De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice. This edition contains Book I: the prooemium and five preliminary disputations on Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian teaching, Manichaean and Reformation positions, Catholic theologians, and the authority of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
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Book One
Prooemium: division of the whole work
Disputatio I: Whether the Pelagians ever admitted that any inward grace, or any supernatural help from God, is divinely given for salvation or for fulfilling the precepts of the law
Disputatio II: What grace the Semi-Pelagians admitted as necessary for salvation, and where their view agrees with or departs from the error of the Pelagians
Disputatio III: What the Manichaeans formerly held, and the Lutherans and Calvinists hold in our time, about the necessity of grace and the natural powers of our free choice
Disputatio IV: What certain Catholic Doctors hold about the natural powers of free choice and its concord with divine foreknowledge, providence, predestination, and the efficacy of the helps of grace
Disputatio V: How much authority Saint Augustine’s teaching has concerning predestination and grace, and whether it is permissible to depart from it
Book Two
Introduction
Disputatio I: Whether the knowledge of God is suitably divided into the knowledge of simple understanding and the knowledge of vision.
Disputatio II: Whether the knowledge of God is sufficiently divided into knowledge that is merely natural and knowledge that is merely free; or whether, besides both, middle knowledge must be posited in God with respect to conditional future things that depend on the human will.
Disputatio III: Whether all future things are actually present in eternity according to the proper existences they will have in their own measure.
Disputatio IV: Whether God certainly knows future contingents because of their real presence in eternity before they come to be, and whether an existence of this kind contributes anything to the certainty and infallibility of the divine knowledge.
Disputatio V: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows all future contingents in the decree, or predetermination, of his divine will.
Disputatio VI: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows future sins in some decree of his divine will.
Disputatio VII: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows future contingents in the predetermination of secondary causes, especially when the secondary causes are free.
Disputatio VIII: Whether, setting aside every predetermination of the divine will and existence in eternity, another ground for the certainty of divine knowledge can be assigned, namely, on the part of the truth of the object.
Disputatio IX: Whether God certainly knows future contingents before the decree of his will, as future, in their ideas.
Disputatio X: Whether there is in God a conjectural knowledge of what, in particular, a created will will do if placed in such circumstances.
Disputatio XI: Whether this causal proposition is true: “Because this is future, it is foreknown by God”; or, conversely: “Because God foreknows something to be future, therefore it is future.”
Disputatio XII: Whether God produces things outside himself immediately through his knowledge, that is, through his intellect; or whether, besides intellect and will, a third executive power must be posited in him, through which things are produced immediately.
Book Three
Introduction
Disputatio I: Whether God’s actual motion, which all secondary causes need in order to produce their effect or operation, is an immediate influx into the secondary cause itself; or whether instead it is only an immediate influx, together with the secondary cause, into its effect.
Disputatio II: What that prior motion is by which God moves and applies secondary causes to act.
Disputatio III: Whether God’s general concurrence, by which he helps secondary causes constituted in first act through supernatural forms to produce supernatural acts, is supernatural; or whether it is of the same order as general concurrence with merely natural acts.
Disputatio IV: Whether God’s general concurrence, especially with respect to acts that depend on created free choice, is indifferent of itself.
Disputatio V: Whether, by an absolute and efficacious decree of his will, God truly predetermines as an efficient cause all secondary causes, both natural and free, to their operations after the manner of a physical cause, while preserving their nature and freedom.
Disputatio VI: Whether, by a prior motion inhering in the created will, God moves, applies, or predetermines it after the manner of a physical cause to all its good acts in particular, while preserving its freedom.
Disputatio VII: Whether, by a prior motion, God truly premoves as an efficient cause free choice after the manner of a physical cause to the act of sin, insofar as it is an act and insofar as it is a being.
Disputatio VIII: Whether all contingent and free acts predetermined by God necessarily occur with the necessity of infallibility, or with necessity on the supposition of the predetermination of the divine will.
Disputatio IX: Whether the first root of contingency is the efficacy, or omnipotence, of the divine will.
Disputatio X: Whether any effect can be called formally contingent in relation to God’s causality, especially when it is produced immediately by him.
Book Four
Introduction
Disputatio I: Whether God has providence not only over all genera and species, but also over all individuals in particular, according to all circumstances of place, time, etc.
Disputatio II: Whether the evils of punishment are willed by an absolute and efficacious will, and predetermined in particular, through divine providence, or are only permitted.
Disputatio III: Whether the nature of divine providence includes not only the ordering of means to an end, but also the attainment of the end intended by God.
Disputatio IV: Whether contingent and free secondary causes can withdraw themselves from, or depart from, the order assigned to them by divine providence.
Disputatio V: Whether created free choice can resist almighty God, or strive against the order of divine providence.
Book Five
Introduction
Disputatio I: Whether all the explanations that St. Augustine gives of those words of the Apostle, “God wills all human beings to be saved,” are legitimate.
Disputatio II: What God's antecedent will is, what his consequent will is, and whether antecedent will formally entails some conditional act or wish in God.
Disputatio III: What predestination is, and in which act it formally consists: an act of the will, or rather an act of the intellect.
Disputatio IV: Whether the good use of the aids of grace, insofar as it proceeds from free will, is an effect of predestination.
Disputatio V: Whether the good use of free will, proceeding from the aid of grace, is a cause, reason, or necessary condition of predestination in adults.
Disputatio VI: Whether the predestination of infants depended on, and presupposed, foreknowledge of the good use of the free will of their parents or of others through whom they came to the grace of baptism.
Disputatio VII: Whether the foreseen merits of Christ are the cause of our predestination with respect to its entire effect.
Disputatio VIII: Whether the grace of the state of innocence was conferred on Adam through the merits of Christ.
Whether the grace of the state of innocence was conferred on Adam from Christ's merits.
I. To explain this difficulty, note that the grace of the state of innocence can be considered in two ways. First, as it was restored after sin through Adam's penance; in this respect all theologians acknowledge that it came from Christ's merits. The reason is that this grace, insofar as it was restored through penance, belonged to a human being redeemed by Christ, and through it, as thus restored, Adam was led efficaciously to eternal life, for by reason of it he has some degree of glory. The same must be said of the meritorious acts Adam performed in the state of innocence: for, as St. Thomas teaches in 3. p. quaest. 89. art. 5., meritorious works made dead through a subsequent sin come back to life through penance. That Adam did penance is found in Wisdom 10: She guarded the first-formed father of the world, who was created by God, and delivered him from his sin. Second, that grace can be considered according to its substance and insofar as it formally belonged to the state of innocence. In this respect too some have said that it was given to Adam from Christ's merits. They add that this opinion is very consonant with the order of Christ's predestination and belongs to his honor and excellence. Asturicensis defends the same teaching as probable in his relection on the grace of Christ.1
The first reason for this opinion is that Christ is the universal source and origin of all grace conferred on human beings. Therefore, the grace of the state of innocence also came from the influence of Christ's merits; otherwise he would not be the universal source of grace.
Second, as St. Thomas teaches in 2. 2. quaest. 2. art. 7. and 3. p. q. 1. art. 3. ad 5., before sin Adam had explicit faith in the Incarnation of Christ, as ordered to the consummation of glory. Therefore, he was justified through faith in Christ and consequently from Christ's merits. The consequence is clear: justification through faith in Jesus Christ comes from his merits, because his merits are applied through faith, as is clear from Romans 3: God set him forth as a propitiation through faith in his blood.
Third. The grace conferred on Adam in the state of innocence belonged to a predestined subject. Therefore, it was an effect of his predestination, and therefore came from Christ's merits. The consequence is clear: since the Lord Christ merited our predestination, as was said above, every grace that is an effect of predestination comes from his merits.
Fourth. Christ, insofar as he is man, is the head of all human beings, as St. Thomas teaches in the body of 3. p. q. 8. ar. 3. Therefore, he was the head of our first parents in the state of innocence. But it belongs to the character of a head to pour motion and life into its members. Therefore, the grace of the state of innocence came from the influence of Christ's merits.
Fifth. As Cajetan teaches, grace was conferred on the Angels from Christ's merits,2 and St. Bernard seems to teach the same in sermon 22 on the Song, where, explaining the Apostle's words, He was made for us righteousness, sanctification, and redemption, he says: He raised up fallen man and gave the standing Angel the gift not to fall. Thus he rescued the one from captivity and defended the other from captivity; in this respect he was redemption for both alike, freeing the one and preserving the other. Hence Ephesians 1 says: To restore all things in Christ, those in heaven and those on earth, in him. Therefore, all the more, the grace conferred on Adam in the state of innocence came from Christ's merits.
II. I consider the opposing opinion more probable and more in keeping with St. Thomas's mind. Master Soto holds it in lib. 1. de natura, et gratia, c. 6.; it is common among Thomists and can be clearly inferred from St. Thomas in 3. p. q. 1. ar. 3., where he teaches that if Adam had not sinned the Word would not have become incarnate.3 But if the grace of the state of innocence had come from Christ's merits, then, insofar as that grace belonged to the state of innocence, even without sin the divine Word would have become incarnate to bring Adam's grace to completion and lead him to eternal life through Christ's merits. Thus, the conclusion follows.
This is further proved because, as St. Thomas teaches in 3. sent. d. 13. q. 2. ar. 2. quaestiunc. 1. in corp., grace conferred on the Angels did not come from Christ's merits, since that grace did not belong to a redeemed subject: there was no sin among the good Angels.4 But the grace of the state of innocence, formally speaking, did not belong to a redeemed or captive human being either, because no sin had preceded. Thus, the conclusion follows.
This is confirmed. Christ, insofar as he is man, was the meritorious cause only of that grace by which human beings are freed from sin. For he came as a physician and as a redeemer to save and free what had perished, as is said in Matthew 9 and 18 and Luke 5. But the grace of the state of innocence did not belong to a sick human being, but to one who was healthy. Thus, the conclusion follows.
III. To the first argument for the opposing opinion, we reply that Christ, insofar as he is God, is the universal source and principal efficient cause of all grace; but insofar as he is man—that is, according to his humanity—he is the source, meritorious cause, secondary efficient cause, and instrumental cause only of that grace conferred on fallen and redeemed human beings.
To the second argument, we reply that for someone to be justified by faith in Christ and by his merits, he must first have been captive and sick. This is clear in the case of the Angels, who were not justified from Christ's merits, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited 3. d. 13. Nevertheless, from the beginning of their creation they had faith in the Incarnation of Christ with respect to its substance, as St. Thomas also teaches in 1. p. q. 64. ar. 1. ad 4. Hence, although Adam had faith in the Incarnation of Christ before sin, it does not follow that he had grace in the state of innocence from Christ's merits.
To the third, we reply that for the grace of a predestined human being to be an effect of his predestination, it is required that through that grace he be led efficaciously to eternal life.5 But through the grace of the state of innocence, insofar as it was the state of innocence, Adam was neither led efficaciously to eternal life nor ordered efficaciously to it. Hence it was not an effect of his predestination, but of a certain supernatural divine providence. Similarly, the grace given for a time to the reprobate is not an effect of their predestination, because through it they are not led efficaciously to eternal life.
Second, we reply that the argument proves only that the grace of the state of innocence was in some respect an effect of Adam's predestination and consequently came from Christ's merits insofar as it was restored through Adam's penance, as was said above.
To the fourth, we reply first that Christ, insofar as he is man, was the head of the faithful in the state of innocence. For although he did not merit the grace conferred on them in that state with respect to its substance, he nevertheless influenced that same grace in certain accidental respects, as was said.6 It is not necessary, however, for a head, especially a mystical head, to influence all its members in the same way. Second, we reply that Christ, insofar as he is man, is the universal head of the whole Church, including the Church triumphant, provided that the mystery of the Incarnation is presupposed. For if Adam had not sinned, the Word would not have assumed human flesh, as St. Thomas teaches;7 consequently Christ as man would not have been head of the Church, but only insofar as he is God, as St. Thomas expressly teaches in q. 29. de ver. ar. 4. ad 3. And because the state of innocence is understood as prior to the Incarnation of the Word or to the divine decree concerning the Incarnation, Christ, insofar as he is man, need not have been the head of the state of innocence except consequently, as St. Thomas says of the Angels in the cited question of De veritate, article 4, ad 5.
IIII. To the fifth, we reply that the grace of the Angels, considered according to its substance, did not come from Christ's merits, as St. Thomas says in the cited 3. d. 13., but only with respect to certain accidents, namely illumination.8 For Christ, even insofar as he is man, enlightens the Angels, as St. Dionysius infers in chapter 1 of the Celestial Hierarchy from Isaiah 63, where, as Christ ascends, the Angels are introduced asking: Who is this who comes from Edon, with garments dyed from Bosrah? Christ, insofar as he is man, answers their question: I, who speak righteousness and am a champion to save. Likewise, insofar as he is man, he sends Angels to us, as St. Thomas infers in 3. p. q. 59. art. 6. from Hebrews 1: All are ministering spirits sent out for service on behalf of those who inherit salvation. Moreover, insofar as he is man, he has the power to judge the Angels and confer accidental rewards on them. Hence St. Thomas teaches in the same article 6 that the judicial power in the Lord Christ, insofar as he is man, also extends to the Angels. Nevertheless, he adds in the same article that, insofar as he is man, Christ did not influence the essential reward of the good Angels, but did so only insofar as he is God. From this it is clearly inferred that the grace of the Angels and the merits by which they attained that essential reward did not come from Christ's influence insofar as he is man, or from his merits. To the authority of St. Bernard brought forward, we reply that it is to be understood of Christ insofar as he is God. Its meaning is that through Christ insofar as he is God the good Angels remained standing, just as through that same Christ, God and man, fallen humanity was restored and redeemed. To the Apostle's passage, we reply that Christ, insofar as he is man, restored the things in heaven insofar as, by redeeming and saving fallen human beings, he filled the vacant seats of the Angels who had fallen.