De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

In which divine providence and its infallibility are treated.

I. Since predestination is a subjective part of providence, as St. Thomas teaches in the First Part, question 23, article 1, before we come to the particular difficulties debated in these times concerning predestination and reprobation, we must resolve certain questions about divine providence. Their resolution clears the way for what must be said about predestination: for if providence is unknown, predestination too must necessarily be unknown. Although Doctors commonly raise many questions about providence, which St. Thomas touches on profoundly and concisely in four articles of Summa theologiae I, question 22, we shall examine only five at present.

I. Whether God has providence over all individuals in particular, according to all circumstances.

II. Whether evils of punishment are willed by God with an absolute and efficacious will and predetermined to occur, or merely permitted.

III. Whether it belongs to the notion of divine providence that there be not only an order of means to an end but also infallible attainment of the end itself.

IIII. Whether contingent and free secondary causes can withdraw themselves or depart from the order established for them by divine providence.

V. Whether created free choice can resist God Almighty or struggle against the order of divine providence.

Whether God has providence not only over all genera and species, but also over all individuals in particular, according to all the circumstances of place, time, etc.

II. To explain this difficulty, we must note that to have providence over all things according to genera and species is to determine how many genera and species are to exist, whether in the genus of substance or in the genus of accident, so that there be neither more nor fewer than God has decreed, and to order for them the means by which they infallibly attain their proper end. To have providence over all individuals in particular, according to all circumstances, is to order all such individuals to their end and to predefine how many individuals are to exist, so that there be neither more nor fewer than God has preordained. For this predefinition and preordination are included in the notion of divine providence, as will be clear below. On this supposition, we have here a twofold controversy: one with the ancient Philosophers, the other with modern Theologians.

The first opinion is that of certain Philosophers who altogether denied God's providence, such as Epicurus and some others, whom Lactantius reports in book 1 of On the Anger of God, chapters 9 and 10. St. Thomas excludes this error in Summa theologiae I, question 22, article 1. Moreover, Cicero, in book 1 of On Divination, denied that God has foreknowledge of future things; for he asserted that everything that happens in time happens by fate, and consequently took the providence of human acts away from God, believing it could not be reconciled with human freedom. St. Augustine reports and refutes Cicero's error in City of God, book 5, chapters 9 and 10. Finally, others said that although God has providence over all things in general, both according to genera and according to species, he does not have providence over all individuals and singulars, especially certain very minute individuals. St. Thomas reports this opinion in the first and second arguments of question 22 of the First Part.

The first argument for it is this. Corruptible individuals are not intended by nature for their own sake, but only for the preservation of the species, which is intended for its own sake and pertains for its own sake to the perfection of the universe. Hence, when individuals are incorruptible, as angels or heavenly bodies are, the author of nature produced only one under each species. Therefore corruptible individuals are not intended by God for their own sake—for nature's intention is the same as God's, since he is the author of nature. Therefore some individuals could be multiplied, at least among imperfect species, apart from the particular intention and order of divine providence.

The second argument is this. Some most imperfect and very minute individuals are produced accidentally by secondary causes, beyond nature's intention; they seem idle and to serve no purpose in the universe, such as flies and fleas. For these animals are not ordered to any end, but follow accidentally by reason of matter. Therefore God does not have providence over them in particular. The consequence is evident, since providence is the ordering of means to an end.

This is confirmed: for it seems unfitting that God should care for these imperfect animals, as the Apostle also seems to suggest when he says, Does God care for oxen?¹ Therefore.

III. The second opinion is that of certain theologians who, although they acknowledge that God has providence—and indeed the most perfect providence—over all individuals, even corruptible ones, in particular and according to all their circumstances, nevertheless say that through such providence all individuals, especially the most imperfect and smallest, are not predefined or predetermined in particular and according to all their circumstances. Nor, they say, is such predetermination necessary for perfect providence, especially with respect to free acts. They admit in divine providence only a predefinition of the free act, on the supposition of that middle knowledge explained in disputation 7 and refuted by us. Others, explaining the manner of divine providence, say that through divine providence God does not predetermine free or contingent causes before any reference to their concurrence. If, indeed, they understand divine providence and predetermination to denote and include a reference to the free concurrence of secondary causes as an effect of that same providence and divine predefinition in the order of a properly efficient cause, it is entirely true that such a reference is included in divine providence. But if they understand—as they seem to understand—that divine providence refers to the free influx of secondary causes as something on which the efficacy of divine providence and predefinition depends, or as something presumed to be known beforehand through middle or conditional knowledge, they coincide² with the second opinion.

A third argument for this opinion is drawn from the authority of Saint Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 23, art. 7, in the body, where he teaches that God determined the number of essential parts, such as the heavens, the elements, and all species, but did not determine the number of corruptible individuals, such as mosquitoes, flies, and the like, nor that this fly should be born today and that one tomorrow; rather, he provided in general that no species of animal should be lacking in the whole world. Saint Thomas, De veritate, q. 6, art. 3, in the body, and Summa contra Gentiles III, ch. 9, are cited for the same opinion, as is Origen, Homilies on Genesis, homily 3, where he says: Remember that we say nothing is done without God’s providence, not that nothing is done without his will; for many things are done without his will, but nothing without his providence. He therefore holds that perfect providence on God’s part does not require a will that predefines all the acts for which provision is made.

A fourth argument follows. Only three things are necessary for the perfection of providence: knowledge, will, and power, as Saint Thomas seems to teach in Summa theologiae I, q. 19, art. 4, reply 4; q. 22, arts. 1 and 2; and q. 25³, art. 5, reply 1. But that predefinition is necessary for the perfection of divine providence under none of these headings. Therefore it is not necessary. The minor premise is proved as follows. It is not necessary on the side of knowledge: for the knowledge of simple understanding, which is presupposed to providence, includes no predefinition by the divine will, since it is natural knowledge and precedes every free act. Likewise, middle or conditional knowledge, which in the order of reason precedes providence, includes no predefinition by the divine will, since it precedes every free act of that will. Yet, on the side of knowledge, this conditional knowledge, on the supposition of the knowledge of simple understanding, suffices for providence. Therefore no predefinition is required on the side of knowledge for perfect providence. It is most certain that it is not required on the side of divine power: God is not able to produce a thing because he has decreed to produce it, for otherwise omnipotence would not belong to God by nature. That predefinition is not required on the side of the will is proved as follows. Given that God willed and ordained by his providence that secondary causes should act contingently and freely, it is enough, as far as the will is concerned, for God to will to apply his power to concur with a free secondary cause if that cause, in keeping with its freedom, wills to concur. Therefore such predefinitions are necessary for the perfection of divine providence under none of these headings.

This is confirmed as follows: for the providence God has concerning the acts of sins, insofar as they are acts, predefinition by the divine will is not required; nevertheless, God has perfect providence of those acts in particular. Therefore the perfection of divine providence neither includes nor requires predefinition of the object provided for.

The third opinion is that of Saint Thomas, and is common among Thomists. To explain it, the following conclusions are laid down.

IIII. First conclusion. God has the most perfect providence of all things, even contingent things and those dependent on human freedom, not only in general but also in particular, and according to all their circumstances.⁴ This conclusion is opposed to all the ancient philosophers cited above. Nevertheless, the authors of the second and third opinions admit it, and effectively prove it from the scriptural passages cited by Saint Thomas and Master Bañez in the first part, question 22, articles 1 and 2. Saint Augustine demonstrates it against Cicero in the previously cited fifth book of The City of God.

It is further proved from Saint Dionysius, chapter 4 of The Celestial Hierarchy, where he says: All things that subsist are governed by the providence of God: Therefore, according to Dionysius, all singular things that in any way have being are subject to divine providence.

It is proved secondly by the argument of Saint Thomas, cited above, in the first part, question 22, which consists in this. Divine providence extends to all that the divine omnipotence and causality extend to. For since God acts through intellect and will, he must order all that he produces to an end and, consequently, have providence of them. But God's omnipotence and causality extend in particular, according to all circumstances, to every individual in particular, however minute, according to every aspect of being that it has; for since such things are beings by participation, they must proceed by efficient causality from the being by essence, who is God. Therefore, he has providence of them all.

V. Second conclusion. By his providence, antecedently to foreknowledge of the cooperation of any future secondary cause, even on the supposition that it is placed in such circumstances, God predefined all singular things in particular according to all circumstances, as to every aspect of being they have,⁵ whether such beings proceed from proximate natural causes or from free and contingent causes. Thus by his providence God predefined in particular that this fly be born today and that one tomorrow; that Peter produce such an action at such a time, with such intensity, and with its other circumstances, according to every aspect of being it has. This conclusion is opposed to the authors of the second opinion; nevertheless, it is the express teaching of Saint Thomas, as is clear from the various passages of his that we cited in Disputations 22, 23, and 24. He proves it especially and expressly in Against the Gentiles, book 3, chapter 76⁶, where, in confirmation of it, he cites the passage from Judith 9: You made the former things, and devised the things that came after them, and this came to pass, which you willed. The holy Doctors cited in those same disputations favor this opinion, when they assert that all good works are predefined or predetermined by God. Dionysius the Areopagite does so especially in chapter 5 of The Divine Names, under the title “On Exemplars,” lecture 3, as cited by Saint Thomas. There he teaches that all existing things have in God the reasons that predetermine and effect those same things. He adds that Theology calls such reasons predefinitions, and divine and good wills that predetermine and effect existing things, according to which the substantial essence predefined and produced all things. From these words an argument is drawn. Divine providence includes the causality of God's will and omnipotence; but the causality of the divine will and omnipotence includes the predetermination of all that God produces in time. For, as has been shown above, the divine will predetermined from eternity to do in time whatever it does. Therefore.

It is proved secondly from the authority of Irenaeus, book 2, chapter 45, where he says that all things have been predefined, ordered, and disposed by God, however small, according to number, measure, and quantity. He sharply reproves those who are excessively curious about divine providence, wishing to know more than they ought. Irenaeus's words are: But what if someone should ask us whether every number of all things that have been made and are being made comes from God, and whether, according to his providence, each of them has received the quantity proper to it; and, when we agree and confess that nothing at all among the things made, being made, or yet to be made escapes God, but that by his providence each has received and does receive its own condition, order, number, and quantity, and that nothing at all has been or is done vainly or at random, but with great fittingness and sublime harmony, and that the reason which can discern such things and state their proper causes is admirable and truly divine—if, after receiving this testimony and agreement from us, he should go further and count the sand and the pebbles of the earth, and even the waves of the sea and the stars of heaven, and devise the causes of the number he thinks he has discovered, would not such a person rightly be called by all who have sound judgment vainly laboring, delirious, and irrational? In these words he plainly teaches that God has determined even the smallest things by his providence.

VI. It is proved thirdly: otherwise those smallest individuals that God did not predetermine in particular would be by chance with respect to the divine will. But this must not be said. Therefore. The consequence is proved as follows: what happens apart from an agent's intention happens by chance. Therefore, if some individuals in particular come to be in nature from secondary causes, apart from the intention and determination of the divine will, they will be by chance with respect to God.

They reply that, for future contingents that God did not predetermine in particular not to happen by chance with respect to God, it suffices that God certainly and infallibly foreknew from eternity that such an effect would follow from such a cause. But there is an argument against this: what happens apart from an agent's intention is called chance. Therefore, if some being in particular, under the aspect of the being it has, happens apart from the intention and predetermination of the divine will, it will be by chance with respect to God. This is confirmed: for from this solution it would follow that, with respect to such effects, God's providence would not be perfect providence, but merely forevision. The proof is that perfect providence implies not only foreknowledge of a future event but also the rational ordering of means to an end. Therefore, for God to be said to have perfect providence with respect to some object, it does not suffice that he foreknow that it will be future. For, as was said above from Saint Thomas, the providence God has of all beings in particular presupposes the divine will by which God wills to produce them according to every aspect of being they have; but the efficacious divine will includes predetermination of future acts in particular, as has been shown. Therefore.

VII. They reply that, for all good acts of the natural order and for the perfect providence God has of them, it is necessary that the divine will have predefined from eternity the production of this universe and all the causes preceding Peter's will, for example, on which it depends that Peter exist in the natural order. Likewise, a predefinition is also required by which God decreed to produce Peter with such powers and operative faculties, and to place him in such circumstances as those in which God foresaw that Peter, by his innate freedom, would consent to such an act. Finally, a predefinition is also required by which God predefined to confer his general concurrence on Peter for speaking, for example, if Peter by his freedom should so wish to speak. But if the actions are supernatural, then, in addition to all the foregoing, they require a predefinition to call and stir Peter's will by prevenient supernatural aid, and a predefinition to concur with him in the supernatural act if he should wish to consent. They add, however, that for the perfect providence God has of human acts it is not necessary for him to predefine by an absolute and efficacious decree the free influx of created free choice itself, such that Peter, for example, cooperate in such circumstances and will the object proposed to him. For they judge this predefinition incompatible with created freedom. Some add that, if we were to admit the impossible—that some will would be so depraved as to resist every call at every time and moment, however powerful—then, on that hypothesis, God could not efficaciously convert such a will while preserving its freedom;⁷ he could nevertheless turn it however he wished by preventing the use of freedom. They say this is not incompatible with divine omnipotence but rather accords with its gentle disposition, since unless that conditional foreknowledge of future consent were presupposed, on the hypothesis that the will is placed in such circumstances, it would be impossible for the will to be converted or to act while preserving the use of freedom.

But the contrary follows from this doctrine: the very influx and consent of the created will would be withdrawn from divine causality, as is clear from the arguments made in Disputations 18, 21, and 22, and from what will be brought forward in Disputations 36, 38, and 39; and consequently it would also be withdrawn from divine providence. This must by no means be granted.

This is confirmed: God is omnipotent not only with respect to the things he does as regards the substance of the act, but also as regards its mode of production. For he is not only the most efficacious cause with respect to the act, but reaches and can reach every mode of it. Therefore, if on that hypothesis God could not by his omnipotence freely convert the will to himself, he would not be omnipotent without qualification.

From these points it follows that these two claims cannot stand together: namely, that God has the most perfect providence of every free action in particular and yet does not predefine that action according to every aspect of being it has.

VIII. To the first argument we reply that corruptible individuals, although they are not intended by nature per se primarily, are nevertheless intended by nature per se secondarily for the preservation of the species, to which they are ordered;⁸ and likewise they are produced for the glory of God and the beauty of the universe. Hence it is written: The Lord has made all things for himself;⁹ and consequently they too fall under divine providence in particular.

In reply to the second argument, we say that it touches on a difficulty treated by Saint Augustine in The Literal Meaning of Genesis, book 3, chapter 14: namely, whether tiny animals and other things harmful to human beings, such as thorns, brambles, and the like, were produced by God before sin, and for what end. The holy Doctor answers that they were produced at the beginning, even before sin. He proves this in chapter 16 from the words of Genesis 3, It shall bring forth thorns and thistles for you. These words were spoken to man after sin. From them Augustine concludes that thorns existed before sin but had not yet served God in avenging sin, since it had not yet been committed. After sin, however, it was said to man, It shall bring forth for you—that is, so that they might be a punishment for the sin committed and punish it as an instrument of divine justice.¹⁰ The reply to the argument, then, is that, as Saint Thomas teaches in Summa theologiae I, q. 22, art. 2, reply 1, although chance events and things produced accidentally fall outside the intention of a particular cause, they cannot occur outside the intention and order of the universal cause. For every effect depends intrinsically on the universal agent, which acts by intellect and will in everything it does.

In reply to the confirmation, we say that a particular governor, responsible for this city or kingdom, ought not to attend in particular to the smallest matters taking place in the kingdom, because his power is limited. Consequently, if he provided in detail for the smallest matters, his care and providence regarding greater matters would be hindered. Hence Isaiah 32 says, A prince will consider what is fitting for a prince, and he himself will preside over the leaders; and in Exodus 18 Jethro advised Moses to appoint tribunes and centurions to attend particularly to the lesser cases of the people of Israel, so that Moses could devote himself to greater matters. But God, the most universal governor of all, is not hindered from providing most perfectly for greater matters while attending in particular to the very smallest and providing for them all, because his providence has infinite and unlimited power. This solution is drawn from Saint Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles III, ch. 94, where, treating the perfection of divine providence and explaining how it extends to every last particular—something a particular agent cannot do—he says: Providence is more perfect in planning an order in advance to the extent that the order of providence can be carried down to the smallest things. Our inability to plan the order of all particulars in advance concerning the things we must arrange arises from a defect in our knowledge, which cannot embrace all singular things. Each person is considered more skillful in providing as he can plan more singular things in advance; but one whose provision consisted only in universals would have little share in prudence. And later: Divine providence must stand at the summit of perfection, because God is simply and universally perfect, as was shown in the first book. In providing, therefore, by the eternal deliberation of his wisdom, he orders all things, however small they may seem.

A second reply is that the argument proves only that it is fitting for divine providence to govern lower things through higher things. This has indeed been established in the order of divine providence, as Saint Thomas teaches in Summa theologiae I, q. 22, art. 3, and often elsewhere.

IX. In reply to the third argument made for the second opinion, we say that in the cited article 7 Saint Thomas does not state absolutely that God does not predestine all corruptible individuals in particular, such as the number of cattle and mosquitoes. He teaches only that God did not predestine them as principal things, but as secondary things, because they are not willed by God for their own sake, but for the good of the universe and for the preservation of species, which pertain principally to that good.¹¹ Saint Thomas’s words are these: Corruptible individuals are not ordered to the good of the universe as principal things, but as secondary things, insofar as the good of the species is preserved in them. Hence, although God knows the number of all individuals, the number of cattle, mosquitoes, or other such things is not preordained by God for its own sake. Rather, divine providence has produced as many of these as suffice for the preservation of the species. Here Saint Thomas does not say absolutely that the number of cattle, mosquitoes, and so on is not absolutely preordained by God; he says that it is not preordained for its own sake. Nor do the other cited passages teach the contrary. On the contrary, in the passages we cited in disputations 22 and 23, he expressly teaches that all things are predefined by God. Since sacred Scripture says that God made all things in number, weight, and measure,¹² it is most certain, speaking absolutely, that God determined the number in particular of all individuals that will exist under any species, so that there are neither more nor fewer than God decreed.

In reply to Origen’s authority, we say that he is speaking of sin, which falls under divine providence insofar as God permits it, as will be shown below, but not under the divine will: for, absolutely speaking, God does not will sins; he wills only to permit them.¹³ Hence Saint Augustine says in the Enchiridion, ch. 95: Nothing happens, then, unless the Omnipotent wills it to happen, either by allowing it to happen or by doing it himself; nor should we doubt that God acts well even by allowing whatever happens badly to happen. Although God does not will sins to occur, he does will the act of sin insofar as it is an act, because in that respect it is good; and at the same time he wills to permit its evil, as was said in disputations 11 and 24.

X. In reply to the fourth argument, we say that perfect providence on God’s part requires, on the side of free knowledge—through which God is the cause of things in second act—and on the side of the will through which all things have been produced, the predetermination in particular of all individuals that will exist, in keeping with the words, How could anything endure unless you had willed it?¹⁴ As for the objection concerning conditional knowledge, which others call middle knowledge, we reply that, as was shown in disputation 7, before a decree of the divine will it is not knowable, even to God, what a created will would do in particular on the supposition that it were placed in such circumstances. For this to be known, a divine decree must first predetermine the created will to that particular act in those circumstances, whether the decree is absolute or conditional with respect to the object willed, as was explained in that same disputation 7.

In reply to the confirmation, we say that, as was shown in disputations 11 and 24, God predefined the act of sin according to every aspect of being that it has, and likewise decreed to permit its evil for the manifestation of his justice in the reprobate. In the predestined, however, he permits sins to make his mercy more manifest, so that they may be humbled and become more cautious thereafter.¹⁵ Hence Saint Augustine says in On Nature and Grace, against the Pelagians, ch. 28¹⁶. God sometimes abandons you in that of which you are proud, so that you may know it is not yours but his, and learn not to be proud. This predefinition suffices for God to have the most perfect providence that can be had with respect to sins.

Whether evils of punishment are willed and predetermined in particular by divine providence with an absolute and efficacious will, or only permitted.

I. There is an opinion of certain theologians who assert that one must by no means admit that all effects occurring in this world have been provided for by God, with causes prepared for them so that they might happen in that way. They also affirm that killings in which some people are unexpectedly slain by robbers, drownings of others in rivers, and similar effects were not intended by divine providence to happen in this way, and that God did not prepare the connection of causes from which they proceed; they admit only that such effects were foreseen and permitted by God. They prove their opinion.

First, because it is not consonant with divine goodness and clemency that he created or ordered the free choice of those who swim for the purpose that those crossing the sea should drown in the waters, or that travelers should be killed by robbers. Therefore such effects are not willed by God, but only permitted.

Second. The drowning of people in rivers and similar effects depend on the sin of our first parents, from which they followed; consequently, they would not exist in nature if that sin had not preceded. Therefore they are not willed by God; otherwise the sin of the first parent itself would have been willed, since whoever wills an effect also wills its cause.

This is confirmed. The vengeance God carries out by inflicting evils of punishment cannot be exercised by him unless the evil of guilt has first occurred. Therefore, if God willed to inflict evils of punishment by an efficacious will and prepared the connection of secondary causes so that such punishments would exist in nature, it follows that he efficaciously willed the evil of guilt committed by those who inflict those same punishments.

II. Nevertheless, it must be held with complete certainty that all effects, even fortuitous and chance occurrences that befall people contrary to their intention, are willed by God with an absolute and efficacious will, in respect of every aspect of being that they possess, and are not merely permitted; consequently, he prepared the connection of secondary causes so that they might arise from them.¹ This is the conclusion of St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, question 19, article 8, in the body, whose words we cited in disputation 26, no. 8. He teaches the same in question 22, article 2, especially in the reply to the first objection, where he says that it is impossible for any effect to escape the order of the universal cause. St. Augustine teaches the same conclusion expressly in his commentary on Psalm 148, on the words, Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy wind, which fulfill his word.² There he says that by God's will and providence it comes about that the smallest animals harmful to human beings, and likewise monsters, are born for the beauty of the universe; and that lightning falling from heaven strikes a mountain and not a robber, or this person and not that one. Augustine's words are: Many foolish people, unable to contemplate and discern creation acting in its own places and order under God's nod and command, have thought that God governs all things above but despises, rejects, and abandons things below, so that he neither cares for nor governs them, but they are ruled by chance. And a little later: Therefore do not suppose that those things are moved by chance which in all their motion serve God's word. Fire shines where God wills; the cloud is borne where he wills, whether it carries rain, snow, or hail. And why do lightning bolts sometimes strike a mountain and not a robber? And further on: All these things which seem to happen heedlessly by chance in the nature of things do only his word, for they happen only at his command. And a little later: Whatever happens here contrary to our will, know that it happens only by the will of God, by his providence, by his order; and if we do not understand why it happens, let us entrust it to his providence, because it does not happen without cause, and we shall not blaspheme. All the Thomists follow this same opinion.

This is proved from the clearest passages of Scripture. For Isaiah 45 says: I am the Lord, and there is no other, forming light and creating darkness, making peace and creating evil; I, the Lord, do all these things. By “evil” the holy Doctors understand the evil of punishment. Saint Augustine does so especially in book 1, chapter 27 of Against Adimantus, a Disciple of Manichaeus, where he refers the phrase “creating evil” to the servitude and punishments God inflicts.³ Irenaeus thinks the same in book 4, chapter 77; Chrysostom in homily 23 on Matthew, chapter 6, where he says: By evil the Prophet does not mean avarice, robbery, or anything of that sort, but the blows inflicted by divine agency. Saint Basil teaches the same in a certain homily entitled That God Is Not the Cause of Evils, as does Saint Gregory in book 3 of the Moralia, chapter 7. The Prophet joined those two phrases, namely, making peace and creating evil, to indicate that these evils of punishment are not opposed to the peace, beauty, and order of the universe, but rather contribute to its greater beauty and order. Likewise, Jeremiah 32 says in God's person: I brought upon this people all this great evil. And Amos 3 says: If there is evil in the city that the Lord has not done—as if to say, “There is none.” In the common interpretation of the Saints, he is speaking of the evil of punishment.

Moreover, another notable passage proves the same point. It is found in 3 Kings, the last chapter, where it says: A certain man drew his bow, aiming his arrow at random, and struck the king of Israel between the lung and the stomach. Yet from the context of that chapter and chapter 22 it is clear that this effect, though accidental with respect to the one who shot the arrow, was willed and ordered by God so that Ahab might be punished for the vineyard he had unjustly taken from Naboth, according to the word of the Lord that he had spoken, as is said there. Therefore the same must be said of other effects that are accidental with respect to secondary causes: they are all willed and ordered by God to some end.

III. Further, in Matthew 10 our Lord Christ said: Are not two sparrows sold for an as? And not one of them will fall to the ground without your Father. That is, without the providence of your Father, as Saint Jerome and the interlinear gloss explain there. Therefore, all the more, when two people are sailing at sea or swimming in a river, if one falls and is drowned contrary to his intention while the other is not, this does not happen without God's will and providence.

Nor is the solution of some valid, who assert that a sparrow is said not to fall to the ground without the heavenly Father because it does not happen without his foreknowledge.⁴ For this solution does not seem to fit our Lord Christ's words. He wished to show, by an argument from the lesser to the greater, that God has providence of all human beings in particular, by means of the providence he has concerning sparrows and other small animals, indeed even the flowers of the field. For he says: Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they do not labor or spin. But I tell you that not even Solomon in all his glory was clothed like one of them. Therefore Christ understood that not one sparrow falls to the ground without God's will and decree, and not merely without his foreknowledge.

Further, Ecclesiasticus 11 says: Good and evil, life and death, poverty and prosperity are from God. And in Job 1, after the messengers reported that raiders had attacked and taken his oxen and donkeys, had struck his servants with the sword, and that fire had fallen and consumed his sheep and servants, along with other such events, Job added: The Lord gave, the Lord has taken away; as it pleased the Lord, so it has happened. There he refers the aforementioned events to the divine will and providence as their first cause. He does not say, “As the Lord permitted” or “foresaw,” but as it pleased the Lord This agrees with 1 Kings 2: The Lord puts to death and gives life; he leads down to the underworld and brings back. The Lord makes poor and makes rich, he humbles and exalts. Therefore the evils of punishment are willed by God.

Nor is it an obstacle that Wisdom 1 says: God did not make death. The meaning of this passage is that God does not intend anyone's death per se and primarily, but on account of another greater good joined to it. Secondly, the passage is explained of death with respect to its cause, namely sin, of which Romans 5 says: And through sin, death. Both explanations accord with the context, for it continues: Nor does he delight in the destruction of the living, for he created all things to be. And a little later: But the ungodly have called it to themselves by their hands and words—namely, death.

IIII. It is proved secondly by reason. God wills by his positive will to do all that his causality extends to. For, as was said above, God wills to cause whatever he causes, since he acts through intellect and will. But God is truly a positive cause, inflicting every evil of punishment, even if it is accidental with respect to its proximate cause. Therefore, by that same will he decreed and willed that all evils of punishment exist. Saint Thomas touches on this argument in the first part, question 22, article 2, reply 1, and question 103, articles 5 and 7; those passages should be consulted.

It is proved thirdly. God prepared efficacious means and a connection of causes so that a predestined person would infallibly die in grace and be saved. But often an accidental death or an unexpected drowning in a river is a means necessary according to the order of divine providence for a predestined person to die in grace, in accord with Wisdom 4: He was taken away lest wickedness should change his understanding. Therefore, by his efficacious will God prepared a connection of secondary causes so that a predestined person would be drowned in a river at such a time or be taken away by an untimely death.

Finally, it is proved by another argument of Saint Thomas in the cited reply to the first objection. Although an effect can depart from the order of a particular cause, it is nevertheless impossible for it to escape the order of the most universal cause, as will also be clear in Disputation 31. Therefore, it is impossible for any effect to occur in the natural order that is not willed and ordered to some end by divine providence.

V. To the first argument we reply that, as Saint Thomas teaches in the first part, question 19, article 9, the evil of punishment, formally speaking, is not willed by God, because under the aspect of evil it is not desirable. Rather, insofar as it is joined to a good that God directly wills, by willing in this way the good of his justice and mercy, he wills to inflict the evil of punishment on the sinner. Nor is this incompatible with divine mercy and clemency. God did not therefore create a human being principally for the purpose of drowning in a river. Rather, he created the predestined person principally so as to show his mercy in that person and so that the person might efficaciously attain eternal life. To bring him to it, God decreed that he be drowned in a river while in grace. If, however, the person was reprobate and in mortal sin, God likewise prepared a connection of secondary causes for him to be drowned in the waters, and does this according to the right order of his providence: first, lest the person live on to commit greater crimes, in which God's mercy also shines; second, to show his justice in punishing him; third, to provide greater warning to the just, so that they may learn to fear God; fourth, so that his mercy may shine more brightly in the elect.⁵

To the second argument we reply that, in our manner of understanding, God wills something to happen in two ways. First, he wills it without presupposing anything else. In this way he willed by his will of good pleasure to create the world, since the creation of the world does not depend, on the side of what is willed, on anything else. In the second way, he wills something to exist while presupposing something else of which he is the cause only by permission. Thus he willed by his will of good pleasure that the divine Word assume human flesh, on the supposition of the first parent's sin, as a remedy for which he came; for God was not a positive cause of that sin but only permitted it. I say, then, that evils of punishment are willed by God as joined to the good of divine justice and mercy, on the supposition of the evil of fault, which God permits. It is like a judge willing to hang a criminal on the supposition of that person's crime, of which the judge is not the cause.

To the confirmation we reply that from God's willing evils of punishment in the way explained, it does not follow that he also wills the evil of fault that is presupposed; it follows only that he wills to permit it. Otherwise the same argument would prove that God willed Adam's sin: for by an efficacious will he willed that the Word assume human flesh as its remedy, so that if sin had not existed, the divine Word would not have been incarnate, as Saint Thomas shows in the third part, question 1, article 3. Yet it must by no means be said that God willed Adam's sin.

Whether the attainment of the end intended by God is part of the nature of divine providence, in addition to the ordering of means to an end.

I. A very similar question is attached to this one, usually proposed in these terms: namely, whether the order of divine providence is certain, unchangeable, indissoluble, and unavoidable with respect to the attainment of its effects. Accordingly, both questions must be discussed together.

The first opinion is that of those who assert that divine providence does not require that what is ordered to an end attain that end. Certain more recent theologians defend this opinion, judging it to be the express teaching of Saint Thomas. They add that, setting aside middle knowledge, by which God knows the future consent of free choice on the hypothesis that it be placed in such circumstances, the order of divine providence with respect to acts dependent on human freedom is not certain, unchangeable, and indissoluble as regards the attainment of the intended effect. They prove this as follows.

First, from the authority of Saint Thomas, question 6 of On Truth, article 1, and book 1 of the Sentences, distinction 40, question 1, article 2. There he establishes this difference between divine providence and predestination: predestination always attains the end to which the predestined person is ordered, whereas providence orders means to an end but does not always attain the end.

Second, all human beings are ordered by divine providence to beatitude as their ultimate end, as Saint Thomas teaches in the passage just cited and is clear from 1 Timothy 2: God wills all people to be saved. Yet not all attain supernatural beatitude, as the Catholic faith teaches. Therefore, and so on.

This is confirmed: otherwise God would not have supernatural providence with respect to the reprobate. But this must not be said. The consequence is proved as follows: supernatural providence must be concerned with a supernatural end, or with things ordered to a supernatural end; but the reprobate do not attain a supernatural end. Therefore, if attainment of the end is included in divine providence, God does not have supernatural providence of the reprobate. The falsity of the consequent is proved as follows: God confers sufficient supernatural aids on all the reprobate, and sometimes grants them efficacious aids and habitual grace, from which they later fall away. Since these gifts are supernatural, they are effects of supernatural divine providence, for they cannot proceed from natural providence alone. Therefore, God has supernatural providence of the reprobate.

Third, for the providence of a prudent general, physician, or diligent farmer, it is enough that he apply suitable means to the end he intends, whether that end follows or is hindered from elsewhere. Therefore, the same must be said of divine providence. The consequence is clear: through the human providence we experience, we come to know divine providence.

Fourth, the argument is taken from the definition of providence: providence is the rational ordering of means to an end, as Saint Thomas teaches in the first part, question 22, article 1, in the body of the text. But attainment of the end is not included in this definition. Therefore.

Fifth, by divine providence every part of the earth is ordered to the center as its proper end, where it naturally comes to rest; yet not every part of the earth attains that end. Therefore.

Sixth, it is proved that, if foreknowledge is set aside, the order of divine providence is neither certain nor indissoluble. For many acts provided for by God necessarily depend on the choice of the human will. But, if divine providence offers no impediment, free choice can either perform or not perform the free act provided for by God. Therefore it can dissolve the order of divine providence. Thus, if foreknowledge of future consent is set aside, that order is not indissoluble with respect to attainment of the effect. The minor premise is proved as follows: otherwise human freedom of choice would be taken away, if the will could not do the opposite of what God provided it would do.

Seventh, God willed all things that depend on created choice—even beatitude itself and the merit of human beings and angels—only by a conditional will: namely, if human beings and angels should also will them. But foreseeing what would be future through the freedom of created choice, he takes pleasure in those things and wills absolutely that they be done. Therefore, apart from foreknowledge of future consent by created free choice, the force of divine providence alone and of the decree of his will does not make the order of divine providence always certain and indissoluble.

This is confirmed: for certainty, formally speaking, is the intellect's firm adherence. Therefore it expresses an intrinsic order to the intellect; therefore divine foreknowledge of the future consent must necessarily be presupposed if we are to say that the order of divine providence is certain and indissoluble.

II. The second opinion is Cajetan's, Summa theologiae I, question 22, article 4, which Thomists commonly defend today and which, in my judgment, is explicitly that of St. Thomas, as the passages cited below will show.¹ For its explanation:

We must note first that we can speak of God's providence in two ways: first, in general, according to the common notion of providence, abstracting from divine or human providence; second, of providence insofar as it is divine, which is most perfect.

Second, we must note that, since providence is the rational ordering of means to an end, it necessarily presupposes the willing or intending of the end; for no one orders means to an end unless he first wills the end itself, just as a physician first intends the sick person's health before applying suitable medicines and ordering them toward attaining that end.² There are two kinds of willing the end: one is absolute, called the will of good pleasure, or consequent will; the other is conditional, called antecedent will, or the will of sign.³ Providence, then, presupposes an absolute willing or intention of the end. For a farmer would be imprudent if he sowed seeds in a field without absolutely willing to gather the fruit, even though he may sometimes be accidentally prevented from attaining this end by the concurrence of other secondary causes. This principle, which is the chief basis of this opinion, expresses the mind of St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, question 22, article 1, reply to the third objection, where he says: Providence presupposes the willing of the end; for no one gives orders about things to be done unless he wills the end. But for St. Thomas the will of the end means an absolute will of the end itself, since a conditional will is not simply a will but a mere wish. This is confirmed: for an efficacious willing of means can arise only from an absolute willing of the end, since a means, as a means, is desirable only for the sake of the end. Therefore, the absolute will to order suitable means toward attaining the end arises from an absolute intention of the end.

III. Third, we must assume that the difference between human and divine providence is this: human providence, although it absolutely and efficaciously wills its intended end and applies suitable means to attain it, nevertheless often fails to attain that end because it can be impeded by the concurrence of other causes. Hence every human providence is imperfect and uncertain with respect to attaining its end, or the effect provided for, in keeping with the words of Wisdom:⁴ The thoughts of mortals are timid, and our plans uncertain.⁵ Divine providence, however, is most perfect and efficacious, as is God's will; accordingly, it cannot be impeded or overcome by any created cause, even a free one, so as to fail to attain its intended end. St. Thomas shows this by several arguments in Summa contra Gentiles III, chapter 94, and we shall prove the same in the following disputation. Hence St. Augustine, explaining the Psalm, All that the Lord willed, he did,⁶ in the Enchiridion to Laurentius, chapter 95, and citing these words in confirmation of this opinion, says: This would certainly not be true if God willed to do certain things and did not do them, and (what is more shameful) did not do them for this reason: that a human will prevented the Almighty's will from bringing about what he willed. And in chapter 96 he adds: God is truly called Almighty for no other reason than that he can do whatever he wills, and the effect of the Almighty's will is not impeded by the will of any creature. And in On Rebuke and Grace, chapter 14, he says: The willing and not willing of the one who wills or does not will is in his power in such a way that it does not impede the divine will or overcome its power; for concerning the things people do that he does not will, he himself does what he wills. And further on: Therefore, there must be no doubt that human wills cannot resist the will of God, who in heaven and on earth has done all that he willed, and who also made what is to come, so as to prevent him from doing what he wills, since he also does what he wills with human wills themselves, etc., having an all-powerful authority to incline human hearts wherever it pleases him. At the end of the same chapter he adds: God has human wills more in his power than they have their own wills. And in chapter 7 of the same book, speaking of those called according to the purpose, he says: If any of them perished, God would be deceived; but none of them perishes, because God is not deceived. If any of them perished, God would be overcome by human fault; but none of them perishes, because God is overcome by nothing.

First conclusion. The common notion of providence does not necessarily require attainment of the intended end. The authors of both opinions agree on this conclusion, and the arguments made at the beginning prove it effectively.

It is proved further: for the common notion of providence is preserved in human providence, but the latter does not always attain the end to which it orders the means, as is evident from the argument given in the third premise. Therefore.

IIII. Second conclusion. Attainment of the intended end belongs to the intrinsic notion of divine providence insofar as it is divine, as well as the ordering of means to an end. This is Cajetan's conclusion, Summa theologiae I, question 22, article 1, section Circa difficultatem, and Master Báñez's, in the same article, doubt 1; he says that all the respected Doctors of our time follow it. It is proved from St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, question 22, article 2, reply to the first objection, where he says that since all particular causes are contained under the universal cause, it is impossible for any effect to escape the order of the universal cause. And in article 4, reply to the second objection, he says that the order of divine providence is immovable and certain⁷ in this: all things provided for by it happen in the way in which it provides, whether necessarily or contingently; and in the reply to the third objection he adds that divine providence does not fail of its effect or of the manner of happening that it provided for.⁸ In the cited chapter 94 of Summa contra Gentiles III, he teaches plainly that divine providence is certain both with respect to the order of means and with respect to the outcome; especially in the section Praeterea, he says that the order of divine providence cannot be changed at all, and in the section Si autem he says that divine provision cannot be frustrated at all.

It is proved secondly by an argument drawn from St. Thomas in the same chapter. Divine providence is at the summit of perfection, and by its intrinsic nature, insofar as it is divine, it is most perfect. But the most perfect providence requires not only the ordering of means to an end but also attainment of the end, as some authors of the contrary opinion also admit. Therefore, etc.

It is proved thirdly: although providence is not concerned with the end but with the means for the sake of the end, it nevertheless presupposes an absolute willing of the intended end, as is clear from what was said in the second premise. But it is impossible for God absolutely to will to attain an end through means and not attain it; otherwise the divine will would be inefficacious, impeded, and overcome by a created will or by other secondary causes. Yet this is impossible and contrary to St. Augustine, as was shown in the third premise. Therefore.

V. Third conclusion. In general, the order of divine providence is certain, immovable, and indissoluble with respect to the attainment of effects, so that this certainty and indissolubility are grounded in the order and causality of the means themselves and in the efficacy of the divine will and providence, altogether independently of a future consent or exercise of the created will foreknown by middle knowledge.⁹ This conclusion belongs to St. Thomas in the cited passages and in Summa theologiae I, question 116, articles 1, 2, and 3, especially since St. Thomas never admitted that middle knowledge, as was shown in disputation 7.

It is proved further by the authority of Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, book 4, prose 6, where he says that fate is an immovable disposition inherent in movable things. He also says: Providence, proceeding from immovable things, binds human acts and future events with an indissoluble joining of causes. Here he grounds the indissolubility of divine providence in the very connection of causes and means.

They reply that St. Thomas and Boethius are to be understood as speaking of what lies on God's side, since he has purposed to carry out such an order; nevertheless, on the side of a contingent and free secondary cause, that order can be dissolved. They add that unless the texts are understood in this way, they cannot be defended. For they think that freedom of choice is removed if, prior to middle foreknowledge, the order of divine providence is certain and immovable by the very causality of the means.

But this explanation manifestly conflicts with the mind of St. Thomas and Boethius, who intend, by the connection of causes and means, to show divine providence to be certain with respect to attaining its end. This is confirmed: for, as will be clear in disputation 41, predestination is certain by the certainty of the causality of the means, and yet this certainty does not destroy freedom of choice, as will become clear in that same disputation. Therefore certainty in the order and causality of the means is not incompatible with freedom.

VI. The first solution to the first argument is Master Báñez's: St. Thomas in that question 6 of On Truth is speaking of human providence. This solution, however, does not seem to conform to the text, in which he speaks explicitly of divine providence. For he says: By God's providence all human beings are ordered to beatitude; but predestination also regards the outcome or attainment of the order, and therefore applies only to those who attain glory. St. Thomas therefore holds that divine providence does not always regard the outcome of the order, unless it is this kind of providence, namely, predestination.

The second solution of the same Master Báñez, which Cajetan had previously used, is that Saint Thomas changed his opinion in Summa theologiae I, q. 22, and in the cited passage of Summa contra Gentiles III. Perhaps a better reply, however, is this: just as in God one distinguishes two wills—one, the will of sign, which is a will in a qualified sense and is not always fulfilled; the other, the will of good pleasure, which is will without qualification and is always fulfilled—so one can distinguish two kinds of providence. By one, things are ordered by the will of good pleasure to an end principally intended, and this providence always attains that end, as will become clear at once. By the other, things are ordered by antecedent will to an end, but not by the will of good pleasure in such a way that the end is principally intended or intended for its own sake. Such providence does not always attain that end; nevertheless, it infallibly attains another end to which things are ordered more principally, as we shall explain shortly concerning the supernatural providence God has with respect to the reprobate.¹⁰ In keeping with this doctrine, we should say that in De veritate, q. 6, Saint Thomas speaks of God’s providence with respect to an end to which things are not ordered principally, but for the sake of another end more principally intended. In the first part, however, he speaks of divine providence with respect to the end to which things are ordered principally. In this way the different passages of Saint Thomas are reconciled, and there is no need to say that he changed his opinion.

VII. In reply to the second argument, we say that all human beings are ordered to supernatural beatitude by antecedent will; by consequent will, or the will of good pleasure, only the predestined are ordered to it. For by consequent will God does not will supernatural beatitude for the reprobate; nor are they ordered principally to its attainment, but to the good of divine justice and the good of the elect.¹¹ Hence Saint Thomas says in Summa theologiae I, q. 23, art. 3, reply 1, that God wills good for everyone, but he does not will for everyone that good which is eternal life. The gifts of grace that God often bestows on the reprobate are effects of the supernatural providence by which they are ordered principally to the good of the elect, so that divine mercy may shine forth more brightly in the elect. They are not effects of the predestination of the reprobate, since they are not predestined; nor are they effects of supernatural providence by which the reprobate are ordered principally to their own beatitude, since, as was said, they are not ordered principally to their own beatitude. To make this clear, consider that, as Saint Thomas teaches in De veritate, q. 5, art. 7, in the body, since human beings through sin are compared to senseless beasts and become like them, as Psalm 48 says, God has providence over the reprobate according to the manner of brute animals. He orders them according to the order proper to brute animals: namely, the good or evil in them is not ordered to their own good, but to the good of others, that is, the elect, for whom all things work together for good, as it says in Romans 8.¹² Divine providence infallibly attains this end when it permits the sins of the reprobate or grants them gifts of grace, which they nevertheless abuse through their own wickedness. For this reason Saint Thomas says that when the reprobate depart from one order of divine providence, they fall into another that God intends more principally, in the manner explained above. See what he teaches concerning providence over the reprobate in Summa theologiae I, q. 22, art. 2, reply 4. The reply to the confirmation is already clear from what was said in answer to the second argument.

The consequence is denied in reply to the third argument, and the reason for the difference is this: as we said in the third premise, human providence is imperfect and can be hindered from attaining the end principally intended, to which it orders the means. Divine providence, however, cannot be hindered from attaining the end it principally intends.

In reply to the fourth argument, we say that the absolute willing of the end principally intended, which providence presupposes, virtually includes its attainment, if we are speaking of divine providence, as is clear from what was said in the third premise.

VIII. To the fifth argument we reply that each part of the earth is ordered principally by divine providence to the good of the universe and its beauty, and this end is always attained. With respect to this end, it is fitting that not every part of the earth attain its particular end, which is to rest at the center. Therefore, it is not necessary for every part of the earth to attain this end by divine providence. The same must be said proportionately of fire and other such creatures. Saint Thomas explained this in these words in Against the Gentiles, book 3, chapter 94: We must consider that every agent intends the good, and the best good it can, as was shown above. But the good and the better are not considered in the same way in the whole and in its parts. In the whole, the good is the integrity that results from the order and composition of the parts. Hence it is better for the whole that there be dissimilarity among its parts, without which the order and perfection of the whole cannot exist, than that all the parts be equal, each one attaining the rank of the noblest part. Considered in itself, however, each part of a lower rank would be better if it were at the rank of a higher part, as is clear in the human body: the foot would be a nobler part of a human being if it had the beauty and power of the eye, but the whole body would be less perfect if it lacked the function of the foot. The particular agent's intention and the universal agent's intention therefore tend toward different things: for the particular agent tends absolutely toward the good of the part and makes it as good as it can, while the universal agent tends toward the good of the whole. Thus a certain defect is outside the intention of the particular agent, yet is according to the intention of the universal agent.

To the sixth argument, we reply from the teaching of Saint Thomas in the cited chapter 94 of Against the Gentiles: notwithstanding the certainty and indissolubility of divine providence, human free choice can absolutely, and in the divided sense, fail to perform the act God provided it would perform; nevertheless, in the composite sense, it is impossible for it not to perform that act or to perform the opposite.¹³ For on the supposition of divine providence and will, it must perform that act by a necessity of infallibility, but not by absolute necessity. Hence such a conditional necessity does not take away freedom of choice, as was explained in Disputation 25.

To the seventh, we deny that God willed only conditionally the free acts that are performed in time by a created will. For it was already shown above in Disputations 22 and 23 that he willed them by an absolute and efficacious will, and predetermined them with respect to every aspect of their being.

To the confirmation, we reply with Saint Thomas, question 6 of On Truth, article 3, in the body of the text, that there are two kinds of certainty. One is certainty of cognition, and this is taken from the relation of the known object to the intellect. The other is certainty of order and causality, and this is drawn from the infallible relation of cause to effect, as it is certain and infallible that if the sun rises, it is day, and if fire is properly applied, it will heat. Divine providence is also certain in this second way, as Saint Thomas teaches in the same article when speaking of predestination. All this will be clearer from what we shall say in Disputation 41, where the same difficulty concerning the certainty of predestination with respect to attainment of the effect will be treated more fully.

Whether contingent and free secondary causes can withdraw themselves from, or depart from, the order assigned to them by divine providence.

I. Authors who deny that contingent and free actions are predetermined by God in particular, antecedently to foreknowledge of the created will's cooperation, consequently teach that contingent and free secondary causes can depart from the order and predetermination of divine providence. They claim that this opinion is especially apt for refuting the errors that heretics of our time, especially Luther and Calvin, have tried to introduce. The chief arguments by which they prove their opinion are nearly the same as those with which, in Disputation 22 and the two following disputations, they tried to prove that God cannot predetermine the created will toward one side while preserving its freedom, either by an extrinsic decree of his will or by some motion inhering in the created will. We judge that those arguments have already been sufficiently resolved in those same disputations. Here, however, only those arguments that seem specifically to support the proposed opinion should be presented and answered.

The first argument is this. Luther, whom Roffensis cites in article 36 of Against Luther, asserted that, with respect to divine providence, all things happen by necessity, because the created will and all other secondary causes governed by divine providence cannot withdraw themselves from its order or predetermination, or do anything other than what divine providence has established and ordered. Luther's words are: To us, looking toward things below, they appear subject to choice; but to those looking toward heavenly things, all things are necessary, because all of us and all things see, do, and suffer not as we will, but as he wills. Calvin likewise says in book 2 of On Free Choice, Against Pighius, page 236: Accordingly, we say that what seem most fortuitous happen necessarily, not by their own nature, but because God's eternal and unchanging plan reigns in governing them. Therefore, we must not grant that the created will cannot depart from the order assigned to it by divine providence.

Secondly, the created will can resist, and in fact often resists, the order of divine providence; otherwise the Psalmist would not pray: Protect me from those who resist your right hand, as the apple of the eye;¹ nor would Saint Stephen have rebuked the Jews, saying: You always resist the Holy Spirit.² Therefore the created will can withdraw itself from the order of divine governance and depart from its predetermination.

Thirdly, the created will freely carries out the order of divine providence and governance with respect to those effects that divine providence causes in things through free and contingent causes; otherwise freedom of choice would be entirely destroyed. Therefore, with respect to such effects, the same created will can carry out or fail to carry out the order of divine governance and consequently can withdraw itself from that order. The consequence is proved as follows: otherwise it would carry out the order of providence and governance by necessity and not freely.

Fourthly, if free choice were to do the opposite of what divine providence ordered and determined, it would in fact withdraw itself from its order and predetermination. Therefore, if it can do the opposite of what divine providence established, it can withdraw itself from the order of that same providence. But, as the Council of Trent teaches, free choice can in fact do the opposite of what God ordered and willed it to do through that same choice. Therefore, it can withdraw itself from the order of divine providence.³

Fifthly, no king justly punishes those who do not depart from his ordinance. Therefore, if created free choice does not depart, or cannot depart, from the order of divine providence, no one would be justly punished by God.

II. Many very weighty Thomists teach the contrary opinion. Among them is Master Báñez, Summa theologiae I, question 14, article 13, final doubt, who, speaking of the necessity of infallibility found in free and contingent acts provided for and willed by God, says: This necessity is drawn from the most efficacious power of the first cause, which so determines all secondary causes to produce their effects that no secondary cause can escape its determination. If correctly understood, this opinion is without doubt that of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and is closely conformed to sacred Scripture. For clarity, we must assume with St. Thomas that the order of divine providence can be considered in two ways: in one way, in general, namely insofar as it proceeds from the governing cause of the whole, that is, from God; in another way, in particular, insofar as it proceeds from a particular cause that executes divine providence and government.⁴

III. Let the first conclusion, then, be this: created free choice can withdraw itself from the order of divine providence and government insofar as that order proceeds through some particular cause. This is explicitly St. Thomas's conclusion, Summa theologiae I, question 103, article 7, in the body. There he asks whether anything can happen outside the order of divine government and replies: An effect can occur outside the order of some particular cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause.⁵ He says the same in replies to the first and second objections of the same article and in the following article 8. The second, third, and fifth arguments made at the beginning prove this conclusion.

It is proved further. Many evils are found in things, especially in created free choice, which often falls into the evil of sin. But, as St. Thomas teaches, a thing is called evil because it departs from the order of some particular good. Therefore created free choice can depart from the order of some particular good and, consequently, can also depart from some particular order of divine providence.⁶

It is proved secondly: many things happen by chance among things, as everyone admits. But nothing happens by chance unless it occurs outside the order of some particular cause; for, as St. Thomas teaches, things are said to be chance events in the world in relation to particular causes, outside whose order they fall.⁷ Therefore, since contingent chance events are found among free acts, it follows that free choice can depart from the order of some particular cause.

It is proved thirdly. In natural things we find that although one particular form cannot escape or depart entirely from the universal form of being, since it would then be reduced to nothing, it can nonetheless depart from another particular form, as whiteness departs from blackness. Therefore, in the same way, although created free choice cannot depart entirely from the order of the universal cause or escape it, it can nevertheless depart from the order of divine providence considered according to some particular cause.

IIII. Second conclusion. Created free choice cannot escape entirely the order of divine providence in general, namely, insofar as it proceeds from the governing cause of the whole.⁸ This is the conclusion of St. Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter, chapter 32, where he says: Unbelievers indeed act against God's will when they do not believe his Gospel; yet they do not thereby conquer it. Rather, they deprive themselves of a great and supreme good and entangle themselves in evils of punishment, to experience in their torments the power of him whose mercy in his gifts they despised. Thus God's will is always unconquered. It would be conquered, however, if he found nothing to do with those who despise him, or if they could somehow escape what he has decreed concerning them. For when he says, for example, “I will that all these servants of mine work in the vineyard and, after their labor, rest and feast, so that whoever among them does not wish this will always grind in the mill.” It seems, indeed, that whoever disobeys acts against his master's will; but he will conquer it only if, by also despising the mill, he escapes it—which can in no way happen under God's power. This conclusion is also explicitly St. Thomas's in the passages cited above, and the holy Doctor proves it.

First: For nothing comes about outside the order of a particular cause except from some other cause that impedes it; that cause must in turn be traced back to the first universal cause. For example, indigestion occurs outside the order of the nutritive power because of some impediment, such as the coarseness of the food, which must be traced back to some cause, and so on up to the first universal cause. Since, then, God is the first universal cause, not merely of one kind but universally of all being, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of divine governance. But precisely because something seems in one respect to depart from the order of divine providence, considered according to some particular cause, it must fall back into that same order according to another cause.⁹

It is proved secondly: For the order of divine providence tends wholly toward the good, but each thing in its operation and striving tends only toward the good; for no one acts while looking to evil, as Dionysius says.¹⁰ Therefore no thing can depart entirely from the order of divine providence.

Saint Thomas confirms this: For every inclination of a thing, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing other than a certain impression from the first mover, just as the inclination of an arrow toward a particular target is nothing other than a certain impression from the archer. Hence all things that are done, whether naturally or voluntarily, reach, as if of their own accord, that to which they are divinely ordered. Therefore God is said to dispose all things gently. Therefore.

Thirdly, nothing is found in the world that is wholly evil, because evil is always grounded in good, as Saint Thomas shows in the first part, question 48¹¹, article 3, and question 49, article 3. Therefore some good is found in all things.¹² But every good, whatever it may be, insofar as it is good, proceeds from the supreme good, namely God. Since, then, God by his providence orders all particular goods of which he is the cause toward himself as their ultimate end, it follows that nothing in the world departs entirely from the order of divine providence.

Fourthly, what happens outside the order of some agent happens by chance with respect to that agent; for chance is a cause acting apart from intention, as Aristotle teaches in book 2 of the Physics, texts 49 and 50, and as Saint Thomas teaches in the second part of the second part, question 64, article 8, in the body of the text, and book 3 of Against the Gentiles, chapter 5. But nothing happens by chance with respect to God, as Saint Thomas teaches in the first part, question 103, article 7, reply 2¹³, where he says: Things are called chance events in relation to particular causes, outside whose order they occur. But as far as divine providence is concerned, nothing happens by chance in the world, as Augustine says in his book of Eighty-Three Questions.¹⁴ Therefore nothing departs entirely from the order of divine providence.

Fifthly, since an effect conforms to its agent according to its form, the same reasoning must apply to efficient causes as to formal causes. But among formal causes nothing can be found that escapes the universal form of being, although something can depart from this or that particular form: something may not be a human being or a living thing, but nothing can fail to be a being, for otherwise it would be nothing. Therefore the same holds among efficient causes: although something can come about outside the order of some particular efficient cause, it cannot come about outside the order of the most universal cause, under which all particular causes are included. But divine providence is the most universal cause of all things and all causes. Therefore no cause or effect, even a free one, can depart from the order of divine providence.¹⁵

This is confirmed: what seems to depart from the divine will and providence according to one order falls back into it according to another. A sinner, for example, insofar as it lies within him, departs from the divine will by sinning; yet he enters the order of the divine will when he is punished by its justice. Therefore the created will cannot escape the order of divine providence entirely.¹⁶

V. Third conclusion. Created free choice cannot perform anything that has not first been predefined by God and disposed and ordered by his providence toward some end.¹⁷ This conclusion is opposed to the authors of the first opinion; nevertheless, recent Thomists assert it. For clarity, we must assume that the foregoing proposition can have two senses. The first is the divided sense, and then it means that created free choice does not have the power to do the opposite of what God has ordered by his will and providence to be done through created free choice. Catholics who teach this proposition do not understand it in that sense, for the true freedom we are bound to defend according to the Catholic faith necessarily requires that created will have the power both to act and not to act. For freedom of choice consists in the faculty of will and reason to do either of two things, as will be shown in disputations 115 and 116. The second sense of the proposition is the composite sense, which we explained at the end of disputation 25. It means that these two things are mutually incompatible: that something be done through free choice and that it not have been first predefined and ordered by divine providence. In this sense, we assert that created free choice cannot do anything unless it has first been predefined by God and ordered by his providence. We explained the proposition, “God cannot do anything except what he foreknew he would do,” in a similar sense in disputation 22, no. 33, with St. Thomas. Its sense is¹⁸ true, according to St. Thomas's interpretation in question 1 of On the Power of God, article 5, reply to the first objection: it cannot happen that something be produced by God and not be foreknown by God. It is proved: created free choice stands in relation to God as an instrument, which cannot act unless it is moved by the principal agent. For St. Thomas says in his commentary on Isaiah 10, on the words Will the axe boast, etc.: Here the boastful one is rebuked, because he too is like an instrument, which cannot act except through the movement of the craftsman. And in On the Governance of Rulers, little work 20, book 3, chapter 8, explaining the same passage of Isaiah, he says: The power of a ruler stands in relation to God as the power of a staff to the one striking with it, and as the power of a saw to the craftsman. Now the power of a saw or axe is plainly nothing in its work unless the craftsman moves and directs it. The same is true of the power to rule: it is nothing without God moving and governing.¹⁹ And in Summa theologiae I, question 2, article 3, in the body, he says: Secondary movers move only insofar as they are moved by the first mover, just as a staff moves only insofar as it is moved by a hand. He says the same in Physics VIII, letter B, where he says that a secondary mover cannot move without the first, just as a staff cannot move a stone unless it is moved by a person. Finally, in Summa theologiae I–II, question 109, in the body, he says: However perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature may be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it is moved by God. He repeats the same in article 9 of that question. But every motion of God is according to the order of his divine providence. Therefore, it never happens that created free choice does anything unless it was first provided for and ordered by God.

It is proved secondly by all the arguments with which it was shown in disputations 18 and 23 that secondary causes do nothing unless God first imparts to them a prior motion by which he predetermines them to act.

VI. Some object against this doctrine as follows. The heretics of our time who attack free choice, especially Calvin, often teach that the human will stands in relation to God as a stick, an axe, or a saw, which cannot act unless moved, bent, and directed by an artisan. From this they have inferred that free choice is a mere name, or a name without a reality. Calvin’s words are: That the impious are like saws in God’s hand, which he moves, turns, and directs wherever he wills, is not from Luther but from the Holy Spirit, if Pighius indeed confesses that the Spirit spoke through the Prophets. For Isaiah says of Sennacherib: Shall the saw boast against him who draws it?²⁰²¹ Elsewhere, explaining the words, As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, and so on, he says: For Christ means nothing other than that, when we are separated from him, we are dry wood that amounts to nothing, since apart from him there is no capacity in us to do good.²²

We reply that Calvin did not err by asserting that the will is moved by God to act and, in a certain respect, stands in relation to him as a saw, axe, or stick stands in relation to the one who draws or moves it.²³ For since sacred Scripture often uses this kind of comparison, it cannot be denied that the comparison holds in some respect and is apt to explain the dependence on God that created free choice has in its operation. Otherwise, one would have to say that the Holy Spirit used an inept comparison, which cannot be said without grave blasphemy. Calvin therefore erred because, from a Catholic premise, he drew by a bad inference a conclusion contrary to the faith: that free choice is a name without a reality, or a reality that is only a name, as was shown in disputation 22, no. 30, and will be shown more fully in disputations 115 and 116.

This also makes clear the reply to the first argument.

In reply to the second, we say that, as will become clear in the following disputation, a created will can and in fact does resist the order of divine providence considered with respect to a particular cause. It cannot, however, and never will, resist the order considered on the side of the efficacious will of God and universal providence, as was said.

In reply to the third, we say that divine providence disposed and ordained that free choice should freely carry out the order established by that same providence, according to the condition and nature of a created will. Hence it would be more contrary to divine providence and its governance if the will were moved by necessity, or carried out the order of divine providence and acted by necessity, which does not befit its nature, than if it were moved freely, as befits its nature, as Saint Thomas says in Summa theologiae I–II, q. 10, art. 4, reply 1.

The consequence is denied in reply to the fourth argument, and the reason for the distinction is this: God did not ordain, nor could he ordain, that free choice should do the opposite of what has been determined and predetermined by the divine will and providence. He did ordain that it should be able to do the opposite of what God willed it to do, since he ordained that it be done freely. Consequently, he disposed that it should happen in such a way that it could fail to happen if a person willed not to do it. The cases are therefore dissimilar.

A second reply is that the argument proves only that created free choice can do something outside the order of divine providence and governance considered according to some particular cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause.

In reply to the fifth, we say with Saint Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 103, art. 8, reply 1, that the wicked are justly punished by God because they withdraw themselves from the order considered according to a determinate good that is fitting for them according to their nature or state. All this will become clearer in the following disputation.

Whether created free choice can resist God Almighty or struggle against the order of divine providence.

I. Since the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, providence, and predestination, and the efficacy of the helps of grace by which all who are delivered are most certainly delivered, rest upon God's omnipotence and the infinite power of his will, by which he has done whatever he willed in heaven and on earth,¹ it will not be foreign to our purpose to inquire more thoroughly and explain whether created free choice can struggle against God's will, resist it, and oppose it. This difficulty is closely related to another that St. Thomas treats in Summa theologiae I–II, question 6, article 4: namely, whether violence can be inflicted on the will by God. There the Thomists also discuss whether any creature can be moved immediately by God with a violent motion. Since a violent motion comes from an extrinsic principle, with the patient contributing no force—that is, resisting—the resolution of this question will bring considerable usefulness and clarity to what must be said about the resistance of free choice. Therefore, in this disputation certain matters concerning this latter difficulty must also be touched on briefly.

We argue first, then, that created free choice can resist God Almighty and his will. For Isaiah 3 says: Their tongue and their inventions are against the Lord, to provoke the eyes of his Majesty. And Psalm 16 says: Protect me from those who resist your right hand, as the pupil of the eye. And Acts 7 says: You have always resisted the Holy Spirit. These words signify that created will can not only resist the divine will, but often actually does so.

Second, it is argued. A created will can be coerced and suffer violence from God, at least by his absolute power. Therefore it can resist him. The consequence is proved: since a coerced or violent motion comes from an extrinsic principle while the patient contributes no force—that is, resists by its own inclination—if God can coerce the will to some act, the will can resist God. The antecedent is proved: the intellect can be coerced by God; therefore so can the will.

First, this is confirmed: for, as theologians commonly admit in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 25, the will can suffer violence in acts it commands. Therefore it can also suffer violence in acts it elicits. The consequence is proved: not only can acts of other powers be commanded by the will, but so can acts elicited by that same will; for the will can turn back upon itself and command itself to perform an act of love, as St. Thomas teaches in Summa theologiae I–II, question 16, article 4, reply to the third objection. This is also gathered from Psalm 118: My soul has desired to desire your justifications at all times.

Second, this is confirmed: for the will can have an act of love contrary to its own inclination and the impetus of its own command—for example, if Peter efficaciously wills to hate Paul and God infuses love of Paul into Peter, turning his heart. That God can do this, and indeed sometimes does it, is gathered from Proverbs 21: The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, like divisions of waters; he will turn it wherever he wills. And Esther 15: God turned the king's spirit to gentleness. St. Augustine draws this from the same passages.² Therefore the will can be coerced by God into an act of love and consequently can resist God.

Third. Demons and the souls of the damned are detained violently by God in hell. Therefore they suffer violence with respect to God, and therefore resist his will.

This is confirmed: the inward sadness with which the damned are tortured in hell is inflicted on them by God contrary to their inclination; yet such sadness is an act elicited by the will. Therefore, in such acts, a created will can be coerced by God contrary to its own inclination and consequently can resist God, since a coerced motion cannot exist without resistance on the part of the thing moved.

Fourth. Other creatures can resist God as he moves them. Therefore so can created will, which is superior to them. The antecedent is proved: if God were to move a stone upward immediately by himself, not to fill a void but as some particular agent moves it, the stone would then be inclined downward by the heaviness it has. Therefore it would resist God as he moved it.

II. Fifth. Suppose that Peter efficaciously wills to remain for a quarter of an hour in the act of love of some object. If, after the act has begun, God withdraws his general concurrence from Peter, he would coerce Peter's will by preventing it from issuing into the act it wills to have. Therefore God could also coerce it to elicit an act it does not will to have; and so created will could resist God as he moves it. The antecedent is proved: someone who is prevented from eliciting an act to which he is inclined is truly coerced. A stone, for example, suffers violence and is coerced when held upward, because it is prevented from moving downward, as its heaviness inclines it to do.

Sixth. Free choice can resist the efficacious help by which God wills to convert a person. Therefore it can resist God and his will. The antecedent is proved from the Council of Sens, decree on faith, 15, which says: The help of God who draws is not such that it cannot be resisted. And St. Augustine says in book 3 of On Free Choice, chapter 18: Whatever this cause of the will may be, if it cannot be resisted, yielding to it is without sin; but if it can be resisted, let it not be yielded to, and we shall not sin. The consequence is proved: for the efficacious help contains God's intention and the power of the divine will, as St. Thomas teaches in Summa theologiae I–II, question 112, article 3. Therefore, if free choice can resist efficacious help, it can also resist God himself and his will.

This is confirmed: as the Apostle says, Whoever resists authority resists God's ordinance, for there is no authority except from God.³ Therefore, one who can resist efficacious help can also resist God himself, since every efficacious help is from God, in keeping with Psalm 120, My help is from the Lord, and Hosea 13, Your destruction is from yourself, O Israel; only in me is your help.

III. To the contrary, it is said in Esther 13: Lord God, Almighty King, all things are placed under your dominion, and no one can resist your will if you have decreed to save Israel. And in Romans 9: Who resists his will? St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, question 103, article 8, teaches that nothing can struggle against the order of divine government in general, that is, insofar as it proceeds from the governing cause of the whole.

To explain this difficulty, we must note that it is one thing for the will to be necessitated, and another for it to be coerced into some act. For it is enough for it to be necessitated that it be determined to one thing by way of nature, so that it is not within its power to do the opposite if it wills, or not to act. In this way it is necessitated in heaven to love God, as was said above.⁴ But for it to suffer violence or be coerced, the act to which it is coerced must be inflicted⁵ by an extrinsic principle while the will itself actually or virtually resists, as St. Thomas teaches in Summa theologiae I–II, question 9, article 4, in the body and reply to the second objection.

Second, note with St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I–II, question 6, article 4, in the body, that there are two kinds of act of the will: one is its immediate act, as it were elicited by the will itself, namely, willing; the other is an act of the will commanded by it and performed through another power, such as walking and speaking, which are commanded by the will through the motive power. As regards acts commanded by the will, the will can suffer violence insofar as the external limbs can be prevented by violence from carrying out the will's command. But as regards the will's own act, violence cannot be inflicted on it. The reason is that an act of the will is nothing other than an inclination proceeding from an interior cognitive principle, just as natural appetite is an inclination from an interior principle but without cognition. What is coerced or violent, however, comes from an exterior principle. Hence it is contrary to the very nature of an act of the will that it be coerced or violent, just as it is contrary to the nature of natural inclination or the motion of a stone that it be carried upward. A stone can⁶* indeed be carried upward by violence, but its natural inclination cannot make that motion violent; likewise a person can be dragged by violence, but that this should be from his will is contrary to the nature of violence.* This teaching of St. Thomas is common among theologians in the second book of the Sentences, distinction 25, and in the fourth, distinction 29; all Thomists follow it.

It must be noted thirdly that God's will is twofold: one is the will of sign, or antecedent will; the other is the will of good pleasure, or consequent will. This distinction and its parts will be explained fully in Disputation 34.

IIII. It must be noted fourthly that the ability to resist is understood in two ways.⁷ First, commonly, as the ability to dissent or to do the opposite of what God willed free choice to do. Our discussion does not concern this sense, for all Catholics admit that free choice can dissent if it wishes and do the opposite of what God absolutely willed to be done through that choice. This is not to oppose or resist God, but rather to fulfill his will, because God decreed and ordered, for example, that Peter consent to God calling him in such a way that he could dissent if he wished; for God decreed that Peter consent freely. Freedom necessarily requires that a free cause have the capacity for either of two alternatives, as will be clear in Disputations 115 and 116. In the second, strict sense, resistance means to strive against and oppose God or his absolute and efficacious will by a contrary inclination, or by one's own motion or impulse; it is in this sense that the term is used here. Finally, we must presuppose the distinction taught and explained in Disputation 25 between the divided and composite senses, which will also be discussed further in Disputations 93 and 94, where this same difficulty will be debated concerning efficacious aid inhering in the will.

Let the first conclusion, then, be this: created free choice can resist, and in fact does resist, God's antecedent will or will of sign, not only in the divided sense but also in the composite sense. Everyone agrees on this conclusion, and the scriptural passages cited in the first argument convincingly prove it. It is also clear from what was said in the preceding disputation, first conclusion.

V. Second conclusion: created free choice never resists, nor can it resist, God or his efficacious will, if we speak properly and strictly of resistance. This is understood not only in the composite sense but also in the divided sense. Thus there is, and can be, no power in created free choice by which it could resist God or oppose his efficacious will.⁸

This conclusion is proved first by the clearest testimonies of sacred Scripture. In addition to those already cited above, which are most powerful, the following establish our conclusion. Genesis 50 says: Joseph said to his brothers: “Can we resist God's will? You planned evil against me, but God turned it to good, so as to exalt me, as you see at present, and to save many peoples.” Job 9 says: God, whose anger no one can resist. And chapter 41: Who can resist my face? Wisdom 11 says: Who can resist the power of your arm? And Isaiah 47: I will take vengeance, and no man will resist me.

Second, the conclusion is proved by testimonies of the holy Fathers. First, Saint Augustine teaches it in On Rebuke and Grace, ch. 14, where he says: No human will resists him who wills to save; for willing or refusing is so within the power of the one who wills or refuses that it neither impedes the divine will nor overcomes its power. For, concerning those who do what he does not will, he himself does what he wills. Some reply that Augustine did not say free choice cannot resist God, but only that it does not resist—just as elsewhere he said that efficacious grace is rejected by no hardened heart, not that it cannot be rejected, since it can be rejected absolutely. Yet this explanation is not in keeping with Saint Augustine’s meaning; rather, it expressly contradicts his context. For a little later he adds: We must not doubt, then, that human wills cannot resist the will of God, who in heaven and on earth has done whatever he willed, and who also made what is yet to come, so as to prevent him from doing what he wills, since he does with human wills themselves what he wills, whenever he wills. Nor does the same explanation seem to fit the scriptural passages cited above, in which both points are stated explicitly: that created free choice does not resist God or his will, and that it cannot resist him. Saint Prosper agrees in his letter to Ruffinus on free choice, saying: Are we to say that human wills oppose the will of God, and that these people’s conduct is so savage and untamable that they do not hear the Gospel because their impious hearts are not open to its preaching? And who changed their hearts, if not the one who fashioned each of their hearts? Who softened the hardness of this rigidity into a disposition to obey, if not the one who can raise up children for Abraham from stones? Saint Jerome, explaining Predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will in his commentary on Ephesians 1, says: We human beings often intend to act by deliberation, but the result does not follow our will. No one, however, can resist him so as to prevent him from doing everything he wills.⁹ From this it does not follow that the will cannot resist efficacious grace inhering in free choice, as will be made clear in disputation 93.

Moreover, Boethius, in book 3, prose 12 of The Consolation of Philosophy, says: There is not, he says, anything that either wishes or is able to oppose this supreme good.¹⁰ Saint Thomas expressly teaches the same in Summa theologiae I, q. 103, art. 8; q. 19, art. 6, in the body and reply 3; and Summa contra Gentiles III, ch. 94, where he says: It is impossible for any agent to prevent the execution of divine providence by acting against it. A little later he adds that divine provision cannot be frustrated at all. He teaches the same in the other passages cited in the preceding disputation.

Third, it is proved by reason. Created free choice cannot move itself or bring anything about unless it is moved by God. But God cannot move created free choice to resist his efficacious will; otherwise God would fight against himself, contrary to Saint Dionysius, and would not work all things for his own sake, contrary to sacred Scripture, which says: The Lord has made all things for himself.¹¹ Therefore created free choice cannot resist God or his efficacious will.

Fourth, it is proved as follows. Taken absolutely, it entails a contradiction that a creature be moved immediately by God and that this motion be simply violent for it, as Saint Thomas teaches in De potentia, q. 1, art. 3, reply 1, along with many other Doctors; reason also supports this. For God cannot move any creature immediately except by ordering that motion to his goodness, as Saint Thomas teaches in Summa theologiae I, q. 44, art. 4, and as follows from the scriptural passages cited above.¹² But every creature is more inclined toward divine goodness than a stone is toward the center. Therefore it is impossible for a creature’s motion to proceed immediately from God and for that motion to be violent for it. Consequently, no creature can resist God when he moves it immediately; likewise, a created will cannot resist God or his efficacious will. This is confirmed: otherwise the miracles God works beyond the order of nature would cause violence in creatures, contrary to the common opinion of the Doctors and to Saint Thomas, De potentia, q. 6, art. 1, reply 17, where he says: In every natural thing there is a natural order and relation to all higher causes. Hence things that take place in lower bodies through the influence of the heavenly bodies are not violent, although they seem contrary to the natural motions of lower bodies, as is evident in the ebb and flow of the sea, which follows the motion of the moon. Much less, then, is what God does in these lower things violent. He teaches the same in De potentia, q. 3, art. 3, reply 1. The words of Wisdom 16 also accord with this: This, however, namely fire, again forgot its own power so that the righteous might be nourished. For the creature serving you, its maker, blazes into torment against the unjust and grows gentler to do good for those who trust in you. It is as though it said: fire cools the righteous no less and is inclined to refresh them when it is moved and applied to this by God than if it lacked the power to burn and torment. The words of Job 9 also accord with this: He is wise in heart and mighty in strength; who has resisted him and remained at peace? As if it stated the point more plainly: a creature is at peace when it does not resist God but is subject to him. Saint Thomas explains these words: A person obtains peace from a more powerful opponent in one way, and from a less powerful or equally powerful one in another. It is clear that the more powerful obtains peace from the less powerful by fighting against him, as when a powerful king wages war against a rebel in his kingdom and, after winning, restores peace to the kingdom. Likewise, a person obtains peace from an equal by fighting: although he cannot overcome him, he wears him down through constant conflict until peace is restored. But no one ever obtains peace from a more powerful opponent by resisting or fighting; he does so only by submitting humbly. This is therefore clear evidence that God’s strength surpasses all human strength, since no one can have peace with him by resisting, but only by obeying him humbly. Hence it is said in Isaiah 26, “You will preserve peace, because we have hoped in you.” Therefore, and so on.

Fifth, it is proved as follows. For one thing to resist another, it must have power equal to or greater than the other; for an action does not arise from a proportion of lesser inequality, and consequently neither does efficacious resistance, which cannot occur without action. But no created free choice has power equal to or greater than God, since divine power and efficacy are infinite, whereas every created power and efficacy is finite and limited. Therefore created free choice cannot resist God or his efficacious will.

VIII. In reply to the first argument, we say that it proves only the first conclusion. Insofar as it seems to militate against the second, we reply with Saint Thomas: Some are said to think, speak, or act against God, or even to resist him, not because they resist the order of divine governance in its entirety—for even sinners intend some good—but because they oppose some particular good that is fitting for them according to their nature or state.¹³

In reply to the second, we say that a created will can indeed be necessitated by God to elicit some act, as in heaven it is necessitated to love God clearly seen; but it cannot be coerced into willing something. Otherwise the will itself would simultaneously will and not will the same object, which is impossible, as Saint Thomas shows in Summa theologiae I–II, q. 9, art. 4, reply 2.

In reply to the first confirmation, we say that when theologians teach that the will can be coerced with respect to commanded acts and suffer coercion in them, they mean the will’s commanded acts when those acts are elicited by other powers, not when they are elicited by the will itself, as are acts on which that same will reflects. For Saint Thomas’s reasoning, by which he proves that the will cannot suffer coercion in acts elicited by itself, also applies to those acts caused immediately by the will and not through another power.¹⁴ Nor is the meaning that an operation actually commanded by the will can be coercive for it; that would plainly involve a contradiction. Since the will, even when it commands, is the inclination of the whole person, it is impossible for an act actually commanded by the will to be coercive: it would follow that the act is both against a person’s inclination and in accord with that inclination. The meaning is that acts of other powers, which are usually commanded by the will, can be coercive—for example, if someone is forced to walk, or to perform a similar action, against the will’s command. This is treated expressly in Summa theologiae I–II, q. 6, art. 4.

IX. In reply to the second confirmation, we say with Saint Thomas: God can change the will, but he cannot coerce it. However much the will is changed toward something, it is not said to be coerced toward it. The reason is that to will something is to be inclined toward it, whereas coercion or violence is contrary to the inclination of the thing coerced. When God changes the will, therefore, he makes another inclination succeed the preceding one: the first is removed, and the second remains. Hence what the will is led to is contrary not to its present inclination, but to the inclination it had before; so there is neither violence nor coercion. A stone, for example, has by its heaviness an inclination toward a lower place. If it is thrown upward while this inclination remains, that will be coercion. But if God removes the stone’s inclination of heaviness and gives it an inclination of lightness, then its being carried upward will not be coercive. In this way a change of motion can occur without violence. This is how we should understand that God changes the will without coercing it.¹⁵¹⁶ Thus, in the case proposed in the argument, God changes Peter’s will so that love of Paul succeeds the prior inclination of hatred by which Peter’s will pursued Paul—just as, in fact, he turned Ahasuerus’s heart, previously possessed by the contrary affection, toward gentleness, as was said above. Therefore that love is not coerced but voluntary, since it proceeds from an intrinsic principle according to the will’s inclination. Hence Saint Thomas says in Sentences II, dist. 25, q. 1, art. 2, reply 1: God works in the will and in free choice according to what befits them. Hence, even if he changes a person’s will toward something else, he nevertheless by his omnipotence brings it about that the person willingly wills what the will is changed toward. Thus the character of coercion is removed. Otherwise, it would involve a contradiction to say that a person does not will what the will is changed toward and is coerced into it, since the necessity of coercion is contrary to the will, as the Philosopher says in book 5 of the Metaphysics. Saint Thomas says the same in the other passages cited in disputations 22 and 23.

X. In reply to the third, we say that demons and the souls of the damned are held by God in hell by means of the fire to which they are bound, and through which they are tormented in many wondrous but real ways, as Augustine says. Hence the coercion they suffer is with respect to the fire, which holds the damned against their will, and not with respect to God.¹⁷ An argument is raised against this: even if God held the damned immediately in hell, they would still be held there coercively; therefore a creature can suffer coercion immediately from God. We reply that if such binding were done immediately by God, it would not be coercive in itself and without qualification, since this binding takes place through the intellect, which is subject to divine omnipotence. It would, however, be coercive in a qualified respect and in the moral order, in relation to the depraved will of the damned, which is not itself necessary for their detention. This is evident from the fact that souls are now detained in purgatory willingly and not coercively, as Master Soto and several other weighty authors teach.¹⁸

In reply to the confirmation, we say that in the act of inward sorrow the damned suffer violence and force from the objects apprehended: against their will and inclination, the intellect is compelled to apprehend things that cause sorrow. Hence, with respect to God, the violence in the will of the damned is only qualified and belongs to the moral order, as was said above.¹⁹ Although God necessitates the will of the damned, through the apprehension of a harmful and saddening object, to elicit an act of sorrow, so that in anguish of spirit they groan and perform fruitless penance, he does not, as is clear from what was said above, coerce them into the aforesaid acts of the will.

XI. In reply to the fourth, we say that, as was said, no creature can suffer violence immediately from God; it would be an imperfection in God if a creature resisted him. Moreover, violence cannot be inflicted on anything except by a cause acting from outside, as is clear from its definition: what is violent is said to proceed from an external principle, with the patient contributing no force. But God works intimately in all things, with full and perfect dominion over them. Hence, just as motion cannot be violent when something moves itself, so too a thing cannot be moved violently when moved immediately by God: every motion of anything depends more on God than on any intrinsic principle, whether active or passive, of the thing moved. Therefore, just as motion proceeding from an intrinsic active or passive principle of the thing moved cannot be violent, neither will it be violent if it proceeds immediately from God.

An argument may be raised: whatever God can do with a secondary cause, he can also do by himself immediately; but God can cause violent motion in things through secondary causes; therefore he can cause it by himself immediately. We reply that when an effect involves a relation to such a cause not only in the order of efficient causation but also in the order of formal causation, God cannot do by himself what he can bring about through a secondary cause, as is clear in vital actions. The same holds when the effect or motion itself intrinsically includes some imperfection which cannot be traced back to the first cause but only to a secondary cause, since every imperfection is incompatible with the first cause. Such an effect can therefore be produced by God through a secondary cause, but not by himself immediately.²⁰ Hence God cannot produce immediately any monster, defective motion, or vicious habit, although he can produce one through a secondary cause. Likewise, he cannot produce immediately by himself any effect that is formally contingent. For, as was shown in disputations 26 and 27, a contingent effect, insofar as it is formally contingent, expresses an intrinsic ordering to a cause liable to fail, or liable to be impeded by the concurrence of another cause. God is not, nor can he be, a cause liable to fail or be impeded, since that intrinsically involves imperfection. Yet it is most certain that God produces many contingent effects through secondary causes. By proportion, we should say in the present case that God produces many violent motions through secondary causes, though he cannot cause them immediately by himself—not from any inability in God, but rather because of his supreme and infinite perfection and omnipotence, to which no imperfection or defect can consequently be attributed.

XII. The fifth argument touches on a difficulty customarily discussed at length in the cited Summa theologiae I–II, question 6, article 4: namely, whether, when the will or another power ceases from acting because God withdraws his general concurrence, it is truly said to be coerced or to suffer violence. Almain, Treatise on Moral Questions, treatise 1, chapter 2, defends the affirmative position, to which Master Medina partly adheres in the cited article 4, conclusion 4. He says that the power is then coerced in some way. Durandus says the same when speaking of the will.²¹ Nevertheless, it must be answered that, strictly speaking, in the case proposed the will would not be coerced or suffer violence; the same must be said of any other power. Conrad teaches this in the cited article 4, as do Master Victoria, Master Soto, and Cajetan, Summa theologiae I, question 82, article 1. The reason is that, when God's general concurrence ceases, the will has no actual inclination toward the act, since every inclination of every secondary cause intrinsically depends on God as a prior per se efficient cause, as was shown in disputations 18, 22, and 23, and will be shown more fully in disputations 96 and 97. Therefore the will would not then cease from the act contrary to its own inclination; therefore it would not be coerced.²² This is confirmed: once God's general concurrence is removed, there would be no resistance in the will; therefore it would not suffer violence or coercion. The consequence is proved: what comes from an extrinsic cause while the patient contributes no force—that is, resists—is said to be violent. Therefore where there is no resistance, there is no violence. Furthermore, if the will wished to cease from an act of love of some object but could not, because God necessitated it to that act with respect to its exercise, just as it is necessitated in heaven to love God, it would not be said to be coerced or to suffer violence, but only to be necessitated. Therefore it would likewise not be coerced if it ceased from the act because God withdrew his general concurrence.

And if someone argues that when the locomotive power is hindered by some external obstacle from pursuing its motion, it is truly coerced, just as a stone is coerced when held upward and prevented from descending; therefore the will would likewise be coerced if God, by withdrawing his general concurrence, prevented it from continuing an act it had begun and made it desist from that act: the consequence is denied. In the case of the antecedent there is actual resistance on the part of the patient, but not in the case of the consequent. Some object, however, that Aristotle in Ethics II calls it violent when an external agent moves or stops something contrary to its inner impulse. The answer is that Aristotle is speaking of violence taken improperly and broadly. For something to be properly violent, it is not enough for a thing or its power to be held or prevented from an operation to which it has a radical or habitual inclination in first act; rather, it must be impeded contrary to its actual or virtual inclination. Or, if Aristotle is speaking properly of violence, he must be understood to mean the case in which a mobile thing resists through an actual impulse, as a stone resists when held upward or when prevented from moving downward at the speed proportionate to its heaviness. For, as St. Thomas teaches in Summa theologiae II–II, question 175, article 1, in the body, a motion is called violent in two ways: in one way with respect to the end of the inclination, or according to the substance of the motion, which is considered on the side of its terminus—for example, if a stone, because it is naturally inclined to be carried downward, is thrown upward. In another way, with respect to the manner of tending, for example, if a stone is thrown downward faster than its natural motion. For then the motion is violent with respect to its manner, because it is moved faster than accords with its nature; and for the same reason, if some extrinsic agent prevents it from moving downward at the speed at which it would descend by its nature, that motion would be violent with respect to its manner.

XIII. In reply to the sixth argument, we say that if the efficacious help inhering in a created will is considered according to its physical entity, setting aside or abstracting from God’s decree by which he wills absolutely to convert a person to himself through that help, free choice can resist that help, because resistance is then considered in relation to a particular cause.²³ But if it is considered as an instrument of the divine will, which intends to convert a person to himself, and insofar as it intentionally contains within itself the power of that same divine will, then, under this aspect, free choice cannot resist that help, just as it cannot resist God’s efficacious will, whose instrument it is.

In reply to the confirmation drawn from the Apostle’s words in Romans 13, we say that when he says that those who resist authority resist God’s ordinance, he is speaking of resistance to the divine ordinance considered according to some particular cause, or of the divine ordinance according to the will of sign and God’s antecedent will. People often resist this ordinance and will of God, as was said in the first conclusion and is clear from the scriptural passages cited in the first argument of this disputation. But if we speak of the ordinance considered according to the universal cause—that is, according to God’s consequent will, which is the will of good pleasure and is efficacious—no one ever resists or can resist the divine ordinance. The Apostle is not speaking of this ordinance, but of the ordinance explained above, as we gather from Saint Thomas, who says: If the authority of rulers, insofar as it is such, is from God, and nothing is from God without order, it follows that the order by which those subject to authority are subordinated to higher authorities is also from God. Therefore, whoever resists authority against this order resists God’s ordinance. 1. Reg. 8. “They have not rejected you, but me, so that I should not reign over them”; and “Whoever rejects you rejects me” (Luke 10). To resist the divine ordinance is contrary to the moral rectitude of virtue. Hence whoever resists authority in what pertains to the ordering of that authority acts against virtue.²⁴ In these words he teaches clearly enough that the Apostle is speaking only of resistance to God’s antecedent will, or will of sign, which, as he says in Summa theologiae I, q. 19, art. 6, is not always fulfilled. Whether free choice can resist efficacious help as an instrument of the divine will, properly speaking of resistance, will be explained in disputations 93 and 94.

End of Book Four.