De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

What predestination is, and in which act it formally consists: whether in an act of the will or rather in an act of the intellect.

I. As an introduction to this disputation, first the various senses in which these terms are commonly used—“predestination” or “predestined,” “foreknowledge” or “foreknown”—must be explained. Then the legitimate definition of predestination must be established. Finally, it must be investigated whether predestination formally consists in an act of the intellect or of the will.

Concerning the first point, it should be noted that “to predestine” (as regards the etymology of the word) means the same as to destine beforehand, send ahead, or preordain, by directing something toward an end as a target, just as an arrow is sent ahead by an archer toward the mark at which it is aimed.¹ Although the term “predestination” is taken in a very broad sense for the ordering of any thing to its end, even its natural end, among theologians it is used more strictly and properly to signify the preordination of an intellectual creature to a supernatural end, with the intention of sending it effectively to that end, just as an arrow is sent by an archer. The Prophet seems to allude to this likeness when, speaking of the predestined, especially the Apostles, he says: As arrows in the hand of a mighty man, so are the sons of those shaken out.² Predestination is used in this sense in Romans 1: Who was predestined to be the Son of God in power; and chapter 8: Those whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son; and Ephesians 1: He predestined us to adoption as sons through Jesus Christ, unto himself, according to the purpose of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace, with which he graced us in his beloved Son. It is true that the holy Doctors sometimes use the term “predestination” with an added qualification to signify reprobation. Thus St Augustine says in book 15 of the City of God, chapter 1³: There are two mystical cities and two societies of human beings: one of them is predestined to reign forever with God, the other to undergo punishment forever with the devil. And in the Council of Trent, sess. 6, decree on Justification, canon 17: If anyone says that the grace of justification comes only to those predestined to life, but that all the others who are called are indeed called but do not receive grace, being predestined to evil by divine power, let him be anathema. Nevertheless, when “predestination” is used without qualification, it is always taken in the good sense.

II. Similarly, “foreknowledge” or “foreknown” is commonly used in a broad sense to designate what is known before it comes to be;⁴ thus God is said to foreknow all future contingencies because he knows them certainly and infallibly before they are brought about according to their proper measure. The object itself, known beforehand by God from eternity, is said to be “foreknown.” Hence, in this sense, being foreknown or known beforehand is a certain denomination of reason arising from the real cognition of the one who knows, just as being seen is a denomination of reason in an object arising from the real vision that exists in the one who sees. Nevertheless, through an accommodation in the usage of theologians, the term “foreknown” commonly signifies the reprobate, who, on the supposition that their sin is foreknown, are preordained to eternal punishment. It is true that sometimes in sacred Scripture and among the holy Doctors predestination is signified by the term “foreknowledge,” and the elect are called “foreknown” or “known beforehand” by God, as in Romans 8: Those whom he foreknew, he also predestined; and in chapter 11: God has not rejected his people, whom he foreknew—that is, whom he chose and predestined,” as St Augustine explains in his book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 18. His words are these: Sometimes that same predestination is also signified by the term ‘foreknowledge,’ as the Apostle says: ‘God has not rejected his people, whom he foreknew.’ What he says, ‘he foreknew,’ is not rightly understood unless it means ‘he predestined,’ as the context of the statement itself shows; for he was speaking of the remnant of the Jews who were saved while the others perished. Hence the Apostle also says: The Lord knows those who are his,”⁵ that is, he approved and loved them. Conversely, God is said not to know the reprobate because he neither approves them nor their works, as is clear from Matthew 25: I do not know you; depart from me, workers of iniquity.

III. As regards the definition of predestination, it should be noted that some theologians, in order to defend the view that predestination by God is not without foreknowledge of merits, define it as follows. Predestination is the reason for the order of means in God by which he foresees that a rational creature is to be brought to eternal life, with the intention of carrying out that same order. They explain this definition further, asserting that predestination is the reason for the order of means by which God, through natural knowledge and middle knowledge, which lies between free and purely natural knowledge, foresees that some creature endowed with a mind will attain eternal life, with the purpose or determination of the divine will, on its part, to put this into effect. From this they infer that predestination is not certain with respect to the attainment of its effect by the certainty of the order or causality of the means, but only by the certainty of foreknowledge; that is, if we set aside that middle knowledge, it is not certain that the effect of predestination for such an adult will come to pass. Nevertheless, this definition of predestination is not in accord with the definition given by St Augustine and St Thomas, as will be clear below, nor does it adequately explain the properties of gratuitous predestination. For, besides the fact that it refers the certainty of predestination to a foundation that does not exist in reality—namely, middle knowledge, which we showed to be impossible in disputation 7—from this same definition it would follow that divine predestination, formally speaking, in its character as predestination and in its efficacy, as well as all the helps of grace that our God confers upon the predestined in time, would depend, as on a condition without which they could not be, upon the free cooperation of our free choice, foreknown by God through middle knowledge. I will show below that this is false and contrary to the teaching of St Augustine and St Thomas.

The legitimate definition of predestination, therefore, is the one given by St Augustine in his book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14, and by St Thomas, 1. p. q. 23. art. 1: “Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of God’s benefits, by which all who are delivered are most certainly delivered.” St Thomas uses this definition very often, although sometimes he gives it in these terms: Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future; at other times, in these: Predestination is the reason for the transmission of a rational creature to eternal life, existing in the mind of God,” as in 1. p. q. 23. ar. 2, in the body of the article, and part 3, question 24, article 1, in the body, and question 6 on Truth, article 1. To explain it, one should note that the “foreknowledge” in the definition of predestination is not taken to mean middle knowledge, as its defenders contend,⁶ but knowledge of simple understanding, or natural knowledge, by which God knows possible creatures. For this foreknowledge is presupposed in God, in the order of reason, with respect to predestination; or it may mean free knowledge, by which God foreknew the subject to be predestined, for this foreknowledge, too, precedes predestination in our manner of understanding. Hence St Thomas writes in part 3, question 1, article 3, reply to the fourth objection: Predestination, he says, presupposes foreknowledge of future things; this is commonly interpreted by the Thomists, especially Cajetan, not as foreknowledge of all future things, but of some—namely, those that are not constituted or brought about by predestination itself, such as the foreknowledge of the future sin of the first parent, as a remedy for which Christ was predestined. The term “foreknowledge” in the definition of predestination can also be understood to mean foreknowledge of the benefits by which all who are delivered are most certainly delivered. But in this opinion, which Augustine follows in many places, one must say that such foreknowledge does not precede the free decree of the predestining God in the order of reason, but rather follows it. God foreknew these things for this very reason: because he predestined them, as was shown by the clearest testimonies of St Augustine in disputation 7. The chief among them is the passage in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10: For by predestination God foreknew the things that he himself was going to do; hence it is said, ‘He made the things that are to come.’ And in chapter 17: Thus they were chosen before the foundation of the world by that predestination in which God foreknew his future works. And in chapter 19: When, therefore, he predestined us, he foreknew his work: he who makes us holy and immaculate. He repeats the same in his book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapters 14, 17, and 18. The Apostle speaks of this foreknowledge in Romans 8 when he says: For those whom he foreknew, he also predestined. By this, the opinion of those who explain St Augustine’s definition in this way is excluded: “Predestination is foreknowledge of what free choice would do on the hypothesis that it were stirred by such grace in such circumstances, and the preparation of benefits by which all who are delivered are most certainly delivered.” For, according to our final explanation of St Augustine’s definition, foreknowledge and predestination refer to precisely the same object, namely, God’s benefits by which the elect are most certainly delivered. But middle knowledge does not have these benefits of God as its immediate object; rather, it has the affection and inclination of the human will situated in such circumstances. Therefore, by “foreknowledge” St Augustine does not mean middle or conditional foreknowledge, but absolute foreknowledge, which follows predestination.

Moreover, one should observe that, as St Thomas teaches in 1. p. q. 23. ar. 2, reply to the third objection, preparation is twofold: one kind is in the person or thing prepared, and this is found in a human being or angel who is predestined;⁷ the other is in the one who prepares, and this is not found in the recipient—that is, in the predestined—but in the agent, namely, in God who predestines. Therefore, “preparation” in the definition of predestination is not taken formally for the preparation found in the one prepared, but for the preparation that is in God who prepares, in the way that someone is said to prepare himself to do something when he arranges, orders, and girds himself to carry it out.

IIII. With these points assumed, it remains to explain whether predestination formally and essentially consists in an act of the divine intellect or in an act of the will.

There are two opinions on this matter. The first is that of Scotus, in book 1 of the Sentences, distinction 40, sole question, at the beginning; St Bonaventure, in the same distinction, article 1, question 2; and Gregory of Rimini, question 1, article 1. They assert that predestination essentially consists in an act of the will by which God wills eternal life for the elect. The chief argument for this opinion is drawn from the Apostle’s words in Ephesians 1: He chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we might be holy,” etc. In this passage predestination is called election; but election is essentially an act of the will, as St Thomas teaches in 1. 2. q. 13. ar. 1. Therefore.

This is confirmed from Romans 9: That the purpose of God according to election might stand, not from works, but from him who calls, it was said: ‘The elder shall serve the younger.’ By these words predestination is called God’s purpose; but purpose is an act of the will. Therefore.

Second: although predestination includes an act of the intellect and of the divine will, it nevertheless principally signifies an act of the will, and only indirectly connotes an act of the practical intellect by which God orders means to an end. Therefore, predestination substantially and essentially stands for an act of the will. The antecedent is proved as follows: as Cajetan noted in 1. p. q. 23. ar. 1, the order of means to an end conceived by the divine intellect, insofar as it precedes the will’s approval and acceptance, has only the character of something conceived, not of predestination. Therefore it is formally constituted as predestination through the approval and acceptance of the divine will, and consequently predestination itself consists principally and formally in an act of the will.

Third: predestination and reprobation are acts of the same power, since one is opposed to the other, as willing is to not willing, and consequently they proceed from the same power. But reprobation is not essentially and formally an act of the intellect, but of the will, to which it belongs to approve or reprobate something. Therefore the same is true of predestination.

V. The second opinion is that of St Thomas, 1. p. q. 23. art. 1, and question 6 on Truth, article 1, where he teaches that predestination is an act of the intellect, although it connotes and has joined to it an act of the will. His opinion is defended by Durand, in book 1 of the Sentences, distinction 40, question 1; Alexander of Hales, part 1, question 28, member 2, articles 1 and 2; Cajetan; Master Bañes; and all the Thomists. For clarity, it should be noted that, although God is utterly simple and no multiplicity of acts really or formally distinct from one another is found in him, nevertheless, by a reasoned distinction, we distinguish in him several acts, both on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will, which concur in predestination. Of these, some stand antecedently to predestination itself, while others stand consequently to it. The first is an act of the intellect by which God, through knowledge of simple understanding, knew all possible human beings and angels. The second is an act of the will by which, from among all possible intellectual creatures, he freely chose and loved certain ones, that they might exist both in natural being and in supernatural being. The third is an active disposition by which God placed the things he had produced in different grades. The fourth is an act of the divine will concerning the end, by which God efficaciously willed to confer eternal life on some. The fifth is an act of supernatural providence, or predestination, by which things disposed among themselves are efficaciously ordered through such means to the supernatural end, which consists in the clear vision of God. St Thomas explains how the disposition of the parts stands in relation to their ordering toward the end in question 5 on Truth, article 1, reply to the ninth objection, and in book 1 of the Sentences, distinction 39, question 1, article 1, in the body and reply to the fourth objection. The sixth and final act is the execution of this order, which God fulfills in time by calling, justifying, and glorifying the predestined, according to Romans 8: Those whom he predestined, he also called; and those whom he called, he also justified; and those whom he justified, he also glorified.

Therefore, predestination essentially and formally consists in an act of the intellect, although it presupposes an act of the will antecedently. This is proved from the definition of predestination given above: predestination is the reason for the order of means to a supernatural end existing in the divine mind. But the reason for an order essentially and formally belongs to the intellect, for ordering belongs to reason and intellect. Hence ordering belongs to the wise man, as St Thomas teaches at the beginning of book 1 of the Contra Gentiles. Therefore, and so forth.

This is confirmed by Acts 13: As many as were ordained to eternal life believed,” where the predestined are called the preordained, because predestination consists in preordination of means toward eternal life. Hence St Augustine says in book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 17: To preordain,” he says, is to arrange future things in foreknowledge and to order them. And the author of the Hypognosticon says at the beginning of book 6: Predestination is so called from foreseeing and ordering what is to come. Since, then, the ordering of means toward an end is essentially an act of the intellect, it remains that predestination essentially and formally consists in an act of the intellect.

It is proved further: predestination is the first cause of all the benefits that God confers on the predestined in time, as is clear from the Apostle’s words cited above: Those whom he predestined, he also called,” etc. But God causes all things through an act of the intellect, although he presupposes an act of the will. For, as was shown in disputations 16 and 17, God operates all things through the intellect as moved by the will. Therefore predestination essentially and formally consists in an act of the divine intellect.

VI. To the first argument in favor of Scotus’s opinion, it is answered that in sacred Scripture predestination is also called preordination, and the predestined are called preordained to eternal life, as is clear from what was said above. Sometimes, however, that same predestination is signified by the name of election or of the divine purpose, which pertains to the will—not because predestination is formally and substantially election or an act of the will, but because it is election antecedently, in the way in which St Thomas says in the cited question 1. 2. q. 13, that election is an act of reason, not substantially,” but antecedently, because it presupposes an act of reason. By this, the answer to the confirmation is clear.

To the second argument, the antecedent is denied. In reply to the proof, it is answered that it concludes only that predestination, which consists in an act of the intellect, intrinsically connotes an act of the divine will, both antecedently, insofar as it presupposes God’s love and election, and also consequently, insofar as it approves and accepts the reason for ordering those to be conveyed to eternal life.

To the third argument it is answered that, as St Thomas teaches in 1. p. q. 23. ar. 3, in the body of the article, reprobation is a part of providence, just as predestination is, although they differ in this: predestination is the cause both of what the predestined await in the future life, namely glory, and of what they receive in the present, namely grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what exists in the present, namely sin, but is the cause of abandonment by God; yet it is the cause of what is rendered in the future, namely eternal punishment. But sin proceeds from the free choice of the one who is reprobated and abandoned by grace. Providence, however, is formally and essentially an act of the intellect, although it presupposes an act of the will. Hence, just as predestination is an act of the divine intellect having an act of the will joined to it antecedently and consequently, so reprobation is essentially and principally an act of the intellect by which God permits some to fall away from the supernatural end, for the manifestation of his justice in the reprobate and his greater mercy in the elect, and, on the supposition of sin, ordains that they be punished with eternal punishments. Yet it has joined to it an act of the will by which God wills to permit sin and to inflict punishment on account of it. It should nevertheless be noted that reprobation does not formally consist in a positive disordering from the ultimate end—for this proceeds from the sin of the reprobate himself—but in the ordering of the permission of sin and of the punishment of the reprobate for sin, toward the manifestation of divine justice in the reprobate and of mercy in the elect, as was said. As for the point raised in the same argument, namely, that approval is formally an act of the will and therefore so is reprobation, the answer is that approval is an act of the intellect, since it is a certain examination together with a judgment of reason, as is clear from 2 Corinthians 13: Test yourselves to see whether you are in the faith; examine yourselves; and 1 Corinthians 11: Let a person examine himself, and so let him eat of that bread and drink of that cup. Hence St Thomas, question 5 on Truth, article 4, in the body and reply to the first objection, distinguishes two kinds of divine providence: one of approval, the other of permission. He teaches that the first concerns only good things, but the second evil things. Nevertheless, the act of approval also connotes an act of the will, as was said concerning reprobation and predestination.