De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether the attainment of the end intended by God is part of the nature of divine providence, in addition to the ordering of means to an end.

I. A very similar question is attached to this one, usually proposed in these terms: namely, whether the order of divine providence is certain, unchangeable, indissoluble, and unavoidable with respect to the attainment of its effects. Accordingly, both questions must be discussed together.

The first opinion is that of those who assert that divine providence does not require that what is ordered to an end attain that end. Certain more recent theologians defend this opinion, judging it to be the express teaching of Saint Thomas. They add that, setting aside middle knowledge, by which God knows the future consent of free choice on the hypothesis that it be placed in such circumstances, the order of divine providence with respect to acts dependent on human freedom is not certain, unchangeable, and indissoluble as regards the attainment of the intended effect. They prove this as follows.

First, from the authority of Saint Thomas, question 6 of On Truth, article 1, and book 1 of the Sentences, distinction 40, question 1, article 2. There he establishes this difference between divine providence and predestination: predestination always attains the end to which the predestined person is ordered, whereas providence orders means to an end but does not always attain the end.

Second, all human beings are ordered by divine providence to beatitude as their ultimate end, as Saint Thomas teaches in the passage just cited and is clear from 1 Timothy 2: God wills all people to be saved. Yet not all attain supernatural beatitude, as the Catholic faith teaches. Therefore, and so on.

This is confirmed: otherwise God would not have supernatural providence with respect to the reprobate. But this must not be said. The consequence is proved as follows: supernatural providence must be concerned with a supernatural end, or with things ordered to a supernatural end; but the reprobate do not attain a supernatural end. Therefore, if attainment of the end is included in divine providence, God does not have supernatural providence of the reprobate. The falsity of the consequent is proved as follows: God confers sufficient supernatural aids on all the reprobate, and sometimes grants them efficacious aids and habitual grace, from which they later fall away. Since these gifts are supernatural, they are effects of supernatural divine providence, for they cannot proceed from natural providence alone. Therefore, God has supernatural providence of the reprobate.

Third, for the providence of a prudent general, physician, or diligent farmer, it is enough that he apply suitable means to the end he intends, whether that end follows or is hindered from elsewhere. Therefore, the same must be said of divine providence. The consequence is clear: through the human providence we experience, we come to know divine providence.

Fourth, the argument is taken from the definition of providence: providence is the rational ordering of means to an end, as Saint Thomas teaches in the first part, question 22, article 1, in the body of the text. But attainment of the end is not included in this definition. Therefore.

Fifth, by divine providence every part of the earth is ordered to the center as its proper end, where it naturally comes to rest; yet not every part of the earth attains that end. Therefore.

Sixth, it is proved that, if foreknowledge is set aside, the order of divine providence is neither certain nor indissoluble. For many acts provided for by God necessarily depend on the choice of the human will. But, if divine providence offers no impediment, free choice can either perform or not perform the free act provided for by God. Therefore it can dissolve the order of divine providence. Thus, if foreknowledge of future consent is set aside, that order is not indissoluble with respect to attainment of the effect. The minor premise is proved as follows: otherwise human freedom of choice would be taken away, if the will could not do the opposite of what God provided it would do.

Seventh, God willed all things that depend on created choice—even beatitude itself and the merit of human beings and angels—only by a conditional will: namely, if human beings and angels should also will them. But foreseeing what would be future through the freedom of created choice, he takes pleasure in those things and wills absolutely that they be done. Therefore, apart from foreknowledge of future consent by created free choice, the force of divine providence alone and of the decree of his will does not make the order of divine providence always certain and indissoluble.

This is confirmed: for certainty, formally speaking, is the intellect's firm adherence. Therefore it expresses an intrinsic order to the intellect; therefore divine foreknowledge of the future consent must necessarily be presupposed if we are to say that the order of divine providence is certain and indissoluble.

II. The second opinion is Cajetan's, Summa theologiae I, question 22, article 4, which Thomists commonly defend today and which, in my judgment, is explicitly that of St. Thomas, as the passages cited below will show.¹ For its explanation:

We must note first that we can speak of God's providence in two ways: first, in general, according to the common notion of providence, abstracting from divine or human providence; second, of providence insofar as it is divine, which is most perfect.

Second, we must note that, since providence is the rational ordering of means to an end, it necessarily presupposes the willing or intending of the end; for no one orders means to an end unless he first wills the end itself, just as a physician first intends the sick person's health before applying suitable medicines and ordering them toward attaining that end.² There are two kinds of willing the end: one is absolute, called the will of good pleasure, or consequent will; the other is conditional, called antecedent will, or the will of sign.³ Providence, then, presupposes an absolute willing or intention of the end. For a farmer would be imprudent if he sowed seeds in a field without absolutely willing to gather the fruit, even though he may sometimes be accidentally prevented from attaining this end by the concurrence of other secondary causes. This principle, which is the chief basis of this opinion, expresses the mind of St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, question 22, article 1, reply to the third objection, where he says: Providence presupposes the willing of the end; for no one gives orders about things to be done unless he wills the end. But for St. Thomas the will of the end means an absolute will of the end itself, since a conditional will is not simply a will but a mere wish. This is confirmed: for an efficacious willing of means can arise only from an absolute willing of the end, since a means, as a means, is desirable only for the sake of the end. Therefore, the absolute will to order suitable means toward attaining the end arises from an absolute intention of the end.

III. Third, we must assume that the difference between human and divine providence is this: human providence, although it absolutely and efficaciously wills its intended end and applies suitable means to attain it, nevertheless often fails to attain that end because it can be impeded by the concurrence of other causes. Hence every human providence is imperfect and uncertain with respect to attaining its end, or the effect provided for, in keeping with the words of Wisdom:⁴ The thoughts of mortals are timid, and our plans uncertain.⁵ Divine providence, however, is most perfect and efficacious, as is God's will; accordingly, it cannot be impeded or overcome by any created cause, even a free one, so as to fail to attain its intended end. St. Thomas shows this by several arguments in Summa contra Gentiles III, chapter 94, and we shall prove the same in the following disputation. Hence St. Augustine, explaining the Psalm, All that the Lord willed, he did,⁶ in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, chapter 95, and citing these words in confirmation of this opinion, says: This would certainly not be true if God willed to do certain things and did not do them, and (what is more shameful) did not do them for this reason: that a human will prevented the Almighty's will from bringing about what he willed. And in chapter 96 he adds: God is truly called Almighty for no other reason than that he can do whatever he wills, and the effect of the Almighty's will is not impeded by the will of any creature. And in On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 14, he says: The willing and not willing of the one who wills or does not will is in his power in such a way that it does not impede the divine will or overcome its power; for concerning the things people do that he does not will, he himself does what he wills. And further on: Therefore, there must be no doubt that human wills cannot resist the will of God, who in heaven and on earth has done all that he willed, and who also made what is to come, so as to prevent him from doing what he wills, since he also does what he wills with human wills themselves, etc., having an all-powerful authority to incline human hearts wherever it pleases him. At the end of the same chapter he adds: God has human wills more in his power than they have their own wills. And in chapter 7 of the same book, speaking of those called according to the purpose, he says: If any of them perished, God would be deceived; but none of them perishes, because God is not deceived. If any of them perished, God would be overcome by human fault; but none of them perishes, because God is overcome by nothing.

First conclusion. The common notion of providence does not necessarily require attainment of the intended end. The authors of both opinions agree on this conclusion, and the arguments made at the beginning prove it effectively.

It is proved further: for the common notion of providence is preserved in human providence, but the latter does not always attain the end to which it orders the means, as is evident from the argument given in the third premise. Therefore.

IIII. Second conclusion. Attainment of the intended end belongs to the intrinsic notion of divine providence insofar as it is divine, as well as the ordering of means to an end. This is Cajetan's conclusion, Summa theologiae I, question 22, article 1, section Circa difficultatem, and Master Báñez's, in the same article, doubt 1; he says that all the respected Doctors of our time follow it. It is proved from St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, question 22, article 2, reply to the first objection, where he says that since all particular causes are contained under the universal cause, it is impossible for any effect to escape the order of the universal cause. And in article 4, reply to the second objection, he says that the order of divine providence is immovable and certain⁷ in this: all things provided for by it happen in the way in which it provides, whether necessarily or contingently; and in the reply to the third objection he adds that divine providence does not fail of its effect or of the manner of happening that it provided for.⁸ In the cited chapter 94 of Summa contra Gentiles III, he teaches plainly that divine providence is certain both with respect to the order of means and with respect to the outcome; especially in the section Praeterea, he says that the order of divine providence cannot be changed at all, and in the section Si autem he says that divine provision cannot be frustrated at all.

It is proved secondly by an argument drawn from St. Thomas in the same chapter. Divine providence is at the summit of perfection, and by its intrinsic nature, insofar as it is divine, it is most perfect. But the most perfect providence requires not only the ordering of means to an end but also attainment of the end, as some authors of the contrary opinion also admit. Therefore, etc.

It is proved thirdly: although providence is not concerned with the end but with the means for the sake of the end, it nevertheless presupposes an absolute willing of the intended end, as is clear from what was said in the second premise. But it is impossible for God absolutely to will to attain an end through means and not attain it; otherwise the divine will would be inefficacious, impeded, and overcome by a created will or by other secondary causes. Yet this is impossible and contrary to St. Augustine, as was shown in the third premise. Therefore.

V. Third conclusion. In general, the order of divine providence is certain, immovable, and indissoluble with respect to the attainment of effects, so that this certainty and indissolubility are grounded in the order and causality of the means themselves and in the efficacy of the divine will and providence, altogether independently of a future consent or exercise of the created will foreknown by middle knowledge.⁹ This conclusion belongs to St. Thomas in the cited passages and in Summa theologiae I, question 116, articles 1, 2, and 3, especially since St. Thomas never admitted that middle knowledge, as was shown in disputation 7.

It is proved further by the authority of Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, book 4, prose 6, where he says that fate is an immovable disposition inherent in movable things. He also says: Providence, proceeding from immovable things, binds human acts and future events with an indissoluble joining of causes. Here he grounds the indissolubility of divine providence in the very connection of causes and means.

They reply that St. Thomas and Boethius are to be understood as speaking of what lies on God's side, since he has purposed to carry out such an order; nevertheless, on the side of a contingent and free secondary cause, that order can be dissolved. They add that unless the texts are understood in this way, they cannot be defended. For they think that freedom of choice is removed if, prior to middle foreknowledge, the order of divine providence is certain and immovable by the very causality of the means.

But this explanation manifestly conflicts with the mind of St. Thomas and Boethius, who intend, by the connection of causes and means, to show divine providence to be certain with respect to attaining its end. This is confirmed: for, as will be clear in disputation 41, predestination is certain by the certainty of the causality of the means, and yet this certainty does not destroy freedom of choice, as will become clear in that same disputation. Therefore certainty in the order and causality of the means is not incompatible with freedom.

VI. The first solution to the first argument is Master Báñez's: St. Thomas in that question 6 of On Truth is speaking of human providence. This solution, however, does not seem to conform to the text, in which he speaks explicitly of divine providence. For he says: By God's providence all human beings are ordered to beatitude; but predestination also regards the outcome or attainment of the order, and therefore applies only to those who attain glory. St. Thomas therefore holds that divine providence does not always regard the outcome of the order, unless it is this kind of providence, namely, predestination.

The second solution of the same Master Báñez, which Cajetan had previously used, is that Saint Thomas changed his opinion in Summa theologiae I, q. 22, and in the cited passage of Summa contra Gentiles III. Perhaps a better reply, however, is this: just as in God one distinguishes two wills—one, the will of sign, which is a will in a qualified sense and is not always fulfilled; the other, the will of good pleasure, which is will without qualification and is always fulfilled—so one can distinguish two kinds of providence. By one, things are ordered by the will of good pleasure to an end principally intended, and this providence always attains that end, as will become clear at once. By the other, things are ordered by antecedent will to an end, but not by the will of good pleasure in such a way that the end is principally intended or intended for its own sake. Such providence does not always attain that end; nevertheless, it infallibly attains another end to which things are ordered more principally, as we shall explain shortly concerning the supernatural providence God has with respect to the reprobate.¹⁰ In keeping with this doctrine, we should say that in De veritate, q. 6, Saint Thomas speaks of God’s providence with respect to an end to which things are not ordered principally, but for the sake of another end more principally intended. In the first part, however, he speaks of divine providence with respect to the end to which things are ordered principally. In this way the different passages of Saint Thomas are reconciled, and there is no need to say that he changed his opinion.

VII. In reply to the second argument, we say that all human beings are ordered to supernatural beatitude by antecedent will; by consequent will, or the will of good pleasure, only the predestined are ordered to it. For by consequent will God does not will supernatural beatitude for the reprobate; nor are they ordered principally to its attainment, but to the good of divine justice and the good of the elect.¹¹ Hence Saint Thomas says in Summa theologiae I, q. 23, art. 3, reply 1, that God wills good for everyone, but he does not will for everyone that good which is eternal life. The gifts of grace that God often bestows on the reprobate are effects of the supernatural providence by which they are ordered principally to the good of the elect, so that divine mercy may shine forth more brightly in the elect. They are not effects of the predestination of the reprobate, since they are not predestined; nor are they effects of supernatural providence by which the reprobate are ordered principally to their own beatitude, since, as was said, they are not ordered principally to their own beatitude. To make this clear, consider that, as Saint Thomas teaches in De veritate, q. 5, art. 7, in the body, since human beings through sin are compared to senseless beasts and become like them, as Psalm 48 says, God has providence over the reprobate according to the manner of brute animals. He orders them according to the order proper to brute animals: namely, the good or evil in them is not ordered to their own good, but to the good of others, that is, the elect, for whom all things work together for good, as it says in Romans 8.¹² Divine providence infallibly attains this end when it permits the sins of the reprobate or grants them gifts of grace, which they nevertheless abuse through their own wickedness. For this reason Saint Thomas says that when the reprobate depart from one order of divine providence, they fall into another that God intends more principally, in the manner explained above. See what he teaches concerning providence over the reprobate in Summa theologiae I, q. 22, art. 2, reply 4. The reply to the confirmation is already clear from what was said in answer to the second argument.

The consequence is denied in reply to the third argument, and the reason for the difference is this: as we said in the third premise, human providence is imperfect and can be hindered from attaining the end principally intended, to which it orders the means. Divine providence, however, cannot be hindered from attaining the end it principally intends.

In reply to the fourth argument, we say that the absolute willing of the end principally intended, which providence presupposes, virtually includes its attainment, if we are speaking of divine providence, as is clear from what was said in the third premise.

VIII. To the fifth argument we reply that each part of the earth is ordered principally by divine providence to the good of the universe and its beauty, and this end is always attained. With respect to this end, it is fitting that not every part of the earth attain its particular end, which is to rest at the center. Therefore, it is not necessary for every part of the earth to attain this end by divine providence. The same must be said proportionately of fire and other such creatures. Saint Thomas explained this in these words in Against the Gentiles, book 3, chapter 94: We must consider that every agent intends the good, and the best good it can, as was shown above. But the good and the better are not considered in the same way in the whole and in its parts. In the whole, the good is the integrity that results from the order and composition of the parts. Hence it is better for the whole that there be dissimilarity among its parts, without which the order and perfection of the whole cannot exist, than that all the parts be equal, each one attaining the rank of the noblest part. Considered in itself, however, each part of a lower rank would be better if it were at the rank of a higher part, as is clear in the human body: the foot would be a nobler part of a human being if it had the beauty and power of the eye, but the whole body would be less perfect if it lacked the function of the foot. The particular agent's intention and the universal agent's intention therefore tend toward different things: for the particular agent tends absolutely toward the good of the part and makes it as good as it can, while the universal agent tends toward the good of the whole. Thus a certain defect is outside the intention of the particular agent, yet is according to the intention of the universal agent.

To the sixth argument, we reply from the teaching of Saint Thomas in the cited chapter 94 of Against the Gentiles: notwithstanding the certainty and indissolubility of divine providence, human free choice can absolutely, and in the divided sense, fail to perform the act God provided it would perform; nevertheless, in the composite sense, it is impossible for it not to perform that act or to perform the opposite.¹³ For on the supposition of divine providence and will, it must perform that act by a necessity of infallibility, but not by absolute necessity. Hence such a conditional necessity does not take away freedom of choice, as was explained in Disputation 25.

To the seventh, we deny that God willed only conditionally the free acts that are performed in time by a created will. For it was already shown above in Disputations 22 and 23 that he willed them by an absolute and efficacious will, and predetermined them with respect to every aspect of their being.

To the confirmation, we reply with Saint Thomas, question 6 of On Truth, article 3, in the body of the text, that there are two kinds of certainty. One is certainty of cognition, and this is taken from the relation of the known object to the intellect. The other is certainty of order and causality, and this is drawn from the infallible relation of cause to effect, as it is certain and infallible that if the sun rises, it is day, and if fire is properly applied, it will heat. Divine providence is also certain in this second way, as Saint Thomas teaches in the same article when speaking of predestination. All this will be clearer from what we shall say in Disputation 41, where the same difficulty concerning the certainty of predestination with respect to attainment of the effect will be treated more fully.