De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether God has providence not only over all genera and species, but also over all individuals in particular, according to all the circumstances of place, time, etc.

II. To explain this difficulty, we must note that to have providence over all things according to genera and species is to determine how many genera and species are to exist, whether in the genus of substance or in the genus of accident, so that there be neither more nor fewer than God has decreed, and to order for them the means by which they infallibly attain their proper end. To have providence over all individuals in particular, according to all circumstances, is to order all such individuals to their end and to predefine how many individuals are to exist, so that there be neither more nor fewer than God has preordained. For this predefinition and preordination are included in the notion of divine providence, as will be clear below. On this supposition, we have here a twofold controversy: one with the ancient Philosophers, the other with modern Theologians.

The first opinion is that of certain Philosophers who altogether denied God's providence, such as Epicurus and some others, whom Lactantius reports in book 1 of On the Anger of God, chapters 9 and 10. St. Thomas excludes this error in Summa theologiae I, question 22, article 1. Moreover, Cicero, in book 1 of On Divination, denied that God has foreknowledge of future things; for he asserted that everything that happens in time happens by fate, and consequently took the providence of human acts away from God, believing it could not be reconciled with human freedom. St. Augustine reports and refutes Cicero's error in City of God, book 5, chapters 9 and 10. Finally, others said that although God has providence over all things in general, both according to genera and according to species, he does not have providence over all individuals and singulars, especially certain very minute individuals. St. Thomas reports this opinion in the first and second arguments of question 22 of the First Part.

The first argument for it is this. Corruptible individuals are not intended by nature for their own sake, but only for the preservation of the species, which is intended for its own sake and pertains for its own sake to the perfection of the universe. Hence, when individuals are incorruptible, as angels or heavenly bodies are, the author of nature produced only one under each species. Therefore corruptible individuals are not intended by God for their own sake—for nature's intention is the same as God's, since he is the author of nature. Therefore some individuals could be multiplied, at least among imperfect species, apart from the particular intention and order of divine providence.

The second argument is this. Some most imperfect and very minute individuals are produced accidentally by secondary causes, beyond nature's intention; they seem idle and to serve no purpose in the universe, such as flies and fleas. For these animals are not ordered to any end, but follow accidentally by reason of matter. Therefore God does not have providence over them in particular. The consequence is evident, since providence is the ordering of means to an end.

This is confirmed: for it seems unfitting that God should care for these imperfect animals, as the Apostle also seems to suggest when he says, Does God care for oxen?¹ Therefore.

III. The second opinion is that of certain theologians who, although they acknowledge that God has providence—and indeed the most perfect providence—over all individuals, even corruptible ones, in particular and according to all their circumstances, nevertheless say that through such providence all individuals, especially the most imperfect and smallest, are not predefined or predetermined in particular and according to all their circumstances. Nor, they say, is such predetermination necessary for perfect providence, especially with respect to free acts. They admit in divine providence only a predefinition of the free act, on the supposition of that middle knowledge explained in disputation 7 and refuted by us. Others, explaining the manner of divine providence, say that through divine providence God does not predetermine free or contingent causes before any reference to their concurrence. If, indeed, they understand divine providence and predetermination to denote and include a reference to the free concurrence of secondary causes as an effect of that same providence and divine predefinition in the order of a properly efficient cause, it is entirely true that such a reference is included in divine providence. But if they understand—as they seem to understand—that divine providence refers to the free influx of secondary causes as something on which the efficacy of divine providence and predefinition depends, or as something presumed to be known beforehand through middle or conditional knowledge, they coincide² with the second opinion.

A third argument for this opinion is drawn from the authority of Saint Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 23, art. 7, in the body, where he teaches that God determined the number of essential parts, such as the heavens, the elements, and all species, but did not determine the number of corruptible individuals, such as mosquitoes, flies, and the like, nor that this fly should be born today and that one tomorrow; rather, he provided in general that no species of animal should be lacking in the whole world. Saint Thomas, De veritate, q. 6, art. 3, in the body, and Summa contra Gentiles III, ch. 9, are cited for the same opinion, as is Origen, Homilies on Genesis, homily 3, where he says: Remember that we say nothing is done without God’s providence, not that nothing is done without his will; for many things are done without his will, but nothing without his providence. He therefore holds that perfect providence on God’s part does not require a will that predefines all the acts for which provision is made.

A fourth argument follows. Only three things are necessary for the perfection of providence: knowledge, will, and power, as Saint Thomas seems to teach in Summa theologiae I, q. 19, art. 4, reply 4; q. 22, arts. 1 and 2; and q. 25³, art. 5, reply 1. But that predefinition is necessary for the perfection of divine providence under none of these headings. Therefore it is not necessary. The minor premise is proved as follows. It is not necessary on the side of knowledge: for the knowledge of simple understanding, which is presupposed to providence, includes no predefinition by the divine will, since it is natural knowledge and precedes every free act. Likewise, middle or conditional knowledge, which in the order of reason precedes providence, includes no predefinition by the divine will, since it precedes every free act of that will. Yet, on the side of knowledge, this conditional knowledge, on the supposition of the knowledge of simple understanding, suffices for providence. Therefore no predefinition is required on the side of knowledge for perfect providence. It is most certain that it is not required on the side of divine power: God is not able to produce a thing because he has decreed to produce it, for otherwise omnipotence would not belong to God by nature. That predefinition is not required on the side of the will is proved as follows. Given that God willed and ordained by his providence that secondary causes should act contingently and freely, it is enough, as far as the will is concerned, for God to will to apply his power to concur with a free secondary cause if that cause, in keeping with its freedom, wills to concur. Therefore such predefinitions are necessary for the perfection of divine providence under none of these headings.

This is confirmed as follows: for the providence God has concerning the acts of sins, insofar as they are acts, predefinition by the divine will is not required; nevertheless, God has perfect providence of those acts in particular. Therefore the perfection of divine providence neither includes nor requires predefinition of the object provided for.

The third opinion is that of Saint Thomas, and is common among Thomists. To explain it, the following conclusions are laid down.

IIII. First conclusion. God has the most perfect providence of all things, even contingent things and those dependent on human freedom, not only in general but also in particular, and according to all their circumstances.⁴ This conclusion is opposed to all the ancient philosophers cited above. Nevertheless, the authors of the second and third opinions admit it, and effectively prove it from the scriptural passages cited by Saint Thomas and Master Bañez in the first part, question 22, articles 1 and 2. Saint Augustine demonstrates it against Cicero in the previously cited fifth book of The City of God.

It is further proved from Saint Dionysius, chapter 4 of The Celestial Hierarchy, where he says: All things that subsist are governed by the providence of God: Therefore, according to Dionysius, all singular things that in any way have being are subject to divine providence.

It is proved secondly by the argument of Saint Thomas, cited above, in the first part, question 22, which consists in this. Divine providence extends to all that the divine omnipotence and causality extend to. For since God acts through intellect and will, he must order all that he produces to an end and, consequently, have providence of them. But God's omnipotence and causality extend in particular, according to all circumstances, to every individual in particular, however minute, according to every aspect of being that it has; for since such things are beings by participation, they must proceed by efficient causality from the being by essence, who is God. Therefore, he has providence of them all.

V. Second conclusion. By his providence, antecedently to foreknowledge of the cooperation of any future secondary cause, even on the supposition that it is placed in such circumstances, God predefined all singular things in particular according to all circumstances, as to every aspect of being they have,⁵ whether such beings proceed from proximate natural causes or from free and contingent causes. Thus by his providence God predefined in particular that this fly be born today and that one tomorrow; that Peter produce such an action at such a time, with such intensity, and with its other circumstances, according to every aspect of being it has. This conclusion is opposed to the authors of the second opinion; nevertheless, it is the express teaching of Saint Thomas, as is clear from the various passages of his that we cited in Disputations 22, 23, and 24. He proves it especially and expressly in Against the Gentiles, book 3, chapter 76⁶, where, in confirmation of it, he cites the passage from Judith 9: You made the former things, and devised the things that came after them, and this came to pass, which you willed. The holy Doctors cited in those same disputations favor this opinion, when they assert that all good works are predefined or predetermined by God. Dionysius the Areopagite does so especially in chapter 5 of The Divine Names, under the title “On Exemplars,” lecture 3, as cited by Saint Thomas. There he teaches that all existing things have in God the reasons that predetermine and effect those same things. He adds that Theology calls such reasons predefinitions, and divine and good wills that predetermine and effect existing things, according to which the substantial essence predefined and produced all things. From these words an argument is drawn. Divine providence includes the causality of God's will and omnipotence; but the causality of the divine will and omnipotence includes the predetermination of all that God produces in time. For, as has been shown above, the divine will predetermined from eternity to do in time whatever it does. Therefore.

It is proved secondly from the authority of Irenaeus, book 2, chapter 45, where he says that all things have been predefined, ordered, and disposed by God, however small, according to number, measure, and quantity. He sharply reproves those who are excessively curious about divine providence, wishing to know more than they ought. Irenaeus's words are: But what if someone should ask us whether every number of all things that have been made and are being made comes from God, and whether, according to his providence, each of them has received the quantity proper to it; and, when we agree and confess that nothing at all among the things made, being made, or yet to be made escapes God, but that by his providence each has received and does receive its own condition, order, number, and quantity, and that nothing at all has been or is done vainly or at random, but with great fittingness and sublime harmony, and that the reason which can discern such things and state their proper causes is admirable and truly divine—if, after receiving this testimony and agreement from us, he should go further and count the sand and the pebbles of the earth, and even the waves of the sea and the stars of heaven, and devise the causes of the number he thinks he has discovered, would not such a person rightly be called by all who have sound judgment vainly laboring, delirious, and irrational? In these words he plainly teaches that God has determined even the smallest things by his providence.

VI. It is proved thirdly: otherwise those smallest individuals that God did not predetermine in particular would be by chance with respect to the divine will. But this must not be said. Therefore. The consequence is proved as follows: what happens apart from an agent's intention happens by chance. Therefore, if some individuals in particular come to be in nature from secondary causes, apart from the intention and determination of the divine will, they will be by chance with respect to God.

They reply that, for future contingents that God did not predetermine in particular not to happen by chance with respect to God, it suffices that God certainly and infallibly foreknew from eternity that such an effect would follow from such a cause. But there is an argument against this: what happens apart from an agent's intention is called chance. Therefore, if some being in particular, under the aspect of the being it has, happens apart from the intention and predetermination of the divine will, it will be by chance with respect to God. This is confirmed: for from this solution it would follow that, with respect to such effects, God's providence would not be perfect providence, but merely forevision. The proof is that perfect providence implies not only foreknowledge of a future event but also the rational ordering of means to an end. Therefore, for God to be said to have perfect providence with respect to some object, it does not suffice that he foreknow that it will be future. For, as was said above from Saint Thomas, the providence God has of all beings in particular presupposes the divine will by which God wills to produce them according to every aspect of being they have; but the efficacious divine will includes predetermination of future acts in particular, as has been shown. Therefore.

VII. They reply that, for all good acts of the natural order and for the perfect providence God has of them, it is necessary that the divine will have predefined from eternity the production of this universe and all the causes preceding Peter's will, for example, on which it depends that Peter exist in the natural order. Likewise, a predefinition is also required by which God decreed to produce Peter with such powers and operative faculties, and to place him in such circumstances as those in which God foresaw that Peter, by his innate freedom, would consent to such an act. Finally, a predefinition is also required by which God predefined to confer his general concurrence on Peter for speaking, for example, if Peter by his freedom should so wish to speak. But if the actions are supernatural, then, in addition to all the foregoing, they require a predefinition to call and stir Peter's will by prevenient supernatural aid, and a predefinition to concur with him in the supernatural act if he should wish to consent. They add, however, that for the perfect providence God has of human acts it is not necessary for him to predefine by an absolute and efficacious decree the free influx of created free choice itself, such that Peter, for example, cooperate in such circumstances and will the object proposed to him. For they judge this predefinition incompatible with created freedom. Some add that, if we were to admit the impossible—that some will would be so depraved as to resist every call at every time and moment, however powerful—then, on that hypothesis, God could not efficaciously convert such a will while preserving its freedom;⁷ he could nevertheless turn it however he wished by preventing the use of freedom. They say this is not incompatible with divine omnipotence but rather accords with its gentle disposition, since unless that conditional foreknowledge of future consent were presupposed, on the hypothesis that the will is placed in such circumstances, it would be impossible for the will to be converted or to act while preserving the use of freedom.

But the contrary follows from this doctrine: the very influx and consent of the created will would be withdrawn from divine causality, as is clear from the arguments made in Disputations 18, 21, and 22, and from what will be brought forward in Disputations 36, 38, and 39; and consequently it would also be withdrawn from divine providence. This must by no means be granted.

This is confirmed: God is omnipotent not only with respect to the things he does as regards the substance of the act, but also as regards its mode of production. For he is not only the most efficacious cause with respect to the act, but reaches and can reach every mode of it. Therefore, if on that hypothesis God could not by his omnipotence freely convert the will to himself, he would not be omnipotent without qualification.

From these points it follows that these two claims cannot stand together: namely, that God has the most perfect providence of every free action in particular and yet does not predefine that action according to every aspect of being it has.

VIII. To the first argument we reply that corruptible individuals, although they are not intended by nature per se primarily, are nevertheless intended by nature per se secondarily for the preservation of the species, to which they are ordered;⁸ and likewise they are produced for the glory of God and the beauty of the universe. Hence it is written: The Lord has made all things for himself;⁹ and consequently they too fall under divine providence in particular.

In reply to the second argument, we say that it touches on a difficulty treated by Saint Augustine in The Literal Meaning of Genesis, book 3, chapter 14: namely, whether tiny animals and other things harmful to human beings, such as thorns, brambles, and the like, were produced by God before sin, and for what end. The holy Doctor answers that they were produced at the beginning, even before sin. He proves this in chapter 16 from the words of Genesis 3, It shall bring forth thorns and thistles for you. These words were spoken to man after sin. From them Augustine concludes that thorns existed before sin but had not yet served God in avenging sin, since it had not yet been committed. After sin, however, it was said to man, It shall bring forth for you—that is, so that they might be a punishment for the sin committed and punish it as an instrument of divine justice.¹⁰ The reply to the argument, then, is that, as Saint Thomas teaches in Summa theologiae I, q. 22, art. 2, reply 1, although chance events and things produced accidentally fall outside the intention of a particular cause, they cannot occur outside the intention and order of the universal cause. For every effect depends intrinsically on the universal agent, which acts by intellect and will in everything it does.

In reply to the confirmation, we say that a particular governor, responsible for this city or kingdom, ought not to attend in particular to the smallest matters taking place in the kingdom, because his power is limited. Consequently, if he provided in detail for the smallest matters, his care and providence regarding greater matters would be hindered. Hence Isaiah 32 says, A prince will consider what is fitting for a prince, and he himself will preside over the leaders; and in Exodus 18 Jethro advised Moses to appoint tribunes and centurions to attend particularly to the lesser cases of the people of Israel, so that Moses could devote himself to greater matters. But God, the most universal governor of all, is not hindered from providing most perfectly for greater matters while attending in particular to the very smallest and providing for them all, because his providence has infinite and unlimited power. This solution is drawn from Saint Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles III, ch. 94, where, treating the perfection of divine providence and explaining how it extends to every last particular—something a particular agent cannot do—he says: Providence is more perfect in planning an order in advance to the extent that the order of providence can be carried down to the smallest things. Our inability to plan the order of all particulars in advance concerning the things we must arrange arises from a defect in our knowledge, which cannot embrace all singular things. Each person is considered more skillful in providing as he can plan more singular things in advance; but one whose provision consisted only in universals would have little share in prudence. And later: Divine providence must stand at the summit of perfection, because God is simply and universally perfect, as was shown in the first book. In providing, therefore, by the eternal deliberation of his wisdom, he orders all things, however small they may seem.

A second reply is that the argument proves only that it is fitting for divine providence to govern lower things through higher things. This has indeed been established in the order of divine providence, as Saint Thomas teaches in Summa theologiae I, q. 22, art. 3, and often elsewhere.

IX. In reply to the third argument made for the second opinion, we say that in the cited article 7 Saint Thomas does not state absolutely that God does not predestine all corruptible individuals in particular, such as the number of cattle and mosquitoes. He teaches only that God did not predestine them as principal things, but as secondary things, because they are not willed by God for their own sake, but for the good of the universe and for the preservation of species, which pertain principally to that good.¹¹ Saint Thomas’s words are these: Corruptible individuals are not ordered to the good of the universe as principal things, but as secondary things, insofar as the good of the species is preserved in them. Hence, although God knows the number of all individuals, the number of cattle, mosquitoes, or other such things is not preordained by God for its own sake. Rather, divine providence has produced as many of these as suffice for the preservation of the species. Here Saint Thomas does not say absolutely that the number of cattle, mosquitoes, and so on is not absolutely preordained by God; he says that it is not preordained for its own sake. Nor do the other cited passages teach the contrary. On the contrary, in the passages we cited in disputations 22 and 23, he expressly teaches that all things are predefined by God. Since sacred Scripture says that God made all things in number, weight, and measure,¹² it is most certain, speaking absolutely, that God determined the number in particular of all individuals that will exist under any species, so that there are neither more nor fewer than God decreed.

In reply to Origen’s authority, we say that he is speaking of sin, which falls under divine providence insofar as God permits it, as will be shown below, but not under the divine will: for, absolutely speaking, God does not will sins; he wills only to permit them.¹³ Hence Saint Augustine says in the Enchiridion, ch. 95: Nothing happens, then, unless the Omnipotent wills it to happen, either by allowing it to happen or by doing it himself; nor should we doubt that God acts well even by allowing whatever happens badly to happen. Although God does not will sins to occur, he does will the act of sin insofar as it is an act, because in that respect it is good; and at the same time he wills to permit its evil, as was said in disputations 11 and 24.

X. In reply to the fourth argument, we say that perfect providence on God’s part requires, on the side of free knowledge—through which God is the cause of things in second act—and on the side of the will through which all things have been produced, the predetermination in particular of all individuals that will exist, in keeping with the words, How could anything endure unless you had willed it?¹⁴ As for the objection concerning conditional knowledge, which others call middle knowledge, we reply that, as was shown in disputation 7, before a decree of the divine will it is not knowable, even to God, what a created will would do in particular on the supposition that it were placed in such circumstances. For this to be known, a divine decree must first predetermine the created will to that particular act in those circumstances, whether the decree is absolute or conditional with respect to the object willed, as was explained in that same disputation 7.

In reply to the confirmation, we say that, as was shown in disputations 11 and 24, God predefined the act of sin according to every aspect of being that it has, and likewise decreed to permit its evil for the manifestation of his justice in the reprobate. In the predestined, however, he permits sins to make his mercy more manifest, so that they may be humbled and become more cautious thereafter.¹⁵ Hence Saint Augustine says in On Nature and Grace, against the Pelagians, ch. 28¹⁶. God sometimes abandons you in that of which you are proud, so that you may know it is not yours but his, and learn not to be proud. This predefinition suffices for God to have the most perfect providence that can be had with respect to sins.