De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)

De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia

First published 1610

Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice. This edition contains Book I: the prooemium and five preliminary disputations on Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian teaching, Manichaean and Reformation positions, Catholic theologians, and the authority of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.

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Book One

Prooemium: division of the whole work

Disputatio I: Whether the Pelagians ever admitted that any inward grace, or any supernatural help from God, is divinely given for salvation or for fulfilling the precepts of the law

Disputatio II: What grace the Semi-Pelagians admitted as necessary for salvation, and where their view agrees with or departs from the error of the Pelagians

Disputatio III: What the Manichaeans formerly held, and the Lutherans and Calvinists hold in our time, about the necessity of grace and the natural powers of our free choice

Disputatio IV: What certain Catholic Doctors hold about the natural powers of free choice and its concord with divine foreknowledge, providence, predestination, and the efficacy of the helps of grace

Disputatio V: How much authority Saint Augustine’s teaching has concerning predestination and grace, and whether it is permissible to depart from it

Book Two

Introduction

Disputatio I: Whether the knowledge of God is suitably divided into the knowledge of simple understanding and the knowledge of vision.

Disputatio II: Whether the knowledge of God is sufficiently divided into knowledge that is merely natural and knowledge that is merely free; or whether, besides both, middle knowledge must be posited in God with respect to conditional future things that depend on the human will.

Disputatio III: Whether all future things are actually present in eternity according to the proper existences they will have in their own measure.

Disputatio IV: Whether God certainly knows future contingents because of their real presence in eternity before they come to be, and whether an existence of this kind contributes anything to the certainty and infallibility of the divine knowledge.

Disputatio V: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows all future contingents in the decree, or predetermination, of his divine will.

Disputatio VI: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows future sins in some decree of his divine will.

Disputatio VII: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows future contingents in the predetermination of secondary causes, especially when the secondary causes are free.

Disputatio VIII: Whether, setting aside every predetermination of the divine will and existence in eternity, another ground for the certainty of divine knowledge can be assigned, namely, on the part of the truth of the object.

Disputatio IX: Whether God certainly knows future contingents before the decree of his will, as future, in their ideas.

Disputatio X: Whether there is in God a conjectural knowledge of what, in particular, a created will will do if placed in such circumstances.

Disputatio XI: Whether this causal proposition is true: “Because this is future, it is foreknown by God”; or, conversely: “Because God foreknows something to be future, therefore it is future.”

Disputatio XII: Whether God produces things outside himself immediately through his knowledge, that is, through his intellect; or whether, besides intellect and will, a third executive power must be posited in him, through which things are produced immediately.

Book Three

Introduction

Disputatio I: Whether God’s actual motion, which all secondary causes need in order to produce their effect or operation, is an immediate influx into the secondary cause itself; or whether instead it is only an immediate influx, together with the secondary cause, into its effect.

Disputatio II: What that prior motion is by which God moves and applies secondary causes to act.

Disputatio III: Whether God’s general concurrence, by which he helps secondary causes constituted in first act through supernatural forms to produce supernatural acts, is supernatural; or whether it is of the same order as general concurrence with merely natural acts.

Disputatio IV: Whether God’s general concurrence, especially with respect to acts that depend on created free choice, is indifferent of itself.

Disputatio V: Whether, by an absolute and efficacious decree of his will, God truly predetermines as an efficient cause all secondary causes, both natural and free, to their operations after the manner of a physical cause, while preserving their nature and freedom.

Disputatio VI: Whether, by a prior motion inhering in the created will, God moves, applies, or predetermines it after the manner of a physical cause to all its good acts in particular, while preserving its freedom.

Disputatio VII: Whether, by a prior motion, God truly premoves as an efficient cause free choice after the manner of a physical cause to the act of sin, insofar as it is an act and insofar as it is a being.

Disputatio VIII: Whether all contingent and free acts predetermined by God necessarily occur with the necessity of infallibility, or with necessity on the supposition of the predetermination of the divine will.

Disputatio IX: Whether the first root of contingency is the efficacy, or omnipotence, of the divine will.

Disputatio X: Whether any effect can be called formally contingent in relation to God’s causality, especially when it is produced immediately by him.

Book Four

Introduction

Disputatio I: Whether God has providence not only over all genera and species, but also over all individuals in particular, according to all circumstances of place, time, etc.

Disputatio II: Whether the evils of punishment are willed by an absolute and efficacious will, and predetermined in particular, through divine providence, or are only permitted.

Disputatio III: Whether the nature of divine providence includes not only the ordering of means to an end, but also the attainment of the end intended by God.

Disputatio IV: Whether contingent and free secondary causes can withdraw themselves from, or depart from, the order assigned to them by divine providence.

Disputatio V: Whether created free choice can resist almighty God, or strive against the order of divine providence.

Book Five

Introduction

Disputatio I: Whether all the explanations that St. Augustine gives of those words of the Apostle, “God wills all human beings to be saved,” are legitimate.

Disputatio II: What God's antecedent will is, what his consequent will is, and whether antecedent will formally entails some conditional act or wish in God.

Disputatio III: What predestination is, and in which act it formally consists: an act of the will, or rather an act of the intellect.

Disputatio IV: Whether the good use of the aids of grace, insofar as it proceeds from free will, is an effect of predestination.

Disputatio V: Whether the good use of free will, proceeding from the aid of grace, is a cause, reason, or necessary condition of predestination in adults.

Disputatio VI: Whether the predestination of infants depended on, and presupposed, foreknowledge of the good use of the free will of their parents or of others through whom they came to the grace of baptism.

Disputatio VII: Whether the foreseen merits of Christ are the cause of our predestination with respect to its entire effect.

Disputatio VIII: Whether the grace of the state of innocence was conferred on Adam through the merits of Christ.

Disputatio IX: Whether predestination, with respect to the attainment of its effects, is certain and infallible with the certainty of the order and causality of the means.

Disputatio X: Whether anyone, apart from divine revelation, can know with infallible certainty that he or another is among the predestined, or infer this from certain signs.

Whether anyone, without divine revelation, can know with infallible certainty that he or another is among the predestined, or infer this from certain signs.

I. IT IS PROVED that this can be known with infallible certainty. First, from 1 John 5: I write these things to you so that you may know that you have life, you who believe in the name of the Son of God. But knowledge denotes certain and infallible cognition. And in Romans 8, speaking in the name of all the predestined, of whom he had said beforehand, Those whom he predestined, he also called, etc., the Apostle says: Who will separate us from the love of Christ, etc.? He immediately adds: I am certain that neither death nor life, etc., will be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus. There the words I am certain designate infallible certainty.

Second, it is argued from Romans 8: The Spirit himself bears witness with our spirit that we are children of God; and if children, then heirs. But the testimony of the Holy Spirit is infallible, since it is trustworthy, in accordance with Psalm 18: The testimony of the Lord is trustworthy, giving wisdom to the little ones. Therefore, etc.

Third, predestination and election depend on the divine will alone, and so does grace. But without a special revelation, a person can know with infallible certainty and without fear that he is in a state of grace. For St. Bernard says in sermons 68 and 69 on the Canticle that certain most holy men would not be foolish if they wished to glory in divine friendship. And in 2 Corinthians 13 the Apostle says: Do you not recognize that Christ dwells in you? Unless, perhaps, you are reprobates? Therefore a person can be certain with infallible certainty that he is predestined.

II. Against this is what Ecclesiastes 9 says: No one knows whether he is held worthy of love or of hatred; all things are kept uncertain for the future. St. Bernard, in his sermon on Septuagesima, and St. Augustine, On the Spirit and the Soul, chapter 59, understand this passage of hatred and love according to eternal reprobation and predestination. And the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 12, admonishes all the faithful lest anyone, while living in this mortal life, presume so far as to determine with certainty that he is among the predestined; it immediately adds: For unless by special revelation, it cannot be known whom God has chosen for himself.

In this controversy, two errors of heretics must be noted and avoided. The first is that of those who assert that the predestined are always in God's grace and can never fall away from it, while the reprobate remain forever in God's hatred and can never attain his grace even for a time. Such was Wycliffe, condemned at the Council of Constance; he also asserted that the distinction between God's love according to eternal predestination and according to present righteousness should be rejected and ridiculed. Calvin held the same heresy with respect to the predestined, Institutes, book 3, chapter 2, §§11 and 12. Andrew de Vega argues very well against it in book 11 of his work on the Council of Trent, chapter 1 and following.

The second error was that of Martin Bucer at the Colloquy of Regensburg, where he dared to assert that one is not a true Christian unless one believes with the certainty of faith that one will have eternal life, with the same certainty with which one believes that Christ is man or God. Calvin followed the same heresy in Institutes, book 3, chapter 2, §16, as did Chemnitz in his Examination of the Council of Trent, where he sharply criticizes the words we cited from Session 6, chapter 12.

Nevertheless, against these heretics, let the following be maintained.

III. First conclusion: in accordance with the Catholic faith, it must be asserted that the predestined who have not been confirmed in grace can sin mortally and lose grace for a time, and that this in fact happens to some. This conclusion opposes the first error, but it is clearly proved from Sacred Scripture. The Apostle Peter was predestined, and yet he sinned mortally and lost grace for a time by denying Christ on the night of his Passion, as the Evangelists relate. The same argument can be made from David and the Apostle Paul, who were among the predestined; yet David sinned mortally through adultery and murder, as is clear from 2 Kings 12: The Lord also has put away your sin. Likewise, Paul sinned mortally by persecuting Christ and his disciples, as he himself attests in 1 Timothy 1: For I was a blasphemer, and insolent, and a persecutor. Yet he was predestined by God. Therefore, etc.

If an argument is made in this way: “God always wills eternal life for the predestined, since from eternity he predestined them and willed this good for them, for otherwise he would change; therefore he always loves them, and consequently they can never fall away from his grace,” the reply is that, according to eternal predestination, God always wills a blessed life for the predestined. For although they sometimes sin, he will eventually convert and save them. But he does not always will eternal life for them according to their present state of righteousness, except when they are in a state of grace.

Moreover, the conclusion is proved by an argument. As long as the predestined are in this life, their free choice remains flexible toward good and evil. For although predestination infallibly effects that a predestined person dies in grace, since the gift of perseverance is an effect of predestination, it does not effect in all the predestined that they never sin or cannot sin mortally. Therefore they can sin unless they have been confirmed in grace. Whether those who have been confirmed in grace can sin will be discussed in Disputation 104.

IIII. Second conclusion: many of the reprobate are for a time in a state of grace and are truly loved by God according to their present state of righteousness. This conclusion too is of faith, and is proved from Sacred Scripture. Saul was in a state of grace when he was chosen king, as is clear from 1 Samuel 9, where it says: His son Saul was chosen and good, and there was no one among the children of Israel better than he. Yet he was reprobate and damned, as St. Augustine teaches in To Simplicianus, book 2, question 1, and as is inferred from 1 Chronicles 10: Saul died because of his transgressions, because he had transgressed the command of the Lord. And 1 Samuel 28 says that Samuel said to Saul: Why do you ask me, when the Lord has departed from you? The Catholic Doctors commonly hold this view, although some among the Hebrews think he was saved, as may be seen in the Ordinary Gloss, part 2, on 1 Samuel, chapter 2, and in the additions on 1 Chronicles, chapter 10, at the words Saul died, where the Ordinary Gloss holds our position. It is also clear from 2 Chronicles 7 that Solomon was at one time God's friend and in his grace, where we read: When Solomon had finished offering his prayers, fire came down from heaven and consumed the holocausts and victims, and the majesty of the Lord filled the house. This was a manifest sign that he, his prayers, and his sacrifices were pleasing to God. Yet he was reprobate and damned, according to the more common opinion of the Doctors, which St. Augustine holds in Against Faustus, book 22, chapter 88, and in his commentary on Psalm 126 explicitly says that Solomon was reprobated by God. He holds the same in City of God, book 17, chapter 20; so do Cyprian, book 1, letter 5; and the Gloss on 2 Kings, chapter 17, at the words I will not take away my mercy from him; and on 4 Kings, chapter 23, at the words He did not remove the high places that were in Jerusalem; and on Isaiah, chapter 1, at the words The idols shall be utterly broken; and at greater length at the beginning of Proverbs, chapter 30. Nevertheless, some Catholic Doctors piously believe that Solomon was saved. St. Jerome follows this opinion in his commentary on Ecclesiastes, chapter 1, and more explicitly on Ezekiel, chapter 43, where he says that Solomon sinned and offended God, although afterwards he did penance when he wrote the Proverbs. He proves this from Proverbs 24, where in another translation Solomon says of himself: At last I did penance and considered how I might choose instruction. Genebrard defends the same opinion in book 1 of his Cosmography, page 112, moved by the authority of Jerome and the cited passage from Proverbs; the Hebrews commonly hold the same, as Lyra noted on Proverbs, chapter 30. However, the Vulgate edition does not contain those words cited from Proverbs 24, nor do they agree with the Hebrew text, as Fr. Ludovicus a Soto Mayor noted in the preface to the Canticle, in the section “On Solomon's penance.” Whatever the case may be, the conclusion is proved by other examples that are not disputed. Lucifer is reprobate and damned, as we read in Ezekiel 28: You were the seal of likeness, full of wisdom and perfect in beauty; you were in the delights of God's Paradise. And below: In the multitude of your commerce your innermost parts were filled with iniquity, and you sinned; and I cast you out from the mountain of God and destroyed you, O covering Cherub, from the midst of the fiery stones. And Isaiah 14 says: How have you fallen, Lucifer, who rose in the morning? St. Augustine interprets this passage of the first Angel in On Christian Doctrine, book 3, chapter 3. Yet the first Angel was created in grace, as were the others, as St. Thomas teaches in Summa theologiae I, question 61, article 3. Judas too was reprobate and damned, as Psalm 108 says and is inferred from the Gospel words: And going out, he hanged himself with a noose. Yet at one time he was in a state of grace, namely, from the beginning of his apostleship. Therefore.

Second, the conclusion is proved from the definition of the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 17, which says: If anyone says that the grace of justification comes only to those predestined to life, while all the rest who are called are indeed called but do not receive grace, as being predestined to evil by divine power, let him be anathema.

Third, it is proved by an argument. As long as a reprobate is on the way, his mind is not hardened in evil; this is proper to those who are in hell, where there is no redemption. Therefore, with God's help he can attain grace, even though in the end he will fall away, as is clear from 1 John 2: They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would surely have remained with us. Therefore a reprobate can for a time turn to God and be in a state of grace.

V. Third conclusion: without a special revelation from God, no one can know with certainty and infallibly that he is among the predestined, much less is he bound to believe this with certain faith. This conclusion is opposed to the second heresy, but it is proved by the authority of Ecclesiastes cited above: No one knows whether he is held worthy of hatred or of love. It is also proved by those words of Proverbs 27: Do not boast about tomorrow, since you do not know what the coming day will bring. To this agrees 3 Kings 20: Let the one who is girded not boast as does the one who has loosened his belt. We explained this passage at length for this purpose in our Commentaries on Isaiah, chapter 45, number 3.

Second, it is proved from the definition of the Council of Trent, Session 6, canon 15 cited above, which says: If anyone says that a person reborn and justified is bound by faith to believe that he is certainly among the predestined, let him be anathema. Canon 16 adds: If anyone says that he will certainly have that great gift of perseverance to the end, with infallible and absolute certainty, unless he has learned this by special revelation, let him be anathema.

Third, it is proved by the authority of the Saints, who unanimously teach our conclusion, especially Cyprian, book 1, letter 5; St. Gregory, Homily 38 on the Gospel; Ambrose, sermon on Psalm 118, at the words Establish your word for your servant in your fear; St. Jerome on Ecclesiastes, chapter 9; Augustine, On Correction and Grace, chapter 13, and On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 22; Prosper, book to the articles falsely attributed to Augustine, article 13; and St. Bernard, in the passage cited above.

Finally, it is proved by an argument: predestination depends on God's gratuitous will, as was shown in Disputation 37. But what depends on God's mere will cannot be known by us with certainty and infallibly except by God's special revelation, as is clear from the Apostle's words: Who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor? Therefore.

It follows from this conclusion that without a special revelation no one can be certain of being predestined, not only with the infallible certainty of faith, but not even with moral certainty to which no falsehood could attach. Thus one cannot be morally certain of this in the way one is certain that one has been baptized, or that the priest celebrating is truly a priest or has the proper intention to consecrate. This is proved as follows: the moral certainty with which one believes that one has been baptized, or that the priest celebrating has the intention to consecrate, excludes all fear and doubt. But no one can be so certain of his predestination, even morally, that this certainty excludes all fear and doubt, as is clear from what was said. Therefore.

Fourth conclusion: as a matter of fact, some people have been certain of their own predestination and salvation with infallible certainty by a special revelation from God. This conclusion is inferred from Sacred Scripture. In Genesis 15 and 22, the Lord said to Abraham: Do not fear; I am your protector, and your reward is exceedingly great. A little later: But you shall go to your fathers in peace and be buried in a good old age. By these words he signified Abraham's own predestination, as the Doctors commonly explain. The same was revealed to Moses in Exodus 33, in the words: I will show you all good. The Apostles' own predestination was also revealed to them in Luke 22: I appoint to you, as my Father appointed to me, a kingdom, so that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom. It was revealed especially to the Apostle Paul, as is clear from 2 Timothy 4: As for the rest, there is laid up for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the just judge, will give me on that day. It was revealed also to the Thief, to whom Luke 23 says: Today you will be with me in paradise. Finally, ecclesiastical histories relate that for certain most holy men their own predestination and salvation were revealed to them as a reward for their labors.

VII. Fifth conclusion: even without a special revelation, the predestination of oneself or another can be known by the faithful from certain signs with a kind of moral certainty, to which, speaking absolutely, falsity could attach and which does not exclude all fear and apprehension of the opposite.

To understand this conclusion, note that, as St. Bernard teaches in sermon 2 on the Octave of Easter, although the Lord decreed that this benefit of predestination should remain hidden from us during mortal life, so that in accordance with the Apostle's command in Philippians 2 we may work out our salvation with fear and trembling, he did not leave his elect entirely without the testimony of consolation in this matter. Rather, he marked them with certain signs from which it is permissible to infer with probability that they are predestined to eternal life. The Apostle seems to suggest this when he says: The Spirit himself bears witness with our spirit that we are children of God.

VIII. The holy Doctors enumerate various signs of predestination. We shall collect only the most important and confirm them with some testimonies of Sacred Scripture.

The first sign is frequent adversity and tribulations in this world, borne patiently. St. Chrysostom establishes and proves this sign at great length in his treatment of Luke 16, at the words Son, remember that you received good things during your life, and Lazarus likewise received bad things; also in book 1, On Providence, near the end, and Homily 66 to the people of Antioch. So does St. Gregory, Moralia, book 5, chapters 1 and 2, at the words Why was light given to the wretched? To make this clear, two foundations assumed by Chrysostom in the cited Homily 8 must be set down.

The first foundation is that no mere human being is so righteous and innocent—excepting only the Blessed Virgin—that he has committed not even some venial sin for which he deserves punishment. For James 3 says: We all offend in many things. And 1 John 1 says: If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. Proverbs 24 says: The just man falls seven times a day. Likewise, no reprobate is so wicked that he has not done one or another morally good deed. St. Chrysostom proves this from Luke 18, where a certain unjust judge is said to have shown mercy to the widow, restraining those who were doing her injury.

The second foundation is that God, since he is supremely just and merciful, leaves no evil deed unpunished and no good deed, even a morally good one, unrewarded. Yet God rewards the good deeds performed by the reprobate with temporal goods in this world, as Ezekiel 29 says of the king of Babylon: I gave him the land of Egypt because he labored for me. And of those who practiced righteousness before people in order to be seen by them, Matthew 6 says: They have received their reward. But for the sins they have committed they will receive fitting punishment in the future. God, however, punishes the sins of the elect with temporal punishments, while he crowns their good merits with an eternal reward.

IX. From these foundations St. Chrysostom draws this conclusion: Therefore, when you see someone living a wicked life and suffering nothing bitter here, do not consider him happy; instead, mourn and lament him, as one who will suffer everything grievously, just as happened to that rich man. Again, when you see someone devoted to virtue and afflicted by countless troubles, consider him blessed and judge him happy, since here he has wiped away all his sins and there has much reward prepared, as happened to this Lazarus. Thus far Chrysostom. The same is suggested by Abraham's reply to the rich man who feasted: Son, remember that you received good things during your life, and Lazarus likewise received bad things; but now he is comforted here, while you are tormented. For this reason St. Augustine in letter 5 to Marcellinus: Nothing, he says, is more wretched than the prosperity of sinners. And on Psalm 143, after the Psalmist had spoken of the reprobate: Their storehouses are full, overflowing from one thing to another, he excludes people's vain judgment by adding: They called the people happy who have these things; but blessed is the people whose God is the Lord. The Apostle also seems to intimate this sign in Hebrews 12 when he says: For what son is there whom his father does not discipline? But if you are without discipline, of which all have become partakers, then you are bastards and not sons. Hence St. Augustine's prayer: Lord, burn here, cut here, so that you may spare us forever. For he knew what the Lord had promised through Nahum 1: Affliction shall not rise up a second time, or, as the Seventy translate it, You will not punish the same thing twice—as if he had said: it will not happen that those who have been tested in the present life, like gold in a furnace, are punished together with the reprobate in the age to come. Finally, St. Bernard, explaining Psalm 72 in sermon 23 on the Canticle, at the words They are not in the labor of men, nor will they be scourged with men, says: Those who are not in the labor of men will surely be in the labor of demons, since the Lord says: Go, you cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the Devil and his Angels. See St. Augustine, volume 8, on Psalm 91, at the words Your thoughts have become exceedingly deep, and on Psalm 93, at the words How long will sinners glory, etc., through the words until a pit is dug for the sinner.

X. The second sign is mercy: when people grieve from the heart over the miseries of others as over their own and strive, in a spirit of charity, to relieve them. St. Augustine establishes this sign in Tractate 5 on the First Epistle of John, where he says that love alone distinguishes the children of the Kingdom from the children of perdition. And at the beginning of volume 10, sermon 44 to the Brothers in the Desert, he says: My dearest brothers, I do not remember ever reading that a person who willingly practiced works of charity or piety in this life died an evil death. For a pious person has many intercessors, and so does one who cheerfully performs works of charity, etc.; therefore it is impossible that the prayers of many should not be heard. This too is found in Sacred Scripture. John 13 says: By this all will know that you are my disciples, if you have love for one another. And Matthew 5 says: Blessed are the merciful, for they will obtain mercy. Scripture says the opposite about the reprobate: Judgment without mercy for the one who does not show mercy. And Tobit 4 says: Almsgiving delivers from every sin and death, and does not permit the soul to go into darkness. Great confidence before the Lord will be almsgiving for all who practice it. Hence the Apostle calls mercy and almsgiving an account of giving and receiving in Philippians 4, saying: No church shared with me in the account of giving and receiving, except you alone. As Chrysostom noted in Homily 15 on the same epistle, he did not say, “No church gave to me,” but shared with me in the account of giving and receiving: for a rich person gives money or something similar to a poor person and receives the kingdom of heaven in return, because almsgiving is a kind of sharing in giving and receiving. See Chrysostom also in the argument of the same epistle, column 3, where he explains Proverbs 3 in the same sense: Let almsgiving and truth not forsake you. He observes that it does not say, “Do not abandon alms,” but Do not let alms abandon you, plainly indicating that we need the alms we give more than they need us.

XI. The third sign is drawn from the goodness and holiness of a person's entire course of life. A holy life regularly produces a good death, whereas a wicked life produces a most wretched death. St. Augustine establishes this sign in On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 22. St. Bernard does so in sermon 22 on the Canticle, explaining Numbers 23: May my soul die the death of the just, and may my end be like theirs. There he teaches plainly that the death of the just is reached through the life of the just. Hence St. Augustine affirms that if someone who has lived wickedly makes a true repentance at the hour of death, his sins will undoubtedly be forgiven and he will be saved. Augustine does doubt, however, that someone who has grown old in a life of sin will afterwards make true repentance before God at the hour of death, because this rarely happens, in accordance with Proverbs 22: A young man will not depart from his way, even when he has grown old. See his commentary on Psalm 118, at the words By what does the young man correct his way?

The fourth sign is willingly to hear the word of God and to taste it with a certain inward sweetness and delight. St. Gregory infers this from John 8: Whoever is of God hears the words of God; this is why you do not hear, because you are not of God. And John 10 says: My sheep hear my voice and follow me. As a sign of this, when Ezekiel, chapter 3, and John the Evangelist, Revelation 10, had eaten the book offered by God, which contained divine words, it seemed sweet in their mouths but bitter in their bellies. For the words of God are sweet and delightful to the elect, who are represented by the mouth of the Lord, in accordance with Jeremiah 15: If you separate the precious from the vile, you shall be as my mouth. But they are bitter and unpleasant to sinners and the reprobate, who are represented by the belly, since, as the Apostle says, their God is their belly. Thus Augustine, explaining Psalm 5: According to the multitude of their impieties drive them out, for they have embittered you, O Lord, says: For sinners the bread of truth is bitter. Hence they hate the mouth of one who speaks the truth. They, then, embittered God, who by sinning fell into such a sickness that they cannot endure, as though it were gall, the food of truth in which sound souls rejoice. Of the elect, however, the Prophet says: How sweet your words are to my palate, sweeter than honey to my mouth. He says “to my mouth,” that is, to the just, not “to my belly,” that is, to the reprobate.

XII. The fifth sign is the testimony of a good conscience. For the Apostle says: This is our glory, the testimony of our conscience. And again: The Spirit himself bears witness that we are children of God; and if children, then heirs; and again: In him, when you believed, you were sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance. There, as St. Thomas noted in lecture 5, the Holy Spirit is called the pledge or earnest of our inheritance, as another reading has it in the Gloss, because something of the very price is now given to the elect, which is not to be taken away but completed in the homeland. St. Bernard establishes this sign in sermons 1 and 2 on the Octave of Easter, where, for our purpose, he explains 1 John 5: There are three who bear witness on earth: the Spirit, the water, and the blood. Therefore, those who ordinarily abstain from mortal sins and have a peaceful, tranquil, and quiet conscience may reasonably be thought to belong to that kingdom of peace, of which the Apostle says: The kingdom of God is not food and drink, but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Spirit. For other signs, see Andrew de Vega, On Justification, book 12, chapter 19; Medina, On Right Faith in God, book 3, chapter 3; and M. Soto, On Nature and Grace, book 3, chapters 11, 12, and 13.

XIII. TO the first argument from the outset, the reply is that the authority of St. John is understood of the certainty of faith, by which we are bound to believe that eternal life is prepared for those who believe in the Son of God and love him, provided they persevere to the end, as St. Thomas explains in his commentary on the same passage. By conditional knowledge, however, our salvation is most certain to us, namely, if we keep God's commandments and persevere to the end. But whether this or that particular person will absolutely persevere to the end, or truly loves God, cannot be certain to us without a special revelation, except by conjectures to which falsity may nevertheless attach.

To the other passage from the Epistle to the Romans, the first reply is that the Apostle there speaks of himself and of others who had a special revelation of their predestination and salvation, as St. Augustine explains in On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 17. A second reply is that, if this authority is understood universally of all the just, its sense is that given by St. Bernard in his sermon on the Twofold Baptism: those who are in charity cannot be separated from it by any external cause unless they themselves wish it. For this reason, among the things he listed, the Apostle said: Neither death, nor life, nor Angels, nor Principalities, nor Powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor strength, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature will be able to separate us from the love of God; he did not include the person himself. For he did not say, “Nor we,” to indicate that by his own free choice a just person can be separated from the love of God by sinning mortally. St. Chrysostom develops this with great elegance in Homily 9, entitled “That no one is harmed except by himself.” There he proves at great length that no external cause can harm a person in spiritual matters unless the person himself wills it. Hence Jerome says: The enemy is weak, since he conquers only one who is willing.

To the second argument, the reply is that this passage is understood of a certain confident assurance to which falsity may attach, as was said; or it can be explained of the Apostles themselves, who had a special revelation of their salvation.

To the third, the reply is that even without a special revelation no one can be certain with infallible certainty that he is in a state of grace, as the theologians commonly teach in part 2, question 112, article 5.

Disputatio XI: Whether, at least among the faithful, there are more elect than reprobate.

Book Six

Introduction

Disputatio I: Whether the children of Adam contract original sin through seminal propagation, such that it truly and properly has the character of guilt in them.

Disputatio II: Whether through original sin man was only deprived of original justice and supernatural gifts, or also wounded in his natural powers.

Disputatio III: What wounds man incurs through original or actual sin.

Disputatio IV: Whether free will in fallen nature, apart from the aids of grace, has the same natural powers for good that it would have had if it had been created in a state of pure nature.

Disputatio V: Whether man can, by the powers of nature alone and without the aid of grace, know every truth pertaining to the natural order.

Disputatio VI: Whether man can, by the powers of nature alone, assent to all the supernatural mysteries proposed and explained to him as revealed by God, with assent that is certain and firm on the believer’s part.

Disputatio VII: Whether, without the aid of grace, man in fallen nature can perform a moral act that is truly good in relation to the ultimate natural end and is an act of true virtue.

Disputatio VIII: Whether man in fallen nature can, by the powers of nature alone together with God’s general concurrence, elicit an absolute, purely natural act of loving God above all things, with an absolute resolve to please him in everything.

Disputatio IX: Whether free will, with general concurrence alone, can elicit attrition or contrition with respect to the substance of the act alone.

Disputatio X: Whether man can, by the natural powers of free will, restore the good connatural to him that he lost through sin.

Disputatio XI: Whether fallen man can, without the aid of grace, keep all the commandments and resist, at every moment, all the temptations he encounters, even the gravest, which must be overcome to keep the natural law.

Book Seven

Introduction

Disputatio I: Whether man can, without the aid of grace, dispose himself at least remotely to obtain grace by asking, seeking, knocking, and so forth.

Disputatio II: Whether those who do all that lies in their power by nature alone receive from God, infallibly and according to a fixed law, the aids of prevenient grace by which they carry it out as required for salvation.

Disputatio III: Whether greater effort of free choice obtains greater or more intense aids of rousing and prevenient grace.

Disputatio IV: Whether someone who does all that lies in his power with the earlier aids of prevenient grace receives subsequent aids infallibly and according to a fixed law.

Disputatio V: Whether someone who does all that lies in his power with efficacious aid, that is, who elicits an act of charity and contrition, receives justifying grace infallibly and according to a fixed law.

Disputatio VI: Whether acts of charity equal to the preexisting habit, or even less intense acts, obtain an increase of habitual grace, charity, and essential glory infallibly and according to a fixed law.

Disputatio VII: Whether deadened merits obtain for the penitent, infallibly and according to an established law, greater habitual grace and a right to more intense essential glory.

Disputatio VIII: Whether greater effort or influence of free choice, with equal aid of assisting grace, obtains for one person greater justifying grace than for another.

Disputatio IX: Whether a naturally more perfect intellect, with equal light of glory, produces a more intense act of beatific vision than another.

Disputatio X: Whether the beatific vision, insofar as it is formally a vital act, is efficiently caused by the light of glory as the principle by which it is produced, or by the intellect alone according to its innate power.

Disputatio XI: Whether acts of believing, hoping, and loving God as the author of grace are supernatural in substance and in the being of nature, or only in their manner and in the moral order.

Disputatio XII: Whether the final disposition to habitual grace proceeds by way of efficient causation from grace itself, or from actual aid alone, that is, from the will elevated by that aid.

Disputatio XIII: Whether free choice can elicit a supernatural act of faith, hope, charity, or repentance by the Holy Spirit’s extrinsic assistance alone, without an aid of grace inhering in the created will.

Disputatio XIV: Whether man is a principal cause in his own order, or only God’s instrument, in the supernatural acts he performs through grace.

Disputatio XV: Whether God’s absolute power can create an intellectual substance capable, by the powers of nature alone, of loving God above all things as the author of grace and eliciting other supernatural acts.

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