De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether all the explanations that St Augustine gives of those words of the Apostle, “God wills all men to be saved,” are legitimate.¹

I. St Augustine gives four explanations of the Apostle’s words just cited. The first is according to a certain suitable distribution, so that the sense is not that he wills universally that all men be saved;² rather, no one is saved whom God does not will to be saved, in the manner of speaking customary when one says: “This teacher teaches all the boys in the city”—not that he teaches them all universally, but that no one learns letters except the one whom he has taught.³ Augustine explains it thus in book 4 against Julian, chapter 8; in On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 14; and in On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 8, where he adduces the example of the teacher; in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, chapter 102; in book 6 of the Hypognosticon, at the end; and in Letter 107 to Vitalis. The second explanation is that the distribution “all” is taken incompletely for the classes of individuals, but not completely for each individual in each class;⁴ and the sense is that God wills some to be saved from every condition of human beings—that is, from among rich and poor, Jews and Gentiles, males and females, kings and subjects, and so on. It is like saying, “Every animal was in Noah’s Ark”: the sense is not that absolutely every animal was there, but that an animal of every species was in Noah’s Ark.⁵ St Augustine gives this interpretation in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, chapter 103. Fulgentius also follows it in book On the Incarnation and Grace of Christ, chapter 31, as do Bede and Anselm on that passage of St Paul. The third explanation is that “God wills”—that is, causes human beings to will—that all be saved, in the sense in which it is said in Romans 8, The Spirit intercedes for us, that is, causes us to intercede with inexpressible groanings.⁶ And in Genesis 22, Now I know, that is, “I have caused it to be known,” that you fear the Lord. St Augustine explains it thus in On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 15, where he says: It can also be understood in this way: God wills all men to be saved because he makes us will it, just as he sent the Spirit of his Son crying, ‘Abba, Father,’ that is, making us cry. We therefore cry, but he is said to cry who causes us to cry. If Scripture rightly called the Spirit ‘crying,’ since he causes us to cry, then it rightly calls God ‘willing’ as well, since he causes us to will. The fourth explanation teaches that the Apostle is speaking of God’s antecedent will,⁷ which is the will of sign and the will in a certain respect, as will be said in the following disputation. St Augustine also gives this explanation in On the Articles Falsely Attributed to Him, article 2, and in the cited chapter 15 of On Rebuke and Grace. It is followed by Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, book 2, chapter 29; Prosper, On the Calling of All Nations, book 2, chapters 19 and 25, and in his second response to the objections of Vincent; Theophylact and Oecumenius on the same epistle; and St Thomas in the same place and in 1. p. q. 23. art. 4, reply to the third objection, and question 19, article 6, in the body of the article, where he also accepts St Augustine’s first and second explanations. Finally, St Chrysostom, Homily 1 on the Epistle to the Ephesians, and St Ambrose on chapter 2 of the First Epistle to Timothy give this last explanation; it is fairly common among the Doctors.

II. But some modern theologians are displeased by St Augustine’s first three explanations, asserting that they are insufficiently consonant with the sacred Scriptures and, consequently, should neither be approved nor admitted. They are refuted by the following arguments:

First: For God ordained all human beings and angels, without exception, to eternal life, and placed them all in the hand of their own counsel, so that, aided by divine grace, they could be saved if they wished, and would in fact attain salvation if the impediment did not lie with them. Therefore God truly and properly wills all to be saved, unless the impediment lies with them; therefore the authority of the Apostle should not be restricted, as St Augustine restricts it.

Second: Another distribution, by which the Apostle says in the same context, “I beseech that supplications, prayers, etc. be made for all men,” suffers no similar restriction; therefore neither does the distribution “He wills all men to be saved.” The antecedent is conceded by all; otherwise one ought to pray only for the predestined, or for some people from each class of human beings, which is more than false. The consequence is proved as follows: St Paul plainly equates the two distributions, and from the fact that God wills all men to be saved, he infers that prayers and supplications are to be made for all. He therefore understands that God wills all those to be saved for whom he says that we must pray.

III. Third, one argues as follows. In God there is a true act of will by which he wills universally that all human beings, without exception, observe the precepts and counsels if they wish; therefore there is also in him a true will by which he wills universally that all human beings be saved, if they themselves wish, or unless the impediment lies with them. The antecedent is evident from Matthew 6: “Your will be done, as in heaven, so also on earth.” This prayer would be mockery unless the aforesaid act of will concerning the observance of the precepts were established in God.

Fourth, one argues that St Augustine’s first two explanations are not in good accord with passages of Scripture which say that God does not will the sinner’s death, but that all be converted and live. For Ezekiel 18 says: Is it my will that the wicked man should die, and not rather that he should be converted and live? And chapter 33 says: As I live, says the Lord, I do not will the death of the wicked; and Matthew 23⁸ says: How often have I wanted to gather your children, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you were unwilling? Therefore.

Fifth, it is proved as follows: otherwise the invitations to penance and to observance of the commandments, which come from God and are addressed to all human beings, would be feigned and mockeries rather than expressions of a true intention. For if God did not have a true will that all be saved without distinction, if they wished, why does he call and invite them to come to the banquet and be saved?

Sixth, one argues as follows. If the salvation and eternal glory of all human beings is considered in itself and absolutely, it is good; therefore it cannot fail to please God. Therefore, concerning the salvation of all human beings, God has not merely a will of sign, but also a will of good pleasure. Therefore, by his will of good pleasure, he wills that all be saved, unless the impediment lies with them. This is confirmed: when the Apostle says that prayers are to be made for all, he assigns the reason, adding: For this is pleasing before God, who wills all men to be saved;⁹ therefore he is speaking of the will of good pleasure.

Seventh, an argument is made against the third explanation. God does not cause each individual to will to be saved and to lead a right life, as is evident; therefore one must have recourse to one of the earlier explanations, and consequently the third explanation cannot stand by itself.

Nevertheless, these arguments not only fail to prove, but do not even make it probable, that these three explanations of St Augustine should not be admitted. For St Thomas and many other Doctors admit them in the places cited above and in their treatment of grace and predestination, concerning which the Supreme Pontiffs received the teaching of this most holy man, as was shown in disputation 5; no one ought to depart from it. But since the opinion defended by the theologians cited above concerning the manner of predestination cannot cohere with those first two explanations of St Augustine, they therefore try to exclude them with so many arguments. Yet from their solution it will become clear enough how groundlessly they attack St Augustine. Moreover, this can be established as follows: for God’s will of good pleasure is always fulfilled, as theologians commonly teach, especially St Thomas, 1. p. q. 19. ar. 6, Cajetan on the First Epistle to Timothy, chapter 2, Scotus in book 1, distinction 46, sole question, reply to the first objection, and St Bonaventure in the same distinction, article 1, question 1. But not all are saved; therefore God does not will by his will of good pleasure that all be saved. Consequently, those explanations of St Augustine and St Thomas must necessarily be admitted. The whole difficulty, then, lies in the solutions to the arguments.

IIII. To the first argument it is answered that all the elect are ordered, or predestined, by the consequent will—which is the will absolutely speaking—to attain eternal life; for since predestination is the plan for ordering means to a supernatural end, namely eternal life, it is impossible for anyone to be simply preordained to eternal life without also being predestined. The reprobate, however, are ordered by divine providence to eternal life by God’s antecedent will, which, as St Thomas says, 1. p. q. 19. ar. 6, in the body of the article, is a will in a certain respect, as was explained in disputation 30, no. 7.¹⁰ Hence God wills that the reprobate be saved, not simply, but in a certain respect. When the objection is raised that all have been placed in the hand of their own counsel, the answer is that all human beings are not said to have been placed in the hand of their own counsel because God wills universally that all be saved, but because, at least through the help of grace—which, by divine mercy, is possible for all as long as they are on the way—they can do good and be saved, or through their own malice depart from the good. For they are capable of turning toward good or evil, as was said above.

But against this: since anyone, while on the way, can be saved through the help of grace, God therefore wills by his will of good pleasure that all be saved, unless the impediment lies with them. The answer is that I deny the inference: all that follows is that God wills that all be able to be saved. This is indeed most true, because, as far as it depends on him, he is ready to give grace to all, as will become clear in disputations 112 and 113.

To the second argument, the answer given with St Augustine, in book On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 14, is that, since we do not know who belongs to the number of the predestined and who does not, we ought to be moved by such a disposition of charity that we wish all to be saved and pray for all, that they may be saved.

A second answer is that prayers are to be offered for all even if God does not will all to be saved by his will of good pleasure,¹¹ but only by his antecedent will, or will of sign. For our Lord Christ prayed to the Father, “If it is possible, let this cup pass from me,”¹² even though he certainly knew that the Father had decreed that Christ should suffer death.

A third answer is that, since God has universal providence over all, it belongs to him to order some simply to attain eternal life and to leave and permit others to fall away from it and be damned through sin, so that greater beauty may be preserved in things and divine mercy shine more brightly in the elect. For this reason he does not will universally that all be saved. Each individual human being, however, has only particular providence; hence it belongs to each to pray indiscriminately for all and to wish for all that good of eternal life, as long as they are capable of it.

V. To the third argument it is answered that God wills, by his antecedent will or will of sign—which is a will in a certain respect—that all universally observe his precepts;¹³ but he does not will this by his consequent will; otherwise all would fulfill God’s precepts. For God’s absolute or consequent will is always fulfilled, as St Thomas teaches in 1. p. q. 19. ar. 6. But for the sake of a greater good he wills to permit some to transgress the precepts. The same must be said proportionately of the will by which he wills all to be saved.

To the fourth argument, the antecedent is denied. In reply to the cited passages of Scripture, it is answered that they are to be understood of spiritual death, which comes through sin. God does not will this death, but only permits it. This explanation is gathered from the context, for it says: “But rather that he be converted and live.” If, however, they are explained of the second death, namely eternal damnation, one must say that God does not will to inflict this death on anyone except on the supposition of sin, as will be clear in disputations 109 and 110.

The fifth argument has already been answered at length in disputation 23, no. 33, where, by the testimonies of St Hilary and St Augustine, we showed that a similar objection had formerly been raised against those explanations and the teaching of that same St Augustine, but that the same holy Doctor resolved it, as was said there; and more will be said in disputation 109, no. 9.

To the sixth argument it is answered that, although God wills the salvation of all universally when considered in itself and absolutely, if it is considered with all its circumstances—that is, insofar as, were all to be saved, there would not be such great beauty in the universe, nor would God’s mercy shine so brightly in the elect—then for this reason he does not will all to be saved, as was said, and will be made clearer in the following disputation. And since the will is directed toward things as they exist externally, with all their circumstances, it follows that the will by which God wills someone to be saved, with all the circumstances weighed, is a will simply speaking; whereas the will by which he wills someone’s eternal salvation considered absolutely, but without considering all the circumstances, is a will in a certain respect, as St Thomas expressly says in 1. p. q. 19. ar. 6, reply to the first objection. By this, the confirmation is also answered.

To the seventh, it is answered that God causes all who are saved to will to be saved, and likewise causes all who will the salvation¹⁴ of everyone else to will it. Nor does it follow from this that the third explanation should not be admitted or cannot stand by itself. For although it partly agrees with the first and second explanations, it nevertheless adds something beyond both, which is not challenged by the argument made.