De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether the first root of contingency is the efficacy, or omnipotence, of the divine will.

I. The present question is especially useful for explaining how the freedom of created choice with respect to its actual exercise stands together with the absolute and efficacious decree of the divine will, which predetermines all future contingent and free things. Accordingly, after showing that God efficaciously predetermines all future contingent and free acts, we must now explain what the first root is from which the contingency of those acts is derived.

The first opinion, then, is Scotus’s, in Sentences I, dist. 2, q. 4; dist. 8, qq. 4 and 5; dist. 38 and 39; and II, dist. 1, q. 3. In these places he asserts that the first root of contingency is not efficacy but the freedom of the divine will, such that if God’s freedom were removed, no contingency would remain in things. From this he infers that philosophers who said the world proceeded from God by necessity of nature and nevertheless admitted contingency in things tacitly admitted two contradictories. Cordoba defends the same opinion in Questionary I, q. 55; all Scotists follow it. It is proved as follows.

First. If God acted by necessity of nature, he would necessarily move and apply secondary causes to acting. Therefore all secondary causes would act by absolute necessity and not contingently. The inference is clear: a cause that moves insofar as it is moved, if it is moved necessarily, moves necessarily. But all secondary causes move insofar as they are moved and applied by God. Therefore, if they were moved by God by necessity of nature, they would move and act necessarily, not freely. Therefore, for contingency to be preserved in things, the first cause must move secondary causes freely, and consequently the first root of contingency is the freedom of the divine will.

II. Second. The first cause reaches the effect by a priority of nature before the second cause does. Therefore, if the first cause acted necessarily, it would necessarily produce the effect of the secondary cause; consequently, the secondary cause would not produce it freely. For it is contradictory that the same effect be at once free and absolutely necessary, even with respect to different causes. Therefore, freedom is required in the first cause for the effect to be free and contingent.

Third. The numerically same effect that is produced by secondary causes can be produced immediately by God alone. But if it is produced by God alone, it cannot be contingent unless the first cause produces it freely; for if God acted by necessity of nature, the effect would be produced necessarily. Therefore, an effect is not contingent when produced by God through a secondary cause unless the first cause acts freely in producing it.

Fourth. Every being by participation is referred as to its first root to the first Being by essence. Therefore, everything free by participation must be referred to the first Free Being, who is free by essence. Therefore, if there were no freedom in the divine will, freedom could not be preserved in secondary causes, which are free by participation, or in their effects. Hence there would be no contingency either.

They confirm this. If God acted by necessity of nature, the free choice of a human being or an angel could not move itself freely without being moved by another prior agent; otherwise it would be simply the first mover and thus would be God. Nor could it be moved freely by God, because then God would move necessarily and not freely. Therefore, nothing would act freely.

III. The second opinion belongs to some more recent Thomists, who assert that the efficacy of the divine will is the first root of contingency. They say, however, that the freedom of the divine will is a condition necessarily required for contingency in things and for the actual freedom of our acts. From this they infer that even if, as things stand, God moved secondary causes and concurred with them as he now does—with the exception of the freedom of the first cause—there would be no contingent and free effect in the nature of things. They are persuaded by the arguments made in support of Scotus’s opinion.

The third opinion is held by other theologians who reject Scotus’s position and teach that the remote first root of contingency is God’s will creating the free choice of human beings and angels, and the sensitive appetite of beasts. The proximate and immediate root, however, is the free choice of human beings and angels, and the sensitive appetite of beasts, with respect to those acts in which these seem to bear a trace of freedom. They think that if these were removed, there could be no contingency in things. They prove that the remote root of contingency is the divine will creating free choice as follows: whatever is a root of contingency must ultimately have its being from the divine will, since the divine will is the first cause of all things that have being in any way. They prove by the following two arguments that created freedom alone is the immediate and proximate root of contingency. Let the arguments, then, be set out in order.

Fifth argument. All other secondary causes, apart from free causes or those having some trace of freedom, act by necessity of nature. Therefore, the immediate and proximate cause of contingency cannot be derived from them, but only from the created will, which has it within its power to act this way or that, or to cease altogether from acting.

Sixth. Natural causes produce their effects contingently because they are freely applied and moved by free secondary causes. For example, the light of a lamp contingently illuminates this hall because it was freely lit by a human being and brought into the hall, although by the innate freedom of the human being it could have remained unlit and not been brought into the hall. Therefore, the formal and proximate root of contingency is created freedom, or a power bearing some trace of freedom.

This is proved a seventh time. An effect of a secondary cause is called contingent because it can be impeded, but it is not called capable of being impeded in relation to the divine will. For Scripture says in Esther 13: There is no one who can resist your will. Nor is it called capable of being impeded in relation to natural causes, since they are naturally determined to one thing and produce their effects by necessity. Therefore, it is called contingent in relation to a created free cause, and consequently all contingency must be traced back to that cause; once it is removed, no effect can be contingent.

This is confirmed from Aristotle, On Interpretation I, where he defines the contingent as what is not determined to one side; and St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 14. ar. 13. in the body, says that if the contingent is considered as actually existing in itself, it is no longer considered as contingent toward either alternative, but as determined to one.

IV. The fourth opinion is that of Cajetan, Summa theologiae I, q. 19, art. 8, and q. 14, art. 13. He traces the contingency of things back to the efficacy of the divine will as to its first source and cause, but does so in such a way that he thinks the freedom of that same will is not a condition necessarily presupposed for contingent effects to proceed from contingent secondary causes. Consequently, even if God acted outwardly by natural necessity, effects would still be contingent and free. Ferrariensis follows the same opinion in Summa contra gentiles I, ch. 67, and many Thomists defend it, especially Master Báñez, Summa theologiae I, q. 19, art. 8, conclusion 7, and Master Zumel, q. 14, art. 13, dispute 8. But these Doctors do not all agree in assigning the reason why, on the supposition that God acted by natural necessity, effects would still be contingent as they are now. Some, such as Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and Master Zumel, say that the reason is to be derived from the free or impedible secondary cause, which participates in the indifferent influx of the first cause and modifies it according to its nature. Others, such as Master Báñez, do not wish to admit that the influx of the first cause is modified by a secondary cause; therefore, they assign the reason for contingency on the side of the contingent secondary causes, which are per se susceptible to being impeded, and consequently the concurrence of one can impede the concurrence of another. Still others assign various further reasons.

V. To resolve this difficulty, it must be assumed that “contingent” is taken in two ways. First, in a broad sense, for that which, simply speaking, can be and can fail to be, at least by the absolute power of God. In this sense not only corruptible things are called contingent beings, but also the heavenly bodies and the angels; for their existence does not belong to them by absolute necessity, but by God’s free will.¹ All creatures proceeded from God not by natural necessity but freely; and just as God freely produced them, so by his absolute power he can also reduce them to nothing. In the second sense, “contingent” is taken properly for that which can be or fail to be insofar as concerns the secondary cause, because that cause is of itself indifferent to producing or not producing the effect called contingent, or, if it is determined, it can be impeded by the concurrence of other secondary causes. Among contingent effects, free acts are the most contingent, as St. Thomas teaches in Sentences I, d. 38, q. 1, art. 5, for a free cause is indifferent to opposites. In this second sense we are treating future contingents here.

VI. Second, it should be noted that for contingency taken properly it is required that the active power of the cause not be determined to one thing. For what is determined to one thing with respect to exercise, so that its effect exists in the nature of things, is no longer called a contingent effect on that supposition. Or, if the cause is determined to one thing, for the effect to be contingent it must be possible for that cause to be impeded by the concurrence of another cause from producing its effect.² Thus, it is not necessary to a contingent cause that it be indifferent to either alternative; it is enough that another secondary cause can impede it. St. Thomas expressly teaches this³ and proves it by the example of fire, which is naturally determined to burn wood brought near it; nevertheless, that combustion is contingent because it can be impeded by pouring water on it. Hence the holy Doctor distinguishes three kinds of contingents.⁴ The first consists of things that occur rarely, such as things that happen by chance or accident. The second consists of things that occur for the most part, such as a person’s hair turning gray in old age, which is caused by nature. The third consists of things that are indifferent to either alternative, because of themselves they are no more inclined to one side than the other; these proceed from choice. St. Thomas therefore holds that besides contingents proceeding from free causes, there are others proceeding from necessary but impedible causes.

VII. Third, we must note that God's will can be considered in two ways. First, insofar as he willed and created free choice for human beings and angels, along with other secondary causes. On account of this will, every active power of secondary causes by which they are habitually constituted in first act is attributed to God as the first per se efficient cause. Second, insofar as he efficaciously willed, established, and ordained that from such contingent causes such contingent effects, with such circumstances, would be produced through the influx of secondary causes. On account of this will, the actual influx and operation of a secondary cause in all the being it possesses is attributed to God as the first efficient principle. We must also note that in the present discussion we can speak either of the first efficient cause of contingency and of a contingent effect, or of the proximate formal cause. Let the first conclusion, then, be as follows.

VIII. First conclusion. The supreme efficacy and omnipotence of the divine will is the first source and first efficient cause of the contingency found in things.⁵ St Thomas expressly teaches this conclusion in Summa theologiae I, q. 19, a. 8. Explaining whence it comes that certain effects are contingent and free, and that not all things occur by absolute necessity, he says “that this happens because of the efficacy of the divine will. For when some cause is efficacious in acting, the effect follows the cause not only as to what comes to be, but also as to its mode of coming to be or being. For weakness in the active power of the seed causes a son to be unlike his father in accidents pertaining to the mode of being. Since, then, the divine will is most efficacious, it follows not only that the things God wills to happen do happen, but also that they happen in the way God wills them to happen. God wills certain things to happen necessarily and certain things contingently, so that there may be order among things for the completion of the universe. Therefore he has fitted necessary causes, which cannot fail, to some effects, from which effects proceed necessarily; to others he has fitted contingent, liable-to-fail causes, from which contingent effects may come to be. The effects willed by God do not therefore happen contingently because their proximate causes are contingent, but because God willed them to happen contingently and prepared contingent causes to produce them.” Cajetan and the other Doctors cited in support of the fourth opinion follow the same conclusion.

First, it is proved as follows. The supreme efficacy of the divine will is the cause, with respect to the exercise of causation, of all things, whether natural or contingent, as was said above; likewise, it prepares contingent and liable-to-fail causes so that such contingent effects may proceed from them. Therefore it is the first source and efficient cause of all contingent things.

Second, the first source and cause of contingency is that which first contains, formally or eminently, every mode of causality actually found in all secondary causes, and brings it about that such causes produce effects proportionate to their nature. But, according to the teaching of St Thomas cited above, the supreme efficacy of the divine will contains, formally or eminently, every mode of causality of secondary causes, since it is the most universal cause and brings it about that secondary causes contribute to effects proportionate to their nature. Therefore, etc.⁶

IX. Second conclusion. The supreme efficacy of the divine will is the first source and cause of the contingency found in things not only because he created free choice in human beings and angels, but also because by an absolute and efficacious will he established that such contingent effects with such circumstances would follow from such contingent causes. This conclusion is opposed to certain modern theologians who deny that the divine will predetermines through efficient causality all secondary causes and applies them to acting. We argued against them in Disputations 22, 23, and 24. Our conclusion, however, is explicitly taught by St Thomas in the passages cited in those same disputations.

First, it is proved as follows. Otherwise it would follow that contingent and free effects, and the actual causality or influx of secondary causes, would be attributed to God as the first efficient cause for no other reason than that he created free choice. Thus man or angel would have from God as efficient cause only the ability to act contingently and freely by free choice; but the actual free and contingent act would come from himself, descending from the source of choice, or from innate freedom. This is expressly contrary to St Augustine in On the Grace of Christ, against Pelagius and Caelestius, chapter 3 and the following chapters, whose words were cited in Disputation 1.

Second, it is proved by St Thomas's reasoning in the cited Article 8. For if the divine will is the first cause and source of contingent things only because it created free choice, and not because it prepared and predetermined contingent causes so that such effects would contingently proceed from them, it would follow that these effects would occur in particular apart from the intention and determination of the divine will. Thus they would be fortuitous and accidental with respect to God, which is impossible.

Third, it is proved as follows: as will become clear shortly, even if no created free choice existed, there could still be many contingent effects that would be reduced to God as their first efficient cause. Therefore the adequate reason why the contingency of things is reduced to God as their first cause is not that he created free choice in human beings or angels.

X. Third conclusion. The proximate and formal character of contingency found in things is not the free choice of human beings or angels, nor the sensitive appetite of beasts. Consequently, even if we exclude all freedom of created choice, there can still be formally contingent effects proceeding from natural causes, one of which is liable to fail and to be impeded.⁷ This conclusion is opposed to Avicenna, whose opinion in Metaphysics X, ch. 1, St. Thomas reports and attacks in Against the Gentiles III, ch. 86, and to some theologians. Nevertheless, it is expressly taught by St. Thomas himself in the same ch. 86, in 1 p., q. 115, art. 6, and in Metaphysics VI, text 5. He says that this is Aristotle’s opinion in the same text and in On Divination in Sleep, ch. 2.

First it is proved as follows. As St. Thomas teaches, angels by the power of their nature do not know with certainty and infallibly future natural events that depend on secondary causes liable to fail, although they fail only rarely; but they know all things that occur necessarily.⁸ Therefore, contingent effects can proceed from natural causes. The inference is clear: otherwise, by their nature angels would know all future effects that depend on natural causes.

Second, rain in winter and thunder⁹ in summer are formally contingent effects, even though they occur regularly, because they sometimes fail to occur. But their contingency cannot be referred, as to its proximate cause, to the freedom of any created agent. As is clear in itself, it is not referred to human freedom, for human beings cannot prevent or cause rain from heaven. Nor is it referred to the freedom of the angels who move the heavens. For although angels move the heavens by their intellect and will, they are nevertheless determined to this motion after the manner of nature, and by the motion of the heavens they cause the effects of lower bodies. Otherwise, it would not be a miracle or contrary to the order of nature if angels were now to cease moving the heavenly bodies; for it is not a miracle for an angel to cease from a free action. Therefore, the proximate and formal character of contingency is not the free choice of human beings or angels.

Third, the liability of natural secondary causes to fail suffices for contingency, as was said in the first foundation. But this liability to fail belongs to corporeal things not because of any created freedom but by their nature, since it belongs to them through the condition of matter, which can fail in being and consequently in operation, as St. Thomas shows in Against the Gentiles III, ch. 86, argument 5. Therefore, human or angelic freedom is not required for contingency.

Fourth. Chance and fortuitous effects are contingent, as was said above. Yet many chance and fortuitous effects occur in lower things even when all created freedom is excluded. For it happens by chance that a lightning bolt falling from heaven consumes a tree that the earth produced spontaneously in that place. For, as St. Thomas shows in the cited passage of Against the Gentiles III, following Aristotle above against Avicenna, the concurrence of two causes together in a fortuitous and chance effect is not an effect intended per se by any created agent, but follows accidentally. Therefore.

Finally, this is proved by other arguments and by the authorities of Damascene and Ptolemy, which St. Thomas adduces in the cited passage of Against the Gentiles III. There he also reports and answers, on the basis of Aristotle’s teaching, the argument by which Avicenna was persuaded; Ferrara should be consulted at the same place.

XI. Fourth conclusion. The proximate and formal character of contingency in these lower things is taken from a proximate cause liable to fail or to be impeded through the concurrence of another cause.¹⁰ This conclusion is Cajetan’s in the cited q. 14 and seems to be expressly taught by St. Thomas in the same question, art. 13, ad 1, and in Against the Gentiles III, cited above, argument 2. There he teaches that although the supreme cause is necessary, an effect can nevertheless be contingent because of a proximate contingent cause, just as a plant’s germination is contingent because of its proximate contingent cause, although the motion of the Sun, which is the first cause, is necessary.

First it is proved: contingency, formally speaking, denotes imperfection and liability to fail. Therefore, its proximate and formal character must be assigned on the part of a secondary cause liable to fail and to be impeded.

Second, it is proved as follows. In the cited passage of Against the Gentiles III, St. Thomas proves from the fact that natural causes can fail because of the condition of matter that contingent effects can proceed from them. Therefore, the liability of a secondary cause to fail is the proximate and formal character of contingency. One must observe, however, that, as Master Bañez rightly notes, God’s general concurrence is not indifferent in itself, nor is it modified or determined by secondary causes; otherwise it would depend on them. Rather, God himself determines his concurrence and modifies it in secondary causes, and he also determines secondary causes to act in conformity with the condition of their nature. For it belongs to the nature of the first cause simply that every being by participation and every particular mode of created being proceed from it. Contingency, like freedom and necessity, is a mode of created being; therefore, it must proceed from the determination of the divine will. We have discussed this more fully in disputation 20 and the three that follow.

XII. Fifth conclusion. Even if God acted outwardly by natural necessity, nevertheless, if he concurred by the same concurrence by which he now moves and assists secondary causes, and the only difference on God’s part were in the mode of acting—through a natural act of the will, that is, as nature, and not through a free act of the will as he now acts—contingency would still be preserved in things.¹¹ Cajetan and the other authors cited in support of the fourth opinion intend this conclusion in this sense.

First, it is proved as follows. In that case many secondary causes would be liable to fail through the concurrence of other causes, just as they are now, and the only difference would concern the immanent act of the divine will, since that act would then be necessary. Therefore, contingency would exist in things. The inference is clear: as was said on the authority of St. Thomas, the formal and proximate character of contingency is derived from secondary causes liable to fail and to be impeded by other causes.

It is proved a second time. As St. Thomas teaches, 1. p. q. 19. art. 8. in the body, the first cause of contingency found in things is the supreme efficacy of the divine will. But even if the act of the divine will by which God acts were necessary in God and not free, the divine will would still have supreme efficacy. Therefore, if by a natural act God willed that contingent effects proceed from secondary causes liable to fail, there would be contingency in things.

This is confirmed. If God moved a person’s will to will some particular good through the mediation of an indifferent judgment of reason, by which the person judged that the good was not necessarily to be loved, that person’s act of willing would be formally free even if God moved the person to will that good through a natural act of his will. Therefore, that act of willing would be contingent.¹² The inference is clear, since every created free act is contingent, as it can be and can fail to be. The antecedent is proved as follows: although freedom is formally in the will, it is rooted and founded in the indifference of the judgment of reason, as St. Thomas teaches in Summa theologiae I, q. 83, art. 3, ad 1, and Summa contra gentiles III, ch. 85, argument 4. Therefore, if the judgment of reason is indifferent, the act of the will that follows it will be free even if God acted by natural necessity.

It is proved a fourth time by an argument drawn from St. Thomas, Summa contra gentiles III, ch. 86, argument 2. A necessary effect does not follow from a first cause unless the intermediate cause is also necessary. For example, in syllogisms with a necessary major premise and a contingent minor premise, the conclusion is not necessary but contingent. But God is the first cause of lower effects, while the proximate causes are the active and passive powers in these lower things, which are not necessary but contingent causes, since they can fail in the minority of cases. Therefore, even if God acted by natural necessity, effects would be contingent because of their contingent proximate cause.

XIII. From these points the answer is clear to the first argument proposed for Scotus’s opinion and to the assumed proposition: “A cause that acts insofar as it is moved, if it is moved necessarily, moves necessarily.”¹³ For we answer that this is true only of purely instrumental causes, which contribute nothing to the production of an effect by virtue of their own form, but not of principal causes, which contribute something to the production of an effect from themselves, that is, from an intrinsic active principle. This is clear from the example given of a plant that sprouts when moved by the sun. Although it is moved necessarily by the sun through its motion, it nevertheless sprouts contingently because of the condition of its own nature. On this point, see St. Thomas, De potentia q. 6, single article, ad 3.

To the second argument, we answer that since the concurrence of the first cause reaches the effect of the secondary cause only after it is received, prior in the order of nature, into that secondary cause and modified in it, the first cause does not reach that effect at any prior stage at which the secondary cause does not also reach it. Hence it does not follow that all effects would be simply necessary if God acted by natural necessity, as is clear from what was said above.

To the third argument, we answer first that the same argument would prove that God as things now stand produces no contingent effect through a secondary cause. For if such an effect were produced immediately by God alone, it would not be formally contingent, since it would not depend on any cause liable to fail. Second, it is said that when an effect does not imply a formal order to a secondary cause, as vital acts do, then God can properly produce by himself, immediately, the very same effect numerically as to its substance that is produced by secondary causes; there would nevertheless be a difference in the mode of causing. For if it were produced by God alone, no liable-to-fail or impedible cause would intervene, and thus the effect would not be formally contingent. But when it is produced through a secondary cause, there can then be some cause liable to be impeded and consequently the effect can be contingent simply speaking.

XIV. To the fourth argument, Master Bañez replies that if God acted outwardly by natural necessity, there would be no created free choice and no free act; he is persuaded by the argument and its confirmation. In accordance with his opinion, one replies to the fourth argument that even if there were no freedom in secondary causes, contingency would still be preserved in other liable-to-fail natural causes, as was said in the third conclusion.¹⁴ I, however, consider it much more probable that in such a case freedom would be preserved in secondary causes, just as contingency would be preserved in natural things.¹⁵ The reason is that if God preserved the order of the universe and the nature of secondary causes, and provided them with an influx outwardly just as he does now, and the only difference concerned the immanent act of the divine will—namely, that he willed creatures by natural necessity—then, just as natural causes would be liable to fail, free choice, in producing one act, would have an active power by which it could produce the opposite if it wished, on account of the condition of its own nature. Therefore, just as in such a case there would be contingency in secondary natural causes, so there would be freedom in secondary free causes.

This is confirmed by the authority of St Thomas, On the Power of God, Question 6, cited above, ad 3, where he says that “God moves the will immutably because of the efficacy of the moving power, which cannot fail; but because of the nature of the will moved, which is indifferent to different things, necessity is not induced, but freedom remains. So too divine providence operates infallibly in all things, and yet contingent effects proceed from contingent causes, insofar as God moves all things proportionately, each according to its own mode.” But, if he preserved the order of this universe, God would move all things proportionately, each according to its own mode. Therefore, even if he acted by natural necessity, there would still be free effects. I said “if he preserved the order of this universe,” because if God acted according to the full extent of his power and had produced at once from eternity everything he could produce, without preserving the natures of the secondary causes that now exist, in that case there would be no contingent or free effect. To the fourth argument, then, we reply that if God acted by natural necessity while preserving the order of the universe, created freedom would be reduced to God as the first free cause eminently, but not as the first free cause formally. For in that case God would not be formally a free cause, but only eminently so, just as he is eminently a horse, because he is its first cause.¹⁶ Similarly, he is now eminently a contingent cause, but not formally. Therefore, just as contingent effects are in fact referred to God as their first efficient cause, although God is not formally a contingent cause, so in the case posited free acts would be reduced to God as their first efficient cause, although God would not be formally free, but only eminently so.

XV. To the confirmation, we reply that in the case posited created will would act freely, moved by God through an inhering motion proportionate to the nature of the will moved, just as was said of contingent causes. Thus it could produce a free act just as it produces such an act now.

To the fifth argument, we reply that all natural causes act by natural necessity unless they are impeded by the concurrence of other causes. Since secondary natural causes can be impeded, contingent effects follow from them. If the argument is raised, “A natural cause that impedes another acts by natural necessity; therefore, by natural necessity it impedes the effect of the other cause; consequently, no contingent effect will ever proceed from that cause,” St Thomas answers this argument expressly in the cited Summa contra Gentiles III, chapter 86:¹⁷ although a natural cause per se produces its own effect, it does not have it per se that it impede the effect of another cause. The reason is that those two causes are joined not per se but accidentally, as whiteness is accidentally joined to a musical person; hence there is no per se cause of the fact that what is white is musical.

To the sixth argument, the antecedent is denied, as is clear from what was said in the third conclusion.

XVI. To the seventh argument, we reply that effects are said to be formally and proximately contingent by their relation to a secondary cause liable to fail, whether that cause is free or natural. To the confirmation from Aristotle, we reply that a contingent thing is one that is not determined to one outcome in such a way that it cannot be impeded.¹⁸ For if it is determined in such a way that it cannot be impeded, the agent would reduce to act by absolute necessity the passive potency of the matter on which it acts. But if it can be impeded, it would not reduce the passive potency of the matter to act by necessity, and thus the effect would be simply contingent. Aristotle must be understood according to this teaching, as St Thomas explains in Book 1 of On Interpretation, lecture 14, section “It must be considered.”

To the other authority from St Thomas, we reply that it proves only that contingent effects are necessary from supposition, namely, on the supposition that they exist, since whatever exists while it exists must exist, as was said in On Interpretation I, chapter 6. This necessity, however, does not destroy the contingency of things, as St Thomas says in 1. p. q. 14. ar. 13., ad 2, and in the other passages cited in the preceding disputation.