De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice. This edition contains Book I: the prooemium and five preliminary disputations on Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian teaching, Manichaean and Reformation positions, Catholic theologians, and the authority of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
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Book One
Prooemium: division of the whole work
Disputatio I: Whether the Pelagians ever admitted that any inward grace, or any supernatural help from God, is divinely given for salvation or for fulfilling the precepts of the law
Disputatio II: What grace the Semi-Pelagians admitted as necessary for salvation, and where their view agrees with or departs from the error of the Pelagians
Disputatio III: What the Manichaeans formerly held, and the Lutherans and Calvinists hold in our time, about the necessity of grace and the natural powers of our free choice
Disputatio IV: What certain Catholic Doctors hold about the natural powers of free choice and its concord with divine foreknowledge, providence, predestination, and the efficacy of the helps of grace
Disputatio V: How much authority Saint Augustine’s teaching has concerning predestination and grace, and whether it is permissible to depart from it
Book Two
Introduction
Disputatio I: Whether the knowledge of God is suitably divided into the knowledge of simple understanding and the knowledge of vision.
Disputatio II: Whether the knowledge of God is sufficiently divided into knowledge that is merely natural and knowledge that is merely free; or whether, besides both, middle knowledge must be posited in God with respect to conditional future things that depend on the human will.
Disputatio III: Whether all future things are actually present in eternity according to the proper existences they will have in their own measure.
Disputatio IV: Whether God certainly knows future contingents because of their real presence in eternity before they come to be, and whether an existence of this kind contributes anything to the certainty and infallibility of the divine knowledge.
Disputatio V: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows all future contingents in the decree, or predetermination, of his divine will.
Disputatio VI: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows future sins in some decree of his divine will.
Disputatio VII: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows future contingents in the predetermination of secondary causes, especially when the secondary causes are free.
Disputatio VIII: Whether, setting aside every predetermination of the divine will and existence in eternity, another ground for the certainty of divine knowledge can be assigned, namely, on the part of the truth of the object.
Disputatio IX: Whether God certainly knows future contingents before the decree of his will, as future, in their ideas.
Disputatio X: Whether there is in God a conjectural knowledge of what, in particular, a created will will do if placed in such circumstances.
Disputatio XI: Whether this causal proposition is true: “Because this is future, it is foreknown by God”; or, conversely: “Because God foreknows something to be future, therefore it is future.”
Disputatio XII: Whether God produces things outside himself immediately through his knowledge, that is, through his intellect; or whether, besides intellect and will, a third executive power must be posited in him, through which things are produced immediately.
Book Three
Introduction
Disputatio I: Whether God’s actual motion, which all secondary causes need in order to produce their effect or operation, is an immediate influx into the secondary cause itself; or whether instead it is only an immediate influx, together with the secondary cause, into its effect.
Disputatio II: What that prior motion is by which God moves and applies secondary causes to act.
Disputatio III: Whether God’s general concurrence, by which he helps secondary causes constituted in first act through supernatural forms to produce supernatural acts, is supernatural; or whether it is of the same order as general concurrence with merely natural acts.
Disputatio IV: Whether God’s general concurrence, especially with respect to acts that depend on created free choice, is indifferent of itself.
Disputatio V: Whether, by an absolute and efficacious decree of his will, God truly predetermines as an efficient cause all secondary causes, both natural and free, to their operations after the manner of a physical cause, while preserving their nature and freedom.
Disputatio VI: Whether, by a prior motion inhering in the created will, God moves, applies, or predetermines it after the manner of a physical cause to all its good acts in particular, while preserving its freedom.
Disputatio VII: Whether, by a prior motion, God truly premoves as an efficient cause free choice after the manner of a physical cause to the act of sin, insofar as it is an act and insofar as it is a being.
Disputatio VIII: Whether all contingent and free acts predetermined by God necessarily occur with the necessity of infallibility, or with necessity on the supposition of the predetermination of the divine will.
Disputatio IX: Whether the first root of contingency is the efficacy, or omnipotence, of the divine will.
Disputatio X: Whether any effect can be called formally contingent in relation to God’s causality, especially when it is produced immediately by him.
Book Four
Introduction
Disputatio I: Whether God has providence not only over all genera and species, but also over all individuals in particular, according to all circumstances of place, time, etc.
Disputatio II: Whether the evils of punishment are willed by an absolute and efficacious will, and predetermined in particular, through divine providence, or are only permitted.
Disputatio III: Whether the nature of divine providence includes not only the ordering of means to an end, but also the attainment of the end intended by God.
Disputatio IV: Whether contingent and free secondary causes can withdraw themselves from, or depart from, the order assigned to them by divine providence.
Disputatio V: Whether created free choice can resist almighty God, or strive against the order of divine providence.
Book Five
Introduction
Disputatio I: Whether all the explanations that St. Augustine gives of those words of the Apostle, “God wills all human beings to be saved,” are legitimate.
Disputatio II: What God's antecedent will is, what his consequent will is, and whether antecedent will formally entails some conditional act or wish in God.
Disputatio III: What predestination is, and in which act it formally consists: an act of the will, or rather an act of the intellect.
Disputatio IV: Whether the good use of the aids of grace, insofar as it proceeds from free will, is an effect of predestination.
Disputatio V: Whether the good use of free will, proceeding from the aid of grace, is a cause, reason, or necessary condition of predestination in adults.
Disputatio VI: Whether the predestination of infants depended on, and presupposed, foreknowledge of the good use of the free will of their parents or of others through whom they came to the grace of baptism.
Disputatio VII: Whether the foreseen merits of Christ are the cause of our predestination with respect to its entire effect.
Disputatio VIII: Whether the grace of the state of innocence was conferred on Adam through the merits of Christ.
Disputatio IX: Whether predestination, with respect to the attainment of its effects, is certain and infallible with the certainty of the order and causality of the means.
Disputatio X: Whether anyone, apart from divine revelation, can know with infallible certainty that he or another is among the predestined, or infer this from certain signs.
Disputatio XI: Whether, at least among the faithful, there are more elect than reprobate.
Whether at least among the faithful the elect are more numerous than the reprobate.
I. ON THE ASSUMPTION that no one can know with certainty and infallibly, without divine revelation, whether he or another particular person is predestined, we must inquire whether it is generally certain that among human beings, at least among the faithful, the predestined are more numerous than the reprobate.
The Doctors hold various opinions on this matter. Damascene, in a certain sermon on the dead, holds that almost all the faithful are saved. Sylvester, in Rosa aurea, treatise 2 on the Gospel for Septuagesima Sunday, says that it may be defended as probable that most Christians who have right faith and live in obedience to the Holy Roman Church are saved. Francis a Christo holds the same in 1 Sentences, distinction 41, single question, conclusion 3, on reprobation; as do some other theologians. Their opinion can be proved from Matthew 22, where, when the King entered to see those reclining at table, he found only one among the many invited wearing a soiled garment. Therefore, among those called to the faith, more are saved and fewer are damned.
Second, more Angels are predestined than reprobated. For it is said of the great dragon, by whom Lucifer is signified: Its tail dragged to earth a third part of the stars of heaven,1 namely, the Angels who fell in imitation of Lucifer. Therefore, likewise among human beings, at least among the faithful of Christ under the law of grace, the elect are more numerous than the reprobate.
Third, it is argued from Revelation 7, where, after the prophetic Evangelist has recounted the multitude of the predestined from every tribe of the children of Israel, he adds: After this I saw a great multitude which no one could number, from all nations and tribes and peoples and tongues, standing before the throne. Therefore fewer are damned from all the tribes, at least among the faithful; otherwise he would not have said that the multitude of the predestined from all nations was great.
Fourth, a very great multitude of infants who die before the use of reason depart this life baptized. Among adults, although the greater part often sin mortally, they also often rise again; thus they spend their lives falling and rising. Finally, a much greater number of them receive the Sacraments of the Church at the point of death, which turn the merely attrite into one who is contrite. Therefore, when all things are weighed, it is probable that more of these Christians are saved.
Fifth, among other animals, failure to attain their end occurs in the minority. Therefore the same will hold among human beings; otherwise their condition would be worse than that of brute animals.
II. The Saints more commonly defend the contrary opinion, asserting that more perish, even among the faithful of Christ, than are saved.2 Thus teaches St. Gregory in Homily 19 on the Gospels, where he says: Many have come to the faith, but few are brought to the heavenly Kingdom. In his commentary on Canticle 6, explaining And of maidens there is no number, and on Psalm 39, explaining They have multiplied beyond number, he explicitly says that wandering souls, that is, the reprobate, outnumber the elect. St. Augustine likewise, Against Cresconius the Grammarian, book 3, chapter 66, explaining Matthew 8, Many will come from the East and the West and recline with Abraham, says that the elect are now called many, now few. For those same good and true Christians, who are many in themselves, are few in comparison with the evil and false; just as we call the many grains that fill great granaries few in comparison with the chaff. He confirms the same in letter 48 to Vincent and in Against Faustus, book 13, chapter 16. To prove it he adduces the passage in Genesis: As the stars of heaven and the sand of the sea, so shall your offspring be:3 understanding the elect by the stars of heaven and the reprobate by the sand of the sea. Therefore, to the extent that the sand of the sea outnumbers the stars of heaven, the number of the reprobate exceeds that of the elect. St. Chrysostom also intimates the same in Homily 40 to the people, saying: How many do you think there are in this city who will be saved? Among so many thousands, one could not find a hundred who will be saved; indeed, I doubt even these. How great is the wickedness among the young, how great the sluggishness among the old! Although these words may seem to be spoken by hyperbole, Chrysostom considers it most certain that more are damned than saved. Finally, Cajetan, explaining Matthew 25, Five of them were foolish, and five wise, thinks that half of the Christians who appear good and have some concern for their salvation perish. He considers this the proper literal sense of the parable of the ten Virgins, five foolish and five wise. This second opinion is very much in accord with the passages of Scripture. Therefore, for the resolution of the question, let the following be stated.
III. First conclusion: if we speak absolutely of all human beings, the number of the reprobate is much greater, incomparably greater, than the number of the elect.4 This conclusion is taught by the authors cited in the second position and is inferred from Sacred Scripture. First, from 4 Esdras, chapter 8, where it says: The Most High made this age for many, but the age to come for few, namely, for the elect. Immediately explaining by an excellent example the very great multitude of the reprobate and the small number of the elect, it adds: The earth yields much clay from which pottery is made, but only a little dust from which gold is made; so many have been created, but few will be saved. It is as though it said more plainly: just as earth exceeds gold dust, so the reprobate exceed the elect. Although that book is not canonical, after the canonical Scripture it nevertheless has great authority; hence the holy Doctors, especially Ambrose and Augustine, often cite it to confirm their teaching.
The second passage is found in Colossians 15, where the Apostle, speaking of the elect, says: He made us worthy to share in the inheritance of the Saints;6 and in Ephesians 17: You were called by lot. There he says that the elect were called by lot to indicate their small number. For when lots are cast among many thousands of people, they fall to very few, and sometimes to the foolish and poor, while the wise, rich, and noble are passed over. So the lot of predestination falls to very few among many thousands of people. In it neither nobility of birth, nor human wisdom, nor great wealth, nor the merits of preceding works are taken into account; rather, in accord with his mercy and gratuitous will, has mercy on whomever he wills, God, and hardens whomever he wills.8 Hence the Apostle: Consider, he says, your calling, brothers: not many are wise according to the flesh, not many powerful, not many noble; but God chose the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and God chose the weak things of the world to confound the strong; and the ignoble and contemptible things of the world God chose, and the things that are not, to destroy the things that are, so that no flesh may glory in his sight.
III. The third passage is found in Psalm 39, where it is said of the reprobate: They have multiplied beyond number, namely, beyond the number of the elect, as St. Gregory explains in the passage cited above. Hence Ecclesiastes 1 says: The number of fools is infinite. And Isaiah, chapter 24, compares the small number of the elect to the few olives and grapes left after the harvest is finished, saying: As if the few olives that remain were shaken from the olive tree, and the grape clusters when the vintage is finished.9 And chapter 17 says: And what remains in it will be like a cluster of two or three olives at the top of a branch, or four or five on its highest boughs, its fruit. Hence the elect are called a remnant because they are few. Romans 9 says: Though the number of the children of Israel be like the sand of the sea, a remnant will be saved. And chapter 1110 says: A remnant has been saved according to election.
V. Second conclusion: even among the faithful who have lived from the Church's beginning until the end of the world, more people are reprobate than elect.11 This conclusion is taught by the authors of the second opinion and is inferred from the scriptural passages cited for the preceding conclusion. Moreover, it is proved from Matthew 20: Many are called, but few are chosen, where the discourse concerns people who have been called to the faith. Likewise, in 1 Corinthians 10, speaking of the Jews, the Apostle says: I do not want you to be ignorant, brothers, that our fathers were all under the cloud, and all passed through the sea; but God was not pleased with most of them, for they were struck down in the desert. He later adds that these things happened to them as a figure. Moreover, the Canticle 2 says: As a lily among thorns, so is my beloved among the daughters. He does not say “among strangers,” as Bernard noted, but among daughters,12 or among those of the household of faith. For just as thorns outnumber lilies, so among the faithful the reprobate also outnumber the elect. Finally, Truth himself cries out in Matthew 7: Narrow is the way that leads to life, and few enter by it; broad is the way that leads to destruction, and many enter by it.
Third conclusion: even among the faithful born under the law of grace, the reprobate are more numerous than the elect. This conclusion is not as certain as the preceding one, but the cited scriptural passages seem to support it. Cajetan teaches it when explaining the parable of the ten virgins in Matthew 2513: he asserts that even among those in the Church who have some particular concern for their salvation—and who are therefore represented by the virgins—half are damned. Therefore, if we count the aforesaid faithful under the law of grace, the reprobate are more numerous than the elect. Experience shows that very many of the faithful, especially those who live where discipline is not maintained or where the Word of God is preached only rarely, have little or no concern for their salvation. Moreover, even under the state of the evangelical law, because of the corruption of nature, whose sense and thought are inclined to evil from youth, many more follow the inclination of sense than of reason, as will be clear from the reply to objections 2 and 5. But how many are predestined in particular is known to God alone, as St. Thomas proves from that prayer of the Church:14 O God, to whom alone is known the number of the elect to be placed in heavenly happiness, etc.
VI. TO the first argument, the reply is that, as Jerome explains, by “one” in that passage of Matthew 22 is meant the whole assembly of the reprobate, which belongs to the one city of Babylon and is signified by the word “one”; for the reprobate, joined together in one, cling to one another like thorns, in accordance with Nahum, chapter 1: For as thorns cling to one another, so is the feast of those who drink together.15 Or else it is because all the reprobate, or damned, share in one punishment of loss, on account of which they are said to be gathered together in one bundle, in accordance with Isaiah's prophecy, chapter 24: They will be gathered together in one bundle for the pit and shut up in prison, as we observed in our commentaries on the same passage.
To the second, the consequence is denied, and the reason for the difference is this: a human being has a twofold nature, rational and sensitive;16 and because a person reaches the act of reason through the operation of sense, more people follow the inclination of sensitive nature than the order of reason, as St. Thomas explains in part 2, question 71, article 2, reply to objection 3. This is especially true of nature in its corrupted state. Hence Aristotle says in Ethics, book 2, chapter 3: Pleasure has been nurtured together with all human beings from their very cradles; therefore it is difficult to remove this affection implanted in life. This reason, however, does not apply to the Angels, so the cases are not alike.
To the third, the reply is that, as St. Augustine says in the passages cited above, the predestined are many, speaking absolutely, but very few in comparison with the multitude of the reprobate. This is also suggested in the same passage of Revelation. For, as St. Thomas noted there, when it says from every tribe, tongue, people, and nation, the word from denotes a certain selection and separation of a few from many.
To the fourth argument, the reply is that very many also die before the use of reason without the laver of regeneration, either because they die in the womb or because, though born, they do not attain baptism. Although more of these die before the use of reason baptized and are saved, if they are compared with the multitude of adults who perish, it will be clear that even under the law of the Gospel more are reprobate than elect. As for the objection about those who receive the Sacraments of the Church at the point of death, the reply is that, rightly considered, very many Christians die without receiving the Sacraments. And even if most receive the Sacraments at the point of death, fewer prepare themselves to receive the effects of the Sacraments.
To the fifth, the consequence is denied, and the reason for the difference is the one St. Thomas gives 1. p. q. 23. art. 7. ad 3.. The end of other animals is proportionate to their nature, whereas eternal beatitude exceeds the common state of created nature, especially insofar as it is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin. A good proportionate to the common state of nature occurs in the majority and is lacking in the minority; but a good that exceeds the common state of nature is found in the minority and lacking in the majority. Therefore, although far more brute animals attain their end, more human beings will fail to attain theirs. St. Thomas gives another reason in the same reply: this most of all displays God's mercy, since he chooses some for eternal salvation, from which many fail. But this is to be discussed below, in the course of the disputation,17 namely, whether the manifestation of divine justice in the reprobate and of greater mercy in the elect is a sufficient reason on God's part for reprobation. Nor does it follow that human beings are in a worse condition than brute animals; rather, because they are in a better condition, more is required of them to attain the ultimate end for which they were created, and for this reason the majority fail to attain it. Let this suffice concerning the inscrutable mystery of predestination.
End of Book Five.