De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether Adam's children contract through seminal propagation original sin, which truly and properly has the character of guilt in them.

I. CONCERNING this difficulty, there were certain Jews before the coming of our Savior who asserted that circumcision had not been instituted by God as a remedy for original sin, but to mark his people and distinguish them from other nations. They proved this from Genesis 17:¹ You shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, etc., so that it may be a sign of the covenant; and consequently they denied original sin. After the Gospel had been promulgated, the first heretic expressly to deny original sin was Pelagius, together with his associate Caelestius, as St. Augustine reports. Julian the Pelagian followed the same error in the four books he wrote against original sin, as the same St. Augustine reports.² But thereafter this heresy lay silent for very many years; around the year of our Lord 600, however, the Armenians revived the same error, which Augustine had buried, as Guido the Carmelite reports.³ St. Antoninus also attributes this error to the Albigensians, in part 4, title 11, chapter 7, § 5. Then, around the year of our Lord 1520, Jacobus Faber Stapulensis asserted in his commentary on Romans 5 that infants contract nothing from Adam. Other heretics, however, called Sacramentarians, while admitting the contagion of original sin contracted from the first parent through seminal propagation, asserted that it is not properly sin and does not merit any punishment, not even the punishment of loss; rather, it is a certain sickness and misery, just as it is misery and not guilt that a man is born leprous or a slave. Zwingli and Johannes Oecolampadius held the same view. St. Augustine presents and refutes the arguments of these heretics in the passages cited below.⁴ We, however, shall bring forward only those arguments that present greater difficulty.

The first argument is Julian's against St. Augustine. What belongs to the nature of sin is that it be voluntary; but in infants, before the use of reason, there is nothing voluntary, nor can there be; therefore there is no sin either. If it is said that original sin is voluntary for infants, not by their own actual will, but by the will of the first parent, which in some way was the will of all infants, since Adam existed as their head, there is an argument against this: original sin truly turns the infant's very will away from God and turns it toward a changeable good; therefore the will of the first parent, and his sin, do not suffice for infants to contract any sin. The consequence is proved: for that will and the sin of the first parent place nothing intrinsic in the infant's will, but stand wholly external to it; therefore it is impossible that, on account of them, the infant's will be said to be turned away intrinsically.

This is confirmed, and the force of the argument is shown. The external executive powers, since they do not have any will in themselves, but their acts are called voluntary only by an extrinsic denomination from the will in the soul's interior power, are capable of no sin except by an extrinsic denomination alone. Therefore, in like manner, the infant's will, since it has no actual freedom, will be said to contract or have original sin only by an extrinsic denomination.

Second. No one gives what he does not have. But Adam no longer has original sin; likewise, the proximate parents, if they have been baptized, do not have original sin. Therefore they do not transmit it to their descendants.

Third. The conjugal act is in itself lawful and sometimes meritorious; therefore original sin is not transmitted through it. The consequence is clear: for if it were transmitted through that act, then such an act would be a cause of sin and consequently sin. This argument too belongs to Julian and Pelagius.

Fourth, Pelagius argues thus in Augustine's Letter 156. The rational soul is not derived by propagation, since it is created by God; therefore it does not contract original sin. For it is unjust that a soul produced today, not from Adam's mass, should bear so ancient an alien sin; therefore there is no reason to concede that God, who forgives one's own sins, imputes those of others. Since, then, sin is primarily in the soul itself and not in the flesh, it follows that Adam's children contract absolutely no sin of nature.

II. Fifth. Adam does not transmit original sin to his descendants morally, that is, by way of merit, nor as an efficient cause, that is, in the manner of a physical cause; therefore he transmits it in no way, and consequently Adam's children do not contract original sin from him. The consequence is proved because there can be no other way in which Adam could transmit original sin to his children. The antecedent is proved as to its first part: just as Adam's demerit arose from his sin, so too, had he persevered, his merit would have arisen from grace and original justice, which was a gift bestowed upon the whole of human nature in Adam. But if Adam had persevered in original justice, he would not have transmitted it to his descendants by way of merit; otherwise grace and original justice would not be given to infants purely as a free gift, but on account of Adam's merits, which seems contrary to grace itself. For if it is by grace, it is no longer from works; otherwise grace is no longer grace, as the Apostle argues in Romans 11. Therefore Adam does not transmit original sin to his children by way of demerit, or as a moral cause. That he does not transmit it as a physical cause is proved as follows: what does not exist actually or virtually does not act physically; but Adam and his sin do not exist actually, as is evident in itself, nor do they remain virtually. For if they did remain, it would be especially in the seed; but there no power that causes original sin remains. Therefore.

This is confirmed. Original sin is not formally something positive, but privative; therefore it has no positive physical cause. For a privation, since it is not a being, cannot have a physical cause. Therefore Adam cannot be the physical cause of the transmission of original sin.

Sixth. Original sin is not transmitted through seminal propagation as through an instrument; therefore it is not transmitted from Adam in any way. The consequence is proved: for if it were transmitted, it would be necessary to assign some means, or instrument, through which it is transmitted; but no other means can be assigned except seminal propagation. The antecedent is proved as follows: an instrument acts through some power communicated to it by the principal agent; but the seed separated from Adam himself, or seminal propagation, has no real power communicated to it by Adam himself by which it could concur instrumentally in transmitting original sin, together with human nature, to descendants. Therefore.

III. Seventh. No instant can be assigned at which Adam's children contract original sin; therefore they do not contract it. The antecedent is proved because they do not contract this sin at the instant when the rational soul is created by God; otherwise the soul itself would have sin from its creation, and thus the same sin would be attributed to God. For this reason St. Thomas teaches that it was impossible for an angel to have sinned by a disordered act of free choice in the first instant of his creation: that sin would be attributed to God, since an operation that begins at the same time as a thing's existence comes to it from the agent from whom it has its existence, just as upward motion comes to fire from the one who generates it.⁵ Adam's children do not contract original sin at the instant when the soul is united to the body either, because sin is not derived from the body into the soul, since the immediate subject of that sin is not the body but the soul or a rational power. Therefore no instant can be assigned at which Adam's children contract original sin; therefore they do not contract it.

Among Catholics, however, Jerome Osorius, in book 7 of On Justice, and Ambrosius Catherinus, in his short work On Original Sin, chapters 5 and 6, while admitting original sin, said that infants are constituted sinners by an extrinsic denomination, through the sin that preceded in Adam. In favor of this opinion there is

The seventh argument, from the Apostle in Romans 5, who says: Through the offense of one, many were constituted sinners. These words seem to signify that all men are formally constituted sinners by the offense of the first parent. But Adam's offense cannot denominate his children sinners except by an extrinsic denomination, because sin denominates intrinsically only the subject in which it exists. Therefore, etc.

Finally, other Catholics, although they admit with all theologians that original sin is proper to each person, and intrinsically denominates and constitutes Adam's children as sinners, nevertheless assert that infants who die without the laver of regeneration will, after Judgment Day, when their souls have been restored to their bodies, be supernaturally freed from all the troubles and hardships to which we are subject in this mortal life, and will lead through everlasting ages a better life in natural things, free of every defect of mind and body, than any mortal has ever led. Ambrosius Catherinus seems to suggest this opinion in his commentary on chapter 3 of the First Epistle of St. Peter. It will, however, be treated expressly in Disputation 114.

On the contrary, the Apostle says: All sinned in Adam;⁶ from this testimony the sacred Councils, supreme Pontiffs, and holy Doctors to be cited below infer that all who descend from Adam through seminal propagation contract original sin along with their nature.

IV. To explain this difficulty, note first that original sin is called the sin of nature, according to Ephesians 2: We were by nature children of wrath, because it corrupted and defiled the whole mass of human nature in the first parent, who was the head and source from whom human nature is derived into others.⁷ It is also called the sin of the world, in John 1: Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who takes away the sins of the world, because it invaded all men, excepting one who is God and man, through whom the others were to be redeemed. Hence St. Jerome calls it the sin of the human condition. For, explaining Psalm 50, Behold, I was conceived in iniquities, and my mother conceived me in sins, he says: Not in the iniquities of my mother, or at any rate in my own, but in the iniquities of the human condition.⁸ St. Chrysostom calls it radical sin, because from original sin, when the bridle of original justice had been removed, there followed disordered concupiscence and desire, which, as the Apostle says, is the root of all evils.⁹ Hence original sin was also in a certain way the root and beginning of all sins, and for this reason it is not inappropriately called radical sin. Thus the same Chrysostom, in his homily on Adam and Eve: From that very, he says, sin of transgression all sins spring forth. When, therefore, man is said to be handed over to his desires, he is guilty by that very descent, because, abandoned by God, he yields to his desires, consents, is overcome, captured, dragged along, and possessed.

Second, note that this is the difference between original sin and the actual sin of a private person: actual sin is committed by the sinner's own will, and hence cannot be transferred to another.¹⁰ For Ezekiel says: The soul that sins shall itself die; the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, and the father shall not bear the iniquity of the son; the justice of the just shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him.¹¹ But original sin, since it is a sin of nature, does not require the proper and particular will of the one who contracts it; the will of the first parent suffices. For the will of the head is reckoned as the will of the whole of human nature and of all who by origin share human nature from him, as St. Thomas very aptly observed.

V. Third, note that, as Master Soto observes, when an infant is conceived in the womb and a soul is infused into him, he is not properly said to sin at that instant, but to be conceived in sin, or to contract sin along with a corrupted nature.¹² For, properly speaking, all Adam's children sinned originally at the instant when Adam himself sinned actually, by eating from the forbidden tree, in accordance with what the Apostle says: All sinned in Adam.¹³¹⁴ For Adam's sin was not only a sin of a person but also of nature.

Fourth, note that infected human nature stands in one way with respect to Adam, or his sin, and in another way with respect to Adam's children and the original sin they contract. In Adam, the person was first infected by actual sin before nature was infected, because the contagion passed from the person into nature.¹⁵ Hence this causal statement is true: because Adam was infected by actual sin, human nature was stained in him. With respect to his children, however, the matter stands conversely. For nature itself is understood to have been corrupted before the person is understood to have been stained by original sin, because original sin passes from corrupted nature into the persons descended from Adam. These foundations being supposed, let there be

VI. First Conclusion. In accordance with the Catholic faith, it must be asserted that infants descended from Adam through seminal propagation contract original sin.¹⁶ This conclusion is against all the heretics cited above. It is nevertheless proved by the clearest testimonies of sacred Scripture, drawn from both the Old and the New Testament. The first testimony is found in Genesis 17: A male whose foreskin has not been circumcised his soul shall be cut off from his people, because he has broken my covenant. Here circumcision is declared necessary for infants for the remission of sin, lest they perish forever on account of having broken God's covenant. From this testimony St. Augustine argues thus against the Pelagians: Infants did not break God's covenant through actual sin, because, since they have no use of free choice, they cannot commit actual sin; therefore they broke God's covenant through original sin; therefore they contract it by origin.¹⁷ It should incidentally be noted that the infant himself is said to have broken that covenant which the Lord made with Adam, saying: On whatever day you eat of it, you shall surely die;¹⁸ for he truly and properly sinned in Adam and in him broke that covenant of the Lord.

The second testimony is found in Psalm 50, where the royal Prophet, in the name of all who descend from Adam, says: For behold, I was conceived in iniquities, and my mother conceived me in sins. From this passage nearly all the Fathers, both Greek and Latin, prove that our conclusion is of the faith. Among the Greeks, above all, are Origen, Homily 8 on Leviticus; Basil the Great in his scholia on Psalm 50; and Chrysostom in his homily on Adam and Eve. Hesychius, book 3 on Leviticus, chapter 12, observes that by these words he accuses no sin of his own mother, but names the maternal nature, signifying that the uncleanness of the sin of Adam and Eve descended upon the whole human race. Euthymius explains the same passage in the same sense in his commentary on that Psalm. Among the Latin Fathers are St. Hilary, on Psalm 118, at the words My soul shall live and shall praise you; Ambrose, book 1 of On Penance, chapter 2; Jerome, on chapter 47 of Ezekiel, whose words we cited above; Rufinus, on Psalm 50; Bede, on chapter 21 of Leviticus; Innocent III, book 1 of On Contempt of the World, chapter 3; and Gregory the Great, on the fourth penitential Psalm.

VII. The third testimony is found in Ecclesiasticus 40: A heavy yoke is upon the sons of Adam from the day they leave their mother's womb until the day they are buried in the mother of all. Explaining this passage, St. Augustine: What is this, he says, heavy yoke, if not sin? And why is it called a yoke, if not because it comes from the two, Adam and Eve? Or does it press and crush the necks of the two, that is, of male and female, that is, of evil and impious persons, since it is a yoke upon both sexes? Therefore he says generally, “A heavy yoke is upon the sons of Adam.” By saying “upon the sons,” he made no distinction of ages or sexes; and by comparing the yoke to sin, on account of Christ, who, unlike the others, was not born through the intercourse of married people, he showed that all the rest were sinners. Bound by this yoke, that is, original sin, old and young, born of that very defect, we drag it as a plow for as long as we are in the body of death, by the plowshare of whose desire our earth is broken up, that is, corrupted.¹⁹²⁰ Many other holy Doctors also infer from this same passage that infants contract original sin.

The fourth and most important testimony, drawn from the New Testament, is found in John 3, where Truth himself says: Unless someone is born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God. St. Augustine often triumphs over the Pelagians by this testimony, showing that infants contract original sin from Adam and, unless they are freed from it by the laver of regeneration, will remain forever excluded from the kingdom of heaven. He treats this matter at great length in several places, but especially in book 6 of On Baptism against the Donatists, chapter 12; book 1 of On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, chapters 17, 20, 29, and 30; and book 2, chapter 27. Pelagius replied to this argument that infants are indeed baptized, but not as a remedy for any original sin; rather, they are baptized so that they may be admitted with Christ into God's kingdom.

But St. Augustine's argument against the Pelagians defeats this evasion. Unbaptized infants remain excluded from the kingdom of God, as Pelagius admits; therefore they are excluded on account of some sin. For in fact no one is excluded from God's kingdom except for sin, as St. Thomas shows in Against the Gentiles, book 4, chapter 50. But they are not excluded on account of actual sin; therefore they are excluded on account of original sin.²¹

VIII. Some of the Pelagians replied that infants who die without baptism will remain excluded from the kingdom of God, not on account of any original sin they contracted or actual sin they committed, but on account of the mortal sins they would have committed had they lived. They seemed to gather « ? » this solution for themselves²² from Wisdom 4: He was taken away lest malice change his understanding, and lest deceit beguile his soul.²³ But St. Augustine attacks this solution in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 14, showing that the authority drawn from Wisdom 4 is to be understood not with respect to foreknowledge but with respect to the dangers of life, as was said in Disputation 7. It is further refuted as follows: God does not condemn anyone on account of sins he would have committed, but on account of those he in fact commits or contracts. Otherwise, if unbaptized infants are damned on account of sins they would have committed had they lived, many of them would also be saved on account of the merits they would have had through God's grace had they lived, or on account of the baptism they would have received had they been born from their mother's womb.

The fifth testimony is found in Romans 5: Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death, and so death passed into all men, in whom all sinned. From this passage St. Chrysostom, in his homily on Adam and Eve, Theodoret in his commentary on Psalm 50, St. Augustine in book 1 of On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, chapter 9; book 4 of Against the Two Letters of the Pelagians, chapter 4; book 1 of Against Julian the Pelagian, chapter 2; and book 6, chapter 12; St. Prosper in book 3 of On the Contemplative Life, chapter 12; and the Master of the Sentences, book 2, distinction 3, prove our conclusion as a matter of faith.

Second, the conclusion is proved by the authority of the supreme Pontiffs, especially Celestine's letter to Nestorius, where he praises him for holding a correct view of the defect of our origin and for not denying that nature itself is bound by guilt. Likewise, Leo the Great, in letter 86 to Nicetas, teaches that baptism benefits all as a remedy for original sin; and Leo IX, in his letter to Bishop Peter, says: I believe and preach that the soul is not a part of God, but is created from nothing and, without baptism, is liable to original sin.

IX. Third, it is proved by the definition of Councils. For the Council of Milevis, canon 2, as quoted in On Consecration, distinction 4, says: It was also decided that whoever denies that infants newly born from their mothers' wombs are to be baptized, or says that they are indeed baptized for the remission of sins but contract from Adam no original sin to be cleansed by the laver of regeneration, so that the form of baptism “for the remission of sins” is consequently understood in them as not true but false, let him be anathema. For what the Apostle says, “Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death, and so it passed into all men, in whom all sinned,” is to be understood in no other way than as the Catholic Church, spread everywhere, has always understood it. For on account of this rule of faith, even infants, who could not yet commit any sins in themselves, are truly baptized for the remission of sins, so that what they contracted by generation may be cleansed in them by regeneration.²⁴²⁵ The Council of Orange, canon 2, says: If anyone asserts that Adam's transgression harmed only himself and not his descendants, or testifies that only bodily death, which is the punishment of sin, and not also sin, which is the death of the soul, passed through one man into the whole human race, he will do an injustice to God, contradicting the Apostle who says, “Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death passed into all men, in whom all sinned.”²⁶²⁷

Fourth, it is proved by the authority of the ancient Fathers, who infer this same truth from sacred Scripture. Origen is especially notable in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, chapter 6, where he speaks as follows: In the law it is commanded that, for one who has been born, a pair of turtledoves or two young pigeons be offered, one for sin and the other as a burnt offering. For what sin is this one young bird offered? Could he have sinned just now? And yet he has sin, on account of which a sacrifice is commanded to be offered, and from which no one is said to be clean, even if his life should be but one day? From Homily 8 on Leviticus 1: Every soul that is born in the flesh is stained by the filth of iniquity and sin. Justin Martyr teaches the same truth in his Dialogue with Trypho; as do Irenaeus, book 5, chapters 17 and 19; Athanasius, On the Incarnation of the Word; Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis 2; Basil the Great, on Psalm 32, explaining The earth is full of the mercy of the Lord, and on Psalm 50, at For behold, I was conceived in iniquities; Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 42 on holy Easter and Oration 38 on the Nativity of Christ; Chrysostom, in his homily on Adam and Eve, where he proves it with many scriptural testimonies; Cyril of Alexandria, book 1 on Genesis; Theodoret, on Psalm 50, at For behold, I was conceived in iniquities; John Damascene, book 2 of The Orthodox Faith, chapter 28; and many other Greek Fathers.

X. The Latin Fathers too unanimously taught the same faith: Cyprian, letter 59; Hilary of Poitiers, on Psalm 118; Ambrose, book On Tobit, chapter 9, and on Psalm 48, where, explaining The iniquity of my heel shall surround me, One thing is, he says, our iniquity; another is the iniquity of our heel: in that heel Adam was wounded by the serpent's tooth, and by his wound left behind an inheritance of guilt for human succession, so that we all limp from that wound.²⁸ He says the same in book 1 of On Penance, chapter 2. Also Jerome, on chapter 42 of Ezekiel; Augustine, book 14 of The City of God, chapter 1, and letter 89; St. Prosper, response 1 to the chapters of Vincent's objections and book 3 of On the Contemplative Life, chapter 2; Fulgentius, On the Grace of Jesus Christ, chapter 31, and On the Faith to Peter, chapter 26; St. Gregory, on the fourth penitential Psalm; Bede, on chapter 21 of Leviticus and on chapter 9 of Mark; St. Bernard, on Wednesday of Holy Week, on the Passion of the Lord; and the Master of the Sentences, book 2, distinction 30, letter I, together with all the Scholastics on the same distinction. Jodocus Coccius reports the words of these authors in The Catholic Treasury, volume 2, book 2, article 2, on original sin; some of the same testimonies are also reported by Brother Peter Crespetius Caelestinus in The Summary of the Catholic Faith, under the entry “Sin.”

Fifth, the conclusion is proved by reason: in every law, even the law of nature, some remedy was always instituted for erasing original sin, as the theologians prove with St. Thomas in part 3, question 61, articles 3 and 4. Therefore all Adam's children truly contract original sin.

This is first confirmed by the reasoning of the Councils of Toledo and Trent. For if there is in infants no original sin to be erased by baptism, it follows that the form of baptism is false. For it means that the baptized person is washed by baptism from the stain of sin. Therefore, if there is in infants no original sin, it follows that the form of baptism is false.

This is confirmed, secondly. One who is baptized dies to sin through baptism, as St. Augustine elegantly proves in lib. 6. cont. Iulianum, cap. 1., ex illo ad Rom. 6: All we who have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized in his death; for we have been buried with him through baptism into death, so that, just as Christ rose from the dead, we too may walk in newness of life. Therefore, if infants are baptized, they die to sin; therefore, before baptism they were in original sin.

XI. Sixth, it is proved as follows. It is of the faith that Christ the Lord is the Redeemer of all, as is clear from the Apostle's words: Who is the Redeemer of all, especially of the faithful;²⁹ and the Evangelist John says: He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world;³⁰ therefore it is of the faith that Christ truly redeemed all infants, some as regards sufficiency, namely, those to whom the sacrament of baptism was not applied, and others as regards efficacy, namely, those who in fact received baptism. But no one can truly be called redeemed unless he was previously captive through sin, as Pope Zosimus defines in these words: For no one is made free except one who is a slave to sin, nor can anyone be called redeemed unless he was truly captive through sin before, as it is written: “If the Son sets you free, you will be free indeed.”³¹ Since, then, infants who die before the use of reason were not captive through actual sin, it follows that they were bound by original sin.

This is confirmed by the reasoning of St. Augustine, lib. 6. contra Iulianum, cap. 2. et 4., where he argues thus. The Apostle says in 2. ad Corinth. 5: If one died for all, then all died; and Christ died for all. Therefore all died. But Christ died for infants, since he redeemed them; therefore they were dead through sin; therefore they were at some time in sin, not actual sin, and therefore original sin.

XII. Nor should we listen to certain most foolish Pelagians who, denying original sin in infants, asserted that they commit I know not what actual sins as soon as they are born from the womb. St. Augustine rebukes them, saying: Behold, infants are certainly innocent in their own works, having with them nothing but what they drew from the first man. For this reason they need the grace of Christ, so that in Christ those who died in Adam may be made alive; so that, because they were defiled by generation, they may be cleansed by regeneration.³²³³ I will therefore call them as witnesses themselves: answer me, why do they die, if all men are born immortal? And is it because they sin that they die? What do you think could have been said? What ears could bear the words? Did they sin too? Where did they sin, I ask; when did they sin, how did they sin? They do not know what good and evil are. Do those who cannot grasp a commandment receive sin? Prove to me that infants are sinners. What did you say? Truly, you have forgotten what you once were: prove the sin of infants to me. Is it because they cry that they sin? Because by movements like those of dumb animals they ward off discomforts and take pleasures, do they therefore sin? If those movements are sins, there are greater sinners at baptism, since they resist most vehemently while being baptized. Why is sin not imputed to them in such resistance, unless because the choice of the will is not yet present? But I say something else. These who have been born, you think, have sinned; for you say that if they had not sinned, they would not die. What do you say about those who die in the womb? A difficulty! “They too,” you say, “have sinned; that is why they die.” Are you lying, or mistaken? The Apostle says the opposite: “Not yet born, nor having done anything good or evil.” I listen to the Apostle rather than to you; I believe the Apostle rather than you: “Not yet born, nor having done anything good or evil.” But if you reject this testimony, dare instead to go on to those wanderings and say that they sinned in heaven and are cast down from there into bodies. St. Thomas adduces other reasons for this conclusion 4. cont. Gent. cap. 50; Ferrariensis and Master Soto, book 1 of On Nature and Grace, chapter 7, should be consulted there.

Second Conclusion. Original sin is not merely a certain misery, like the bondage of a slave, but is truly and properly sin and guilt.³⁴ This conclusion is against the heretical Armentarians³⁵ cited above, but it is proved by the arguments given for the preceding conclusion.

Moreover, original sin causes a stain in the soul and constitutes men children of wrath, according to ad Ephes. 2: We were by nature children of wrath. Finally, it excludes man from the kingdom of God, as is clear from the authority of Ioan. 3, cited above. Therefore it is truly sin and not merely misery. The consequence is clear, for man is excluded from the kingdom of God only on account of sin, as St. Thomas proves 4. cont. Gent. cap. 50..

XIII. Third Conclusion. Original sin does not constitute infants sinners by an extrinsic denomination, as though original sin itself had existed previously only in Adam and his children were formally called sinners on his account. Rather, in each infant there is a proper original sin contracted from the first parent and existing in them, through which they are formally sinners and enemies of God.³⁶ This conclusion is against Jerome Osorius and Ambrosius Catherinus in the passages cited above. Nevertheless, it is so certain that it cannot be denied after the Council of Trent. For in sess. 5. in decreto de peccato originali, can. 3, it is defined as follows: If anyone asserts that this sin of Adam, which is one in origin and is transmitted to all by propagation, not by imitation, and is inherent in each as his own, is removed either by the powers of human nature or by any other remedy than the merit of the one mediator, our Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema. There the term inest, “is present,” indicates an intrinsic denomination.

Moreover, it is proved by reason. Infants are truly cleansed by baptism from the stain of sin, as is clear from ad Ephes. 5: Cleansing her by the laver in the word of life. Therefore they had in themselves original sin, contracted from the first parent.

Second, it is proved as follows: Adam's sin stands in relation to sinners born from Adam by carnal generation as Christ's justice stands in relation to the just, spiritually reborn, as is clear from the Apostle's words: As all die in Adam, so also all will be made alive in Christ;³⁷ and in ad Rom. 5: As through the disobedience of one man many were constituted sinners, so through the obedience of one many will be constituted just.³⁸ But those reborn from Christ the Lord are not formally just merely by an extrinsic denomination through the justice that is in Christ; rather, they are just through grace and justice inhering in them, as defined by the Conc. Trid. sess. 6. de iustificatione can. 10, where it anathematizes anyone who says that men are justified without the justice of Christ, by which he merited for us, or that they are formally just by that very justice. Therefore, in like manner, infants are formally sinners through original guilt existing in them, and they are not called children of wrath merely by an extrinsic denomination from the sin that preceded in the first parent.

XIV. Fourth Conclusion. Infants who die without the laver of regeneration, when their souls have been restored to their bodies, will not be supernaturally freed from all misery; nor will they lead through everlasting ages a better life in natural things, free of every defect of mind and body, than any mortal has ever led.³⁹ St. Augustine proves this conclusion; his words have been cited and will be examined in Disputation 114, where the conclusion will be expressly disputed.⁴⁰

XV. TO the first of the arguments made at the beginning, it is answered from the foundations laid down that original sin is voluntary for infants by the will of the first parent, insofar as he was the head of the whole nature corrupted in him; and this voluntary character suffices for original sin.⁴¹ The reason is that original sin, insofar as it is original, is not a sin of a person but of nature. Hence it is not required that it be contracted by the proper will of the person who is born; the voluntary character that preceded in the head of the whole nature suffices. As to the argument that this will is external to infants, the reply is that it is external to them if they are considered as particular persons in themselves, but not if they are considered as members of Adam and parts of a corrupted nature; for in this respect they constitute one with Adam. An example is a man who, by his will, moves his sensitive appetite to an act of intemperance. That will is external to the man's sensitive appetite considered in itself, but is not external to it insofar as it is the sensitive appetite of a man; for the will is the inclination of the whole human supposit, and consequently of all its parts insofar as they are its parts. Accordingly, a vice and a virtue are found intrinsically in the sensitive appetite, even if in the appetite itself there is not formally any voluntary character proper to the appetite, but only a voluntary character participated from the will, which is the inclination of the whole supposit. The same, then, must proportionally be said of infants, who by generation contract a sin proper and intrinsic to themselves, although they have no other voluntary character than that of the first parent, who was the head of the whole nature. For that voluntary character is reckoned as the infant's, as was said.

To the confirmation, it is answered that the case of infants with respect to original sin is not altogether the same as that of the external executive powers with respect to actual sin. The difference is this: external powers are not capable of a virtue or vice inhering in themselves, as S. Tho. shows in 1. 2. q. 50. ar. 1. and Cajetan and Master Medina there. Such powers are determined to one thing and have no proper motion of their own by which they could resist the motion of the will; consequently, they are not perfected through habits. For, as Aristot. says in 2. Ethic. c. 1., things determined to one do not become accustomed through habits and virtues. Infants, however, are a subject capable of vice and virtue. Hence, although before the use of reason they cannot have an actual sin intrinsic to themselves, they can nevertheless contract an original sin proper to themselves.⁴²

To the second, it is answered that the proposition “No one gives what he does not have” is to be understood thus: no one gives what he does not have actually or virtually. The sun produces heat, which it does not have formally in act, but has virtually.⁴³ Therefore baptized parents communicate original sin to their children: although they do not have original sin actually, they do have it virtually in the seed and in the concupiscence of corrupted nature.

Second, a reply is given by the solution of S. Aug. lib. 2. de peccatorum meritis, et remis. cap. 9. et lib. 3. cap. 8. et 9.. Baptized and holy parents do not beget children insofar as they are holy and baptized; for as such they are not children of Adam but of God, since their sanctification does not come from having been born of Adam, but from being reborn of God through grace, according to Ioan. 1: Who were born not of bloods, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. They therefore beget children who are children of Adam, from whom they received a corrupted nature, and in this corrupted state transmit it to their descendants. It is like a golden or silver vessel that receives corrupted and muddy water from a spring and communicates it, also corrupted, to others. This can also be illustrated more clearly by another example used by St. Augustine himself. Wheat, when cleaned through human care, produces more wheat that is not cleaned but wrapped in chaff and awns, because the sown wheat was born in the same way. Proportionally, since the proximate parents were born from Adam with original sin, even if they were cleansed from it through baptism or penance, they nevertheless later beget children infected with the original sin in which they themselves were born.

XVI. To the third argument, which Augustine discusses in many places, it is answered that the deformity of original sin follows from carnal generation, not in itself as generation, nor insofar as it proceeds from proximate parents, but insofar as it is referred back to the first parent, who sinned voluntarily and by sinning infected the whole of human nature.⁴⁴ Hence the defect of original sin must be attributed to the first parent and not to proximate parents, just as we said above in disp. 18. et 24. that the defect and evil that follow upon an act of sin are attributed to the deficient cause, namely, the human will, and not to God. For although that defect follows upon the act of sin, it does not follow from it insofar as it is an act or insofar as it is from God, but insofar as it proceeds from a created will that is deficient.

But there is an argument against this. It follows at least that whenever any infant contracts original sin, Adam sins. The proof is that Adam is the principal cause inducing original sin in infants; therefore Adam sins whenever anyone proceeds from him by carnal propagation.

It is answered that when infants contract original sin, Adam does not sin; rather, all the malice of such original sins preceded in that actual sin by which he ate from the forbidden tree. For, as St. Thomas says in 2. 2. q. 163. ar. 3. ad 2, Adam's sin was most grave on account of the circumstance, or the harm of original sin, which he transmits to descendants.⁴⁵ St. Thomas explains this solution. It is certain that if someone inflicted a mortal wound on Peter, from which he later died, and then repented of that sin before Peter died, the killer would not commit a new sin at the instant Peter died; rather, all the malice of that external homicide preceded in the act that caused the subsequent death. The same, proportionally, must be said here of Adam's sin with respect to the death of infants.

XVII. If an argument is made that proximate parents can prevent infants from contracting original sin, since they can refrain from begetting them, yet do not prevent that sin, therefore they sin, the consequence is denied. They are not bound to prevent that sin. For in order for someone who does not prevent an evil to sin, it does not suffice that he be able to prevent it and does not do so; beyond this, it is required that he be bound to prevent it, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2. q. 6. ar. 3., and 2. 2. q. 79. ar. 3., in the body and reply to objection 2.⁴⁶

To the fourth argument, St. Augustine replies in the cited letter 156 that Pelagius should rather have asserted that the origin of the soul was unknown to him than denied that Adam's children contract original sin.⁴⁷

Second, it is answered that the soul is indeed produced by God alone through creation, as regards its existence, which it has independently of the body; in this respect it neither contracts nor can contract original sin, for otherwise that sin would be attributed to God. But if the rational soul is considered insofar as it is actually a part of human nature and the form of the body, then in this respect it does not come from God alone; rather, it also falls under the efficient causality of the man begetting the whole composite, through the power of the seed separated from the first parent, who sinned voluntarily. In this respect it contracts original sin along with nature. Therefore this sin and defect must be referred not to God but to a deficient secondary cause.

To the fifth, there are various ways of speaking.

The first is that of John Driedo, who asserts that Adam caused original sin in his children by way of nature, not by way of merit, or morally.⁴⁸ Other theologians, however, hold that original sin is transmitted from Adam to descendants both by way of merit and by way of an efficient cause.

XVIII. Their opinion is more reasonable and more in keeping with the mind of St. Thomas. Indeed, St. Thomas asserts that Adam was a meritorious cause of the transmission of original sin in 3. p. q. 19. ar. 4. in arg. sed contra, where he says that Adam's demerit is derived to his descendants and is the cause of their condemnation; from this he proves that Christ's merit benefits the justified.⁴⁹ Pope Leo holds the same opinion in serm. 5. de natali Domini, where he says that Adam, obeying the Devil to the point of transgression, merited that we all should die in him; but merit implies moral causality. The reasoning drawn from St. Thomas supports this: Adam's sin stands in relation to his children as Christ's justice stands in relation to the justified, as is clear from ad Rom. 5: As through the offense of one man there was condemnation for all men, so also through the justice of one there is justification for all men. But Christ's justice was the meritorious cause of our justification; therefore Adam's sin was the meritorious cause of original sin and of the condemnation of his children.

Moreover, one who commits some fault for which such-and-such a punishment has been established is the moral and meritorious cause of that punishment. But Adam committed a fault on account of which he and his children incurred the punishment of eternal death; therefore he is the moral cause of the transmission of original sin to his children, on account of which they incur that punishment.

This is confirmed: not only the death of the soul but also the original sin that Adam's children contract is a punishment for Adam's own actual sin. For original justice was given to him on this condition: if he kept God's commandment, he would transmit that justice to his children through carnal generation; otherwise he himself and his descendants would be deprived of that justice.

Finally, it is proved as follows. As St. Thomas says in 1. 2. q. 6. ar. 3., one who can and is bound to avoid something, but does not avoid it, is its moral cause and is judged indirectly to will it. But Adam could and was bound to prevent original sin in his children: for he could and was bound not to commit the actual sin from which original sin subsequently followed in his descendants, but he did not prevent it. Therefore.

That the first parent, or his sin, was also the physical and real cause of the transmission of original sin to descendants is proved as follows. Whatever is the physical and real cause of some quality to which the privation of another quality follows, is consequently and indirectly the physical cause of that privation, in the way in which privations have a cause. For one who causes whiteness in a subject consequently causes the privation of blackness. But the first parent was the real cause of a turning toward an object contrary to reason, by eating from the forbidden tree; and the privation of original justice followed upon that disordered turning, both in him and in the whole nature and in his children. Therefore.

Hence, to the objection raised against this in the fourth principal argument, it is answered that just as a man who is just and in a state of grace, if he sins, merits through his sin the loss of that grace (although he did not in any way merit its infusion by any act of his, since first grace is not subject to merit), so proportionally in the present case, although Adam's children remain deprived of original justice on account of Adam's demerit, just as he himself remained deprived, nevertheless, if Adam had persevered in that same justice, he would not have merited its transmission to his descendants. For from the beginning he received it from God as a free gift, without any preceding merits, for himself and his children. Hence, if Adam had persevered in original justice, his perseverance would only have been a condition without which original justice would not be transmitted to descendants; it would not properly have been a meritorious cause of that transmission. There is also another difference: the first root of good and merit comes from God and from his grace, whereas evil and demerit proceed from us alone, according to Oseae 13: Your evil is from you, Israel; only in me is your help. Therefore Adam could be the first moral and demeritorious cause of the transmission of original sin, but he would not have been the first or principal moral or meritorious cause of the transmission of original justice, even if he had persevered in grace.

If an argument is made against this that Adam was not the first moral head of human nature, but only its natural head, insofar as he physically generated and transmitted nature to his descendants by carnal generation, and therefore he did not morally transmit original sin, or transmit it by way of demerit, to his descendants but only by way of nature, it is answered that Adam had both roles: he was the natural head of the whole nature insofar as he really communicated human nature to all his children by carnal propagation, and he was its moral head insofar as by a moral and free act he stained the whole nature and merited that it be deprived of original justice. Hence he is the cause of original sin in both ways, morally and as an efficient or physical cause, which is the same thing.

To the other objection, which proves that Adam is not the physical cause of the transmission of original sin, it is answered that Adam and his sin remain in his descendants virtually, namely, in the seed separated from Adam, insofar as it has a relation to the tinder of corrupted nature. Through the power left in the seed, Adam transmits original sin to descendants along with nature as an efficient cause, as will be clear in the reply to the second argument.

XIX. To the confirmation, it is answered that it touches on the difficulty whether original sin, formally considered, is something positive or privative. Some have said that formally it is something positive, namely, a certain vicious and morbid quality inhering in corrupted nature, by which it is inclined toward a changeable good without the order of reason. This is held by William of Auxerre, who distinguishes a twofold morbid quality in original sin: one immediately in the soul, in which quality he teaches that original sin essentially consists; the other in the body, which consequently pertains to original sin as its effect.⁵⁰ The same opinion is defended by Henr. and Greg. Arim.; Gabriel says it is probable in 2. d. 30. q. 2. art. 2. concl. 2; and Driedo holds it in lib. 1. de gratia et libero arbitrio, tract. 3. cap. 3. p. 4.⁵¹ The chief foundations of this opinion are as follows. First, the Council of Trent, sess. 5. in decreto de peccato originali, can. 3., defines that original sin inheres in all; St. Thomas also teaches this in 1. 2. q. 82. ar. 3. But inherence is proper to a positive being; therefore.⁵² Second, St. Thomas says in that same art. 1.⁵³ that original sin is a habit, like sickness. But sickness is formally something positive, for it is placed in the category of quality and is opposed to health as its contrary, as can be seen in St. Thomas, q. 27. de verit. ar. 1. ad 4. Therefore. Third, St. Augustine says in lib. 5. contra Iulianum, cap. 3., that the soul in the flesh is corrupted like water in a corrupted vessel. But water is corrupted through a vicious quality that it contracts from the vessel; therefore. Fourth, actual sin of commission is formally something positive, because it essentially signifies a turning toward an object contrary to reason, from which it is specified, as the Thomists commonly teach with St. Thomas and Cajetan. But original sin likewise essentially signifies a turning toward an object contrary to reason and is specified by it, for aversion from an unchangeable good follows from a turning toward a changeable good. Since, then, in original sin there is an aversion from an unchangeable good, it must follow from a turning toward a changeable good contrary to reason, and be specified by that turning. Thus original sin will formally be something positive, just as actual sin is. Fifth, original sin is a sin of commission, not omission. For St. Thomas says in q. 5. de malo, ar. 1. ad 12., that original sin in infants is not one of omission but of commission; therefore it is formally something positive. The consequence is proved as follows: a sin of commission is against a negative precept, which is broken only through a positive act contrary to reason, as St. Thomas teaches in 2. 2. q. 79. ar. 2. 3. et 4. This is confirmed because the same St. Thomas says in q. 2. de malo, ar. 1. ad 4., that in a sin of omission, properly speaking, it is true that there is only a privation, but not so in a sin of transgression, or commission. Therefore, if original sin is a sin of transgression and commission, it will formally be something positive and not a pure privation. Sixth, original sin cannot formally consist in the privation of original justice; therefore it does not consist in any privation, and consequently it will formally be something positive. The consequence holds because no other privation can be assigned in which original sin essentially consists. The antecedent is proved as follows: St. Thomas says in 1. 2. q. 76. ar. 2.⁵⁴ that the privation of grace in itself is not sin but a punishment for sin; therefore the privation of original justice likewise will formally be a punishment for sin, not sin itself.

Some Thomists say that original sin belongs to two genera: first, to the genus of evil simply, and in this genus it is not formally something positive but privative, as all his disciples admit with St. Thomas concerning actual sin; second, it belongs to the genus of moral evil, and in this genus they say original sin is formally something positive. If it is asked what this positive thing is, they answer that it is a certain habitual turning toward a changeable good, arising from the turning of the first parent, in whom we were all turned toward a changeable good by Adam's will, insofar as he was the head of the whole nature. For his will is reckoned as ours; hence the Apostle also says: All sinned in Adam.⁵⁵ They attribute this opinion to St. Thomas and cite many other important authorities in its favor. M. Medina, in 1. 2. q. 82. ar. 1. is very doubtful and seems, from the force of the arguments, to incline now to one side, now to the other. M. Victoria, as Soto reports in lib. 1. de natura, et gratia c. 8. in fine, tried to explain this difficulty, saying that original sin is nothing other than a certain enmity, which in Spanish he called desgratia, through which all those propagated from the first parent are constituted children of wrath.

XX. Another opinion, which I judge to be true and to reflect the mind of St. Thomas, asserts that materially original sin is something positive, but formally it is a privation of original justice as regards its primary effect.⁵⁶ To make this clear, consider that, as Cajetan and Master Soto teach, something is called material with respect to another in two ways. In one way, properly, as a body is material with respect to whiteness, because it is informed by whiteness and denominated from it. In this way, in actual sin of commission, the substance of the interior act itself is material, because it is the subject of moral evil, by which it is formally constituted as sin.⁵⁷ In a second, more general way, that is called the material of sin which is its effect. In this way an exterior act is called material with respect to an interior one, as St. Thomas teaches in 1. 2. q. 18. ar. 6., ad 2. In this sense we say that disordered concupiscence and the other disordered lower powers are material in original sin, because they are effects of its formal character. Hence St. Augustine in many places calls this concupiscence a daughter of original sin, especially in lib. 1. retra. c. 15. et lib. 1. de nuptiis, et concupiscentiis c. 24. et lib. 1. cont. duas epist. Pelag. c. 13. It cannot, however, be called material in the first way, because such disordered concupiscence is in the flesh, or in the sensitive appetite, while original sin formally is in the essence of the soul; thus such concupiscence cannot be its proper immediate subject.⁵⁸ In this sense, then, we assert that materially original sin is something positive, namely, disordered concupiscence and the tinder of sin, as St. Thomas proves in the cited 1. 2. q. 82. art. 3. Whether this concupiscence, or tinder, is a morbid quality added to and distinct from the lower powers as one thing from another, or is itself the appetite disordered and habitually inclined toward a changeable good, matters little to the present question. On this, see S. Tho. q. 4. de malo, art. 2.; 3. p. q. 15. art. 2. et q. 27. art. 3., and Cajetan and Medina there.

XXI. That original sin is formally privative is proved from St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 82. ar. 3., who says that the formal element of original sin is the privation of original justice. For he says: Materially, original sin is concupiscence, but formally it is the defect of original justice. More clearly, he teaches the same in q. 4. de malo, ar. 2. ad 4., from the objections on the contrary, saying: The privation of grace is not in the act itself but in the subject of the act, and therefore it does not pertain to actual sin. But the lack of original justice is in nature, and therefore it can pertain to original sin, which is the sin of nature. The solution of other Thomists, who assert that St. Thomas is speaking there of original sin not as moral evil but as evil simply, just as he very often teaches concerning actual sin, is not valid. I say that this explanation is invalid because, in that reply to objection 4, St. Thomas establishes a difference between actual and original sin: he says that the privation of grace does not pertain to actual sin because it is not in the act itself but in its subject, namely, the soul; but the lack of original justice is in nature, or in the essence of the soul, and therefore can pertain to original sin, which is the sin of nature. But if St. Thomas were speaking of original sin as evil simply and not according to its particular character in the genus of morals, there would be no difference, since actual and original sin agree in both being privative insofar as each is placed in the genus of evil simply. St. Thomas therefore holds that original sin, in its character as moral evil, is formally something privative.

Moreover, original sin does not include in its essence a turning toward a changeable good, but only an aversion from an unchangeable good; therefore it is formally a privation.⁵⁹ The consequence is clear, for aversion is something privative. The antecedent is proved from St. Thomas, q. 24. de verit. ar. 12. ad 2., where he says that original and mortal sin do not differ as regards aversion, since in both there is a habitual aversion from an unchangeable good, but they differ on the side of conversion, since in mortal sin there is a habitual turning toward an undue end. In q. 5. de malo, ar. 2. in corp., he says that in original sin there is no conversion but only aversion. The same antecedent is confirmed. No punishment of sense corresponds to original sin, but only the punishment of loss, as St. Thomas admits in q. 5. de malo, art. 2., where he proves that those who die with original sin alone have no punishment or interior pain of the will, even after Judgment Day. Therefore original sin consists in aversion and not conversion.⁶⁰ The consequence is clear, for according to St. Thomas in that same art. the punishment of loss corresponds to sin on the side of aversion, while the punishment of sense corresponds to it on the side of conversion. Finally, disordered concupiscence and every other positive quality found in original sin pertain not to its formal element but to its material element, as St. Thomas teaches in the passages from 1. 2. cited above. Therefore it is not formally something positive.

XXII. Hence, to the first argument for the opposite opinion, drawn from the Council of Trent, it is answered that original sin is said to inhere in a broad sense, as blindness is said to be in the eyes, since the privation of sight must be where sight ought to be.⁶¹ Or it may be said that original sin properly inheres, not formally, as though the formal element of original sin inhered, but materially, because its effects, namely, the tinder and disordered concupiscence, inhere. To the second, it is answered that St. Thomas expressly held the opinion we defend, as is clear from the passages we cited.⁶² As to the passage brought forward against it, the reply is that the comparison with sickness, which the holy Doctor uses to explain the nature of original sin, does not hold in every respect. It holds in this respect: just as bodily sickness follows when health is removed, so when original justice and the soul's subjection to God are removed, languor and disorder of the lower powers, rebellion against the spirit, and the tinder of sin follow. This tinder is something positive in the manner explained above. Nevertheless, this positive being does not pertain formally to the constitution of original sin, but materially, as an effect that follows from the same sin, as was said above. By this we also answer the third argument, drawn from the comparison with water existing in a corrupted vessel, which St. Augustine uses to explain the nature of original sin.⁶³

To the fourth, it is answered that original sin in infants is not specified by a disordered turning toward a changeable good, as was said.⁶⁴ For this disordered turning preceded in Adam's actual sin. As to the refutation, it is answered that in actual sin aversion follows from a turning toward a changeable good, or toward the object from which actual sin is specified, because the whole essence of actual sin is understood before its formal aversion. But in original sin, since it is not committed through the infant's own act or personal will, but is transmitted by origin along with the nature corrupted in the first parent, its essence cannot consist in a turning but in a privation of original justice, as was said.

XXIII. To the fifth, it is answered that original sin, as it exists in infants, is not properly a sin of omission or commission, for that division of sin into commission and omission is made concerning actual sin.⁶⁵ Hence St. Thomas in that reply to objection 12 does not say that an infant's original sin is one of commission, but only says that it is not one of omission; from this, however, it is not permissible to infer that it is one of commission. If St. Thomas had ever said that original sin is one of commission, he would have to be understood as speaking of original sin insofar as it preceded in the first parent, in whom the same sin was, under one aspect, an actual sin of a person and, under another, the sin of nature. By this we answer the other objections commonly made against this doctrine.

To the sixth, it is answered that the privation of grace that follows actual sin in adults is not sin but its effect in the order of demeritorious causality; in original sin, however, the privation itself constitutes the sin, as was said.⁶⁶ St. Thomas gives the reason for the difference between these two sins in q. 4. de malo, ar. 2. in corp., in the reply to the fourth principal objection, and in the reply to objection 4 among the objections on the contrary. Actual sin consists in a voluntary act of a person; therefore it must necessarily be subjectively in a power that is the principle of action, and accordingly it intrinsically includes a turning toward some disordered object, by which it is constituted in its species. Hence it cannot primarily consist in the privation of grace, because such a privation is not primarily subjectively in any power, but in the essence of the soul itself, in which habitual grace has its subject. Original sin, however, since it pertains to nature, is in the essence of the soul, as is original justice, to which it is opposed. Hence such a privation can pertain to the essence of original sin.

XXIV. We have, then, that original sin is formally a privation of original justice. For a fuller explanation, it should be observed that three things can be considered in original justice: first, the gift of original justice itself, considered in itself; second, its primary effect, which is the rectification of the soul with God; third, its secondary effect, by which the lower powers were rectified in relation to reason.⁶⁷ When, then, we assert that original sin is formally a privation of original justice, we are not speaking of a privation of original justice in itself. For the character of original sin cannot consist in a privation of original justice in itself, as some have thought. Otherwise original sin would not truly be remitted by baptism with respect to that in it which formally has the true and proper character of sin, which nevertheless is contrary to the decrees of the Councils of Milevis and Trent.⁶⁸⁶⁹ The consequence is proved as follows: a privation cannot be removed unless the form of which it is the privation is restored, just as blindness is not removed unless sight is restored. But baptism does not restore original justice in itself; therefore it does not remove the privation of original justice in itself. Therefore, if original sin formally consists in the privation of original justice considered in itself, it follows that original sin is not remitted with respect to that in it which has the true and proper character of sin. We must therefore say, as many most learned Thomists think, that it consists in a privation of original justice with respect to its primary effect. St. Thomas teaches this clearly enough in 1. 2. q. 82. ar. 3., when he says that the privation of original justice, through which the will was subject to God, is the formal element in original sin.⁷⁰ Manifest reason supports this: original sin is formally that privation which is removed primarily through baptism; but baptism primarily removes the privation of the soul's rectitude with God, for through baptismal grace the soul is reconciled and rectified with God, from whom it had been turned away through original sin. Therefore original sin is formally a privation of original justice with respect to its primary effect, which was the soul's rectification with God.

If the argument made above is turned against this opinion—that a privation of the primary and formal effect of a form cannot be removed unless the form itself, from which that effect proceeds, is restored; but baptism does not restore the gift of original justice itself; therefore it does not restore the primary effect of that gift; therefore original sin cannot consist in the privation of original justice with respect to its first effect, since otherwise it would not be removed through baptism—it is answered that the soul's being rectified in relation to God is not the adequate formal effect of the gift of original justice. For the soul can be rectified in relation to God without original justice, through habitual grace, which is at least formally distinct from original justice.⁷¹ Hence, for the privation of original justice to be removed through baptism with respect to its first effect, and for the soul to be rectified in relation to God, it is not necessary that the gift of original justice itself be restored as such; it suffices for habitual grace to be restored, through which the soul too is rectified in relation to God.

From these points the confirmation of the fourth principal argument, on whose occasion we raised this difficulty, is readily answered. We say that although original sin is formally privative, it is materially something positive, as was said; in this respect it can have a real efficient cause, and it can have such a cause formally as well, in the way in which privations have causes. For blindness has a real cause that primarily terminates in a quality contrary to the visual power, from which contrary quality the privation of sight follows.

XXVI. To the fifth principal argument, it is answered that it raises another difficulty: namely, whether there is in the seed some quality, at least intentional, by whose power original sin is transmitted to descendants, as in other instruments a certain motion bearing the power of the principal agent is posited, added to the instrument's nature, by which it attains the effect of the same principal agent.⁷² Albert the Great held that, from the curse of God found in Gen. 3, Cursed is the earth in your work, a certain power was communicated to human seed for staining the soul of the one who is derived from Adam through carnal propagation.⁷³ He proves this from Sap. 12: For the seed was cursed from the beginning. Capreolus too posits in the seed a certain intentional power that causes original sin. His opinion seems to have a foundation in St. Thomas, q. 4. de malo, ar. 1. ad 4., where he says that original sin is in the man's seed according to a certain intention of it.⁷⁴

Nevertheless, it must be said that no real power is required in the seed itself for original sin to be transmitted through it to Adam's children. This is the view of Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and Scotus.⁷⁵ Ferrariensis proves this by reasoning: formally, original sin is a pure privation of original justice, as was said above; therefore it has no real cause that directly and in itself terminates in it. Consequently, there is no need to posit in the seed some real or intentional power productive of original sin, distinct from the tinder of sin, so that Adam may be said to transmit original sin as an efficient cause to descendants by the power of the seed. The consequence is proved as follows: something incomplete and intentional is posited in instruments for producing the effect of the principal agent when the instrument's action terminates directly in something real, the intention of which must precede in the instrument itself. Moreover, it is proved by reasoning drawn from St. Thomas, q. 4. de malo, ar. 3. ad 2. Since original sin is the sin of nature, it does not pertain to the soul or get contracted by it except insofar as the soul is part of human nature, which was corrupted in Adam. Therefore, by the very fact that the soul becomes part of corrupted human nature, it incurs original sin. Therefore, it is not necessary to posit in the seed some real power causing it; the power it has to unite the soul with the body, so that the soul becomes part of human nature, together with the relation that the seed has to the tinder and to the first parent who sinned voluntarily, suffices. From this it follows that if the rational soul were not united to the body as the form of matter, but as a mover to what is moved, as the Platonists held, it would not be infected with original sin, because it would not then become part of the whole nature. So says S. Tho. q. 3. de pot. art. 4. ad 3. et 4.

Hence, to Albert's argument, it is answered that in this passage in Sap. 12, “seed” does not signify male seed but wicked men; it is often used in this sense in sacred Scripture, as in Isa. 1: Woe to the sinful nation, the wicked seed, the criminal children, and Dan. 13⁷⁶: Seed of Canaan, and not of Judah.

To the authority of St. Thomas brought forward for Capreolus's opinion, it is answered that by the “intention” of original sin St. Thomas means not some added quality, but the defect and privation of rectitude, from which it follows that human nature produced by the power of the seed is subject to original guilt. Ferrariensis and Cajetan reply in this way. This defect is called an intention of original sin because it is a certain likeness of it by way of proportion.

Second, it is answered that the seed itself, insofar as it has a relation to the tinder and to the first parent who sinned voluntarily, is called a certain intention of original sin without any other added quality.

XXVII. FROM these points the fifth principal argument remains solved. For we say that the seed, or the act of generation by the power of the seed, insofar as it has an order to the tinder and to the first parent who sinned voluntarily, concurs as an instrument in transmitting original sin. Hence St. Thomas says in 1. 2. q. 81. ar. 1., reply to objection 2, that through the power of the seed human nature is transmitted from parent to offspring, and together with nature, the infection of nature. And in q. 83. art. 1. ad 2., he says that original sin is caused by the seed as by an instrumental cause.

XXVIII. To the sixth principal argument, it is answered that original sin is contracted at the instant when the soul is united to the body by the power of the seed; for at that instant the soul actually becomes part of corrupted nature, which is accompanied by original guilt, as St. Thomas says in 1. 2. q. 81. ar. 1., reply to objection 3.⁷⁷ As to the refutation, it is answered that the soul is not infected through the flesh but through the seed. The reason is that given by St. Thomas in 1. 2. q. 81. ar. 1., reply to objection 4: the seed is the principle of generation, which is the proper act of nature, serving its propagation. Therefore the soul is infected more through the seed than through the perfected flesh, which has already been determined to a person. But original sin is not formally in the seed; it is there causally, as in an instrument, as was said.

To the seventh argument, it is answered that by Adam's offense all his children are constituted sinners causally, because the corruption of nature took its origin from him as from a cause. They are not, however, constituted sinners formally by the offense that was in Adam, but by the sin proper to each one, which each contracts, as was said about Christ's justice with respect to those regenerated by grace.