it had been created in pure nature, is this: exclusion from glory and the lack of grace and original justice properly have the character of privation and punishment with respect to those who sinned in Adam, but not with respect to a man constituted in pure nature. Therefore through sin man was not wounded in natural things, but was stripped only of gratuitous gifts.

Third. Man after original sin and man in pure nature differ as a naked man and a man who has been stripped. For in pure nature man would be naked, because he would not have grace and charity, which is the wedding garment of the soul; but in the state of original sin he is said to have been stripped, because he lost the supernatural gifts with which he had been adorned. Therefore, with respect to natural things, man is no more wounded in fallen nature than he would be in pure nature, if he had been created in that state.

Fourth. By original sin the natural inclination to the good was not diminished in man; therefore by that sin he was not wounded in his natural endowments. The consequence is clear, because a wound of rational nature cannot be understood unless the natural inclination to¹ the good of reason is diminished by it. The antecedent is proved: for the natural inclination to the good of reason is a property, or proper passion, consequent upon the principles of rational nature, since it is nothing other than the rational power itself inclined toward the good. But a property of a nature, or its proper passion, cannot be diminished; for a proper passion always stands in the same way, being predicated of its subject convertibly and unchangeably, as Porphyry says in the chapter on the Proper. Hence St. Thomas, I–II, q. 85, art. 1, in the body, says that the gift of nature—that is, the principles by which nature itself is constituted—and the properties caused by those same principles are neither taken away nor diminished by sin. Therefore.

The same antecedent is confirmed, first. The natural inclination of human nature is finite, since human nature itself is finite; therefore, if it is diminished by sin, through the multiplication of sins it could be wholly destroyed. For everything finite is consumed by subtraction, if the subtraction is not made in proportional parts; but in the present case the subtraction is not made in proportional parts, as St. Thomas teaches in I–II, q. 85, art. 2. Yet it is impossible that the natural inclination to the good of reason be wholly destroyed while human nature remains, as St. Thomas proves in the same second article. Therefore.

The same antecedent is confirmed, secondly. The natural inclination to the good of reason is not increased by acts of the virtues; therefore neither is it diminished by sin.

Fifth, an argument is made. Sin diminishes the good of nature insofar as it generates a vicious habit; but original sin generates neither a vicious habit nor any morbid quality, since formally it is a pure privation of original justice, and consists in aversion, not in an inordinate turning toward something, as was said above. Therefore, the same conclusion follows as before.

St. Thomas teaches the contrary opinion in I–II, q. 85, art. 1, as do very many Thomists. Hence let this be

The first conclusion against the Pelagians: According to the Catholic faith, it must be asserted that human nature was changed, weakened, and debilitated by sin. All Catholics agree on this conclusion. For it is gathered from the sacred Scriptures, especially Psalm 40: I said, Lord, have mercy on me; heal my soul, because I have sinned against you. Explaining these words, St. Augustine says: What is healed, if nothing has been wounded, nothing hurt, nothing weakened and corrupted? And Isaiah 1: Every head is sick, and every heart is sorrowful; from the sole of the foot to the crown there is no soundness in it: wound, and bruise, and swelling sore. It has not been bound up, nor treated with medicine, nor soothed with oil. And Matthew 9: Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are ill; for I came not to call the just, but sinners. Secondly, it is proved from the definitions of the councils, especially those of Orange and Trent, to be cited below, in which our conclusion against the Pelagians is defined. Thirdly, it is proved by the authority of the Saints, especially St. Chrysostom, Homily 30 to the People of Antioch: there he compares the sinner to a sick man stricken with fever, who has suffered not only this distress, that he is sick, but also that after the illness he will be weaker, even if he returns to good health after a long sickness. St. Prosper, On the Call of All Nations, book 1, chapter 7, says: From there—that is, from the sin of the first man—mortality was drawn; from there came the manifold corruption of body and soul.

The second conclusion: Human nature was not merely stripped of gratuitous gifts by original sin, but was also wounded in its natural endowments. This conclusion is against certain more recent theologians, but it is proved. First, for it is said of that man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, who bore the type of the sinner, in Luke 10, that he fell among robbers, who stripped him and, laying wounds upon him, went away, leaving him half dead:² here it is asserted not only that this man was stripped of gratuitous gifts, but also that he was wounded in his natural endowments, as Bede explains in the Ordinary Gloss on the same passage, and Ambrose, Commentary on Luke, book 7.

Secondly, it is proved from the definition of the Council of Orange, canon 1, where it says as follows: If anyone says that through the offense of Adam’s transgression man was not wholly changed for the worse—that is, in body and soul—but believes that only the body was made subject to corruption, while the soul’s freedom remained unimpaired, deceived by the error of Pelagius he opposes the Scripture that says: ‘The soul that has sinned shall itself die.’ And do you not know that to whom you present yourselves as slaves for obedience, you are slaves of the one whom you obey? And by whomsoever a person is overcome, to him he is also made a slave.³ The sacred Council of Trent confirms the same definition in Session 5, in its decree on original sin, in these words: If anyone does not confess that the first man Adam, when he had transgressed God’s command in Paradise, immediately lost the holiness and justice in which he had been constituted, and through the offense of this transgression incurred the wrath and indignation of God, and hence also the death with which God had previously threatened him, and with death captivity under the power of him who thereafter held the dominion of death, that is, the Devil, and that the whole Adam through that offense of transgression was changed for the worse in body and soul: let him be anathema.⁴⁵ Here man is said to have been changed for the worse in soul and body by original sin for this reason: because he was not only stripped of supernatural gifts, but was also wounded in his natural endowments. The same is evident from the Council of Valence, chapter 6, whose words must be cited in Disputation 54, no. 10.

The authors of the contrary opinion reply that the Councils speak by comparison with the powers that free choice had in the state of innocence through the presence of original justice, and not by comparison with the powers it would have had if man had been created in pure nature.

This solution, however, does not seem to agree with the words of the Councils and of sacred Scripture cited above. For if, when they say that through sin man was changed for the worse in soul and body, they are not speaking of man by comparison with the state of pure nature, it would follow that man received no wound in himself through sin and was not left half dead, as Scripture signifies. For in pure nature man would truly have no wound and would not be called half dead, although there would be in him rebellion of the sensitive appetite and a struggle between flesh and spirit arising from human nature itself.

Moreover, as will be clear below, free choice in fallen nature does not have the same natural powers for the good that it would have had if it had been created in pure nature. For in fallen nature, without the help of grace, it cannot elicit any act of love of God above all things as the author of nature, whereas it could elicit such an act if man had been created in pure nature, as will be clear below. Therefore, through sin man was changed for the worse not only with respect to the state he had in intact nature, but also with respect to the state he would have had if he had been created in pure nature.

IV. The conclusion is proved thirdly. For the natural inclination to the good of reason proportionate to human nature is diminished by sin, as St. Thomas teaches in I–II, q. 85, arts. 1 and 2, as do Cajetan and Conrad there, Capreolus in 2 Sentences, dist. 24, single question, art. 1, conclusion 3; Ferrariensis, Against the Gentiles, book 3, chapter 12; Alexander of Hales, Summa, part 2, q. 94, member 8, art. 4, in the body and in reply to objection 2; Richard in 2 Sentences, dist. 35, around the second principal point, qq. 1 and 2; and Gregory in the same distinction, single question, art. 1, reply to objection 6, against the first conclusion.⁶ Reason supports this: the aptitude of a natural power for the good, or for the exercise of good acts, is diminished by sin, because by reason of it the power is made less ready to do good than it would be if it had committed no sin; experience itself teaches us this. Therefore, through original sin man is placed in a worse state with regard to this sort of inclination and natural propensity toward the good of virtue than he would be in pure nature, if he had been created in that state.

To the argument of Pelagius made at the beginning, St. Augustine replies in On Nature and Grace, chapter 20, that just as abstaining from food is not a substance, and yet the substance of the body, if it abstains from food altogether, grows weak, is impaired by an imbalance of health, is drained of strength, weakened by fatigue, and broken down, so sin, although it is not a substance, could weaken human nature, diminish its powers, and make it infirm.

Secondly, it is replied that although original sin is not formally something positive but privative, as was said above, actual sin is formally something positive and causes in the soul a habit of vice contrary to the habit of virtue. In this respect too it can diminish the natural powers of human nature and weaken it, so that it cannot by itself accomplish the works of sound nature unless it is divinely helped and healed by grace.

To the first argument brought forward in favor of the Catholic opinion, it is replied that St. Thomas expressly teaches our opinion in the places cited above, and does not say the contrary in the passage drawn from the First Part. For there he does not say that natural endowments remained wholly intact in men or demons after sin; he says only that they remained intact if the subject is the first good of nature, which is to be, to live, and to understand. For thus he explains Dionysius in his reply to objection 1 of the same article.⁷ And by this the confirmation is answered.

Secondly, it is replied that in demons there is no concupiscence or disorder of the sensitive appetite, as there is in fallen man, since there is no sensitive appetite in angels. Hence, in this respect, man can be more wounded in his natural endowments by sin than the devil.

V. To the second argument, the antecedent is denied, because in fallen nature the absence of grace and original justice has not only the character of punishment but truly the character of guilt, through which human nature remains wounded and unable to perform perfect good works, even natural ones, such as loving God above all things without qualification and resisting more serious temptations.⁸ For these and similar things man cannot accomplish in fallen nature, even for a short time, unless he is healed and helped by grace; yet in pure nature he could have elicited one or another purely natural act of love of God above all things by the powers of nature, and could have resisted more serious temptations for a short time, as will be clear below.

To the third argument it is replied that man in fallen nature and in pure nature do indeed differ as a naked man and a man who has been stripped; but they differ not only in this, but also because in fallen nature, by the very fact that he has been stripped through sin, man has suffered many wounds in his natural endowments that he would not have had in pure nature.

To the fourth argument, the antecedent is denied. To the proof, it is replied that the rational power of human nature cannot be diminished intrinsically and entitatively by destruction of some degree of that power; yet it can be diminished by the addition of an impediment, such as sin, or by a contrary inclination toward sins, which inclination is generated by evil acts.⁹ For it is necessary that, from the fact that something is inclined toward one of two contraries, its inclination toward the other is diminished. Since, then, sin is contrary to virtue, by the very fact that man sins the good of nature, which is inclination toward virtue, is diminished, as St. Thomas teaches in I–II, q. 85, art. 1, in the body.

VI. To the first confirmation, it is replied with St. Thomas that this objection proceeds when diminution occurs through subtraction.¹⁰ But through sin the natural inclination to the good is not diminished by subtraction, but by the addition of an impediment, which neither takes away nor diminishes the root of the inclination. Since sin does not diminish rational nature itself, it cannot diminish the root of the natural inclination to the good, which is identical with nature itself. Therefore this sort of inclination is diminished only on the side of its term, insofar, that is, as through sin an impediment to reaching the term is posited, as St. Thomas explains in the body of the same article. Hence, however infinitely sins may be multiplied, the natural inclination of the person to the good of reason cannot be wholly destroyed. The same solution is pursued by the holy Doctor in 1. p. q. 48. ar. 4, reply to objection 3.

But an argument presses against this solution: so many impediments can be added and so many sins multiplied that the natural inclination of human nature toward virtue can not only act with greater difficulty in an act of virtue, but also be wholly unable to do so. Therefore such a natural inclination can be wholly destroyed through the multiplication of sins. The consequence is proved: for by the same reasoning that the natural inclination to the good can be diminished through the addition of an impediment, so that it can exercise a good act only with difficulty, impediments could be multiplied to such a degree that it could not issue into a good act at all. The consequence is denied in reply, and the reason for the distinction is this: for the natural inclination to the good to be diminished, it suffices that it be made in some way less, whether this happens intrinsically through subtraction or extrinsically through the addition of an impediment; but for it to be wholly destroyed, the entire entity of that same inclination must perish.

VII. To the second confirmation, it is replied that acts of the virtues, insofar as they generate a habit by which the power is perfected with respect to acts of the virtues, in a certain way increase its inclination.

To the fifth argument, it is replied that actual mortal sin wounds intellectual nature by diminishing its inclination toward the good through the addition of a contrary inclination, even if it is a sin of omission, since in its exercise it is never found without any act at all.¹¹ Original sin, however, wounds in natural endowments by removing original justice and the other gifts by which the lower powers were kept under the bridle of reason, and insofar as by that same sin the intellectual creature is turned away from its ultimate end, and consequently rendered unable to perform the most perfect acts of that same nature, such as the love of God above all things as the natural end. Thus actual sin wounds man in his natural endowments by inducing a positive inclination of vice, contrary to the inclination of virtue; original sin, however, wounds in natural endowments by taking away from the rational powers the gifts by which they were kept in order, and by introducing a stain into the soul and turning it away from its ultimate end, as was said. See M. Soto, On Nature and Grace, book 1, chapter 14.