De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate

Whether God, by a prior motion, truly premoves through efficient causality free choice to an act of sin, as a physical cause, insofar as it is an act and a being.

I. The first opinion is that of a certain more recent Doctor, who not only denies that God premoves or predetermines created will to an act of sin insofar as it is a being, but also denies that the material element of sin, to which evil is always or here and now necessarily attached, is caused by God simply speaking, but only in a qualified sense. He gives as his reason that although God is its per se cause, he is nevertheless only a permissive cause, or a cause by a permissive will, on which such an act necessarily depends. He adds that God simply speaking is not the cause of an evil motion, even insofar as it is a motion or on account of its positive aspect. He attributes this opinion to Augustine, On Free Choice II, chapter 20, and Book III, chapter 1; The City of God V, chapter 8; and Retractations I, chapter 9. Yet in those very passages St Augustine clearly teaches the contrary, as will be clear below. Indeed, other authors who do not admit God's physical predetermination of our will to free acts, even good ones, acknowledge that God, by a simultaneous influx, absolutely and simply effects together with created will any act of sin insofar as it is a being, without contributing to its evil. Hence this first opinion must be rejected as improbable, for the reasons to be given in support of the first and second conclusions. In particular, it would follow from it that God is not the first efficient cause of every positive being insofar as it is a being, and consequently that two first principles of things must be admitted.

The second opinion is that of other theologians who, since they think God cannot physically predetermine created will to good acts, even supernatural ones, without prejudice to our freedom, assert this all the more concerning sinful acts, even insofar as they are acts. Several other Doctors defend the same opinion, including some who admit efficacious prior predetermination by God in good acts, especially supernatural ones. They prove it:

First, from the authorities of Sacred Scripture. For James 1 says: “God is untempted by evils; he himself tempts no one.” But temptation occurs in no other way than by inclining and moving a person to an evil act; for it is for this reason that the Devil is said to tempt a person. Therefore God does not incline or move the will, or predetermine it to an evil act, especially when it is intrinsically sinful, such as hatred of God or blasphemy.

This is confirmed. If God moved a person's will morally, persuading him to consent to an act of blasphemy or hatred of God, he would be said to tempt him. Therefore all the more would he be said to tempt him if he physically moved and predetermined his will to consent, that is, to an act of hatred of God or blasphemy. The consequence is clear: a cause that physically moves the will to an evil act is a more efficacious cause of evil than one that moves it only in a moral way.

The same is proved from Ecclesiasticus 15: “Do not say, ‘It is through God that it is lacking’; do not do what he hates. Do not say, ‘He has led me astray’; for he has no need of impious men.” But if God efficaciously predetermines a person's will to an act of sin, he leads that person astray. And just as it is said of good acts in John 6, “No one can come to me unless my Father draws him”; in Philippians 2, “For it is God who works in us both to will and to accomplish”; and in Ezekiel 36, “I will make you act,” and similarly elsewhere, so it could be said of sinful acts that no one can consent to an act of sin unless the heavenly Father draws him to that consent, that God works in us to will and accomplish an act of sin, that he makes us act, and that he works so that we perform intrinsically evil acts. But this is nothing other than leading a person astray. Therefore, etc.

II. The difficulty of this argument is increased by considering a person afflicted by a grave temptation of lust, who, before consenting, considers by a judgment of reason what is shameful and what is pleasurable. By the power of this consideration he can, in keeping with his freedom, either consent or dissent with divine grace. Let us then also consider God adding his efficacy, preceding this person's consent, and determining his will to consent and to will that lustful act as something pleasurable to him. Surely such a person could justly excuse himself and complain, saying, “Through God it was lacking”: for God could have determined my will to dissent, but he did not—not through any fault of mine, but by his own will. For before I sinned in any way, he had so decreed and acted. He could truly also say, “He led me astray,” for he determined my will and made me perform an act of sin; and unless he had initiated such a will in me, I could not have begun, and after he had determined me, I could not avoid the evil that I had together with that act. Likewise, Hosea 13 says: “Your destruction is from yourself; your help is only in me.” If, then, help is only from God, predetermination to an act of sin is not from him; otherwise our destruction would be more from God than from ourselves. Moreover, in Romans 9, after the Apostle had said of the reprobate, “God endured with much patience the vessels of wrath, fit for destruction,” he later says of the predestined: “So that he might show the riches of his glory toward the vessels of mercy, which he prepared for glory.” He says that he prepared the elect for glory, but of the reprobate only that he endured them. How, however, would he merely endure them and not prepare them, if he efficaciously predetermined them to the means of condemnation, namely, to acts that are intrinsically sins?

III. Second, an argument is made from the authority of the Councils. For canon 23 of the Second Council of Orange says: People do their own will, not God’s, when they do what displeases God. And canon 25 says: We not only do not believe that some people have been predestined to evil by divine power, but if there are those who wish to believe so great an evil, we pronounce anathema against them with utter detestation. Here it is clearly defined that God does not initiate an evil act, nor predetermine a person’s will to it by his power. For, as was said above, “predestine” means the same as “predetermine.”¹ The Council immediately adds the difference between evil and good works: This we salutarily profess and believe: in every good work, we do not begin and are afterward helped by God’s mercy; rather, with no good merits preceding, he himself first inspires in us both faith and love of himself. Therefore, it holds that in every evil work we begin first, and God does not; otherwise, in this respect there would be absolutely no difference between good works and evil ones.

Likewise, in the same Council of Trent, Session 6, on Justification, canon 6² defines: If anyone says that it is not in a person’s power to make his ways evil, but that God performs evil works just as he performs good ones, not merely by permitting them but properly and by himself, so that the betrayal of Judas is no less his own work than the calling of Paul, let him be anathema. And canon 17 anathematizes anyone who says that those who are not predestined are indeed called, but do not receive grace, since they have been predestined to evil by divine power. In this decree, the words “it is in a person’s power to make his ways evil” must be considered. This would certainly not be true if a prior motion by which God efficaciously predetermines the human will were necessary for the act of sin, since this motion is not in a person’s power but in God’s power alone. Consequently, evil works, just like good ones, would be in God’s power.

IV. If it is said that the Council is speaking of the malice of sin, but not of the act of sin insofar as it is an act and a being, the reply is: the Council defines that God does not properly and by himself perform evil works. Therefore, it speaks not only of the malice of works but also of the evil works themselves, which are properly called such only of the actual real acts performed by the will against the law.

This is confirmed as follows. Otherwise, the Council would have determined nothing against the heretics of our time. For they do not assert that God is the author of sin or instigates sin, but say that God is the author of the will by which a person consents while sinning and succumbs to temptation, and that God either instigates or determines that will. This is how Beza speaks in his response to Sebastian Castellio, in his refutation of the second calumny, explaining Calvin’s opinion in Aphorisms 22, where he says that free choice is not merely permitted by God in the act of sin, but is also driven, stirred, moved, and ruled by him. Nor does he say that God is the author of sin insofar as it is evil and deformed; for in this respect he attributes sin to the created will alone in Aphorisms 31. Rather, he says that our will is driven, stirred, moved, and ruled by God toward the very act of sin. Calvin speaks in the same way in Institutes III, ch. 22, § 9, and III, ch. 23, §§ 2 and 4, as does Zwingli in Sermon on Providence, ch. 6; we cited their words in dispute 3, no. 14. Nor could the heretics say that God causes or wills sin insofar as it is sin, since even the created will cannot will it under that aspect, because, as Dionysius says, No one acts with evil as his intention.³

V. Third, it is proved by the authority of the holy Fathers, especially Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter, ch. 31, where he says⁴: Nowhere do we read in the sacred Scriptures, “There is no will except from God”; and it was rightly not written, because it is not true. Otherwise God would also be the author—far be it!—of sins, if there were no will except from him, since an evil will is already sin by itself, even if its effect is absent. Likewise, in On Articles Falsely Attributed to Him, art. 10, he says: Detestable and abominable is the opinion that believes God to be the author of each evil will or evil action, whose predestination is never outside goodness, never outside justice; for all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth. Holy Divinity knows not how to institute the adulteries of married women and the seductions of virgins, but to condemn them; nor to ordain them, but to punish them. A little later in the same article he says: Therefore God’s predestination neither aroused, persuaded, nor impelled the falls of those who fall, the malice of the wicked, or the desires of sinners. Behold, Augustine denies that not only beings of reason or formal aspects of sins come from God, but also the very acts of willing and actions by which the commandments are transgressed—namely, the adulteries of married women, the seductions of virgins, and so forth. In art. 6 he says: Just as God did not implant in the angels who transgressed the will by which they did not remain in the truth, so by the same reasoning he did not implant in human beings that inclination by which they imitate the devil. And in art. 11, speaking of certain criminal acts, he says: If the devil were charged with being the author and inventor of such crimes, he could free himself from this reproach and convict their perpetrators on the basis of their own will. For although he delighted in the fury of sinners, he would nevertheless prove that he did not impose the force of their crimes. With what folly, then, or what madness could one define as belonging to God’s counsel what cannot be attributed wholly even to the devil? Likewise, in City of God V, ch. 9, he says: Evil wills are not from him, because they are contrary to nature. And in On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins II, ch. 18, while discussing Paul’s words, What do you have that you did not receive?⁵ he reports the interpretation of those who assert that this was said because God gave us free choice and the capacity to act well. He himself attacks this interpretation, saying that this was not the reason it was said, but rather that God gives us not only the capacity but also willing the good itself. Otherwise, he says, one could also say that an evil will must be attributed to God as its author, because it could not exist in a human being unless the human being in whom it existed also existed; but God is the author of the human being. Thus, whatever there is of an evil will—which could not exist at all unless it had a human being in whom to exist—would have to be referred to God as its author, which is wrong to say. A little farther on he treats in the same way the words in Phil. 2, God works in us to will and to accomplish. He denies that this can in any way be said of an evil willing. For he says: Accordingly, our turning away from God is our own, and this is an evil will, where he speaks clearly of the very real action of sin.

VI. Leo IX, in his letter to Peter of Antioch, in his profession of faith, says that God predestined only good things, but foreknew both good and evil things.⁶ In his replies to Vincentius, objections 4 and 11, St. Prosper repeatedly says that the opinion which believes God to be the author of each evil will or evil action is detestable and abominable.⁷ Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, ch. 30, says that God does not predefine everything, because he does not predefine sins.⁸ Fulgentius, in On Predestination II, shows expressly that it is impossible for God to predetermine evil works.⁹ St. Thomas in 1.2, q. 9, art. 6, ad 3, seems to teach the same.¹⁰ Many other Fathers do so as well, whose testimonies in favor of the same opinion are reported in nearly countless numbers by its authors. But because they present no new difficulty beyond the one touched on in the words of the Saints cited above, they are deliberately omitted.

Fourth. If God predetermined the will to an act of sin, it would follow that he was the author of sin. The inference is proved: he would be the first root and cause of a person’s willing this object here and now, with such an awareness of reason, although the object is contrary to reason. But a person sins only by willing this; therefore God would be the cause of that person’s sinning and, consequently, the author of sin.

They confirm this. As the authors of the opposing opinion admit, God not only willed to permit Judas to sell Christ, but also willed to decree it; indeed, he prewilled and preordained it before he foreknew that Judas would will it. For Judas willed it because God willed him to will it and also made him will it. Therefore that opinion truly makes God the author of sin.

VII. Fifth. It would follow from the same opinion that no divine permission is necessarily required either for God to know that a human being’s sin will occur or for that sin to occur. This consequence is contrary to the Council of Trent at the place cited, where it is stated that God works evil deeds only permissively. Therefore, the inference is proved: whatever follows by necessary consequence and concomitance upon a predetermined act can be foreknown in the predetermination of that same act, with any further permission excluded. But the deformity necessarily accompanies an intrinsically evil act predetermined by God, precisely as it is predetermined. For according to the opposing opinion God by an efficacious motion predetermines the will and makes it consent freely to an act of blasphemy with all its circumstances, which the created will cannot do without sin. Therefore God can infallibly know that a sin will occur through that predetermination alone, with every permission excluded.

Sixth. If God predetermines the will to the act of lying, it follows that in order to lie a person needs prior efficacious aid; consequently, one who lies has greater aid from God than one who does not lie. Thus by that aid God would distinguish the liar from the non-liar, just as by supernatural efficacious aid he distinguishes the person who is converted from the one who persists in sin.

Seventh. From eternity God willed and commanded by his law that no one commit an evil act against reason. But this will cannot coexist with an efficacious will predetermining free choice to an act that must be sin and evil against reason. Therefore, the conclusion follows.

VIII. Eighth. Physical motion, or predetermination, of the will to some act cannot occur without moral motion, which is on the side of the object; rather, it necessarily presupposes moral motion, since nothing is willed unless it is first known. Otherwise, the will would not act in a free and human manner. But God cannot move the will morally by persuading or advising it to perform an act of sin, or even by commanding such an act, since he rather advises and commands that the act not be done. Therefore, he cannot predetermine through efficient causality the created will to that act.

Ninth. Whatever God does pertains either to justice or to mercy, according to Psalm 24: All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth. But inclining and predetermining a person’s will to an act of sin pertains to neither justice, at least in the first sin (for no prior sin has occurred as punishment for which God might incline and predetermine the will to another act of sin), nor to mercy, since by performing an act of sin a person falls into the greatest misery rather than being raised out of it. Therefore, God does not predetermine the created will to such an act.

Tenth. Since God is supreme goodness and first truth, he cannot infuse a habit that by itself inclines the will to an intrinsically evil act or to what is false. Therefore, neither can he infuse an aid predetermining the will to an evil act.

Eleventh. From the contrary opinion it would follow that the hardening or blinding of the sinner consists in the bestowal of some positive aid that efficaciously predetermines the will to evil acts. But this consequence is contrary to the common opinion of the Saints, who teach that God hardens and blinds sinners not positively but negatively: that is, he does not soften or enlighten them, but withdraws his aid from them. This is what St. Augustine teaches in On Predestination and Grace, ch. 34; To Simplician, book 1, q. 2; and City of God, book 20, ch. 19; Euthymius on Psalm 78 and on John 15; John Chrysostom, Homily 6 on John; Jerome, Question 10 to Hedibia; and Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, book 4, ch. 20. Therefore, the conclusion follows, and so on.

IX. Twelfth. A common argument is made: whoever is the efficacious cause of some act is consequently the cause of what follows from that act per se and intrinsically. Therefore, if God is the first cause premoving and predetermining the created will to an intrinsically evil act, namely, an act of blasphemy, then he will consequently be the cause of the moral evil that follows per se from that act; thus he will be the cause of sin in its formal aspect and insofar as it is sin. Yet it is impious and blasphemous to concede this.

This is confirmed. Sin in its formal aspect is something positive, as the authors of the contrary opinion admit. Therefore, if God predetermines the will to an act of sin according to every aspect of positive being that it has, it follows that he predetermines it to the act of sin insofar as it is sin.

X. All the Doctors who defend the necessity of efficacious aid predetermining free choice with respect to the exercise of the act for every good work hold the contrary opinion. For they consequently say that God, as a physical cause, premoves and predetermines the will to an act of sin insofar as it is an act and a being. In our judgment, this is the express opinion of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, as we shall show below.

Therefore, to resolve this difficulty, it must be assumed that sinful acts are of two different kinds. Some are good by their object, or at least are not morally evil by their object, but have evil attached to them through some circumstance—as when someone gives alms for vainglory, or goes out into the field in order to kill an enemy. Other acts are intrinsically so evil that they cannot be performed by the created will without sin, if they are freely produced. Such are acts of blasphemy or hatred of God, lying, and other similar acts, which have moral evil intrinsically attached to them.

XI. Second, it should be noted that, as St. Thomas teaches in Sentences II, d. 37, q. 2, art. 2, at the end of the body, all expressions that signify that God is, absolutely speaking, the cause of sin or moral evil must be avoided and denied.¹¹ Hence he says: Whatever name signifies deformity together with an act, either in general or in particular, cannot simply be said to come from God. Thus one cannot say absolutely that sin is from God, as in the case of murder or something of that sort, except with this qualification: insofar as it is an act and insofar as it is a being. Therefore, expressions signifying that God is the first author and first cause of any entity insofar as it is an act and a being, even if that act otherwise has moral evil attached to it through the failing created will, are to be conceded. For every being by participation, insofar as it is such, must be traced back as to its first cause to being by essence, which is God.

XII. Third, we must presuppose what we said in Disputation 18 concerning God's general concurrence, in Disputation 7 concerning middle knowledge, and what we noted in the two preceding disputations concerning both extrinsic predetermination by God's absolute and efficacious decree and intrinsic predetermination by a motion inhering in created will, by which God predetermines through efficient causality that same will to all good acts in particular, with all their circumstances. From what was said there, it will be clear what must be said about an act of sin insofar as it is an act. But for a fuller explanation and a brief solution of this disputation, let us begin with the clearer points, as follows.

XIII. First conclusion. By his efficacious will God predetermined all good acts by their object that occur in time, and those that are not evil by their object, insofar as they are acts, even though they may otherwise be sins in the individual case because of an evil circumstance.¹² This conclusion is effectively proved by that passage of Isaiah 10: “Assyria is the rod of my fury, and he himself is the staff. I will send him against a deceitful nation, and I will command him against the people of my wrath.” And a little later: “Will the axe boast against him who cuts with it? Or will the saw exalt itself against him who draws it? As if a rod should be lifted against the one who lifts it, or a staff exalt itself, which is only wood?” An argument is drawn from this testimony. Assyria sinned through the evil circumstance of his end, by defeating nations; nevertheless God predetermined that he would lay waste those nations, and sent and moved him to do so. For this reason, as St Thomas observed, he is compared to a rod, staff, and saw: by God's motion he won victories, which he nevertheless arrogantly claimed for himself, as is clear from the course of that same chapter. Therefore, etc.¹³ Isaiah 14 also says: “This is the plan that I have made concerning the whole earth, and this is the hand extended over all nations. For the Lord of hosts has decreed it, and who can weaken it? His hand is extended, and who will turn it back?” From this testimony it is clear that by an eternal decree God predetermines the punishment that he inflicts on sinners in this age by a just judgment, whether he inflicts it immediately by himself or through the ministry of angels or human beings. Yet often the people whose ministry he uses sin through an evil circumstance. Therefore, etc.

This is confirmed by Matthew 10: “Are not two sparrows sold for an as, and not one of them falls to the ground without your Father?” That is, without your Father's providence and will, as the holy Fathers commonly explain this same passage. But it often happens that a person through whose ministry and effort one of the two sparrows falls to the ground sins venially by killing the sparrow—for example, if he does so out of vainglory—and sometimes mortally, as when he kills the sparrow intending to kill an enemy. Therefore, etc.

XIV. It is also proved as follows. The consecration performed by a priest who is in mortal sin, and likewise the absolution given by a confessor who, while in an affection for mortal sin, absolves a penitent, is an evil action and a mortal sin in the individual case because of an evil circumstance, although it is good by its object. Nevertheless, by the efficacious decree of his will God moves and applies the priest and confessor to that action insofar as it is a consecration or absolution.¹⁴ For the consecrating priest and the absolving confessor act as God's instrumental causes; they do not bring it about as principal causes. But it belongs to the nature of an instrument to be premoved and applied by the principal agent. Therefore God premoves and predetermines the will to an action that is good by its object, insofar as it is an action, even though it is otherwise a sin because of an evil circumstance.

XV. Second conclusion. Whatever positive entity is found in any act of sin, even if the act is otherwise intrinsically evil, must be referred to God as the first cause premoving and predetermining the created will by actual motion to such an act insofar as it is an act and according as it is a being.¹⁵ This conclusion is opposed to the authors of the first opinion, but is defended by the authors of the second; Capreolus teaches it in Sentences II, dist. 37, art. 3, ad the second principal argument. Speaking there of the motion by which God determines the created will to an act of sin insofar as it is an act, he says: As regards everything positive that is in an act of the will, the action of the created will is posterior to God’s action in producing each such thing, because no creature acts unless moved by God.¹⁶ He adds: God’s motion does not determine the created will to something evil in itself, but to what is good in itself by its nature, although it is evil with respect to the deformity it has in relation to the secondary cause. The explanation some attribute to Capreolus is not, however, in keeping with his meaning: namely, that he speaks not of prior determination but of a determination made through the very act itself. This explanation resembles the one they attribute to St. Thomas’s words that the created will must be determined by God in order to produce a determinate act, since in itself it is indifferent among many operations. They say that St. Thomas is to be understood not as speaking of a prior motion but of one made through the very act itself. We rejected this explanation above as contrary to the mind of St. Thomas, and we will also refute it below.¹⁷ This explanation of Capreolus must be rejected in the same way. For from his second argument, to which he is replying, it is evident that he is speaking of prior determination and motion. His second argument was as follows: If God concurs in acts of the will, either this is because he follows the determination of the will in that act in such a way that by a priority of nature the will first determines itself to that act, and from this God coacts with the will once determined; or, on the contrary, God first determines himself to act, and our will follows his determination; or they come to this action on equal terms. But none of these ways applies. Not the first, because then God would willingly coact in sin; and the point at issue would also be granted, since in that determining God would not coact with the will and thus would not be the cause of every positive act. Nor can the second way be admitted, because then the will would be determined by God to sin, and thus it would not act from itself but from another; and so the will would not sin, because it would not have from itself what makes it the cause of sin, namely, freedom, for it would be determined from outside. Nor is the third way possible, both because that way would be a matter of chance and because God would willingly coact in sin. He answers this argument with the words cited above, and immediately adds: The other consequence made there is also denied: namely, “The will does not act from itself but from another; therefore it has from another, and not from itself, that it is the cause of evil; and consequently it does not sin.” The reason is that the created will does not sin because it performs that act, but because it performs it in such a way. It has the first from God, but not the second. Capreolus, therefore, speaks of prior determination, not merely of the determination made through the very act or operation of the created will.

XVI. Ferrara defends the same opinion in Against the Gentiles III, ch. 71, near the end, where he teaches that, according to the mind of St. Thomas, the first agent truly moves the secondary cause to perform the entity of the action of sin insofar as it is an action, without acting with respect to its deformity. We cited his words in disputation 18, no. 22. Master Soto teaches the same in On Nature and Grace I, ch. 18, near the end, where he says: Theologians admit that God is the cause of the entity that is sin by the kind of efficient causality by which he premoves all things, animate and inanimate, to their natural actions. Master Cano holds the same, On Theological Places II, ch. 4, ad 7; Master Medina, 1.2, q. 79, art. 2, and q. 109, art. 2; and Master Bañez, 1 p., q. 19, art. 10, dub. 1, after the third foundation, and q. 49, art. 2. Cajetan favors the same opinion in his commentary on 2 Samuel last chapter and in Ientaculum 6, q. 2. Finally, nearly all Thomists, with one or another exception, teach this conclusion, which is plainly the mind of St. Augustine and St. Thomas and is proved as follows:

First, St Augustine, in Book 2 of On Free Choice, chapter 19, poses this very question of ours in these words: “But perhaps you will ask: Since the will is moved when it turns away from the incorruptible good toward a mutable good, where does this motion of it come from? It is certainly evil.” Immediately, answering the question in chapter 20, he says: “Every good is from God; therefore there is no nature that is not from God. Therefore that motion of turning away, which we acknowledge to be sin because it is a deficient motion—every defect, however, is from nothing—see where it belongs, and do not doubt that it belongs to God, although this defect, since it is voluntary, has been placed in our power.” Here St Augustine clearly distinguishes in an act of sin the will's real and physical motion, insofar as it is motion, and teaches that this is from God and belongs to God. The other element is the defect from right reason, which he reduces to the deficient created will alone. The will has this defect because it is liable to fail, since it came from nothing. In Book 5 of Against Julian, chapter 3, he says: “The good wills of human beings, which he himself makes from evil ones, are in God's power; but so too are those that preserve the creature of the world, so that he makes them incline wherever and whenever he wills.” And again he says: God works in the hearts of human beings to incline their wills wherever he wills: toward good by his mercy, or toward evil according to their merits. Here he must be understood to speak of an evil act insofar as it is an act. And, arguing against Julian, he adduces many testimonies of Sacred Scripture to prove that God moves or inclines wills to evil acts insofar as they are acts—especially Isaiah 19: “The Lord has mingled into them a spirit of error”; Isaiah 63: “Why have you made us err, O Lord, from your way? You have hardened our hearts so that we would not fear you”; and Romans 1: “Therefore God gave them over to a reprobate mind,” etc.

XVII. Some reply that it is customary in Sacred Scripture to attribute to God as though he were the maker whatever he permits, especially if he permits it as punishment for that or another sin, or for some particular end and good—not positively and properly, as though he contributed to the effect, but negatively, because he does not prevent it although he could, and permits it. They say that Augustine's words must be understood in this way. But this explanation manifestly conflicts with the context of St Augustine. For in the same chapter 3, refuting Julian, who had assigned this very explanation to the cited words of Sacred Scripture, Augustine says: “But what do you mean when you say that those who are said to have been given over to their desires are to be understood as abandoned by divine patience, not compelled into sins by his power? As if the Apostle had not placed both things together: patience and power, when he says, ‘Thus God, willing to show his wrath and make known his power…’”¹⁸

Second, our opinion is proved by the clearest testimonies of St. Thomas, especially in his Sentences II, d. 37, q. 2, art. 2, where he teaches our opinion most clearly. To make this evident, let us cite the holy Doctor’s words.¹⁹ In the title of the article he asks whether the act of sin, insofar as it is an act, is from God; and in his answer he says: On this question the Master touches upon two opinions. One said that all acts, insofar as they are acts, are from God, but that insofar as they have deformity they are not from God, but from man or the Devil; he discussed the arguments for these opinions above, in distinction 31. The other opinion said that acts of sin are in no way from God, not even insofar as they are acts. This opinion is touched upon in the present distinction, and at present few or none hold it, because it comes very close to two errors. First, it seems to imply that there are several first principles. For it belongs to the notion of a first principle that it can act without the aid and influx of a prior agent. Thus, if the human will could produce some action of which God was not the author, the human will would have the character of a first principle. Although they try to resolve this by saying that even if the will can produce an action by itself, without the influx of a prior agent, it nevertheless does not have existence from itself, but from another—and this too would be required for something to be a first principle—this seems unreasonable: that what does not have existence from itself should be able to act from itself, since what is not from itself cannot even endure by itself. Moreover, every power proceeds from essence, and operation from power. Hence what has its essence from another must also have its power and operation from another. Further, although this answer might avoid making it a first principle simply speaking, it still could not avoid making it a first agent if its action were not traced back to some prior agent as its cause. Second, since the act of sin is also a being—not in the sense in which privations and negations are called beings, but in the sense that things existing in a genus are beings, since actions themselves are also classified in a genus—it would follow that if acts of sin were not from God, some being having an essence would not be from God, and thus God would not be the universal cause of all beings. This is contrary to the perfection of the first being; for the first in any genus is the cause of those that come after, as is said in Metaphysics II.²⁰ Therefore, with the first opinion, it must be said that an act, insofar as it is an act, is from God, and as such has nothing in it that has deformity. How this is so may be considered in this way. In everything where a defect arises from the secondary cause and not from the first cause, whatever there is in the deficient effect of essence and goodness proceeds wholly from the first cause; but the defect is traced back to the deficient secondary cause, as is clear in limping, which comes from the power of locomotion through the tibia: because of the curvature of the tibia, an obliquity remains in the gait of the person who limps. Hence whatever there is in the whole act of walking comes from the power of locomotion, but the defect or obliquity of the gait does not come from that power, but only from the tibia. The order of God to the created will is likewise that of a first cause to a secondary cause; therefore, no defect can arise on God’s part. But a caused will is capable of defect. Therefore, whatever there is in a deficient act—that is, in sin—of the character of act, being, and good, all of this proceeds from the first agent, namely, God, through the will; but the defect that is in the act in this way comes from the will and does not proceed from God. Therefore, whatever name signifies deformity together with an act, either in general or in particular, cannot simply be said to come from God. Thus one cannot say absolutely that sin is from God, as in the case of murder or something of that sort, except with this qualification: insofar as it is an act and insofar as it is a being. By these words he teaches most clearly that the act of sin, insofar as it is an act, is from God as from a prior efficient cause.

XVIII. Nor can St. Thomas be explained as speaking only of simultaneous concurrence, by which God concurs at the same time as the will determining itself in an act of sin insofar as it is an act. For through such concurrence God does not produce the act of sin by means of the will—that is, by giving influx to the will itself as a cause—but immediately together with the will. Yet St. Thomas says that whatever there is in an act of sin belonging to the character of being and goodness proceeds entirely from the first agent, namely, God, by means of the will. He therefore holds that God premoves that same will to produce the act of sin insofar as it is an act. This is clearer still from the reply to the second argument. In answering the argument that is the chief foundation of the opposing opinion—for if God were the cause of the action in which evil or sin consists, he would truly be the cause of sin or would cooperate in sin—he answers that one is said to cooperate in evil who inclines to an action insofar as it is subject to deformity and hence evil; this, however, does not befit God, and so he need not be said to cooperate in evil, although he is the cause of the action in which evil consists, insofar as he gives the agent being, ability, and action, and whatever perfection there is in the agent. Therefore, he is speaking of prior influx. For by simultaneous concurrence God does not give the agent the very act of acting, but immediately gives influx into the action together with free choice determining itself. Yet St. Thomas plainly says that God is the cause of the action in which evil consists according to the way he gives the agent being, ability, and action. When objectors say that it would follow that God should be called the author of evil actions in the same way as he is the author of good ones, he answers in the reply to the third argument of the same article: God is called the cause of good operations not only with respect to the essence of the act, but also with respect to the perfection according to which they are called good; for he gives the agent both things: that it act and that it act well. But in evil actions, although he is their cause with respect to their essence, he is not their cause with respect to their defect. Therefore he is called absolutely the cause of good works, but not of sins. I have chosen to cite all these words of St. Thomas so that it may be clear that the opinion we defend is truly and expressly his, especially since nearly all the arguments modern theologians make against our position were first raised by St. Thomas himself and resolved by precisely the same answers that we, following that same holy Doctor, apply to those arguments. He confirms the same teaching in 1.2, q. 79, art. 2, and q. 3, On Evil, art. 2, especially argument 2, where he speaks expressly of the causality of the act of sin through a prior influx received immediately in free choice. The same is gathered from the reply to the fourth argument. Moreover, in q. 3, On the Power of God, art. 7, in the body and ad 7, and in Against the Gentiles III, ch. 70, and 1 p., q. 105, art. 4, especially in the reply to the third argument, and often elsewhere, he teaches that God moves and applies all secondary causes to perform their operations, just as an artisan moves and applies his instruments to the work of his craft. He therefore holds that God, as first cause, through efficient causality moves, applies, and predetermines the created will to the act of sin insofar as it is an act. For with respect to that act insofar as it is an act, the created will is truly a secondary efficient cause, not a first cause; otherwise two first principles would have to be admitted, which would be to fall into the error of the Manicheans. Moreover, in Quodlibet 12, q. 4, art. 4, he says that all things are predetermined and ordered by God’s providence, as he also asserts in several other places cited in the two preceding disputations. Therefore, the act of sin insofar as it is an act truly proceeds from divine providence and predetermination. Nor can St. Thomas be explained as speaking of a simultaneous motion or determination, for the word “predetermines” signifies a predetermination that precedes.

XIX. Third, the point is proved by St. Thomas’s argument in Sentences II, cited above. Every being by participation must be referred to Being by essence as the first agent simply. But the act of sin, insofar as it is an act, is a being by participation. Therefore, under this aspect it must be referred to Being by essence, namely, to God, as the first agent simply. But by an absolute and efficacious decree of his will God brings about all things that he produces in time, as we said above on the authority of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 25. art. 5. ad 1. Therefore, by an absolute and efficacious decree God determined that the created will would produce the act of sin insofar as it is an act.

They confirm this: from the opposing opinion it would follow that there are several first principles. For it belongs to the nature of a first principle that it can act without the help and influence of a prior agent. Therefore, if the created will could produce some action of which God was not the author, the created will would have the character of a first principle with respect to that action, and thus there would be several first principles.

If it is said that the created will does not have the character of a first principle simply because it does not have being from itself but from another, and that therefore, although it can by itself produce an act of sin without the influence of a prior agent, it does not follow that there are several first principles,²¹ St. Thomas rises against this answer in the cited article 2, refuting it with two arguments, as is clear from the words of the holy Doctor cited above. Hence in Sentences II, to Hannibald, dist. 37, single question, art. 1, in the body, when discussing the question “Whether it must be held that every being is from God,” he answers in these words: It is heretical to say that some being, insofar as it is a being, is not from God; this is contrary not only to the faith but also to reason. He is also speaking of the entity of the act of sin, as is clear from the reply to the third argument of the same article.

XX. Fourth, the chief foundation of the opposing opinion is refuted. From it the authors prove that by a prior motion²² God does not physically predetermine created will to an act of sin insofar as it is an act; for it would follow that God is the cause of sin. But this does not follow. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is proved as follows. As we said in Disputation 18, no. 21, and as the authors of the opposing opinion admit, God concurs through efficient causality by simultaneous help in the being of every act of sin, in particular, insofar as it is an act, without concurring in its deformity.²³ Therefore he also does so by a prior influx that predetermines the will to that same act insofar as it is an act. The consequence is proved: moral evil and the deformity of sin are no less attached to the exercise of an act of hatred of God than to the application and determination of the will to such an act. Therefore, if God immediately produces through efficient causality together with the will the act of hatred of God insofar as it is an act, without concurring in its deformity, he can also premove and predetermine through efficient causality the will to that same act insofar as it is an act without moving and predetermining it to sin or concurring in the moral evil that follows from that act as it proceeds from a deficient will.

This is confirmed. God reaches the act of sin insofar as it is an act more immediately by simultaneous concurrence than by a prior motion. Therefore, if by a simultaneous influx he reaches the act of sin without working toward its deformity, all the more can he bring this about through prior concurrence.

XXI. They reply by denying the consequence and give as the reason for the distinction that God's general concurrence, by which he immediately contributes with created will to an act of sin, is indifferent in itself. But when a human being sins, he abuses that same influx through his malice in order to perform the act of sin. For this reason the moral evil found in such an act must be attributed to created will alone, since, on God's part, he does not provide man with an influx determined to an evil act. By contrast, if God were to predetermine created will through prior help to an act of sin in particular, insofar as it is an act, then, on God's part, he would grant man his concurrence for that determinate act with all its circumstances. Consequently, the moral evil, which is a circumstance that follows such an act as it occurs in the individual case, would be attributed to God, and God would truly be the cause of sin. But this solution rests on a false foundation: for God's general concurrence is not indifferent in itself, as was shown in Disputation 21. Otherwise God's concurrence would be determined by created will and would be posterior to it. Consequently, with respect to some real act insofar as it is an act, created will would be simply the first agent, and thus this causal statement would have to be granted: “Because created will performs such an act insofar as it is a being, God cooperates.” St Thomas effectively proves in the cited passage of Sentences II that this must in no way be granted: for it would follow that two first principles must be posited and that God is not simply the first cause of all things that have being in any way whatsoever.

Moreover, the same solution is refuted. Although God predetermines the will to an act of sin in the individual case, insofar as it is an act, and to all its circumstances insofar as those circumstances have the character of being, he does not predetermine the will to the act of sin or to those circumstances insofar as they have the character of sin or moral evil. For with respect to God these two things can be separated, as is clear from what was said both in this disputation and in Disputation 18, no. 21.

XXII. Fifth, it is proved that God has perfect providence over an act of sin insofar as it is an act, since divine providence extends to everything that in any way has the character of being. Therefore, by the eternal decree of his will he predetermined and ordained such an act to an end insofar as it is an act. The consequence is clear, since providence is the reason for the ordering of means to an end, as St Thomas teaches in Summa theologiae I, q. 22.

Finally, it is proved by all the arguments with which in Disputation 18 we showed God's general concurrence to be an immediate influx into a secondary cause, by which he moves and predetermines it, according to its own nature, to each operation. But by his general concurrence God is the first cause of every action, even a sinful one, insofar as it is an action, as the authors of the opposing opinion admit. Therefore, by that same concurrence, he moves through efficient causality and predetermines created will to such an act insofar as it is an act. All the arguments given in the two preceding disputations to prove that God predetermined all the good acts of created will confirm this very point, for they all apply also to acts of sin insofar as they are acts, since under this consideration they have the character of good.

XXIII. Third conclusion. Absolutely speaking, it must not be conceded that God is the cause of sin or moral evil; nor must it be conceded absolutely that God is the cause of blasphemy, lying, or hatred of God, or that a person needs God’s aid in order to lie. The arguments made at the beginning prove this conclusion effectively, and St. Thomas teaches it in the passage from Sentences II, d. 37, cited above. Theologians do not agree, however, on whether this proposition should be conceded: “God is the cause of sin materially.”²⁴ Some concede it; others deny it, even among those who follow our opinion. It is better, however, to distinguish the senses. If the term “materially” is taken formally, as referring to sin’s formal aspect, the proposition must be denied. For the act derives neither its relation to sin’s formal aspect, nor its grounding of moral evil, nor its subjection to it from God’s causality, but from the defect of the created will. In this sense those theologians can be understood who, although they admit with us that God physically predetermines the created will to good acts, nevertheless deny that he premoves or predetermines it to an act of sin and moral evil, even materially. But if the material aspect of sin is taken absolutely to mean the entity of the act of sin insofar as it is an act, to which evil nevertheless accrues through the defect of the created will, then it can be conceded that God is the cause of what is material in sin, namely, the entity of the act insofar as it is a being, as is clear from the passages of St. Thomas cited. In the same sense, it can also be conceded that God premoves and predetermines the will materially to an act of sin.

XXIV. To the first argument from scriptural authorities, we answer that it proves only the third conclusion: namely, that God does not predetermine the created will to sin, absolutely speaking, nor necessitate it to sin, as the heretics claimed. It does not, however, prove that he does not move or predetermine it to the entity of the act of sin insofar as it is an entity and a certain positive perfection. The Devil is said to tempt a person because he morally inclines him to sin, that is, by persuading him to sin; for he persuades him to the act insofar as it is against God and has the character of guilt, since, as Cajetan says, whatever the Devil does refers virtually to an evil end.²⁵ God does not do this, but moves through efficient causality the will to the positive act of sin insofar as it is a being, because in this respect it is something good.

To the other passage from Ecclesiasticus 15, we answer that God does not lead a person astray;²⁶ for he does not necessitate the person’s will or move it to evil, as was said. To the passage cited from John 6 and Philippians 2, we answer that God is said to draw people to Christ and to work in us the willing and completing of supernatural acts in a special sense, because by a special supernatural aid he moves them not only through efficient causality on the side of the power but also morally on the side of the object, persuading them to come to Christ and act well. As for the positive entity of the act of sin insofar as it is an act, he moves the will only by general concurrence. Moreover, by special efficacious aid he not only influences the will to act, but also to act well and supernaturally; by general concurrence, however, he influences the will to perform the act of sin, but does not bestow upon it the acting badly or defectively, as St. Thomas says in Sentences II, d. 37, q. 2, art. 2, ad 3. Hence the cases are not alike.

XXV. As for what is mentioned in the same argument concerning a person placed in a grave temptation of lust,²⁷ we answer that he can in no way be excused or justly complain against God if he consents to carnal pleasure. For even in the very instant in which God predetermines his will to the act of sin insofar as it is an act, he can nevertheless, speaking absolutely, refuse consent; and he consents freely. Therefore, he must impute the sin, or moral evil that follows upon that act insofar as it proceeds from a deficient will, to himself and not to God.

To the other passage from Hosea, ch. 13, we answer that the motion of God by which the created will is predetermined to the act of sin insofar as it is an action is truly an actual aid of that will, without which the creature will do nothing, in accordance with the words of the Truth: For without me you can do nothing.²⁸ Hence, just as all our aid is from God, so too it proceeds from him, and it is from him that the will determines itself to any action whatsoever, even an act of sin, insofar as it is an action; for in this respect it is good.

XXVI. To the passage from Romans, ch. 9, we answer that the Apostle says only of the reprobate, or vessels of wrath, that he endured them, not that he prepared them, since he did not prepare or predetermine them to evil or sin, absolutely speaking. Nevertheless, this is consistent with his having predetermined them to the act of sin insofar as it is an act.

To the second argument from the authority of the councils, I answer on the basis of what has been said: the councils speak of evil acts formally, or of sins insofar as they are sins.²⁹ For under this aspect they displease God, but not insofar as they are beings. For every being, insofar as it is a being, is good and consequently, under this aspect, cannot displease God or be hated by him. Hence, in every action insofar as it is an action, God is the one who first begins by moving the power. Otherwise, if its causality were not referred to another prior agent, the created will would be simply the first cause of its action. But if we speak of sin itself, or of moral evil absolutely, it must be referred to the created will alone, which by its nature is liable to fail, since it is from nothing. The difference the Council of Trent establishes between good and evil works with respect to divine operation consists in this: God works in us and with us so that we may perform good works, not only insofar as they are acts but also insofar as they are good. God works evil works in us and with us insofar as they are acts, but not insofar as they are evil. St. Thomas established this same distinction earlier in Sentences II, dist. 37, q. 2, art. 2³⁰. There, having objected in the third argument that if God were the cause of evil actions insofar as they are actions proceeding from a power, he should be called the author of evil actions in the same way that he is the author of good ones, he answers in the reply to the third argument that God is called the author and cause of good operations not only with respect to the essence of the act but also with respect to the perfection according to which they are called good. For he gives the agent both things: that it act and that it act well. But in evil actions, although he is their cause with respect to their essence, he is not their cause with respect to their defect; and therefore he is called absolutely the cause of good works, but not of sins.

XXVII. To the confirmation, which objects that the heretics of our time, against whom the Council of Trent speaks, never said that God is the author or cause of sin insofar as it is sin, but instead expressly attribute it under that aspect to created will alone, we reply that the Lutherans and Calvinists sometimes conceded in words that God is not the author of sin, but created will alone, while in reality they held something else, which at times they concealed under ambiguous words.³¹ Thus Pelagius denied in words that grace is given according to our merits, as was shown in Disputation 1, no. 5, by the clearest testimonies of St Augustine; yet in reality he always maintained and held this. Nevertheless, he often used the term “grace,” with this word “allaying odium and avoiding offense,” as that same Augustine says in his book On the Grace of Christ.³²³³ Hence St Jerome, speaking of certain heretics, says: “Thus,” he says, “they temper their words, thus they rearrange their order and compose whatever is ambiguous, so that they may retain both our confession and that of our adversaries, and so that a heretic hears one thing and a Catholic another.”³⁴ And a little later: “‘We believe,’ they say, ‘in the future resurrection of bodies.’ If said rightly, this is a pure confession. But since there are heavenly bodies and earthly bodies, and this air and the light breeze are called bodies according to their nature, they say ‘body’ but not ‘flesh,’ so that the orthodox person, hearing ‘body,’ thinks of flesh, while the heretic recognizes spirit.” Likewise, the Lutherans said in words that sins are not referred to God but to created will, in order to avoid the offense of the expression; in reality, however, they held that God is the author of sin and the cause of a human being's sinning. To make this clear, consider that, as is evident from what was said in Disputation 3, the Lutherans and Calvinists erred chiefly in two respects. Their first error was that God produces evil works in us just as he does good ones, with created will being purely passive. Luther asserted this. Calvin, however, and several others said that a human being is necessitated to sin by God, or by divine providence and predetermination, although he sins willingly, because he actively concurred in sin by his will, though not freely. Thus Calvin says in Book 3 of the Institutes, section 9: “The reprobate wish to be held excusable when they sin, because they cannot escape the necessity of sinning, especially since this necessity is imposed on them by God's ordination.”³⁵ He says the same elsewhere. Zwingli also says in the cited chapter 6: “Man was compelled to sin.” The Council of Trent defines against this error in Session 6, on justification, canon 6³⁶, where it anathematizes anyone who says “that it is not in a person's power to make his ways evil,” clearly showing that people sin not only willingly but also freely, for they are truly free with respect to what is in their power. Their second error was that God is the true cause, not only as efficient cause but also morally, of a human being or angel sinning. In this sense they conceded that God is the author of sin, since he makes people sin; but they added that God does not sin by bringing this about and is not called a sinner because he is not subject to the law. Zwingli said this in Sermon On Providence, chapter 5, where he says: “When God makes an angel or man a transgressor, he himself does not transgress, since he does not violate the law.” And in chapter 6: “One and the same crime, say adultery or homicide, insofar as it is the work of God as author, mover, and instigator, is not a crime; but insofar as it is the work of a human being, it is a crime and wickedness, for he is not bound by the law.” And in the same chapter he says: “What God does, he does freely, being free of every wrongful desire; therefore he does it without sin.” Calvin speaks in the same way in Book 3 of the Institutes, chapter 23, section 8: “He falls,” he says, “as God so ordains by his providence.” And in section 9 he adds: “God does not sin by doing this, because he does it with equity known to himself.” He says the same in his book On the Eternal Predestination of God, page 946. So too Beza in Aphorisms 19 and 31 and in his Response to Sebastian Castellio in Refutation of the Second Calumny, and the other heretics cited in Disputation 3, no. 14. The Council of Trent defines against this error when it condemns anyone who says: “It is not in a person's power to make his ways evil, but that God works evil deeds just as he works good ones, not merely permissively but properly and per se, so that Judas's betrayal is his own work no less than Paul's calling.”³⁷ The Council does not define that an act of sin, or the consent of created will to an evil act, is not from God as the first author insofar as it is an act; indeed, it seems to presuppose the contrary. For if a good act is more from God than an evil one, it follows that an evil act is from God under some aspect, namely, insofar as it is an act, since the comparative presupposes the positive. Nor is it enough to say that an act of sin insofar as it is an act proceeds from God by simultaneous concurrence but not by a prior motion. For, as was shown in Disputation 18, to preserve the causality of the First Cause with respect to all and each individual action, it is not enough to posit this simultaneous concurrence with secondary causes; prior concurrence must also be admitted. When the Council says that God works evil deeds only permissively, not properly and per se, it speaks of them absolutely, or with respect to the moral evil and deformity they possess. These are attributed to deficient created will alone, not only denominatively, since only created will is called sinful, but also through efficient causality. For by predetermining the will to an act of sin insofar as it is an act, God is neither called a sinner nor does he make us sin. In good and meritorious acts, however, although God is not called meritorious, he truly makes us merit and act well, both morally and through efficient causality³⁸ by moving us to act well and merit³⁹.

XXVIII. When it is objected that heretics could not have said God causes or wills evil insofar as it is evil, since even the created will cannot desire it under that aspect, I answer that, as St. Thomas teaches in 1.2, q. 78, art. 1, ad 2, although evil cannot be intended by anyone in itself, it can nevertheless be intended in order to avoid another evil or obtain some good. Thus a lustful person would rather incur God’s offense by sinning than be deprived of pleasure, although, if it could be done, he would wish to enjoy the pleasure without offending God.⁴⁰ Therefore, when the created will sins, it wills the evil of sin secondarily and consequently, because it freely chooses an action to which the evil of sin follows insofar as that action proceeds from the same deficient will. But God neither wills nor causes the evil of fault as a primary end, nor does he will or cause it secondarily and indirectly, as St. Thomas proves in 1.2, q. 79, art. 2. For moral evil does not follow upon the act of sin insofar as it is an act, nor insofar as it proceeds from God, but insofar as it is from a deficient will, as was said in disputation 18, nos. 21 and 22.

XXIX. To the third argument from the authorities of St. Augustine I answer that, in the places cited above, he teaches clearly enough that every action, even a sinful one, insofar as it is an action, must be referred to God as its first author; nor does the holy Doctor say the contrary anywhere. Hence, when he says that an evil will is not from God, and uses similar words, he is speaking of an evil will absolutely, in the sense in which we explained the words of the councils above. In particular, in City of God V, when he says, Evil wills are not from him, because they are contrary to the nature that is from him, he shows as clearly as daylight that he is not speaking of an evil will or action insofar as it is an action, but insofar as it is evil. For insofar as it is an action, or insofar as it is a being, it is not contrary to the nature that is from him; it is contrary to human nature, which is from him, only insofar as it is morally evil.

To the passage from On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins II, I answer that Augustine there wishes to conclude against the Pelagians that God is the cause of right action not only insofar as it is an action but also insofar as it is right and good. This does not apply to evil actions. For although God works them in us and with us insofar as they are actions, he is not their cause insofar as they are evil. From the position of the Pelagians, who assert that God is called the cause of good works only because he gave us free choice by which we can act well, St. Augustine plainly concludes that God would also have to be called the author of evil works, absolutely and formally speaking. For he also gave us free choice by which we can act badly, and without which no one can sin.

XXX. To the passage of Pope Leo I answer that he only denies that God predestined evil works, speaking absolutely, or insofar as they are evil. The same answer applies to the authority of Damascene, about which we said several things in disputation 22, nos. 20 and 21; and the same must be said of the authority of Fulgentius and Prosper.

As for St. Thomas, it is clear from the passages cited in support of our conclusion that he held the same opinion we defend. Nor does he teach the opposite in the cited q. 9 of 1.2; for his words are these: To the third argument it must be said that God moves the human will as a universal mover toward the universal object of the will, which is the good; and without this universal motion a human being cannot will anything. But by reason a human being determines himself to will this or that, which is truly good or only apparently good. Nevertheless, God sometimes moves certain people in a special way to will something determinate that is good, as in those whom he moves through grace, as will be said below.⁴¹ He refers to questions 109 and 111. By these words he intends to teach only three things. First, with respect to the universal object of the will, which is the good, the created will does not move itself by deliberation but is moved by God alone, who gave it its natural inclination toward the good. Second, a human being determines himself by reason to will this or that, which is truly good or apparently good. Consequently, it happens through a free determination of the created will that in some actions a person is moved toward evil and sins, namely, when he desires what is not truly good but only apparently good. Yet it does not follow from this that the created will is not determined by God to the act of sin insofar as it is an act. Just as it does not follow from the fact that the will determines or moves itself to a determinate good that it is not moved or predetermined by God, as is clear from what was said in disputations 22 and 23. On the contrary, the opposite follows from St. Thomas’s first statement. For since God moves the human will as a universal mover toward the universal object of the will, which is the good, it clearly follows that God, as universal mover, moves the human will to the action of sin insofar as it is a being, because insofar as it is such, it is good. St. Thomas’s third statement is that God moves some people in a special way through grace to will something determinate. It does not follow from this, however, that he does not move the will by general concurrence to will determinately every other action; it follows only that he does not move it in a special way, as when he moves his own through grace. Thus, according to the mind of St. Thomas, with respect to the universal good the will does not move itself morally by deliberation but is moved by God, because deliberation is not about the end but about the means, as is election, as St. Thomas teaches in 1.2, q. 13, art. 3. With respect to a particular good, however, the will both moves itself and is moved by God, for it is a moved mover. Yet with respect to a supernatural good it is moved in a special way by God through the helps of divine grace, as was said above.

XXXI. To the fourth argument, we deny that it follows from our opinion that God is the author of sin. For although God is the first source and cause of the fact that a person here and now, with such awareness of reason, has a volition concerning this object contrary to reason—insofar as the volition is an action—he is not the cause of the person’s willing that object defectively; this kind of defect must be attributed solely to the created will. A person does not sin simply because he wills that object, but because he wills defectively. Hence, as St. Thomas says in Sentences II, d. 37, q. 2, art. 2, ad 3, God is indeed the cause of the will’s acting, but is not the cause of its acting defectively and sinning, because he is not the cause of the act of sin insofar as it turns away from the rule of reason, nor insofar as it is the foundation of turning away from God himself; consequently, he is not the author of sin. We have said more about this argument in dispute 18, nos. 21 and 22.

To the confirmation, we answer that God did not will, prewill, or preordain that Judas should betray Christ, absolutely speaking, but only with a qualification: namely, considering that action insofar as it was an action, and under the aspect of being that it had. Under this aspect the following causal statement may be conceded: “Judas willed that action insofar as it was an action because God willed that he will it insofar as it is a being.” Nevertheless, God does not thereby become the author of sin, because moral evil does not follow upon that action insofar as it is an action, but insofar as it is deficient from the rule of reason, as was said in dispute 18, no. 21.

To the fifth argument, we deny the consequence. In answer to its proof, we answer that God did indeed predetermine the created will to the action of sin insofar as it is an action, and to all its circumstances insofar as those circumstances have the character of being, but not insofar as they have moral evil attached to them. Therefore, for a sin to be future, and for God to know with certainty and infallibly that it will be future, beyond the predetermination of the act of sin, God’s permission of its evil is necessarily required, as was said in dispute 11, no. 3.

XXXII. To the sixth argument, we answer that “to lie” signifies an act together with deformity, as does “murder”; hence a person does not need prior aid in order to lie, nor is the liar distinguished from the non-liar by that aid, but by his own malice. We nevertheless admit that one who produces an act of lying, insofar as it is an act, has some actual prior aid of God, or prior concurrence (let there be no dispute over the word), which another person who does not produce such an act, insofar as it is an act, does not have—just as the authors of the contrary opinion are bound to concede this in the case of God’s simultaneous concurrence. Nor is it unreasonable to concede that God distinguishes one who produces the act of lying, insofar as it is an act, from one who does not produce such an act, insofar as it is an act, by actual aid. For insofar as it is sin, the sinner is distinguished from the one who stands firm by his own fault or malice.

To the seventh argument, we answer that by his antecedent will, which is the will of sign, God willed from eternity that no one should sin. Nevertheless, an efficacious will also coexists in God, by which he predetermined that some would produce an act of sin insofar as it is an act. For these two wills are not in conflict, but rather agree with each other, just as it is not contradictory for a judge to will that a person live insofar as he is a human being and to put him to death insofar as he is a criminal.

XXXIII. To the eighth argument, we answer that physical motion of the will presupposes moral motion, but moral motion need not always come from the same agent.⁴² For the Devil moves the will morally toward an act of sin by persuading and advising that act, yet cannot move it through efficient causality, as St. Thomas teaches in De malo q. 3, art. 3, in the body. Hence it does not follow that God moves morally toward the act of sin insofar as it is an act.

Second, we answer that, as St. Thomas teaches in Sentences II, To Hannibald, d. 37, q. un., art. 1, ad 3, not only the act of sin but also the very thought by which a person thinks of carrying out an act of sin is from God insofar as it is an act. He proves this from 2 Corinthians 3: We are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as if from ourselves.

To the ninth argument, we answer that, as St. Thomas says, 1. p. q. 21. ar. 4. in the body, it is necessary that mercy and truth, or justice, be found in every work of God, provided that mercy is taken to mean the removal of any defect whatsoever, although not every defect can properly be called misery, but only a defect of rational nature, which can be happy.⁴³ Justice, in turn, is found insofar as whatever God does in created things, he does according to a fitting order and proportion, in which the character of justice consists; and thus justice must be in every work of God. On this basis, it must be said that moving and predetermining a person’s will to an act of sin insofar as it is an act pertains to God’s mercy, since through that motion he reduces the power to second act and frees it from a certain defect, namely, its lack of second act and its being in potency to that act. For everything in potency, insofar as it is such, implies a certain imperfection, since it thereby falls short of the perfection of God, who is pure act. Likewise, such motion and predetermination to an act of sin insofar as it is an act pertains to justice, insofar as God performs it according to a manner fitting to his wisdom and goodness, and according to the mode of a rational creature, which consists in freedom. Moreover, in sinful acts that presuppose another sin, divine justice appears in a certain special way, insofar as, as punishment for a prior sin, the created will is predetermined to such an act of sin insofar as it is an act, and is permitted to fall into a new sin.

XXXIV. To the tenth argument, we deny the consequence. The reason for the distinction is that a vicious habit inclines one to act badly, as St. Thomas teaches in Summa theologiae I, q. 83, art. 2, in the body, and Aristotle in Ethics II, ch. 6, and Metaphysics V, text 25. But God cannot immediately cause in us something that inclines us to evil, since that very evil and defect would then be from God.⁴⁴ On the other hand, God’s actual aid is necessary even for the entity of the action itself insofar as it is an action, in accordance with John 15: For without me you can do nothing. Hence God can properly provide immediate actual aid for producing the entity of an act of sin insofar as it is an act, without cooperating in its deformity.

XXXV. To the eleventh argument we reply that God is said to harden and blind sinners in several ways, as we noted in our commentary on Isaiah, chapter 6, no. 48 and the following two numbers.⁴⁵ First, negatively and permissively, namely, because as punishment for their previous sins he does not soften or enlighten them, as the Doctors cited in the argument explain. In a second way, God is said to harden and blind some people not only negatively, because he does not soften or enlighten them, but also positively, though indirectly, as St Thomas explains in his commentary on Romans, chapter 9, on the words, “For this very purpose I raised you up, etc.” Namely, as a just judge he uses the ministry of the Devil to punish the reprobate with the penalty of blindness, in keeping with Psalm 77, “Missions through evil angels.” So teach Augustine, The City of God XX, chapter 19; Chrysostom, Homily 67 on John and Homily 8 on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians; Origen, Homily 2 on the Book of Judges; Gregory, Moralia XXV, chapters 12 and 13, on Job 34, “He brings on night, and they are crushed,” and Homily 11 on Ezekiel; and John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith IV, chapter 20. Third, God is said to harden and blind sinners positively because he inclines their wills to evil by furnishing an occasion, by proposing inwardly and outwardly to sinners certain things that in themselves lead to good, but which sinners, through their own malice, turn to their own evil. In this way the Lord himself, speaking to the children of Israel, says: “I will provoke you to jealousy by a non-nation, by a foolish nation I will anger you.”⁴⁶⁴⁷⁴⁸ This is to be taken as occurring by occasion: for the mercy bestowed on the Gentiles, which in itself led to good, became for the Jews an occasion of envy. The statement in Wisdom 14 must be understood in the same sense: “For the creatures of God became hateful, and a temptation to the souls of men, and a snare to the feet of the foolish.” For the foolish, through their own malice, take occasion to sin from the very creatures that show the wisdom, omnipotence, and goodness of their Creator. In this same way, then, God is said to blind and harden sinners, as Augustine teaches in Question 10 on Exodus, in On Grace and Free Choice, chapters 20 and 21, and on Psalm 104, on the words: “He turned their heart to hate his people and to deal craftily with his servants.” Yet one must not therefore think that sinners hardened by God do not harden themselves or do not persist freely in their sins. Both things are entirely true: God hardens certain sinners, and they freely harden themselves. St Augustine noted this in On Grace and Free Choice, chapter 23, in these words: “Do not therefore take free choice away from Pharaoh because in many places God says, ‘I hardened Pharaoh,’ or ‘I hardened’ or ‘I will harden Pharaoh's heart.’ For this does not mean that Pharaoh himself did not harden his heart. For this too is read of him: when the dog-fly was taken away from the Egyptians, Sacred Scripture says, ‘And Pharaoh hardened his heart, and at that time he was unwilling to let the people go.’ Accordingly, God hardened him by a just judgment, and Pharaoh himself hardened his heart by free choice.” Therefore, whenever God hardens some people as punishment for previous sins, whether negatively or positively, he does so in the ways explained, permitting them to sin and moving them by actual motion to an act of sin insofar as it is an act. For, as St Thomas attests in Summa theologiae I–II, q. 109, a. 9, body, “no created thing can proceed to any act whatsoever except by the power of divine motion.” The Truth himself also attests this clearly when he says: “For without me you can do nothing.”⁴⁹

XXXXI. To the twelfth argument I answer that this same argument was proposed and answered in disputation 18, nos. 21 and 22. But because the authors of the opposing opinion press it so often, it must also be refuted often. For, as Prosper says, It is necessary and useful to write even what has already been written, lest what is not often argued be thought insignificant.⁵⁰ Julian raised a similar argument against St. Augustine to prove that original sin is not present in little children. He argued as follows: God is the universal cause of a human being; therefore, if original sin follows upon such generation, God will be the cause of original sin, for whoever is the cause of something is also the cause of what follows upon it. Hence, in his reply to the articles falsely attributed to him, Augustine writes: This, he says, is the emptiness of the objection from that school in which human nature is defended as free from Adam’s sin and unharmed, so that, because we assert that all human beings are born guilty of transgression and liable to damnation, and will perish unless they are reborn in Christ, we seem to say that the one we profess to be the creator of nature is the same one we call the author of guilt. We utterly reject this from our way of thinking, for we know God to be just and good, the creator of human substance and of the inner and outer senses;⁵¹⁵² so that⁵³ whatever pertains to nature is wholly from him, and whatever is contrary to nature is wholly not from him. But sin is contrary to nature, and from it death and all that belongs to death arise. Therefore, St. Augustine answers the argument in Against Julian III, ch. 9, by saying that original sin does not follow upon the generation of a human being according to his nature, insofar as it is human generation, but insofar as it expresses a relation to the first parent, who sinned voluntarily.⁵⁴ For if Adam had persevered in the state of innocence, there would have been true human generation without original sin following upon it. Thus original sin is not from God, who concurs in and moves the generation of a human being, but from the first parent, who stained the whole of human nature by his disobedience. This will be treated in disputation 44. By analogy we say of actual sin that the deformity of sin, or moral evil, does not follow intrinsically and by the nature of the thing upon the act of blasphemy or hatred of God insofar as it is an act, nor insofar as it is a being in the order of nature, even as an individual; it follows only insofar as the act proceeds from a deficient created will. Hence moral evil and the defect of sin must be referred to the deficient will, not to God. This is the solution of St. Thomas, q. 3, On Evil, art. 2, ad 2, and Sentences II, dist. 37, q. 2, art. 2, ad 2, which Capreolus discusses more fully in Sentences II, dist. 37, art. 3, at the beginning. His words are these: One must consider that a privation or condition can follow upon an act in two ways. First, it may follow from the very essence and nature of the act considered in itself and absolutely; for example, the privation of integrity and the experience of venereal pleasure follow and accompany by its nature the act of fornication. In another way, a privation may follow upon and accompany an act not from the act’s own nature and essence considered in itself—that is, insofar as it regards the object from which it receives its species in the order of nature—but insofar as the act is performed by a particular agent. For example, the privation of order and rectitude accompanies the act of fornication insofar as it is performed by an agent who, in doing such an act, departs from his rule and law; it does so not insofar as the act is considered in the order of nature but in the moral order. It is then said that whatever produces an act produces or causes every privation or property that follows upon the act in the first way; but it need not be the cause of a privation that follows upon the act in the second way. Deformity follows upon an act of sin in that second way, not the first. Therefore God can cause whatever is absolute and positive in the act of sin without causing the deformity that follows upon the act. Capreolus asserts that this is St. Thomas’s solution in the cited q. 3, On Evil, which we have also developed in disputation 18, nos. 21 and 22.

By this the final argument made in the preceding disputation remains answered. For we say that even for evil acts, insofar as they are acts, actual help is required beforehand to predetermine the created will to such acts in every respect of their entity.

XXXVII. But since some of the Thomists (though few) hold that by an actual motion God does not premove or predetermine the created will to an act of sin, even insofar as it is an act, we answer that argument a second time as follows. Even if it were granted—but not conceded—that God does not premove or predetermine our will to evil acts insofar as they are acts, one may not infer from this, as some do, that he does not predetermine it to supernatural good acts, especially those by which the predestined attain eternal life.⁵⁵ The reason for the distinction is that, as St. Thomas teaches in Summa theologiae I–II, q. 109, art. 9, in the body, even one who has already attained grace needs divine aid by which God moves him to act rightly, for two reasons. First, for a general reason: no created thing can proceed to any act whatsoever except by the power of the divine motion. Second, for a special reason, owing to the condition of the state of human nature. Although grace heals the mind, corruption and infection remain in the flesh, through which it is subject to the law of sin, as is said in Romans 7. A certain obscurity of ignorance also remains in the intellect, by reason of which we do not know what we ought to pray for as we should.⁵⁶ Thus, in this present state, a person does not perfectly participate in grace itself, as he explains in his answer to the second objection⁵⁷: It is clear that anything that perfectly possesses some nature, form, or power can act by itself according to it, though not to the exclusion of God’s operation, since God works inwardly in every nature and will. But what imperfectly possesses some nature, form, or power cannot act by itself unless it is moved by another: thus the sun, because it is perfectly luminous, can illuminate by itself; but the moon, in which the nature of light is imperfect, does not illuminate unless it has been illuminated. A physician, too, who perfectly knows the art of medicine can act by himself, but his student, who is not fully instructed, cannot act by himself unless he is instructed by the physician. Therefore, since in the present state intellectual nature participates imperfectly in supernatural forms, because it does not possess them fully, in accordance with the Apostle’s words, For we know in part and we prophesy in part,⁵⁸ it needs divine motion for this special reason, in order to act according to such forms. Hence, even if one granted that God’s prior motion is not necessary for an act of sin insofar as it is an act, because of the first reason, namely, the essential subordination to the first agent, it would still have to be asserted, on account of the second reason, that this motion is necessary for good acts, especially supernatural ones, which are chiefly the subject of our dispute.