De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate
Diego Álvarez (1550–1631)
De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate, ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorundem auxiliorum concordia
First published 1610
Diego Álvarez’s twelve-book treatise on divine grace and human free choice. This edition contains Book I: the prooemium and five preliminary disputations on Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian teaching, Manichaean and Reformation positions, Catholic theologians, and the authority of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Latin from the Rome 1610 edition, with a new English translation.
✦ This work is being completed — add a section.
Book One
Prooemium: division of the whole work
Disputatio I: Whether the Pelagians ever admitted that any inward grace, or any supernatural help from God, is divinely given for salvation or for fulfilling the precepts of the law
Disputatio II: What grace the Semi-Pelagians admitted as necessary for salvation, and where their view agrees with or departs from the error of the Pelagians
Disputatio III: What the Manichaeans formerly held, and the Lutherans and Calvinists hold in our time, about the necessity of grace and the natural powers of our free choice
Disputatio IV: What certain Catholic Doctors hold about the natural powers of free choice and its concord with divine foreknowledge, providence, predestination, and the efficacy of the helps of grace
Disputatio V: How much authority Saint Augustine’s teaching has concerning predestination and grace, and whether it is permissible to depart from it
Book Two
Introduction
Disputatio I: Whether the knowledge of God is suitably divided into the knowledge of simple understanding and the knowledge of vision.
Disputatio II: Whether the knowledge of God is sufficiently divided into knowledge that is merely natural and knowledge that is merely free; or whether, besides both, middle knowledge must be posited in God with respect to conditional future things that depend on the human will.
Disputatio III: Whether all future things are actually present in eternity according to the proper existences they will have in their own measure.
Disputatio IV: Whether God certainly knows future contingents because of their real presence in eternity before they come to be, and whether an existence of this kind contributes anything to the certainty and infallibility of the divine knowledge.
Disputatio V: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows all future contingents in the decree, or predetermination, of his divine will.
Disputatio VI: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows future sins in some decree of his divine will.
Disputatio VII: Whether God certainly and infallibly knows future contingents in the predetermination of secondary causes, especially when the secondary causes are free.
Disputatio VIII: Whether, setting aside every predetermination of the divine will and existence in eternity, another ground for the certainty of divine knowledge can be assigned, namely, on the part of the truth of the object.
Disputatio IX: Whether God certainly knows future contingents before the decree of his will, as future, in their ideas.
Disputatio X: Whether there is in God a conjectural knowledge of what, in particular, a created will will do if placed in such circumstances.
Disputatio XI: Whether this causal proposition is true: “Because this is future, it is foreknown by God”; or, conversely: “Because God foreknows something to be future, therefore it is future.”
Disputatio XII: Whether God produces things outside himself immediately through his knowledge, that is, through his intellect; or whether, besides intellect and will, a third executive power must be posited in him, through which things are produced immediately.
Book Three
Introduction
Disputatio I: Whether God’s actual motion, which all secondary causes need in order to produce their effect or operation, is an immediate influx into the secondary cause itself; or whether instead it is only an immediate influx, together with the secondary cause, into its effect.
Disputatio II: What that prior motion is by which God moves and applies secondary causes to act.
Disputatio III: Whether God’s general concurrence, by which he helps secondary causes constituted in first act through supernatural forms to produce supernatural acts, is supernatural; or whether it is of the same order as general concurrence with merely natural acts.
Disputatio IV: Whether God’s general concurrence, especially with respect to acts that depend on created free choice, is indifferent of itself.
Disputatio V: Whether, by an absolute and efficacious decree of his will, God truly predetermines as an efficient cause all secondary causes, both natural and free, to their operations after the manner of a physical cause, while preserving their nature and freedom.
Disputatio VI: Whether, by a prior motion inhering in the created will, God moves, applies, or predetermines it after the manner of a physical cause to all its good acts in particular, while preserving its freedom.
Disputatio VII: Whether, by a prior motion, God truly premoves as an efficient cause free choice after the manner of a physical cause to the act of sin, insofar as it is an act and insofar as it is a being.
Disputatio VIII: Whether all contingent and free acts predetermined by God necessarily occur with the necessity of infallibility, or with necessity on the supposition of the predetermination of the divine will.
Disputatio IX: Whether the first root of contingency is the efficacy, or omnipotence, of the divine will.
Disputatio X: Whether any effect can be called formally contingent in relation to God’s causality, especially when it is produced immediately by him.
Book Four
Introduction
Disputatio I: Whether God has providence not only over all genera and species, but also over all individuals in particular, according to all circumstances of place, time, etc.
Disputatio II: Whether the evils of punishment are willed by an absolute and efficacious will, and predetermined in particular, through divine providence, or are only permitted.
Disputatio III: Whether the nature of divine providence includes not only the ordering of means to an end, but also the attainment of the end intended by God.
Disputatio IV: Whether contingent and free secondary causes can withdraw themselves from, or depart from, the order assigned to them by divine providence.
Disputatio V: Whether created free choice can resist almighty God, or strive against the order of divine providence.
Book Five
Introduction
Disputatio I: Whether all the explanations that St. Augustine gives of those words of the Apostle, “God wills all human beings to be saved,” are legitimate.
Disputatio II: What God's antecedent will is, what his consequent will is, and whether antecedent will formally entails some conditional act or wish in God.
What is the antecedent will of God, what is his consequent will, and whether antecedent will formally entails in God some conditional act, or a velleity.
I. The first opinion is that antecedent will is a will that proceeds from God alone in such a way that it takes no occasion from any of our evil deeds and presupposes none. Consequent will, however, is one that arises from our fault and presupposes it. The following argument is advanced in support of this opinion:
An argument is made from the authority of St Thomas, 1. p. q. 19. ar. 6, reply to the first objection, where he says that by antecedent will a just judge wills every person to live, but by consequent will he wills a murderer to be hanged—that is, on the supposition of sin. In this way, he says, “God antecedently wills every human being to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned according to the order of his justice.” But God’s retributive justice presupposes sin; therefore, according to St Thomas, God’s consequent will presupposes our evil deeds.
This is confirmed from St Augustine, book 3 against Julian, chapter 18, who says: “God can free some without good merits, because he is good; he cannot damn some without evil merits, because he is just.” And if someone asks what act God’s antecedent will entails with respect to the salvation of all, they reply that it entails an act conditional on the part of the object willed, by which he wills all to be saved if they themselves will it, or if the impediment does not lie with them. From this they infer that God always wills antecedently the opposite of what he wills by consequent will. For they say that consequent will is the will by which, upon the addition of certain circumstances, something is willed absolutely, while a velleity for the opposite remains.
II. Nevertheless, this opinion explains neither rightly nor adequately what God’s antecedent will and consequent will are, nor does it accord with the mind of St Thomas in 1. p. q. 19. ar. 6 cited above, where he treats this matter expressly. To explain it, one must first assume that, as St Thomas teaches in the cited article 6, everything is willed by God insofar as it is good; nor can it be hated under this aspect, since the good is what all things desire. Second, one must note that something considered absolutely and in itself can be good and lovable, yet, when considered individually together with all its attendant circumstances, may not be good but may take on the character of evil—namely, because it deprives us of another, greater good, which is more desirable. For a lesser good, in comparison with a greater good, takes on a certain character of evil. Thus, to love and preserve one’s goods is good in itself; yet it is not good to preserve them at the cost of one’s life. Third, one must assume that a will which regards an object considered in itself is antecedent will, whereas a will which regards the object together with all its attendant features and circumstances is called consequent will, as St Thomas expressly teaches in the cited article 6, reply to the first objection. The reason the holy Doctor gives is that consideration of an object in itself precedes consideration of that same object as having such attendant circumstances. Let the following, then, be stated:
III. First conclusion. God’s antecedent will is that which is directed toward some object considered absolutely and in itself;1 this will is called antecedent not because it precedes the good or evil use of our free choice, as the authors of the first opinion suppose, but because it precedes the will by which God is directed toward an object considered with some attendant circumstance; that will is consequent, and its consideration comes later. St Thomas teaches this conclusion plainly in the cited article 6.2 It is proved in no other way than from the principles laid down and from the meaning of the words themselves.
Second conclusion. If the salvation of the reprobate is considered in itself and absolutely, then it is willed by God;3 but if it is considered insofar as it has joined to it the privation or absence of a greater good—namely, the universal good of divine providence, the beauty of the universe, the manifestation of divine justice in the reprobate, and the greater splendor of God’s mercy in the elect—then it is not willed by God. Accordingly, we assert that by consequent will God does not will all to be saved, but only the predestined. The first part of this conclusion is conceded by all; the second is denied by the adherents of the first opinion. Nevertheless, it is in keeping with the mind of St Thomas, 1. p. q. 23. ar. 3, reply to the first objection, where he says, God loves all human beings, and also all creatures, insofar as he wills some good for them all; yet he does not will every good for them all. Therefore, insofar as he does not will for some the good that is eternal life, he is said to hate or reprobate them. He confirms the same in article 5 of the same question, reply to the third objection. It is proved from the principles laid down: a particular good that entails the loss of a greater good is not desirable, since through its attendant circumstances it takes on the character of evil. But if all were saved universally, the universal good of divine providence and the perfection of the universe would be impeded; for these require different grades among things, with some of them holding the highest place and others the lowest. The manifestation of divine justice and the greater splendor of his mercy toward the elect would also be impeded. These goods are much greater than the salvation of some; therefore.
IIII. Third conclusion. It is not necessary that God, by antecedent will, will the opposite of what he wills by consequent will.4 This conclusion is against the authors of the first opinion, but it is proved by most evident reasons. First: God willed St Peter to be saved by consequent will, since he was saved; and he also willed his salvation by antecedent will, for by this will he wills all to be saved. Therefore God does not always will by consequent will the opposite of what he wills by antecedent will, nor vice versa. It is proved a second time: that St Peter be saved is good considered in itself; therefore it is willed by God through antecedent will. The inference is clear, for antecedent will is directed toward an object considered absolutely and in itself. Likewise, if St Peter’s salvation is considered with all its attendant features and circumstances, it is good, since he was just and holy, and in him God’s mercy and the beauty of the universe shone forth especially. Therefore it is willed by God through consequent will. The same argument applies to all the predestined; therefore the conclusion is the same as before. It is proved finally as follows: predestination includes antecedent and consequent will concerning someone’s salvation, as St Thomas expressly teaches in the first book of the Sentences, on Annibaldus, distinction 46, sole question, article 2, reply to the first objection. Therefore God wills the eternal salvation of all the predestined by antecedent and consequent will. God, then, does not always will by consequent will the opposite of what he wills by antecedent will.
V. Fourth conclusion. Antecedent will formally entails in God a conditional act by which he would will the salvation of all, unless the beauty of the universe and the universal good of divine justice and mercy were thereby impeded.5 Master Bañes and Zumel defend the first part of the conclusion as probable in the cited article 6, although they assert that the opposite opinion is more probable. For they say that a conditional act, or velleity, is found in God only eminently. Nevertheless, many other Thomists defend our opinion, and it is proved by the authority of St Thomas in the cited article 6, where he teaches that, just as a judge has that antecedent will, “I would wish all men to live,” so God wills all men to be saved. He says the same in question 23 on Truth, article 2.6 But antecedent will and velleity with respect to the preservation of everyone’s life are found formally in a judge; therefore, they are also found formally in God. It is proved a second time: God loves the reprobate by an actual love of friendship while he exists in grace; therefore, by a formal act of willing, he wills blessedness for him. The inference is clear: blessedness is a good that God wills for his friends, but this willing of blessedness is not absolute, since it is not fulfilled; therefore, it is formally a conditional act of willing on the part of the object willed—namely, if he perseveres to the end. The inference is proved as follows: every formal act of willing must be absolute or nonabsolute, and consequently conditional. The second part of the conclusion is clear from what was said both in the second conclusion and in the preceding disputation. Moreover, it can be proved by the authority of St Augustine, who says that many are not saved, not because they themselves are unwilling, but because God does not will it; this is shown without any controversy in the case of infants;7 therefore, the condition included in antecedent will, by which God wills all men to be saved, is not “if they themselves will it, or if the impediment does not lie with them.”
VI. But an argument is made against the first part of this conclusion. Velleity denotes an intrinsic imperfection; therefore it is not found formally in God, but only eminently.
A second argument is made. There is no formal desire in God; therefore there is no conditional will or velleity. The inference is proved as follows: velleity seems to imply a certain desire.
A third argument is made from the authority of Pope Agatho in a certain decretal letter, which is cited in the Sixth General Council, action 4. It says that our Lord Christ had two wills, the divine, namely, and the human, and assigns this difference between them: Christ’s divine will is always fulfilled, but his human will is not, as is clear when in Mark 7 he “wanted to hide, and could not.”8 From this the following argument is drawn: if velleity were found formally in God, the assigned difference between the divine and human wills of our Lord Christ would be null. For Christ’s absolute human will was always fulfilled, but not his conditional will, as when he said: “Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me.”9 But if velleity is found formally in the divine will, Christ’s divine will likewise, when absolute, is always fulfilled, but not when conditional. Therefore.
To the first argument it is answered that velleity does not denote an intrinsic imperfection on the part of the act of will in God himself, but only on the part of the object. For an object is not lovable by God insofar as it has joined to it the privation of a greater good; it is lovable only when considered absolutely and in itself. An example is found in the divine will: it necessarily loves God’s own goodness, but it does not love the goodness of creatures necessarily, rather it loves it freely—not because of an imperfection in the act of the divine will, but because of the imperfection of the object willed secondarily, namely, because that object does not have a necessary connection with divine goodness. Consequently, it is not lovable by God necessarily, but freely.
VII. To the second argument it is answered that there is no formal desire in God with respect to his own good, because he always has it present;10 nevertheless, it is not incompatible with this that he have a formal conditional desire for some created good under its antecedent aspect.
To the third argument it is answered that the divine will of our Lord Christ, by itself and from its own nature, has omnipotence and is efficacious for accomplishing everything it wills in heaven and on earth, whether it acts immediately by itself or through the ministry of creatures. The human will of our Lord Christ, however, even when absolute, was not efficacious by itself and from its own nature for doing everything it willed to be done, but acted by a power communicated to it through union with the Word, as is discussed in the third part, question 13, article 4. Hence the reasoning is not the same for the two wills.
To the argument made at the beginning in favor of the first opinion, it is answered that St Thomas there established an example concerning a particular object that God wills by consequent will, on the supposition of sin. Yet it is not necessary that what God wills by consequent will always presuppose sin, as was said in the third conclusion. By this, the authority of St Augustine is also answered.